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9 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Asger F
47d299e93b Add parse diagnostics support via getSyntacticDiagnostics API
Fetch syntactic diagnostics from the tsgo API after parsing each file.
Only genuine parse errors (diagnostic codes 1000-1999) are included;
higher codes like 2880 (import assertion deprecation) are filtered out
since they don't indicate actual parse failures.

The Java extractor uses parseDiagnostics to report syntax errors and
skip full AST extraction for broken files, matching TS5 behavior.

TRAP test results: 495/495 passing (100%)

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-13 15:27:47 +02:00
Asger F
fbaf648e4f Fix nodeFlags: bit 6 is ExportContext, not GlobalAugmentation
TS7 binary AST uses bit 6 for ExportContext (set on all nodes inside
`declare module` contexts), not GlobalAugmentation as previously assumed.
GlobalAugmentation is not a flag in the TS7 binary format at all.

Fix by using a synthetic flag bit (1<<30) for GlobalAugmentation that the
converter sets on `declare global {}` nodes based on the name identifier
being "global". This lets the Java extractor correctly distinguish
`declare global {}` from regular namespace declarations.

Also corrects the flag shift: ExportContext=64 (bit 6), ContainsThis=128
(bit 7), etc., matching the actual TS7 binary layout.

TRAP test results: 494/495 passing (99.8%)
Remaining: badimport.ts (TS7 binary API doesn't report parse diagnostics)

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-13 15:22:58 +02:00
Asger F
637ce99e44 TypeScript Go extractor: metadata fixes, NestedNamespace inference, and scanner improvements
- Fix TS7 nodeFlags: remove Synthesized (shifted in TS7), add GlobalAugmentation=64,
  correct OptionalChain=32, Namespace=16, shift subsequent flags
- Add 33 missing operator/punctuation token kinds to syntaxKinds metadata
- Infer NestedNamespace flag for dotted namespace declarations (TS7 binary
  doesn't set it, but Java extractor needs it)
- Fix shebang handling: emit ShebangTrivia (kind 6) instead of SingleLineCommentTrivia
- Fix token kinds for regex/template rescans to match TS5 pre-rescan behavior
  (SlashToken for regexes, CloseBraceToken for template continuations)
- Fix augmentPos to correctly skip comments (matching TS5's trivia-skipping regex)
- Resolve native tsgo binary from npm wrapper to avoid Node.js dependency
- Update project-layout glob for worktree support

TRAP test results: 493/495 passing (99.6%)
Remaining: badimport.ts (missing diagnostics), externalmodule.ts (structural diff)

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-13 15:11:48 +02:00
Asger F
bd9d6b1962 Add Go TypeScript parser wrapper integration to Java extractor
Wire the Go-based TypeScript parser wrapper as an alternative to the
Node.js wrapper. Enabled via SEMMLE_TYPESCRIPT_USE_GO_PARSER=true.

When enabled:
- Skips Node.js installation verification
- Launches the Go binary directly (no Node.js required)
- Uses the same newline-delimited JSON protocol over stdin/stdout
- Go binary path configurable via SEMMLE_TYPESCRIPT_GO_PARSER_WRAPPER
- tsgo binary path passed through via SEMMLE_TYPESCRIPT_TSGO_BINARY

The Go wrapper implements all protocol commands: get-metadata, parse,
prepare-files, reset, and quit.

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-10 15:44:55 +02:00
Asger F
bd5e4761bd Fix broader validation: 52/57 tests pass
Key fixes:
- UTF-16 offset conversion for positions (buildOffsetTables, byteToUTF16, utf16ToByte)
- Unicode identifier scanning (support ID_Start/ID_Continue categories)
- Filter zero-width synthetic modifiers from nested namespaces
- Add ImportAttributes to childprops (elements property)
- Emit isTypeOf:false for ImportType nodes
- Always emit empty statements array for SourceFile
- Emit empty arrays for remaining array properties when no children
- Non-greedy > scanning (always single GreaterThanToken)
- Ignore parseDiagnostics in structural comparison

Remaining 5 failures are binary/UTF-16-BOM encoded files (not real TypeScript).

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-10 15:19:49 +02:00
Asger F
93deb33a2a Fix validation script to tolerate expected TS7 kind/flags diffsTS5
The shell validation script now uses a structural comparison that
ignores expected numeric differences in kind/flags/token/operator
values between TS5 and TS7. Only truly structural diffs cause failure.

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-10 14:54:19 +02:00
Asger F
f3b27a56b1 TypeScript-Go wrapper: binary AST decoder, JSON converter, and tokenizer
Implement the core components for translating tsgo's binary AST format
into the JSON format expected by the Java extractor:

- decoder.go: Binary AST format parser with random-access node accessors
  (kind, pos, end, flags, children, strings, extended data)
- converter.go: Walks decoded AST and produces JSON matching Node.js
  wrapper output (augmented , , , ,
  isTypeOnly, HeritageClause token, TypeOperator operator)
- childprops.go: Maps ~100 SyntaxKind names to ordered child property
  name lists for correct bitmask-to-property assignment
- scanner.go: TypeScript tokenizer producing  array with rescan
  support for regex, template, and greater-than disambiguation

Update metadata.go with correct TS7 SyntaxKind iota values and export
metadata functions. Wire decoder+converter through TsgoParser.Parse().

Validation test passes: all 421 diffs are expected TS5-vs-TS7 numeric
kind/flags/token/operator value differences. Zero structural diffs.

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-10 14:36:00 +02:00
Asger F
37852aa1d3 JS: Fix validation script to use stdin protocol with timeouts
The script was calling wrappers in single-file CLI mode, but neither
wrapper supports that (they read commands from stdin). Now sends
parse + quit commands via stdin and uses `timeout` to avoid hangs.

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-10 13:46:39 +02:00
Asger F
78b1651596 JS: Add Go-based TypeScript parser wrapper scaffolding
Add initial scaffolding for a Go process that will replace the Node.js
TypeScript parser wrapper, preparing for TypeScript 7's Go-based compiler.

The Go wrapper implements the same stdin/stdout line-delimited JSON
protocol as the existing Node.js wrapper (lib/typescript/src/main.ts),
making it a drop-in replacement from the Java extractor's perspective.

Key components:
- Protocol handler matching the Node.js wrapper's command set
  (get-metadata, prepare-files, parse, reset, quit)
- Parser backend interface with tsgo subprocess implementation
  using the tsgo --api --async JSON-RPC mode (LSP Content-Length framing)
- AST property whitelist matching the ~90 properties from the Node.js wrapper
- Static TS7 SyntaxKind and NodeFlags metadata mappings
- Validation framework for comparing JSON output between wrappers
- Integration tests demonstrating successful tsgo API communication:
  initialize, updateSnapshot (project opening), getSourceFile

Key finding: the tsgo API returns binary-encoded ASTs (not JSON),
requiring a decoder for the custom flat-node-array format. See
microsoft/typescript-go/internal/api/encoder/ for the format spec.

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-10 13:11:17 +02:00
1664 changed files with 115788 additions and 226309 deletions

View File

@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ jobs:
SHORTNAME=`basename $DATABASE`
python misc/scripts/models-as-data/generate_mad.py --language java --with-summaries --with-sinks $DATABASE $SHORTNAME/$QL_VARIANT
mkdir -p $MODELS/$SHORTNAME
mv java/ql/lib/ext/generated/modelgenerator/$SHORTNAME/$QL_VARIANT $MODELS/$SHORTNAME
mv java/ql/lib/ext/generated/$SHORTNAME/$QL_VARIANT $MODELS/$SHORTNAME
cd ..
}

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ on:
paths:
- "misc/bazel/**"
- "misc/codegen/**"
- "misc/scripts/models-as-data/*.py"
- "misc/scripts/models-as-data/bulk_generate_mad.py"
- "*.bazel*"
- .github/workflows/codegen.yml
- .pre-commit-config.yaml

442
Cargo.lock generated
View File

@@ -140,26 +140,6 @@ version = "0.22.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "72b3254f16251a8381aa12e40e3c4d2f0199f8c6508fbecb9d91f575e0fbb8c6"
[[package]]
name = "bindgen"
version = "0.72.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "993776b509cfb49c750f11b8f07a46fa23e0a1386ffc01fb1e7d343efc387895"
dependencies = [
"bitflags 2.9.4",
"cexpr",
"clang-sys",
"itertools 0.12.1",
"log 0.4.28",
"prettyplease",
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
"regex",
"rustc-hash 2.1.1",
"shlex",
"syn",
]
[[package]]
name = "bitflags"
version = "1.3.2"
@@ -260,9 +240,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "cc"
version = "1.2.61"
version = "1.2.37"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d16d90359e986641506914ba71350897565610e87ce0ad9e6f28569db3dd5c6d"
checksum = "65193589c6404eb80b450d618eaf9a2cafaaafd57ecce47370519ef674a7bd44"
dependencies = [
"find-msvc-tools",
"jobserver",
@@ -270,15 +250,6 @@ dependencies = [
"shlex",
]
[[package]]
name = "cexpr"
version = "0.6.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "6fac387a98bb7c37292057cffc56d62ecb629900026402633ae9160df93a8766"
dependencies = [
"nom",
]
[[package]]
name = "cfg-if"
version = "1.0.3"
@@ -357,7 +328,7 @@ dependencies = [
"chalk-derive 0.103.0",
"chalk-ir 0.103.0",
"ena",
"indexmap 2.14.0",
"indexmap 2.11.4",
"itertools 0.12.1",
"petgraph",
"rustc-hash 1.1.0",
@@ -378,17 +349,6 @@ dependencies = [
"windows-link 0.2.0",
]
[[package]]
name = "clang-sys"
version = "1.8.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "0b023947811758c97c59bf9d1c188fd619ad4718dcaa767947df1cadb14f39f4"
dependencies = [
"glob",
"libc",
"libloading",
]
[[package]]
name = "clap"
version = "4.5.48"
@@ -456,7 +416,6 @@ dependencies = [
"tree-sitter",
"tree-sitter-json",
"tree-sitter-ql",
"yeast",
"zstd",
]
@@ -478,25 +437,6 @@ dependencies = [
"tree-sitter-ruby",
]
[[package]]
name = "codeql-extractor-unified"
version = "0.1.0"
dependencies = [
"clap",
"codeql-extractor",
"encoding",
"lazy_static",
"rayon",
"regex",
"serde_json",
"tracing",
"tracing-subscriber",
"tree-sitter",
"tree-sitter-embedded-template",
"tree-sitter-swift",
"yeast",
]
[[package]]
name = "codeql-rust"
version = "0.1.0"
@@ -545,15 +485,6 @@ version = "1.0.4"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "b05b61dc5112cbb17e4b6cd61790d9845d13888356391624cbe7e41efeac1e75"
[[package]]
name = "convert_case"
version = "0.8.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "baaaa0ecca5b51987b9423ccdc971514dd8b0bb7b4060b983d3664dad3f1f89f"
dependencies = [
"unicode-segmentation",
]
[[package]]
name = "core-foundation-sys"
version = "0.8.7"
@@ -807,12 +738,6 @@ dependencies = [
"typeid",
]
[[package]]
name = "fastrand"
version = "2.4.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "9f1f227452a390804cdb637b74a86990f2a7d7ba4b7d5693aac9b4dd6defd8d6"
[[package]]
name = "figment"
version = "0.10.19"
@@ -829,9 +754,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "find-msvc-tools"
version = "0.1.9"
version = "0.1.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "5baebc0774151f905a1a2cc41989300b1e6fbb29aff0ceffa1064fdd3088d582"
checksum = "7fd99930f64d146689264c637b5af2f0233a933bef0d8570e2526bf9e083192d"
[[package]]
name = "fixedbitset"
@@ -861,12 +786,6 @@ version = "0.1.5"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d9c4f5dac5e15c24eb999c26181a6ca40b39fe946cbe4c263c7209467bc83af2"
[[package]]
name = "foldhash"
version = "0.2.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "77ce24cb58228fbb8aa041425bb1050850ac19177686ea6e0f41a70416f56fdb"
[[package]]
name = "form_urlencoded"
version = "1.2.2"
@@ -951,26 +870,9 @@ checksum = "9229cfe53dfd69f0609a49f65461bd93001ea1ef889cd5529dd176593f5338a1"
dependencies = [
"allocator-api2",
"equivalent",
"foldhash 0.1.5",
"foldhash",
]
[[package]]
name = "hashbrown"
version = "0.16.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "841d1cc9bed7f9236f321df977030373f4a4163ae1a7dbfe1a51a2c1a51d9100"
dependencies = [
"allocator-api2",
"equivalent",
"foldhash 0.2.0",
]
[[package]]
name = "hashbrown"
version = "0.17.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "ed5909b6e89a2db4456e54cd5f673791d7eca6732202bbf2a9cc504fe2f9b84a"
[[package]]
name = "hashlink"
version = "0.10.0"
@@ -1157,25 +1059,16 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "indexmap"
version = "2.14.0"
version = "2.11.4"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d466e9454f08e4a911e14806c24e16fba1b4c121d1ea474396f396069cf949d9"
checksum = "4b0f83760fb341a774ed326568e19f5a863af4a952def8c39f9ab92fd95b88e5"
dependencies = [
"equivalent",
"hashbrown 0.17.1",
"hashbrown 0.15.5",
"serde",
"serde_core",
]
[[package]]
name = "indoc"
version = "2.0.7"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "79cf5c93f93228cf8efb3ba362535fb11199ac548a09ce117c9b1adc3030d706"
dependencies = [
"rustversion",
]
[[package]]
name = "inlinable_string"
version = "0.1.15"
@@ -1305,16 +1198,6 @@ version = "0.2.175"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "6a82ae493e598baaea5209805c49bbf2ea7de956d50d7da0da1164f9c6d28543"
[[package]]
name = "libloading"
version = "0.8.9"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d7c4b02199fee7c5d21a5ae7d8cfa79a6ef5bb2fc834d6e9058e89c825efdc55"
dependencies = [
"cfg-if",
"windows-link 0.2.0",
]
[[package]]
name = "line-index"
version = "0.1.2"
@@ -1380,12 +1263,6 @@ dependencies = [
"autocfg",
]
[[package]]
name = "minimal-lexical"
version = "0.2.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "68354c5c6bd36d73ff3feceb05efa59b6acb7626617f4962be322a825e61f79a"
[[package]]
name = "miniz_oxide"
version = "0.8.9"
@@ -1432,16 +1309,6 @@ version = "0.2.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "2bf50223579dc7cdcfb3bfcacf7069ff68243f8c363f62ffa99cf000a6b9c451"
[[package]]
name = "nom"
version = "7.1.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d273983c5a657a70a3e8f2a01329822f3b8c8172b73826411a55751e404a0a4a"
dependencies = [
"memchr",
"minimal-lexical",
]
[[package]]
name = "notify"
version = "8.2.0"
@@ -1569,12 +1436,6 @@ dependencies = [
"windows-targets 0.52.6",
]
[[package]]
name = "pathdiff"
version = "0.2.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "df94ce210e5bc13cb6651479fa48d14f601d9858cfe0467f43ae157023b938d3"
[[package]]
name = "pear"
version = "0.2.9"
@@ -1630,36 +1491,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "b4c5cc86750666a3ed20bdaf5ca2a0344f9c67674cae0515bec2da16fbaa47db"
dependencies = [
"fixedbitset",
"indexmap 2.14.0",
]
[[package]]
name = "phf"
version = "0.13.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "c1562dc717473dbaa4c1f85a36410e03c047b2e7df7f45ee938fbef64ae7fadf"
dependencies = [
"phf_shared",
"serde",
]
[[package]]
name = "phf_generator"
version = "0.13.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "135ace3a761e564ec88c03a77317a7c6b80bb7f7135ef2544dbe054243b89737"
dependencies = [
"fastrand",
"phf_shared",
]
[[package]]
name = "phf_shared"
version = "0.13.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "e57fef6bc5981e38c2ce2d63bfa546861309f875b8a75f092d1d54ae2d64f266"
dependencies = [
"siphasher",
"indexmap 2.11.4",
]
[[package]]
@@ -1704,25 +1536,6 @@ dependencies = [
"zerocopy",
]
[[package]]
name = "prettyplease"
version = "0.2.37"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "479ca8adacdd7ce8f1fb39ce9ecccbfe93a3f1344b3d0d97f20bc0196208f62b"
dependencies = [
"proc-macro2",
"syn",
]
[[package]]
name = "proc-macro-crate"
version = "3.5.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "e67ba7e9b2b56446f1d419b1d807906278ffa1a658a8a5d8a39dcb1f5a78614f"
dependencies = [
"toml_edit 0.25.11+spec-1.1.0",
]
[[package]]
name = "proc-macro2"
version = "1.0.101"
@@ -1854,7 +1667,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "e876bb2c3e52a8d4e6684526a2d4e81f9d028b939ee4dc5dc775fe10deb44d59"
dependencies = [
"dashmap",
"indexmap 2.14.0",
"indexmap 2.11.4",
"la-arena",
"ra_ap_cfg",
"ra_ap_intern",
@@ -1896,7 +1709,7 @@ checksum = "ebffdc134eccabc17209d7760cfff7fd12ed18ab6e21188c5e084b97aa38504c"
dependencies = [
"arrayvec",
"either",
"indexmap 2.14.0",
"indexmap 2.11.4",
"itertools 0.14.0",
"ra_ap_base_db",
"ra_ap_cfg",
@@ -1926,7 +1739,7 @@ dependencies = [
"drop_bomb",
"either",
"fst",
"indexmap 2.14.0",
"indexmap 2.11.4",
"itertools 0.14.0",
"la-arena",
"ra-ap-rustc_abi",
@@ -1995,7 +1808,7 @@ dependencies = [
"cov-mark",
"either",
"ena",
"indexmap 2.14.0",
"indexmap 2.11.4",
"itertools 0.14.0",
"la-arena",
"oorandom",
@@ -2033,7 +1846,7 @@ dependencies = [
"crossbeam-channel",
"either",
"fst",
"indexmap 2.14.0",
"indexmap 2.11.4",
"itertools 0.14.0",
"line-index",
"memchr",
@@ -2135,7 +1948,7 @@ version = "0.0.301"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "45db9e2df587d56f0738afa89fb2c100ff7c1e9cbe49e07f6a8b62342832211b"
dependencies = [
"indexmap 2.14.0",
"indexmap 2.11.4",
"ra_ap_intern",
"ra_ap_paths",
"ra_ap_span",
@@ -2294,7 +2107,7 @@ checksum = "6c174d6b9b7a7f54687df7e00c3e75ed6f082a7943a9afb1d54f33c0c12773de"
dependencies = [
"crossbeam-channel",
"fst",
"indexmap 2.14.0",
"indexmap 2.11.4",
"nohash-hasher",
"ra_ap_paths",
"ra_ap_stdx",
@@ -2426,15 +2239,6 @@ version = "0.8.6"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "caf4aa5b0f434c91fe5c7f1ecb6a5ece2130b02ad2a590589dda5146df959001"
[[package]]
name = "relative-path"
version = "2.0.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "bca40a312222d8ba74837cb474edef44b37f561da5f773981007a10bbaa992b0"
dependencies = [
"serde",
]
[[package]]
name = "rowan"
version = "0.15.15"
@@ -2448,57 +2252,6 @@ dependencies = [
"text-size",
]
[[package]]
name = "rquickjs"
version = "0.10.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "a135375fbac5ba723bb6a48f432a72f81539cedde422f0121a86c7c4e96d8e0d"
dependencies = [
"rquickjs-core",
"rquickjs-macro",
]
[[package]]
name = "rquickjs-core"
version = "0.10.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "bccb7121a123865c8ace4dea42e7ed84d78b90cbaf4ca32c59849d8d210c9672"
dependencies = [
"hashbrown 0.16.1",
"phf",
"relative-path",
"rquickjs-sys",
]
[[package]]
name = "rquickjs-macro"
version = "0.10.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "89f93602cc3112c7f30bf5f29e722784232138692c7df4c52ebbac7e035d900d"
dependencies = [
"convert_case",
"fnv",
"ident_case",
"indexmap 2.14.0",
"phf_generator",
"phf_shared",
"proc-macro-crate",
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
"rquickjs-core",
"syn",
]
[[package]]
name = "rquickjs-sys"
version = "0.10.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "57b1b6528590d4d65dc86b5159eae2d0219709546644c66408b2441696d1d725"
dependencies = [
"bindgen",
"cc",
]
[[package]]
name = "rust-extractor-macros"
version = "0.1.0"
@@ -2564,7 +2317,7 @@ dependencies = [
"crossbeam-utils",
"hashbrown 0.15.5",
"hashlink",
"indexmap 2.14.0",
"indexmap 2.11.4",
"intrusive-collections",
"papaya",
"parking_lot",
@@ -2653,12 +2406,11 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "semver"
version = "1.0.28"
version = "1.0.26"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "8a7852d02fc848982e0c167ef163aaff9cd91dc640ba85e263cb1ce46fae51cd"
checksum = "56e6fa9c48d24d85fb3de5ad847117517440f6beceb7798af16b4a87d616b8d0"
dependencies = [
"serde",
"serde_core",
]
[[package]]
@@ -2718,7 +2470,7 @@ version = "1.0.145"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "402a6f66d8c709116cf22f558eab210f5a50187f702eb4d7e5ef38d9a7f1c79c"
dependencies = [
"indexmap 2.14.0",
"indexmap 2.11.4",
"itoa",
"memchr",
"ryu",
@@ -2754,7 +2506,7 @@ dependencies = [
"chrono",
"hex",
"indexmap 1.9.3",
"indexmap 2.14.0",
"indexmap 2.11.4",
"schemars 0.9.0",
"schemars 1.0.4",
"serde",
@@ -2782,7 +2534,7 @@ version = "0.9.34+deprecated"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "6a8b1a1a2ebf674015cc02edccce75287f1a0130d394307b36743c2f5d504b47"
dependencies = [
"indexmap 2.14.0",
"indexmap 2.11.4",
"itoa",
"ryu",
"serde",
@@ -2804,18 +2556,6 @@ version = "1.3.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "0fda2ff0d084019ba4d7c6f371c95d8fd75ce3524c3cb8fb653a3023f6323e64"
[[package]]
name = "siphasher"
version = "1.0.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "8ee5873ec9cce0195efcb7a4e9507a04cd49aec9c83d0389df45b1ef7ba2e649"
[[package]]
name = "smallbitvec"
version = "2.6.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "9b0e903ee191d8f7a8fbf0d712c3a1699d19e04ceba5ad1eb673053c7d938a09"
[[package]]
name = "smallvec"
version = "1.15.1"
@@ -2892,18 +2632,18 @@ checksum = "144f754d318415ac792f9d69fc87abbbfc043ce2ef041c60f16ad828f638717d"
[[package]]
name = "thiserror"
version = "2.0.18"
version = "2.0.16"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "4288b5bcbc7920c07a1149a35cf9590a2aa808e0bc1eafaade0b80947865fbc4"
checksum = "3467d614147380f2e4e374161426ff399c91084acd2363eaf549172b3d5e60c0"
dependencies = [
"thiserror-impl",
]
[[package]]
name = "thiserror-impl"
version = "2.0.18"
version = "2.0.16"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "ebc4ee7f67670e9b64d05fa4253e753e016c6c95ff35b89b7941d6b856dec1d5"
checksum = "6c5e1be1c48b9172ee610da68fd9cd2770e7a4056cb3fc98710ee6906f0c7960"
dependencies = [
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
@@ -2968,7 +2708,7 @@ dependencies = [
"serde",
"serde_spanned 0.6.9",
"toml_datetime 0.6.11",
"toml_edit 0.22.27",
"toml_edit",
]
[[package]]
@@ -2977,13 +2717,13 @@ version = "0.9.7"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "00e5e5d9bf2475ac9d4f0d9edab68cc573dc2fd644b0dba36b0c30a92dd9eaa0"
dependencies = [
"indexmap 2.14.0",
"indexmap 2.11.4",
"serde_core",
"serde_spanned 1.0.2",
"toml_datetime 0.7.2",
"toml_parser",
"toml_writer",
"winnow 0.7.13",
"winnow",
]
[[package]]
@@ -3004,48 +2744,27 @@ dependencies = [
"serde_core",
]
[[package]]
name = "toml_datetime"
version = "1.1.1+spec-1.1.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "3165f65f62e28e0115a00b2ebdd37eb6f3b641855f9d636d3cd4103767159ad7"
dependencies = [
"serde_core",
]
[[package]]
name = "toml_edit"
version = "0.22.27"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "41fe8c660ae4257887cf66394862d21dbca4a6ddd26f04a3560410406a2f819a"
dependencies = [
"indexmap 2.14.0",
"indexmap 2.11.4",
"serde",
"serde_spanned 0.6.9",
"toml_datetime 0.6.11",
"toml_write",
"winnow 0.7.13",
]
[[package]]
name = "toml_edit"
version = "0.25.11+spec-1.1.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "0b59c4d22ed448339746c59b905d24568fcbb3ab65a500494f7b8c3e97739f2b"
dependencies = [
"indexmap 2.14.0",
"toml_datetime 1.1.1+spec-1.1.0",
"toml_parser",
"winnow 1.0.2",
"winnow",
]
[[package]]
name = "toml_parser"
version = "1.1.2+spec-1.1.0"
version = "1.0.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "a2abe9b86193656635d2411dc43050282ca48aa31c2451210f4202550afb7526"
checksum = "4cf893c33be71572e0e9aa6dd15e6677937abd686b066eac3f8cd3531688a627"
dependencies = [
"winnow 1.0.2",
"winnow",
]
[[package]]
@@ -3060,12 +2779,6 @@ version = "1.0.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d163a63c116ce562a22cda521fcc4d79152e7aba014456fb5eb442f6d6a10109"
[[package]]
name = "topological-sort"
version = "0.2.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "ea68304e134ecd095ac6c3574494fc62b909f416c4fca77e440530221e549d3d"
[[package]]
name = "tracing"
version = "0.1.41"
@@ -3140,9 +2853,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "tree-sitter"
version = "0.26.8"
version = "0.25.9"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "887bd495d0582c5e3e0d8ece2233666169fa56a9644d172fc22ad179ab2d0538"
checksum = "ccd2a058a86cfece0bf96f7cce1021efef9c8ed0e892ab74639173e5ed7a34fa"
dependencies = [
"cc",
"regex",
@@ -3162,30 +2875,6 @@ dependencies = [
"tree-sitter-language",
]
[[package]]
name = "tree-sitter-generate"
version = "0.26.8"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "c3fb2e1bdb1d5f9d23cd5fa68cf98b3bedbd223c92a2edd60bbcf30bcf7180a5"
dependencies = [
"bitflags 2.9.4",
"dunce",
"indexmap 2.14.0",
"indoc",
"log 0.4.28",
"pathdiff",
"regex",
"regex-syntax",
"rquickjs",
"rustc-hash 2.1.1",
"semver",
"serde",
"serde_json",
"smallbitvec",
"thiserror",
"topological-sort",
]
[[package]]
name = "tree-sitter-json"
version = "0.24.8"
@@ -3202,16 +2891,6 @@ version = "0.1.5"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "c4013970217383f67b18aef68f6fb2e8d409bc5755227092d32efb0422ba24b8"
[[package]]
name = "tree-sitter-python"
version = "0.23.6"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "3d065aaa27f3aaceaf60c1f0e0ac09e1cb9eb8ed28e7bcdaa52129cffc7f4b04"
dependencies = [
"cc",
"tree-sitter-language",
]
[[package]]
name = "tree-sitter-ql"
version = "0.23.1"
@@ -3232,15 +2911,6 @@ dependencies = [
"tree-sitter-language",
]
[[package]]
name = "tree-sitter-swift"
version = "0.7.2"
dependencies = [
"cc",
"tree-sitter-generate",
"tree-sitter-language",
]
[[package]]
name = "triomphe"
version = "0.1.14"
@@ -3290,12 +2960,6 @@ version = "0.1.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "e70f2a8b45122e719eb623c01822704c4e0907e7e426a05927e1a1cfff5b75d0"
[[package]]
name = "unicode-segmentation"
version = "1.13.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "9629274872b2bfaf8d66f5f15725007f635594914870f65218920345aa11aa8c"
[[package]]
name = "unicode-xid"
version = "0.2.6"
@@ -3685,15 +3349,6 @@ dependencies = [
"memchr",
]
[[package]]
name = "winnow"
version = "1.0.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "2ee1708bef14716a11bae175f579062d4554d95be2c6829f518df847b7b3fdd0"
dependencies = [
"memchr",
]
[[package]]
name = "wit-bindgen"
version = "0.45.1"
@@ -3712,29 +3367,6 @@ version = "1.0.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "cfe53a6657fd280eaa890a3bc59152892ffa3e30101319d168b781ed6529b049"
[[package]]
name = "yeast"
version = "0.1.0"
dependencies = [
"clap",
"serde",
"serde_json",
"serde_yaml",
"tree-sitter",
"tree-sitter-python",
"tree-sitter-ruby",
"yeast-macros",
]
[[package]]
name = "yeast-macros"
version = "0.1.0"
dependencies = [
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
"syn",
]
[[package]]
name = "yoke"
version = "0.8.0"

View File

@@ -4,11 +4,7 @@
resolver = "2"
members = [
"shared/tree-sitter-extractor",
"shared/yeast",
"shared/yeast-macros",
"ruby/extractor",
"unified/extractor",
"unified/extractor/tree-sitter-swift",
"rust/extractor",
"rust/extractor/macros",
"rust/ast-generator",

View File

@@ -102,7 +102,6 @@ use_repo(
tree_sitter_extractors_deps,
"vendor_ts__anyhow-1.0.100",
"vendor_ts__argfile-0.2.1",
"vendor_ts__cc-1.2.61",
"vendor_ts__chalk-ir-0.104.0",
"vendor_ts__chrono-0.4.42",
"vendor_ts__clap-4.5.48",
@@ -142,18 +141,14 @@ use_repo(
"vendor_ts__serde-1.0.228",
"vendor_ts__serde_json-1.0.145",
"vendor_ts__serde_with-3.14.1",
"vendor_ts__serde_yaml-0.9.34-deprecated",
"vendor_ts__syn-2.0.106",
"vendor_ts__toml-0.9.7",
"vendor_ts__tracing-0.1.41",
"vendor_ts__tracing-flame-0.2.0",
"vendor_ts__tracing-subscriber-0.3.20",
"vendor_ts__tree-sitter-0.26.8",
"vendor_ts__tree-sitter-0.25.9",
"vendor_ts__tree-sitter-embedded-template-0.25.0",
"vendor_ts__tree-sitter-generate-0.26.8",
"vendor_ts__tree-sitter-json-0.24.8",
"vendor_ts__tree-sitter-language-0.1.5",
"vendor_ts__tree-sitter-python-0.23.6",
"vendor_ts__tree-sitter-ql-0.23.1",
"vendor_ts__tree-sitter-ruby-0.23.1",
"vendor_ts__triomphe-0.1.14",

View File

@@ -8,5 +8,5 @@
import actions
from UsesStep uses
where uses.getVersion().regexpMatch("^[A-Fa-f0-9]{40}([A-Fa-f0-9]{24})?$")
where uses.getVersion().regexpMatch("^[A-Fa-f0-9]{40}$")
select uses, "This 'uses' step has a pinned SHA version."

View File

@@ -1,23 +1,3 @@
## 0.4.36
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Altered 2 patterns in the `poisonable_steps` modelling. Extra sinks are detected in the following cases: scripts executed via python modules and `go run` in directories are detected as potential mechanisms of injection. For the go execution pattern, the pattern is updated to now ignore flags that occur between go and the specific command. This change may lead to more results being detected by the following queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/critical`, `actions/cache-poisoning/poisonable-step`, `actions/cache-poisoning/direct-cache` and `actions/artifact-poisoning/path-traversal`.
## 0.4.35
No user-facing changes.
## 0.4.34
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Removed false positive injection sink models for the `context` input of `docker/build-push-action` and the `allowed-endpoints` input of `step-security/harden-runner`.
## 0.4.33
No user-facing changes.
## 0.4.32
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
---
category: minorAnalysis
---
* The GitHub Actions analysis now recognizes more Bash regex checks that restrict a value to alphanumeric characters, include regexes like `^[0-9a-zA-Z]{40}([0-9a-zA-Z]{24})?$` which check for a sha1 or sha256 hash. This may reduce false positive results where command output is validated with grouped or optional alphanumeric patterns before being used.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.4.33
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
## 0.4.34
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Removed false positive injection sink models for the `context` input of `docker/build-push-action` and the `allowed-endpoints` input of `step-security/harden-runner`.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.4.35
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
## 0.4.36
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Altered 2 patterns in the `poisonable_steps` modelling. Extra sinks are detected in the following cases: scripts executed via python modules and `go run` in directories are detected as potential mechanisms of injection. For the go execution pattern, the pattern is updated to now ignore flags that occur between go and the specific command. This change may lead to more results being detected by the following queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/critical`, `actions/cache-poisoning/poisonable-step`, `actions/cache-poisoning/direct-cache` and `actions/artifact-poisoning/path-traversal`.

View File

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
---
lastReleaseVersion: 0.4.36
lastReleaseVersion: 0.4.32

View File

@@ -785,22 +785,7 @@ module Bash {
/**
* Holds if the given regex is used to match an alphanumeric string
* eg: `^[0-9a-zA-Z]{40}([0-9a-zA-Z]{24})?$`, `^[0-9]+$` or `^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$`
* eg: `^[0-9a-zA-Z]{40}$`, `^[0-9]+$` or `^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$`
*/
string alphaNumericRegex() {
exists(string r1, string r2, string r3, string r4 |
// An alphanumeric character class
r1 = "\\[([09azAZ_-]+)\\]" and
// The same as above, followed by a quantifier like `+` or `{20}`
r2 = r1 + "(\\+|\\{\\d+\\})" and
// The same as above, possibly with parentheses around it
r3 = "\\(?" + r2 + "\\)?" and
// The same as above, possibly with a `?` after it
r4 = r3 + "\\??"
|
// The same as above, repeated one or more times, and with `^` at the
// beginning and `$` at the end
result = "^\\^(" + r4 + ")+\\$$"
)
}
string alphaNumericRegex() { result = "^\\^\\[([09azAZ_-]+)\\](\\+|\\{\\d+\\})\\$$" }
}

View File

@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ extensions:
- ["(source|sh|bash|zsh|fish)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\b", 2]
- ["(node)\\s+([^\\s]+)(\\.js|\\.ts)\\b", 2]
- ["(python[\\d\\.]*)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.py\\b", 2]
- ["(python[\\d\\.]*)\\s+-m\\s+([A-Za-z_][\\w\\.]*)\\b", 2] # eg: pythonX -m anything(dir or file)
- ["(ruby)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.rb\\b", 2]
- ["(go)\\s+(generate|run)(?:\\s+-[^\\s]+)*\\s+([^\\s]+)", 3]
- ["(go)\\s+(generate|run)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.go\\b", 3]
- ["(dotnet)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.csproj\\b", 2]

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
extensions:
- addsTo:
pack: codeql/actions-all
extensible: actionsSinkModel
data:
- ["docker/build-push-action", "*", "input.context", "code-injection", "manual"]

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
extensions:
- addsTo:
pack: codeql/actions-all
extensible: actionsSinkModel
data:
- ["step-security/harden-runner", "*", "input.allowed-endpoints", "command-injection", "manual"]

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
name: codeql/actions-all
version: 0.4.37-dev
version: 0.4.33-dev
library: true
warnOnImplicitThis: true
dependencies:

View File

@@ -1,35 +1,3 @@
## 0.6.28
### Query Metadata Changes
* Adjusted the name of `actions/untrusted-checkout/high` to more clearly describe which parts of the scenario are in a privileged context.
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* The `actions/unpinned-tag` query now analyzes composite action metadata (`action.yml`/`action.yaml` files) in addition to workflow files, providing more comprehensive detection of unpinned action references across the entire Actions ecosystem.
### Bug Fixes
* Fixed help file descriptions for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`. Previously the messages were unclear as to why and how the vulnerabilities could occur.
## 0.6.27
No user-facing changes.
## 0.6.26
### Major Analysis Improvements
* Fixed alert messages in `actions/artifact-poisoning/critical` and `actions/artifact-poisoning/medium` as they previously included a redundant placeholder in the alert message that would on occasion contain a long block of yml that makes the alert difficult to understand. Also improved the wording to make it clearer that it is not the artifact that is being poisoned, but instead a potentially untrusted artifact that is consumed. Finally, changed the alert location to be the source, to align more with other queries reporting an artifact (e.g. zipslip) which is more useful.
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* The query `actions/missing-workflow-permissions` no longer produces false positive results on reusable workflows where all callers set permissions.
## 0.6.25
No user-facing changes.
## 0.6.24
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -26,23 +26,10 @@ string permissionsForJob(Job job) {
"{" + concat(string permission | permission = jobNeedsPermission(job) | permission, ", ") + "}"
}
predicate jobHasPermissions(Job job) {
exists(job.getPermissions())
or
exists(job.getEnclosingWorkflow().getPermissions())
or
// The workflow is reusable and cannot be triggered in any other way; check callers
exists(ReusableWorkflow r | r = job.getEnclosingWorkflow() |
not exists(Event e | e = r.getOn().getAnEvent() | e.getName() != "workflow_call") and
forall(Job caller | caller = job.getEnclosingWorkflow().(ReusableWorkflow).getACaller() |
jobHasPermissions(caller)
)
)
}
from Job job, string permissions
where
not jobHasPermissions(job) and
not exists(job.getPermissions()) and
not exists(job.getEnclosingWorkflow().getPermissions()) and
// exists a trigger event that is not a workflow_call
exists(Event e |
e = job.getATriggerEvent() and

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/**
* @name Unpinned tag for a non-immutable Action in workflow or composite action
* @name Unpinned tag for a non-immutable Action in workflow
* @description Using a tag for a non-immutable Action that is not pinned to a commit can lead to executing an untrusted Action through a supply chain attack.
* @kind problem
* @security-severity 5.0
@@ -15,9 +15,7 @@ import actions
import codeql.actions.security.UseOfUnversionedImmutableAction
bindingset[version]
private predicate isPinnedCommit(string version) {
version.regexpMatch("^[A-Fa-f0-9]{40}([A-Fa-f0-9]{24})?$")
}
private predicate isPinnedCommit(string version) { version.regexpMatch("^[A-Fa-f0-9]{40}$") }
bindingset[nwo]
private predicate isTrustedOwner(string nwo) {
@@ -33,26 +31,15 @@ private predicate isPinnedContainer(string version) {
bindingset[nwo]
private predicate isContainerImage(string nwo) { nwo.regexpMatch("^docker://.+") }
private predicate getStepContainerName(UsesStep uses, string name) {
exists(Workflow workflow |
uses.getEnclosingWorkflow() = workflow and
(
workflow.getName() = name
or
not exists(workflow.getName()) and workflow.getLocation().getFile().getBaseName() = name
)
)
or
exists(CompositeAction action |
uses.getEnclosingCompositeAction() = action and
name = action.getLocation().getFile().getBaseName()
)
}
from UsesStep uses, string nwo, string version, string name
from UsesStep uses, string nwo, string version, Workflow workflow, string name
where
uses.getCallee() = nwo and
getStepContainerName(uses, name) and
uses.getEnclosingWorkflow() = workflow and
(
workflow.getName() = name
or
not exists(workflow.getName()) and workflow.getLocation().getFile().getBaseName() = name
) and
uses.getVersion() = version and
not isTrustedOwner(nwo) and
not (if isContainerImage(nwo) then isPinnedContainer(version) else isPinnedCommit(version)) and

View File

@@ -1,35 +1,6 @@
## Overview
GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. Under certain conditions described below, attackers can take over a repository by opening malicious PRs from forks. The attacks can result in malicious code execution causing unauthorized changes to the repository or exfiltration of repository secrets and a compromise of connected systems.
## Workflow Security Model
In GitHub Actions, there is a distinction between unprivileged and privileged workflows. For example, a workflow with a `pull_request` trigger is unprivileged while a workflow with `pull_request_target` is privileged.
This is relevant especially for PRs from forks. Normal PRs can only be submitted by people who have write access to a repository, while PRs from forks can be submitted by anyone.
On a PR from a fork, an unprivileged `pull_request` workflow has only limited capabilities but a privileged `pull_request_target` workflow is much more dangerous. A privileged workflow:
* Runs in the context of the base repository
* Has access to organization and repository secrets (e.g., API keys, deployment tokens)
* Has a read/write `GITHUB_TOKEN` by default
* Can access private resources
Certain triggers automatically grant a workflow elevated privileges:
* `pull_request_target` as described above
* `workflow_run`: Triggered when another workflow completes.
* `issue_comment`: Triggered when a comment is made on an issue or PR.
## Attack Details
* A repository has a privileged workflow
* An attacker forks the repository and adds malicious code (e.g., in the build script)
* The attacker opens a PR from the fork, and, if needed, comments on the PR
* The workflow in the base repository checks out the forked code
* The workflow runs the malicious code
Please note that not only build scripts can be malicious code vectors. There is a large number of other possibilities. Some of them are listed in the [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/) catalog.
GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. A potentially dangerous misuse of the triggers such as `pull_request_target` or `issue_comment` followed by an explicit checkout of untrusted code (Pull Request HEAD) may lead to repository compromise if untrusted code gets executed (e.g., due to a modified build script) in a privileged job.
## Recommendation
@@ -41,8 +12,6 @@ The best practice is to handle the potentially untrusted pull request via the **
The artifacts downloaded from the first workflow should be considered untrusted and must be verified.
Additionally, ensure that least privilege are used both at the workflow level (through event triggers and workflow permissions) and job level (through job permissions).
## Example
### Incorrect Usage
@@ -164,6 +133,3 @@ jobs:
## References
- GitHub Security Lab Research: [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/).
- Mitigating risks of untrusted checkout: [GitHub Docs](https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/actions/reference/security/secure-use#mitigating-the-risks-of-untrusted-code-checkout).
- Securing with least privilege: [Workflow secure use](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/secure-use).
- Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/).

View File

@@ -51,6 +51,5 @@ where
event.getName() = checkoutTriggers() and
not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(checkout, event, "untrusted-checkout")) and
not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(poisonable, event, "untrusted-checkout"))
select checkout, checkout, poisonable,
"Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@).",
event, event.getName()
select poisonable, checkout, poisonable,
"Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@)", event, event.getName()

View File

@@ -1,35 +1,6 @@
## Overview
GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. Under certain conditions described below, attackers can take over a repository by opening malicious PRs from forks. The attacks can result in malicious code execution causing unauthorized changes to the repository or exfiltration of repository secrets and a compromise of connected systems.
## Workflow Security Model
In GitHub Actions, there is a distinction between unprivileged and privileged workflows. For example, a workflow with a `pull_request` trigger is unprivileged while a workflow with `pull_request_target` is privileged.
This is relevant especially for PRs from forks. Normal PRs can only be submitted by people who have write access to a repository, while PRs from forks can be submitted by anyone.
On a PR from a fork, an unprivileged `pull_request` workflow has only limited capabilities but a privileged `pull_request_target` workflow is much more dangerous. A privileged workflow:
* Runs in the context of the base repository
* Has access to organization and repository secrets (e.g., API keys, deployment tokens)
* Has a read/write `GITHUB_TOKEN` by default
* Can access private resources
Certain triggers automatically grant a workflow elevated privileges:
* `pull_request_target` as described above
* `workflow_run`: Triggered when another workflow completes.
* `issue_comment`: Triggered when a comment is made on an issue or PR.
## Attack Details
* A repository has a privileged workflow
* An attacker forks the repository and adds malicious code (e.g., in the build script)
* The attacker opens a PR from the fork, and, if needed, comments on the PR
* The workflow in the base repository checks out the forked code
* The workflow runs the malicious code
Please note that not only build scripts can be malicious code vectors. There is a large number of other possibilities. Some of them are listed in the [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/) catalog.
GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. A potentially dangerous misuse of the triggers such as `pull_request_target` or `issue_comment` followed by an explicit checkout of untrusted code (Pull Request HEAD) may lead to repository compromise if untrusted code gets executed (e.g., due to a modified build script) in a privileged job.
## Recommendation
@@ -41,8 +12,6 @@ The best practice is to handle the potentially untrusted pull request via the **
The artifacts downloaded from the first workflow should be considered untrusted and must be verified.
Additionally, ensure that least privilege are used both at the workflow level (through event triggers and workflow permissions) and job level (through job permissions).
## Example
### Incorrect Usage
@@ -164,6 +133,3 @@ jobs:
## References
- GitHub Security Lab Research: [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/).
- Mitigating risks of untrusted checkout: [GitHub Docs](https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/actions/reference/security/secure-use#mitigating-the-risks-of-untrusted-code-checkout).
- Securing with least privilege: [Workflow secure use](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/secure-use).
- Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/).

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/**
* @name Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged context
* @name Checkout of untrusted code in trusted context
* @description Privileged workflows have read/write access to the base repository and access to secrets.
* By explicitly checking out and running the build script from a fork the untrusted code is running in an environment
* that is able to push to the base repository and to access secrets.
@@ -42,6 +42,5 @@ where
not event.getName() = "issue_comment" and
not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(checkout, event, "untrusted-checkout"))
)
select checkout,
"Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@).",
event, event.getName()
select checkout, "Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@)", event,
event.getName()

View File

@@ -1,35 +1,6 @@
## Overview
GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. Under certain conditions described below, attackers can take over a repository by opening malicious PRs from forks. The attacks can result in malicious code execution causing unauthorized changes to the repository or exfiltration of repository secrets and a compromise of connected systems.
## Workflow Security Model
In GitHub Actions, there is a distinction between unprivileged and privileged workflows. For example, a workflow with a `pull_request` trigger is unprivileged while a workflow with `pull_request_target` is privileged.
This is relevant especially for PRs from forks. Normal PRs can only be submitted by people who have write access to a repository, while PRs from forks can be submitted by anyone.
On a PR from a fork, an unprivileged `pull_request` workflow has only limited capabilities but a privileged `pull_request_target` workflow is much more dangerous. A privileged workflow:
* Runs in the context of the base repository
* Has access to organization and repository secrets (e.g., API keys, deployment tokens)
* Has a read/write `GITHUB_TOKEN` by default
* Can access private resources
Certain triggers automatically grant a workflow elevated privileges:
* `pull_request_target` as described above
* `workflow_run`: Triggered when another workflow completes.
* `issue_comment`: Triggered when a comment is made on an issue or PR.
## Attack Details
* A repository has a privileged workflow
* An attacker forks the repository and adds malicious code (e.g., in the build script)
* The attacker opens a PR from the fork, and, if needed, comments on the PR
* The workflow in the base repository checks out the forked code
* The workflow runs the malicious code
Please note that not only build scripts can be malicious code vectors. There is a large number of other possibilities. Some of them are listed in the [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/) catalog.
GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. A potentially dangerous misuse of the triggers such as `pull_request_target` or `issue_comment` followed by an explicit checkout of untrusted code (Pull Request HEAD) may lead to repository compromise if untrusted code gets executed (e.g., due to a modified build script) in a privileged job.
## Recommendation
@@ -41,8 +12,6 @@ The best practice is to handle the potentially untrusted pull request via the **
The artifacts downloaded from the first workflow should be considered untrusted and must be verified.
Additionally, ensure that least privilege are used both at the workflow level (through event triggers and workflow permissions) and job level (through job permissions).
## Example
### Incorrect Usage
@@ -164,6 +133,3 @@ jobs:
## References
- GitHub Security Lab Research: [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/).
- Mitigating risks of untrusted checkout: [GitHub Docs](https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/actions/reference/security/secure-use#mitigating-the-risks-of-untrusted-code-checkout).
- Securing with least privilege: [Workflow secure use](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/secure-use).
- Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/).

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/**
* @name Checkout of untrusted code in a trusted context
* @name Checkout of untrusted code in trusted context
* @description Privileged workflows have read/write access to the base repository and access to secrets.
* By explicitly checking out and running the build script from a fork the untrusted code is running in an environment
* that is able to push to the base repository and to access secrets.

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
---
category: majorAnalysis
---
* Fixed alert messages in `actions/artifact-poisoning/critical` and `actions/artifact-poisoning/medium` as they previously included a redundant placeholder in the alert message that would on occasion contain a long block of yml that makes the alert difficult to understand. Also clarify the wording to make it clear that it is not the artifact that is being poisoned, but instead a potentially untrusted artifact that is consumed. Also change the alert location to be the source, to align more with other queries reporting an artifact (e.g. zipslip) which is more useful.

View File

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
---
category: majorAnalysis
---
* Adjusted `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical` to align more with other untrusted resource queries, where the alert location is the location where the artifact is obtained from (the checkout point). This aligns with the other 2 related queries. This will cause the same alerts to re-open for closed alerts of this query.

View File

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
---
category: minorAnalysis
---
* The `actions/unpinned-tag` query now recognizes 64-character SHA-256 commit hashes as properly pinned references, in addition to 40-character SHA-1 hashes.

View File

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
---
category: minorAnalysis
---
* Altered the alert message for clarity for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`.

View File

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
---
category: fix
---
* Adjusted (minor) help file descriptions for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`. Clarified wording on in minor point, added one more listed resource and added one more recommendation for things to check.

View File

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
---
category: queryMetadata
---
* Reversed adjustment of the name of `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, but kept the portion of the previous change for the word "trusted" to "privileged". Added a missing "a" to phrasing in `actions/untrusted-checkout/high` and `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.6.25
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
## 0.6.26
### Major Analysis Improvements
* Fixed alert messages in `actions/artifact-poisoning/critical` and `actions/artifact-poisoning/medium` as they previously included a redundant placeholder in the alert message that would on occasion contain a long block of yml that makes the alert difficult to understand. Also improved the wording to make it clearer that it is not the artifact that is being poisoned, but instead a potentially untrusted artifact that is consumed. Finally, changed the alert location to be the source, to align more with other queries reporting an artifact (e.g. zipslip) which is more useful.
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* The query `actions/missing-workflow-permissions` no longer produces false positive results on reusable workflows where all callers set permissions.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.6.27
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
## 0.6.28
### Query Metadata Changes
* Adjusted the name of `actions/untrusted-checkout/high` to more clearly describe which parts of the scenario are in a privileged context.
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* The `actions/unpinned-tag` query now analyzes composite action metadata (`action.yml`/`action.yaml` files) in addition to workflow files, providing more comprehensive detection of unpinned action references across the entire Actions ecosystem.
### Bug Fixes
* Fixed help file descriptions for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`. Previously the messages were unclear as to why and how the vulnerabilities could occur.

View File

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
---
lastReleaseVersion: 0.6.28
lastReleaseVersion: 0.6.24

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
name: codeql/actions-queries
version: 0.6.29-dev
version: 0.6.25-dev
library: false
warnOnImplicitThis: true
groups: [actions, queries]

View File

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
on:
workflow_call:
jobs:
build:
name: Build and test
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/deploy-pages

View File

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
on:
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write
pages: write
jobs:
call-workflow:
uses: ./.github/workflows/perms11.yml

View File

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
name: Composite unpinned tag test
runs:
using: "composite"
steps:
- uses: foo/bar@v2
- uses: foo/bar@25b062c917b0c75f8b47d8469aff6c94ffd89abb

View File

@@ -11,9 +11,3 @@ jobs:
- uses: foo/bar@25b062c917b0c75f8b47d8469aff6c94ffd89abb
- uses: docker://foo/bar@latest
- uses: docker://foo/bar@sha256:887a259a5a534f3c4f36cb02dca341673c6089431057242cdc931e9f133147e9
# SHA-256 pinned (64 hex chars) - should NOT be flagged
- uses: foo/bar@25b062c917b0c75f8b47d8469aff6c94ffd89abb25b062c917b0c75f8b47d84d
# SHA-1 pinned (40 hex chars) regression - should NOT be flagged
- uses: foo/bar@a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2
# Invalid 50-char hex string - should be flagged
- uses: foo/bar@a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2a1b2c3d4e5

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
| .github/actions/unpinned-tag/action.yml:5:13:5:22 | foo/bar@v2 | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'action.yml' step $@ uses 'foo/bar' with ref 'v2', not a pinned commit hash | .github/actions/unpinned-tag/action.yml:5:7:6:4 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:19:13:19:36 | completely/fakeaction@v2 | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'actor_trusted_checkout.yml' step $@ uses 'completely/fakeaction' with ref 'v2', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:19:7:23:4 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:23:13:23:37 | fakerepo/comment-on-pr@v1 | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'actor_trusted_checkout.yml' step $@ uses 'fakerepo/comment-on-pr' with ref 'v1', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:23:7:26:21 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:13:15:13:49 | dawidd6/action-download-artifact@v2 | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'Pull Request Open' step $@ uses 'dawidd6/action-download-artifact' with ref 'v2', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:13:9:18:6 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
@@ -34,4 +33,3 @@
| .github/workflows/test18.yml:37:21:37:63 | sonarsource/sonarcloud-github-action@master | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'Sonar' step $@ uses 'sonarsource/sonarcloud-github-action' with ref 'master', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/test18.yml:36:15:40:58 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:10:13:10:22 | foo/bar@v1 | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'unpinned_tags.yml' step $@ uses 'foo/bar' with ref 'v1', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:10:7:11:4 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:12:13:12:35 | docker://foo/bar@latest | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'unpinned_tags.yml' step $@ uses 'docker://foo/bar' with ref 'latest', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:12:7:13:4 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:19:13:19:70 | foo/bar@a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2a1b2c3d4e5 | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'unpinned_tags.yml' step $@ uses 'foo/bar' with ref 'a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2a1b2c3d4e5', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:19:7:19:71 | Uses Step | Uses Step |

View File

@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ edges
| .github/actions/download-artifact/action.yaml:25:7:29:4 | Run Step | .github/actions/download-artifact/action.yaml:29:7:32:18 | Run Step |
| .github/actions/download-artifact/action.yaml:29:7:32:18 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning91.yml:19:9:25:6 | Run Step: metadata |
| .github/actions/download-artifact/action.yaml:29:7:32:18 | Run Step | .github/workflows/resolve-args.yml:22:9:36:13 | Run Step: resolve-step |
| .github/actions/unpinned-tag/action.yml:5:7:6:4 | Uses Step | .github/actions/unpinned-tag/action.yml:6:7:6:61 | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:9:7:14:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:14:7:15:4 | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:14:7:15:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:15:7:19:4 | Run Step |
| .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:15:7:19:4 | Run Step | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:19:7:23:4 | Uses Step |
@@ -312,10 +311,7 @@ edges
| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:9:7:10:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:10:7:11:4 | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:10:7:11:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:11:7:12:4 | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:11:7:12:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:12:7:13:4 | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:12:7:13:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:13:7:15:4 | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:13:7:15:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:15:7:17:4 | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:15:7:17:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:17:7:19:4 | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:17:7:19:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:19:7:19:71 | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:12:7:13:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:13:7:13:101 | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:7:9:14:6 | Run Step: pr_number | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:14:9:19:72 | Run Step |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:11:9:12:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:12:9:13:6 | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:12:9:13:6 | Uses Step | .github/actions/dangerous-git-checkout/action.yml:6:7:11:4 | Uses Step |
@@ -338,42 +334,42 @@ edges
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_3.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_3.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step |
#select
| .github/actions/dangerous-git-checkout/action.yml:6:7:11:4 | Uses Step | .github/actions/dangerous-git-checkout/action.yml:6:7:11:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:13:9:13:23 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:32:9:37:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:48:9:52:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:79:9:84:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:84:9:93:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:15:9:20:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:15:9:20:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:25:9:48:6 | Run Step: set-milestone | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:3:5:3:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/reusable_caller1.yaml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:10:11:18:8 | Run Step | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:10:11:18:8 | Run Step | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:21:11:23:22 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:12:7:16:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:12:7:16:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:17:7:21:4 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/level0.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/level0.yml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/level0.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/level0.yml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:42:9:47:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:52:9:58:24 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:216:9:222:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:216:9:222:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:222:9:227:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:250:9:256:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:250:9:256:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:256:9:261:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:284:9:290:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:284:9:290:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:290:9:295:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:391:9:395:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:395:9:404:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:404:9:414:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:414:9:423:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:423:9:432:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/reusable_caller3.yaml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:33:9:36:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:36:9:39:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:49:9:59:6 | Run Step: benchmark-pr | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:59:9:60:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:60:9:60:37 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test10.yml:20:9:25:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test10.yml:20:9:25:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test10.yml:25:9:30:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test10.yml:8:3:8:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/test11.yml:84:7:90:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test11.yml:84:7:90:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test11.yml:90:7:93:54 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test11.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test17.yml:12:15:19:12 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test17.yml:12:15:19:12 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test17.yml:19:15:23:58 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test17.yml:3:5:3:16 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/test27.yml:18:9:21:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test27.yml:18:9:21:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test27.yml:21:9:22:16 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test26.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/test29.yml:8:7:14:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test29.yml:8:7:14:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test29.yml:14:7:21:11 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test29.yml:1:5:1:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:35:7:41:4 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:41:7:47:4 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:47:7:51:46 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:8:9:11:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:8:9:11:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:15:9:18:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:30:9:32:23 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:32:9:37:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:32:9:37:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:48:9:52:2 | Run Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:48:9:52:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:79:9:84:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:79:9:84:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:84:9:93:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:84:9:93:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:25:9:48:6 | Run Step: set-milestone | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:15:9:20:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:25:9:48:6 | Run Step: set-milestone | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:3:5:3:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/reusable_caller1.yaml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:21:11:23:22 | Run Step | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:10:11:18:8 | Run Step | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:21:11:23:22 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:17:7:21:4 | Run Step | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:12:7:16:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:17:7:21:4 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/level0.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/level0.yml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/level0.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/level0.yml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/poc2.yml:42:9:47:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:42:9:47:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/poc2.yml:52:9:58:24 | Run Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:52:9:58:24 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:222:9:227:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:216:9:222:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:222:9:227:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:256:9:261:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:250:9:256:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:256:9:261:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:290:9:295:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:284:9:290:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:290:9:295:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:391:9:395:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:391:9:395:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:395:9:404:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:395:9:404:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:404:9:414:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:404:9:414:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:414:9:423:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:414:9:423:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:423:9:432:2 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:423:9:432:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/reusable_caller3.yaml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:33:9:36:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:33:9:36:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:36:9:39:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:36:9:39:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:49:9:59:6 | Run Step: benchmark-pr | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:49:9:59:6 | Run Step: benchmark-pr | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:59:9:60:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:59:9:60:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:60:9:60:37 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:60:9:60:37 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test10.yml:25:9:30:2 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test10.yml:20:9:25:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test10.yml:25:9:30:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test10.yml:8:3:8:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/test11.yml:90:7:93:54 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test11.yml:84:7:90:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test11.yml:90:7:93:54 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test11.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test17.yml:19:15:23:58 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test17.yml:12:15:19:12 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test17.yml:19:15:23:58 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test17.yml:3:5:3:16 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/test27.yml:21:9:22:16 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test27.yml:18:9:21:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test27.yml:21:9:22:16 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test26.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/test29.yml:14:7:21:11 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test29.yml:8:7:14:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test29.yml:14:7:21:11 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test29.yml:1:5:1:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:13:9:13:23 | Run Step | .github/actions/dangerous-git-checkout/action.yml:6:7:11:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:13:9:13:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:35:7:41:4 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:35:7:41:4 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:41:7:47:4 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:41:7:47:4 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:47:7:51:46 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:47:7:51:46 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:15:9:18:2 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:8:9:11:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:15:9:18:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:30:9:32:23 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:30:9:32:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |

View File

@@ -1,23 +1,23 @@
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:12:9:16:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:20:9:24:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:28:9:32:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:35:9:40:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:43:9:46:126 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:28:9:33:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:48:7:50:46 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit2.yml:27:9:31:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:26:9:30:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:30:9:35:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:57:9:62:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:79:9:83:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:95:9:100:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:109:9:114:66 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:103:9:109:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:139:9:144:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:444:9:449:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/test13.yml:20:7:25:4 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test13.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:14:9:19:72 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:1:5:1:17 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:12:9:16:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:20:9:24:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:28:9:32:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:35:9:40:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:43:9:46:126 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:28:9:33:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:48:7:50:46 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit2.yml:27:9:31:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:26:9:30:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:30:9:35:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:57:9:62:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:79:9:83:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:95:9:100:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:109:9:114:66 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:103:9:109:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:139:9:144:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:444:9:449:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/test13.yml:20:7:25:4 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test13.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:14:9:19:72 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:1:5:1:17 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |

View File

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
description: Support alias templates
compatibility: full
is_alias_template.rel: delete
alias_instantiation.rel: delete
alias_template_argument.rel: delete
alias_template_argument_value.rel: delete

View File

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
description: Capture information about one template being generated from another
compatibility: full
class_template_generated_from.rel: delete
function_template_generated_from.rel: delete
variable_template_generated_from.rel: delete
alias_template_generated_from.rel: delete

View File

@@ -7,12 +7,10 @@ ql/cpp/ql/src/Diagnostics/ExtractedFiles.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Diagnostics/ExtractionWarnings.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Diagnostics/FailedExtractorInvocations.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Arithmetic/BadAdditionOverflowCheck.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Arithmetic/IntMultToLong.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Arithmetic/SignedOverflowCheck.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Conversion/CastArrayPointerArithmetic.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Format/SnprintfOverflow.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Format/WrongNumberOfFormatArguments.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Format/WrongTypeFormatArguments.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Memory Management/AllocaInLoop.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Memory Management/PointerOverflow.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Memory Management/ReturnStackAllocatedMemory.ql
@@ -30,7 +28,6 @@ ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-120/VeryLikelyOverrunWrite.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-131/NoSpaceForZeroTerminator.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-134/UncontrolledFormatString.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-190/ArithmeticUncontrolled.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-190/ComparisonWithWiderType.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-191/UnsignedDifferenceExpressionComparedZero.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-253/HResultBooleanConversion.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-311/CleartextFileWrite.ql
@@ -43,7 +40,6 @@ ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-367/TOCTOUFilesystemRace.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-416/IteratorToExpiredContainer.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-416/UseOfStringAfterLifetimeEnds.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-416/UseOfUniquePointerAfterLifetimeEnds.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-468/SuspiciousAddWithSizeof.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-497/ExposedSystemData.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-611/XXE.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-676/DangerousFunctionOverflow.ql

View File

@@ -1,51 +1,3 @@
## 10.1.1
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* The `RemoteFlowSourceFunction` model for `fscanf` (and variants) now implements `hasSocketInput` to reflect that these functions may read from a socket.
## 10.1.0
### New Features
* A new predicate `getSwitchCase` was added to the `SwitchStmt` class, which yields the `n`th `case` statement from a `switch` statement.
* Data flow barriers and barrier guards can now be added using data extensions. For more information see [Customizing library models for C and C++](https://codeql.github.com/docs/codeql-language-guides/customizing-library-models-for-cpp/).
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Added taint flow models for the `Strsafe.h` header from the Windows SDK.
## 10.0.0
### Breaking Changes
* The deprecated `NonThrowingFunction` class has been removed, use `NonCppThrowingFunction` instead.
* The deprecated `ThrowingFunction` class has been removed, use `AlwaysSehThrowingFunction` instead.
### New Features
* Added a subclass `AutoconfConfigureTestFile` of `ConfigurationTestFile` that represents files created by GNU autoconf configure scripts to test the build configuration.
## 9.0.0
### Breaking Changes
* The `SourceModelCsv`, `SinkModelCsv`, and `SummaryModelCsv` classes and the associated CSV parsing infrastructure have been removed from `ExternalFlow.qll`. New models should be added as `.model.yml` files in the `ext/` directory.
### New Features
* Added a subclass `MesonPrivateTestFile` of `ConfigurationTestFile` that represents files created by Meson to test the build configuration.
* Added a class `ConstructorDirectFieldInit` to represent field initializations that occur in member initializer lists.
* Added a class `ConstructorDefaultFieldInit` to represent default field initializations.
* Added a class `DataFlow::IndirectParameterNode` to represent the indirection of a parameter as a dataflow node.
* Added a predicate `Node::asIndirectInstruction` which returns the `Instruction` that defines the indirect dataflow node, if any.
* Added a class `IndirectUninitializedNode` to represent the indirection of an uninitialized local variable as a dataflow node.
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Added `HttpReceiveHttpRequest`, `HttpReceiveRequestEntityBody`, and `HttpReceiveClientCertificate` from Win32's `http.h` as remote flow sources.
* Added dataflow through members initialized via non-static data member initialization (NSDMI).
## 8.0.3
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
---
category: feature
---
* Added a class `IndirectUninitializedNode` to represent the indirection of an uninitialized local variable as a dataflow node.

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
---
category: feature
---
* Added a class `DataFlow::IndirectParameterNode` to represent the indirection of a parameter as a dataflow node.
* Added a predicate `Node::asIndirectInstruction` which returns the `Instruction` that defines the indirect dataflow node, if any.

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
---
category: feature
---
* Added a class `ConstructorDirectFieldInit` to represent field initializations that occur in member initializer lists.
* Added a class `ConstructorDefaultFieldInit` to represent default field initializations.

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
---
category: breaking
---
* The `SourceModelCsv`, `SinkModelCsv`, and `SummaryModelCsv` classes and the associated CSV parsing infrastructure have been removed from `ExternalFlow.qll`. New models should be added as `.model.yml` files in the `ext/` directory.

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
---
category: minorAnalysis
---
* Added dataflow through members initialized via non-static data member initialization (NSDMI).

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
---
category: minorAnalysis
---
* Added `HttpReceiveHttpRequest`, `HttpReceiveRequestEntityBody`, and `HttpReceiveClientCertificate` from Win32's `http.h` as remote flow sources.

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
---
category: feature
---
* Added a subclass `MesonPrivateTestFile` of `ConfigurationTestFile` that represents files created by Meson to test the build configuration.

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
---
category: feature
---
* Added a subclass `AutoconfConfigureTestFile` of `ConfigurationTestFile` that represents files created by GNU autoconf configure scripts to test the build configuration.

View File

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
---
category: minorAnalysis
---
* Added flow source models for `scanf_s` and related functions.
* Added a `Call` column to `LocalFlowSourceFunction::hasLocalFlowSource` and `RemoteFlowSourceFunction::hasRemoteFlowSource`. The old predicates without a `Call` column continue to be supported.

View File

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
---
category: feature
---
* Added `AliasTemplateType` and `AliasTemplateInstantiationType` classes, representing C++ alias templates and their instantiations.

View File

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
---
category: deprecated
---
* The `UsingAliasTypedefType` class has been deprecated. Use `TypeAliasType` instead.

View File

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
---
category: feature
---
* Added a `getOriginalTemplate` predicate to `TemplateClass`, `TemplateFunction`, `TemplateVariable`, and `AliasTemplateType`, which yields the class member template the template was generated from. The predicates only have results for templates that are members of class template instantiations.

View File

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
## 10.0.0
### Breaking Changes
* The deprecated `NonThrowingFunction` class has been removed, use `NonCppThrowingFunction` instead.
* The deprecated `ThrowingFunction` class has been removed, use `AlwaysSehThrowingFunction` instead.
### New Features
* Added a subclass `AutoconfConfigureTestFile` of `ConfigurationTestFile` that represents files created by GNU autoconf configure scripts to test the build configuration.

View File

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
## 10.1.0
### New Features
* A new predicate `getSwitchCase` was added to the `SwitchStmt` class, which yields the `n`th `case` statement from a `switch` statement.
* Data flow barriers and barrier guards can now be added using data extensions. For more information see [Customizing library models for C and C++](https://codeql.github.com/docs/codeql-language-guides/customizing-library-models-for-cpp/).
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Added taint flow models for the `Strsafe.h` header from the Windows SDK.

View File

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
## 10.1.1
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* The `RemoteFlowSourceFunction` model for `fscanf` (and variants) now implements `hasSocketInput` to reflect that these functions may read from a socket.

View File

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
## 9.0.0
### Breaking Changes
* The `SourceModelCsv`, `SinkModelCsv`, and `SummaryModelCsv` classes and the associated CSV parsing infrastructure have been removed from `ExternalFlow.qll`. New models should be added as `.model.yml` files in the `ext/` directory.
### New Features
* Added a subclass `MesonPrivateTestFile` of `ConfigurationTestFile` that represents files created by Meson to test the build configuration.
* Added a class `ConstructorDirectFieldInit` to represent field initializations that occur in member initializer lists.
* Added a class `ConstructorDefaultFieldInit` to represent default field initializations.
* Added a class `DataFlow::IndirectParameterNode` to represent the indirection of a parameter as a dataflow node.
* Added a predicate `Node::asIndirectInstruction` which returns the `Instruction` that defines the indirect dataflow node, if any.
* Added a class `IndirectUninitializedNode` to represent the indirection of an uninitialized local variable as a dataflow node.
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Added `HttpReceiveHttpRequest`, `HttpReceiveRequestEntityBody`, and `HttpReceiveClientCertificate` from Win32's `http.h` as remote flow sources.
* Added dataflow through members initialized via non-static data member initialization (NSDMI).

View File

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
---
lastReleaseVersion: 10.1.1
lastReleaseVersion: 8.0.3

View File

@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
# Models for strsafe.h safe string functions
extensions:
- addsTo:
pack: codeql/cpp-all
extensible: sourceModel
data: # namespace, type, subtypes, name, signature, ext, output, kind, provenance
# StringCchGets: (pszDest, cchDest)
- ["", "", False, "StringCchGetsA", "", "", "Argument[*0]", "local", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCchGetsW", "", "", "Argument[*0]", "local", "manual"]
# StringCbGets: (pszDest, cbDest)
- ["", "", False, "StringCbGetsA", "", "", "Argument[*0]", "local", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCbGetsW", "", "", "Argument[*0]", "local", "manual"]
# StringCchGetsEx: (pszDest, cchDest, ppszDestEnd, pcchRemaining, dwFlags)
- ["", "", False, "StringCchGetsExA", "", "", "Argument[*0]", "local", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCchGetsExW", "", "", "Argument[*0]", "local", "manual"]
# StringCbGetsEx: (pszDest, cbDest, ppszDestEnd, pcbRemaining, dwFlags)
- ["", "", False, "StringCbGetsExA", "", "", "Argument[*0]", "local", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCbGetsExW", "", "", "Argument[*0]", "local", "manual"]
- addsTo:
pack: codeql/cpp-all
extensible: summaryModel
data: # namespace, type, subtypes, name, signature, ext, input, output, kind, provenance
# StringCchCopy: (pszDest, cchDest, pszSrc)
- ["", "", False, "StringCchCopyA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCchCopyW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCbCopy: (pszDest, cbDest, pszSrc)
- ["", "", False, "StringCbCopyA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCbCopyW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCchCopyEx: (pszDest, cchDest, pszSrc, ppszDestEnd, pcchRemaining, dwFlags)
- ["", "", False, "StringCchCopyExA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCchCopyExW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCbCopyEx: (pszDest, cbDest, pszSrc, ppszDestEnd, pcbRemaining, dwFlags)
- ["", "", False, "StringCbCopyExA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCbCopyExW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCchCopyN: (pszDest, cchDest, pszSrc, cchToCopy)
- ["", "", False, "StringCchCopyNA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCchCopyNW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCbCopyN: (pszDest, cbDest, pszSrc, cbToCopy)
- ["", "", False, "StringCbCopyNA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCbCopyNW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCchCopyNEx: (pszDest, cchDest, pszSrc, cchToCopy, ppszDestEnd, pcchRemaining, dwFlags)
- ["", "", False, "StringCchCopyNExA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCchCopyNExW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCbCopyNEx: (pszDest, cbDest, pszSrc, cbToCopy, ppszDestEnd, pcbRemaining, dwFlags)
- ["", "", False, "StringCbCopyNExA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCbCopyNExW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCchCat: (pszDest, cchDest, pszSrc)
- ["", "", False, "StringCchCatA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCchCatW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCbCat: (pszDest, cbDest, pszSrc)
- ["", "", False, "StringCbCatA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCbCatW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCchCatEx: (pszDest, cchDest, pszSrc, ppszDestEnd, pcchRemaining, dwFlags)
- ["", "", False, "StringCchCatExA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCchCatExW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCbCatEx: (pszDest, cbDest, pszSrc, ppszDestEnd, pcbRemaining, dwFlags)
- ["", "", False, "StringCbCatExA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCbCatExW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCchCatN: (pszDest, cchDest, pszSrc, cchToAppend)
- ["", "", False, "StringCchCatNA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCchCatNW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCbCatN: (pszDest, cbDest, pszSrc, cbToAppend)
- ["", "", False, "StringCbCatNA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCbCatNW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCchCatNEx: (pszDest, cchDest, pszSrc, cchToAppend, ppszDestEnd, pcchRemaining, dwFlags)
- ["", "", False, "StringCchCatNExA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCchCatNExW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCbCatNEx: (pszDest, cbDest, pszSrc, cbToAppend, ppszDestEnd, pcbRemaining, dwFlags)
- ["", "", False, "StringCbCatNExA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCbCatNExW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCchPrintf: (pszDest, cchDest, pszFormat, ...)
- ["", "", False, "StringCchPrintfA", "", "", "Argument[*2..8]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCchPrintfW", "", "", "Argument[*2..8]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCbPrintf: (pszDest, cbDest, pszFormat, ...)
- ["", "", False, "StringCbPrintfA", "", "", "Argument[*2..8]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCbPrintfW", "", "", "Argument[*2..8]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCchPrintfEx: (pszDest, cchDest, ppszDestEnd, pcchRemaining, dwFlags, pszFormat, ...)
- ["", "", False, "StringCchPrintfExA", "", "", "Argument[*5..11]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCchPrintfExW", "", "", "Argument[*5..11]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCbPrintfEx: (pszDest, cbDest, ppszDestEnd, pcbRemaining, dwFlags, pszFormat, ...)
- ["", "", False, "StringCbPrintfExA", "", "", "Argument[*5..11]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCbPrintfExW", "", "", "Argument[*5..11]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCchVPrintf: (pszDest, cchDest, pszFormat, argList)
- ["", "", False, "StringCchVPrintfA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCchVPrintfW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCbVPrintf: (pszDest, cbDest, pszFormat, argList)
- ["", "", False, "StringCbVPrintfA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCbVPrintfW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCchVPrintfEx: (pszDest, cchDest, ppszDestEnd, pcchRemaining, dwFlags, pszFormat, argList)
- ["", "", False, "StringCchVPrintfExA", "", "", "Argument[*5]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCchVPrintfExW", "", "", "Argument[*5]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCbVPrintfEx: (pszDest, cbDest, ppszDestEnd, pcbRemaining, dwFlags, pszFormat, argList)
- ["", "", False, "StringCbVPrintfExA", "", "", "Argument[*5]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCbVPrintfExW", "", "", "Argument[*5]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]

View File

@@ -12,7 +12,4 @@ extensions:
- ["", "", False, "_malloca", "0", "", "", False]
- ["", "", False, "calloc", "1", "0", "", True]
- ["std", "", False, "calloc", "1", "0", "", True]
- ["bsl", "", False, "calloc", "1", "0", "", True]
- ["", "", False, "aligned_alloc", "1", "", "", True]
- ["std", "", False, "aligned_alloc", "1", "", "", True]
- ["bsl", "", False, "aligned_alloc", "1", "", "", True]
- ["bsl", "", False, "calloc", "1", "0", "", True]

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
name: codeql/cpp-all
version: 10.1.2-dev
version: 8.0.4-dev
groups: cpp
dbscheme: semmlecode.cpp.dbscheme
extractor: cpp

View File

@@ -856,10 +856,8 @@ class AbstractClass extends Class {
/**
* A class template (this class also finds partial specializations
* of class templates).
*
* For example in the following code there is a `MyTemplateClass<T>`
* template:
* of class templates). For example in the following code there is a
* `MyTemplateClass<T>` template:
* ```
* template<class T>
* class MyTemplateClass {
@@ -895,29 +893,6 @@ class TemplateClass extends Class {
}
override string getAPrimaryQlClass() { result = "TemplateClass" }
/**
* Gets the class member template this template was generated from.
*
* This predicate only has results for templates that are members of class
* template instantiations. For example, for `MyTemplateClass<int>::C<S>`
* in the following code, the result is `MyTemplateClass<T>::C<S>`.
* ```cpp
* template<class T>
* class MyTemplateClass {
* template<class S>
* class C {
* ...
* };
* };
*
* template
* class MyTemplateClass<int>;
* ```
*/
TemplateClass getOriginalTemplate() {
class_template_generated_from(underlyingElement(this), unresolveElement(result))
}
}
/**

View File

@@ -278,8 +278,6 @@ class Declaration extends Locatable, @declaration {
or
variable_template_argument(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
or
alias_template_argument(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
or
template_template_argument(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
or
concept_template_argument(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
@@ -292,8 +290,6 @@ class Declaration extends Locatable, @declaration {
or
variable_template_argument_value(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
or
alias_template_argument_value(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
or
template_template_argument_value(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
or
concept_template_argument_value(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))

View File

@@ -278,15 +278,6 @@ private predicate isFromTemplateInstantiationRec(Element e, Element instantiatio
instantiation.(Variable).isConstructedFrom(_) and
e = instantiation
or
instantiation.(TypeAliasType).isConstructedFrom(_) and
e = instantiation
or
instantiation.(TemplateTemplateParameterInstantiation).isConstructedFrom(_) and
e = instantiation
or
exists(instantiation.(ConceptIdExpr).getConcept()) and
e = instantiation
or
isFromTemplateInstantiationRec(e.getEnclosingElement(), instantiation)
}
@@ -300,15 +291,6 @@ private predicate isFromUninstantiatedTemplateRec(Element e, Element template) {
is_variable_template(unresolveElement(template)) and
e = template
or
is_alias_template(unresolveElement(template)) and
e = template
or
usertypes(unresolveElement(template), _, 8) and // template template parameter
e = template
or
template instanceof @concept_template and
e = template
or
isFromUninstantiatedTemplateRec(e.getEnclosingElement(), template)
}

View File

@@ -828,27 +828,6 @@ class TemplateFunction extends Function {
* such things -- see FunctionTemplateSpecialization for further details.
*/
FunctionTemplateSpecialization getASpecialization() { result.getPrimaryTemplate() = this }
/**
* Gets the class member template this template was generated from.
*
* This predicate only has results for templates that are members of class
* template instantiations. For example, for `MyTemplateClass<int>::f<S>`
* in the following code, the result is `MyTemplateClass<T>::f<S>`.
* ```cpp
* template<class T>
* class MyTemplateClass {
* template<class S>
* S f();
* };
*
* template
* class MyTemplateClass<int>;
* ```
*/
TemplateFunction getOriginalTemplate() {
function_template_generated_from(underlyingElement(this), unresolveElement(result))
}
}
/**

View File

@@ -64,123 +64,23 @@ class CTypedefType extends TypedefType {
}
/**
* DEPRECATED: Use `TypeAlias` instead.
*
* A C++ type alias or alias template.
*
* For example the type declared in the following code:
* A using alias C++ typedef type. For example the type declared in the following code:
* ```
* using my_int2 = int;
* ```
*/
deprecated class UsingAliasTypedefType = TypeAliasType;
class UsingAliasTypedefType extends TypedefType {
UsingAliasTypedefType() { usertype_alias_kind(underlyingElement(this), 1) }
/**
* A C++ type alias or alias template.
*
* For example the type declared in the following code:
* ```
* using my_int2 = int;
* ```
*/
class TypeAliasType extends TypedefType {
TypeAliasType() { usertype_alias_kind(underlyingElement(this), 1) }
override string getAPrimaryQlClass() { result = "TypeAliasType" }
override string getAPrimaryQlClass() { result = "UsingAliasTypedefType" }
override string explain() {
result = "using {" + this.getBaseType().explain() + "} as \"" + this.getName() + "\""
}
/**
* Holds if this alias is constructed from another alias as a result of
* template instantiation.
*/
predicate isConstructedFrom(TypeAliasType t) {
alias_instantiation(underlyingElement(this), unresolveElement(t))
}
}
/**
* A C++ alias template.
*
* For example the type declared in the following code:
* ```
* template <typename T>
* using my_type = T;
* ```
*/
class AliasTemplateType extends TypeAliasType {
AliasTemplateType() { is_alias_template(underlyingElement(this)) }
override string getAPrimaryQlClass() { result = "AliasTemplateType" }
/**
* Gets an alias instantiated from this template.
*
* For example for `MyAliasTemplate<T>` in the following code, the results are
* `MyAliasTemplate<int>` and `MyAliasTemplate<long>`:
* ```
* template<typename T>
* using MyAliasTemplate = ...;
*
* MyAliasTemplate<int> instance1;
*
* MyAliasTemplate<long> instance2;
* ```
*/
TypeAliasType getAnInstantiation() { result.isConstructedFrom(this) }
/**
* Gets the class member template this template was generated from.
*
* This predicate only has results for templates that are members of class
* template instantiations. For example, for `MyTemplateClass<int>::t<S>`
* in the following code, the result is `MyTemplateClass<T>::t<S>`.
* ```cpp
* template<class T>
* class MyTemplateClass {
* template<class S>
* using t = S;
* };
*
* template
* class MyTemplateClass<int>;
* ```
*/
AliasTemplateType getOriginalTemplate() {
alias_template_generated_from(underlyingElement(this), unresolveElement(result))
}
}
/**
* A C++ alias template instantiation.
*
* For example the `my_int_type` type declared in the following code:
* ```
* template <typename T>
* using my_type = T;
*
* using my_int_type = my_type<int>;
* ```
*/
class AliasTemplateInstantiationType extends TypeAliasType {
AliasTemplateType at;
AliasTemplateInstantiationType() { at.getAnInstantiation() = this }
override string getAPrimaryQlClass() { result = "AliasTemplateInstantiationType" }
/**
* Gets the alias template from which this instantiation was instantiated.
*/
AliasTemplateType getTemplate() { result = at }
}
/**
* A C++ `typedef` type that is directly enclosed by a function.
*
* For example the type declared inside the function `foo` in
* A C++ `typedef` type that is directly enclosed by a function. For example the type declared inside the function `foo` in
* the following code:
* ```
* int foo(void) { typedef int local; }

View File

@@ -614,27 +614,6 @@ class TemplateVariable extends Variable {
result.isConstructedFrom(this) and
not result.isSpecialization()
}
/**
* Gets the class member template this template was generated from.
*
* This predicate only has results for templates that are members of class
* template instantiations. For example, for `MyTemplateClass<int>::x<S>`
* in the following code, the result is `MyTemplateClass<T>::x<S>`.
* ```cpp
* template<class T>
* class MyTemplateClass {
* template<class S>
* static S x;
* };
*
* template
* class MyTemplateClass<int>;
* ```
*/
TemplateVariable getOriginalTemplate() {
variable_template_generated_from(underlyingElement(this), unresolveElement(result))
}
}
/**

View File

@@ -459,13 +459,6 @@ class FormatLiteral extends Literal instanceof StringLiteral {
*/
int getConvSpecOffset(int n) { result = this.getFormat().indexOf("%", n, 0) }
/**
* Gets the nth conversion specifier string.
*/
private string getConvSpecString(int n) {
n >= 0 and result = "%" + this.getFormat().splitAt("%", n + 1)
}
/*
* Each of these predicates gets a regular expressions to match each individual
* parts of a conversion specifier.
@@ -531,20 +524,22 @@ class FormatLiteral extends Literal instanceof StringLiteral {
int n, string spec, string params, string flags, string width, string prec, string len,
string conv
) {
exists(string convSpec, string regexp |
convSpec = this.getConvSpecString(n) and
exists(int offset, string fmt, string rst, string regexp |
offset = this.getConvSpecOffset(n) and
fmt = this.getFormat() and
rst = fmt.substring(offset, fmt.length()) and
regexp = this.getConvSpecRegexp() and
(
spec = convSpec.regexpCapture(regexp, 1) and
params = convSpec.regexpCapture(regexp, 2) and
flags = convSpec.regexpCapture(regexp, 3) and
width = convSpec.regexpCapture(regexp, 4) and
prec = convSpec.regexpCapture(regexp, 5) and
len = convSpec.regexpCapture(regexp, 6) and
conv = convSpec.regexpCapture(regexp, 7)
spec = rst.regexpCapture(regexp, 1) and
params = rst.regexpCapture(regexp, 2) and
flags = rst.regexpCapture(regexp, 3) and
width = rst.regexpCapture(regexp, 4) and
prec = rst.regexpCapture(regexp, 5) and
len = rst.regexpCapture(regexp, 6) and
conv = rst.regexpCapture(regexp, 7)
or
spec = convSpec.regexpCapture(regexp, 1) and
not exists(convSpec.regexpCapture(regexp, 2)) and
spec = rst.regexpCapture(regexp, 1) and
not exists(rst.regexpCapture(regexp, 2)) and
params = "" and
flags = "" and
width = "" and
@@ -559,10 +554,12 @@ class FormatLiteral extends Literal instanceof StringLiteral {
* Gets the nth conversion specifier (including the initial `%`).
*/
string getConvSpec(int n) {
exists(string convSpec, string regexp |
convSpec = this.getConvSpecString(n) and
exists(int offset, string fmt, string rst, string regexp |
offset = this.getConvSpecOffset(n) and
fmt = this.getFormat() and
rst = fmt.substring(offset, fmt.length()) and
regexp = this.getConvSpecRegexp() and
result = convSpec.regexpCapture(regexp, 1)
result = rst.regexpCapture(regexp, 1)
)
}

View File

@@ -25,15 +25,6 @@ abstract class ScanfFunction extends Function {
* (rather than a `char*`).
*/
predicate isWideCharDefault() { exists(this.getName().indexOf("wscanf")) }
/** Holds if this is one of the `scanf_s` variants. */
predicate isSVariant() {
exists(string name | name = this.getName() |
name.matches("%\\_s")
or
name.matches("%\\_s\\_l")
)
}
}
/**
@@ -43,12 +34,8 @@ class Scanf extends ScanfFunction instanceof TopLevelFunction {
Scanf() {
this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("scanf") or // scanf(format, args...)
this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("wscanf") or // wscanf(format, args...)
this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("scanf_s") or // scanf_s(format, args...)
this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("wscanf_s") or // wscanf_s(format, args...)
this.hasGlobalName("_scanf_l") or // _scanf_l(format, locale, args...)
this.hasGlobalName("_wscanf_l") or // _wscanf_l(format, locale, args...)
this.hasGlobalName("_scanf_s_l") or // _scanf_s_l(format, locale, args...)
this.hasGlobalName("_wscanf_s_l") // _wscanf_s_l(format, locale, args...)
this.hasGlobalName("_wscanf_l")
}
override int getInputParameterIndex() { none() }
@@ -63,12 +50,8 @@ class Fscanf extends ScanfFunction instanceof TopLevelFunction {
Fscanf() {
this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("fscanf") or // fscanf(src_stream, format, args...)
this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("fwscanf") or // fwscanf(src_stream, format, args...)
this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("fscanf_s") or // fscanf_s(src_stream, format, args...)
this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("fwscanf_s") or // fwscanf_s(src_stream, format, args...)
this.hasGlobalName("_fscanf_l") or // _fscanf_l(src_stream, format, locale, args...)
this.hasGlobalName("_fwscanf_l") or // _fwscanf_l(src_stream, format, locale, args...)
this.hasGlobalName("_fscanf_s_l") or // _fscanf_s_l(src_stream, format, locale, args...)
this.hasGlobalName("_fwscanf_s_l") // _fwscanf_s_l(src_stream, format, locale, args...)
this.hasGlobalName("_fwscanf_l")
}
override int getInputParameterIndex() { result = 0 }
@@ -83,12 +66,8 @@ class Sscanf extends ScanfFunction instanceof TopLevelFunction {
Sscanf() {
this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("sscanf") or // sscanf(src_stream, format, args...)
this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("swscanf") or // swscanf(src, format, args...)
this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("sscanf_s") or // sscanf_s(src, format, args...)
this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("swscanf_s") or // swscanf_s(src, format, args...)
this.hasGlobalName("_sscanf_l") or // _sscanf_l(src, format, locale, args...)
this.hasGlobalName("_swscanf_l") or // _swscanf_l(src, format, locale, args...)
this.hasGlobalName("_sscanf_s_l") or // _sscanf_s_l(src, format, locale, args...)
this.hasGlobalName("_swscanf_s_l") // _swscanf_s_l(src, format, locale, args...)
this.hasGlobalName("_swscanf_l")
}
override int getInputParameterIndex() { result = 0 }
@@ -118,14 +97,6 @@ class Snscanf extends ScanfFunction instanceof TopLevelFunction {
int getInputLengthParameterIndex() { result = 1 }
}
private predicate isCharLike(Type t) { t instanceof CharType or t instanceof Wchar_t }
private predicate isStringLike(Type t) {
isCharLike(t.(PointerType).getBaseType())
or
isCharLike(t.(ArrayType).getBaseType())
}
/**
* A call to one of the `scanf` functions.
*/
@@ -159,40 +130,14 @@ class ScanfFunctionCall extends FunctionCall {
*/
predicate isWideCharDefault() { this.getScanfFunction().isWideCharDefault() }
bindingset[this, k]
pragma[inline_late]
private predicate isSizeArgument(int k) {
// The first vararg is never the size argument since a size argument must
// always follow a string buffer argument.
k > 0 and
isStringLike(this.getArgument(this.getScanfFunction().getNumberOfParameters() + k - 1)
.getUnspecifiedType())
}
/**
* Gets the output argument at position `n` in the vararg list of this call.
*
* The range of `n` is from `0` to `this.getNumberOfOutputArguments() - 1`.
*/
Expr getOutputArgument(int n) {
exists(ScanfFunction target | target = this.getScanfFunction() |
// If this is an S variant then every string buffer argument has a
// corresponding size argument immediately following it, so we need to
// skip over those size arguments when counting the output arguments.
if target.isSVariant()
then
result =
rank[n + 1](Expr arg, int k |
k >= 0 and
arg = this.getArgument(target.getNumberOfParameters() + k) and
not this.isSizeArgument(k)
|
arg order by k
)
else (
n >= 0 and result = this.getArgument(target.getNumberOfParameters() + n)
)
)
result = this.getArgument(this.getTarget().getNumberOfParameters() + n) and
n >= 0
}
/**
@@ -249,13 +194,6 @@ class ScanfFormatLiteral extends Expr {
)
}
/**
* Gets the nth conversion specifier string.
*/
private string getConvSpecString(int n) {
n >= 0 and result = "%" + this.getFormat().splitAt("%", n + 1)
}
/**
* Gets the regular expression to match each individual part of a conversion specifier.
*/
@@ -289,14 +227,16 @@ class ScanfFormatLiteral extends Expr {
* specifier.
*/
predicate parseConvSpec(int n, string spec, string width, string len, string conv) {
exists(string convSpec, string regexp |
convSpec = this.getConvSpecString(n) and
exists(int offset, string fmt, string rst, string regexp |
offset = this.getConvSpecOffset(n) and
fmt = this.getFormat() and
rst = fmt.substring(offset, fmt.length()) and
regexp = this.getConvSpecRegexp() and
(
spec = convSpec.regexpCapture(regexp, 1) and
width = convSpec.regexpCapture(regexp, 2) and
len = convSpec.regexpCapture(regexp, 3) and
conv = convSpec.regexpCapture(regexp, 4)
spec = rst.regexpCapture(regexp, 1) and
width = rst.regexpCapture(regexp, 2) and
len = rst.regexpCapture(regexp, 3) and
conv = rst.regexpCapture(regexp, 4)
)
)
}

View File

@@ -6,15 +6,11 @@
*
* The extensible relations have the following columns:
* - Sources:
* `namespace; type; subtypes; name; signature; ext; output; kind; provenance`
* `namespace; type; subtypes; name; signature; ext; output; kind`
* - Sinks:
* `namespace; type; subtypes; name; signature; ext; input; kind; provenance`
* `namespace; type; subtypes; name; signature; ext; input; kind`
* - Summaries:
* `namespace; type; subtypes; name; signature; ext; input; output; kind; provenance`
* - Barriers:
* `namespace; type; subtypes; name; signature; ext; output; kind; provenance`
* - BarrierGuards:
* `namespace; type; subtypes; name; signature; ext; input; acceptingValue; kind; provenance`
* `namespace; type; subtypes; name; signature; ext; input; output; kind`
*
* The interpretation of a row is similar to API-graphs with a left-to-right
* reading.
@@ -91,23 +87,11 @@
* value, and
* - flow from the _second_ indirection of the 0th argument to the first
* indirection of the return value, etc.
* 8. The `acceptingValue` column of barrier guard models specifies the condition
* under which the guard blocks flow. It can be one of "true" or "false". In
* the future "no-exception", "not-zero", "null", "not-null" may be supported.
* 9. The `kind` column is a tag that can be referenced from QL to determine to
* 8. The `kind` column is a tag that can be referenced from QL to determine to
* which classes the interpreted elements should be added. For example, for
* sources "remote" indicates a default remote flow source, and for summaries
* "taint" indicates a default additional taint step and "value" indicates a
* globally applicable value-preserving step.
* 10. The `provenance` column is a tag to indicate the origin and verification of a model.
* The format is {origin}-{verification} or just "manual" where the origin describes
* the origin of the model and verification describes how the model has been verified.
* Some examples are:
* - "df-generated": The model has been generated by the model generator tool.
* - "df-manual": The model has been generated by the model generator and verified by a human.
* - "manual": The model has been written by hand.
* This information is used in a heuristic for dataflow analysis to determine, if a
* model or source code should be used for determining flow.
*/
import cpp
@@ -947,13 +931,13 @@ private module Cached {
private predicate barrierGuardChecks(IRGuardCondition g, Expr e, boolean gv, TKindModelPair kmp) {
exists(
SourceSinkInterpretationInput::InterpretNode n, Public::AcceptingValue acceptingValue,
SourceSinkInterpretationInput::InterpretNode n, Public::AcceptingValue acceptingvalue,
string kind, string model
|
isBarrierGuardNode(n, acceptingValue, kind, model) and
isBarrierGuardNode(n, acceptingvalue, kind, model) and
n.asNode().asExpr() = e and
kmp = TMkPair(kind, model) and
gv = convertAcceptingValue(acceptingValue).asBooleanValue() and
gv = convertAcceptingValue(acceptingvalue).asBooleanValue() and
n.asNode().(Private::ArgumentNode).getCall().asCallInstruction() = g
)
}
@@ -970,14 +954,14 @@ private module Cached {
) {
exists(
SourceSinkInterpretationInput::InterpretNode interpretNode,
Public::AcceptingValue acceptingValue, string kind, string model, int indirectionIndex,
Public::AcceptingValue acceptingvalue, string kind, string model, int indirectionIndex,
Private::ArgumentNode arg
|
isBarrierGuardNode(interpretNode, acceptingValue, kind, model) and
isBarrierGuardNode(interpretNode, acceptingvalue, kind, model) and
arg = interpretNode.asNode() and
arg.asIndirectExpr(indirectionIndex) = e and
kmp = MkKindModelPairIntPair(TMkPair(kind, model), indirectionIndex) and
gv = convertAcceptingValue(acceptingValue).asBooleanValue() and
gv = convertAcceptingValue(acceptingvalue).asBooleanValue() and
arg.getCall().asCallInstruction() = g
)
}

View File

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ extensible predicate barrierModel(
*/
extensible predicate barrierGuardModel(
string namespace, string type, boolean subtypes, string name, string signature, string ext,
string input, string acceptingValue, string kind, string provenance, QlBuiltins::ExtensionId madId
string input, string acceptingvalue, string kind, string provenance, QlBuiltins::ExtensionId madId
);
/**

View File

@@ -162,13 +162,13 @@ module SourceSinkInterpretationInput implements
}
predicate barrierGuardElement(
Element e, string input, Public::AcceptingValue acceptingValue, string kind,
Element e, string input, Public::AcceptingValue acceptingvalue, string kind,
Public::Provenance provenance, string model
) {
exists(
string package, string type, boolean subtypes, string name, string signature, string ext
|
barrierGuardModel(package, type, subtypes, name, signature, ext, input, acceptingValue, kind,
barrierGuardModel(package, type, subtypes, name, signature, ext, input, acceptingvalue, kind,
provenance, model) and
e = interpretElement(package, type, subtypes, name, signature, ext)
)

View File

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ class Namespace extends @namespace {
if namespacembrs(_, this)
then
exists(Namespace ns |
namespacembrs(ns, pragma[only_bind_out](this)) and
namespacembrs(ns, this) and
result = ns.getQualifiedName() + "::" + this.getName()
)
else result = this.getName()
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ class Namespace extends @namespace {
string getAQualifierForMembers() {
if namespacembrs(_, this)
then
exists(Namespace ns | namespacembrs(ns, pragma[only_bind_out](this)) |
exists(Namespace ns | namespacembrs(ns, this) |
result = ns.getAQualifierForMembers() + "::" + this.getName()
or
// If this is an inline namespace, its members are also visible in any

View File

@@ -136,9 +136,7 @@ private module SourceVariables {
NormalSourceVariable() { this = TNormalSourceVariable(base, ind) }
final override string toString() {
if this.getIndirection() = 0
then result = "&" + base.toString()
else result = repeatStars(this.getIndirection() - 1) + base.toString()
result = repeatStars(this.getIndirection()) + base.toString()
}
}
@@ -159,9 +157,7 @@ private module SourceVariables {
}
final override string toString() {
if this.getIndirection() = 0
then result = "&" + base.toString() + " [before crement]"
else result = repeatStars(this.getIndirection() - 1) + base.toString() + " [before crement]"
result = repeatStars(this.getIndirection()) + base.toString() + " [before crement]"
}
/**
@@ -1357,52 +1353,6 @@ class PhiNode extends Definition instanceof SsaImpl::PhiNode {
final predicate hasInputFromBlock(Definition input, IRBlock bb) {
phiHasInputFromBlock(this, input, bb)
}
override int getIndirection() { result = this.getSourceVariable().getIndirection() }
override predicate isCertain() {
// If this phi node is part of a phi cycle of phi nodes the least
// fixed-point semantics of datalog means we don't get the right answer.
// So we perform an SCC reduction to simulate greatest fixed-point semantics.
getCycle(this).isCertain()
or
// If there is no cycle we get the right semantics through traditional
// recursion.
not exists(getCycle(this)) and
forex(Definition inp | inp = this.getAnInput() | inp.isCertain())
}
final override Declaration getFunction() {
result = SsaImpl::PhiNode.super.getBasicBlock().getEnclosingFunction()
}
}
private PhiNode getAnInput(PhiNode phi) { result = phi.getAnInput() }
private predicate sccEdge(PhiNode phi1, PhiNode phi2) {
getAnInput(phi1) = phi2 and getAnInput+(phi2) = phi1
}
private module PhiCycleEquivalence = QlBuiltins::EquivalenceRelation<PhiNode, sccEdge/2>;
private PhiCycle getCycle(PhiNode phi) { result.getAPhiNode() = phi }
private class PhiCycle extends PhiCycleEquivalence::EquivalenceClass {
PhiNode getAPhiNode() { PhiCycleEquivalence::getEquivalenceClass(result) = this }
predicate hasPhiNode(PhiNode phi) { this.getAPhiNode() = phi }
pragma[nomagic]
Definition getAnInput() {
result = this.getAPhiNode().getAnInput() and not this.hasPhiNode(result)
}
string toString() { result = strictconcat(this.getAPhiNode().toString(), ", ") }
predicate isCertain() {
// A phi cycle is certain if all of the inputs into the phi cycle is certain.
forex(Definition inp | inp = this.getAnInput() | inp.isCertain())
}
}
/** An static single assignment (SSA) definition. */

View File

@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ abstract class Indirection extends Type {
*
* `certain` is `true` if this write is guaranteed to write to the address.
*/
predicate isAdditionalWrite(Node0Impl value, Operand address, Certainty certain) { none() }
predicate isAdditionalWrite(Node0Impl value, Operand address, boolean certain) { none() }
/**
* Gets the base type of this indirection, after specifiers have been deeply
@@ -198,11 +198,11 @@ private module IteratorIndirections {
baseType = super.getValueType()
}
override predicate isAdditionalWrite(Node0Impl value, Operand address, Certainty certain) {
override predicate isAdditionalWrite(Node0Impl value, Operand address, boolean certain) {
exists(CallInstruction call | call.getArgumentOperand(0) = value.asOperand() |
this = call.getStaticCallTarget().(Function).getClassAndName("operator=") and
address = call.getThisArgumentOperand() and
certain instanceof AlwaysUncertain
certain = false
)
}
@@ -271,62 +271,30 @@ predicate isDereference(Instruction deref, Operand address, boolean additional)
additional = false
}
private newtype TCertainty =
TCertainWhenAddressIsCertain() or
TAlwaysCertain() or
TAlwaysUncertain()
abstract private class Certainty extends TCertainty {
abstract predicate isCertain(boolean addressIsCertain);
abstract string toString();
}
private class CertainWhenAddressIsCertain extends Certainty, TCertainWhenAddressIsCertain {
override predicate isCertain(boolean addressIsCertain) { addressIsCertain = true }
override string toString() { result = "CertainWhenAddressIsCertain" }
}
private class AlwaysCertain extends Certainty, TAlwaysCertain {
override predicate isCertain(boolean addressIsCertain) {
addressIsCertain = true or addressIsCertain = false
}
override string toString() { result = "AlwaysCertain" }
}
private class AlwaysUncertain extends Certainty, TAlwaysUncertain {
override predicate isCertain(boolean addressIsCertain) { none() }
override string toString() { result = "AlwaysUncertain" }
}
predicate isWrite(Node0Impl value, Operand address, Certainty certain) {
predicate isWrite(Node0Impl value, Operand address, boolean certain) {
any(Indirection ind).isAdditionalWrite(value, address, certain)
or
exists(StoreInstruction store |
value.asInstruction() = store and
address = store.getDestinationAddressOperand() and
certain instanceof CertainWhenAddressIsCertain
)
or
exists(InitializeParameterInstruction init |
value.asInstruction() = init and
address = init.getAnOperand() and
certain instanceof AlwaysCertain
)
or
exists(InitializeDynamicAllocationInstruction init |
value.asInstruction() = init and
address = init.getAllocationAddressOperand() and
certain instanceof AlwaysCertain
)
or
exists(UninitializedInstruction uninitialized |
value.asInstruction() = uninitialized and
address = uninitialized.getAnOperand() and
certain instanceof AlwaysCertain
certain = true and
(
exists(StoreInstruction store |
value.asInstruction() = store and
address = store.getDestinationAddressOperand()
)
or
exists(InitializeParameterInstruction init |
value.asInstruction() = init and
address = init.getAnOperand()
)
or
exists(InitializeDynamicAllocationInstruction init |
value.asInstruction() = init and
address = init.getAllocationAddressOperand()
)
or
exists(UninitializedInstruction uninitialized |
value.asInstruction() = uninitialized and
address = uninitialized.getAnOperand()
)
)
}
@@ -750,18 +718,16 @@ private module Cached {
int indirectionIndex
) {
exists(
Certainty writeIsCertain, boolean addressIsCertain, int ind0, CppType type, int lower,
int upper
boolean writeIsCertain, boolean addressIsCertain, int ind0, CppType type, int lower, int upper
|
isWrite(value, address, writeIsCertain) and
isDefImpl(address, base, ind0, addressIsCertain) and
certain = writeIsCertain.booleanAnd(addressIsCertain) and
type = getLanguageType(address) and
upper = countIndirectionsForCppType(type) and
ind = ind0 + [lower .. upper] and
indirectionIndex = ind - (ind0 + lower) and
lower = getMinIndirectionsForType(any(Type t | type.hasUnspecifiedType(t, _)))
|
if writeIsCertain.isCertain(addressIsCertain) then certain = true else certain = false
)
}

View File

@@ -114,7 +114,6 @@ private predicate parseArgument(string arg, string s, int i, Opcode opcode) {
private Element getAChildScope(Element scope) { result.getParentScope() = scope }
pragma[nomagic]
private predicate hasAVariable(MacroInvocation mi, Stmt s, Element scope) {
assertion0(mi, s, _) and
s.getParent() = scope
@@ -122,32 +121,15 @@ private predicate hasAVariable(MacroInvocation mi, Stmt s, Element scope) {
hasAVariable(mi, s, getAChildScope(scope))
}
private predicate hasParentScope(Variable v, Element scope) { v.getParentScope() = scope }
pragma[nomagic]
private predicate hasAssertionOperand(MacroInvocation mi, int i, Stmt s, string operand) {
exists(string arg |
assertion0(mi, s, arg) and
parseArgument(arg, operand, i, _)
)
}
pragma[nomagic]
private predicate hasNameAndParentScope(string name, Element scope, Variable v) {
v.hasName(name) and
hasParentScope(v, scope)
}
pragma[nomagic]
private LocalScopeVariable getVariable(MacroInvocation mi, int i) {
exists(string name, Stmt s |
hasAssertionOperand(mi, i, s, name) and
exists(string operand, string arg, Stmt s |
assertion0(mi, s, arg) and
parseArgument(arg, operand, i, _) and
result =
unique(Variable v, Element parentScope |
hasAssertionOperand(mi, _, s, name) and
unique(Variable v |
v.getLocation().getStartLine() < s.getLocation().getStartLine() and
hasAVariable(mi, s, parentScope) and
hasNameAndParentScope(name, parentScope, v)
hasAVariable(mi, s, v.getParentScope()) and
v.hasName(operand)
|
v
)

View File

@@ -11,9 +11,7 @@ private class Fopen extends Function, AliasFunction, SideEffectFunction, TaintFu
Fopen() {
this.hasGlobalOrStdName(["fopen", "fopen_s", "freopen"])
or
this.hasGlobalName([
"_open", "_wfopen", "_fsopen", "_wfsopen", "_wopen", "_sopen_s", "_wsopen_s"
])
this.hasGlobalName(["_open", "_wfopen", "_fsopen", "_wfsopen", "_wopen"])
}
override predicate hasOnlySpecificWriteSideEffects() { any() }
@@ -48,10 +46,6 @@ private class Fopen extends Function, AliasFunction, SideEffectFunction, TaintFu
this.hasGlobalName(["_open", "_wopen"]) and
i = 0 and
buffer = true
or
this.hasGlobalName(["_sopen_s", "_wsopen_s"]) and
i = 1 and
buffer = true
}
override predicate hasTaintFlow(FunctionInput input, FunctionOutput output) {
@@ -70,9 +64,5 @@ private class Fopen extends Function, AliasFunction, SideEffectFunction, TaintFu
this.hasGlobalName(["_open", "_wopen"]) and
input.isParameterDeref(0) and
output.isReturnValue()
or
this.hasGlobalName(["_sopen_s", "_wsopen_s"]) and
input.isParameterDeref(1) and
output.isParameterDeref(0)
}
}

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