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Author SHA1 Message Date
Arthur Baars
c3ae3a5770 Update 2025-08-25-loc-option.md 2025-09-01 22:39:13 +02:00
6202 changed files with 240720 additions and 529962 deletions

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@@ -1 +1 @@
8.4.2
8.1.1

3
.gitattributes vendored
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@@ -82,6 +82,9 @@
/csharp/paket.main.bzl linguist-generated=true
/csharp/paket.main_extension.bzl linguist-generated=true
# ripunzip tool
/misc/ripunzip/ripunzip-* filter=lfs diff=lfs merge=lfs -text
# swift prebuilt resources
/swift/third_party/resources/*.zip filter=lfs diff=lfs merge=lfs -text
/swift/third_party/resources/*.tar.zst filter=lfs diff=lfs merge=lfs -text

4
.github/copilot-instructions.md vendored Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
When reviewing code:
* do not review changes in files with `.expected` extension (they are automatically ensured to be correct).
* in `.ql` and `.qll` files, do not try to review the code itself as you don't understand the programming language
well enough to make comments in these languages. You can still check for typos or comment improvements.

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@@ -40,8 +40,3 @@ updates:
- dependency-name: "*"
reviewers:
- "github/codeql-go"
- package-ecosystem: bazel
directory: "/"
schedule:
interval: weekly

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@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
---
applyTo: "**/*.expected"
---
Ignore these files. These are generated to be correct by running the tests, and should not be edited manually.

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@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
---
applyTo: "**/*.ql,**/*.qll"
---
When reviewing these QL files, do not make any comment on the code itself. You don't understand the QL programming language well enough yet. You can only make comments about the following aspects:
* comments (lines starting with `//` or block comments enclosed in `/* ... */`): you can suggest improvements to the clarity of comments, or point out spelling mistakes
* typos in identifiers

74
.github/workflows/build-ripunzip.yml vendored Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
name: Build runzip
on:
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
ripunzip-version:
description: "what reference to checktout from google/runzip"
required: false
default: v2.0.2
openssl-version:
description: "what reference to checkout from openssl/openssl for Linux"
required: false
default: openssl-3.5.0
jobs:
build:
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
os: [ubuntu-22.04, macos-13, windows-2022]
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
with:
repository: google/ripunzip
ref: ${{ inputs.ripunzip-version }}
# we need to avoid ripunzip dynamically linking into libssl
# see https://github.com/sfackler/rust-openssl/issues/183
- if: runner.os == 'Linux'
name: checkout openssl
uses: actions/checkout@v5
with:
repository: openssl/openssl
path: openssl
ref: ${{ inputs.openssl-version }}
- if: runner.os == 'Linux'
name: build and install openssl with fPIC
shell: bash
working-directory: openssl
run: |
./config -fPIC --prefix=$HOME/.local --openssldir=$HOME/.local/ssl
make -j $(nproc)
make install_sw -j $(nproc)
- if: runner.os == 'Linux'
name: build (linux)
shell: bash
run: |
env OPENSSL_LIB_DIR=$HOME/.local/lib64 OPENSSL_INCLUDE_DIR=$HOME/.local/include OPENSSL_STATIC=yes cargo build --release
mv target/release/ripunzip ripunzip-linux
- if: runner.os == 'Windows'
name: build (windows)
shell: bash
run: |
cargo build --release
mv target/release/ripunzip ripunzip-windows
- name: build (macOS)
if: runner.os == 'macOS'
shell: bash
run: |
rustup target install x86_64-apple-darwin
rustup target install aarch64-apple-darwin
cargo build --target x86_64-apple-darwin --release
cargo build --target aarch64-apple-darwin --release
lipo -create -output ripunzip-macos \
-arch x86_64 target/x86_64-apple-darwin/release/ripunzip \
-arch arm64 target/aarch64-apple-darwin/release/ripunzip
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: ripunzip-${{ runner.os }}
path: ripunzip-*
- name: Check built binary
shell: bash
run: |
./ripunzip-* --version

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@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Setup dotnet
uses: actions/setup-dotnet@v4
with:
dotnet-version: 10.0.100
dotnet-version: 9.0.100
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v5

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@@ -43,14 +43,14 @@ jobs:
- name: Setup dotnet
uses: actions/setup-dotnet@v4
with:
dotnet-version: 10.0.100
dotnet-version: 9.0.100
- name: Extractor unit tests
run: |
dotnet tool restore
dotnet test -p:RuntimeFrameworkVersion=10.0.0 extractor/Semmle.Util.Tests
dotnet test -p:RuntimeFrameworkVersion=10.0.0 extractor/Semmle.Extraction.Tests
dotnet test -p:RuntimeFrameworkVersion=10.0.0 autobuilder/Semmle.Autobuild.CSharp.Tests
dotnet test -p:RuntimeFrameworkVersion=10.0.0 autobuilder/Semmle.Autobuild.Cpp.Tests
dotnet test -p:RuntimeFrameworkVersion=9.0.0 extractor/Semmle.Util.Tests
dotnet test -p:RuntimeFrameworkVersion=9.0.0 extractor/Semmle.Extraction.Tests
dotnet test -p:RuntimeFrameworkVersion=9.0.0 autobuilder/Semmle.Autobuild.CSharp.Tests
dotnet test -p:RuntimeFrameworkVersion=9.0.0 autobuilder/Semmle.Autobuild.Cpp.Tests
shell: bash
stubgentest:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest

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@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ jobs:
with:
python-version: 3.8
- name: Download CodeQL CLI
# Look under the `codeql` directory, as this is where we checked out the `github/codeql` repo
# Look under the `codeql` directory, as this is where we checked out the `github/codeql` repo
uses: ./codeql/.github/actions/fetch-codeql
- name: Build code scanning query list
run: |

3
.gitignore vendored
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@@ -76,6 +76,3 @@ node_modules/
# some upgrade/downgrade checks create these files
**/upgrades/*/*.dbscheme.stats
**/downgrades/*/*.dbscheme.stats
# Mergetool files
*.orig

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@@ -1,33 +1,17 @@
# Catch-all for anything which isn't matched by a line lower down
* @github/code-scanning-alert-coverage
# CodeQL language libraries
/actions/ @github/codeql-dynamic
/cpp/ @github/codeql-c-analysis
/csharp/ @github/codeql-csharp
/csharp/autobuilder/Semmle.Autobuild.Cpp @github/codeql-c-extractor @github/code-scanning-language-coverage
/csharp/autobuilder/Semmle.Autobuild.Cpp.Tests @github/codeql-c-extractor @github/code-scanning-language-coverage
/csharp/autobuilder/Semmle.Autobuild.Cpp @github/codeql-c-extractor
/csharp/autobuilder/Semmle.Autobuild.Cpp.Tests @github/codeql-c-extractor
/go/ @github/codeql-go
/go/codeql-tools/ @github/codeql-go @github/code-scanning-language-coverage
/go/downgrades/ @github/codeql-go @github/code-scanning-language-coverage
/go/extractor/ @github/codeql-go @github/code-scanning-language-coverage
/go/extractor-smoke-test/ @github/codeql-go @github/code-scanning-language-coverage
/go/ql/test/extractor-tests/ @github/codeql-go @github/code-scanning-language-coverage
/java/ @github/codeql-java
/javascript/ @github/codeql-javascript
/javascript/extractor/ @github/codeql-javascript @github/code-scanning-language-coverage
/python/ @github/codeql-python
/python/extractor/ @github/codeql-python @github/code-scanning-language-coverage
/ql/ @github/codeql-ql-for-ql-reviewers
/ruby/ @github/codeql-ruby
/ruby/extractor/ @github/codeql-ruby @github/code-scanning-language-coverage
/rust/ @github/codeql-rust
/rust/extractor/ @github/codeql-rust @github/code-scanning-language-coverage
/shared/ @github/codeql-shared-libraries-reviewers
/swift/ @github/codeql-swift
/swift/extractor/ @github/codeql-swift @github/code-scanning-language-coverage
/misc/codegen/ @github/codeql-swift
/java/kotlin-extractor/ @github/codeql-kotlin @github/code-scanning-language-coverage
/java/kotlin-extractor/ @github/codeql-kotlin
/java/ql/test-kotlin1/ @github/codeql-kotlin
/java/ql/test-kotlin2/ @github/codeql-kotlin
@@ -41,6 +25,9 @@
/docs/codeql/ql-language-reference/ @github/codeql-frontend-reviewers
/docs/query-*-style-guide.md @github/codeql-analysis-reviewers
# QL for QL reviewers
/ql/ @github/codeql-ql-for-ql-reviewers
# Bazel (excluding BUILD.bazel files)
MODULE.bazel @github/codeql-ci-reviewers
.bazelversion @github/codeql-ci-reviewers

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Cargo.lock generated Normal file

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13
Cargo.toml Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
# This is the shared workspace file for extractor using shared/tree-sitter/extractor
[workspace]
resolver = "2"
members = [
"shared/tree-sitter-extractor",
"ruby/extractor",
"rust/extractor",
"rust/extractor/macros",
"rust/ast-generator",
"rust/autobuild",
]
exclude = ["mad-generation-build"]

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@@ -19,16 +19,16 @@ bazel_dep(name = "rules_go", version = "0.56.1")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_pkg", version = "1.0.1")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_nodejs", version = "6.2.0-codeql.1")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_python", version = "0.40.0")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_shell", version = "0.5.0")
bazel_dep(name = "bazel_skylib", version = "1.8.1")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_shell", version = "0.3.0")
bazel_dep(name = "bazel_skylib", version = "1.7.1")
bazel_dep(name = "abseil-cpp", version = "20240116.1", repo_name = "absl")
bazel_dep(name = "nlohmann_json", version = "3.11.3", repo_name = "json")
bazel_dep(name = "fmt", version = "12.1.0-codeql.1")
bazel_dep(name = "fmt", version = "10.0.0")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_kotlin", version = "2.1.3-codeql.1")
bazel_dep(name = "gazelle", version = "0.40.0")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_dotnet", version = "0.21.5-codeql.1")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_dotnet", version = "0.17.4")
bazel_dep(name = "googletest", version = "1.14.0.bcr.1")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_rust", version = "0.66.0")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_rust", version = "0.63.0")
bazel_dep(name = "zstd", version = "1.5.5.bcr.1")
bazel_dep(name = "buildifier_prebuilt", version = "6.4.0", dev_dependency = True)
@@ -89,94 +89,69 @@ use_repo(
"vendor_py__cc-1.2.14",
"vendor_py__clap-4.5.30",
"vendor_py__regex-1.11.1",
"vendor_py__tree-sitter-0.24.7",
"vendor_py__tree-sitter-graph-0.12.0",
"vendor_py__tree-sitter-0.20.4",
"vendor_py__tree-sitter-graph-0.7.0",
)
# deps for ruby extractor
# deps for ruby+rust
# keep in sync by running `misc/bazel/3rdparty/update_cargo_deps.sh`
ruby_deps = use_extension("//misc/bazel/3rdparty:ruby_deps_extension.bzl", "ruby")
tree_sitter_extractors_deps = use_extension("//misc/bazel/3rdparty:tree_sitter_extractors_extension.bzl", "r")
use_repo(
ruby_deps,
"vendor_ruby__chrono-0.4.43",
"vendor_ruby__clap-4.5.54",
"vendor_ruby__encoding-0.2.33",
"vendor_ruby__flate2-1.1.8",
"vendor_ruby__globset-0.4.18",
"vendor_ruby__lazy_static-1.5.0",
"vendor_ruby__num_cpus-1.17.0",
"vendor_ruby__rand-0.9.2",
"vendor_ruby__rayon-1.11.0",
"vendor_ruby__regex-1.12.2",
"vendor_ruby__serde-1.0.228",
"vendor_ruby__serde_json-1.0.149",
"vendor_ruby__tracing-0.1.44",
"vendor_ruby__tracing-subscriber-0.3.22",
"vendor_ruby__tree-sitter-0.26.3",
"vendor_ruby__tree-sitter-embedded-template-0.25.0",
"vendor_ruby__tree-sitter-json-0.24.8",
"vendor_ruby__tree-sitter-ql-0.23.1",
"vendor_ruby__tree-sitter-ruby-0.23.1",
"vendor_ruby__zstd-0.13.3",
)
# deps for rust extractor
# keep in sync by running `misc/bazel/3rdparty/update_cargo_deps.sh`
rust_deps = use_extension("//misc/bazel/3rdparty:rust_deps_extension.bzl", "rust")
use_repo(
rust_deps,
"vendor_rust__anyhow-1.0.100",
"vendor_rust__argfile-0.2.1",
"vendor_rust__chalk-ir-0.104.0",
"vendor_rust__chrono-0.4.43",
"vendor_rust__clap-4.5.54",
"vendor_rust__dunce-1.0.5",
"vendor_rust__either-1.15.0",
"vendor_rust__encoding-0.2.33",
"vendor_rust__figment-0.10.19",
"vendor_rust__flate2-1.1.8",
"vendor_rust__glob-0.3.3",
"vendor_rust__globset-0.4.18",
"vendor_rust__itertools-0.14.0",
"vendor_rust__lazy_static-1.5.0",
"vendor_rust__mustache-0.9.0",
"vendor_rust__num-traits-0.2.19",
"vendor_rust__num_cpus-1.17.0",
"vendor_rust__proc-macro2-1.0.105",
"vendor_rust__quote-1.0.43",
"vendor_rust__ra_ap_base_db-0.0.301",
"vendor_rust__ra_ap_cfg-0.0.301",
"vendor_rust__ra_ap_hir-0.0.301",
"vendor_rust__ra_ap_hir_def-0.0.301",
"vendor_rust__ra_ap_hir_expand-0.0.301",
"vendor_rust__ra_ap_hir_ty-0.0.301",
"vendor_rust__ra_ap_ide_db-0.0.301",
"vendor_rust__ra_ap_intern-0.0.301",
"vendor_rust__ra_ap_load-cargo-0.0.301",
"vendor_rust__ra_ap_parser-0.0.301",
"vendor_rust__ra_ap_paths-0.0.301",
"vendor_rust__ra_ap_project_model-0.0.301",
"vendor_rust__ra_ap_span-0.0.301",
"vendor_rust__ra_ap_stdx-0.0.301",
"vendor_rust__ra_ap_syntax-0.0.301",
"vendor_rust__ra_ap_vfs-0.0.301",
"vendor_rust__rand-0.9.2",
"vendor_rust__rayon-1.11.0",
"vendor_rust__regex-1.12.2",
"vendor_rust__serde-1.0.228",
"vendor_rust__serde_json-1.0.149",
"vendor_rust__serde_with-3.16.1",
"vendor_rust__syn-2.0.114",
"vendor_rust__toml-0.9.11-spec-1.1.0",
"vendor_rust__tracing-0.1.44",
"vendor_rust__tracing-flame-0.2.0",
"vendor_rust__tracing-subscriber-0.3.22",
"vendor_rust__tree-sitter-0.26.3",
"vendor_rust__tree-sitter-json-0.24.8",
"vendor_rust__tree-sitter-ql-0.23.1",
"vendor_rust__triomphe-0.1.15",
"vendor_rust__ungrammar-1.16.1",
"vendor_rust__zstd-0.13.3",
tree_sitter_extractors_deps,
"vendor_ts__anyhow-1.0.99",
"vendor_ts__argfile-0.2.1",
"vendor_ts__chalk-ir-0.104.0",
"vendor_ts__chrono-0.4.41",
"vendor_ts__clap-4.5.44",
"vendor_ts__dunce-1.0.5",
"vendor_ts__either-1.15.0",
"vendor_ts__encoding-0.2.33",
"vendor_ts__figment-0.10.19",
"vendor_ts__flate2-1.1.0",
"vendor_ts__glob-0.3.3",
"vendor_ts__globset-0.4.15",
"vendor_ts__itertools-0.14.0",
"vendor_ts__lazy_static-1.5.0",
"vendor_ts__mustache-0.9.0",
"vendor_ts__num-traits-0.2.19",
"vendor_ts__num_cpus-1.17.0",
"vendor_ts__proc-macro2-1.0.97",
"vendor_ts__quote-1.0.40",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_base_db-0.0.300",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_cfg-0.0.300",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_hir-0.0.300",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_hir_def-0.0.300",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_hir_expand-0.0.300",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_hir_ty-0.0.300",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_ide_db-0.0.300",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_intern-0.0.300",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_load-cargo-0.0.300",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_parser-0.0.300",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_paths-0.0.300",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_project_model-0.0.300",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_span-0.0.300",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_stdx-0.0.300",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_syntax-0.0.300",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_vfs-0.0.300",
"vendor_ts__rand-0.9.2",
"vendor_ts__rayon-1.10.0",
"vendor_ts__regex-1.11.1",
"vendor_ts__serde-1.0.219",
"vendor_ts__serde_json-1.0.142",
"vendor_ts__serde_with-3.14.0",
"vendor_ts__syn-2.0.104",
"vendor_ts__toml-0.9.5",
"vendor_ts__tracing-0.1.41",
"vendor_ts__tracing-flame-0.2.0",
"vendor_ts__tracing-subscriber-0.3.19",
"vendor_ts__tree-sitter-0.24.6",
"vendor_ts__tree-sitter-embedded-template-0.23.2",
"vendor_ts__tree-sitter-json-0.24.8",
"vendor_ts__tree-sitter-ql-0.23.1",
"vendor_ts__tree-sitter-ruby-0.23.1",
"vendor_ts__triomphe-0.1.14",
"vendor_ts__ungrammar-1.16.1",
"vendor_ts__zstd-0.13.3",
)
http_archive = use_repo_rule("@bazel_tools//tools/build_defs/repo:http.bzl", "http_archive")
@@ -197,7 +172,7 @@ http_archive(
)
dotnet = use_extension("@rules_dotnet//dotnet:extensions.bzl", "dotnet")
dotnet.toolchain(dotnet_version = "10.0.100")
dotnet.toolchain(dotnet_version = "9.0.100")
use_repo(dotnet, "dotnet_toolchains")
register_toolchains("@dotnet_toolchains//:all")
@@ -294,16 +269,24 @@ go_deps = use_extension("@gazelle//:extensions.bzl", "go_deps")
go_deps.from_file(go_mod = "//go/extractor:go.mod")
use_repo(go_deps, "org_golang_x_mod", "org_golang_x_tools")
ripunzip_archive = use_repo_rule("//misc/ripunzip:ripunzip.bzl", "ripunzip_archive")
lfs_archive = use_repo_rule("//misc/bazel:lfs.bzl", "lfs_archive")
# go to https://github.com/GoogleChrome/ripunzip/releases to find latest version and corresponding sha256s
ripunzip_archive(
name = "ripunzip",
sha256_linux = "71482d7a7e4ea9176d5596161c49250c34b136b157c45f632b1111323fbfc0de",
sha256_macos_arm = "604194ab13f0aba3972995d995f11002b8fc285c8170401fcd46655065df20c9",
sha256_macos_intel = "65367b94fd579d93d46f2d2595cc4c9a60cfcf497e3c824f9d1a7b80fa8bd38a",
sha256_windows = "ac3874075def2b9e5074a3b5945005ab082cc6e689e1de658da8965bc23e643e",
version = "2.0.4",
lfs_archive(
name = "ripunzip-linux",
src = "//misc/ripunzip:ripunzip-Linux.zip",
build_file = "//misc/ripunzip:BUILD.ripunzip.bazel",
)
lfs_archive(
name = "ripunzip-windows",
src = "//misc/ripunzip:ripunzip-Windows.zip",
build_file = "//misc/ripunzip:BUILD.ripunzip.bazel",
)
lfs_archive(
name = "ripunzip-macos",
src = "//misc/ripunzip:ripunzip-macOS.zip",
build_file = "//misc/ripunzip:BUILD.ripunzip.bazel",
)
register_toolchains(

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@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
name: "actions"
aliases: []
display_name: "GitHub Actions"
version: 0.0.1
column_kind: "utf16"
@@ -7,11 +8,9 @@ build_modes:
- none
default_queries:
- codeql/actions-queries
# Actions workflows are not reported separately by the GitHub API, so we can't
# associate them with a specific language.
file_coverage_languages: []
github_api_languages: []
scc_languages:
- YAML
scc_languages: []
file_types:
- name: workflow
display_name: GitHub Actions workflow files

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@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
{
"paths": [
".github/workflows/*.yml",
".github/workflows/*.yaml",
".github/reusable_workflows/**/*.yml",
".github/reusable_workflows/**/*.yaml",
"**/action.yml",
"**/action.yaml"
]
}

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@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
@echo off
type "%CODEQL_EXTRACTOR_ACTIONS_ROOT%\tools\baseline-config.json"

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@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
cat "$CODEQL_EXTRACTOR_ACTIONS_ROOT/tools/baseline-config.json"

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@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
ql/actions/ql/src/Diagnostics/SuccessfullyExtractedFiles.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionCritical.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvVarInjectionCritical.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionCritical.ql

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@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
ql/actions/ql/src/Debug/SyntaxError.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Diagnostics/SuccessfullyExtractedFiles.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionCritical.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionMedium.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvVarInjectionCritical.ql

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@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
ql/actions/ql/src/Diagnostics/SuccessfullyExtractedFiles.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionCritical.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionMedium.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvVarInjectionCritical.ql

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@@ -1,43 +1,3 @@
## 0.4.25
No user-facing changes.
## 0.4.24
No user-facing changes.
## 0.4.23
No user-facing changes.
## 0.4.22
No user-facing changes.
## 0.4.21
No user-facing changes.
## 0.4.20
No user-facing changes.
## 0.4.19
No user-facing changes.
## 0.4.18
No user-facing changes.
## 0.4.17
No user-facing changes.
## 0.4.16
No user-facing changes.
## 0.4.15
No user-facing changes.

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@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
---
category: majorAnalysis
---
* The query `actions/code-injection/medium` has been updated to include results which were incorrectly excluded while filtering out results that are reported by `actions/code-injection/critical`.

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@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.4.16
No user-facing changes.

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@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.4.17
No user-facing changes.

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@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.4.18
No user-facing changes.

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@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.4.19
No user-facing changes.

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@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.4.20
No user-facing changes.

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@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.4.21
No user-facing changes.

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@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.4.22
No user-facing changes.

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@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.4.23
No user-facing changes.

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@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.4.24
No user-facing changes.

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@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.4.25
No user-facing changes.

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@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
---
lastReleaseVersion: 0.4.25
lastReleaseVersion: 0.4.15

View File

@@ -70,8 +70,8 @@ class Location extends TLocation, TBaseLocation {
/**
* Holds if this element is at the specified location.
* The location spans column `sc` of line `sl` to
* column `ec` of line `el` in file `p`.
* The location spans column `startcolumn` of line `startline` to
* column `endcolumn` of line `endline` in file `filepath`.
* For more information, see
* [Providing locations in CodeQL queries](https://codeql.github.com/docs/writing-codeql-queries/providing-locations-in-codeql-queries/).
*/

View File

@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ class If extends AstNode instanceof IfImpl {
}
/**
* An Environment node representing a deployment environment.
* An Environemnt node representing a deployment environment.
*/
class Environment extends AstNode instanceof EnvironmentImpl {
string getName() { result = super.getName() }

View File

@@ -125,11 +125,12 @@ abstract class AstNodeImpl extends TAstNode {
* Gets the enclosing Step.
*/
StepImpl getEnclosingStep() {
this instanceof StepImpl and
result = this
or
this instanceof ScalarValueImpl and
result.getAChildNode*() = this.getParentNode()
if this instanceof StepImpl
then result = this
else
if this instanceof ScalarValueImpl
then result.getAChildNode*() = this.getParentNode()
else none()
}
/**
@@ -1415,8 +1416,9 @@ class ExternalJobImpl extends JobImpl, UsesImpl {
override string getVersion() {
exists(YamlString name |
n.lookup("uses") = name and
not name.getValue().matches("\\.%") and
result = name.getValue().regexpCapture(repoUsesParser(), 4)
if not name.getValue().matches("\\.%")
then result = name.getValue().regexpCapture(repoUsesParser(), 4)
else none()
)
}
}

View File

@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ private module Cached {
/**
* Holds if `cfn` is the `i`th node in basic block `bb`.
*
* In other words, `i` is the shortest distance from a node `bbStart`
* In other words, `i` is the shortest distance from a node `bb`
* that starts a basic block to `cfn` along the `intraBBSucc` relation.
*/
cached

View File

@@ -3,8 +3,6 @@ private import codeql.controlflow.Cfg as CfgShared
private import codeql.Locations
module Completion {
import codeql.controlflow.SuccessorType
private newtype TCompletion =
TSimpleCompletion() or
TBooleanCompletion(boolean b) { b in [false, true] } or
@@ -27,7 +25,7 @@ module Completion {
override predicate isValidFor(AstNode e) { not any(Completion c).isValidForSpecific(e) }
override DirectSuccessor getAMatchingSuccessorType() { any() }
override NormalSuccessor getAMatchingSuccessorType() { any() }
}
class BooleanCompletion extends NormalCompletion, TBooleanCompletion {
@@ -51,6 +49,34 @@ module Completion {
override ReturnSuccessor getAMatchingSuccessorType() { any() }
}
cached
private newtype TSuccessorType =
TNormalSuccessor() or
TBooleanSuccessor(boolean b) { b in [false, true] } or
TReturnSuccessor()
class SuccessorType extends TSuccessorType {
string toString() { none() }
}
class NormalSuccessor extends SuccessorType, TNormalSuccessor {
override string toString() { result = "successor" }
}
class BooleanSuccessor extends SuccessorType, TBooleanSuccessor {
boolean value;
BooleanSuccessor() { this = TBooleanSuccessor(value) }
override string toString() { result = value.toString() }
boolean getValue() { result = value }
}
class ReturnSuccessor extends SuccessorType, TReturnSuccessor {
override string toString() { result = "return" }
}
}
module CfgScope {
@@ -101,8 +127,14 @@ private module Implementation implements CfgShared::InputSig<Location> {
last(scope.(CompositeAction), e, c)
}
predicate successorTypeIsSimple(SuccessorType t) { t instanceof NormalSuccessor }
predicate successorTypeIsCondition(SuccessorType t) { t instanceof BooleanSuccessor }
SuccessorType getAMatchingSuccessorType(Completion c) { result = c.getAMatchingSuccessorType() }
predicate isAbnormalExitType(SuccessorType t) { none() }
int idOfAstNode(AstNode node) { none() }
int idOfCfgScope(CfgScope scope) { none() }

View File

@@ -63,10 +63,10 @@ predicate madSource(DataFlow::Node source, string kind, string fieldName) {
(
if fieldName.trim().matches("env.%")
then source.asExpr() = uses.getInScopeEnvVarExpr(fieldName.trim().replaceAll("env.", ""))
else (
fieldName.trim().matches("output.%") and
source.asExpr() = uses
)
else
if fieldName.trim().matches("output.%")
then source.asExpr() = uses
else none()
)
)
}

View File

@@ -31,14 +31,14 @@ abstract class RemoteFlowSource extends SourceNode {
class GitHubCtxSource extends RemoteFlowSource {
string flag;
string event;
GitHubExpression e;
GitHubCtxSource() {
exists(GitHubExpression e |
this.asExpr() = e and
// github.head_ref
e.getFieldName() = "head_ref" and
flag = "branch"
|
this.asExpr() = e and
// github.head_ref
e.getFieldName() = "head_ref" and
flag = "branch" and
(
event = e.getATriggerEvent().getName() and
event = "pull_request_target"
or
@@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ class GhCLICommandSource extends RemoteFlowSource, CommandSource {
class GitHubEventPathSource extends RemoteFlowSource, CommandSource {
string cmd;
string flag;
string access_path;
Run run;
// Examples
@@ -162,7 +163,7 @@ class GitHubEventPathSource extends RemoteFlowSource, CommandSource {
run.getScript().getACommand() = cmd and
cmd.matches("jq%") and
cmd.matches("%GITHUB_EVENT_PATH%") and
exists(string regexp, string access_path |
exists(string regexp |
untrustedEventPropertiesDataModel(regexp, flag) and
not flag = "json" and
access_path = "github.event" + cmd.regexpCapture(".*\\s+([^\\s]+)\\s+.*", 1) and

View File

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ abstract class ArgumentInjectionSink extends DataFlow::Node {
*/
class ArgumentInjectionFromEnvVarSink extends ArgumentInjectionSink {
string command;
string argument;
ArgumentInjectionFromEnvVarSink() {
exists(Run run, string var |
@@ -27,7 +28,7 @@ class ArgumentInjectionFromEnvVarSink extends ArgumentInjectionSink {
exists(run.getInScopeEnvVarExpr(var)) or
var = "GITHUB_HEAD_REF"
) and
run.getScript().getAnEnvReachingArgumentInjectionSink(var, command, _)
run.getScript().getAnEnvReachingArgumentInjectionSink(var, command, argument)
)
}
@@ -43,12 +44,13 @@ class ArgumentInjectionFromEnvVarSink extends ArgumentInjectionSink {
*/
class ArgumentInjectionFromCommandSink extends ArgumentInjectionSink {
string command;
string argument;
ArgumentInjectionFromCommandSink() {
exists(CommandSource source, Run run |
run = source.getEnclosingRun() and
this.asExpr() = run.getScript() and
run.getScript().getACmdReachingArgumentInjectionSink(source.getCommand(), command, _)
run.getScript().getACmdReachingArgumentInjectionSink(source.getCommand(), command, argument)
)
}
@@ -100,6 +102,8 @@ private module ArgumentInjectionConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node source) { none() }
Location getASelectedSinkLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) {
result = sink.getLocation()
or

View File

@@ -125,6 +125,8 @@ class LegitLabsDownloadArtifactActionStep extends UntrustedArtifactDownloadStep,
}
class ActionsGitHubScriptDownloadStep extends UntrustedArtifactDownloadStep, UsesStep {
string script;
ActionsGitHubScriptDownloadStep() {
// eg:
// - uses: actions/github-script@v6
@@ -147,14 +149,12 @@ class ActionsGitHubScriptDownloadStep extends UntrustedArtifactDownloadStep, Use
// var fs = require('fs');
// fs.writeFileSync('${{github.workspace}}/test-results.zip', Buffer.from(download.data));
this.getCallee() = "actions/github-script" and
exists(string script |
this.getArgument("script") = script and
script.matches("%listWorkflowRunArtifacts(%") and
script.matches("%downloadArtifact(%") and
script.matches("%writeFileSync(%") and
// Filter out artifacts that were created by pull-request.
not script.matches("%exclude_pull_requests: true%")
)
this.getArgument("script") = script and
script.matches("%listWorkflowRunArtifacts(%") and
script.matches("%downloadArtifact(%") and
script.matches("%writeFileSync(%") and
// Filter out artifacts that were created by pull-request.
not script.matches("%exclude_pull_requests: true%")
}
override string getPath() {
@@ -171,10 +171,10 @@ class ActionsGitHubScriptDownloadStep extends UntrustedArtifactDownloadStep, Use
.getScript()
.getACommand()
.regexpCapture(unzipRegexp() + unzipDirArgRegexp(), 3)))
else (
this.getAFollowingStep().(Run).getScript().getACommand().regexpMatch(unzipRegexp()) and
result = "GITHUB_WORKSPACE/"
)
else
if this.getAFollowingStep().(Run).getScript().getACommand().regexpMatch(unzipRegexp())
then result = "GITHUB_WORKSPACE/"
else none()
}
}
@@ -207,13 +207,12 @@ class GHRunArtifactDownloadStep extends UntrustedArtifactDownloadStep, Run {
.getScript()
.getACommand()
.regexpCapture(unzipRegexp() + unzipDirArgRegexp(), 3)))
else (
(
else
if
this.getAFollowingStep().(Run).getScript().getACommand().regexpMatch(unzipRegexp()) or
this.getScript().getACommand().regexpMatch(unzipRegexp())
) and
result = "GITHUB_WORKSPACE/"
)
then result = "GITHUB_WORKSPACE/"
else none()
}
}
@@ -260,15 +259,15 @@ class DirectArtifactDownloadStep extends UntrustedArtifactDownloadStep, Run {
class ArtifactPoisoningSink extends DataFlow::Node {
UntrustedArtifactDownloadStep download;
PoisonableStep poisonable;
ArtifactPoisoningSink() {
exists(PoisonableStep poisonable |
download.getAFollowingStep() = poisonable and
// excluding artifacts downloaded to the temporary directory
not download.getPath().regexpMatch("^/tmp.*") and
not download.getPath().regexpMatch("^\\$\\{\\{\\s*runner\\.temp\\s*}}.*") and
not download.getPath().regexpMatch("^\\$RUNNER_TEMP.*")
|
download.getAFollowingStep() = poisonable and
// excluding artifacts downloaded to the temporary directory
not download.getPath().regexpMatch("^/tmp.*") and
not download.getPath().regexpMatch("^\\$\\{\\{\\s*runner\\.temp\\s*}}.*") and
not download.getPath().regexpMatch("^\\$RUNNER_TEMP.*") and
(
poisonable.(Run).getScript() = this.asExpr() and
(
// Check if the poisonable step is a local script execution step
@@ -333,6 +332,8 @@ private module ArtifactPoisoningConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node source) { none() }
Location getASelectedSinkLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) {
result = sink.getLocation()
or

View File

@@ -19,7 +19,12 @@ class CodeInjectionSink extends DataFlow::Node {
Event getRelevantCriticalEventForSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
inPrivilegedContext(sink.asExpr(), result) and
not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(sink.asExpr(), result, "code-injection")) and
not isGithubScriptUsingToJson(sink.asExpr())
// exclude cases where the sink is a JS script and the expression uses toJson
not exists(UsesStep script |
script.getCallee() = "actions/github-script" and
script.getArgumentExpr("script") = sink.asExpr() and
exists(getAToJsonReferenceExpression(sink.asExpr().(Expression).getExpression(), _))
)
}
/**
@@ -75,6 +80,8 @@ private module CodeInjectionConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node source) { none() }
Location getASelectedSinkLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) {
result = sink.getLocation()
or
@@ -86,38 +93,3 @@ private module CodeInjectionConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
/** Tracks flow of unsafe user input that is used to construct and evaluate a code script. */
module CodeInjectionFlow = TaintTracking::Global<CodeInjectionConfig>;
/**
* Holds if there is a code injection flow from `source` to `sink` with
* critical severity, linked by `event`.
*/
predicate criticalSeverityCodeInjection(
CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode source, CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode sink, Event event
) {
CodeInjectionFlow::flowPath(source, sink) and
event = getRelevantCriticalEventForSink(sink.getNode()) and
source.getNode().(RemoteFlowSource).getEventName() = event.getName()
}
/**
* Holds if there is a code injection flow from `source` to `sink` with medium severity.
*/
predicate mediumSeverityCodeInjection(
CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode source, CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode sink
) {
CodeInjectionFlow::flowPath(source, sink) and
not criticalSeverityCodeInjection(source, sink, _) and
not isGithubScriptUsingToJson(sink.getNode().asExpr())
}
/**
* Holds if `expr` is the `script` input to `actions/github-script` and it uses
* `toJson`.
*/
predicate isGithubScriptUsingToJson(Expression expr) {
exists(UsesStep script |
script.getCallee() = "actions/github-script" and
script.getArgumentExpr("script") = expr and
exists(getAToJsonReferenceExpression(expr.getExpression(), _))
)
}

View File

@@ -159,8 +159,11 @@ abstract class CommentVsHeadDateCheck extends ControlCheck {
/* Specific implementations of control checks */
class LabelIfCheck extends LabelCheck instanceof If {
string condition;
LabelIfCheck() {
exists(string condition | condition = normalizeExpr(this.getCondition()) |
condition = normalizeExpr(this.getCondition()) and
(
// eg: contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'safe to test')
condition.regexpMatch(".*(^|[^!])contains\\(\\s*github\\.event\\.pull_request\\.labels\\b.*")
or

View File

@@ -130,6 +130,8 @@ private module EnvPathInjectionConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node source) { none() }
Location getASelectedSinkLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) {
result = sink.getLocation()
or

View File

@@ -55,8 +55,12 @@ class EnvVarInjectionFromFileReadSink extends EnvVarInjectionSink {
* echo "COMMIT_MESSAGE=${COMMIT_MESSAGE}" >> $GITHUB_ENV
*/
class EnvVarInjectionFromCommandSink extends EnvVarInjectionSink {
CommandSource inCommand;
string injectedVar;
string command;
EnvVarInjectionFromCommandSink() {
exists(Run run, CommandSource inCommand, string injectedVar, string command |
exists(Run run |
this.asExpr() = inCommand.getEnclosingRun().getScript() and
run = inCommand.getEnclosingRun() and
run.getScript().getACmdReachingGitHubEnvWrite(inCommand.getCommand(), injectedVar) and
@@ -82,8 +86,12 @@ class EnvVarInjectionFromCommandSink extends EnvVarInjectionSink {
* echo "FOO=$BODY" >> $GITHUB_ENV
*/
class EnvVarInjectionFromEnvVarSink extends EnvVarInjectionSink {
string inVar;
string injectedVar;
string command;
EnvVarInjectionFromEnvVarSink() {
exists(Run run, string inVar, string injectedVar, string command |
exists(Run run |
run.getScript() = this.asExpr() and
exists(run.getInScopeEnvVarExpr(inVar)) and
run.getScript().getAnEnvReachingGitHubEnvWrite(inVar, injectedVar) and
@@ -184,6 +192,8 @@ private module EnvVarInjectionConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node source) { none() }
Location getASelectedSinkLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) {
result = sink.getLocation()
or

View File

@@ -99,14 +99,18 @@ class OutputClobberingFromEnvVarSink extends OutputClobberingSink {
* echo $BODY
*/
class WorkflowCommandClobberingFromEnvVarSink extends OutputClobberingSink {
string clobbering_var;
string clobbered_value;
WorkflowCommandClobberingFromEnvVarSink() {
exists(Run run, string workflow_cmd_stmt, string clobbering_stmt, string clobbering_var |
exists(Run run, string workflow_cmd_stmt, string clobbering_stmt |
run.getScript() = this.asExpr() and
run.getScript().getAStmt() = clobbering_stmt and
clobbering_stmt.regexpMatch("echo\\s+(-e\\s+)?(\"|')?\\$(\\{)?" + clobbering_var + ".*") and
exists(run.getInScopeEnvVarExpr(clobbering_var)) and
run.getScript().getAStmt() = workflow_cmd_stmt and
exists(trimQuotes(workflow_cmd_stmt.regexpCapture(".*::set-output\\s+name=.*::(.*)", 1)))
clobbered_value =
trimQuotes(workflow_cmd_stmt.regexpCapture(".*::set-output\\s+name=.*::(.*)", 1))
)
}
}
@@ -212,6 +216,8 @@ private module OutputClobberingConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
}
predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) { none() }
}
/** Tracks flow of unsafe user input that is used to construct and evaluate an environment variable. */

View File

@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ private module RequestForgeryConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof RequestForgerySink }
predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) { none() }
}
/** Tracks flow of unsafe user input that is used to construct and evaluate a system command. */

View File

@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ private module SecretExfiltrationConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof SecretExfiltrationSink }
predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) { none() }
}
/** Tracks flow of unsafe user input that is used in a context where it may lead to a secret exfiltration. */

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
import actions
class UnversionedImmutableAction extends UsesStep {
string immutable_action;
UnversionedImmutableAction() {
isImmutableAction(this, _) and
isImmutableAction(this, immutable_action) and
not isSemVer(this.getVersion())
}
}

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
name: codeql/actions-all
version: 0.4.26-dev
version: 0.4.16-dev
library: true
warnOnImplicitThis: true
dependencies:

View File

@@ -1,45 +1,3 @@
## 0.6.17
No user-facing changes.
## 0.6.16
No user-facing changes.
## 0.6.15
No user-facing changes.
## 0.6.14
No user-facing changes.
## 0.6.13
No user-facing changes.
## 0.6.12
No user-facing changes.
## 0.6.11
No user-facing changes.
## 0.6.10
No user-facing changes.
## 0.6.9
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Actions analysis now reports file coverage information on the CodeQL status page.
## 0.6.8
No user-facing changes.
## 0.6.7
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
/**
* @id actions/diagnostics/successfully-extracted-files
* @name Extracted files
* @description List all files that were extracted.
* @kind diagnostic
* @tags successfully-extracted-files
*/
private import codeql.Locations
from File f
where exists(f.getRelativePath())
select f, ""

View File

@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ private module MyConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
}
predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) { none() }
}
module MyFlow = TaintTracking::Global<MyConfig>;

View File

@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ private module MyConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
}
predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) { none() }
}
module MyFlow = TaintTracking::Global<MyConfig>;

View File

@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ private module MyConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
}
predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) { none() }
}
module MyFlow = TaintTracking::Global<MyConfig>;

View File

@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ private module MyConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
}
predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) { none() }
}
module MyFlow = TaintTracking::Global<MyConfig>;

View File

@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ private module MyConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
}
predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) { none() }
}
module MyFlow = TaintTracking::Global<MyConfig>;

View File

@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ private module MyConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
}
predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) { none() }
}
module MyFlow = TaintTracking::Global<MyConfig>;

View File

@@ -20,7 +20,10 @@ import CodeInjectionFlow::PathGraph
import codeql.actions.security.ControlChecks
from CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode source, CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode sink, Event event
where criticalSeverityCodeInjection(source, sink, event)
where
CodeInjectionFlow::flowPath(source, sink) and
event = getRelevantCriticalEventForSink(sink.getNode()) and
source.getNode().(RemoteFlowSource).getEventName() = event.getName()
select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
"Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@).", sink,
sink.getNode().asExpr().(Expression).getRawExpression(), event, event.getName()

View File

@@ -19,7 +19,15 @@ import codeql.actions.security.CodeInjectionQuery
import CodeInjectionFlow::PathGraph
from CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode source, CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode sink
where mediumSeverityCodeInjection(source, sink)
where
CodeInjectionFlow::flowPath(source, sink) and
inNonPrivilegedContext(sink.getNode().asExpr()) and
// exclude cases where the sink is a JS script and the expression uses toJson
not exists(UsesStep script |
script.getCallee() = "actions/github-script" and
script.getArgumentExpr("script") = sink.getNode().asExpr() and
exists(getAToJsonReferenceExpression(sink.getNode().asExpr().(Expression).getExpression(), _))
)
select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
"Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user.", sink,
sink.getNode().asExpr().(Expression).getRawExpression()

View File

@@ -2,8 +2,6 @@
If a GitHub Actions job or workflow has no explicit permissions set, then the repository permissions are used. Repositories created under organizations inherit the organization permissions. The organizations or repositories created before February 2023 have the default permissions set to read-write. Often these permissions do not adhere to the principle of least privilege and can be reduced to read-only, leaving the `write` permission only to a specific types as `issues: write` or `pull-requests: write`.
Note that this query cannot check whether the organization or repository token settings are set to read-only. However, even if they are, it is recommended to define explicit permissions (`contents: read` and `packages: read` are equivalent to the read-only default) so that (a) the actual needs of the workflow are documented, and (b) the permissions will remain restricted if the default is subsequently changed, or the workflow is copied to a different repository or organization.
## Recommendation
Add the `permissions` key to the job or the root of workflow (in this case it is applied to all jobs in the workflow that do not have their own `permissions` key) and assign the least privileges required to complete the task.

View File

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ jobs:
- uses: actions/setup-node@v1
- run: |
npm install # scripts in package.json from PR would be executed here
npm install # scripts in package.json from PR would be executed here
npm build
- uses: completely/fakeaction@v2

View File

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ jobs:
- uses: actions/setup-node@v1
- run: |
npm install # scripts in package.json from PR would be executed here
npm install # scripts in package.json from PR would be executed here
npm build
- uses: completely/fakeaction@v2

View File

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ jobs:
- uses: actions/setup-node@v1
- run: |
npm install # scripts in package.json from PR would be executed here
npm install # scripts in package.json from PR would be executed here
npm build
- uses: completely/fakeaction@v2

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.6.10
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.6.11
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.6.12
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.6.13
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.6.14
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.6.15
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.6.16
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.6.17
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.6.8
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
## 0.6.9
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Actions analysis now reports file coverage information on the CodeQL status page.

View File

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
---
lastReleaseVersion: 0.6.17
lastReleaseVersion: 0.6.7

View File

@@ -19,5 +19,5 @@ import SecretExfiltrationFlow::PathGraph
from SecretExfiltrationFlow::PathNode source, SecretExfiltrationFlow::PathNode sink
where SecretExfiltrationFlow::flowPath(source, sink)
select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
"Potential secret exfiltration in $@, which may be leaked to an attacker-controlled resource.",
"Potential secret exfiltration in $@, which may be be leaked to an attacker-controlled resource.",
sink, sink.getNode().asExpr().(Expression).getRawExpression()

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/**
* @name Artifact Poisoning (Path Traversal)
* @name Artifact Poisoning (Path Traversal).
* @description An attacker may be able to poison the workflow's artifacts and influence on consequent steps.
* @kind problem
* @problem.severity error
@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ where
)
or
// upload artifact is not used in the same workflow
not download.getEnclosingWorkflow().getAJob().(LocalJob).getAStep() instanceof UsesStep
not exists(UsesStep upload |
download.getEnclosingWorkflow().getAJob().(LocalJob).getAStep() = upload
)
)
select download, "Potential artifact poisoning"

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
name: codeql/actions-queries
version: 0.6.18-dev
version: 0.6.8-dev
library: false
warnOnImplicitThis: true
groups: [actions, queries]

View File

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
on:
push:
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
echo-chamber:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- run: echo '${{ github.event.commits[11].message }}'
- run: echo '${{ github.event.commits[11].author.email }}'
- run: echo '${{ github.event.commits[11].author.name }}'
- run: echo '${{ github.event.head_commit.message }}'
- run: echo '${{ github.event.head_commit.author.email }}'
- run: echo '${{ github.event.head_commit.author.name }}'
- run: echo '${{ github.event.head_commit.committer.email }}'
- run: echo '${{ github.event.head_commit.committer.name }}'
- run: echo '${{ github.event.commits[11].committer.email }}'
- run: echo '${{ github.event.commits[11].committer.name }}'

View File

@@ -435,16 +435,6 @@ nodes
| .github/workflows/push.yml:14:19:14:64 | github.event.head_commit.committer.name | semmle.label | github.event.head_commit.committer.name |
| .github/workflows/push.yml:15:19:15:65 | github.event.commits[11].committer.email | semmle.label | github.event.commits[11].committer.email |
| .github/workflows/push.yml:16:19:16:64 | github.event.commits[11].committer.name | semmle.label | github.event.commits[11].committer.name |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:9:19:9:57 | github.event.commits[11].message | semmle.label | github.event.commits[11].message |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:10:19:10:62 | github.event.commits[11].author.email | semmle.label | github.event.commits[11].author.email |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:11:19:11:61 | github.event.commits[11].author.name | semmle.label | github.event.commits[11].author.name |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:12:19:12:57 | github.event.head_commit.message | semmle.label | github.event.head_commit.message |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:13:19:13:62 | github.event.head_commit.author.email | semmle.label | github.event.head_commit.author.email |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:14:19:14:61 | github.event.head_commit.author.name | semmle.label | github.event.head_commit.author.name |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:15:19:15:65 | github.event.head_commit.committer.email | semmle.label | github.event.head_commit.committer.email |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:16:19:16:64 | github.event.head_commit.committer.name | semmle.label | github.event.head_commit.committer.name |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:17:19:17:65 | github.event.commits[11].committer.email | semmle.label | github.event.commits[11].committer.email |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:18:19:18:64 | github.event.commits[11].committer.name | semmle.label | github.event.commits[11].committer.name |
| .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:6:7:6:11 | input taint | semmle.label | input taint |
| .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:36:21:36:39 | inputs.taint | semmle.label | inputs.taint |
| .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:44:19:44:56 | github.event.pull_request.title | semmle.label | github.event.pull_request.title |

View File

@@ -435,16 +435,6 @@ nodes
| .github/workflows/push.yml:14:19:14:64 | github.event.head_commit.committer.name | semmle.label | github.event.head_commit.committer.name |
| .github/workflows/push.yml:15:19:15:65 | github.event.commits[11].committer.email | semmle.label | github.event.commits[11].committer.email |
| .github/workflows/push.yml:16:19:16:64 | github.event.commits[11].committer.name | semmle.label | github.event.commits[11].committer.name |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:9:19:9:57 | github.event.commits[11].message | semmle.label | github.event.commits[11].message |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:10:19:10:62 | github.event.commits[11].author.email | semmle.label | github.event.commits[11].author.email |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:11:19:11:61 | github.event.commits[11].author.name | semmle.label | github.event.commits[11].author.name |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:12:19:12:57 | github.event.head_commit.message | semmle.label | github.event.head_commit.message |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:13:19:13:62 | github.event.head_commit.author.email | semmle.label | github.event.head_commit.author.email |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:14:19:14:61 | github.event.head_commit.author.name | semmle.label | github.event.head_commit.author.name |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:15:19:15:65 | github.event.head_commit.committer.email | semmle.label | github.event.head_commit.committer.email |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:16:19:16:64 | github.event.head_commit.committer.name | semmle.label | github.event.head_commit.committer.name |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:17:19:17:65 | github.event.commits[11].committer.email | semmle.label | github.event.commits[11].committer.email |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:18:19:18:64 | github.event.commits[11].committer.name | semmle.label | github.event.commits[11].committer.name |
| .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:6:7:6:11 | input taint | semmle.label | input taint |
| .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:36:21:36:39 | inputs.taint | semmle.label | inputs.taint |
| .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:44:19:44:56 | github.event.pull_request.title | semmle.label | github.event.pull_request.title |
@@ -729,16 +719,6 @@ subpaths
| .github/workflows/push.yml:14:19:14:64 | github.event.head_commit.committer.name | .github/workflows/push.yml:14:19:14:64 | github.event.head_commit.committer.name | .github/workflows/push.yml:14:19:14:64 | github.event.head_commit.committer.name | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/push.yml:14:19:14:64 | github.event.head_commit.committer.name | ${{ github.event.head_commit.committer.name }} |
| .github/workflows/push.yml:15:19:15:65 | github.event.commits[11].committer.email | .github/workflows/push.yml:15:19:15:65 | github.event.commits[11].committer.email | .github/workflows/push.yml:15:19:15:65 | github.event.commits[11].committer.email | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/push.yml:15:19:15:65 | github.event.commits[11].committer.email | ${{ github.event.commits[11].committer.email }} |
| .github/workflows/push.yml:16:19:16:64 | github.event.commits[11].committer.name | .github/workflows/push.yml:16:19:16:64 | github.event.commits[11].committer.name | .github/workflows/push.yml:16:19:16:64 | github.event.commits[11].committer.name | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/push.yml:16:19:16:64 | github.event.commits[11].committer.name | ${{ github.event.commits[11].committer.name }} |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:9:19:9:57 | github.event.commits[11].message | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:9:19:9:57 | github.event.commits[11].message | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:9:19:9:57 | github.event.commits[11].message | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:9:19:9:57 | github.event.commits[11].message | ${{ github.event.commits[11].message }} |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:10:19:10:62 | github.event.commits[11].author.email | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:10:19:10:62 | github.event.commits[11].author.email | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:10:19:10:62 | github.event.commits[11].author.email | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:10:19:10:62 | github.event.commits[11].author.email | ${{ github.event.commits[11].author.email }} |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:11:19:11:61 | github.event.commits[11].author.name | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:11:19:11:61 | github.event.commits[11].author.name | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:11:19:11:61 | github.event.commits[11].author.name | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:11:19:11:61 | github.event.commits[11].author.name | ${{ github.event.commits[11].author.name }} |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:12:19:12:57 | github.event.head_commit.message | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:12:19:12:57 | github.event.head_commit.message | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:12:19:12:57 | github.event.head_commit.message | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:12:19:12:57 | github.event.head_commit.message | ${{ github.event.head_commit.message }} |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:13:19:13:62 | github.event.head_commit.author.email | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:13:19:13:62 | github.event.head_commit.author.email | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:13:19:13:62 | github.event.head_commit.author.email | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:13:19:13:62 | github.event.head_commit.author.email | ${{ github.event.head_commit.author.email }} |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:14:19:14:61 | github.event.head_commit.author.name | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:14:19:14:61 | github.event.head_commit.author.name | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:14:19:14:61 | github.event.head_commit.author.name | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:14:19:14:61 | github.event.head_commit.author.name | ${{ github.event.head_commit.author.name }} |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:15:19:15:65 | github.event.head_commit.committer.email | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:15:19:15:65 | github.event.head_commit.committer.email | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:15:19:15:65 | github.event.head_commit.committer.email | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:15:19:15:65 | github.event.head_commit.committer.email | ${{ github.event.head_commit.committer.email }} |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:16:19:16:64 | github.event.head_commit.committer.name | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:16:19:16:64 | github.event.head_commit.committer.name | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:16:19:16:64 | github.event.head_commit.committer.name | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:16:19:16:64 | github.event.head_commit.committer.name | ${{ github.event.head_commit.committer.name }} |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:17:19:17:65 | github.event.commits[11].committer.email | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:17:19:17:65 | github.event.commits[11].committer.email | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:17:19:17:65 | github.event.commits[11].committer.email | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:17:19:17:65 | github.event.commits[11].committer.email | ${{ github.event.commits[11].committer.email }} |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:18:19:18:64 | github.event.commits[11].committer.name | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:18:19:18:64 | github.event.commits[11].committer.name | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:18:19:18:64 | github.event.commits[11].committer.name | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:18:19:18:64 | github.event.commits[11].committer.name | ${{ github.event.commits[11].committer.name }} |
| .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:36:21:36:39 | inputs.taint | .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-caller-1.yml:11:15:11:52 | github.event.pull_request.title | .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:36:21:36:39 | inputs.taint | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:36:21:36:39 | inputs.taint | ${{ inputs.taint }} |
| .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:53:26:53:39 | env.log | .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:44:19:44:56 | github.event.pull_request.title | .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:53:26:53:39 | env.log | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:53:26:53:39 | env.log | ${{ env.log }} |
| .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:66:34:66:52 | env.prev_log | .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:45:24:45:61 | github.event.changes.title.from | .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:66:34:66:52 | env.prev_log | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:66:34:66:52 | env.prev_log | ${{ env.prev_log }} |
@@ -749,10 +729,6 @@ subpaths
| .github/workflows/test10.yml:333:34:333:77 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | .github/workflows/test10.yml:333:34:333:77 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | .github/workflows/test10.yml:333:34:333:77 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/test10.yml:333:34:333:77 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }} |
| .github/workflows/test10.yml:423:34:423:77 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | .github/workflows/test10.yml:423:34:423:77 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | .github/workflows/test10.yml:423:34:423:77 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/test10.yml:423:34:423:77 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }} |
| .github/workflows/test10.yml:518:34:518:77 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | .github/workflows/test10.yml:518:34:518:77 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | .github/workflows/test10.yml:518:34:518:77 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/test10.yml:518:34:518:77 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }} |
| .github/workflows/test20.yml:15:54:15:94 | github.event.pull_request.head.ref | .github/workflows/test20.yml:15:54:15:94 | github.event.pull_request.head.ref | .github/workflows/test20.yml:15:54:15:94 | github.event.pull_request.head.ref | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/test20.yml:15:54:15:94 | github.event.pull_request.head.ref | ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }} |
| .github/workflows/test21.yml:22:35:22:73 | github.event.head_commit.message | .github/workflows/test21.yml:22:35:22:73 | github.event.head_commit.message | .github/workflows/test21.yml:22:35:22:73 | github.event.head_commit.message | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/test21.yml:22:35:22:73 | github.event.head_commit.message | ${{ github.event.head_commit.message }} |
| .github/workflows/test21.yml:23:36:23:74 | github.event.head_commit.message | .github/workflows/test21.yml:23:36:23:74 | github.event.head_commit.message | .github/workflows/test21.yml:23:36:23:74 | github.event.head_commit.message | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/test21.yml:23:36:23:74 | github.event.head_commit.message | ${{ github.event.head_commit.message }} |
| .github/workflows/test21.yml:24:50:24:88 | github.event.head_commit.message | .github/workflows/test21.yml:24:50:24:88 | github.event.head_commit.message | .github/workflows/test21.yml:24:50:24:88 | github.event.head_commit.message | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/test21.yml:24:50:24:88 | github.event.head_commit.message | ${{ github.event.head_commit.message }} |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_branches1.yml:13:20:13:63 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | .github/workflows/workflow_run_branches1.yml:13:20:13:63 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | .github/workflows/workflow_run_branches1.yml:13:20:13:63 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/workflow_run_branches1.yml:13:20:13:63 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }} |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_branches2.yml:13:20:13:63 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | .github/workflows/workflow_run_branches2.yml:13:20:13:63 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | .github/workflows/workflow_run_branches2.yml:13:20:13:63 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/workflow_run_branches2.yml:13:20:13:63 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }} |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_branches4.yml:13:20:13:63 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | .github/workflows/workflow_run_branches4.yml:13:20:13:63 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | .github/workflows/workflow_run_branches4.yml:13:20:13:63 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/workflow_run_branches4.yml:13:20:13:63 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }} |

View File

@@ -3,4 +3,4 @@ nodes
| .github/workflows/test1.yml:15:11:16:75 | github.event.pull_request.title | semmle.label | github.event.pull_request.title |
subpaths
#select
| .github/workflows/test1.yml:15:11:16:75 | github.event.pull_request.title | .github/workflows/test1.yml:15:11:16:75 | github.event.pull_request.title | .github/workflows/test1.yml:15:11:16:75 | github.event.pull_request.title | Potential secret exfiltration in $@, which may be leaked to an attacker-controlled resource. | .github/workflows/test1.yml:15:11:16:75 | github.event.pull_request.title | ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }} |
| .github/workflows/test1.yml:15:11:16:75 | github.event.pull_request.title | .github/workflows/test1.yml:15:11:16:75 | github.event.pull_request.title | .github/workflows/test1.yml:15:11:16:75 | github.event.pull_request.title | Potential secret exfiltration in $@, which may be be leaked to an attacker-controlled resource. | .github/workflows/test1.yml:15:11:16:75 | github.event.pull_request.title | ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }} |

View File

@@ -177,12 +177,6 @@ def insert_overlay_caller_annotations(lines):
out_lines.append(line)
return out_lines
explicitly_global = set([
"java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/dispatch/VirtualDispatch.qll",
"java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/dispatch/DispatchFlow.qll",
"java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/dispatch/ObjFlow.qll",
"java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/dispatch/internal/Unification.qll",
])
def annotate_as_appropriate(filename, lines):
'''
@@ -202,9 +196,6 @@ def annotate_as_appropriate(filename, lines):
((filename.endswith("Query.qll") or filename.endswith("Config.qll")) and
any("implements DataFlow::ConfigSig" in line for line in lines))):
return None
elif filename in explicitly_global:
# These files are explicitly global and should not be annotated.
return None
elif not any(line for line in lines if line.strip()):
return None

View File

@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@
"fragments": [
"/*- Compilations -*/",
"/*- External data -*/",
"/*- Overlay support -*/",
"/*- Files and folders -*/",
"/*- Diagnostic messages -*/",
"/*- Diagnostic messages: severity -*/",

View File

@@ -276,13 +276,5 @@
"Python model summaries test extension": [
"python/ql/test/library-tests/dataflow/model-summaries/InlineTaintTest.ext.yml",
"python/ql/test/library-tests/dataflow/model-summaries/NormalDataflowTest.ext.yml"
],
"XML discard predicates": [
"javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/internal/OverlayXml.qll",
"java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/internal/OverlayXml.qll",
"go/ql/lib/semmle/go/internal/OverlayXml.qll",
"python/ql/lib/semmle/python/internal/OverlayXml.qll",
"csharp/ql/lib/semmle/code/csharp/internal/OverlayXml.qll",
"cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/internal/OverlayXml.qll"
]
}

View File

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
class Expr extends @expr {
string toString() { none() }
}
class Location extends @location_default {
string toString() { none() }
}
predicate isExprWithNewBuiltin(Expr expr) {
exists(int kind | exprs(expr, kind, _) | 394 <= kind and kind <= 396)
}
from Expr expr, int kind, int kind_new, Location location
where
exprs(expr, kind, location) and
if isExprWithNewBuiltin(expr) then kind_new = 1 else kind_new = kind
select expr, kind_new, location

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@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
description: Add new builtin operations and this parameter access table
compatibility: partial
exprs.rel: run exprs.qlo
param_ref_to_this.rel: delete

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@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
description: Support expanded compilation argument lists
compatibility: full
compilation_expanded_args.rel: delete

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@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
description: Fix decltype qualifier issue
compatibility: full

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