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2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
BazookaMusic
088f969c34 Add Avro MaD models for testing 2026-05-21 17:46:51 +02:00
BazookaMusic
56aceb3254 test: empty commit for DCA experiment 2026-05-21 16:37:55 +02:00
491 changed files with 3688 additions and 22542 deletions

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@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
## 0.4.36
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Altered 2 patterns in the `poisonable_steps` modelling. Extra sinks are detected in the following cases: scripts executed via python modules and `go run` in directories are detected as potential mechanisms of injection. For the go execution pattern, the pattern is updated to now ignore flags that occur between go and the specific command. This change may lead to more results being detected by the following queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/critical`, `actions/cache-poisoning/poisonable-step`, `actions/cache-poisoning/direct-cache` and `actions/artifact-poisoning/path-traversal`.
## 0.4.35
No user-facing changes.

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@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
## 0.4.36
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Altered 2 patterns in the `poisonable_steps` modelling. Extra sinks are detected in the following cases: scripts executed via python modules and `go run` in directories are detected as potential mechanisms of injection. For the go execution pattern, the pattern is updated to now ignore flags that occur between go and the specific command. This change may lead to more results being detected by the following queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/critical`, `actions/cache-poisoning/poisonable-step`, `actions/cache-poisoning/direct-cache` and `actions/artifact-poisoning/path-traversal`.
---
category: minorAnalysis
---
* Altered 2 patterns in the `poisonable_steps` modelling. Extra sinks are detected in the following cases: scripts executed via python modules and `go run` in directories are detected as potential mechanisms of injection. For the go execution pattern, the pattern is updated to now ignore flags that occur between go and the specific command. This change may lead to more results being detected by the following queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/critical`, `actions/cache-poisoning/poisonable-step`, `actions/cache-poisoning/direct-cache` and `actions/artifact-poisoning/path-traversal`.

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@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
---
lastReleaseVersion: 0.4.36
lastReleaseVersion: 0.4.35

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@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
name: codeql/actions-all
version: 0.4.37-dev
version: 0.4.36-dev
library: true
warnOnImplicitThis: true
dependencies:

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@@ -1,17 +1,3 @@
## 0.6.28
### Query Metadata Changes
* Adjusted the name of `actions/untrusted-checkout/high` to more clearly describe which parts of the scenario are in a privileged context.
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* The `actions/unpinned-tag` query now analyzes composite action metadata (`action.yml`/`action.yaml` files) in addition to workflow files, providing more comprehensive detection of unpinned action references across the entire Actions ecosystem.
### Bug Fixes
* Fixed help file descriptions for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`. Previously the messages were unclear as to why and how the vulnerabilities could occur.
## 0.6.27
No user-facing changes.

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@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Certain triggers automatically grant a workflow elevated privileges:
* An attacker forks the repository and adds malicious code (e.g., in the build script)
* The attacker opens a PR from the fork, and, if needed, comments on the PR
* The workflow in the base repository checks out the forked code
* The workflow runs the malicious code
* The workflow runs, (e.g. the build script etc.), which contains the malicious code
Please note that not only build scripts can be malicious code vectors. There is a large number of other possibilities. Some of them are listed in the [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/) catalog.
@@ -41,8 +41,6 @@ The best practice is to handle the potentially untrusted pull request via the **
The artifacts downloaded from the first workflow should be considered untrusted and must be verified.
Additionally, ensure that least privilege are used both at the workflow level (through event triggers and workflow permissions) and job level (through job permissions).
## Example
### Incorrect Usage
@@ -165,5 +163,4 @@ jobs:
- GitHub Security Lab Research: [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/).
- Mitigating risks of untrusted checkout: [GitHub Docs](https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/actions/reference/security/secure-use#mitigating-the-risks-of-untrusted-code-checkout).
- Securing with least privilege: [Workflow secure use](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/secure-use).
- Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/).

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@@ -52,5 +52,4 @@ where
not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(checkout, event, "untrusted-checkout")) and
not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(poisonable, event, "untrusted-checkout"))
select checkout, checkout, poisonable,
"Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@).",
event, event.getName()
"Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@)", event, event.getName()

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@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Certain triggers automatically grant a workflow elevated privileges:
* An attacker forks the repository and adds malicious code (e.g., in the build script)
* The attacker opens a PR from the fork, and, if needed, comments on the PR
* The workflow in the base repository checks out the forked code
* The workflow runs the malicious code
* The workflow runs, (e.g. the build script etc.), which contains the malicious code
Please note that not only build scripts can be malicious code vectors. There is a large number of other possibilities. Some of them are listed in the [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/) catalog.
@@ -41,8 +41,6 @@ The best practice is to handle the potentially untrusted pull request via the **
The artifacts downloaded from the first workflow should be considered untrusted and must be verified.
Additionally, ensure that least privilege are used both at the workflow level (through event triggers and workflow permissions) and job level (through job permissions).
## Example
### Incorrect Usage
@@ -165,5 +163,4 @@ jobs:
- GitHub Security Lab Research: [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/).
- Mitigating risks of untrusted checkout: [GitHub Docs](https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/actions/reference/security/secure-use#mitigating-the-risks-of-untrusted-code-checkout).
- Securing with least privilege: [Workflow secure use](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/secure-use).
- Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/).

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@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/**
* @name Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged context
* @name Checkout of untrusted code in privileged context without privileged context use
* @description Privileged workflows have read/write access to the base repository and access to secrets.
* By explicitly checking out and running the build script from a fork the untrusted code is running in an environment
* that is able to push to the base repository and to access secrets.
@@ -42,6 +42,5 @@ where
not event.getName() = "issue_comment" and
not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(checkout, event, "untrusted-checkout"))
)
select checkout,
"Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@).",
event, event.getName()
select checkout, "Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@)", event,
event.getName()

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@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Certain triggers automatically grant a workflow elevated privileges:
* An attacker forks the repository and adds malicious code (e.g., in the build script)
* The attacker opens a PR from the fork, and, if needed, comments on the PR
* The workflow in the base repository checks out the forked code
* The workflow runs the malicious code
* The workflow runs, (e.g. the build script etc.), which contains the malicious code
Please note that not only build scripts can be malicious code vectors. There is a large number of other possibilities. Some of them are listed in the [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/) catalog.
@@ -41,8 +41,6 @@ The best practice is to handle the potentially untrusted pull request via the **
The artifacts downloaded from the first workflow should be considered untrusted and must be verified.
Additionally, ensure that least privilege are used both at the workflow level (through event triggers and workflow permissions) and job level (through job permissions).
## Example
### Incorrect Usage
@@ -165,5 +163,4 @@ jobs:
- GitHub Security Lab Research: [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/).
- Mitigating risks of untrusted checkout: [GitHub Docs](https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/actions/reference/security/secure-use#mitigating-the-risks-of-untrusted-code-checkout).
- Securing with least privilege: [Workflow secure use](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/secure-use).
- Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/).

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@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/**
* @name Checkout of untrusted code in a trusted context
* @name Checkout of untrusted code in trusted context
* @description Privileged workflows have read/write access to the base repository and access to secrets.
* By explicitly checking out and running the build script from a fork the untrusted code is running in an environment
* that is able to push to the base repository and to access secrets.

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@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
---
category: fix
---
* Fixed help file descriptions for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`. Previously the messages were unclear as to why and how the vulnerabilities could occur.

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@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
---
category: queryMetadata
---
* Adjusted the name of `actions/untrusted-checkout/high` to more clearly describe which parts of the scenario are in a privileged context.

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@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
---
category: minorAnalysis
---
* The `actions/unpinned-tag` query now analyzes composite action metadata (`action.yml`/`action.yaml` files) in addition to workflow files, providing more comprehensive detection of unpinned action references across the entire Actions ecosystem.

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@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
---
category: minorAnalysis
---
* Altered the alert message for clarity for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`.

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@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
---
category: fix
---
* Adjusted (minor) help file descriptions for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`. Clarified wording on in minor point, added one more listed resource and added one more recommendation for things to check.

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@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
---
category: queryMetadata
---
* Reversed adjustment of the name of `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, but kept the portion of the previous change for the word "trusted" to "privileged". Added a missing "a" to phrasing in `actions/untrusted-checkout/high` and `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`.

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@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
## 0.6.28
### Query Metadata Changes
* Adjusted the name of `actions/untrusted-checkout/high` to more clearly describe which parts of the scenario are in a privileged context.
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* The `actions/unpinned-tag` query now analyzes composite action metadata (`action.yml`/`action.yaml` files) in addition to workflow files, providing more comprehensive detection of unpinned action references across the entire Actions ecosystem.
### Bug Fixes
* Fixed help file descriptions for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`. Previously the messages were unclear as to why and how the vulnerabilities could occur.

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@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
---
lastReleaseVersion: 0.6.28
lastReleaseVersion: 0.6.27

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@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
name: codeql/actions-queries
version: 0.6.29-dev
version: 0.6.28-dev
library: false
warnOnImplicitThis: true
groups: [actions, queries]

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@@ -338,42 +338,42 @@ edges
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_3.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_3.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step |
#select
| .github/actions/dangerous-git-checkout/action.yml:6:7:11:4 | Uses Step | .github/actions/dangerous-git-checkout/action.yml:6:7:11:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:13:9:13:23 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:32:9:37:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:48:9:52:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:79:9:84:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:84:9:93:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:15:9:20:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:15:9:20:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:25:9:48:6 | Run Step: set-milestone | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:3:5:3:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/reusable_caller1.yaml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:10:11:18:8 | Run Step | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:10:11:18:8 | Run Step | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:21:11:23:22 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:12:7:16:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:12:7:16:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:17:7:21:4 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/level0.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/level0.yml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/level0.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/level0.yml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:42:9:47:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:52:9:58:24 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:216:9:222:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:216:9:222:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:222:9:227:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:250:9:256:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:250:9:256:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:256:9:261:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:284:9:290:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:284:9:290:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:290:9:295:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:391:9:395:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:395:9:404:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:404:9:414:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:414:9:423:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:423:9:432:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/reusable_caller3.yaml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:33:9:36:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:36:9:39:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:49:9:59:6 | Run Step: benchmark-pr | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:59:9:60:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:60:9:60:37 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test10.yml:20:9:25:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test10.yml:20:9:25:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test10.yml:25:9:30:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test10.yml:8:3:8:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/test11.yml:84:7:90:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test11.yml:84:7:90:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test11.yml:90:7:93:54 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test11.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test17.yml:12:15:19:12 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test17.yml:12:15:19:12 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test17.yml:19:15:23:58 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test17.yml:3:5:3:16 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/test27.yml:18:9:21:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test27.yml:18:9:21:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test27.yml:21:9:22:16 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test26.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/test29.yml:8:7:14:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test29.yml:8:7:14:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test29.yml:14:7:21:11 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test29.yml:1:5:1:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:35:7:41:4 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:41:7:47:4 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:47:7:51:46 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:8:9:11:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:8:9:11:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:15:9:18:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:30:9:32:23 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/actions/dangerous-git-checkout/action.yml:6:7:11:4 | Uses Step | .github/actions/dangerous-git-checkout/action.yml:6:7:11:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:13:9:13:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:32:9:37:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:48:9:52:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:79:9:84:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:84:9:93:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:15:9:20:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:15:9:20:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:25:9:48:6 | Run Step: set-milestone | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:3:5:3:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/reusable_caller1.yaml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:10:11:18:8 | Run Step | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:10:11:18:8 | Run Step | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:21:11:23:22 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:12:7:16:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:12:7:16:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:17:7:21:4 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/level0.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/level0.yml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/level0.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/level0.yml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:42:9:47:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:52:9:58:24 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:216:9:222:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:216:9:222:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:222:9:227:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:250:9:256:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:250:9:256:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:256:9:261:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:284:9:290:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:284:9:290:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:290:9:295:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:391:9:395:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:395:9:404:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:404:9:414:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:414:9:423:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:423:9:432:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/reusable_caller3.yaml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:33:9:36:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:36:9:39:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:49:9:59:6 | Run Step: benchmark-pr | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:59:9:60:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:60:9:60:37 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test10.yml:20:9:25:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test10.yml:20:9:25:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test10.yml:25:9:30:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test10.yml:8:3:8:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/test11.yml:84:7:90:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test11.yml:84:7:90:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test11.yml:90:7:93:54 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test11.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test17.yml:12:15:19:12 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test17.yml:12:15:19:12 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test17.yml:19:15:23:58 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test17.yml:3:5:3:16 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/test27.yml:18:9:21:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test27.yml:18:9:21:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test27.yml:21:9:22:16 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test26.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/test29.yml:8:7:14:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test29.yml:8:7:14:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test29.yml:14:7:21:11 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test29.yml:1:5:1:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:35:7:41:4 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:41:7:47:4 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:47:7:51:46 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:8:9:11:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:8:9:11:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:15:9:18:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:30:9:32:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |

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@@ -1,23 +1,23 @@
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:12:9:16:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:20:9:24:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:28:9:32:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:35:9:40:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:43:9:46:126 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:28:9:33:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:48:7:50:46 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit2.yml:27:9:31:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:26:9:30:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:30:9:35:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:57:9:62:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:79:9:83:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:95:9:100:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:109:9:114:66 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:103:9:109:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:139:9:144:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:444:9:449:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/test13.yml:20:7:25:4 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test13.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:14:9:19:72 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:1:5:1:17 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:12:9:16:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:20:9:24:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:28:9:32:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:35:9:40:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:43:9:46:126 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:28:9:33:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:48:7:50:46 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit2.yml:27:9:31:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:26:9:30:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:30:9:35:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:57:9:62:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:79:9:83:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:95:9:100:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:109:9:114:66 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:103:9:109:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:139:9:144:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:444:9:449:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/test13.yml:20:7:25:4 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test13.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:14:9:19:72 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:1:5:1:17 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |

View File

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
description: Capture information about one template being generated from another
compatibility: full
class_template_generated_from.rel: delete
function_template_generated_from.rel: delete
variable_template_generated_from.rel: delete
alias_template_generated_from.rel: delete

View File

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
## 10.1.1
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* The `RemoteFlowSourceFunction` model for `fscanf` (and variants) now implements `hasSocketInput` to reflect that these functions may read from a socket.
## 10.1.0
### New Features

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
## 10.1.1
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* The `RemoteFlowSourceFunction` model for `fscanf` (and variants) now implements `hasSocketInput` to reflect that these functions may read from a socket.
---
category: minorAnalysis
---
* The `RemoteFlowSourceFunction` model for `fscanf` (and variants) now implements `hasSocketInput` to reflect that these functions may read from a socket.

View File

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
---
category: minorAnalysis
---
* Added flow source models for `scanf_s` and related functions.
* Added a `Call` column to `LocalFlowSourceFunction::hasLocalFlowSource` and `RemoteFlowSourceFunction::hasRemoteFlowSource`. The old predicates without a `Call` column continue to be supported.

View File

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
---
category: feature
---
* Added a `getOriginalTemplate` predicate to `TemplateClass`, `TemplateFunction`, `TemplateVariable`, and `AliasTemplateType`, which yields the class member template the template was generated from. The predicates only have results for templates that are members of class template instantiations.

View File

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
---
lastReleaseVersion: 10.1.1
lastReleaseVersion: 10.1.0

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
name: codeql/cpp-all
version: 10.1.2-dev
version: 10.1.1-dev
groups: cpp
dbscheme: semmlecode.cpp.dbscheme
extractor: cpp

View File

@@ -856,10 +856,8 @@ class AbstractClass extends Class {
/**
* A class template (this class also finds partial specializations
* of class templates).
*
* For example in the following code there is a `MyTemplateClass<T>`
* template:
* of class templates). For example in the following code there is a
* `MyTemplateClass<T>` template:
* ```
* template<class T>
* class MyTemplateClass {
@@ -895,29 +893,6 @@ class TemplateClass extends Class {
}
override string getAPrimaryQlClass() { result = "TemplateClass" }
/**
* Gets the class member template this template was generated from.
*
* This predicate only has results for templates that are members of class
* template instantiations. For example, for `MyTemplateClass<int>::C<S>`
* in the following code, the result is `MyTemplateClass<T>::C<S>`.
* ```cpp
* template<class T>
* class MyTemplateClass {
* template<class S>
* class C {
* ...
* };
* };
*
* template
* class MyTemplateClass<int>;
* ```
*/
TemplateClass getOriginalTemplate() {
class_template_generated_from(underlyingElement(this), unresolveElement(result))
}
}
/**

View File

@@ -828,27 +828,6 @@ class TemplateFunction extends Function {
* such things -- see FunctionTemplateSpecialization for further details.
*/
FunctionTemplateSpecialization getASpecialization() { result.getPrimaryTemplate() = this }
/**
* Gets the class member template this template was generated from.
*
* This predicate only has results for templates that are members of class
* template instantiations. For example, for `MyTemplateClass<int>::f<S>`
* in the following code, the result is `MyTemplateClass<T>::f<S>`.
* ```cpp
* template<class T>
* class MyTemplateClass {
* template<class S>
* S f();
* };
*
* template
* class MyTemplateClass<int>;
* ```
*/
TemplateFunction getOriginalTemplate() {
function_template_generated_from(underlyingElement(this), unresolveElement(result))
}
}
/**

View File

@@ -130,27 +130,6 @@ class AliasTemplateType extends TypeAliasType {
* ```
*/
TypeAliasType getAnInstantiation() { result.isConstructedFrom(this) }
/**
* Gets the class member template this template was generated from.
*
* This predicate only has results for templates that are members of class
* template instantiations. For example, for `MyTemplateClass<int>::t<S>`
* in the following code, the result is `MyTemplateClass<T>::t<S>`.
* ```cpp
* template<class T>
* class MyTemplateClass {
* template<class S>
* using t = S;
* };
*
* template
* class MyTemplateClass<int>;
* ```
*/
AliasTemplateType getOriginalTemplate() {
alias_template_generated_from(underlyingElement(this), unresolveElement(result))
}
}
/**

View File

@@ -614,27 +614,6 @@ class TemplateVariable extends Variable {
result.isConstructedFrom(this) and
not result.isSpecialization()
}
/**
* Gets the class member template this template was generated from.
*
* This predicate only has results for templates that are members of class
* template instantiations. For example, for `MyTemplateClass<int>::x<S>`
* in the following code, the result is `MyTemplateClass<T>::x<S>`.
* ```cpp
* template<class T>
* class MyTemplateClass {
* template<class S>
* static S x;
* };
*
* template
* class MyTemplateClass<int>;
* ```
*/
TemplateVariable getOriginalTemplate() {
variable_template_generated_from(underlyingElement(this), unresolveElement(result))
}
}
/**

View File

@@ -25,15 +25,6 @@ abstract class ScanfFunction extends Function {
* (rather than a `char*`).
*/
predicate isWideCharDefault() { exists(this.getName().indexOf("wscanf")) }
/** Holds if this is one of the `scanf_s` variants. */
predicate isSVariant() {
exists(string name | name = this.getName() |
name.matches("%\\_s")
or
name.matches("%\\_s\\_l")
)
}
}
/**
@@ -43,12 +34,8 @@ class Scanf extends ScanfFunction instanceof TopLevelFunction {
Scanf() {
this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("scanf") or // scanf(format, args...)
this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("wscanf") or // wscanf(format, args...)
this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("scanf_s") or // scanf_s(format, args...)
this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("wscanf_s") or // wscanf_s(format, args...)
this.hasGlobalName("_scanf_l") or // _scanf_l(format, locale, args...)
this.hasGlobalName("_wscanf_l") or // _wscanf_l(format, locale, args...)
this.hasGlobalName("_scanf_s_l") or // _scanf_s_l(format, locale, args...)
this.hasGlobalName("_wscanf_s_l") // _wscanf_s_l(format, locale, args...)
this.hasGlobalName("_wscanf_l")
}
override int getInputParameterIndex() { none() }
@@ -63,12 +50,8 @@ class Fscanf extends ScanfFunction instanceof TopLevelFunction {
Fscanf() {
this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("fscanf") or // fscanf(src_stream, format, args...)
this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("fwscanf") or // fwscanf(src_stream, format, args...)
this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("fscanf_s") or // fscanf_s(src_stream, format, args...)
this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("fwscanf_s") or // fwscanf_s(src_stream, format, args...)
this.hasGlobalName("_fscanf_l") or // _fscanf_l(src_stream, format, locale, args...)
this.hasGlobalName("_fwscanf_l") or // _fwscanf_l(src_stream, format, locale, args...)
this.hasGlobalName("_fscanf_s_l") or // _fscanf_s_l(src_stream, format, locale, args...)
this.hasGlobalName("_fwscanf_s_l") // _fwscanf_s_l(src_stream, format, locale, args...)
this.hasGlobalName("_fwscanf_l")
}
override int getInputParameterIndex() { result = 0 }
@@ -83,12 +66,8 @@ class Sscanf extends ScanfFunction instanceof TopLevelFunction {
Sscanf() {
this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("sscanf") or // sscanf(src_stream, format, args...)
this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("swscanf") or // swscanf(src, format, args...)
this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("sscanf_s") or // sscanf_s(src, format, args...)
this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("swscanf_s") or // swscanf_s(src, format, args...)
this.hasGlobalName("_sscanf_l") or // _sscanf_l(src, format, locale, args...)
this.hasGlobalName("_swscanf_l") or // _swscanf_l(src, format, locale, args...)
this.hasGlobalName("_sscanf_s_l") or // _sscanf_s_l(src, format, locale, args...)
this.hasGlobalName("_swscanf_s_l") // _swscanf_s_l(src, format, locale, args...)
this.hasGlobalName("_swscanf_l")
}
override int getInputParameterIndex() { result = 0 }
@@ -118,14 +97,6 @@ class Snscanf extends ScanfFunction instanceof TopLevelFunction {
int getInputLengthParameterIndex() { result = 1 }
}
private predicate isCharLike(Type t) { t instanceof CharType or t instanceof Wchar_t }
private predicate isStringLike(Type t) {
isCharLike(t.(PointerType).getBaseType())
or
isCharLike(t.(ArrayType).getBaseType())
}
/**
* A call to one of the `scanf` functions.
*/
@@ -159,40 +130,14 @@ class ScanfFunctionCall extends FunctionCall {
*/
predicate isWideCharDefault() { this.getScanfFunction().isWideCharDefault() }
bindingset[this, k]
pragma[inline_late]
private predicate isSizeArgument(int k) {
// The first vararg is never the size argument since a size argument must
// always follow a string buffer argument.
k > 0 and
isStringLike(this.getArgument(this.getScanfFunction().getNumberOfParameters() + k - 1)
.getUnspecifiedType())
}
/**
* Gets the output argument at position `n` in the vararg list of this call.
*
* The range of `n` is from `0` to `this.getNumberOfOutputArguments() - 1`.
*/
Expr getOutputArgument(int n) {
exists(ScanfFunction target | target = this.getScanfFunction() |
// If this is an S variant then every string buffer argument has a
// corresponding size argument immediately following it, so we need to
// skip over those size arguments when counting the output arguments.
if target.isSVariant()
then
result =
rank[n + 1](Expr arg, int k |
k >= 0 and
arg = this.getArgument(target.getNumberOfParameters() + k) and
not this.isSizeArgument(k)
|
arg order by k
)
else (
n >= 0 and result = this.getArgument(target.getNumberOfParameters() + n)
)
)
result = this.getArgument(this.getTarget().getNumberOfParameters() + n) and
n >= 0
}
/**

View File

@@ -30,10 +30,7 @@ abstract private class ScanfFunctionModel extends ArrayFunction, TaintFunction,
(
if exists(this.getLengthParameterIndex())
then result = this.getLengthParameterIndex() + 2
else
if exists(this.(ScanfFunction).getInputParameterIndex())
then result = 2
else result = 1
else result = 2
)
}
@@ -72,24 +69,13 @@ abstract private class ScanfFunctionModel extends ArrayFunction, TaintFunction,
}
}
private predicate hasFlowSource(
ScanfFunction func, ScanfFunctionCall call, FunctionOutput output, string description
) {
exists(int n, Expr arg |
call.getScanfFunction() = func and
call.getOutputArgument(_) = arg and
call.getArgument(n) = arg and
output.isParameterDeref(n) and
description = "value read by " + func.getName()
)
}
/**
* The standard function `scanf` and its assorted variants
*/
private class ScanfModel extends ScanfFunctionModel, LocalFlowSourceFunction instanceof Scanf {
override predicate hasLocalFlowSource(Call call, FunctionOutput output, string description) {
hasFlowSource(this, call, output, description)
override predicate hasLocalFlowSource(FunctionOutput output, string description) {
output.isParameterDeref(any(int i | i >= this.getArgsStartPosition())) and
description = "value read by " + this.getName()
}
}
@@ -97,8 +83,9 @@ private class ScanfModel extends ScanfFunctionModel, LocalFlowSourceFunction ins
* The standard function `fscanf` and its assorted variants
*/
private class FscanfModel extends ScanfFunctionModel, RemoteFlowSourceFunction instanceof Fscanf {
override predicate hasRemoteFlowSource(Call call, FunctionOutput output, string description) {
hasFlowSource(this, call, output, description)
override predicate hasRemoteFlowSource(FunctionOutput output, string description) {
output.isParameterDeref(any(int i | i >= this.getArgsStartPosition())) and
description = "value read by " + this.getName()
}
override predicate hasSocketInput(FunctionInput input) {

View File

@@ -18,17 +18,7 @@ abstract class RemoteFlowSourceFunction extends Function {
/**
* Holds if remote data described by `description` flows from `output` of a call to this function.
*/
predicate hasRemoteFlowSource(FunctionOutput output, string description) {
this.hasRemoteFlowSource(_, output, description)
}
/**
* Holds if remote data described by `description` flows from `output` of `call` to this function.
*/
predicate hasRemoteFlowSource(Call call, FunctionOutput output, string description) {
call.getTarget() = this and
this.hasRemoteFlowSource(output, description)
}
abstract predicate hasRemoteFlowSource(FunctionOutput output, string description);
/**
* Holds if remote data from this source comes from a socket or stream
@@ -45,17 +35,7 @@ abstract class LocalFlowSourceFunction extends Function {
/**
* Holds if data described by `description` flows from `output` of a call to this function.
*/
predicate hasLocalFlowSource(FunctionOutput output, string description) {
this.hasLocalFlowSource(_, output, description)
}
/**
* Holds if data described by `description` flows from `output` of `call` to this function.
*/
predicate hasLocalFlowSource(Call call, FunctionOutput output, string description) {
call.getTarget() = this and
this.hasLocalFlowSource(output, description)
}
abstract predicate hasLocalFlowSource(FunctionOutput output, string description);
}
/** A library function that sends data over a network connection. */

View File

@@ -28,7 +28,8 @@ private class RemoteModelSource extends RemoteFlowSource {
RemoteModelSource() {
exists(CallInstruction call, RemoteFlowSourceFunction func, FunctionOutput output |
func.hasRemoteFlowSource(call.getConvertedResultExpression(), output, sourceType) and
call.getStaticCallTarget() = func and
func.hasRemoteFlowSource(output, sourceType) and
this = callOutput(call, output)
)
}
@@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ private class LocalModelSource extends LocalFlowSource {
LocalModelSource() {
exists(CallInstruction call, LocalFlowSourceFunction func, FunctionOutput output |
call.getStaticCallTarget() = func and
func.hasLocalFlowSource(call.getConvertedResultExpression(), output, sourceType) and
func.hasLocalFlowSource(output, sourceType) and
this = callOutput(call, output)
)
}

View File

@@ -912,10 +912,6 @@ class_template_argument_value(
int index: int ref,
int arg_value: @expr ref
);
class_template_generated_from(
unique int template: @usertype ref,
int from: @usertype ref
)
@user_or_decltype = @usertype | @decltype;
@@ -947,10 +943,6 @@ function_template_argument_value(
int index: int ref,
int arg_value: @expr ref
);
function_template_generated_from(
unique int template: @function ref,
int from: @function ref
);
is_variable_template(unique int id: @variable ref);
variable_instantiation(
@@ -967,10 +959,6 @@ variable_template_argument_value(
int index: int ref,
int arg_value: @expr ref
);
variable_template_generated_from(
unique int template: @variable ref,
int from: @variable ref
);
is_alias_template(unique int id: @usertype ref);
alias_instantiation(
@@ -978,19 +966,15 @@ alias_instantiation(
int from: @usertype ref
);
alias_template_argument(
int type_id: @usertype ref,
int variable_id: @usertype ref,
int index: int ref,
int arg_type: @type ref
);
alias_template_argument_value(
int type_id: @usertype ref,
int variable_id: @usertype ref,
int index: int ref,
int arg_value: @expr ref
);
alias_template_generated_from(
unique int template: @usertype ref,
int from: @usertype ref
);
template_template_instantiation(
int to: @usertype ref,

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
description: Capture information about one template being generated from another
compatibility: backwards

View File

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
## 1.6.3
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* The 'Cleartext transmission of sensitive information' query (`cpp/cleartext-transmission`) no longer raises an alert on calls to `fscanf` (and variants) when the call reads from an "obviously local" `FILE` stream such as `stdin`.
## 1.6.2
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -44,7 +44,10 @@ class ExternalApiDataNode extends DataFlow::Node {
/** A configuration for tracking flow from `RemoteFlowSource`s to `ExternalApiDataNode`s. */
private module UntrustedDataToExternalApiConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) {
any(RemoteFlowSourceFunction remoteFlow).hasRemoteFlowSource(source.asExpr(), _, _)
exists(RemoteFlowSourceFunction remoteFlow |
remoteFlow = source.asExpr().(Call).getTarget() and
remoteFlow.hasRemoteFlowSource(_, _)
)
}
predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof ExternalApiDataNode }

View File

@@ -94,8 +94,9 @@ class Recv extends SendRecv instanceof RemoteFlowSourceFunction {
}
override Expr getDataExpr(Call call) {
call.getTarget() = this and
exists(FunctionOutput output, int arg |
super.hasRemoteFlowSource(call, output, _) and
super.hasRemoteFlowSource(output, _) and
output.isParameterDeref(arg) and
result = call.getArgument(arg)
)

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
## 1.6.3
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* The 'Cleartext transmission of sensitive information' query (`cpp/cleartext-transmission`) no longer raises an alert on calls to `fscanf` (and variants) when the call reads from an "obviously local" `FILE` stream such as `stdin`.
---
category: minorAnalysis
---
* The 'Cleartext transmission of sensitive information' query (`cpp/cleartext-transmission`) no longer raises an alert on calls to `fscanf` (and variants) when the call reads from an "obviously local" `FILE` stream such as `stdin`.

View File

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
---
lastReleaseVersion: 1.6.3
lastReleaseVersion: 1.6.2

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
name: codeql/cpp-queries
version: 1.6.4-dev
version: 1.6.3-dev
groups:
- cpp
- queries

View File

@@ -131,112 +131,3 @@ void test_strsafe_gets() {
StringCchGetsExA(dest, sizeof(dest), &end, &remaining, 0); // $ local_source
}
}
int scanf_s(const char *format, ...);
int fscanf_s(FILE *stream, const char *format, ...);
void test_scanf_s(FILE *stream) {
{
int n1, n2;
scanf_s(
"%d %d",
&n1, // $ local_source
&n2); // $ local_source
}
{
int n;
fscanf_s(stream, "%d", &n); // $ remote_source
}
{
int n1, n2;
char buf[256];
scanf_s("%d %s %d",
&n1, // $ local_source
buf, // $ local_source
256,
&n2); // $ local_source
}
{
int n1, n2;
char buf[256];
fscanf_s(stream, "%d %s %d",
&n1, // $ remote_source
buf, // $ remote_source
256,
&n2); // $ remote_source
}
}
typedef void *locale_t;
int wscanf_s(const wchar_t *format, ...);
int _scanf_s_l(const char *format, locale_t locale, ...);
int _wscanf_s_l(const wchar_t *format, locale_t locale, ...);
int fwscanf_s(FILE *stream, const wchar_t *format, ...);
int _fscanf_s_l(FILE *stream, const char *format, locale_t locale, ...);
int _fwscanf_s_l(FILE *stream, const wchar_t *format, locale_t locale, ...);
void test_additional_scanf_s_variants(FILE *stream, locale_t locale) {
{
int n1, n2;
wchar_t buf[256];
wscanf_s(L"%d %s %d",
&n1, // $ local_source
buf, // $ local_source
256,
&n2); // $ local_source
}
{
int n1, n2;
char buf[256];
_scanf_s_l("%d %s %d", locale,
&n1, // $ local_source
buf, // $ local_source
256,
&n2); // $ local_source
}
{
int n1, n2;
wchar_t buf[256];
_wscanf_s_l(L"%d %s %d", locale,
&n1, // $ local_source
buf, // $ local_source
256,
&n2); // $ local_source
}
{
int n1, n2;
wchar_t buf[256];
fwscanf_s(stream, L"%d %s %d",
&n1, // $ remote_source
buf, // $ remote_source
256,
&n2); // $ remote_source
}
{
int n1, n2;
char buf[256];
_fscanf_s_l(stream, "%d %s %d", locale,
&n1, // $ remote_source
buf, // $ remote_source
256,
&n2); // $ remote_source
}
{
int n1, n2;
wchar_t buf[256];
_fwscanf_s_l(stream, L"%d %s %d", locale,
&n1, // $ remote_source
buf, // $ remote_source
256,
&n2); // $ remote_source
}
}

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,5 @@
| test.c:19:2:19:6 | call to scanf | 0 | s | 0 | 0 |
| test.c:20:2:20:7 | call to fscanf | 0 | s | 10 | 10 |
| test.c:20:2:20:7 | call to fscanf | 1 | i | 0 | 0 |
| test.c:21:2:21:7 | call to sscanf | 0 | s | 0 | 0 |
| test.c:22:2:22:8 | call to swscanf | 0 | s | 10 | 10 |
| test.c:23:2:23:8 | call to scanf_s | 0 | d | 0 | 0 |
| test.c:23:2:23:8 | call to scanf_s | 1 | s | 0 | 0 |
| test.c:23:2:23:8 | call to scanf_s | 2 | d | 0 | 0 |
| test.c:18:2:18:6 | call to scanf | 0 | s | 0 | 0 |
| test.c:19:2:19:7 | call to fscanf | 0 | s | 10 | 10 |
| test.c:19:2:19:7 | call to fscanf | 1 | i | 0 | 0 |
| test.c:20:2:20:7 | call to sscanf | 0 | s | 0 | 0 |
| test.c:21:2:21:8 | call to swscanf | 0 | s | 10 | 10 |

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
| ms.cpp:17:3:17:8 | call to sscanf | 0 | 1 | ms.cpp:17:24:17:30 | %I64i | non-wide |
| test.c:19:2:19:6 | call to scanf | 0 | 0 | test.c:19:8:19:11 | %s | non-wide |
| test.c:20:2:20:7 | call to fscanf | 0 | 1 | test.c:20:15:20:23 | %10s %i | non-wide |
| test.c:21:2:21:7 | call to sscanf | 0 | 1 | test.c:21:19:21:28 | %*i%s%*s | non-wide |
| test.c:22:2:22:8 | call to swscanf | 0 | 1 | test.c:22:21:22:26 | %10s | wide |
| test.c:23:2:23:8 | call to scanf_s | 0 | 0 | test.c:23:10:23:19 | %d %s %d | non-wide |
| test.c:18:2:18:6 | call to scanf | 0 | 0 | test.c:18:8:18:11 | %s | non-wide |
| test.c:19:2:19:7 | call to fscanf | 0 | 1 | test.c:19:15:19:23 | %10s %i | non-wide |
| test.c:20:2:20:7 | call to sscanf | 0 | 1 | test.c:20:19:20:28 | %*i%s%*s | non-wide |
| test.c:21:2:21:8 | call to swscanf | 0 | 1 | test.c:21:21:21:26 | %10s | wide |

View File

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
| ms.cpp:17:3:17:8 | call to sscanf | ms.cpp:17:33:17:36 | & ... | 0 |
| test.c:19:2:19:6 | call to scanf | test.c:19:14:19:19 | buffer | 0 |
| test.c:20:2:20:7 | call to fscanf | test.c:20:26:20:31 | buffer | 0 |
| test.c:20:2:20:7 | call to fscanf | test.c:20:34:20:34 | i | 1 |
| test.c:21:2:21:7 | call to sscanf | test.c:21:31:21:36 | buffer | 0 |
| test.c:22:2:22:8 | call to swscanf | test.c:22:29:22:35 | wbuffer | 0 |
| test.c:23:2:23:8 | call to scanf_s | test.c:23:22:23:23 | & ... | 0 |
| test.c:23:2:23:8 | call to scanf_s | test.c:23:26:23:31 | buffer | 1 |
| test.c:23:2:23:8 | call to scanf_s | test.c:23:38:23:40 | & ... | 2 |

View File

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
import semmle.code.cpp.commons.Scanf
from ScanfFunctionCall sfc, Expr e, int n
where e = sfc.getOutputArgument(n)
select sfc, e, n

View File

@@ -7,20 +7,18 @@ int scanf(const char *format, ...);
int fscanf(FILE *stream, const char *format, ...);
int sscanf(const char *s, const char *format, ...);
int swscanf(const wchar_t* ws, const wchar_t* format, ...);
int scanf_s(const char *format, ...);
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
char buffer[256];
wchar_t wbuffer[256];
FILE *file;
int i, i2;
int i;
scanf("%s", buffer);
fscanf(file, "%10s %i", buffer, i);
sscanf("Hello.", "%*i%s%*s", buffer);
swscanf(L"Hello.", "%10s", wbuffer);
scanf_s("%d %s %d", &i, buffer, 10, &i2);
return 0;
}

View File

@@ -32,13 +32,9 @@ namespace Semmle.Extraction.CSharp.Entities
{
var assembly = Assembly.CreateOutputAssembly(Context);
var path = Context.ExtractionContext.PathTransformer.Transform(cwd);
trapFile.compilations(this, path.Value);
trapFile.compilations(this, FileUtils.ConvertToUnix(cwd));
trapFile.compilation_assembly(this, assembly);
// Ensure that a `Folder` entity exists
Folder.Create(Context, path);
// Arguments
var expandedIndex = 0;
for (var i = 0; i < args.Length; i++)

View File

@@ -58,10 +58,10 @@ namespace Semmle.Extraction.CSharp.Entities.Expressions
return Invocation.Create(info);
case SyntaxKind.PostIncrementExpression:
return PostfixUnary.Create(info.SetKind(ExprKind.POST_INCR));
return PostfixUnary.Create(info.SetKind(ExprKind.POST_INCR), ((PostfixUnaryExpressionSyntax)info.Node).Operand);
case SyntaxKind.PostDecrementExpression:
return PostfixUnary.Create(info.SetKind(ExprKind.POST_DECR));
return PostfixUnary.Create(info.SetKind(ExprKind.POST_DECR), ((PostfixUnaryExpressionSyntax)info.Node).Operand);
case SyntaxKind.AwaitExpression:
return Await.Create(info);
@@ -109,10 +109,10 @@ namespace Semmle.Extraction.CSharp.Entities.Expressions
return MemberAccess.Create(info, (MemberAccessExpressionSyntax)info.Node);
case SyntaxKind.UnaryMinusExpression:
return PrefixUnary.Create(info.SetKind(ExprKind.MINUS));
return Unary.Create(info.SetKind(ExprKind.MINUS));
case SyntaxKind.UnaryPlusExpression:
return PrefixUnary.Create(info.SetKind(ExprKind.PLUS));
return Unary.Create(info.SetKind(ExprKind.PLUS));
case SyntaxKind.SimpleLambdaExpression:
return Lambda.Create(info, (SimpleLambdaExpressionSyntax)info.Node);
@@ -146,16 +146,16 @@ namespace Semmle.Extraction.CSharp.Entities.Expressions
return Name.Create(info);
case SyntaxKind.LogicalNotExpression:
return PrefixUnary.Create(info.SetKind(ExprKind.LOG_NOT));
return Unary.Create(info.SetKind(ExprKind.LOG_NOT));
case SyntaxKind.BitwiseNotExpression:
return PrefixUnary.Create(info.SetKind(ExprKind.BIT_NOT));
return Unary.Create(info.SetKind(ExprKind.BIT_NOT));
case SyntaxKind.PreIncrementExpression:
return PrefixUnary.Create(info.SetKind(ExprKind.PRE_INCR));
return Unary.Create(info.SetKind(ExprKind.PRE_INCR));
case SyntaxKind.PreDecrementExpression:
return PrefixUnary.Create(info.SetKind(ExprKind.PRE_DECR));
return Unary.Create(info.SetKind(ExprKind.PRE_DECR));
case SyntaxKind.ThisExpression:
return This.CreateExplicit(info);
@@ -164,10 +164,10 @@ namespace Semmle.Extraction.CSharp.Entities.Expressions
return PropertyFieldAccess.Create(info);
case SyntaxKind.AddressOfExpression:
return PrefixUnary.Create(info.SetKind(ExprKind.ADDRESS_OF));
return Unary.Create(info.SetKind(ExprKind.ADDRESS_OF));
case SyntaxKind.PointerIndirectionExpression:
return PrefixUnary.Create(info.SetKind(ExprKind.POINTER_INDIRECTION));
return Unary.Create(info.SetKind(ExprKind.POINTER_INDIRECTION));
case SyntaxKind.DefaultExpression:
return Default.Create(info);
@@ -248,13 +248,13 @@ namespace Semmle.Extraction.CSharp.Entities.Expressions
return RangeExpression.Create(info);
case SyntaxKind.IndexExpression:
return PrefixUnary.Create(info.SetKind(ExprKind.INDEX));
return Unary.Create(info.SetKind(ExprKind.INDEX));
case SyntaxKind.SwitchExpression:
return Switch.Create(info);
case SyntaxKind.SuppressNullableWarningExpression:
return PostfixUnary.Create(info.SetKind(ExprKind.SUPPRESS_NULLABLE_WARNING));
return PostfixUnary.Create(info.SetKind(ExprKind.SUPPRESS_NULLABLE_WARNING), ((PostfixUnaryExpressionSyntax)info.Node).Operand);
case SyntaxKind.WithExpression:
return WithExpression.Create(info);

View File

@@ -4,30 +4,29 @@ using Semmle.Extraction.Kinds;
namespace Semmle.Extraction.CSharp.Entities.Expressions
{
internal class PostfixUnary : Expression<PostfixUnaryExpressionSyntax>
internal class PostfixUnary : Expression<ExpressionSyntax>
{
private PostfixUnary(ExpressionNodeInfo info, ExprKind kind)
private PostfixUnary(ExpressionNodeInfo info, ExprKind kind, ExpressionSyntax operand)
: base(info.SetKind(UnaryOperatorKind(info.Context, kind, info.Node)))
{
this.operand = operand;
operatorKind = kind;
}
private readonly ExpressionSyntax operand;
private readonly ExprKind operatorKind;
public static Expression Create(ExpressionNodeInfo info) => new PostfixUnary(info, info.Kind).TryPopulate();
public static Expression Create(ExpressionNodeInfo info, ExpressionSyntax operand) => new PostfixUnary(info, info.Kind, operand).TryPopulate();
protected override void PopulateExpression(TextWriter trapFile)
{
Create(Context, Syntax.Operand, this, 0);
Create(Context, operand, this, 0);
if (Kind == ExprKind.OPERATOR_INVOCATION)
if ((operatorKind == ExprKind.POST_INCR || operatorKind == ExprKind.POST_DECR) &&
Kind == ExprKind.OPERATOR_INVOCATION)
{
AddOperatorCall(trapFile, Syntax);
if (operatorKind == ExprKind.POST_INCR || operatorKind == ExprKind.POST_DECR)
{
trapFile.mutator_invocation_mode(this, 2);
}
trapFile.mutator_invocation_mode(this, 2);
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
using System.IO;
using Microsoft.CodeAnalysis.CSharp.Syntax;
using Semmle.Extraction.Kinds;
namespace Semmle.Extraction.CSharp.Entities.Expressions
{
internal class PrefixUnary : Expression<PrefixUnaryExpressionSyntax>
{
private PrefixUnary(ExpressionNodeInfo info, ExprKind kind)
: base(info.SetKind(UnaryOperatorKind(info.Context, info.Kind, info.Node)))
{
operatorKind = kind;
}
private readonly ExprKind operatorKind;
public static Expression Create(ExpressionNodeInfo info) => new PrefixUnary(info, info.Kind).TryPopulate();
protected override void PopulateExpression(TextWriter trapFile)
{
Create(Context, Syntax.Operand, this, 0);
if (Kind == ExprKind.OPERATOR_INVOCATION)
{
AddOperatorCall(trapFile, Syntax);
if (operatorKind == ExprKind.PRE_INCR || operatorKind == ExprKind.PRE_DECR)
{
trapFile.mutator_invocation_mode(this, 1);
}
}
}
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
using System.IO;
using Microsoft.CodeAnalysis.CSharp.Syntax;
using Semmle.Extraction.Kinds;
namespace Semmle.Extraction.CSharp.Entities.Expressions
{
internal class Unary : Expression<PrefixUnaryExpressionSyntax>
{
private Unary(ExpressionNodeInfo info, ExprKind kind)
: base(info.SetKind(UnaryOperatorKind(info.Context, info.Kind, info.Node)))
{
operatorKind = kind;
}
private readonly ExprKind operatorKind;
public static Unary Create(ExpressionNodeInfo info)
{
var ret = new Unary(info, info.Kind);
ret.TryPopulate();
return ret;
}
protected override void PopulateExpression(TextWriter trapFile)
{
Create(Context, Syntax.Operand, this, 0);
AddOperatorCall(trapFile, Syntax);
if ((operatorKind == ExprKind.PRE_INCR || operatorKind == ExprKind.PRE_DECR) &&
Kind == ExprKind.OPERATOR_INVOCATION)
{
trapFile.mutator_invocation_mode(this, 1);
}
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,3 @@
## 1.7.67
No user-facing changes.
## 1.7.66
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 1.7.67
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
---
lastReleaseVersion: 1.7.67
lastReleaseVersion: 1.7.66

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
name: codeql/csharp-solorigate-all
version: 1.7.68-dev
version: 1.7.67-dev
groups:
- csharp
- solorigate

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,3 @@
## 1.7.67
No user-facing changes.
## 1.7.66
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 1.7.67
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
---
lastReleaseVersion: 1.7.67
lastReleaseVersion: 1.7.66

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
name: codeql/csharp-solorigate-queries
version: 1.7.68-dev
version: 1.7.67-dev
groups:
- csharp
- solorigate

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,3 @@
## 6.0.1
No user-facing changes.
## 6.0.0
### Breaking Changes

View File

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
---
category: minorAnalysis
---
* Full support for C# 14 / .NET 10. All new language features are now supported by the extractor. The QL library and data flow analysis now support the new C# 14 language constructs and include generated Models as Data (MaD) models for the .NET 10 runtime.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 6.0.1
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
---
lastReleaseVersion: 6.0.1
lastReleaseVersion: 6.0.0

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
name: codeql/csharp-all
version: 6.0.2-dev
version: 6.0.1-dev
groups: csharp
dbscheme: semmlecode.csharp.dbscheme
extractor: csharp

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,3 @@
## 1.7.3
No user-facing changes.
## 1.7.2
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 1.7.3
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
---
lastReleaseVersion: 1.7.3
lastReleaseVersion: 1.7.2

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
name: codeql/csharp-queries
version: 1.7.4-dev
version: 1.7.3-dev
groups:
- csharp
- queries

View File

@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
.. _codeql-cli-2.25.5:
==========================
CodeQL 2.25.5 (2026-05-21)
==========================
.. contents:: Contents
:depth: 2
:local:
:backlinks: none
This is an overview of changes in the CodeQL CLI and relevant CodeQL query and library packs. For additional updates on changes to the CodeQL code scanning experience, check out the `code scanning section on the GitHub blog <https://github.blog/tag/code-scanning/>`__, `relevant GitHub Changelog updates <https://github.blog/changelog/label/application-security/>`__, `changes in the CodeQL extension for Visual Studio Code <https://marketplace.visualstudio.com/items/GitHub.vscode-codeql/changelog>`__, and the `CodeQL Action changelog <https://github.com/github/codeql-action/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md>`__.
Security Coverage
-----------------
CodeQL 2.25.5 runs a total of 496 security queries when configured with the Default suite (covering 169 CWE). The Extended suite enables an additional 131 queries (covering 32 more CWE).
CodeQL CLI
----------
There are no user-facing CLI changes in this release.
Query Packs
-----------
Bug Fixes
~~~~~~~~~
GitHub Actions
""""""""""""""
* Fixed help file descriptions for queries: :code:`actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, :code:`actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, :code:`actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`. Previously the messages were unclear as to why and how the vulnerabilities could occur.
Minor Analysis Improvements
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
C/C++
"""""
* The 'Cleartext transmission of sensitive information' query (:code:`cpp/cleartext-transmission`) no longer raises an alert on calls to :code:`fscanf` (and variants) when the call reads from an "obviously local" :code:`FILE` stream such as :code:`stdin`.
Java/Kotlin
"""""""""""
* The :code:`java/zipslip` query no longer reports archive entry names that flow only to read-only path sinks such as :code:`ClassLoader.getResource`, :code:`FileInputStream`, and :code:`FileReader`. The query now restricts its sinks to the :code:`path-injection` kind and deliberately excludes the new :code:`path-injection[read]` sub-kind, matching the Zip Slip threat model of unsafe archive extraction.
GitHub Actions
""""""""""""""
* The :code:`actions/unpinned-tag` query now analyzes composite action metadata (:code:`action.yml`\ /\ :code:`action.yaml` files) in addition to workflow files, providing more comprehensive detection of unpinned action references across the entire Actions ecosystem.
Query Metadata Changes
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
GitHub Actions
""""""""""""""
* Adjusted the name of :code:`actions/untrusted-checkout/high` to more clearly describe which parts of the scenario are in a privileged context.
Language Libraries
------------------
Minor Analysis Improvements
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
C/C++
"""""
* The :code:`RemoteFlowSourceFunction` model for :code:`fscanf` (and variants) now implements :code:`hasSocketInput` to reflect that these functions may read from a socket.
Java/Kotlin
"""""""""""
* Introduced a new sink kind :code:`path-injection[read]` for Models-as-Data rows that only read from a path (such as :code:`ClassLoader.getResource`, :code:`FileInputStream`, :code:`FileReader`, :code:`Files.readAllBytes`, and related APIs). The general :code:`java/path-injection` query continues to consider both :code:`path-injection` and :code:`path-injection[read]` sinks.
GitHub Actions
""""""""""""""
* Altered 2 patterns in the :code:`poisonable_steps` modelling. Extra sinks are detected in the following cases: scripts executed via python modules and :code:`go run` in directories are detected as potential mechanisms of injection. For the go execution pattern, the pattern is updated to now ignore flags that occur between go and the specific command. This change may lead to more results being detected by the following queries: :code:`actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, :code:`actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, :code:`actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/high`, :code:`actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/critical`, :code:`actions/cache-poisoning/poisonable-step`, :code:`actions/cache-poisoning/direct-cache` and :code:`actions/artifact-poisoning/path-traversal`.
New Features
~~~~~~~~~~~~
Swift
"""""
* The :code:`TypeDecl` class now defines a :code:`getDeclaredInterfaceType` predicate, which yields the declared interface type of the type declaration.

View File

@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ A list of queries for each suite and language `is available here <https://docs.g
.. toctree::
:maxdepth: 1
codeql-cli-2.25.5
codeql-cli-2.25.4
codeql-cli-2.25.3
codeql-cli-2.25.2

View File

@@ -11,23 +11,23 @@
Microsoft extensions (up to VS 2022),
Arm Compiler 5 [5]_","``.cpp``, ``.c++``, ``.cxx``, ``.hpp``, ``.hh``, ``.h++``, ``.hxx``, ``.c``, ``.cc``, ``.h``"
C#,C# up to 14,"Microsoft Visual Studio up to 2019 with .NET up to 4.8,
C#,C# up to 14 [6]_,"Microsoft Visual Studio up to 2019 with .NET up to 4.8,
.NET Core up to 3.1
.NET 5, .NET 6, .NET 7, .NET 8, .NET 9, .NET 10","``.sln``, ``.slnx``, ``.csproj``, ``.cs``, ``.cshtml``, ``.xaml``"
.NET 5, .NET 6, .NET 7, .NET 8, .NET 9, .NET 10 [6]_","``.sln``, ``.slnx``, ``.csproj``, ``.cs``, ``.cshtml``, ``.xaml``"
GitHub Actions,"Not applicable",Not applicable,"``.github/workflows/*.yml``, ``.github/workflows/*.yaml``, ``**/action.yml``, ``**/action.yaml``"
Go (aka Golang), "Go up to 1.26", "Go 1.11 or more recent", ``.go``
Java,"Java 7 to 26 [6]_","javac (OpenJDK and Oracle JDK),
Java,"Java 7 to 26 [7]_","javac (OpenJDK and Oracle JDK),
Eclipse compiler for Java (ECJ) [7]_",``.java``
Eclipse compiler for Java (ECJ) [8]_",``.java``
Kotlin,"Kotlin 1.8.0 to 2.3.2\ *x*","kotlinc",``.kt``
JavaScript,ECMAScript 2022 or lower,Not applicable,"``.js``, ``.jsx``, ``.mjs``, ``.es``, ``.es6``, ``.htm``, ``.html``, ``.xhtm``, ``.xhtml``, ``.vue``, ``.hbs``, ``.ejs``, ``.njk``, ``.json``, ``.yaml``, ``.yml``, ``.raml``, ``.xml`` [8]_"
Python [9]_,"2.7, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13",Not applicable,``.py``
Ruby [10]_,"up to 3.3",Not applicable,"``.rb``, ``.erb``, ``.gemspec``, ``Gemfile``"
Rust [11]_,"Rust editions 2021 and 2024","Rust compiler","``.rs``, ``Cargo.toml``"
Swift [12]_ [13]_,"Swift 5.4-6.3","Swift compiler","``.swift``"
TypeScript [14]_,"2.6-5.9",Standard TypeScript compiler,"``.ts``, ``.tsx``, ``.mts``, ``.cts``"
JavaScript,ECMAScript 2022 or lower,Not applicable,"``.js``, ``.jsx``, ``.mjs``, ``.es``, ``.es6``, ``.htm``, ``.html``, ``.xhtm``, ``.xhtml``, ``.vue``, ``.hbs``, ``.ejs``, ``.njk``, ``.json``, ``.yaml``, ``.yml``, ``.raml``, ``.xml`` [9]_"
Python [10]_,"2.7, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13",Not applicable,``.py``
Ruby [11]_,"up to 3.3",Not applicable,"``.rb``, ``.erb``, ``.gemspec``, ``Gemfile``"
Rust [12]_,"Rust editions 2021 and 2024","Rust compiler","``.rs``, ``Cargo.toml``"
Swift [13]_ [14]_,"Swift 5.4-6.3","Swift compiler","``.swift``"
TypeScript [15]_,"2.6-5.9",Standard TypeScript compiler,"``.ts``, ``.tsx``, ``.mts``, ``.cts``"
.. container:: footnote-group
@@ -36,12 +36,13 @@
.. [3] Objective-C, Objective-C++, C++/CLI, and C++/CX are not supported.
.. [4] Support for the clang-cl compiler is preliminary.
.. [5] Support for the Arm Compiler (armcc) is preliminary.
.. [6] Builds that execute on Java 7 to 26 can be analyzed. The analysis understands standard language features in Java 8 to 26; "preview" and "incubator" features are not supported. Source code using Java language versions older than Java 8 are analyzed as Java 8 code.
.. [7] ECJ is supported when the build invokes it via the Maven Compiler plugin or the Takari Lifecycle plugin.
.. [8] JSX and Flow code, YAML, JSON, HTML, and XML files may also be analyzed with JavaScript files.
.. [9] The extractor requires Python 3 to run. To analyze Python 2.7 you should install both versions of Python.
.. [10] Requires glibc 2.17.
.. [11] Requires ``rustup`` and ``cargo`` to be installed. Features from nightly toolchains are not supported.
.. [12] Support for the analysis of Swift requires macOS.
.. [13] Embedded Swift is not supported.
.. [14] TypeScript analysis is performed by running the JavaScript extractor with TypeScript enabled. This is the default.
.. [6] Support for .NET 10 is preliminary and code that uses language features new to C# 14 is not yet fully supported for extraction and analysis.
.. [7] Builds that execute on Java 7 to 26 can be analyzed. The analysis understands standard language features in Java 8 to 26; "preview" and "incubator" features are not supported. Source code using Java language versions older than Java 8 are analyzed as Java 8 code.
.. [8] ECJ is supported when the build invokes it via the Maven Compiler plugin or the Takari Lifecycle plugin.
.. [9] JSX and Flow code, YAML, JSON, HTML, and XML files may also be analyzed with JavaScript files.
.. [10] The extractor requires Python 3 to run. To analyze Python 2.7 you should install both versions of Python.
.. [11] Requires glibc 2.17.
.. [12] Requires ``rustup`` and ``cargo`` to be installed. Features from nightly toolchains are not supported.
.. [13] Support for the analysis of Swift requires macOS.
.. [14] Embedded Swift is not supported.
.. [15] TypeScript analysis is performed by running the JavaScript extractor with TypeScript enabled. This is the default.

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,3 @@
## 1.0.50
No user-facing changes.
## 1.0.49
No user-facing changes.

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@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 1.0.50
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
---
lastReleaseVersion: 1.0.50
lastReleaseVersion: 1.0.49

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
name: codeql-go-consistency-queries
version: 1.0.51-dev
version: 1.0.50-dev
groups:
- go
- queries

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,3 @@
## 7.1.1
No user-facing changes.
## 7.1.0
### New Features

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 7.1.1
No user-facing changes.

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@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
---
lastReleaseVersion: 7.1.1
lastReleaseVersion: 7.1.0

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
name: codeql/go-all
version: 7.1.2-dev
version: 7.1.1-dev
groups: go
dbscheme: go.dbscheme
extractor: go

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,3 @@
## 1.6.3
No user-facing changes.
## 1.6.2
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 1.6.3
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
---
lastReleaseVersion: 1.6.3
lastReleaseVersion: 1.6.2

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
name: codeql/go-queries
version: 1.6.4-dev
version: 1.6.3-dev
groups:
- go
- queries

View File

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
## 9.1.1
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Introduced a new sink kind `path-injection[read]` for Models-as-Data rows that only read from a path (such as `ClassLoader.getResource`, `FileInputStream`, `FileReader`, `Files.readAllBytes`, and related APIs). The general `java/path-injection` query continues to consider both `path-injection` and `path-injection[read]` sinks.
## 9.1.0
### New Features

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
## 9.1.1
### Minor Analysis Improvements
---
category: minorAnalysis
---
* Introduced a new sink kind `path-injection[read]` for Models-as-Data rows that only read from a path (such as `ClassLoader.getResource`, `FileInputStream`, `FileReader`, `Files.readAllBytes`, and related APIs). The general `java/path-injection` query continues to consider both `path-injection` and `path-injection[read]` sinks.

View File

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
---
lastReleaseVersion: 9.1.1
lastReleaseVersion: 9.1.0

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
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View File

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# THIS FILE IS AN AUTO-GENERATED MODELS AS DATA FILE. DO NOT EDIT.
# Generated from /Users/bazookamusic/git/test-repos/avro#unknown by codeql-mads-via-llm
extensions:
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data:
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View File

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# THIS FILE IS AN AUTO-GENERATED MODELS AS DATA FILE. DO NOT EDIT.
# Generated from /Users/bazookamusic/git/test-repos/avro#unknown by codeql-mads-via-llm
extensions:
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View File

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# THIS FILE IS AN AUTO-GENERATED MODELS AS DATA FILE. DO NOT EDIT.
# Generated from /Users/bazookamusic/git/test-repos/avro#unknown by codeql-mads-via-llm
extensions:
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