Convert non-Go/Java qlrefs to query key format

Python: Implement `ContentApprox`

.github/workflows/go-version-update.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+name: Update Go version
+
+on:
+  workflow_dispatch:
+  schedule:
+    - cron: "0 3 * * 1"  # Run weekly on Mondays at 3 AM UTC (1 = Monday)
+
+permissions:
+  contents: write
+  pull-requests: write
+
+jobs:
+  update-go-version:
+    name: Check and update Go version
+    if: github.repository == 'github/codeql'
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout repository
+        uses: actions/checkout@v5
+        with:
+          fetch-depth: 0
+
+      - name: Set up Git
+        run: |
+          git config user.name "github-actions[bot]"
+          git config user.email "41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com"
+
+      - name: Fetch latest Go version
+        id: fetch-version
+        run: |
+          LATEST_GO_VERSION=$(curl -s https://go.dev/dl/?mode=json | jq -r '.[0].version')
+          
+          if [ -z "$LATEST_GO_VERSION" ] || [ "$LATEST_GO_VERSION" = "null" ]; then
+            echo "Error: Failed to fetch latest Go version from go.dev"
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          
+          echo "Latest Go version from go.dev: $LATEST_GO_VERSION"
+          echo "version=$LATEST_GO_VERSION" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
+          
+          # Extract version numbers (e.g., go1.26.0 -> 1.26.0)
+          LATEST_VERSION_NUM=$(echo $LATEST_GO_VERSION | sed 's/^go//')
+          echo "version_num=$LATEST_VERSION_NUM" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
+          
+          # Extract major.minor version (e.g., 1.26.0 -> 1.26)
+          LATEST_MAJOR_MINOR=$(echo $LATEST_VERSION_NUM | sed -E 's/^([0-9]+\.[0-9]+).*/\1/')
+          echo "major_minor=$LATEST_MAJOR_MINOR" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
+
+      - name: Check current Go version
+        id: current-version
+        run: |
+          CURRENT_VERSION=$(sed -n 's/.*go_sdk\.download(version = \"\([^\"]*\)\".*/\1/p' MODULE.bazel)
+          
+          if [ -z "$CURRENT_VERSION" ]; then
+            echo "Error: Could not extract Go version from MODULE.bazel"
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          
+          echo "Current Go version in MODULE.bazel: $CURRENT_VERSION"
+          echo "version=$CURRENT_VERSION" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
+          
+          # Extract major.minor version
+          CURRENT_MAJOR_MINOR=$(echo $CURRENT_VERSION | sed -E 's/^([0-9]+\.[0-9]+).*/\1/')
+          echo "major_minor=$CURRENT_MAJOR_MINOR" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
+
+      - name: Compare versions
+        id: compare
+        run: |
+          LATEST="${{ steps.fetch-version.outputs.version_num }}"
+          CURRENT="${{ steps.current-version.outputs.version }}"
+          
+          echo "Latest: $LATEST"
+          echo "Current: $CURRENT"
+          
+          if [ "$LATEST" = "$CURRENT" ]; then
+            echo "Go version is up to date"
+            echo "needs_update=false" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
+          else
+            echo "Go version needs update from $CURRENT to $LATEST"
+            echo "needs_update=true" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
+          fi
+
+      - name: Update Go version in files
+        if: steps.compare.outputs.needs_update == 'true'
+        run: |
+          LATEST_VERSION_NUM="${{ steps.fetch-version.outputs.version_num }}"
+          LATEST_MAJOR_MINOR="${{ steps.fetch-version.outputs.major_minor }}"
+          CURRENT_VERSION="${{ steps.current-version.outputs.version }}"
+          CURRENT_MAJOR_MINOR="${{ steps.current-version.outputs.major_minor }}"
+          
+          echo "Updating from $CURRENT_VERSION to $LATEST_VERSION_NUM"
+          
+          # Escape dots in current version strings for use in sed patterns
+          CURRENT_VERSION_ESCAPED=$(echo "$CURRENT_VERSION" | sed 's/\./\\./g')
+          CURRENT_MAJOR_MINOR_ESCAPED=$(echo "$CURRENT_MAJOR_MINOR" | sed 's/\./\\./g')
+          
+          # Update MODULE.bazel
+          sed -i "s/go_sdk\.download(version = \"$CURRENT_VERSION_ESCAPED\")/go_sdk.download(version = \"$LATEST_VERSION_NUM\")/" MODULE.bazel
+          if ! grep -q "go_sdk.download(version = \"$LATEST_VERSION_NUM\")" MODULE.bazel; then
+            echo "Error: Failed to update MODULE.bazel"
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          
+          # Update go/extractor/go.mod
+          if ! sed -i "s/^go $CURRENT_MAJOR_MINOR_ESCAPED\$/go $LATEST_MAJOR_MINOR/" go/extractor/go.mod; then
+            echo "Warning: Failed to update go directive in go.mod"
+          fi
+          if ! sed -i "s/^toolchain go$CURRENT_VERSION_ESCAPED\$/toolchain go$LATEST_VERSION_NUM/" go/extractor/go.mod; then
+            echo "Warning: Failed to update toolchain in go.mod"
+          fi
+          
+          # Update go/extractor/autobuilder/build-environment.go
+          if ! sed -i "s/var maxGoVersion = util\.NewSemVer(\"$CURRENT_MAJOR_MINOR_ESCAPED\")/var maxGoVersion = util.NewSemVer(\"$LATEST_MAJOR_MINOR\")/" go/extractor/autobuilder/build-environment.go; then
+            echo "Warning: Failed to update build-environment.go"
+          fi
+          
+          # Update go/actions/test/action.yml
+          if ! sed -i "s/default: \"~$CURRENT_VERSION_ESCAPED\"/default: \"~$LATEST_VERSION_NUM\"/" go/actions/test/action.yml; then
+            echo "Warning: Failed to update action.yml"
+          fi
+          
+          # Show what changed
+          git diff
+
+      - name: Check for changes
+        id: check-changes
+        if: steps.compare.outputs.needs_update == 'true'
+        run: |
+          if git diff --quiet; then
+            echo "No changes detected"
+            echo "has_changes=false" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
+          else
+            echo "Changes detected"
+            echo "has_changes=true" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
+          fi
+
+      - name: Check for existing PR
+        if: steps.check-changes.outputs.has_changes == 'true'
+        id: check-pr
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+        run: |
+          BRANCH_NAME="workflow/go-version-update"
+          PR_NUMBER=$(gh pr list --head "$BRANCH_NAME" --state open --json number --jq '.[0].number')
+          
+          if [ -n "$PR_NUMBER" ]; then
+            echo "Existing PR found: #$PR_NUMBER"
+            echo "pr_exists=true" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
+            echo "pr_number=$PR_NUMBER" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
+          else
+            echo "No existing PR found"
+            echo "pr_exists=false" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
+          fi
+
+      - name: Commit and push changes
+        if: steps.check-changes.outputs.has_changes == 'true'
+        run: |
+          BRANCH_NAME="workflow/go-version-update"
+          LATEST_VERSION_NUM="${{ steps.fetch-version.outputs.version_num }}"
+          LATEST_MAJOR_MINOR="${{ steps.fetch-version.outputs.major_minor }}"
+          
+          # Create or switch to branch
+          git checkout -B "$BRANCH_NAME"
+          
+          # Stage and commit changes
+          git add MODULE.bazel go/extractor/go.mod go/extractor/autobuilder/build-environment.go go/actions/test/action.yml
+          git commit -m "Go: Update to $LATEST_VERSION_NUM"
+          
+          # Push changes
+          git push --force-with-lease origin "$BRANCH_NAME"
+
+      - name: Create or update PR
+        if: steps.check-changes.outputs.has_changes == 'true'
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+        run: |
+          BRANCH_NAME="workflow/go-version-update"
+          LATEST_VERSION_NUM="${{ steps.fetch-version.outputs.version_num }}"
+          CURRENT_VERSION="${{ steps.current-version.outputs.version }}"
+          
+          PR_TITLE="Go: Update to $LATEST_VERSION_NUM"
+          
+          PR_BODY=$(cat <<EOF
+          This PR updates Go from $CURRENT_VERSION to $LATEST_VERSION_NUM.
+
+          Updated files:
+          - \`MODULE.bazel\` - go_sdk.download version
+          - \`go/extractor/go.mod\` - go directive and toolchain
+          - \`go/extractor/autobuilder/build-environment.go\` - maxGoVersion (only if MAJOR.MINOR changes)
+          - \`go/actions/test/action.yml\` - default go-test-version
+
+          This PR was automatically created by the [Go version update workflow](https://github.com/${{ github.repository }}/blob/main/.github/workflows/go-version-update.yml).
+          EOF
+          )
+          
+          if [ "${{ steps.check-pr.outputs.pr_exists }}" = "true" ]; then
+            echo "Updating existing PR #${{ steps.check-pr.outputs.pr_number }}"
+            gh pr edit "${{ steps.check-pr.outputs.pr_number }}" --title "$PR_TITLE" --body "$PR_BODY"
+          else
+            echo "Creating new PR"
+            gh pr create \
+              --title "$PR_TITLE" \
+              --body "$PR_BODY" \
+              --base main \
+              --head "$BRANCH_NAME" \
+              --label "Go"
+          fi

Cargo.lock

@@ -1477,9 +1477,9 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "num-conv"
-version = "0.2.1"
+version = "0.1.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "c6673768db2d862beb9b39a78fdcb1a69439615d5794a1be50caa9bc92c81967"
+checksum = "51d515d32fb182ee37cda2ccdcb92950d6a3c2893aa280e540671c2cd0f3b1d9"
 
 [[package]]
 name = "num-traits"
@@ -2321,9 +2321,9 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "rand"
-version = "0.9.3"
+version = "0.9.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "7ec095654a25171c2124e9e3393a930bddbffdc939556c914957a4c3e0a87166"
+checksum = "6db2770f06117d490610c7488547d543617b21bfa07796d7a12f6f1bd53850d1"
 dependencies = [
  "rand_chacha",
  "rand_core",
@@ -2921,30 +2921,29 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "time"
-version = "0.3.47"
+version = "0.3.43"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "743bd48c283afc0388f9b8827b976905fb217ad9e647fae3a379a9283c4def2c"
+checksum = "83bde6f1ec10e72d583d91623c939f623002284ef622b87de38cfd546cbf2031"
 dependencies = [
  "deranged",
- "itoa",
  "num-conv",
  "powerfmt",
- "serde_core",
+ "serde",
  "time-core",
  "time-macros",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
 name = "time-core"
-version = "0.1.8"
+version = "0.1.6"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "7694e1cfe791f8d31026952abf09c69ca6f6fa4e1a1229e18988f06a04a12dca"
+checksum = "40868e7c1d2f0b8d73e4a8c7f0ff63af4f6d19be117e90bd73eb1d62cf831c6b"
 
 [[package]]
 name = "time-macros"
-version = "0.2.27"
+version = "0.2.24"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "2e70e4c5a0e0a8a4823ad65dfe1a6930e4f4d756dcd9dd7939022b5e8c501215"
+checksum = "30cfb0125f12d9c277f35663a0a33f8c30190f4e4574868a330595412d34ebf3"
 dependencies = [
  "num-conv",
  "time-core",

MODULE.bazel

@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ use_repo(
 )
 
 go_sdk = use_extension("@rules_go//go:extensions.bzl", "go_sdk")
-go_sdk.download(version = "1.26.0")
+go_sdk.download(version = "1.26.4")
 
 go_deps = use_extension("@gazelle//:extensions.bzl", "go_deps")
 go_deps.from_file(go_mod = "//go/extractor:go.mod")

actions/ql/examples/snippets/uses_pinned_sha.ql

@@ -8,5 +8,5 @@
 import actions
 
 from UsesStep uses
-where uses.getVersion().regexpMatch("^[A-Fa-f0-9]{40}$")
+where uses.getVersion().regexpMatch("^[A-Fa-f0-9]{40}([A-Fa-f0-9]{24})?$")
 select uses, "This 'uses' step has a pinned SHA version."

actions/ql/lib/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,3 +1,15 @@
+## 0.4.37
+
+### Minor Analysis Improvements
+
+* The GitHub Actions analysis now recognizes more Bash regex checks that restrict a value to alphanumeric characters, include regexes like `^[0-9a-zA-Z]{40}([0-9a-zA-Z]{24})?$` which check for a sha1 or sha256 hash. This may reduce false positive results where command output is validated with grouped or optional alphanumeric patterns before being used.
+
+## 0.4.36
+
+### Minor Analysis Improvements
+
+* Altered 2 patterns in the `poisonable_steps` modelling. Extra sinks are detected in the following cases: scripts executed via python modules and `go run` in directories are detected as potential mechanisms of injection. For the go execution pattern, the pattern is updated to now ignore flags that occur between go and the specific command. This change may lead to more results being detected by the following queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/critical`, `actions/cache-poisoning/poisonable-step`, `actions/cache-poisoning/direct-cache` and `actions/artifact-poisoning/path-traversal`.
+
 ## 0.4.35
 
 No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/lib/change-notes/released/0.4.36.md

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
----
-category: minorAnalysis
----
-* Altered 2 patterns in the `poisonable_steps` modelling. Extra sinks are detected in the following cases: scripts executed via python modules and `go run` in directories are detected as potential mechanisms of injection. For the go execution pattern, the pattern is updated to now ignore flags that occur between go and the specific command. This change may lead to more results being detected by the following queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/critical`, `actions/cache-poisoning/poisonable-step`, `actions/cache-poisoning/direct-cache` and `actions/artifact-poisoning/path-traversal`.
+## 0.4.36
+
+### Minor Analysis Improvements
+
+* Altered 2 patterns in the `poisonable_steps` modelling. Extra sinks are detected in the following cases: scripts executed via python modules and `go run` in directories are detected as potential mechanisms of injection. For the go execution pattern, the pattern is updated to now ignore flags that occur between go and the specific command. This change may lead to more results being detected by the following queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/critical`, `actions/cache-poisoning/poisonable-step`, `actions/cache-poisoning/direct-cache` and `actions/artifact-poisoning/path-traversal`.

actions/ql/lib/change-notes/released/0.4.37.md

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+## 0.4.37
+
+### Minor Analysis Improvements
+
+* The GitHub Actions analysis now recognizes more Bash regex checks that restrict a value to alphanumeric characters, include regexes like `^[0-9a-zA-Z]{40}([0-9a-zA-Z]{24})?$` which check for a sha1 or sha256 hash. This may reduce false positive results where command output is validated with grouped or optional alphanumeric patterns before being used.

actions/ql/lib/codeql-pack.release.yml

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 ---
-lastReleaseVersion: 0.4.35
+lastReleaseVersion: 0.4.37

actions/ql/lib/codeql/actions/Bash.qll

@@ -785,7 +785,22 @@ module Bash {
 
   /**
    * Holds if the given regex is used to match an alphanumeric string
-   * eg: `^[0-9a-zA-Z]{40}$`, `^[0-9]+$` or `^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$`
+   * eg: `^[0-9a-zA-Z]{40}([0-9a-zA-Z]{24})?$`, `^[0-9]+$` or `^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$`
    */
-  string alphaNumericRegex() { result = "^\\^\\[([09azAZ_-]+)\\](\\+|\\{\\d+\\})\\$$" }
+  string alphaNumericRegex() {
+    exists(string r1, string r2, string r3, string r4 |
+      // An alphanumeric character class
+      r1 = "\\[([09azAZ_-]+)\\]" and
+      // The same as above, followed by a quantifier like `+` or `{20}`
+      r2 = r1 + "(\\+|\\{\\d+\\})" and
+      // The same as above, possibly with parentheses around it
+      r3 = "\\(?" + r2 + "\\)?" and
+      // The same as above, possibly with a `?` after it
+      r4 = r3 + "\\??"
+    |
+      // The same as above, repeated one or more times, and with `^` at the
+      // beginning and `$` at the end
+      result = "^\\^(" + r4 + ")+\\$$"
+    )
+  }
 }

actions/ql/lib/qlpack.yml

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 name: codeql/actions-all
-version: 0.4.36-dev
+version: 0.4.38-dev
 library: true
 warnOnImplicitThis: true
 dependencies:

actions/ql/src/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,3 +1,36 @@
+## 0.6.29
+
+### Query Metadata Changes
+
+* Reversed adjustment of the name of `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, but kept the portion of the previous change for the word "trusted" to "privileged". Added a missing "a" to phrasing in `actions/untrusted-checkout/high` and `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`.
+
+### Major Analysis Improvements
+
+* Adjusted `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical` to align more with other untrusted resource queries, where the alert location is the location where the artifact is obtained from (the checkout point). This aligns with the other 2 related queries. This will cause the same alerts to re-open for closed alerts of this query.
+
+### Minor Analysis Improvements
+
+* Altered the alert message for clarity for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`.
+* The `actions/unpinned-tag` query now recognizes 64-character SHA-256 commit hashes as properly pinned references, in addition to 40-character SHA-1 hashes.
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* Adjusted (minor) help file descriptions for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`. Clarified wording on in minor point, added one more listed resource and added one more recommendation for things to check.
+
+## 0.6.28
+
+### Query Metadata Changes
+
+* Adjusted the name of `actions/untrusted-checkout/high` to more clearly describe which parts of the scenario are in a privileged context.
+
+### Minor Analysis Improvements
+
+* The `actions/unpinned-tag` query now analyzes composite action metadata (`action.yml`/`action.yaml` files) in addition to workflow files, providing more comprehensive detection of unpinned action references across the entire Actions ecosystem.
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* Fixed help file descriptions for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`. Previously the messages were unclear as to why and how the vulnerabilities could occur. 
+
 ## 0.6.27
 
 No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UnpinnedActionsTag.ql

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /**
- * @name Unpinned tag for a non-immutable Action in workflow
+ * @name Unpinned tag for a non-immutable Action in workflow or composite action
  * @description Using a tag for a non-immutable Action that is not pinned to a commit can lead to executing an untrusted Action through a supply chain attack.
  * @kind problem
  * @security-severity 5.0
@@ -15,7 +15,9 @@ import actions
 import codeql.actions.security.UseOfUnversionedImmutableAction
 
 bindingset[version]
-private predicate isPinnedCommit(string version) { version.regexpMatch("^[A-Fa-f0-9]{40}$") }
+private predicate isPinnedCommit(string version) {
+  version.regexpMatch("^[A-Fa-f0-9]{40}([A-Fa-f0-9]{24})?$")
+}
 
 bindingset[nwo]
 private predicate isTrustedOwner(string nwo) {
@@ -31,15 +33,26 @@ private predicate isPinnedContainer(string version) {
 bindingset[nwo]
 private predicate isContainerImage(string nwo) { nwo.regexpMatch("^docker://.+") }
 
-from UsesStep uses, string nwo, string version, Workflow workflow, string name
+private predicate getStepContainerName(UsesStep uses, string name) {
+  exists(Workflow workflow |
+    uses.getEnclosingWorkflow() = workflow and
+    (
+      workflow.getName() = name
+      or
+      not exists(workflow.getName()) and workflow.getLocation().getFile().getBaseName() = name
+    )
+  )
+  or
+  exists(CompositeAction action |
+    uses.getEnclosingCompositeAction() = action and
+    name = action.getLocation().getFile().getBaseName()
+  )
+}
+
+from UsesStep uses, string nwo, string version, string name
 where
   uses.getCallee() = nwo and
-  uses.getEnclosingWorkflow() = workflow and
-  (
-    workflow.getName() = name
-    or
-    not exists(workflow.getName()) and workflow.getLocation().getFile().getBaseName() = name
-  ) and
+  getStepContainerName(uses, name) and
   uses.getVersion() = version and
   not isTrustedOwner(nwo) and
   not (if isContainerImage(nwo) then isPinnedContainer(version) else isPinnedCommit(version)) and

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.md

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Certain triggers automatically grant a workflow elevated privileges:
   * An attacker forks the repository and adds malicious code (e.g., in the build script)
   * The attacker opens a PR from the fork, and, if needed, comments on the PR
   * The workflow in the base repository checks out the forked code
-  * The workflow runs, (e.g. the build script etc.), which contains the malicious code
+  * The workflow runs the malicious code
 
 Please note that not only build scripts can be malicious code vectors. There is a large number of other possibilities. Some of them are listed in the [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/) catalog.
 
@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ The best practice is to handle the potentially untrusted pull request via the **
 
 The artifacts downloaded from the first workflow should be considered untrusted and must be verified.
 
+Additionally, ensure that least privilege are used both at the workflow level (through event triggers and workflow permissions) and job level (through job permissions).
+
 ## Example
 
 ### Incorrect Usage
@@ -163,4 +165,5 @@ jobs:
 
 - GitHub Security Lab Research: [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/).
 - Mitigating risks of untrusted checkout: [GitHub Docs](https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/actions/reference/security/secure-use#mitigating-the-risks-of-untrusted-code-checkout).
+- Securing with least privilege: [Workflow secure use](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/secure-use).
 - Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/).

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.ql

@@ -51,5 +51,6 @@ where
   event.getName() = checkoutTriggers() and
   not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(checkout, event, "untrusted-checkout")) and
   not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(poisonable, event, "untrusted-checkout"))
-select poisonable, checkout, poisonable,
-  "Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@)", event, event.getName()
+select checkout, checkout, poisonable,
+  "Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@).",
+  event, event.getName()

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.md

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Certain triggers automatically grant a workflow elevated privileges:
   * An attacker forks the repository and adds malicious code (e.g., in the build script)
   * The attacker opens a PR from the fork, and, if needed, comments on the PR
   * The workflow in the base repository checks out the forked code
-  * The workflow runs, (e.g. the build script etc.), which contains the malicious code
+  * The workflow runs the malicious code
 
 Please note that not only build scripts can be malicious code vectors. There is a large number of other possibilities. Some of them are listed in the [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/) catalog.
 
@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ The best practice is to handle the potentially untrusted pull request via the **
 
 The artifacts downloaded from the first workflow should be considered untrusted and must be verified.
 
+Additionally, ensure that least privilege are used both at the workflow level (through event triggers and workflow permissions) and job level (through job permissions).
+
 ## Example
 
 ### Incorrect Usage
@@ -163,4 +165,5 @@ jobs:
 
 - GitHub Security Lab Research: [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/).
 - Mitigating risks of untrusted checkout: [GitHub Docs](https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/actions/reference/security/secure-use#mitigating-the-risks-of-untrusted-code-checkout).
+- Securing with least privilege: [Workflow secure use](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/secure-use).
 - Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/).

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.ql

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /**
- * @name Checkout of untrusted code in privileged context without privileged context use
+ * @name Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged context
  * @description Privileged workflows have read/write access to the base repository and access to secrets.
  *              By explicitly checking out and running the build script from a fork the untrusted code is running in an environment
  *              that is able to push to the base repository and to access secrets.
@@ -42,5 +42,6 @@ where
     not event.getName() = "issue_comment" and
     not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(checkout, event, "untrusted-checkout"))
   )
-select checkout, "Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@)", event,
-  event.getName()
+select checkout,
+  "Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@).",
+  event, event.getName()

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutMedium.md

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Certain triggers automatically grant a workflow elevated privileges:
   * An attacker forks the repository and adds malicious code (e.g., in the build script)
   * The attacker opens a PR from the fork, and, if needed, comments on the PR
   * The workflow in the base repository checks out the forked code
-  * The workflow runs, (e.g. the build script etc.), which contains the malicious code
+  * The workflow runs the malicious code
 
 Please note that not only build scripts can be malicious code vectors. There is a large number of other possibilities. Some of them are listed in the [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/) catalog.
 
@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ The best practice is to handle the potentially untrusted pull request via the **
 
 The artifacts downloaded from the first workflow should be considered untrusted and must be verified.
 
+Additionally, ensure that least privilege are used both at the workflow level (through event triggers and workflow permissions) and job level (through job permissions).
+
 ## Example
 
 ### Incorrect Usage
@@ -163,4 +165,5 @@ jobs:
 
 - GitHub Security Lab Research: [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/).
 - Mitigating risks of untrusted checkout: [GitHub Docs](https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/actions/reference/security/secure-use#mitigating-the-risks-of-untrusted-code-checkout).
+- Securing with least privilege: [Workflow secure use](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/secure-use).
 - Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/).

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutMedium.ql

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /**
- * @name Checkout of untrusted code in trusted context
+ * @name Checkout of untrusted code in a trusted context
  * @description Privileged workflows have read/write access to the base repository and access to secrets.
  *              By explicitly checking out and running the build script from a fork the untrusted code is running in an environment
  *              that is able to push to the base repository and to access secrets.

actions/ql/src/change-notes/2026-04-15-untrusted-checkout-improvements-helpfile.md

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
----
-category: fix
----
-* Fixed help file descriptions for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`. Previously the messages were unclear as to why and how the vulnerabilities could occur. 

actions/ql/src/change-notes/2026-04-15-untrusted-checkout-improvements-metadata.md

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
----
-category: queryMetadata
----
-* Adjusted the name of `actions/untrusted-checkout/high` to more clearly describe which parts of the scenario are in a privileged context.

actions/ql/src/change-notes/released/0.6.28.md

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+## 0.6.28
+
+### Query Metadata Changes
+
+* Adjusted the name of `actions/untrusted-checkout/high` to more clearly describe which parts of the scenario are in a privileged context.
+
+### Minor Analysis Improvements
+
+* The `actions/unpinned-tag` query now analyzes composite action metadata (`action.yml`/`action.yaml` files) in addition to workflow files, providing more comprehensive detection of unpinned action references across the entire Actions ecosystem.
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* Fixed help file descriptions for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`. Previously the messages were unclear as to why and how the vulnerabilities could occur. 

actions/ql/src/change-notes/released/0.6.29.md

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+## 0.6.29
+
+### Query Metadata Changes
+
+* Reversed adjustment of the name of `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, but kept the portion of the previous change for the word "trusted" to "privileged". Added a missing "a" to phrasing in `actions/untrusted-checkout/high` and `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`.
+
+### Major Analysis Improvements
+
+* Adjusted `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical` to align more with other untrusted resource queries, where the alert location is the location where the artifact is obtained from (the checkout point). This aligns with the other 2 related queries. This will cause the same alerts to re-open for closed alerts of this query.
+
+### Minor Analysis Improvements
+
+* Altered the alert message for clarity for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`.
+* The `actions/unpinned-tag` query now recognizes 64-character SHA-256 commit hashes as properly pinned references, in addition to 40-character SHA-1 hashes.
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* Adjusted (minor) help file descriptions for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`. Clarified wording on in minor point, added one more listed resource and added one more recommendation for things to check.

actions/ql/src/codeql-pack.release.yml

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 ---
-lastReleaseVersion: 0.6.27
+lastReleaseVersion: 0.6.29

actions/ql/src/qlpack.yml

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 name: codeql/actions-queries
-version: 0.6.28-dev
+version: 0.6.30-dev
 library: false
 warnOnImplicitThis: true
 groups: [actions, queries]

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Models/CompositeActionsSinks.qlref

@@ -1 +1 @@
-Models/CompositeActionsSinks.ql
+query: Models/CompositeActionsSinks.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Models/CompositeActionsSources.qlref

@@ -1,2 +1 @@
-Models/CompositeActionsSources.ql
-
+query: Models/CompositeActionsSources.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Models/CompositeActionsSummaries.qlref

@@ -1,2 +1 @@
-Models/CompositeActionsSummaries.ql
-
+query: Models/CompositeActionsSummaries.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Models/ReusableWorkflowsSinks.qlref

@@ -1,2 +1 @@
-Models/ReusableWorkflowsSinks.ql
-
+query: Models/ReusableWorkflowsSinks.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Models/ReusableWorkflowsSources.qlref

@@ -1,2 +1 @@
-Models/ReusableWorkflowsSources.ql
-
+query: Models/ReusableWorkflowsSources.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Models/ReusableWorkflowsSummaries.qlref

@@ -1,2 +1 @@
-Models/ReusableWorkflowsSummaries.ql
-
+query: Models/ReusableWorkflowsSummaries.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-074/OutputClobberingHigh.qlref

@@ -1 +1 @@
-experimental/Security/CWE-074/OutputClobberingHigh.ql
+query: experimental/Security/CWE-074/OutputClobberingHigh.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionCritical.qlref

@@ -1 +1 @@
-Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionCritical.ql
+query: Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionCritical.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionMedium.qlref

@@ -1 +1 @@
-Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionMedium.ql
+query: Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionMedium.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-077/EnvVarInjectionCritical.qlref

@@ -1 +1 @@
-Security/CWE-077/EnvVarInjectionCritical.ql
+query: Security/CWE-077/EnvVarInjectionCritical.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-077/EnvVarInjectionMedium.qlref

@@ -1 +1 @@
-Security/CWE-077/EnvVarInjectionMedium.ql
+query: Security/CWE-077/EnvVarInjectionMedium.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-078/CommandInjectionCritical.qlref

@@ -1 +1 @@
-experimental/Security/CWE-078/CommandInjectionCritical.ql
+query: experimental/Security/CWE-078/CommandInjectionCritical.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-078/CommandInjectionMedium.qlref

@@ -1 +1 @@
-experimental/Security/CWE-078/CommandInjectionMedium.ql
+query: experimental/Security/CWE-078/CommandInjectionMedium.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-088/ArgumentInjectionCritical.qlref

@@ -1 +1 @@
-experimental/Security/CWE-088/ArgumentInjectionCritical.ql
+query: experimental/Security/CWE-088/ArgumentInjectionCritical.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-088/ArgumentInjectionMedium.qlref

@@ -1 +1 @@
-experimental/Security/CWE-088/ArgumentInjectionMedium.ql
+query: experimental/Security/CWE-088/ArgumentInjectionMedium.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionCritical.qlref

@@ -1 +1 @@
-Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionCritical.ql
+query: Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionCritical.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionMedium.qlref

@@ -1 +1 @@
-Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionMedium.ql
+query: Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionMedium.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-1395/UseOfKnownVulnerableAction.qlref

@@ -1,2 +1 @@
-Security/CWE-1395/UseOfKnownVulnerableAction.ql
-
+query: Security/CWE-1395/UseOfKnownVulnerableAction.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-200/SecretExfiltration.qlref

@@ -1,2 +1 @@
-experimental/Security/CWE-200/SecretExfiltration.ql
-
+query: experimental/Security/CWE-200/SecretExfiltration.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-275/MissingActionsPermissions.qlref

@@ -1,2 +1 @@
-Security/CWE-275/MissingActionsPermissions.ql
-
+query: Security/CWE-275/MissingActionsPermissions.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-284/CodeExecutionOnSelfHostedRunner.qlref

@@ -1,2 +1 @@
-experimental/Security/CWE-284/CodeExecutionOnSelfHostedRunner.ql
-
+query: experimental/Security/CWE-284/CodeExecutionOnSelfHostedRunner.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-285/ImproperAccessControl.qlref

@@ -1,2 +1 @@
-Security/CWE-285/ImproperAccessControl.ql
-
+query: Security/CWE-285/ImproperAccessControl.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-312/ExcessiveSecretsExposure.qlref

@@ -1,2 +1 @@
-Security/CWE-312/ExcessiveSecretsExposure.ql
-
+query: Security/CWE-312/ExcessiveSecretsExposure.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-312/SecretsInArtifacts.qlref

@@ -1,2 +1 @@
-Security/CWE-312/SecretsInArtifacts.ql
-
+query: Security/CWE-312/SecretsInArtifacts.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-312/UnmaskedSecretExposure.qlref

@@ -1,2 +1 @@
-Security/CWE-312/UnmaskedSecretExposure.ql
-
+query: Security/CWE-312/UnmaskedSecretExposure.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaCodeInjection.qlref

@@ -1,2 +1 @@
-Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaCodeInjection.ql
-
+query: Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaCodeInjection.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaDirectCache.qlref

@@ -1,2 +1 @@
-Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaDirectCache.ql
-
+query: Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaDirectCache.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaPoisonableStep.qlref

@@ -1,2 +1 @@
-Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaPoisonableStep.ql
-
+query: Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaPoisonableStep.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-367/UntrustedCheckoutTOCTOUCritical.qlref

@@ -1 +1 @@
-Security/CWE-367/UntrustedCheckoutTOCTOUCritical.ql
+query: Security/CWE-367/UntrustedCheckoutTOCTOUCritical.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-367/UntrustedCheckoutTOCTOUHigh.qlref

@@ -1 +1 @@
-Security/CWE-367/UntrustedCheckoutTOCTOUHigh.ql
+query: Security/CWE-367/UntrustedCheckoutTOCTOUHigh.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-571/ExpressionIsAlwaysTrueCritical.qlref

@@ -1 +1 @@
-Security/CWE-571/ExpressionIsAlwaysTrueCritical.ql
+query: Security/CWE-571/ExpressionIsAlwaysTrueCritical.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-571/ExpressionIsAlwaysTrueHigh.qlref

@@ -1 +1 @@
-Security/CWE-571/ExpressionIsAlwaysTrueHigh.ql
+query: Security/CWE-571/ExpressionIsAlwaysTrueHigh.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/.github/actions/unpinned-tag/action.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+name: Composite unpinned tag test
+runs:
+  using: "composite"
+  steps:
+    - uses: foo/bar@v2
+    - uses: foo/bar@25b062c917b0c75f8b47d8469aff6c94ffd89abb

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/.github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml

@@ -11,3 +11,9 @@ jobs:
     - uses: foo/bar@25b062c917b0c75f8b47d8469aff6c94ffd89abb
     - uses: docker://foo/bar@latest
     - uses: docker://foo/bar@sha256:887a259a5a534f3c4f36cb02dca341673c6089431057242cdc931e9f133147e9
+    # SHA-256 pinned (64 hex chars) - should NOT be flagged
+    - uses: foo/bar@25b062c917b0c75f8b47d8469aff6c94ffd89abb25b062c917b0c75f8b47d84d
+    # SHA-1 pinned (40 hex chars) regression - should NOT be flagged
+    - uses: foo/bar@a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2
+    # Invalid 50-char hex string - should be flagged
+    - uses: foo/bar@a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2a1b2c3d4e5

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/ArtifactPoisoningCritical.qlref

@@ -1,2 +1 @@
-Security/CWE-829/ArtifactPoisoningCritical.ql
-
+query: Security/CWE-829/ArtifactPoisoningCritical.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/ArtifactPoisoningMedium.qlref

@@ -1,2 +1 @@
-Security/CWE-829/ArtifactPoisoningMedium.ql
-
+query: Security/CWE-829/ArtifactPoisoningMedium.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/ArtifactPoisoningPathTraversal.qlref

@@ -1,2 +1 @@
-experimental/Security/CWE-829/ArtifactPoisoningPathTraversal.ql
-
+query: experimental/Security/CWE-829/ArtifactPoisoningPathTraversal.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/UnpinnedActionsTag.expected

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+| .github/actions/unpinned-tag/action.yml:5:13:5:22 | foo/bar@v2 | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'action.yml' step $@ uses 'foo/bar' with ref 'v2', not a pinned commit hash | .github/actions/unpinned-tag/action.yml:5:7:6:4 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:19:13:19:36 | completely/fakeaction@v2 | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'actor_trusted_checkout.yml' step $@ uses 'completely/fakeaction' with ref 'v2', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:19:7:23:4 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:23:13:23:37 | fakerepo/comment-on-pr@v1 | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'actor_trusted_checkout.yml' step $@ uses 'fakerepo/comment-on-pr' with ref 'v1', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:23:7:26:21 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:13:15:13:49 | dawidd6/action-download-artifact@v2 | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'Pull Request Open' step $@ uses 'dawidd6/action-download-artifact' with ref 'v2', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:13:9:18:6 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
@@ -33,3 +34,4 @@
 | .github/workflows/test18.yml:37:21:37:63 | sonarsource/sonarcloud-github-action@master | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'Sonar' step $@ uses 'sonarsource/sonarcloud-github-action' with ref 'master', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/test18.yml:36:15:40:58 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:10:13:10:22 | foo/bar@v1 | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'unpinned_tags.yml' step $@ uses 'foo/bar' with ref 'v1', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:10:7:11:4 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:12:13:12:35 | docker://foo/bar@latest | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'unpinned_tags.yml' step $@ uses 'docker://foo/bar' with ref 'latest', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:12:7:13:4 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
+| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:19:13:19:70 | foo/bar@a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2a1b2c3d4e5 | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'unpinned_tags.yml' step $@ uses 'foo/bar' with ref 'a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2a1b2c3d4e5', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:19:7:19:71 | Uses Step | Uses Step |

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/UnpinnedActionsTag.qlref

@@ -1 +1 @@
-Security/CWE-829/UnpinnedActionsTag.ql
+query: Security/CWE-829/UnpinnedActionsTag.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.expected

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ edges
 | .github/actions/download-artifact/action.yaml:25:7:29:4 | Run Step | .github/actions/download-artifact/action.yaml:29:7:32:18 | Run Step |
 | .github/actions/download-artifact/action.yaml:29:7:32:18 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning91.yml:19:9:25:6 | Run Step: metadata |
 | .github/actions/download-artifact/action.yaml:29:7:32:18 | Run Step | .github/workflows/resolve-args.yml:22:9:36:13 | Run Step: resolve-step |
+| .github/actions/unpinned-tag/action.yml:5:7:6:4 | Uses Step | .github/actions/unpinned-tag/action.yml:6:7:6:61 | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:9:7:14:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:14:7:15:4 | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:14:7:15:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:15:7:19:4 | Run Step |
 | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:15:7:19:4 | Run Step | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:19:7:23:4 | Uses Step |
@@ -311,7 +312,10 @@ edges
 | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:9:7:10:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:10:7:11:4 | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:10:7:11:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:11:7:12:4 | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:11:7:12:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:12:7:13:4 | Uses Step |
-| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:12:7:13:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:13:7:13:101 | Uses Step |
+| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:12:7:13:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:13:7:15:4 | Uses Step |
+| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:13:7:15:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:15:7:17:4 | Uses Step |
+| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:15:7:17:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:17:7:19:4 | Uses Step |
+| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:17:7:19:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:19:7:19:71 | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:7:9:14:6 | Run Step: pr_number | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:14:9:19:72 | Run Step |
 | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:11:9:12:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:12:9:13:6 | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:12:9:13:6 | Uses Step | .github/actions/dangerous-git-checkout/action.yml:6:7:11:4 | Uses Step |
@@ -334,42 +338,42 @@ edges
 | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_3.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_3.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step |
 #select
-| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:32:9:37:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:32:9:37:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:48:9:52:2 | Run Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:48:9:52:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:79:9:84:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:79:9:84:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:84:9:93:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:84:9:93:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:25:9:48:6 | Run Step: set-milestone | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:15:9:20:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:25:9:48:6 | Run Step: set-milestone | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:3:5:3:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/reusable_caller1.yaml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:21:11:23:22 | Run Step | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:10:11:18:8 | Run Step | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:21:11:23:22 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:17:7:21:4 | Run Step | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:12:7:16:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:17:7:21:4 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/level0.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/level0.yml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/level0.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/level0.yml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/poc2.yml:42:9:47:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:42:9:47:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/poc2.yml:52:9:58:24 | Run Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:52:9:58:24 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:222:9:227:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:216:9:222:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:222:9:227:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:256:9:261:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:250:9:256:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:256:9:261:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:290:9:295:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:284:9:290:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:290:9:295:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:391:9:395:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:391:9:395:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:395:9:404:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:395:9:404:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:404:9:414:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:404:9:414:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:414:9:423:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:414:9:423:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:423:9:432:2 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:423:9:432:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/reusable_caller3.yaml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/test7.yml:33:9:36:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:33:9:36:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/test7.yml:36:9:39:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:36:9:39:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/test7.yml:49:9:59:6 | Run Step: benchmark-pr | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:49:9:59:6 | Run Step: benchmark-pr | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/test7.yml:59:9:60:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:59:9:60:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/test7.yml:60:9:60:37 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:60:9:60:37 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/test10.yml:25:9:30:2 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test10.yml:20:9:25:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test10.yml:25:9:30:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test10.yml:8:3:8:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/test11.yml:90:7:93:54 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test11.yml:84:7:90:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test11.yml:90:7:93:54 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test11.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/test17.yml:19:15:23:58 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test17.yml:12:15:19:12 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test17.yml:19:15:23:58 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test17.yml:3:5:3:16 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/test27.yml:21:9:22:16 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test27.yml:18:9:21:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test27.yml:21:9:22:16 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test26.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/test29.yml:14:7:21:11 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test29.yml:8:7:14:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test29.yml:14:7:21:11 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test29.yml:1:5:1:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:13:9:13:23 | Run Step | .github/actions/dangerous-git-checkout/action.yml:6:7:11:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:13:9:13:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:35:7:41:4 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:35:7:41:4 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:41:7:47:4 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:41:7:47:4 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:47:7:51:46 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:47:7:51:46 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:15:9:18:2 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:8:9:11:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:15:9:18:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:30:9:32:23 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:30:9:32:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/actions/dangerous-git-checkout/action.yml:6:7:11:4 | Uses Step | .github/actions/dangerous-git-checkout/action.yml:6:7:11:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:13:9:13:23 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:32:9:37:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:48:9:52:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:79:9:84:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:84:9:93:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:15:9:20:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:15:9:20:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:25:9:48:6 | Run Step: set-milestone | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:3:5:3:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/reusable_caller1.yaml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:10:11:18:8 | Run Step | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:10:11:18:8 | Run Step | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:21:11:23:22 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:12:7:16:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:12:7:16:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:17:7:21:4 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/level0.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/level0.yml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/level0.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/level0.yml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:42:9:47:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:52:9:58:24 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:216:9:222:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:216:9:222:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:222:9:227:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:250:9:256:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:250:9:256:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:256:9:261:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:284:9:290:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:284:9:290:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:290:9:295:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:391:9:395:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:395:9:404:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:404:9:414:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:414:9:423:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:423:9:432:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/reusable_caller3.yaml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:33:9:36:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:36:9:39:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:49:9:59:6 | Run Step: benchmark-pr | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:59:9:60:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:60:9:60:37 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/test10.yml:20:9:25:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test10.yml:20:9:25:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test10.yml:25:9:30:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test10.yml:8:3:8:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/test11.yml:84:7:90:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test11.yml:84:7:90:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test11.yml:90:7:93:54 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test11.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/test17.yml:12:15:19:12 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test17.yml:12:15:19:12 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test17.yml:19:15:23:58 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test17.yml:3:5:3:16 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/test27.yml:18:9:21:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test27.yml:18:9:21:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test27.yml:21:9:22:16 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test26.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/test29.yml:8:7:14:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test29.yml:8:7:14:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test29.yml:14:7:21:11 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test29.yml:1:5:1:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:35:7:41:4 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:41:7:47:4 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:47:7:51:46 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:8:9:11:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:8:9:11:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:15:9:18:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:30:9:32:23 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.qlref

@@ -1 +1 @@
-Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.ql
+query: Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.expected

@@ -1,23 +1,23 @@
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:12:9:16:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:20:9:24:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:28:9:32:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:35:9:40:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:43:9:46:126 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:28:9:33:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:48:7:50:46 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit2.yml:27:9:31:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:26:9:30:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:30:9:35:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:57:9:62:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:79:9:83:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:95:9:100:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:109:9:114:66 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:103:9:109:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:139:9:144:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:444:9:449:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/test13.yml:20:7:25:4 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test13.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:14:9:19:72 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:1:5:1:17 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:12:9:16:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:20:9:24:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:28:9:32:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:35:9:40:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:43:9:46:126 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:28:9:33:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:48:7:50:46 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit2.yml:27:9:31:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:26:9:30:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:30:9:35:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:57:9:62:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:79:9:83:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:95:9:100:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:109:9:114:66 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:103:9:109:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:139:9:144:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:444:9:449:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/test13.yml:20:7:25:4 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test13.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:14:9:19:72 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:1:5:1:17 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.qlref

@@ -1 +1 @@
-Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.ql
+query: Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutMedium.qlref

@@ -1 +1 @@
-Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutMedium.ql
+query: Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutMedium.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/UnversionedImmutableAction.qlref

@@ -1 +1 @@
-experimental/Security/CWE-829/UnversionedImmutableAction.ql
+query: experimental/Security/CWE-829/UnversionedImmutableAction.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-918/RequestForgery.qlref

@@ -1 +1 @@
-experimental/Security/CWE-918/RequestForgery.ql
+query: experimental/Security/CWE-918/RequestForgery.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/SyntaxError/SyntaxError.qlref

@@ -1 +1 @@
-Debug/SyntaxError.ql
+query: Debug/SyntaxError.ql

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Violations Of Best Practice/CodeQL/UnnecessaryUseOfAdvancedConfig.qlref

@@ -1 +1 @@
-Violations Of Best Practice/CodeQL/UnnecessaryUseOfAdvancedConfig.ql
+query: Violations Of Best Practice/CodeQL/UnnecessaryUseOfAdvancedConfig.ql

config/identical-files.json

@@ -11,10 +11,6 @@
     "java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/dataflow/internal/rangeanalysis/SignAnalysisCommon.qll",
     "csharp/ql/lib/semmle/code/csharp/dataflow/internal/rangeanalysis/SignAnalysisCommon.qll"
   ],
-  "Bound Java/C#": [
-    "java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/dataflow/Bound.qll",
-    "csharp/ql/lib/semmle/code/csharp/dataflow/Bound.qll"
-  ],
   "ModulusAnalysis Java/C#": [
     "java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/dataflow/ModulusAnalysis.qll",
     "csharp/ql/lib/semmle/code/csharp/dataflow/ModulusAnalysis.qll"

cpp/downgrades/837c4e02326aee4582405d069263092e80a15d82/upgrade.properties

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+description: Support alias templates
+compatibility: full
+is_alias_template.rel: delete
+alias_instantiation.rel: delete
+alias_template_argument.rel: delete
+alias_template_argument_value.rel: delete

cpp/downgrades/ef8d209a22e27413aaaeff4446f0ecb9fa2c227b/upgrade.properties

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+description: Capture information about one template being generated from another
+compatibility: full
+class_template_generated_from.rel: delete
+function_template_generated_from.rel: delete
+variable_template_generated_from.rel: delete
+alias_template_generated_from.rel: delete

cpp/ql/lib/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,3 +1,25 @@
+## 10.2.0
+
+### Deprecated APIs
+
+* The `UsingAliasTypedefType` class has been deprecated. Use `TypeAliasType` instead.
+
+### New Features
+
+* Added a `getOriginalTemplate` predicate to `TemplateClass`, `TemplateFunction`, `TemplateVariable`, and `AliasTemplateType`, which yields the class member template the template was generated from. The predicates only have results for templates that are members of class template instantiations.
+* Added `AliasTemplateType` and `AliasTemplateInstantiationType` classes, representing C++ alias templates and their instantiations.
+
+### Minor Analysis Improvements
+
+* Added flow source models for `scanf_s` and related functions.
+* Added a `Call` column to `LocalFlowSourceFunction::hasLocalFlowSource` and `RemoteFlowSourceFunction::hasRemoteFlowSource`. The old predicates without a `Call` column continue to be supported.
+
+## 10.1.1
+
+### Minor Analysis Improvements
+
+* The `RemoteFlowSourceFunction` model for `fscanf` (and variants) now implements `hasSocketInput` to reflect that these functions may read from a socket.
+
 ## 10.1.0
 
 ### New Features

cpp/ql/lib/DefaultOptions.qll

@@ -30,8 +30,6 @@ class Options extends string {
   predicate overrideReturnsNull(Call call) {
     // Used in CVS:
     call.(FunctionCall).getTarget().hasGlobalName("Xstrdup")
-    or
-    CustomOptions::overrideReturnsNull(call) // old Options.qll
   }
 
   /**
@@ -45,8 +43,6 @@ class Options extends string {
     // Used in CVS:
     call.(FunctionCall).getTarget().hasGlobalName("Xstrdup") and
     nullValue(call.getArgument(0))
-    or
-    CustomOptions::returnsNull(call) // old Options.qll
   }
 
   /**
@@ -65,8 +61,6 @@ class Options extends string {
     f.hasGlobalOrStdName([
         "exit", "_exit", "_Exit", "abort", "__assert_fail", "longjmp", "__builtin_unreachable"
       ])
-    or
-    CustomOptions::exits(f) // old Options.qll
   }
 
   /**
@@ -79,8 +73,7 @@ class Options extends string {
    * runtime, the program's behavior is undefined)
    */
   predicate exprExits(Expr e) {
-    e.(AssumeExpr).getChild(0).(CompileTimeConstantInt).getIntValue() = 0 or
-    CustomOptions::exprExits(e) // old Options.qll
+    e.(AssumeExpr).getChild(0).(CompileTimeConstantInt).getIntValue() = 0
   }
 
   /**
@@ -88,10 +81,7 @@ class Options extends string {
    *
    * By default holds only for `fgets`.
    */
-  predicate alwaysCheckReturnValue(Function f) {
-    f.hasGlobalOrStdName("fgets") or
-    CustomOptions::alwaysCheckReturnValue(f) // old Options.qll
-  }
+  predicate alwaysCheckReturnValue(Function f) { f.hasGlobalOrStdName("fgets") }
 
   /**
    * Holds if it is reasonable to ignore the return value of function
@@ -107,8 +97,6 @@ class Options extends string {
     // common way of sleeping using select:
     fc.getTarget().hasGlobalName("select") and
     fc.getArgument(0).getValue() = "0"
-    or
-    CustomOptions::okToIgnoreReturnValue(fc) // old Options.qll
   }
 }
 

cpp/ql/lib/Options.qll

@@ -98,57 +98,3 @@ class CustomMutexType extends MutexType {
    */
   override predicate unlockAccess(FunctionCall fc, Expr arg) { none() }
 }
-
-/**
- * DEPRECATED: customize `CustomOptions.overrideReturnsNull` instead.
- *
- * This predicate is required to support backwards compatibility for
- * older `Options.qll` files.  It should not be removed or modified by
- * end users.
- */
-predicate overrideReturnsNull(Call call) { none() }
-
-/**
- * DEPRECATED: customize `CustomOptions.returnsNull` instead.
- *
- * This predicate is required to support backwards compatibility for
- * older `Options.qll` files.  It should not be removed or modified by
- * end users.
- */
-predicate returnsNull(Call call) { none() }
-
-/**
- * DEPRECATED: customize `CustomOptions.exits` instead.
- *
- * This predicate is required to support backwards compatibility for
- * older `Options.qll` files.  It should not be removed or modified by
- * end users.
- */
-predicate exits(Function f) { none() }
-
-/**
- * DEPRECATED: customize `CustomOptions.exprExits` instead.
- *
- * This predicate is required to support backwards compatibility for
- * older `Options.qll` files.  It should not be removed or modified by
- * end users.
- */
-predicate exprExits(Expr e) { none() }
-
-/**
- * DEPRECATED: customize `CustomOptions.alwaysCheckReturnValue` instead.
- *
- * This predicate is required to support backwards compatibility for
- * older `Options.qll` files.  It should not be removed or modified by
- * end users.
- */
-predicate alwaysCheckReturnValue(Function f) { none() }
-
-/**
- * DEPRECATED: customize `CustomOptions.okToIgnoreReturnValue` instead.
- *
- * This predicate is required to support backwards compatibility for
- * older `Options.qll` files.  It should not be removed or modified by
- * end users.
- */
-predicate okToIgnoreReturnValue(FunctionCall fc) { none() }

cpp/ql/lib/change-notes/2026-05-27-deprecated-removal.md

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+---
+category: breaking
+---
+* Removed the deprecated `overrideReturnsNull` predicate from `Options.qll`. Use `CustomOptions.overrideReturnsNull` instead.
+* Removed the deprecated `returnsNull` predicate from `Options.qll`. Use `CustomOptions.returnsNull` instead.
+* Removed the deprecated `exits` predicate from `Options.qll`. Use `CustomOptions.exits` instead.
+* Removed the deprecated `exprExits` predicate from `Options.qll`. Use `CustomOptions.exprExits` instead.
+* Removed the deprecated `alwaysCheckReturnValue` predicate from `Options.qll`. Use `CustomOptions.alwaysCheckReturnValue` instead.
+* Removed the deprecated `okToIgnoreReturnValue` predicate from `Options.qll`. Use `CustomOptions.okToIgnoreReturnValue` instead.
+* Removed the deprecated `semmle.code.cpp.Member`. Import `semmle.code.cpp.Element` and/or `semmle.code.cpp.Type` directly.
+* Removed the deprecated `UnknownDefaultLocation` class. Use `UnknownLocation` instead.
+* Removed the deprecated `UnknownExprLocation` class. Use `UnknownLocation` instead.
+* Removed the deprecated `UnknownStmtLocation` class. Use `UnknownLocation` instead.
+* Removed the deprecated `TemplateParameter` class. Use `TypeTemplateParameter` instead.
+* Support for class resolution across link targets has been removed for databases which were created with CodeQL versions before 1.23.0.

cpp/ql/lib/change-notes/released/10.1.1.md

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+## 10.1.1
+
+### Minor Analysis Improvements
+
+* The `RemoteFlowSourceFunction` model for `fscanf` (and variants) now implements `hasSocketInput` to reflect that these functions may read from a socket.

cpp/ql/lib/change-notes/released/10.2.0.md

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+## 10.2.0
+
+### Deprecated APIs
+
+* The `UsingAliasTypedefType` class has been deprecated. Use `TypeAliasType` instead.
+
+### New Features
+
+* Added a `getOriginalTemplate` predicate to `TemplateClass`, `TemplateFunction`, `TemplateVariable`, and `AliasTemplateType`, which yields the class member template the template was generated from. The predicates only have results for templates that are members of class template instantiations.
+* Added `AliasTemplateType` and `AliasTemplateInstantiationType` classes, representing C++ alias templates and their instantiations.
+
+### Minor Analysis Improvements
+
+* Added flow source models for `scanf_s` and related functions.
+* Added a `Call` column to `LocalFlowSourceFunction::hasLocalFlowSource` and `RemoteFlowSourceFunction::hasRemoteFlowSource`. The old predicates without a `Call` column continue to be supported.

cpp/ql/lib/codeql-pack.release.yml

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 ---
-lastReleaseVersion: 10.1.0
+lastReleaseVersion: 10.2.0

cpp/ql/lib/cpp.qll

@@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ import semmle.code.cpp.Class
 import semmle.code.cpp.Struct
 import semmle.code.cpp.Union
 import semmle.code.cpp.Enum
-import semmle.code.cpp.Member
 import semmle.code.cpp.Field
 import semmle.code.cpp.Function
 import semmle.code.cpp.MemberFunction

cpp/ql/lib/qlpack.yml

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 name: codeql/cpp-all
-version: 10.1.1-dev
+version: 10.2.1-dev
 groups: cpp
 dbscheme: semmlecode.cpp.dbscheme
 extractor: cpp

cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/Class.qll

@@ -856,8 +856,10 @@ class AbstractClass extends Class {
 
 /**
  * A class template (this class also finds partial specializations
- * of class templates).  For example in the following code there is a
- * `MyTemplateClass<T>` template:
+ * of class templates).
+ *
+ * For example in the following code there is a `MyTemplateClass<T>`
+ * template:
  * ```
  * template<class T>
  * class MyTemplateClass {
@@ -893,6 +895,29 @@ class TemplateClass extends Class {
   }
 
   override string getAPrimaryQlClass() { result = "TemplateClass" }
+
+  /**
+   * Gets the class member template this template was generated from.
+   *
+   * This predicate only has results for templates that are members of class
+   * template instantiations. For example, for `MyTemplateClass<int>::C<S>`
+   * in the following code, the result is `MyTemplateClass<T>::C<S>`.
+   * ```cpp
+   * template<class T>
+   * class MyTemplateClass {
+   *   template<class S>
+   *   class C {
+   *     ...
+   *   };
+   * };
+   *
+   * template
+   * class MyTemplateClass<int>;
+   * ```
+   */
+  TemplateClass getOriginalTemplate() {
+    class_template_generated_from(underlyingElement(this), unresolveElement(result))
+  }
 }
 
 /**

cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/Declaration.qll

@@ -278,6 +278,8 @@ class Declaration extends Locatable, @declaration {
     or
     variable_template_argument(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
     or
+    alias_template_argument(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
+    or
     template_template_argument(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
     or
     concept_template_argument(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
@@ -290,6 +292,8 @@ class Declaration extends Locatable, @declaration {
     or
     variable_template_argument_value(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
     or
+    alias_template_argument_value(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
+    or
     template_template_argument_value(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
     or
     concept_template_argument_value(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))

cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/Element.qll

@@ -278,6 +278,15 @@ private predicate isFromTemplateInstantiationRec(Element e, Element instantiatio
   instantiation.(Variable).isConstructedFrom(_) and
   e = instantiation
   or
+  instantiation.(TypeAliasType).isConstructedFrom(_) and
+  e = instantiation
+  or
+  instantiation.(TemplateTemplateParameterInstantiation).isConstructedFrom(_) and
+  e = instantiation
+  or
+  exists(instantiation.(ConceptIdExpr).getConcept()) and
+  e = instantiation
+  or
   isFromTemplateInstantiationRec(e.getEnclosingElement(), instantiation)
 }
 
@@ -291,6 +300,15 @@ private predicate isFromUninstantiatedTemplateRec(Element e, Element template) {
   is_variable_template(unresolveElement(template)) and
   e = template
   or
+  is_alias_template(unresolveElement(template)) and
+  e = template
+  or
+  usertypes(unresolveElement(template), _, 8) and // template template parameter
+  e = template
+  or
+  template instanceof @concept_template and
+  e = template
+  or
   isFromUninstantiatedTemplateRec(e.getEnclosingElement(), template)
 }
 

cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/Function.qll

@@ -828,6 +828,27 @@ class TemplateFunction extends Function {
    * such things -- see FunctionTemplateSpecialization for further details.
    */
   FunctionTemplateSpecialization getASpecialization() { result.getPrimaryTemplate() = this }
+
+  /**
+   * Gets the class member template this template was generated from.
+   *
+   * This predicate only has results for templates that are members of class
+   * template instantiations. For example, for `MyTemplateClass<int>::f<S>`
+   * in the following code, the result is `MyTemplateClass<T>::f<S>`.
+   * ```cpp
+   * template<class T>
+   * class MyTemplateClass {
+   *   template<class S>
+   *   S f();
+   * };
+   *
+   * template
+   * class MyTemplateClass<int>;
+   * ```
+   */
+  TemplateFunction getOriginalTemplate() {
+    function_template_generated_from(underlyingElement(this), unresolveElement(result))
+  }
 }
 
 /**

cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/Location.qll

@@ -148,28 +148,3 @@ class UnknownLocation extends Location {
     this.getFile().getAbsolutePath() = "" and locations_default(this, _, 0, 0, 0, 0)
   }
 }
-
-/**
- * A dummy location which is used when something doesn't have a location in
- * the source code but needs to have a `Location` associated with it.
- *
- * DEPRECATED: use `UnknownLocation`
- */
-deprecated class UnknownDefaultLocation extends UnknownLocation { }
-
-/**
- * A dummy location which is used when an expression doesn't have a
- * location in the source code but needs to have a `Location` associated
- * with it.
- *
- * DEPRECATED: use `UnknownLocation`
- */
-deprecated class UnknownExprLocation extends UnknownLocation { }
-
-/**
- * A dummy location which is used when a statement doesn't have a location
- * in the source code but needs to have a `Location` associated with it.
- *
- * DEPRECATED: use `UnknownLocation`
- */
-deprecated class UnknownStmtLocation extends UnknownLocation { }

cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/Member.qll

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * DEPRECATED: import `semmle.code.cpp.Element` and/or `semmle.code.cpp.Type` directly as required.
- */
-
-import semmle.code.cpp.Element
-import semmle.code.cpp.Type

cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/TemplateParameter.qll

@@ -35,13 +35,6 @@ class NonTypeTemplateParameter extends Literal, TemplateParameterImpl {
   override string getAPrimaryQlClass() { result = "NonTypeTemplateParameter" }
 }
 
-/**
- * A C++ `typename` (or `class`) template parameter.
- *
- * DEPRECATED: Use `TypeTemplateParameter` instead.
- */
-deprecated class TemplateParameter = TypeTemplateParameter;
-
 /**
  * A C++ `typename` (or `class`) template parameter.
  *

cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/TypedefType.qll

@@ -64,23 +64,123 @@ class CTypedefType extends TypedefType {
 }
 
 /**
- * A using alias C++ typedef type.  For example the type declared in the following code:
+ * DEPRECATED: Use `TypeAlias` instead.
+ *
+ * A C++ type alias or alias template.
+ *
+ * For example the type declared in the following code:
  * ```
  * using my_int2 = int;
  * ```
  */
-class UsingAliasTypedefType extends TypedefType {
-  UsingAliasTypedefType() { usertype_alias_kind(underlyingElement(this), 1) }
+deprecated class UsingAliasTypedefType = TypeAliasType;
 
-  override string getAPrimaryQlClass() { result = "UsingAliasTypedefType" }
+/**
+ * A C++ type alias or alias template.
+ *
+ * For example the type declared in the following code:
+ * ```
+ * using my_int2 = int;
+ * ```
+ */
+class TypeAliasType extends TypedefType {
+  TypeAliasType() { usertype_alias_kind(underlyingElement(this), 1) }
+
+  override string getAPrimaryQlClass() { result = "TypeAliasType" }
 
   override string explain() {
     result = "using {" + this.getBaseType().explain() + "} as \"" + this.getName() + "\""
   }
+
+  /**
+   * Holds if this alias is constructed from another alias as a result of
+   * template instantiation.
+   */
+  predicate isConstructedFrom(TypeAliasType t) {
+    alias_instantiation(underlyingElement(this), unresolveElement(t))
+  }
 }
 
 /**
- * A C++ `typedef` type that is directly enclosed by a function.  For example the type declared inside the function `foo` in
+ * A C++ alias template.
+ *
+ * For example the type declared in the following code:
+ * ```
+ * template <typename T>
+ * using my_type = T;
+ * ```
+ */
+class AliasTemplateType extends TypeAliasType {
+  AliasTemplateType() { is_alias_template(underlyingElement(this)) }
+
+  override string getAPrimaryQlClass() { result = "AliasTemplateType" }
+
+  /**
+   * Gets an alias instantiated from this template.
+   *
+   * For example for `MyAliasTemplate<T>` in the following code, the results are
+   * `MyAliasTemplate<int>` and `MyAliasTemplate<long>`:
+   * ```
+   * template<typename T>
+   * using MyAliasTemplate = ...;
+   *
+   * MyAliasTemplate<int> instance1;
+   *
+   * MyAliasTemplate<long> instance2;
+   * ```
+   */
+  TypeAliasType getAnInstantiation() { result.isConstructedFrom(this) }
+
+  /**
+   * Gets the class member template this template was generated from.
+   *
+   * This predicate only has results for templates that are members of class
+   * template instantiations. For example, for `MyTemplateClass<int>::t<S>`
+   * in the following code, the result is `MyTemplateClass<T>::t<S>`.
+   * ```cpp
+   * template<class T>
+   * class MyTemplateClass {
+   *   template<class S>
+   *   using t = S;
+   * };
+   *
+   * template
+   * class MyTemplateClass<int>;
+   * ```
+   */
+  AliasTemplateType getOriginalTemplate() {
+    alias_template_generated_from(underlyingElement(this), unresolveElement(result))
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * A C++ alias template instantiation.
+ *
+ * For example the `my_int_type` type declared in the following code:
+ * ```
+ * template <typename T>
+ * using my_type = T;
+ *
+ * using my_int_type = my_type<int>;
+ * ```
+ */
+class AliasTemplateInstantiationType extends TypeAliasType {
+  AliasTemplateType at;
+
+  AliasTemplateInstantiationType() { at.getAnInstantiation() = this }
+
+  override string getAPrimaryQlClass() { result = "AliasTemplateInstantiationType" }
+
+  /**
+   * Gets the alias template from which this instantiation was instantiated.
+   */
+  AliasTemplateType getTemplate() { result = at }
+}
+
+/**
+ * A C++ `typedef` type that is directly enclosed by a function.
+ *
+ * For example the type declared inside the function `foo` in
  * the following code:
  * ```
  * int foo(void) { typedef int local; }

cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/Variable.qll

@@ -614,6 +614,27 @@ class TemplateVariable extends Variable {
     result.isConstructedFrom(this) and
     not result.isSpecialization()
   }
+
+  /**
+   * Gets the class member template this template was generated from.
+   *
+   * This predicate only has results for templates that are members of class
+   * template instantiations. For example, for `MyTemplateClass<int>::x<S>`
+   * in the following code, the result is `MyTemplateClass<T>::x<S>`.
+   * ```cpp
+   * template<class T>
+   * class MyTemplateClass {
+   *   template<class S>
+   *   static S x;
+   * };
+   *
+   * template
+   * class MyTemplateClass<int>;
+   * ```
+   */
+  TemplateVariable getOriginalTemplate() {
+    variable_template_generated_from(underlyingElement(this), unresolveElement(result))
+  }
 }
 
 /**

cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/commons/Scanf.qll

@@ -25,6 +25,15 @@ abstract class ScanfFunction extends Function {
    * (rather than a `char*`).
    */
   predicate isWideCharDefault() { exists(this.getName().indexOf("wscanf")) }
+
+  /** Holds if this is one of the `scanf_s` variants. */
+  predicate isSVariant() {
+    exists(string name | name = this.getName() |
+      name.matches("%\\_s")
+      or
+      name.matches("%\\_s\\_l")
+    )
+  }
 }
 
 /**
@@ -34,8 +43,12 @@ class Scanf extends ScanfFunction instanceof TopLevelFunction {
   Scanf() {
     this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("scanf") or // scanf(format, args...)
     this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("wscanf") or // wscanf(format, args...)
+    this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("scanf_s") or // scanf_s(format, args...)
+    this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("wscanf_s") or // wscanf_s(format, args...)
     this.hasGlobalName("_scanf_l") or // _scanf_l(format, locale, args...)
-    this.hasGlobalName("_wscanf_l")
+    this.hasGlobalName("_wscanf_l") or // _wscanf_l(format, locale, args...)
+    this.hasGlobalName("_scanf_s_l") or // _scanf_s_l(format, locale, args...)
+    this.hasGlobalName("_wscanf_s_l") // _wscanf_s_l(format, locale, args...)
   }
 
   override int getInputParameterIndex() { none() }
@@ -50,8 +63,12 @@ class Fscanf extends ScanfFunction instanceof TopLevelFunction {
   Fscanf() {
     this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("fscanf") or // fscanf(src_stream, format, args...)
     this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("fwscanf") or // fwscanf(src_stream, format, args...)
+    this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("fscanf_s") or // fscanf_s(src_stream, format, args...)
+    this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("fwscanf_s") or // fwscanf_s(src_stream, format, args...)
     this.hasGlobalName("_fscanf_l") or // _fscanf_l(src_stream, format, locale, args...)
-    this.hasGlobalName("_fwscanf_l")
+    this.hasGlobalName("_fwscanf_l") or // _fwscanf_l(src_stream, format, locale, args...)
+    this.hasGlobalName("_fscanf_s_l") or // _fscanf_s_l(src_stream, format, locale, args...)
+    this.hasGlobalName("_fwscanf_s_l") // _fwscanf_s_l(src_stream, format, locale, args...)
   }
 
   override int getInputParameterIndex() { result = 0 }
@@ -66,8 +83,12 @@ class Sscanf extends ScanfFunction instanceof TopLevelFunction {
   Sscanf() {
     this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("sscanf") or // sscanf(src_stream, format, args...)
     this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("swscanf") or // swscanf(src, format, args...)
+    this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("sscanf_s") or // sscanf_s(src, format, args...)
+    this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("swscanf_s") or // swscanf_s(src, format, args...)
     this.hasGlobalName("_sscanf_l") or // _sscanf_l(src, format, locale, args...)
-    this.hasGlobalName("_swscanf_l")
+    this.hasGlobalName("_swscanf_l") or // _swscanf_l(src, format, locale, args...)
+    this.hasGlobalName("_sscanf_s_l") or // _sscanf_s_l(src, format, locale, args...)
+    this.hasGlobalName("_swscanf_s_l") // _swscanf_s_l(src, format, locale, args...)
   }
 
   override int getInputParameterIndex() { result = 0 }
@@ -97,6 +118,14 @@ class Snscanf extends ScanfFunction instanceof TopLevelFunction {
   int getInputLengthParameterIndex() { result = 1 }
 }
 
+private predicate isCharLike(Type t) { t instanceof CharType or t instanceof Wchar_t }
+
+private predicate isStringLike(Type t) {
+  isCharLike(t.(PointerType).getBaseType())
+  or
+  isCharLike(t.(ArrayType).getBaseType())
+}
+
 /**
  * A call to one of the `scanf` functions.
  */
@@ -130,14 +159,40 @@ class ScanfFunctionCall extends FunctionCall {
    */
   predicate isWideCharDefault() { this.getScanfFunction().isWideCharDefault() }
 
+  bindingset[this, k]
+  pragma[inline_late]
+  private predicate isSizeArgument(int k) {
+    // The first vararg is never the size argument since a size argument must
+    // always follow a string buffer argument.
+    k > 0 and
+    isStringLike(this.getArgument(this.getScanfFunction().getNumberOfParameters() + k - 1)
+          .getUnspecifiedType())
+  }
+
   /**
    * Gets the output argument at position `n` in the vararg list of this call.
    *
    * The range of `n` is from `0` to `this.getNumberOfOutputArguments() - 1`.
    */
   Expr getOutputArgument(int n) {
-    result = this.getArgument(this.getTarget().getNumberOfParameters() + n) and
-    n >= 0
+    exists(ScanfFunction target | target = this.getScanfFunction() |
+      // If this is an S variant then every string buffer argument has a
+      // corresponding size argument immediately following it, so we need to
+      // skip over those size arguments when counting the output arguments.
+      if target.isSVariant()
+      then
+        result =
+          rank[n + 1](Expr arg, int k |
+            k >= 0 and
+            arg = this.getArgument(target.getNumberOfParameters() + k) and
+            not this.isSizeArgument(k)
+          |
+            arg order by k
+          )
+      else (
+        n >= 0 and result = this.getArgument(target.getNumberOfParameters() + n)
+      )
+    )
   }
 
   /**

cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/dataflow/ExternalFlow.qll

@@ -276,6 +276,45 @@ private predicate isClassConstructedFrom(Class c, Class templateClass) {
   not c.isConstructedFrom(_) and c = templateClass
 }
 
+/** Gets the fully templated version of `c`. */
+private Class getFullyTemplatedClassOld(Class c) {
+  not c.isFromUninstantiatedTemplate(_) and
+  isClassConstructedFrom(c, result)
+}
+
+private TemplateClass getOriginalClassTemplate(TemplateClass tc) {
+  result = tc.getOriginalTemplate()
+  or
+  not exists(tc.getOriginalTemplate()) and
+  result = tc
+}
+
+/** Gets the fully templated version of `c`. */
+private Class getFullyTemplatedClassNew(Class c) {
+  not c.isFromUninstantiatedTemplate(_) and
+  exists(Class mid |
+    c.isConstructedFrom(mid)
+    or
+    not c.isConstructedFrom(_) and c = mid
+  |
+    result = getOriginalClassTemplate(mid)
+    or
+    not mid instanceof TemplateClass and mid = result
+  )
+}
+
+/** Gets the fully templated version of `c`. */
+private Class getFullyTemplatedClass(Class c) {
+  // The `Class::getOriginalTemplate` predicate was introduced in CodeQL
+  // version 2.25.6 and the upgrade script leaves the
+  // `class_template_generated_from` extensionals empty if the database
+  // was generated with an older extractor. So we use the old implementation
+  // if the `class_template_generated_from` extensional is empty.
+  if class_template_generated_from(_, _)
+  then result = getFullyTemplatedClassNew(c)
+  else result = getFullyTemplatedClassOld(c)
+}
+
 /**
  * Holds if `f` is an instantiation of a function template `templateFunc`, or
  * holds with `f = templateFunc` if `f` is not an instantiation of any function
@@ -292,7 +331,7 @@ private predicate isFunctionConstructedFrom(Function f, Function templateFunc) {
 }
 
 /** Gets the fully templated version of `f`. */
-Function getFullyTemplatedFunction(Function f) {
+private Function getFullyTemplatedFunctionOld(Function f) {
   not f.isFromUninstantiatedTemplate(_) and
   (
     exists(Class c, Class templateClass, int i |
@@ -306,13 +345,46 @@ Function getFullyTemplatedFunction(Function f) {
   )
 }
 
+private TemplateFunction getOriginalFunctionTemplate(TemplateFunction tf) {
+  result = tf.getOriginalTemplate()
+  or
+  not exists(tf.getOriginalTemplate()) and
+  result = tf
+}
+
+/** Gets the fully templated version of `f`. */
+private Function getFullyTemplatedFunctionNew(Function f) {
+  not f.isFromUninstantiatedTemplate(_) and
+  exists(Function mid |
+    f.isConstructedFrom(mid)
+    or
+    not f.isConstructedFrom(_) and f = mid
+  |
+    result = getOriginalFunctionTemplate(mid)
+    or
+    not mid instanceof TemplateFunction and mid = result
+  )
+}
+
+/** Gets the fully templated version of `f`. */
+Function getFullyTemplatedFunction(Function f) {
+  // The `Function::getOriginalTemplate` predicate was introduced in CodeQL
+  // version 2.25.6 and the upgrade script leaves the
+  // `function_template_generated_from` extensionals empty if the database
+  // was generated with an older extractor. So we use the old implementation
+  // if the `function_template_generated_from` extensional is empty.
+  if function_template_generated_from(_, _)
+  then result = getFullyTemplatedFunctionNew(f)
+  else result = getFullyTemplatedFunctionOld(f)
+}
+
 /** Prefixes `const` to `s` if `t` is const, or returns `s` otherwise. */
 bindingset[s, t]
 private string withConst(string s, Type t) {
   if t.isConst() then result = "const " + s else result = s
 }
 
-/** Prefixes `volatile` to `s` if `t` is const, or returns `s` otherwise. */
+/** Prefixes `volatile` to `s` if `t` is volatile, or returns `s` otherwise. */
 bindingset[s, t]
 private string withVolatile(string s, Type t) {
   if t.isVolatile() then result = "volatile " + s else result = s
@@ -490,7 +562,7 @@ pragma[nomagic]
 private string getTypeNameWithoutClassTemplates(Function f, int n, int remaining) {
   // If there is a declaring type then we start by expanding the function templates
   exists(Class template |
-    isClassConstructedFrom(f.getDeclaringType(), template) and
+    template = getFullyTemplatedClass(f.getDeclaringType()) and
     remaining = getNumberOfSupportedClassTemplateArguments(template) and
     result = getTypeNameWithoutFunctionTemplates(f, n, 0)
   )
@@ -502,7 +574,7 @@ private string getTypeNameWithoutClassTemplates(Function f, int n, int remaining
   or
   exists(string mid, TypeTemplateParameter tp, Class template |
     mid = getTypeNameWithoutClassTemplates(f, n, remaining + 1) and
-    isClassConstructedFrom(f.getDeclaringType(), template) and
+    template = getFullyTemplatedClass(f.getDeclaringType()) and
     tp = getSupportedClassTemplateArgument(template, remaining)
   |
     result = mid.replaceAll(tp.getName(), "class:" + remaining.toString())

cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/internal/ResolveClass.qll

@@ -1,59 +1,5 @@
 import semmle.code.cpp.Type
 
-/** For upgraded databases without mangled name info. */
-pragma[noinline]
-private string getTopLevelClassName(@usertype c) {
-  not mangled_name(_, _, _) and
-  isClass(c) and
-  usertypes(c, result, _) and
-  not namespacembrs(_, c) and // not in a namespace
-  not member(_, _, c) and // not in some structure
-  not class_instantiation(c, _) // not a template instantiation
-}
-
-/**
- * For upgraded databases without mangled name info.
- * Holds if `d` is a unique complete class named `name`.
- */
-pragma[noinline]
-private predicate existsCompleteWithName(string name, @usertype d) {
-  not mangled_name(_, _, _) and
-  is_complete(d) and
-  name = getTopLevelClassName(d) and
-  onlyOneCompleteClassExistsWithName(name)
-}
-
-/** For upgraded databases without mangled name info. */
-pragma[noinline]
-private predicate onlyOneCompleteClassExistsWithName(string name) {
-  not mangled_name(_, _, _) and
-  strictcount(@usertype c | is_complete(c) and getTopLevelClassName(c) = name) = 1
-}
-
-/**
- * For upgraded databases without mangled name info.
- * Holds if `c` is an incomplete class named `name`.
- */
-pragma[noinline]
-private predicate existsIncompleteWithName(string name, @usertype c) {
-  not mangled_name(_, _, _) and
-  not is_complete(c) and
-  name = getTopLevelClassName(c)
-}
-
-/**
- * For upgraded databases without mangled name info.
- * Holds if `c` is an incomplete class, and there exists a unique complete class `d`
- * with the same name.
- */
-private predicate oldHasCompleteTwin(@usertype c, @usertype d) {
-  not mangled_name(_, _, _) and
-  exists(string name |
-    existsIncompleteWithName(name, c) and
-    existsCompleteWithName(name, d)
-  )
-}
-
 pragma[noinline]
 private @mangledname getClassMangledName(@usertype c) {
   isClass(c) and
@@ -103,10 +49,7 @@ private module Cached {
   @usertype resolveClass(@usertype c) {
     hasCompleteTwin(c, result)
     or
-    oldHasCompleteTwin(c, result)
-    or
     not hasCompleteTwin(c, _) and
-    not oldHasCompleteTwin(c, _) and
     result = c
   }