Copilot review on #22004: the Log/LogAttrs test cases didn't pass any
variadic args/attrs, so the Argument[..3] portion of the sink range was
untested. Pass an ...any arg to slog.Log/Logger.Log and a slog.Attr to
slog.LogAttrs/Logger.LogAttrs, with inline expectations asserting they're
captured as logged components.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The standard-library structured logger `log/slog` (Go 1.21+) was not
modeled, so `go/log-injection` and `go/clear-text-logging` were blind to
any code that logs through it.
Model its logging functions and `*slog.Logger` methods — `Debug`, `Info`,
`Warn`, `Error`, their `Context` variants, and `Log`/`LogAttrs` — as
`log-injection` sinks (the kind that feeds `LoggerCall`, powering both
queries). Adds `log/slog` cases to the `LoggerCall` library test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2. Add annotations for sources
2. Fix a modelling issue in the openai library - missing coverage for a legacy method when moving to MaDs and a mistake in the assistants.create models
ASP.NET Core Razor Page handler method parameters (OnGet, OnPost, etc.)
were not modeled as remote flow sources, causing security queries like
SQL injection to miss vulnerabilities in PageModel subclasses.
This adds AspNetCorePageHandlerMethodParameter, analogous to the existing
AspNetCoreActionMethodParameter for MVC controllers, using the existing
PageModelClass.getAHandlerMethod() from Razor.qll.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Update the alert message to "This system prompt depends on a $@." matching the SQL injection query style, and move the test out of experimental into Security/CWE-1427 to mirror the stable query location.
Move UserPromptInjection out of experimental into stable JavaScript security locations.
Set js/user-prompt-injection precision to low and remove experimental tagging.
Move supporting dataflow libraries, qhelp/examples, and tests to stable paths and update references.
Fix the JS integration test failure flagged in review by listing the new
experimental CWE-918 query in the expected not-included-in-qls suite, in
sorted order.
It was the number of result declarations, which is
different from the number of results when one
result declaration declares more than one
variable, as in `x, y int`.
Add javascript/ssrf-ipv6-transition-incomplete-guard, an experimental
@kind problem query that flags hand-rolled SSRF host guards which reject
private/loopback IPv4 ranges but never unwrap IPv6-transition forms
(IPv4-mapped ::ffff:, NAT64 64:ff9b::, 6to4 2002::). Such guards can be
bypassed by wrapping an internal IPv4 address in a transition literal.
Includes a .qhelp with good/bad examples, a change note, and a test pack
with two true-positive fixtures (private-ip package guard and a
hand-written RFC 1918 denylist) and two negative-control fixtures
(ipaddr.js range classifier and an explicit ::ffff: unwrap).
Signed-off-by: tonghuaroot <23011166+tonghuaroot@users.noreply.github.com>
A deferred Close runs at function exit, but the CFG splices it in at the exit node where it can be reached along paths that never execute Sync. The previous dominance check therefore produced a false positive when a statement followed the if-block that registered the defer (e.g. deferredCloseWithSync2). For deferred closes, require instead that a handled Sync post-dominates the point where the defer is registered, which guarantees Sync runs before Close on every path on which Close is registered. Non-deferred closes keep the existing dominance check.
Correct the doc for unhandledCall (it also matches expression statements where the result is discarded) and remove a stale commented-out line in isWritableFileHandle.
There are paths to the exit of the function which go through the defer
statement and paths which don't, so we add an optional call to the
deferred function. This causes FPs in the query as it stands.
The internal predicates that identify `@staticmethod`, `@classmethod` and
`@property` decorators previously required the decorator's `NameNode` to
satisfy `isGlobal()` (i.e. no SSA def reaches the decorator's name use).
That filter was correct but unnecessarily indirect: these three names
are builtins, and even when a class body redefines one, the class body
has not started executing at the decorator position, so Python uses the
builtin.
Match the decorator's AST `Name` directly instead, dropping the CFG/SSA
detour. The slight semantic change — `isGlobal()` would have rejected
module-level shadowing of these builtins — is negligible in practice
and explicitly documented in the change note.
`hasContextmanagerDecorator` and `hasOverloadDecorator` keep the
`NameNode.isGlobal()` check because their target names (`contextmanager`,
`overload`) are imported, not builtin, and local shadowing is a real
concern.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Add FieldCardinality to Schema to track required/multiple per field,
populated from the ast_types.yml suffixes (bare = required single,
? = optional single, + = required multiple, * = optional multiple).
dump_ast_with_type_errors now emits:
<-- ERROR: missing required field 'name'
for any node in the output AST whose declared schema requires a field
that is absent from the actual node.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
When a {..expr} splice in an output template is empty (e.g. from an
optional capture that did not match), drop the field entirely rather
than emitting an empty named field. This lets a single rule with
optional captures replace what used to be two near-identical rules.
Also re-renders the corpus to drop the now-suppressed empty fields.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
We now find an alert on this line as we hope to
It is not an alert for _full_ SSRF, though, since that configuration cannot handle multiple substitutions.
- remove `tupleStoreStep` and `dictStoreStep` from `containerStep`
These are imprecise compared to the content being precise.
- add implicit reads to recover taint at sinks
- add implicit read steps for decoders
to supplement the `AdditionalTaintStep`
that now only covers when the full container is tainted.
- Use BUILD_REPO/DIST_REPO split so zip contains only runtime deps
(build-lifecycle plugins, test jars, etc. stay in throwaway BUILD_REPO)
- Minimal inline stub pom.xml (no deps) instead of archetype:generate
to avoid polluting DIST_REPO with stub project's own dependencies
- Replace grep -oP (PCRE, unavailable on macOS BSD grep) with Python re
- Use version-aware Python version_key() for max POM version selection
(lexicographic sort fails for e.g. 2.18.10 vs 2.18.6; release > snapshot)
- Write zip to caller's working directory; keep cleanup trap active;
remove `trap - EXIT` which was leaving WORK_DIR behind
Same as in the preceding commit, these items do not make sense as
separate fields on the parent node, so we materialise (or create new)
intermediate nodes to group them together.
The field representation would have made it difficult to figure out
which parameters correspond to which default values and attributes, so
instead we now encapsulate these in a new `function_parameter` node.
Introduces (by making it named) a `block` node, and conversely makes
`statements` anonymous. This enables us to sensibly distinguish between
the "then" and "else" branch of an `if_statement`, which we were not
able to previously.
Move OpenAI, Anthropic, Google GenAI, and LangChain sinks that are
structurally typed (identified by API name alone) into MaD YAML files.
Role-filtered sinks that require inspecting a sibling 'role' property
remain in QL code since MaD cannot express conditional logic.
Use two distinct sink kinds:
- user-prompt-injection: picked up by UserPromptInjection.ql
- system-prompt-injection: picked up by SystemPromptInjection.ql
New files:
- javascript/ql/lib/ext/openai.model.yml
- javascript/ql/lib/ext/anthropic.model.yml
- javascript/ql/lib/ext/google-genai.model.yml
- javascript/ql/lib/ext/langchain.model.yml
The output is not so interesting as the mapping removes most nodes from the current test file.
I added a name_expr.swift test so at least one NameExpr makes it through.
ast_types.yml additions:
- tuple_pattern { element*: pattern } in the pattern supertype.
- sequence_condition { stmt*: stmt, condition: condition } in the
condition supertype.
swift.rs:
- Map Swift tuple destructuring (e.g. `let (a, b) = pair`) to the new
tuple_pattern instead of synthesizing an apply_pattern.
- if-let / guard-let: explicitly match the value_binding_pattern
(the `let` keyword) and bind the source expression as the next
condition child, so `let` no longer leaks into the output.
Two changes to parse_query_fields:
- Allow `field: (kind)* @cap` (repetition + optional capture) in field
position, mirroring how it works for bare children.
- When the same field name is declared multiple times in a query (e.g.
`condition: (foo) condition: (bar)`), merge them into a single
ordered list of children rather than emitting duplicate field
entries (which at runtime restart the iterator for the field and
cause the second declaration to re-match from the first child).
Introduce NodeRef as a typed wrapper around node arena IDs. Captures in
desugaring rules are now bound as NodeRef instead of raw usize, which
prevents accidental misuse and enables source-text-aware rendering.
Add the YeastDisplay trait as an alternative to Display: its
yeast_to_string method receives the Ast, allowing NodeRef to resolve to
the captured node's source text instead of printing a numeric ID.
Store the original source bytes in the Ast so that NodeContent::Range
values (from synthesized literal nodes) can be resolved back to text.
Update yeast-macros to emit NodeRef-typed capture bindings and use
Into::<usize>::into where raw IDs are needed. The #{expr} template
syntax now uses YeastDisplay instead of Display.
The effect is visible in the corpus tests: operator nodes now correctly
render as e.g. operator "+" instead of operator "3".
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Add corpus test cases for Swift covering closures, collections, control
flow, functions, literals, loops, operators, optionals/errors, types,
and variables. Update existing desugar.txt with raw parse sections.
Note: operator nodes currently render their node ID instead of the actual
operator text (e.g. operator "3" instead of operator "+"). This will be
fixed in the next commit.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Add ast_types.yml defining the unified output AST schema with supertypes
(expr, stmt, condition, pattern) and named nodes (top_level, binary_expr,
name_expr, etc.).
Rewrite swift translation rules to map from tree-sitter Swift grammar to
the unified AST, using one-shot phase rules.
Update the generator to use the output AST schema for dbscheme/QL
generation, and normalize the extraction table prefix to 'unified'.
Improve the corpus test framework to include raw tree-sitter parse output,
type-error checking against the output schema, and better failure
reporting.
Regenerate Ast.qll, unified.dbscheme, and update BasicTest accordingly.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
One-shot desugaring rules now skip unnamed nodes (punctuation, keywords,
etc.) since rules are intended to target named nodes only.
Also prevent infinite recursion when a capture refers to the root node of
the matched tree (e.g. an @_ capture on the pattern root).
Additionally fix the swift.rs add_phase call to match the updated 3-arg
signature introduced by the one-shot phase kind commit.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Diagnostic `Location.file` fields contained absolute filesystem paths,
causing the GitHub UI to generate broken file links with runner paths
like `/home/runner/work/...`. Now paths are relativized against the
source root (`LGTM_SRC` or cwd), falling back to absolute if the file
is outside the source root.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Canonicalize `current_dir()` to match canonicalized file paths (avoids
`\\?\` prefix mismatch on Windows), and normalize backslashes to
forward slashes in relative diagnostic paths.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Drop the `url` crate dependency. When a path can't be relativized
against the source root, emit it as a bare absolute path and let the
CLI's SARIF generator handle URI conversion downstream.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Diagnostic `location.file` entries were using absolute paths (e.g.
`/home/runner/work/...`), causing broken links in the GitHub UI.
Now relativize against CWD (the source root during extraction), falling
back to a properly percent-encoded `file:` URI for paths outside it.
Fixes https://github.com/github/codeql/issues/21802
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
This named node (which is in fact emitted by the scanner as an
`external`) was appearing as a child of `class_body` because of inlining
via `_class_member_separator`. This, in itself, appears to be somewhat
of a hack, to handle cases where a multiline comment signals the end of
a class member.
To fix this, we make the external node _unnamed_, but keep the `extras`
node _named_ (so we can still extract it from the parse tree), and we
add a new rule `multiline_comment` that mediates between the two. That
way, the use inside `_class_member_separator` can use the unnamed
variant, and no node is pushed into $children.
Doing this involved materialising a lot of previously anonymous nodes,
and I'm not entirely sure it's the best solution, but the node types
look decent enough.
Not entirely happy about the mixed nature of the `kind` filed (having
both tokens and the named node `throw_keyword` in there), but that's a
problem for a different time.
Some nodes with a single child (arguably redundant to do, but I think
it's nice to have the types be consistent), and also an instance of
ensuring that all branches of a `choice` expose consistent field names.
A lot of changes, but for the most part these are just adding named
fields in places where they make sense.
After this, there are still ~20 instances of unnamed children appearing.
I ended up also aliasing `_async_keyword` to a named node to make it
more consistent with the other node kinds that can be in this field (as
it would be awkward to have two named types and a token here).
Elsewhere in the node types, we'll still have `async?: "async"`, and I
think that's okay.
Part 1 of N of "getting rid of $children" in node-types.yml
Note: in one of the cases the affected node still has the $children
field present. This is because there's some weirdness about recording
multiline comments as class member separators that I did not want to
figure out how to address right now.
This one is potentially a bit iffy -- it checks for a very powerful
property (that implies many of the other queries), but as the test
results show, it can produce false positives when there is in fact no
problem. We may want to get rid of it entirely, if it becomes too noisy.
This looks for nodes annotated with `t[never]` in the test that are
reachable in the CFG. This should not happen (it messes with various
queries, e.g. the "mixed returns" query), but the test shows that in a
few particular cases (involving the `match` statement where all cases
contain `return`s), we _do_ have reachable nodes that shouldn't be.
This one demonstrates a bug in the current CFG. In a dictionary
comprehension `{k: v for k, v in d.items()}`, we evaluate the value
before the key, which is incorrect. (A fix for this bug has been
implemented in a separate PR.)
These use the annotated, self-verifying test files to check various
consistency requirements.
Some of these may be expressing the same thing in different ways, but
it's fairly cheap to keep them around, so I have not attempted to
produce a minimal set of queries for this.
These tests consist of various Python constructions (hopefully a
somewhat comprehensive set) with specific timestamp annotations
scattered throughout. When the tests are run using the Python 3
interpreter, these annotations are checked and compared to the "current
timestamp" to see that they are in agreement. This is what makes the
tests "self-validating".
There are a few different kinds of annotations: the basic `t[4]` style
(meaning this is executed at timestamp 4), the `t[dead(4)]` variant
(meaning this _would_ happen at timestamp 4, but it is in a dead
branch), and `t[never]` (meaning this is never executed at all).
In addition to this, there is a query, MissingAnnotations, which checks
whether we have applied these annotations maximally. Many expression
nodes are not actually annotatable, so there is a sizeable list of
excluded nodes for that query.
Add the 'Publish data extension files in a CodeQL model pack to share'
section, matching the structure used in C#, C++, Go, and Java docs.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Add barrierModel and barrierGuardModel sections to the Rust library
models documentation, following the pattern established in PR #21523
for other languages.
Includes:
- New extensible predicate descriptions in the overview
- Example: barrier for SQL injection using escape_sql
- Example: barrier guard for path injection using is_safe_path
- Reference material for both barrierModel and barrierGuardModel
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Add documentation for customizing library models for Rust using data
extension files. This follows the pattern of existing documentation for
other languages (Java, Python, Ruby, Go, C#, C++, JavaScript).
The documentation covers:
- Rust-specific extensible predicates (sourceModel, sinkModel,
summaryModel, neutralModel) with their simplified schema
- Canonical path syntax for identifying Rust functions and methods
- Examples using real models from the codebase (sqlx, reqwest,
std::env, std::path, Iterator::map)
- Access path token reference (Argument, Parameter, ReturnValue,
Element, Field, Reference, Future)
- Source and sink kind reference
- Threat model integration
Also updates codeql-for-rust.rst to include the new page in the
toctree.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
if ! sed -i "s/var maxGoVersion = util\.NewSemVer(\"$CURRENT_MAJOR_MINOR_ESCAPED\")/var maxGoVersion = util.NewSemVer(\"$LATEST_MAJOR_MINOR\")/" go/extractor/autobuilder/build-environment.go; then
echo "Warning: Failed to update build-environment.go"
fi
# Update go/actions/test/action.yml
if ! sed -i "s/default: \"~$CURRENT_VERSION_ESCAPED\"/default: \"~$LATEST_VERSION_NUM\"/" go/actions/test/action.yml; then
This PR was automatically created by the [Go version update workflow](https://github.com/${{ github.repository }}/blob/main/.github/workflows/go-version-update.yml).
EOF
)
if [ "${{ steps.check-pr.outputs.pr_exists }}" = "true" ]; then
* The GitHub Actions analysis now recognizes more Bash regex checks that restrict a value to alphanumeric characters, including regexes like `^[0-9a-zA-Z]{40}([0-9a-zA-Z]{24})?$` which check for a SHA-1 or SHA-256 hash. This may reduce false positive results where command output is validated with grouped or optional alphanumeric patterns before being used.
## 0.4.36
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Altered 2 patterns in the `poisonable_steps` modelling. Extra sinks are detected in the following cases: scripts executed via python modules and `go run` in directories are detected as potential mechanisms of injection. For the go execution pattern, the pattern is updated to now ignore flags that occur between go and the specific command. This change may lead to more results being detected by the following queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/critical`, `actions/cache-poisoning/poisonable-step`, `actions/cache-poisoning/direct-cache` and `actions/artifact-poisoning/path-traversal`.
* Altered 2 patterns in the `poisonable_steps` modelling. Extra sinks are detected in the following cases: scripts executed via python modules and `go run` in directories are detected as potential mechanisms of injection. For the go execution pattern, the pattern is updated to now ignore flags that occur between go and the specific command. This change may lead to more results being detected by the following queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/critical`, `actions/cache-poisoning/poisonable-step`, `actions/cache-poisoning/direct-cache` and `actions/artifact-poisoning/path-traversal`.
## 0.4.36
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Altered 2 patterns in the `poisonable_steps` modelling. Extra sinks are detected in the following cases: scripts executed via python modules and `go run` in directories are detected as potential mechanisms of injection. For the go execution pattern, the pattern is updated to now ignore flags that occur between go and the specific command. This change may lead to more results being detected by the following queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/critical`, `actions/cache-poisoning/poisonable-step`, `actions/cache-poisoning/direct-cache` and `actions/artifact-poisoning/path-traversal`.
* The GitHub Actions analysis now recognizes more Bash regex checks that restrict a value to alphanumeric characters, including regexes like `^[0-9a-zA-Z]{40}([0-9a-zA-Z]{24})?$` which check for a SHA-1 or SHA-256 hash. This may reduce false positive results where command output is validated with grouped or optional alphanumeric patterns before being used.
* Reversed adjustment of the name of `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, but kept the portion of the previous change for the word "trusted" to "privileged". Added a missing "a" to phrasing in `actions/untrusted-checkout/high` and `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`.
### Major Analysis Improvements
* Adjusted `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical` to align more with other untrusted resource queries, where the alert location is the location where the artifact is obtained from (the checkout point). This aligns with the other 2 related queries. This will cause the same alerts to re-open for closed alerts of this query.
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Altered the alert message for clarity for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`.
* The `actions/unpinned-tag` query now recognizes 64-character SHA-256 commit hashes as properly pinned references, in addition to 40-character SHA-1 hashes.
### Bug Fixes
* Adjusted (minor) help file descriptions for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`. Clarified wording on a minor point, added one more listed resource and added one more recommendation for things to check.
## 0.6.28
### Query Metadata Changes
* Adjusted the name of `actions/untrusted-checkout/high` to more clearly describe which parts of the scenario are in a privileged context.
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* The `actions/unpinned-tag` query now analyzes composite action metadata (`action.yml`/`action.yaml` files) in addition to workflow files, providing more comprehensive detection of unpinned action references across the entire Actions ecosystem.
### Bug Fixes
* Fixed help file descriptions for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`. Previously the messages were unclear as to why and how the vulnerabilities could occur.
* @name Unpinned tag for a non-immutable Action in workflow
* @name Unpinned tag for a non-immutable Action in workflow or composite action
* @description Using a tag for a non-immutable Action that is not pinned to a commit can lead to executing an untrusted Action through a supply chain attack.
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Certain triggers automatically grant a workflow elevated privileges:
* An attacker forks the repository and adds malicious code (e.g., in the build script)
* The attacker opens a PR from the fork, and, if needed, comments on the PR
* The workflow in the base repository checks out the forked code
* The workflow runs, (e.g. the build script etc.), which contains the malicious code
* The workflow runs the malicious code
Please note that not only build scripts can be malicious code vectors. There is a large number of other possibilities. Some of them are listed in the [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/) catalog.
@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ The best practice is to handle the potentially untrusted pull request via the **
The artifacts downloaded from the first workflow should be considered untrusted and must be verified.
Additionally, ensure that least privilege are used both at the workflow level (through event triggers and workflow permissions) and job level (through job permissions).
## Example
### Incorrect Usage
@@ -163,4 +165,5 @@ jobs:
- GitHub Security Lab Research: [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/).
- Mitigating risks of untrusted checkout: [GitHub Docs](https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/actions/reference/security/secure-use#mitigating-the-risks-of-untrusted-code-checkout).
- Securing with least privilege: [Workflow secure use](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/secure-use).
- Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/).
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Certain triggers automatically grant a workflow elevated privileges:
* An attacker forks the repository and adds malicious code (e.g., in the build script)
* The attacker opens a PR from the fork, and, if needed, comments on the PR
* The workflow in the base repository checks out the forked code
* The workflow runs, (e.g. the build script etc.), which contains the malicious code
* The workflow runs the malicious code
Please note that not only build scripts can be malicious code vectors. There is a large number of other possibilities. Some of them are listed in the [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/) catalog.
@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ The best practice is to handle the potentially untrusted pull request via the **
The artifacts downloaded from the first workflow should be considered untrusted and must be verified.
Additionally, ensure that least privilege are used both at the workflow level (through event triggers and workflow permissions) and job level (through job permissions).
## Example
### Incorrect Usage
@@ -163,4 +165,5 @@ jobs:
- GitHub Security Lab Research: [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/).
- Mitigating risks of untrusted checkout: [GitHub Docs](https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/actions/reference/security/secure-use#mitigating-the-risks-of-untrusted-code-checkout).
- Securing with least privilege: [Workflow secure use](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/secure-use).
- Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/).
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Certain triggers automatically grant a workflow elevated privileges:
* An attacker forks the repository and adds malicious code (e.g., in the build script)
* The attacker opens a PR from the fork, and, if needed, comments on the PR
* The workflow in the base repository checks out the forked code
* The workflow runs, (e.g. the build script etc.), which contains the malicious code
* The workflow runs the malicious code
Please note that not only build scripts can be malicious code vectors. There is a large number of other possibilities. Some of them are listed in the [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/) catalog.
@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ The best practice is to handle the potentially untrusted pull request via the **
The artifacts downloaded from the first workflow should be considered untrusted and must be verified.
Additionally, ensure that least privilege are used both at the workflow level (through event triggers and workflow permissions) and job level (through job permissions).
## Example
### Incorrect Usage
@@ -163,4 +165,5 @@ jobs:
- GitHub Security Lab Research: [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/).
- Mitigating risks of untrusted checkout: [GitHub Docs](https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/actions/reference/security/secure-use#mitigating-the-risks-of-untrusted-code-checkout).
- Securing with least privilege: [Workflow secure use](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/secure-use).
- Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/).
* Fixed help file descriptions for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`. Previously the messages were unclear as to why and how the vulnerabilities could occur.
* Adjusted the name of `actions/untrusted-checkout/high` to more clearly describe which parts of the scenario are in a privileged context.
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* The `actions/unpinned-tag` query now analyzes composite action metadata (`action.yml`/`action.yaml` files) in addition to workflow files, providing more comprehensive detection of unpinned action references across the entire Actions ecosystem.
### Bug Fixes
* Fixed help file descriptions for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`. Previously the messages were unclear as to why and how the vulnerabilities could occur.
* Reversed adjustment of the name of `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, but kept the portion of the previous change for the word "trusted" to "privileged". Added a missing "a" to phrasing in `actions/untrusted-checkout/high` and `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`.
### Major Analysis Improvements
* Adjusted `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical` to align more with other untrusted resource queries, where the alert location is the location where the artifact is obtained from (the checkout point). This aligns with the other 2 related queries. This will cause the same alerts to re-open for closed alerts of this query.
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Altered the alert message for clarity for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`.
* The `actions/unpinned-tag` query now recognizes 64-character SHA-256 commit hashes as properly pinned references, in addition to 40-character SHA-1 hashes.
### Bug Fixes
* Adjusted (minor) help file descriptions for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`. Clarified wording on a minor point, added one more listed resource and added one more recommendation for things to check.
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:13:9:13:23 | Run Step | .github/actions/dangerous-git-checkout/action.yml:6:7:11:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:13:9:13:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:35:7:41:4 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:35:7:41:4 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:41:7:47:4 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:41:7:47:4 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:47:7:51:46 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:47:7:51:46 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:15:9:18:2 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:8:9:11:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:15:9:18:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:30:9:32:23 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:30:9:32:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/actions/dangerous-git-checkout/action.yml:6:7:11:4 | Uses Step | .github/actions/dangerous-git-checkout/action.yml:6:7:11:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:13:9:13:23 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:32:9:37:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:48:9:52:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:79:9:84:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:84:9:93:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:15:9:20:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:15:9:20:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:25:9:48:6 | Run Step: set-milestone | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:3:5:3:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/reusable_caller1.yaml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:10:11:18:8 | Run Step | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:10:11:18:8 | Run Step | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:21:11:23:22 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:12:7:16:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:12:7:16:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:17:7:21:4 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/level0.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/level0.yml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/level0.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/level0.yml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:42:9:47:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:52:9:58:24 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:216:9:222:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:216:9:222:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:222:9:227:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:250:9:256:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:250:9:256:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:256:9:261:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:284:9:290:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:284:9:290:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:290:9:295:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:391:9:395:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:395:9:404:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:404:9:414:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:414:9:423:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:423:9:432:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/reusable_caller3.yaml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:33:9:36:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:36:9:39:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:49:9:59:6 | Run Step: benchmark-pr | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:59:9:60:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:60:9:60:37 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test10.yml:20:9:25:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test10.yml:20:9:25:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test10.yml:25:9:30:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test10.yml:8:3:8:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/test11.yml:84:7:90:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test11.yml:84:7:90:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test11.yml:90:7:93:54 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test11.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test17.yml:12:15:19:12 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test17.yml:12:15:19:12 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test17.yml:19:15:23:58 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test17.yml:3:5:3:16 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/test27.yml:18:9:21:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test27.yml:18:9:21:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test27.yml:21:9:22:16 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test26.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/test29.yml:8:7:14:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test29.yml:8:7:14:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test29.yml:14:7:21:11 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test29.yml:1:5:1:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:35:7:41:4 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:41:7:47:4 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:47:7:51:46 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:8:9:11:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:8:9:11:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:15:9:18:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:30:9:32:23 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:12:9:16:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:20:9:24:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:28:9:32:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:35:9:40:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:43:9:46:126 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:28:9:33:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:48:7:50:46 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit2.yml:27:9:31:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:26:9:30:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:30:9:35:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:57:9:62:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:79:9:83:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:95:9:100:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:109:9:114:66 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:103:9:109:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:139:9:144:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:444:9:449:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/test13.yml:20:7:25:4 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test13.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:14:9:19:72 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:1:5:1:17 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:12:9:16:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:20:9:24:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:28:9:32:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:35:9:40:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:43:9:46:126 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:28:9:33:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:48:7:50:46 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit2.yml:27:9:31:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:26:9:30:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:30:9:35:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:57:9:62:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:79:9:83:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:95:9:100:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:109:9:114:66 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:103:9:109:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:139:9:144:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:444:9:449:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/test13.yml:20:7:25:4 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test13.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:14:9:19:72 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:1:5:1:17 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
* The `UsingAliasTypedefType` class has been deprecated. Use `TypeAliasType` instead.
### New Features
* Added a `getOriginalTemplate` predicate to `TemplateClass`, `TemplateFunction`, `TemplateVariable`, and `AliasTemplateType`, which yields the class member template the template was generated from. The predicates only have results for templates that are members of class template instantiations.
* Added `AliasTemplateType` and `AliasTemplateInstantiationType` classes, representing C++ alias templates and their instantiations.
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Added flow source models for `scanf_s` and related functions.
* Added a `Call` column to `LocalFlowSourceFunction::hasLocalFlowSource` and `RemoteFlowSourceFunction::hasRemoteFlowSource`. The old predicates without a `Call` column continue to be supported.
## 10.1.1
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* The `RemoteFlowSourceFunction` model for `fscanf` (and variants) now implements `hasSocketInput` to reflect that these functions may read from a socket.
* The `RemoteFlowSourceFunction` model for `fscanf` (and variants) now implements `hasSocketInput` to reflect that these functions may read from a socket.
* The `UsingAliasTypedefType` class has been deprecated. Use `TypeAliasType` instead.
### New Features
* Added a `getOriginalTemplate` predicate to `TemplateClass`, `TemplateFunction`, `TemplateVariable`, and `AliasTemplateType`, which yields the class member template the template was generated from. The predicates only have results for templates that are members of class template instantiations.
* Added `AliasTemplateType` and `AliasTemplateInstantiationType` classes, representing C++ alias templates and their instantiations.
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Added flow source models for `scanf_s` and related functions.
* Added a `Call` column to `LocalFlowSourceFunction::hasLocalFlowSource` and `RemoteFlowSourceFunction::hasRemoteFlowSource`. The old predicates without a `Call` column continue to be supported.
* The 'Cleartext transmission of sensitive information' query (`cpp/cleartext-transmission`) no longer raises an alert on calls to `fscanf` (and variants) when the call reads from an "obviously local" `FILE` stream such as `stdin`.
* The 'Cleartext transmission of sensitive information' query (`cpp/cleartext-transmission`) no longer raises an alert on calls to `fscanf` (and variants) when the call reads from an "obviously local" `FILE` stream such as `stdin`.
| test.cpp:72:5:72:15 | PointerAdd: access to array | test.cpp:79:32:79:34 | buf | test.cpp:72:5:72:15 | access to array | This pointer arithmetic may have an off-by-1 error allowing it to overrun $@ at this $@. | test.cpp:15:9:15:11 | buf | buf | test.cpp:72:5:72:19 | Store: ... = ... | write |
| test.cpp:77:27:77:44 | PointerAdd: access to array | test.cpp:77:32:77:34 | buf | test.cpp:66:32:66:32 | p | This pointer arithmetic may have an off-by-1 error allowing it to overrun $@ at this $@. | test.cpp:15:9:15:11 | buf | buf | test.cpp:67:5:67:10 | Store: ... = ... | write |
| test.cpp:88:5:88:27 | PointerAdd: access to array | test.cpp:85:34:85:36 | buf | test.cpp:88:5:88:27 | access to array | This pointer arithmetic may have an off-by-1 error allowing it to overrun $@ at this $@. | test.cpp:15:9:15:11 | buf | buf | test.cpp:88:5:88:31 | Store: ... = ... | write |
| test.cpp:128:9:128:14 | PointerAdd: access to array | test.cpp:125:11:125:13 | definition of arr | test.cpp:128:9:128:14 | access to array | This pointer arithmetic may have an off-by-1 error allowing it to overrun $@ at this $@. | test.cpp:125:11:125:13 | arr | arr | test.cpp:128:9:128:18 | Store: ... = ... | write |
| test.cpp:128:9:128:14 | PointerAdd: access to array | test.cpp:128:9:128:11 | arr | test.cpp:128:9:128:14 | access to array | This pointer arithmetic may have an off-by-1 error allowing it to overrun $@ at this $@. | test.cpp:125:11:125:13 | arr | arr | test.cpp:128:9:128:18 | Store: ... = ... | write |
| test.cpp:136:9:136:16 | PointerAdd: ... += ... | test.cpp:142:10:142:13 | definition of asdf | test.cpp:138:13:138:15 | arr | This pointer arithmetic may have an off-by-2 error allowing it to overrun $@ at this $@. | test.cpp:142:10:142:13 | asdf | asdf | test.cpp:138:12:138:15 | Load: * ... | read |
| test.cpp:136:9:136:16 | PointerAdd: ... += ... | test.cpp:143:18:143:21 | asdf | test.cpp:138:13:138:15 | arr | This pointer arithmetic may have an off-by-2 error allowing it to overrun $@ at this $@. | test.cpp:142:10:142:13 | asdf | asdf | test.cpp:138:12:138:15 | Load: * ... | read |
| test.cpp:156:12:156:18 | PointerAdd: ... + ... | test.cpp:154:7:154:9 | definition of buf | test.cpp:147:4:147:9 | -- ... | This pointer arithmetic may have an off-by-1 error allowing it to overrun $@ at this $@. | test.cpp:154:7:154:9 | buf | buf | test.cpp:147:3:147:13 | Store: ... = ... | write |
| test.cpp:156:12:156:18 | PointerAdd: ... + ... | test.cpp:154:7:154:9 | definition of buf | test.cpp:147:4:147:9 | -- ... | This pointer arithmetic may have an off-by-1 error allowing it to overrun $@ at this $@. | test.cpp:154:7:154:9 | buf | buf | test.cpp:147:3:147:13 | Store: ... = ... | write |
| test.cpp:156:12:156:18 | PointerAdd: ... + ... | test.cpp:156:12:156:14 | buf | test.cpp:147:4:147:9 | -- ... | This pointer arithmetic may have an off-by-1 error allowing it to overrun $@ at this $@. | test.cpp:154:7:154:9 | buf | buf | test.cpp:147:3:147:13 | Store: ... = ... | write |
| test.cpp:156:12:156:18 | PointerAdd: ... + ... | test.cpp:156:12:156:14 | buf | test.cpp:147:4:147:9 | -- ... | This pointer arithmetic may have an off-by-1 error allowing it to overrun $@ at this $@. | test.cpp:154:7:154:9 | buf | buf | test.cpp:147:3:147:13 | Store: ... = ... | write |
| test.cpp:221:5:221:11 | PointerAdd: access to array | test.cpp:217:19:217:24 | definition of buffer | test.cpp:221:5:221:11 | access to array | This pointer arithmetic may have an off-by-1 error allowing it to overrun $@ at this $@. | test.cpp:217:19:217:24 | buffer | buffer | test.cpp:221:5:221:15 | Store: ... = ... | write |
| test.cpp:221:5:221:11 | PointerAdd: access to array | test.cpp:218:23:218:28 | buffer | test.cpp:221:5:221:11 | access to array | This pointer arithmetic may have an off-by-1 error allowing it to overrun $@ at this $@. | test.cpp:217:19:217:24 | buffer | buffer | test.cpp:221:5:221:15 | Store: ... = ... | write |
| test.cpp:232:5:232:10 | PointerAdd: access to array | test.cpp:228:10:228:14 | definition of array | test.cpp:232:5:232:10 | access to array | This pointer arithmetic may have an off-by-1 error allowing it to overrun $@ at this $@. | test.cpp:228:10:228:14 | array | array | test.cpp:232:5:232:19 | Store: ... = ... | write |
| test.cpp:232:5:232:10 | PointerAdd: access to array | test.cpp:229:25:229:29 | array | test.cpp:232:5:232:10 | access to array | This pointer arithmetic may have an off-by-1 error allowing it to overrun $@ at this $@. | test.cpp:228:10:228:14 | array | array | test.cpp:232:5:232:19 | Store: ... = ... | write |
| test.cpp:261:27:261:30 | PointerAdd: access to array | test.cpp:285:19:285:25 | definition of buffer2 | test.cpp:261:27:261:30 | access to array | This pointer arithmetic may have an off-by-1 error allowing it to overrun $@ at this $@. | test.cpp:285:19:285:25 | buffer2 | buffer2 | test.cpp:261:27:261:30 | Load: access to array | read |
| test.cpp:261:27:261:30 | PointerAdd: access to array | test.cpp:286:19:286:25 | buffer2 | test.cpp:261:27:261:30 | access to array | This pointer arithmetic may have an off-by-1 error allowing it to overrun $@ at this $@. | test.cpp:285:19:285:25 | buffer2 | buffer2 | test.cpp:261:27:261:30 | Load: access to array | read |
| test.cpp:299:16:299:21 | PointerAdd: access to array | test.cpp:308:9:308:12 | definition of arr2 | test.cpp:299:16:299:21 | access to array | This pointer arithmetic may have an off-by-1014 error allowing it to overrun $@ at this $@. | test.cpp:308:9:308:12 | arr2 | arr2 | test.cpp:299:16:299:21 | Load: access to array | read |
| test.cpp:299:16:299:21 | PointerAdd: access to array | test.cpp:309:20:309:23 | arr2 | test.cpp:299:16:299:21 | access to array | This pointer arithmetic may have an off-by-1014 error allowing it to overrun $@ at this $@. | test.cpp:308:9:308:12 | arr2 | arr2 | test.cpp:299:16:299:21 | Load: access to array | read |
| test.cpp:322:19:322:27 | PointerAdd: ... + ... | test.cpp:314:10:314:13 | definition of temp | test.cpp:325:24:325:26 | end | This pointer arithmetic may have an off-by-1 error allowing it to overrun $@ at this $@. | test.cpp:314:10:314:13 | temp | temp | test.cpp:330:13:330:24 | Store: ... = ... | write |
| test.cpp:322:19:322:27 | PointerAdd: ... + ... | test.cpp:314:10:314:13 | definition of temp | test.cpp:325:24:325:26 | end | This pointer arithmetic may have an off-by-1 error allowing it to overrun $@ at this $@. | test.cpp:314:10:314:13 | temp | temp | test.cpp:331:13:331:24 | Store: ... = ... | write |
| test.cpp:322:19:322:27 | PointerAdd: ... + ... | test.cpp:314:10:314:13 | definition of temp | test.cpp:325:24:325:26 | end | This pointer arithmetic may have an off-by-1 error allowing it to overrun $@ at this $@. | test.cpp:314:10:314:13 | temp | temp | test.cpp:333:13:333:24 | Store: ... = ... | write |
| test.cpp:322:19:322:27 | PointerAdd: ... + ... | test.cpp:322:19:322:22 | temp | test.cpp:325:24:325:26 | end | This pointer arithmetic may have an off-by-1 error allowing it to overrun $@ at this $@. | test.cpp:314:10:314:13 | temp | temp | test.cpp:330:13:330:24 | Store: ... = ... | write |
| test.cpp:322:19:322:27 | PointerAdd: ... + ... | test.cpp:322:19:322:22 | temp | test.cpp:325:24:325:26 | end | This pointer arithmetic may have an off-by-1 error allowing it to overrun $@ at this $@. | test.cpp:314:10:314:13 | temp | temp | test.cpp:331:13:331:24 | Store: ... = ... | write |
| test.cpp:322:19:322:27 | PointerAdd: ... + ... | test.cpp:322:19:322:22 | temp | test.cpp:325:24:325:26 | end | This pointer arithmetic may have an off-by-1 error allowing it to overrun $@ at this $@. | test.cpp:314:10:314:13 | temp | temp | test.cpp:333:13:333:24 | Store: ... = ... | write |
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