Bump actions/download-artifact from 4 to 8

Bumps [actions/download-artifact](https://github.com/actions/download-artifact) from 4 to 8.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/actions/download-artifact/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/actions/download-artifact/compare/v4...v8)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: actions/download-artifact
  dependency-version: '8'
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-major
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>

.github/workflows/mad_modelDiff.yml

@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ jobs:
             SHORTNAME=`basename $DATABASE`
             python misc/scripts/models-as-data/generate_mad.py --language java --with-summaries --with-sinks $DATABASE $SHORTNAME/$QL_VARIANT
             mkdir -p $MODELS/$SHORTNAME
-            mv java/ql/lib/ext/generated/modelgenerator/$SHORTNAME/$QL_VARIANT $MODELS/$SHORTNAME
+            mv java/ql/lib/ext/generated/$SHORTNAME/$QL_VARIANT $MODELS/$SHORTNAME
             cd ..
           }
 

.github/workflows/python-tooling.yml

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ on:
     paths:
       - "misc/bazel/**"
       - "misc/codegen/**"
-      - "misc/scripts/models-as-data/*.py"
+      - "misc/scripts/models-as-data/bulk_generate_mad.py"
       - "*.bazel*"
       - .github/workflows/codegen.yml
       - .pre-commit-config.yaml

.github/workflows/ql-for-ql-dataset_measure.yml

@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ jobs:
     needs: measure
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v5
-      - uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
+      - uses: actions/download-artifact@v8
         with:
           name: measurements
           path: stats

.pre-commit-config.yaml

@@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ repos:
     rev: v3.2.0
     hooks:
       - id: trailing-whitespace
-        exclude: /test([^/]*)/.*$(?<!\.qlref)|.*\.patch$|.*\.qll?$
+        exclude: /test/.*$(?<!\.qlref)|.*\.patch$|.*\.qll?$
       - id: end-of-file-fixer
-        exclude: Cargo.lock$|/test([^/]*)/.*$(?<!\.qlref)|.*\.patch$|.*\.qll?$
+        exclude: Cargo.lock$|/test/.*$(?<!\.qlref)|.*\.patch$|.*\.qll?$
 
   - repo: https://github.com/pre-commit/mirrors-clang-format
     rev: v17.0.6

Cargo.lock

@@ -140,26 +140,6 @@ version = "0.22.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "72b3254f16251a8381aa12e40e3c4d2f0199f8c6508fbecb9d91f575e0fbb8c6"
 
-[[package]]
-name = "bindgen"
-version = "0.72.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "993776b509cfb49c750f11b8f07a46fa23e0a1386ffc01fb1e7d343efc387895"
-dependencies = [
- "bitflags 2.9.4",
- "cexpr",
- "clang-sys",
- "itertools 0.12.1",
- "log 0.4.28",
- "prettyplease",
- "proc-macro2",
- "quote",
- "regex",
- "rustc-hash 2.1.1",
- "shlex",
- "syn",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "bitflags"
 version = "1.3.2"
@@ -260,9 +240,9 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "cc"
-version = "1.2.61"
+version = "1.2.37"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "d16d90359e986641506914ba71350897565610e87ce0ad9e6f28569db3dd5c6d"
+checksum = "65193589c6404eb80b450d618eaf9a2cafaaafd57ecce47370519ef674a7bd44"
 dependencies = [
  "find-msvc-tools",
  "jobserver",
@@ -270,15 +250,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "shlex",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "cexpr"
-version = "0.6.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "6fac387a98bb7c37292057cffc56d62ecb629900026402633ae9160df93a8766"
-dependencies = [
- "nom",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "cfg-if"
 version = "1.0.3"
@@ -357,7 +328,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "chalk-derive 0.103.0",
  "chalk-ir 0.103.0",
  "ena",
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
+ "indexmap 2.11.4",
  "itertools 0.12.1",
  "petgraph",
  "rustc-hash 1.1.0",
@@ -378,17 +349,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "windows-link 0.2.0",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "clang-sys"
-version = "1.8.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "0b023947811758c97c59bf9d1c188fd619ad4718dcaa767947df1cadb14f39f4"
-dependencies = [
- "glob",
- "libc",
- "libloading",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "clap"
 version = "4.5.48"
@@ -456,7 +416,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "tree-sitter",
  "tree-sitter-json",
  "tree-sitter-ql",
- "yeast",
  "zstd",
 ]
 
@@ -478,25 +437,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "tree-sitter-ruby",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "codeql-extractor-unified"
-version = "0.1.0"
-dependencies = [
- "clap",
- "codeql-extractor",
- "encoding",
- "lazy_static",
- "rayon",
- "regex",
- "serde_json",
- "tracing",
- "tracing-subscriber",
- "tree-sitter",
- "tree-sitter-embedded-template",
- "tree-sitter-swift",
- "yeast",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "codeql-rust"
 version = "0.1.0"
@@ -545,15 +485,6 @@ version = "1.0.4"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "b05b61dc5112cbb17e4b6cd61790d9845d13888356391624cbe7e41efeac1e75"
 
-[[package]]
-name = "convert_case"
-version = "0.8.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "baaaa0ecca5b51987b9423ccdc971514dd8b0bb7b4060b983d3664dad3f1f89f"
-dependencies = [
- "unicode-segmentation",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "core-foundation-sys"
 version = "0.8.7"
@@ -807,12 +738,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "typeid",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "fastrand"
-version = "2.4.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "9f1f227452a390804cdb637b74a86990f2a7d7ba4b7d5693aac9b4dd6defd8d6"
-
 [[package]]
 name = "figment"
 version = "0.10.19"
@@ -829,9 +754,9 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "find-msvc-tools"
-version = "0.1.9"
+version = "0.1.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "5baebc0774151f905a1a2cc41989300b1e6fbb29aff0ceffa1064fdd3088d582"
+checksum = "7fd99930f64d146689264c637b5af2f0233a933bef0d8570e2526bf9e083192d"
 
 [[package]]
 name = "fixedbitset"
@@ -861,12 +786,6 @@ version = "0.1.5"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "d9c4f5dac5e15c24eb999c26181a6ca40b39fe946cbe4c263c7209467bc83af2"
 
-[[package]]
-name = "foldhash"
-version = "0.2.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "77ce24cb58228fbb8aa041425bb1050850ac19177686ea6e0f41a70416f56fdb"
-
 [[package]]
 name = "form_urlencoded"
 version = "1.2.2"
@@ -951,26 +870,9 @@ checksum = "9229cfe53dfd69f0609a49f65461bd93001ea1ef889cd5529dd176593f5338a1"
 dependencies = [
  "allocator-api2",
  "equivalent",
- "foldhash 0.1.5",
+ "foldhash",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "hashbrown"
-version = "0.16.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "841d1cc9bed7f9236f321df977030373f4a4163ae1a7dbfe1a51a2c1a51d9100"
-dependencies = [
- "allocator-api2",
- "equivalent",
- "foldhash 0.2.0",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "hashbrown"
-version = "0.17.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "ed5909b6e89a2db4456e54cd5f673791d7eca6732202bbf2a9cc504fe2f9b84a"
-
 [[package]]
 name = "hashlink"
 version = "0.10.0"
@@ -1157,25 +1059,16 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "indexmap"
-version = "2.14.0"
+version = "2.11.4"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "d466e9454f08e4a911e14806c24e16fba1b4c121d1ea474396f396069cf949d9"
+checksum = "4b0f83760fb341a774ed326568e19f5a863af4a952def8c39f9ab92fd95b88e5"
 dependencies = [
  "equivalent",
- "hashbrown 0.17.1",
+ "hashbrown 0.15.5",
  "serde",
  "serde_core",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "indoc"
-version = "2.0.7"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "79cf5c93f93228cf8efb3ba362535fb11199ac548a09ce117c9b1adc3030d706"
-dependencies = [
- "rustversion",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "inlinable_string"
 version = "0.1.15"
@@ -1305,16 +1198,6 @@ version = "0.2.175"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "6a82ae493e598baaea5209805c49bbf2ea7de956d50d7da0da1164f9c6d28543"
 
-[[package]]
-name = "libloading"
-version = "0.8.9"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "d7c4b02199fee7c5d21a5ae7d8cfa79a6ef5bb2fc834d6e9058e89c825efdc55"
-dependencies = [
- "cfg-if",
- "windows-link 0.2.0",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "line-index"
 version = "0.1.2"
@@ -1380,12 +1263,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "autocfg",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "minimal-lexical"
-version = "0.2.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "68354c5c6bd36d73ff3feceb05efa59b6acb7626617f4962be322a825e61f79a"
-
 [[package]]
 name = "miniz_oxide"
 version = "0.8.9"
@@ -1432,16 +1309,6 @@ version = "0.2.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "2bf50223579dc7cdcfb3bfcacf7069ff68243f8c363f62ffa99cf000a6b9c451"
 
-[[package]]
-name = "nom"
-version = "7.1.3"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "d273983c5a657a70a3e8f2a01329822f3b8c8172b73826411a55751e404a0a4a"
-dependencies = [
- "memchr",
- "minimal-lexical",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "notify"
 version = "8.2.0"
@@ -1569,12 +1436,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "windows-targets 0.52.6",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "pathdiff"
-version = "0.2.3"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "df94ce210e5bc13cb6651479fa48d14f601d9858cfe0467f43ae157023b938d3"
-
 [[package]]
 name = "pear"
 version = "0.2.9"
@@ -1630,36 +1491,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "b4c5cc86750666a3ed20bdaf5ca2a0344f9c67674cae0515bec2da16fbaa47db"
 dependencies = [
  "fixedbitset",
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "phf"
-version = "0.13.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "c1562dc717473dbaa4c1f85a36410e03c047b2e7df7f45ee938fbef64ae7fadf"
-dependencies = [
- "phf_shared",
- "serde",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "phf_generator"
-version = "0.13.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "135ace3a761e564ec88c03a77317a7c6b80bb7f7135ef2544dbe054243b89737"
-dependencies = [
- "fastrand",
- "phf_shared",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "phf_shared"
-version = "0.13.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "e57fef6bc5981e38c2ce2d63bfa546861309f875b8a75f092d1d54ae2d64f266"
-dependencies = [
- "siphasher",
+ "indexmap 2.11.4",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -1704,25 +1536,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "zerocopy",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "prettyplease"
-version = "0.2.37"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "479ca8adacdd7ce8f1fb39ce9ecccbfe93a3f1344b3d0d97f20bc0196208f62b"
-dependencies = [
- "proc-macro2",
- "syn",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "proc-macro-crate"
-version = "3.5.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "e67ba7e9b2b56446f1d419b1d807906278ffa1a658a8a5d8a39dcb1f5a78614f"
-dependencies = [
- "toml_edit 0.25.11+spec-1.1.0",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "proc-macro2"
 version = "1.0.101"
@@ -1854,7 +1667,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "e876bb2c3e52a8d4e6684526a2d4e81f9d028b939ee4dc5dc775fe10deb44d59"
 dependencies = [
  "dashmap",
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
+ "indexmap 2.11.4",
  "la-arena",
  "ra_ap_cfg",
  "ra_ap_intern",
@@ -1896,7 +1709,7 @@ checksum = "ebffdc134eccabc17209d7760cfff7fd12ed18ab6e21188c5e084b97aa38504c"
 dependencies = [
  "arrayvec",
  "either",
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
+ "indexmap 2.11.4",
  "itertools 0.14.0",
  "ra_ap_base_db",
  "ra_ap_cfg",
@@ -1926,7 +1739,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "drop_bomb",
  "either",
  "fst",
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
+ "indexmap 2.11.4",
  "itertools 0.14.0",
  "la-arena",
  "ra-ap-rustc_abi",
@@ -1995,7 +1808,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "cov-mark",
  "either",
  "ena",
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
+ "indexmap 2.11.4",
  "itertools 0.14.0",
  "la-arena",
  "oorandom",
@@ -2033,7 +1846,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "crossbeam-channel",
  "either",
  "fst",
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
+ "indexmap 2.11.4",
  "itertools 0.14.0",
  "line-index",
  "memchr",
@@ -2135,7 +1948,7 @@ version = "0.0.301"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "45db9e2df587d56f0738afa89fb2c100ff7c1e9cbe49e07f6a8b62342832211b"
 dependencies = [
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
+ "indexmap 2.11.4",
  "ra_ap_intern",
  "ra_ap_paths",
  "ra_ap_span",
@@ -2294,7 +2107,7 @@ checksum = "6c174d6b9b7a7f54687df7e00c3e75ed6f082a7943a9afb1d54f33c0c12773de"
 dependencies = [
  "crossbeam-channel",
  "fst",
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
+ "indexmap 2.11.4",
  "nohash-hasher",
  "ra_ap_paths",
  "ra_ap_stdx",
@@ -2426,15 +2239,6 @@ version = "0.8.6"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "caf4aa5b0f434c91fe5c7f1ecb6a5ece2130b02ad2a590589dda5146df959001"
 
-[[package]]
-name = "relative-path"
-version = "2.0.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "bca40a312222d8ba74837cb474edef44b37f561da5f773981007a10bbaa992b0"
-dependencies = [
- "serde",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "rowan"
 version = "0.15.15"
@@ -2448,57 +2252,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "text-size",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "rquickjs"
-version = "0.10.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "a135375fbac5ba723bb6a48f432a72f81539cedde422f0121a86c7c4e96d8e0d"
-dependencies = [
- "rquickjs-core",
- "rquickjs-macro",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "rquickjs-core"
-version = "0.10.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "bccb7121a123865c8ace4dea42e7ed84d78b90cbaf4ca32c59849d8d210c9672"
-dependencies = [
- "hashbrown 0.16.1",
- "phf",
- "relative-path",
- "rquickjs-sys",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "rquickjs-macro"
-version = "0.10.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "89f93602cc3112c7f30bf5f29e722784232138692c7df4c52ebbac7e035d900d"
-dependencies = [
- "convert_case",
- "fnv",
- "ident_case",
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
- "phf_generator",
- "phf_shared",
- "proc-macro-crate",
- "proc-macro2",
- "quote",
- "rquickjs-core",
- "syn",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "rquickjs-sys"
-version = "0.10.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "57b1b6528590d4d65dc86b5159eae2d0219709546644c66408b2441696d1d725"
-dependencies = [
- "bindgen",
- "cc",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "rust-extractor-macros"
 version = "0.1.0"
@@ -2564,7 +2317,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "crossbeam-utils",
  "hashbrown 0.15.5",
  "hashlink",
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
+ "indexmap 2.11.4",
  "intrusive-collections",
  "papaya",
  "parking_lot",
@@ -2653,12 +2406,11 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "semver"
-version = "1.0.28"
+version = "1.0.26"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "8a7852d02fc848982e0c167ef163aaff9cd91dc640ba85e263cb1ce46fae51cd"
+checksum = "56e6fa9c48d24d85fb3de5ad847117517440f6beceb7798af16b4a87d616b8d0"
 dependencies = [
  "serde",
- "serde_core",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -2718,7 +2470,7 @@ version = "1.0.145"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "402a6f66d8c709116cf22f558eab210f5a50187f702eb4d7e5ef38d9a7f1c79c"
 dependencies = [
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
+ "indexmap 2.11.4",
  "itoa",
  "memchr",
  "ryu",
@@ -2754,7 +2506,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "chrono",
  "hex",
  "indexmap 1.9.3",
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
+ "indexmap 2.11.4",
  "schemars 0.9.0",
  "schemars 1.0.4",
  "serde",
@@ -2782,7 +2534,7 @@ version = "0.9.34+deprecated"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "6a8b1a1a2ebf674015cc02edccce75287f1a0130d394307b36743c2f5d504b47"
 dependencies = [
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
+ "indexmap 2.11.4",
  "itoa",
  "ryu",
  "serde",
@@ -2804,18 +2556,6 @@ version = "1.3.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "0fda2ff0d084019ba4d7c6f371c95d8fd75ce3524c3cb8fb653a3023f6323e64"
 
-[[package]]
-name = "siphasher"
-version = "1.0.3"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "8ee5873ec9cce0195efcb7a4e9507a04cd49aec9c83d0389df45b1ef7ba2e649"
-
-[[package]]
-name = "smallbitvec"
-version = "2.6.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "9b0e903ee191d8f7a8fbf0d712c3a1699d19e04ceba5ad1eb673053c7d938a09"
-
 [[package]]
 name = "smallvec"
 version = "1.15.1"
@@ -2892,18 +2632,18 @@ checksum = "144f754d318415ac792f9d69fc87abbbfc043ce2ef041c60f16ad828f638717d"
 
 [[package]]
 name = "thiserror"
-version = "2.0.18"
+version = "2.0.16"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "4288b5bcbc7920c07a1149a35cf9590a2aa808e0bc1eafaade0b80947865fbc4"
+checksum = "3467d614147380f2e4e374161426ff399c91084acd2363eaf549172b3d5e60c0"
 dependencies = [
  "thiserror-impl",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
 name = "thiserror-impl"
-version = "2.0.18"
+version = "2.0.16"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "ebc4ee7f67670e9b64d05fa4253e753e016c6c95ff35b89b7941d6b856dec1d5"
+checksum = "6c5e1be1c48b9172ee610da68fd9cd2770e7a4056cb3fc98710ee6906f0c7960"
 dependencies = [
  "proc-macro2",
  "quote",
@@ -2968,7 +2708,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "serde",
  "serde_spanned 0.6.9",
  "toml_datetime 0.6.11",
- "toml_edit 0.22.27",
+ "toml_edit",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -2977,13 +2717,13 @@ version = "0.9.7"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "00e5e5d9bf2475ac9d4f0d9edab68cc573dc2fd644b0dba36b0c30a92dd9eaa0"
 dependencies = [
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
+ "indexmap 2.11.4",
  "serde_core",
  "serde_spanned 1.0.2",
  "toml_datetime 0.7.2",
  "toml_parser",
  "toml_writer",
- "winnow 0.7.13",
+ "winnow",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -3004,48 +2744,27 @@ dependencies = [
  "serde_core",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "toml_datetime"
-version = "1.1.1+spec-1.1.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "3165f65f62e28e0115a00b2ebdd37eb6f3b641855f9d636d3cd4103767159ad7"
-dependencies = [
- "serde_core",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "toml_edit"
 version = "0.22.27"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "41fe8c660ae4257887cf66394862d21dbca4a6ddd26f04a3560410406a2f819a"
 dependencies = [
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
+ "indexmap 2.11.4",
  "serde",
  "serde_spanned 0.6.9",
  "toml_datetime 0.6.11",
  "toml_write",
- "winnow 0.7.13",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "toml_edit"
-version = "0.25.11+spec-1.1.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "0b59c4d22ed448339746c59b905d24568fcbb3ab65a500494f7b8c3e97739f2b"
-dependencies = [
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
- "toml_datetime 1.1.1+spec-1.1.0",
- "toml_parser",
- "winnow 1.0.2",
+ "winnow",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
 name = "toml_parser"
-version = "1.1.2+spec-1.1.0"
+version = "1.0.3"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "a2abe9b86193656635d2411dc43050282ca48aa31c2451210f4202550afb7526"
+checksum = "4cf893c33be71572e0e9aa6dd15e6677937abd686b066eac3f8cd3531688a627"
 dependencies = [
- "winnow 1.0.2",
+ "winnow",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -3060,12 +2779,6 @@ version = "1.0.3"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "d163a63c116ce562a22cda521fcc4d79152e7aba014456fb5eb442f6d6a10109"
 
-[[package]]
-name = "topological-sort"
-version = "0.2.2"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "ea68304e134ecd095ac6c3574494fc62b909f416c4fca77e440530221e549d3d"
-
 [[package]]
 name = "tracing"
 version = "0.1.41"
@@ -3140,9 +2853,9 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "tree-sitter"
-version = "0.26.8"
+version = "0.25.9"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "887bd495d0582c5e3e0d8ece2233666169fa56a9644d172fc22ad179ab2d0538"
+checksum = "ccd2a058a86cfece0bf96f7cce1021efef9c8ed0e892ab74639173e5ed7a34fa"
 dependencies = [
  "cc",
  "regex",
@@ -3162,30 +2875,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "tree-sitter-language",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "tree-sitter-generate"
-version = "0.26.8"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "c3fb2e1bdb1d5f9d23cd5fa68cf98b3bedbd223c92a2edd60bbcf30bcf7180a5"
-dependencies = [
- "bitflags 2.9.4",
- "dunce",
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
- "indoc",
- "log 0.4.28",
- "pathdiff",
- "regex",
- "regex-syntax",
- "rquickjs",
- "rustc-hash 2.1.1",
- "semver",
- "serde",
- "serde_json",
- "smallbitvec",
- "thiserror",
- "topological-sort",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "tree-sitter-json"
 version = "0.24.8"
@@ -3202,16 +2891,6 @@ version = "0.1.5"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "c4013970217383f67b18aef68f6fb2e8d409bc5755227092d32efb0422ba24b8"
 
-[[package]]
-name = "tree-sitter-python"
-version = "0.23.6"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "3d065aaa27f3aaceaf60c1f0e0ac09e1cb9eb8ed28e7bcdaa52129cffc7f4b04"
-dependencies = [
- "cc",
- "tree-sitter-language",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "tree-sitter-ql"
 version = "0.23.1"
@@ -3232,15 +2911,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "tree-sitter-language",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "tree-sitter-swift"
-version = "0.7.2"
-dependencies = [
- "cc",
- "tree-sitter-generate",
- "tree-sitter-language",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "triomphe"
 version = "0.1.14"
@@ -3290,12 +2960,6 @@ version = "0.1.3"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "e70f2a8b45122e719eb623c01822704c4e0907e7e426a05927e1a1cfff5b75d0"
 
-[[package]]
-name = "unicode-segmentation"
-version = "1.13.2"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "9629274872b2bfaf8d66f5f15725007f635594914870f65218920345aa11aa8c"
-
 [[package]]
 name = "unicode-xid"
 version = "0.2.6"
@@ -3685,15 +3349,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "memchr",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "winnow"
-version = "1.0.2"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "2ee1708bef14716a11bae175f579062d4554d95be2c6829f518df847b7b3fdd0"
-dependencies = [
- "memchr",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "wit-bindgen"
 version = "0.45.1"
@@ -3712,29 +3367,6 @@ version = "1.0.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "cfe53a6657fd280eaa890a3bc59152892ffa3e30101319d168b781ed6529b049"
 
-[[package]]
-name = "yeast"
-version = "0.1.0"
-dependencies = [
- "clap",
- "serde",
- "serde_json",
- "serde_yaml",
- "tree-sitter",
- "tree-sitter-python",
- "tree-sitter-ruby",
- "yeast-macros",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "yeast-macros"
-version = "0.1.0"
-dependencies = [
- "proc-macro2",
- "quote",
- "syn",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "yoke"
 version = "0.8.0"

Cargo.toml

@@ -4,11 +4,7 @@
 resolver = "2"
 members = [
     "shared/tree-sitter-extractor",
-    "shared/yeast",
-    "shared/yeast-macros",
     "ruby/extractor",
-    "unified/extractor",
-    "unified/extractor/tree-sitter-swift",
     "rust/extractor",
     "rust/extractor/macros",
     "rust/ast-generator",

MODULE.bazel

@@ -21,13 +21,13 @@ bazel_dep(name = "rules_java", version = "9.6.1")
 bazel_dep(name = "rules_pkg", version = "1.2.0")
 bazel_dep(name = "rules_nodejs", version = "6.7.3")
 bazel_dep(name = "rules_python", version = "1.9.0")
-bazel_dep(name = "rules_shell", version = "0.7.1")
+bazel_dep(name = "rules_shell", version = "0.6.1")
 bazel_dep(name = "bazel_skylib", version = "1.9.0")
 bazel_dep(name = "abseil-cpp", version = "20260107.1", repo_name = "absl")
 bazel_dep(name = "nlohmann_json", version = "3.11.3", repo_name = "json")
 bazel_dep(name = "fmt", version = "12.1.0-codeql.1")
 bazel_dep(name = "rules_kotlin", version = "2.2.2-codeql.1")
-bazel_dep(name = "gazelle", version = "0.50.0")
+bazel_dep(name = "gazelle", version = "0.47.0")
 bazel_dep(name = "rules_dotnet", version = "0.21.5-codeql.1")
 bazel_dep(name = "googletest", version = "1.17.0.bcr.2")
 bazel_dep(name = "rules_rust", version = "0.69.0")
@@ -102,7 +102,6 @@ use_repo(
     tree_sitter_extractors_deps,
     "vendor_ts__anyhow-1.0.100",
     "vendor_ts__argfile-0.2.1",
-    "vendor_ts__cc-1.2.61",
     "vendor_ts__chalk-ir-0.104.0",
     "vendor_ts__chrono-0.4.42",
     "vendor_ts__clap-4.5.48",
@@ -142,18 +141,14 @@ use_repo(
     "vendor_ts__serde-1.0.228",
     "vendor_ts__serde_json-1.0.145",
     "vendor_ts__serde_with-3.14.1",
-    "vendor_ts__serde_yaml-0.9.34-deprecated",
     "vendor_ts__syn-2.0.106",
     "vendor_ts__toml-0.9.7",
     "vendor_ts__tracing-0.1.41",
     "vendor_ts__tracing-flame-0.2.0",
     "vendor_ts__tracing-subscriber-0.3.20",
-    "vendor_ts__tree-sitter-0.26.8",
+    "vendor_ts__tree-sitter-0.25.9",
     "vendor_ts__tree-sitter-embedded-template-0.25.0",
-    "vendor_ts__tree-sitter-generate-0.26.8",
     "vendor_ts__tree-sitter-json-0.24.8",
-    "vendor_ts__tree-sitter-language-0.1.5",
-    "vendor_ts__tree-sitter-python-0.23.6",
     "vendor_ts__tree-sitter-ql-0.23.1",
     "vendor_ts__tree-sitter-ruby-0.23.1",
     "vendor_ts__triomphe-0.1.14",
@@ -247,7 +242,6 @@ use_repo(
     "kotlin-compiler-2.2.0-Beta1",
     "kotlin-compiler-2.2.20-Beta2",
     "kotlin-compiler-2.3.0",
-    "kotlin-compiler-2.3.20",
     "kotlin-compiler-embeddable-1.8.0",
     "kotlin-compiler-embeddable-1.9.0-Beta",
     "kotlin-compiler-embeddable-1.9.20-Beta",
@@ -258,7 +252,6 @@ use_repo(
     "kotlin-compiler-embeddable-2.2.0-Beta1",
     "kotlin-compiler-embeddable-2.2.20-Beta2",
     "kotlin-compiler-embeddable-2.3.0",
-    "kotlin-compiler-embeddable-2.3.20",
     "kotlin-stdlib-1.8.0",
     "kotlin-stdlib-1.9.0-Beta",
     "kotlin-stdlib-1.9.20-Beta",
@@ -269,7 +262,6 @@ use_repo(
     "kotlin-stdlib-2.2.0-Beta1",
     "kotlin-stdlib-2.2.20-Beta2",
     "kotlin-stdlib-2.3.0",
-    "kotlin-stdlib-2.3.20",
 )
 
 go_sdk = use_extension("@rules_go//go:extensions.bzl", "go_sdk")

actions/ql/examples/snippets/uses_pinned_sha.ql

@@ -8,5 +8,5 @@
 import actions
 
 from UsesStep uses
-where uses.getVersion().regexpMatch("^[A-Fa-f0-9]{40}([A-Fa-f0-9]{24})?$")
+where uses.getVersion().regexpMatch("^[A-Fa-f0-9]{40}$")
 select uses, "This 'uses' step has a pinned SHA version."

actions/ql/lib/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,37 +1,3 @@
-## 0.4.37
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* The GitHub Actions analysis now recognizes more Bash regex checks that restrict a value to alphanumeric characters, include regexes like `^[0-9a-zA-Z]{40}([0-9a-zA-Z]{24})?$` which check for a sha1 or sha256 hash. This may reduce false positive results where command output is validated with grouped or optional alphanumeric patterns before being used.
-
-## 0.4.36
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* Altered 2 patterns in the `poisonable_steps` modelling. Extra sinks are detected in the following cases: scripts executed via python modules and `go run` in directories are detected as potential mechanisms of injection. For the go execution pattern, the pattern is updated to now ignore flags that occur between go and the specific command. This change may lead to more results being detected by the following queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/critical`, `actions/cache-poisoning/poisonable-step`, `actions/cache-poisoning/direct-cache` and `actions/artifact-poisoning/path-traversal`.
-
-## 0.4.35
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 0.4.34
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* Removed false positive injection sink models for the `context` input of `docker/build-push-action` and the `allowed-endpoints` input of `step-security/harden-runner`.
-
-## 0.4.33
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 0.4.32
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 0.4.31
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
 ## 0.4.30
 
 No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/lib/change-notes/released/0.4.31.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-## 0.4.31
-
-No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/lib/change-notes/released/0.4.32.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-## 0.4.32
-
-No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/lib/change-notes/released/0.4.33.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-## 0.4.33
-
-No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/lib/change-notes/released/0.4.34.md

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-## 0.4.34
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* Removed false positive injection sink models for the `context` input of `docker/build-push-action` and the `allowed-endpoints` input of `step-security/harden-runner`.

actions/ql/lib/change-notes/released/0.4.35.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-## 0.4.35
-
-No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/lib/change-notes/released/0.4.36.md

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-## 0.4.36
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* Altered 2 patterns in the `poisonable_steps` modelling. Extra sinks are detected in the following cases: scripts executed via python modules and `go run` in directories are detected as potential mechanisms of injection. For the go execution pattern, the pattern is updated to now ignore flags that occur between go and the specific command. This change may lead to more results being detected by the following queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/critical`, `actions/cache-poisoning/poisonable-step`, `actions/cache-poisoning/direct-cache` and `actions/artifact-poisoning/path-traversal`.

actions/ql/lib/change-notes/released/0.4.37.md

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-## 0.4.37
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* The GitHub Actions analysis now recognizes more Bash regex checks that restrict a value to alphanumeric characters, include regexes like `^[0-9a-zA-Z]{40}([0-9a-zA-Z]{24})?$` which check for a sha1 or sha256 hash. This may reduce false positive results where command output is validated with grouped or optional alphanumeric patterns before being used.

actions/ql/lib/codeql-pack.release.yml

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 ---
-lastReleaseVersion: 0.4.37
+lastReleaseVersion: 0.4.30

actions/ql/lib/codeql/actions/Bash.qll

@@ -785,22 +785,7 @@ module Bash {
 
   /**
    * Holds if the given regex is used to match an alphanumeric string
-   * eg: `^[0-9a-zA-Z]{40}([0-9a-zA-Z]{24})?$`, `^[0-9]+$` or `^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$`
+   * eg: `^[0-9a-zA-Z]{40}$`, `^[0-9]+$` or `^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$`
    */
-  string alphaNumericRegex() {
-    exists(string r1, string r2, string r3, string r4 |
-      // An alphanumeric character class
-      r1 = "\\[([09azAZ_-]+)\\]" and
-      // The same as above, followed by a quantifier like `+` or `{20}`
-      r2 = r1 + "(\\+|\\{\\d+\\})" and
-      // The same as above, possibly with parentheses around it
-      r3 = "\\(?" + r2 + "\\)?" and
-      // The same as above, possibly with a `?` after it
-      r4 = r3 + "\\??"
-    |
-      // The same as above, repeated one or more times, and with `^` at the
-      // beginning and `$` at the end
-      result = "^\\^(" + r4 + ")+\\$$"
-    )
-  }
+  string alphaNumericRegex() { result = "^\\^\\[([09azAZ_-]+)\\](\\+|\\{\\d+\\})\\$$" }
 }

actions/ql/lib/ext/config/poisonable_steps.yml

@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ extensions:
       - ["(source|sh|bash|zsh|fish)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\b", 2]
       - ["(node)\\s+([^\\s]+)(\\.js|\\.ts)\\b", 2]
       - ["(python[\\d\\.]*)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.py\\b", 2]
-      - ["(python[\\d\\.]*)\\s+-m\\s+([A-Za-z_][\\w\\.]*)\\b", 2] # eg: pythonX -m anything(dir or file)
       - ["(ruby)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.rb\\b", 2]
-      - ["(go)\\s+(generate|run)(?:\\s+-[^\\s]+)*\\s+([^\\s]+)", 3]
+      - ["(go)\\s+(generate|run)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.go\\b", 3]
       - ["(dotnet)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.csproj\\b", 2]
+

actions/ql/lib/ext/manual/docker_build-push-action.model.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+extensions:
+  - addsTo:
+      pack: codeql/actions-all
+      extensible: actionsSinkModel
+    data:
+      - ["docker/build-push-action", "*", "input.context", "code-injection", "manual"]

actions/ql/lib/ext/manual/step-security_harden-runner.model.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+extensions:
+  - addsTo:
+      pack: codeql/actions-all
+      extensible: actionsSinkModel
+    data:
+      - ["step-security/harden-runner", "*", "input.allowed-endpoints", "command-injection", "manual"]

actions/ql/lib/qlpack.yml

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 name: codeql/actions-all
-version: 0.4.38-dev
+version: 0.4.31-dev
 library: true
 warnOnImplicitThis: true
 dependencies:

actions/ql/src/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,62 +1,3 @@
-## 0.6.29
-
-### Query Metadata Changes
-
-* Reversed adjustment of the name of `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, but kept the portion of the previous change for the word "trusted" to "privileged". Added a missing "a" to phrasing in `actions/untrusted-checkout/high` and `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`.
-
-### Major Analysis Improvements
-
-* Adjusted `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical` to align more with other untrusted resource queries, where the alert location is the location where the artifact is obtained from (the checkout point). This aligns with the other 2 related queries. This will cause the same alerts to re-open for closed alerts of this query.
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* Altered the alert message for clarity for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`.
-* The `actions/unpinned-tag` query now recognizes 64-character SHA-256 commit hashes as properly pinned references, in addition to 40-character SHA-1 hashes.
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* Adjusted (minor) help file descriptions for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`. Clarified wording on in minor point, added one more listed resource and added one more recommendation for things to check.
-
-## 0.6.28
-
-### Query Metadata Changes
-
-* Adjusted the name of `actions/untrusted-checkout/high` to more clearly describe which parts of the scenario are in a privileged context.
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* The `actions/unpinned-tag` query now analyzes composite action metadata (`action.yml`/`action.yaml` files) in addition to workflow files, providing more comprehensive detection of unpinned action references across the entire Actions ecosystem.
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* Fixed help file descriptions for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`. Previously the messages were unclear as to why and how the vulnerabilities could occur. 
-
-## 0.6.27
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 0.6.26
-
-### Major Analysis Improvements
-
-* Fixed alert messages in `actions/artifact-poisoning/critical` and `actions/artifact-poisoning/medium` as they previously included a redundant placeholder in the alert message that would on occasion contain a long block of yml that makes the alert difficult to understand. Also improved the wording to make it clearer that it is not the artifact that is being poisoned, but instead a potentially untrusted artifact that is consumed. Finally, changed the alert location to be the source, to align more with other queries reporting an artifact (e.g. zipslip) which is more useful.
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* The query `actions/missing-workflow-permissions` no longer produces false positive results on reusable workflows where all callers set permissions.
-
-## 0.6.25
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 0.6.24
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 0.6.23
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
 ## 0.6.22
 
 No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-275/MissingActionsPermissions.ql

@@ -26,23 +26,10 @@ string permissionsForJob(Job job) {
     "{" + concat(string permission | permission = jobNeedsPermission(job) | permission, ", ") + "}"
 }
 
-predicate jobHasPermissions(Job job) {
-  exists(job.getPermissions())
-  or
-  exists(job.getEnclosingWorkflow().getPermissions())
-  or
-  // The workflow is reusable and cannot be triggered in any other way; check callers
-  exists(ReusableWorkflow r | r = job.getEnclosingWorkflow() |
-    not exists(Event e | e = r.getOn().getAnEvent() | e.getName() != "workflow_call") and
-    forall(Job caller | caller = job.getEnclosingWorkflow().(ReusableWorkflow).getACaller() |
-      jobHasPermissions(caller)
-    )
-  )
-}
-
 from Job job, string permissions
 where
-  not jobHasPermissions(job) and
+  not exists(job.getPermissions()) and
+  not exists(job.getEnclosingWorkflow().getPermissions()) and
   // exists a trigger event that is not a workflow_call
   exists(Event e |
     e = job.getATriggerEvent() and

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/ArtifactPoisoningCritical.ql

@@ -20,6 +20,6 @@ from ArtifactPoisoningFlow::PathNode source, ArtifactPoisoningFlow::PathNode sin
 where
   ArtifactPoisoningFlow::flowPath(source, sink) and
   event = getRelevantEventInPrivilegedContext(sink.getNode())
-select source.getNode(), source, sink,
-  "Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@).",
-  event, event.getName()
+select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
+  "Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@).", sink,
+  sink.getNode().toString(), event, event.getName()

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/ArtifactPoisoningMedium.ql

@@ -20,5 +20,6 @@ from ArtifactPoisoningFlow::PathNode source, ArtifactPoisoningFlow::PathNode sin
 where
   ArtifactPoisoningFlow::flowPath(source, sink) and
   inNonPrivilegedContext(sink.getNode().asExpr())
-select source.getNode(), source, sink,
-  "Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user."
+select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
+  "Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user.", sink,
+  sink.getNode().toString()

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UnpinnedActionsTag.ql

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /**
- * @name Unpinned tag for a non-immutable Action in workflow or composite action
+ * @name Unpinned tag for a non-immutable Action in workflow
  * @description Using a tag for a non-immutable Action that is not pinned to a commit can lead to executing an untrusted Action through a supply chain attack.
  * @kind problem
  * @security-severity 5.0
@@ -15,9 +15,7 @@ import actions
 import codeql.actions.security.UseOfUnversionedImmutableAction
 
 bindingset[version]
-private predicate isPinnedCommit(string version) {
-  version.regexpMatch("^[A-Fa-f0-9]{40}([A-Fa-f0-9]{24})?$")
-}
+private predicate isPinnedCommit(string version) { version.regexpMatch("^[A-Fa-f0-9]{40}$") }
 
 bindingset[nwo]
 private predicate isTrustedOwner(string nwo) {
@@ -33,26 +31,15 @@ private predicate isPinnedContainer(string version) {
 bindingset[nwo]
 private predicate isContainerImage(string nwo) { nwo.regexpMatch("^docker://.+") }
 
-private predicate getStepContainerName(UsesStep uses, string name) {
-  exists(Workflow workflow |
-    uses.getEnclosingWorkflow() = workflow and
-    (
-      workflow.getName() = name
-      or
-      not exists(workflow.getName()) and workflow.getLocation().getFile().getBaseName() = name
-    )
-  )
-  or
-  exists(CompositeAction action |
-    uses.getEnclosingCompositeAction() = action and
-    name = action.getLocation().getFile().getBaseName()
-  )
-}
-
-from UsesStep uses, string nwo, string version, string name
+from UsesStep uses, string nwo, string version, Workflow workflow, string name
 where
   uses.getCallee() = nwo and
-  getStepContainerName(uses, name) and
+  uses.getEnclosingWorkflow() = workflow and
+  (
+    workflow.getName() = name
+    or
+    not exists(workflow.getName()) and workflow.getLocation().getFile().getBaseName() = name
+  ) and
   uses.getVersion() = version and
   not isTrustedOwner(nwo) and
   not (if isContainerImage(nwo) then isPinnedContainer(version) else isPinnedCommit(version)) and

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.md

@@ -1,35 +1,6 @@
 ## Overview
 
-GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. Under certain conditions described below, attackers can take over a repository by opening malicious PRs from forks. The attacks can result in malicious code execution causing unauthorized changes to the repository or exfiltration of repository secrets and a compromise of connected systems.
-
-## Workflow Security Model
-
-In GitHub Actions, there is a distinction between unprivileged and privileged workflows. For example, a workflow with a `pull_request` trigger is unprivileged while a workflow with `pull_request_target` is privileged.
-
-This is relevant especially for PRs from forks. Normal PRs can only be submitted by people who have write access to a repository, while PRs from forks can be submitted by anyone.
-
-On a PR from a fork, an unprivileged `pull_request` workflow has only limited capabilities but a privileged `pull_request_target` workflow is much more dangerous. A privileged workflow:
-
-  * Runs in the context of the base repository
-  * Has access to organization and repository secrets (e.g., API keys, deployment tokens)
-  * Has a read/write `GITHUB_TOKEN` by default
-  * Can access private resources
-
-Certain triggers automatically grant a workflow elevated privileges:
-
-  * `pull_request_target` as described above
-  * `workflow_run`: Triggered when another workflow completes.
-  * `issue_comment`: Triggered when a comment is made on an issue or PR.
-
-## Attack Details
-
-  * A repository has a privileged workflow
-  * An attacker forks the repository and adds malicious code (e.g., in the build script)
-  * The attacker opens a PR from the fork, and, if needed, comments on the PR
-  * The workflow in the base repository checks out the forked code
-  * The workflow runs the malicious code
-
-Please note that not only build scripts can be malicious code vectors. There is a large number of other possibilities. Some of them are listed in the [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/) catalog.
+GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. A potentially dangerous misuse of the triggers such as `pull_request_target` or `issue_comment` followed by an explicit checkout of untrusted code (Pull Request HEAD) may lead to repository compromise if untrusted code gets executed (e.g., due to a modified build script) in a privileged job.
 
 ## Recommendation
 
@@ -41,8 +12,6 @@ The best practice is to handle the potentially untrusted pull request via the **
 
 The artifacts downloaded from the first workflow should be considered untrusted and must be verified.
 
-Additionally, ensure that least privilege are used both at the workflow level (through event triggers and workflow permissions) and job level (through job permissions).
-
 ## Example
 
 ### Incorrect Usage
@@ -164,6 +133,3 @@ jobs:
 ## References
 
 - GitHub Security Lab Research: [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/).
-- Mitigating risks of untrusted checkout: [GitHub Docs](https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/actions/reference/security/secure-use#mitigating-the-risks-of-untrusted-code-checkout).
-- Securing with least privilege: [Workflow secure use](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/secure-use).
-- Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/).

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.ql

@@ -51,6 +51,5 @@ where
   event.getName() = checkoutTriggers() and
   not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(checkout, event, "untrusted-checkout")) and
   not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(poisonable, event, "untrusted-checkout"))
-select checkout, checkout, poisonable,
-  "Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@).",
-  event, event.getName()
+select poisonable, checkout, poisonable,
+  "Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@)", event, event.getName()

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.md

@@ -1,35 +1,6 @@
 ## Overview
 
-GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. Under certain conditions described below, attackers can take over a repository by opening malicious PRs from forks. The attacks can result in malicious code execution causing unauthorized changes to the repository or exfiltration of repository secrets and a compromise of connected systems.
-
-## Workflow Security Model
-
-In GitHub Actions, there is a distinction between unprivileged and privileged workflows. For example, a workflow with a `pull_request` trigger is unprivileged while a workflow with `pull_request_target` is privileged.
-
-This is relevant especially for PRs from forks. Normal PRs can only be submitted by people who have write access to a repository, while PRs from forks can be submitted by anyone.
-
-On a PR from a fork, an unprivileged `pull_request` workflow has only limited capabilities but a privileged `pull_request_target` workflow is much more dangerous. A privileged workflow:
-
-  * Runs in the context of the base repository
-  * Has access to organization and repository secrets (e.g., API keys, deployment tokens)
-  * Has a read/write `GITHUB_TOKEN` by default
-  * Can access private resources
-
-Certain triggers automatically grant a workflow elevated privileges:
-
-  * `pull_request_target` as described above
-  * `workflow_run`: Triggered when another workflow completes.
-  * `issue_comment`: Triggered when a comment is made on an issue or PR.
-
-## Attack Details
-
-  * A repository has a privileged workflow
-  * An attacker forks the repository and adds malicious code (e.g., in the build script)
-  * The attacker opens a PR from the fork, and, if needed, comments on the PR
-  * The workflow in the base repository checks out the forked code
-  * The workflow runs the malicious code
-
-Please note that not only build scripts can be malicious code vectors. There is a large number of other possibilities. Some of them are listed in the [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/) catalog.
+GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. A potentially dangerous misuse of the triggers such as `pull_request_target` or `issue_comment` followed by an explicit checkout of untrusted code (Pull Request HEAD) may lead to repository compromise if untrusted code gets executed (e.g., due to a modified build script) in a privileged job.
 
 ## Recommendation
 
@@ -41,8 +12,6 @@ The best practice is to handle the potentially untrusted pull request via the **
 
 The artifacts downloaded from the first workflow should be considered untrusted and must be verified.
 
-Additionally, ensure that least privilege are used both at the workflow level (through event triggers and workflow permissions) and job level (through job permissions).
-
 ## Example
 
 ### Incorrect Usage
@@ -164,6 +133,3 @@ jobs:
 ## References
 
 - GitHub Security Lab Research: [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/).
-- Mitigating risks of untrusted checkout: [GitHub Docs](https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/actions/reference/security/secure-use#mitigating-the-risks-of-untrusted-code-checkout).
-- Securing with least privilege: [Workflow secure use](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/secure-use).
-- Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/).

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.ql

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /**
- * @name Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged context
+ * @name Checkout of untrusted code in trusted context
  * @description Privileged workflows have read/write access to the base repository and access to secrets.
  *              By explicitly checking out and running the build script from a fork the untrusted code is running in an environment
  *              that is able to push to the base repository and to access secrets.
@@ -42,6 +42,5 @@ where
     not event.getName() = "issue_comment" and
     not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(checkout, event, "untrusted-checkout"))
   )
-select checkout,
-  "Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@).",
-  event, event.getName()
+select checkout, "Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@)", event,
+  event.getName()

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutMedium.md

@@ -1,35 +1,6 @@
 ## Overview
 
-GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. Under certain conditions described below, attackers can take over a repository by opening malicious PRs from forks. The attacks can result in malicious code execution causing unauthorized changes to the repository or exfiltration of repository secrets and a compromise of connected systems.
-
-## Workflow Security Model
-
-In GitHub Actions, there is a distinction between unprivileged and privileged workflows. For example, a workflow with a `pull_request` trigger is unprivileged while a workflow with `pull_request_target` is privileged.
-
-This is relevant especially for PRs from forks. Normal PRs can only be submitted by people who have write access to a repository, while PRs from forks can be submitted by anyone.
-
-On a PR from a fork, an unprivileged `pull_request` workflow has only limited capabilities but a privileged `pull_request_target` workflow is much more dangerous. A privileged workflow:
-
-  * Runs in the context of the base repository
-  * Has access to organization and repository secrets (e.g., API keys, deployment tokens)
-  * Has a read/write `GITHUB_TOKEN` by default
-  * Can access private resources
-
-Certain triggers automatically grant a workflow elevated privileges:
-
-  * `pull_request_target` as described above
-  * `workflow_run`: Triggered when another workflow completes.
-  * `issue_comment`: Triggered when a comment is made on an issue or PR.
-
-## Attack Details
-
-  * A repository has a privileged workflow
-  * An attacker forks the repository and adds malicious code (e.g., in the build script)
-  * The attacker opens a PR from the fork, and, if needed, comments on the PR
-  * The workflow in the base repository checks out the forked code
-  * The workflow runs the malicious code
-
-Please note that not only build scripts can be malicious code vectors. There is a large number of other possibilities. Some of them are listed in the [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/) catalog.
+GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. A potentially dangerous misuse of the triggers such as `pull_request_target` or `issue_comment` followed by an explicit checkout of untrusted code (Pull Request HEAD) may lead to repository compromise if untrusted code gets executed (e.g., due to a modified build script) in a privileged job.
 
 ## Recommendation
 
@@ -41,8 +12,6 @@ The best practice is to handle the potentially untrusted pull request via the **
 
 The artifacts downloaded from the first workflow should be considered untrusted and must be verified.
 
-Additionally, ensure that least privilege are used both at the workflow level (through event triggers and workflow permissions) and job level (through job permissions).
-
 ## Example
 
 ### Incorrect Usage
@@ -164,6 +133,3 @@ jobs:
 ## References
 
 - GitHub Security Lab Research: [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/).
-- Mitigating risks of untrusted checkout: [GitHub Docs](https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/actions/reference/security/secure-use#mitigating-the-risks-of-untrusted-code-checkout).
-- Securing with least privilege: [Workflow secure use](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/secure-use).
-- Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/).

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutMedium.ql

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /**
- * @name Checkout of untrusted code in a trusted context
+ * @name Checkout of untrusted code in trusted context
  * @description Privileged workflows have read/write access to the base repository and access to secrets.
  *              By explicitly checking out and running the build script from a fork the untrusted code is running in an environment
  *              that is able to push to the base repository and to access secrets.

actions/ql/src/change-notes/released/0.6.23.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-## 0.6.23
-
-No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/src/change-notes/released/0.6.24.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-## 0.6.24
-
-No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/src/change-notes/released/0.6.25.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-## 0.6.25
-
-No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/src/change-notes/released/0.6.26.md

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-## 0.6.26
-
-### Major Analysis Improvements
-
-* Fixed alert messages in `actions/artifact-poisoning/critical` and `actions/artifact-poisoning/medium` as they previously included a redundant placeholder in the alert message that would on occasion contain a long block of yml that makes the alert difficult to understand. Also improved the wording to make it clearer that it is not the artifact that is being poisoned, but instead a potentially untrusted artifact that is consumed. Finally, changed the alert location to be the source, to align more with other queries reporting an artifact (e.g. zipslip) which is more useful.
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* The query `actions/missing-workflow-permissions` no longer produces false positive results on reusable workflows where all callers set permissions.

actions/ql/src/change-notes/released/0.6.27.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-## 0.6.27
-
-No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/src/change-notes/released/0.6.28.md

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-## 0.6.28
-
-### Query Metadata Changes
-
-* Adjusted the name of `actions/untrusted-checkout/high` to more clearly describe which parts of the scenario are in a privileged context.
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* The `actions/unpinned-tag` query now analyzes composite action metadata (`action.yml`/`action.yaml` files) in addition to workflow files, providing more comprehensive detection of unpinned action references across the entire Actions ecosystem.
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* Fixed help file descriptions for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`. Previously the messages were unclear as to why and how the vulnerabilities could occur. 

actions/ql/src/change-notes/released/0.6.29.md

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-## 0.6.29
-
-### Query Metadata Changes
-
-* Reversed adjustment of the name of `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, but kept the portion of the previous change for the word "trusted" to "privileged". Added a missing "a" to phrasing in `actions/untrusted-checkout/high` and `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`.
-
-### Major Analysis Improvements
-
-* Adjusted `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical` to align more with other untrusted resource queries, where the alert location is the location where the artifact is obtained from (the checkout point). This aligns with the other 2 related queries. This will cause the same alerts to re-open for closed alerts of this query.
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* Altered the alert message for clarity for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`.
-* The `actions/unpinned-tag` query now recognizes 64-character SHA-256 commit hashes as properly pinned references, in addition to 40-character SHA-1 hashes.
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* Adjusted (minor) help file descriptions for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`. Clarified wording on in minor point, added one more listed resource and added one more recommendation for things to check.

actions/ql/src/codeql-pack.release.yml

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 ---
-lastReleaseVersion: 0.6.29
+lastReleaseVersion: 0.6.22

actions/ql/src/qlpack.yml

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 name: codeql/actions-queries
-version: 0.6.30-dev
+version: 0.6.23-dev
 library: false
 warnOnImplicitThis: true
 groups: [actions, queries]

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-275/.github/workflows/perms11.yml

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-on:
-  workflow_call:
-
-jobs:
-  build:
-    name: Build and test
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    steps:
-    - uses: actions/deploy-pages

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-275/.github/workflows/perms12.yml

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-on:
-  workflow_dispatch:
-
-permissions:
-  contents: read
-  id-token: write
-  pages: write
-
-jobs:
-  call-workflow:
-    uses: ./.github/workflows/perms11.yml

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/.github/actions/unpinned-tag/action.yml

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-name: Composite unpinned tag test
-runs:
-  using: "composite"
-  steps:
-    - uses: foo/bar@v2
-    - uses: foo/bar@25b062c917b0c75f8b47d8469aff6c94ffd89abb

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/.github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml

@@ -11,9 +11,3 @@ jobs:
     - uses: foo/bar@25b062c917b0c75f8b47d8469aff6c94ffd89abb
     - uses: docker://foo/bar@latest
     - uses: docker://foo/bar@sha256:887a259a5a534f3c4f36cb02dca341673c6089431057242cdc931e9f133147e9
-    # SHA-256 pinned (64 hex chars) - should NOT be flagged
-    - uses: foo/bar@25b062c917b0c75f8b47d8469aff6c94ffd89abb25b062c917b0c75f8b47d84d
-    # SHA-1 pinned (40 hex chars) regression - should NOT be flagged
-    - uses: foo/bar@a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2
-    # Invalid 50-char hex string - should be flagged
-    - uses: foo/bar@a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2a1b2c3d4e5

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/ArtifactPoisoningCritical.expected

@@ -55,21 +55,21 @@ nodes
 | .github/workflows/test25.yml:39:14:40:45 | ./gradlew buildScanPublishPrevious\n | semmle.label | ./gradlew buildScanPublishPrevious\n |
 subpaths
 #select
-| .github/actions/download-artifact-2/action.yaml:6:7:25:4 | Uses Step | .github/actions/download-artifact-2/action.yaml:6:7:25:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:28:9:29:6 | Uses Step | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:3:3:3:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/actions/download-artifact-2/action.yaml:6:7:25:4 | Uses Step | .github/actions/download-artifact-2/action.yaml:6:7:25:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:29:14:29:26 | make snapshot | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:3:3:3:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning11.yml:13:9:32:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning11.yml:13:9:32:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning11.yml:38:11:38:77 | ./sonarcloud-data/x.py build -j$(nproc) --compiler gcc --skip-build | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning11.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning12.yml:13:9:32:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning12.yml:13:9:32:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning12.yml:38:11:38:25 | python foo/x.py | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning12.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:13:9:18:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:13:9:18:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:19:14:20:21 | sh foo/cmd\n | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning22.yml:13:9:17:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning22.yml:13:9:17:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning22.yml:18:14:18:19 | sh cmd | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning22.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning31.yml:13:9:15:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning31.yml:13:9:15:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning31.yml:19:14:19:22 | ./foo/cmd | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning31.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning32.yml:13:9:16:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning32.yml:13:9:16:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning32.yml:17:14:18:20 | ./bar/cmd\n | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning32.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning33.yml:13:9:16:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning33.yml:13:9:16:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning33.yml:17:14:18:20 | ./bar/cmd\n | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning33.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning34.yml:13:9:16:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning34.yml:13:9:16:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning34.yml:20:14:22:23 | npm install\nnpm run lint\n | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning34.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning41.yml:13:9:21:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning41.yml:13:9:21:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning41.yml:22:14:22:22 | ./foo/cmd | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning41.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning42.yml:13:9:21:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning42.yml:13:9:21:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning42.yml:22:14:22:18 | ./cmd | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning42.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning71.yml:9:9:16:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning71.yml:9:9:16:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning71.yml:17:14:18:40 | sed -f config foo.md > bar.md\n | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning71.yml:4:5:4:16 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning81.yml:28:9:31:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning81.yml:28:9:31:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning81.yml:31:14:31:27 | python test.py | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning81.yml:3:5:3:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning96.yml:13:9:18:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning96.yml:13:9:18:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning96.yml:18:14:18:24 | npm install | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning96.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning101.yml:10:9:16:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning101.yml:10:9:16:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning101.yml:17:14:19:59 | PR_NUMBER=$(./get_pull_request_number.sh pr_number.txt)\necho "PR_NUMBER=$PR_NUMBER" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT \n | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning101.yml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/test18.yml:12:15:33:12 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test18.yml:12:15:33:12 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test18.yml:36:15:40:58 | Uses Step | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/test18.yml:3:5:3:16 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/test25.yml:22:9:32:6 | Uses Step: downloadBuildScan | .github/workflows/test25.yml:22:9:32:6 | Uses Step: downloadBuildScan | .github/workflows/test25.yml:39:14:40:45 | ./gradlew buildScanPublishPrevious\n | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/test25.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning11.yml:38:11:38:77 | ./sonarcloud-data/x.py build -j$(nproc) --compiler gcc --skip-build | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning11.yml:13:9:32:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning11.yml:38:11:38:77 | ./sonarcloud-data/x.py build -j$(nproc) --compiler gcc --skip-build | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning11.yml:38:11:38:77 | ./sonarcloud-data/x.py build -j$(nproc) --compiler gcc --skip-build | ./sonarcloud-data/x.py build -j$(nproc) --compiler gcc --skip-build | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning11.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning12.yml:38:11:38:25 | python foo/x.py | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning12.yml:13:9:32:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning12.yml:38:11:38:25 | python foo/x.py | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning12.yml:38:11:38:25 | python foo/x.py | python foo/x.py | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning12.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:19:14:20:21 | sh foo/cmd\n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:13:9:18:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:19:14:20:21 | sh foo/cmd\n | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:19:14:20:21 | sh foo/cmd\n | sh foo/cmd\n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning22.yml:18:14:18:19 | sh cmd | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning22.yml:13:9:17:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning22.yml:18:14:18:19 | sh cmd | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning22.yml:18:14:18:19 | sh cmd | sh cmd | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning22.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning31.yml:19:14:19:22 | ./foo/cmd | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning31.yml:13:9:15:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning31.yml:19:14:19:22 | ./foo/cmd | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning31.yml:19:14:19:22 | ./foo/cmd | ./foo/cmd | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning31.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning32.yml:17:14:18:20 | ./bar/cmd\n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning32.yml:13:9:16:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning32.yml:17:14:18:20 | ./bar/cmd\n | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning32.yml:17:14:18:20 | ./bar/cmd\n | ./bar/cmd\n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning32.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning33.yml:17:14:18:20 | ./bar/cmd\n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning33.yml:13:9:16:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning33.yml:17:14:18:20 | ./bar/cmd\n | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning33.yml:17:14:18:20 | ./bar/cmd\n | ./bar/cmd\n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning33.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning34.yml:20:14:22:23 | npm install\nnpm run lint\n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning34.yml:13:9:16:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning34.yml:20:14:22:23 | npm install\nnpm run lint\n | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning34.yml:20:14:22:23 | npm install\nnpm run lint\n | npm install\nnpm run lint\n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning34.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning41.yml:22:14:22:22 | ./foo/cmd | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning41.yml:13:9:21:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning41.yml:22:14:22:22 | ./foo/cmd | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning41.yml:22:14:22:22 | ./foo/cmd | ./foo/cmd | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning41.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning42.yml:22:14:22:18 | ./cmd | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning42.yml:13:9:21:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning42.yml:22:14:22:18 | ./cmd | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning42.yml:22:14:22:18 | ./cmd | ./cmd | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning42.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning71.yml:17:14:18:40 | sed -f config foo.md > bar.md\n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning71.yml:9:9:16:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning71.yml:17:14:18:40 | sed -f config foo.md > bar.md\n | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning71.yml:17:14:18:40 | sed -f config foo.md > bar.md\n | sed -f config foo.md > bar.md\n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning71.yml:4:5:4:16 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning81.yml:31:14:31:27 | python test.py | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning81.yml:28:9:31:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning81.yml:31:14:31:27 | python test.py | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning81.yml:31:14:31:27 | python test.py | python test.py | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning81.yml:3:5:3:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:28:9:29:6 | Uses Step | .github/actions/download-artifact-2/action.yaml:6:7:25:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:28:9:29:6 | Uses Step | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:28:9:29:6 | Uses Step | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:3:3:3:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:29:14:29:26 | make snapshot | .github/actions/download-artifact-2/action.yaml:6:7:25:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:29:14:29:26 | make snapshot | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:29:14:29:26 | make snapshot | make snapshot | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:3:3:3:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning96.yml:18:14:18:24 | npm install | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning96.yml:13:9:18:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning96.yml:18:14:18:24 | npm install | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning96.yml:18:14:18:24 | npm install | npm install | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning96.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning101.yml:17:14:19:59 | PR_NUMBER=$(./get_pull_request_number.sh pr_number.txt)\necho "PR_NUMBER=$PR_NUMBER" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT \n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning101.yml:10:9:16:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning101.yml:17:14:19:59 | PR_NUMBER=$(./get_pull_request_number.sh pr_number.txt)\necho "PR_NUMBER=$PR_NUMBER" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT \n | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning101.yml:17:14:19:59 | PR_NUMBER=$(./get_pull_request_number.sh pr_number.txt)\necho "PR_NUMBER=$PR_NUMBER" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT \n | PR_NUMBER=$(./get_pull_request_number.sh pr_number.txt)\necho "PR_NUMBER=$PR_NUMBER" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT \n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning101.yml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/test18.yml:36:15:40:58 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test18.yml:12:15:33:12 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test18.yml:36:15:40:58 | Uses Step | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/test18.yml:36:15:40:58 | Uses Step | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test18.yml:3:5:3:16 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/test25.yml:39:14:40:45 | ./gradlew buildScanPublishPrevious\n | .github/workflows/test25.yml:22:9:32:6 | Uses Step: downloadBuildScan | .github/workflows/test25.yml:39:14:40:45 | ./gradlew buildScanPublishPrevious\n | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/test25.yml:39:14:40:45 | ./gradlew buildScanPublishPrevious\n | ./gradlew buildScanPublishPrevious\n | .github/workflows/test25.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/UnpinnedActionsTag.expected

@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-| .github/actions/unpinned-tag/action.yml:5:13:5:22 | foo/bar@v2 | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'action.yml' step $@ uses 'foo/bar' with ref 'v2', not a pinned commit hash | .github/actions/unpinned-tag/action.yml:5:7:6:4 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:19:13:19:36 | completely/fakeaction@v2 | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'actor_trusted_checkout.yml' step $@ uses 'completely/fakeaction' with ref 'v2', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:19:7:23:4 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:23:13:23:37 | fakerepo/comment-on-pr@v1 | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'actor_trusted_checkout.yml' step $@ uses 'fakerepo/comment-on-pr' with ref 'v1', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:23:7:26:21 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:13:15:13:49 | dawidd6/action-download-artifact@v2 | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'Pull Request Open' step $@ uses 'dawidd6/action-download-artifact' with ref 'v2', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:13:9:18:6 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
@@ -34,4 +33,3 @@
 | .github/workflows/test18.yml:37:21:37:63 | sonarsource/sonarcloud-github-action@master | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'Sonar' step $@ uses 'sonarsource/sonarcloud-github-action' with ref 'master', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/test18.yml:36:15:40:58 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:10:13:10:22 | foo/bar@v1 | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'unpinned_tags.yml' step $@ uses 'foo/bar' with ref 'v1', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:10:7:11:4 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:12:13:12:35 | docker://foo/bar@latest | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'unpinned_tags.yml' step $@ uses 'docker://foo/bar' with ref 'latest', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:12:7:13:4 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
-| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:19:13:19:70 | foo/bar@a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2a1b2c3d4e5 | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'unpinned_tags.yml' step $@ uses 'foo/bar' with ref 'a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2a1b2c3d4e5', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:19:7:19:71 | Uses Step | Uses Step |

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.expected

@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ edges
 | .github/actions/download-artifact/action.yaml:25:7:29:4 | Run Step | .github/actions/download-artifact/action.yaml:29:7:32:18 | Run Step |
 | .github/actions/download-artifact/action.yaml:29:7:32:18 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning91.yml:19:9:25:6 | Run Step: metadata |
 | .github/actions/download-artifact/action.yaml:29:7:32:18 | Run Step | .github/workflows/resolve-args.yml:22:9:36:13 | Run Step: resolve-step |
-| .github/actions/unpinned-tag/action.yml:5:7:6:4 | Uses Step | .github/actions/unpinned-tag/action.yml:6:7:6:61 | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:9:7:14:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:14:7:15:4 | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:14:7:15:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:15:7:19:4 | Run Step |
 | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:15:7:19:4 | Run Step | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:19:7:23:4 | Uses Step |
@@ -312,10 +311,7 @@ edges
 | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:9:7:10:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:10:7:11:4 | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:10:7:11:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:11:7:12:4 | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:11:7:12:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:12:7:13:4 | Uses Step |
-| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:12:7:13:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:13:7:15:4 | Uses Step |
-| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:13:7:15:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:15:7:17:4 | Uses Step |
-| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:15:7:17:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:17:7:19:4 | Uses Step |
-| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:17:7:19:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:19:7:19:71 | Uses Step |
+| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:12:7:13:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:13:7:13:101 | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:7:9:14:6 | Run Step: pr_number | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:14:9:19:72 | Run Step |
 | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:11:9:12:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:12:9:13:6 | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:12:9:13:6 | Uses Step | .github/actions/dangerous-git-checkout/action.yml:6:7:11:4 | Uses Step |
@@ -338,42 +334,42 @@ edges
 | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_3.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_3.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step |
 #select
-| .github/actions/dangerous-git-checkout/action.yml:6:7:11:4 | Uses Step | .github/actions/dangerous-git-checkout/action.yml:6:7:11:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:13:9:13:23 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:32:9:37:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:48:9:52:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:79:9:84:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:84:9:93:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:15:9:20:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:15:9:20:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:25:9:48:6 | Run Step: set-milestone | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:3:5:3:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/reusable_caller1.yaml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:10:11:18:8 | Run Step | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:10:11:18:8 | Run Step | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:21:11:23:22 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:12:7:16:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:12:7:16:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:17:7:21:4 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/level0.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/level0.yml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/level0.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/level0.yml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:42:9:47:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:52:9:58:24 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:216:9:222:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:216:9:222:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:222:9:227:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:250:9:256:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:250:9:256:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:256:9:261:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:284:9:290:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:284:9:290:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:290:9:295:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:391:9:395:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:395:9:404:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:404:9:414:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:414:9:423:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:423:9:432:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/reusable_caller3.yaml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:33:9:36:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:36:9:39:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:49:9:59:6 | Run Step: benchmark-pr | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:59:9:60:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:60:9:60:37 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/test10.yml:20:9:25:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test10.yml:20:9:25:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test10.yml:25:9:30:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test10.yml:8:3:8:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/test11.yml:84:7:90:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test11.yml:84:7:90:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test11.yml:90:7:93:54 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test11.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/test17.yml:12:15:19:12 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test17.yml:12:15:19:12 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test17.yml:19:15:23:58 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test17.yml:3:5:3:16 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/test27.yml:18:9:21:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test27.yml:18:9:21:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test27.yml:21:9:22:16 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test26.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/test29.yml:8:7:14:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test29.yml:8:7:14:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test29.yml:14:7:21:11 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test29.yml:1:5:1:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:35:7:41:4 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:41:7:47:4 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:47:7:51:46 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:8:9:11:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:8:9:11:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:15:9:18:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:30:9:32:23 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:32:9:37:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:32:9:37:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:48:9:52:2 | Run Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:48:9:52:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:79:9:84:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:79:9:84:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:84:9:93:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:84:9:93:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:25:9:48:6 | Run Step: set-milestone | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:15:9:20:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:25:9:48:6 | Run Step: set-milestone | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:3:5:3:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/reusable_caller1.yaml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:21:11:23:22 | Run Step | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:10:11:18:8 | Run Step | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:21:11:23:22 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:17:7:21:4 | Run Step | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:12:7:16:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:17:7:21:4 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/level0.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/level0.yml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/level0.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/level0.yml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/poc2.yml:42:9:47:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:42:9:47:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/poc2.yml:52:9:58:24 | Run Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:52:9:58:24 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:222:9:227:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:216:9:222:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:222:9:227:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:256:9:261:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:250:9:256:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:256:9:261:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:290:9:295:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:284:9:290:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:290:9:295:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:391:9:395:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:391:9:395:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:395:9:404:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:395:9:404:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:404:9:414:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:404:9:414:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:414:9:423:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:414:9:423:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:423:9:432:2 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:423:9:432:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/reusable_caller3.yaml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/test7.yml:33:9:36:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:33:9:36:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/test7.yml:36:9:39:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:36:9:39:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/test7.yml:49:9:59:6 | Run Step: benchmark-pr | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:49:9:59:6 | Run Step: benchmark-pr | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/test7.yml:59:9:60:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:59:9:60:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/test7.yml:60:9:60:37 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:60:9:60:37 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/test10.yml:25:9:30:2 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test10.yml:20:9:25:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test10.yml:25:9:30:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test10.yml:8:3:8:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/test11.yml:90:7:93:54 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test11.yml:84:7:90:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test11.yml:90:7:93:54 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test11.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/test17.yml:19:15:23:58 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test17.yml:12:15:19:12 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test17.yml:19:15:23:58 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test17.yml:3:5:3:16 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/test27.yml:21:9:22:16 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test27.yml:18:9:21:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test27.yml:21:9:22:16 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test26.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/test29.yml:14:7:21:11 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test29.yml:8:7:14:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test29.yml:14:7:21:11 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test29.yml:1:5:1:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:13:9:13:23 | Run Step | .github/actions/dangerous-git-checkout/action.yml:6:7:11:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:13:9:13:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:35:7:41:4 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:35:7:41:4 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:41:7:47:4 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:41:7:47:4 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:47:7:51:46 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:47:7:51:46 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:15:9:18:2 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:8:9:11:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:15:9:18:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:30:9:32:23 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:30:9:32:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.expected

@@ -1,23 +1,23 @@
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:12:9:16:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:20:9:24:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:28:9:32:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:35:9:40:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:43:9:46:126 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:28:9:33:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:48:7:50:46 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit2.yml:27:9:31:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:26:9:30:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:30:9:35:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:57:9:62:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:79:9:83:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:95:9:100:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:109:9:114:66 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:103:9:109:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:139:9:144:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:444:9:449:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/test13.yml:20:7:25:4 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test13.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:14:9:19:72 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:1:5:1:17 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:12:9:16:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:20:9:24:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:28:9:32:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:35:9:40:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:43:9:46:126 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:28:9:33:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:48:7:50:46 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit2.yml:27:9:31:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:26:9:30:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:30:9:35:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:57:9:62:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:79:9:83:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:95:9:100:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:109:9:114:66 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:103:9:109:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:139:9:144:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:444:9:449:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/test13.yml:20:7:25:4 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test13.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:14:9:19:72 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:1:5:1:17 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |

cpp/downgrades/837c4e02326aee4582405d069263092e80a15d82/upgrade.properties

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-description: Support alias templates
-compatibility: full
-is_alias_template.rel: delete
-alias_instantiation.rel: delete
-alias_template_argument.rel: delete
-alias_template_argument_value.rel: delete

cpp/downgrades/ef8d209a22e27413aaaeff4446f0ecb9fa2c227b/upgrade.properties

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-description: Capture information about one template being generated from another
-compatibility: full
-class_template_generated_from.rel: delete
-function_template_generated_from.rel: delete
-variable_template_generated_from.rel: delete
-alias_template_generated_from.rel: delete

cpp/ql/integration-tests/query-suite/cpp-code-scanning.qls.expected

@@ -7,12 +7,10 @@ ql/cpp/ql/src/Diagnostics/ExtractedFiles.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Diagnostics/ExtractionWarnings.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Diagnostics/FailedExtractorInvocations.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Arithmetic/BadAdditionOverflowCheck.ql
-ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Arithmetic/IntMultToLong.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Arithmetic/SignedOverflowCheck.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Conversion/CastArrayPointerArithmetic.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Format/SnprintfOverflow.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Format/WrongNumberOfFormatArguments.ql
-ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Format/WrongTypeFormatArguments.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Memory Management/AllocaInLoop.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Memory Management/PointerOverflow.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Memory Management/ReturnStackAllocatedMemory.ql
@@ -30,7 +28,6 @@ ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-120/VeryLikelyOverrunWrite.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-131/NoSpaceForZeroTerminator.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-134/UncontrolledFormatString.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-190/ArithmeticUncontrolled.ql
-ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-190/ComparisonWithWiderType.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-191/UnsignedDifferenceExpressionComparedZero.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-253/HResultBooleanConversion.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-311/CleartextFileWrite.ql
@@ -43,7 +40,6 @@ ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-367/TOCTOUFilesystemRace.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-416/IteratorToExpiredContainer.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-416/UseOfStringAfterLifetimeEnds.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-416/UseOfUniquePointerAfterLifetimeEnds.ql
-ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-468/SuspiciousAddWithSizeof.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-497/ExposedSystemData.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-611/XXE.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-676/DangerousFunctionOverflow.ql

cpp/ql/lib/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,75 +1,3 @@
-## 10.2.0
-
-### Deprecated APIs
-
-* The `UsingAliasTypedefType` class has been deprecated. Use `TypeAliasType` instead.
-
-### New Features
-
-* Added a `getOriginalTemplate` predicate to `TemplateClass`, `TemplateFunction`, `TemplateVariable`, and `AliasTemplateType`, which yields the class member template the template was generated from. The predicates only have results for templates that are members of class template instantiations.
-* Added `AliasTemplateType` and `AliasTemplateInstantiationType` classes, representing C++ alias templates and their instantiations.
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* Added flow source models for `scanf_s` and related functions.
-* Added a `Call` column to `LocalFlowSourceFunction::hasLocalFlowSource` and `RemoteFlowSourceFunction::hasRemoteFlowSource`. The old predicates without a `Call` column continue to be supported.
-
-## 10.1.1
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* The `RemoteFlowSourceFunction` model for `fscanf` (and variants) now implements `hasSocketInput` to reflect that these functions may read from a socket.
-
-## 10.1.0
-
-### New Features
-
-* A new predicate `getSwitchCase` was added to the `SwitchStmt` class, which yields the `n`th `case` statement from a `switch` statement.
-* Data flow barriers and barrier guards can now be added using data extensions. For more information see [Customizing library models for C and C++](https://codeql.github.com/docs/codeql-language-guides/customizing-library-models-for-cpp/).
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* Added taint flow models for the `Strsafe.h` header from the Windows SDK.
-
-## 10.0.0
-
-### Breaking Changes
-
-* The deprecated `NonThrowingFunction` class has been removed, use `NonCppThrowingFunction` instead.
-* The deprecated `ThrowingFunction` class has been removed, use `AlwaysSehThrowingFunction` instead.
-
-### New Features
-
-* Added a subclass `AutoconfConfigureTestFile` of `ConfigurationTestFile` that represents files created by GNU autoconf configure scripts to test the build configuration.
-
-## 9.0.0
-
-### Breaking Changes
-
-* The `SourceModelCsv`, `SinkModelCsv`, and `SummaryModelCsv` classes and the associated CSV parsing infrastructure have been removed from `ExternalFlow.qll`. New models should be added as `.model.yml` files in the `ext/` directory.
-
-### New Features
-
-* Added a subclass `MesonPrivateTestFile` of `ConfigurationTestFile` that represents files created by Meson to test the build configuration.
-* Added a class `ConstructorDirectFieldInit` to represent field initializations that occur in member initializer lists.
-* Added a class `ConstructorDefaultFieldInit` to represent default field initializations.
-* Added a class `DataFlow::IndirectParameterNode` to represent the indirection of a parameter as a dataflow node.
-* Added a predicate `Node::asIndirectInstruction` which returns the `Instruction` that defines the indirect dataflow node, if any.
-* Added a class `IndirectUninitializedNode` to represent the indirection of an uninitialized local variable as a dataflow node.
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* Added `HttpReceiveHttpRequest`, `HttpReceiveRequestEntityBody`, and `HttpReceiveClientCertificate` from Win32's `http.h` as remote flow sources.
-* Added dataflow through members initialized via non-static data member initialization (NSDMI).
-
-## 8.0.3
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 8.0.2
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
 ## 8.0.1
 
 ### Minor Analysis Improvements

cpp/ql/lib/DefaultOptions.qll

@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ class Options extends string {
   predicate overrideReturnsNull(Call call) {
     // Used in CVS:
     call.(FunctionCall).getTarget().hasGlobalName("Xstrdup")
+    or
+    CustomOptions::overrideReturnsNull(call) // old Options.qll
   }
 
   /**
@@ -43,6 +45,8 @@ class Options extends string {
     // Used in CVS:
     call.(FunctionCall).getTarget().hasGlobalName("Xstrdup") and
     nullValue(call.getArgument(0))
+    or
+    CustomOptions::returnsNull(call) // old Options.qll
   }
 
   /**
@@ -61,6 +65,8 @@ class Options extends string {
     f.hasGlobalOrStdName([
         "exit", "_exit", "_Exit", "abort", "__assert_fail", "longjmp", "__builtin_unreachable"
       ])
+    or
+    CustomOptions::exits(f) // old Options.qll
   }
 
   /**
@@ -73,7 +79,8 @@ class Options extends string {
    * runtime, the program's behavior is undefined)
    */
   predicate exprExits(Expr e) {
-    e.(AssumeExpr).getChild(0).(CompileTimeConstantInt).getIntValue() = 0
+    e.(AssumeExpr).getChild(0).(CompileTimeConstantInt).getIntValue() = 0 or
+    CustomOptions::exprExits(e) // old Options.qll
   }
 
   /**
@@ -81,7 +88,10 @@ class Options extends string {
    *
    * By default holds only for `fgets`.
    */
-  predicate alwaysCheckReturnValue(Function f) { f.hasGlobalOrStdName("fgets") }
+  predicate alwaysCheckReturnValue(Function f) {
+    f.hasGlobalOrStdName("fgets") or
+    CustomOptions::alwaysCheckReturnValue(f) // old Options.qll
+  }
 
   /**
    * Holds if it is reasonable to ignore the return value of function
@@ -97,6 +107,8 @@ class Options extends string {
     // common way of sleeping using select:
     fc.getTarget().hasGlobalName("select") and
     fc.getArgument(0).getValue() = "0"
+    or
+    CustomOptions::okToIgnoreReturnValue(fc) // old Options.qll
   }
 }
 

cpp/ql/lib/Options.qll

@@ -98,3 +98,57 @@ class CustomMutexType extends MutexType {
    */
   override predicate unlockAccess(FunctionCall fc, Expr arg) { none() }
 }
+
+/**
+ * DEPRECATED: customize `CustomOptions.overrideReturnsNull` instead.
+ *
+ * This predicate is required to support backwards compatibility for
+ * older `Options.qll` files.  It should not be removed or modified by
+ * end users.
+ */
+predicate overrideReturnsNull(Call call) { none() }
+
+/**
+ * DEPRECATED: customize `CustomOptions.returnsNull` instead.
+ *
+ * This predicate is required to support backwards compatibility for
+ * older `Options.qll` files.  It should not be removed or modified by
+ * end users.
+ */
+predicate returnsNull(Call call) { none() }
+
+/**
+ * DEPRECATED: customize `CustomOptions.exits` instead.
+ *
+ * This predicate is required to support backwards compatibility for
+ * older `Options.qll` files.  It should not be removed or modified by
+ * end users.
+ */
+predicate exits(Function f) { none() }
+
+/**
+ * DEPRECATED: customize `CustomOptions.exprExits` instead.
+ *
+ * This predicate is required to support backwards compatibility for
+ * older `Options.qll` files.  It should not be removed or modified by
+ * end users.
+ */
+predicate exprExits(Expr e) { none() }
+
+/**
+ * DEPRECATED: customize `CustomOptions.alwaysCheckReturnValue` instead.
+ *
+ * This predicate is required to support backwards compatibility for
+ * older `Options.qll` files.  It should not be removed or modified by
+ * end users.
+ */
+predicate alwaysCheckReturnValue(Function f) { none() }
+
+/**
+ * DEPRECATED: customize `CustomOptions.okToIgnoreReturnValue` instead.
+ *
+ * This predicate is required to support backwards compatibility for
+ * older `Options.qll` files.  It should not be removed or modified by
+ * end users.
+ */
+predicate okToIgnoreReturnValue(FunctionCall fc) { none() }

cpp/ql/lib/change-notes/2026-05-27-deprecated-removal.md

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
----
-category: breaking
----
-* Removed the deprecated `overrideReturnsNull` predicate from `Options.qll`. Use `CustomOptions.overrideReturnsNull` instead.
-* Removed the deprecated `returnsNull` predicate from `Options.qll`. Use `CustomOptions.returnsNull` instead.
-* Removed the deprecated `exits` predicate from `Options.qll`. Use `CustomOptions.exits` instead.
-* Removed the deprecated `exprExits` predicate from `Options.qll`. Use `CustomOptions.exprExits` instead.
-* Removed the deprecated `alwaysCheckReturnValue` predicate from `Options.qll`. Use `CustomOptions.alwaysCheckReturnValue` instead.
-* Removed the deprecated `okToIgnoreReturnValue` predicate from `Options.qll`. Use `CustomOptions.okToIgnoreReturnValue` instead.
-* Removed the deprecated `semmle.code.cpp.Member`. Import `semmle.code.cpp.Element` and/or `semmle.code.cpp.Type` directly.
-* Removed the deprecated `UnknownDefaultLocation` class. Use `UnknownLocation` instead.
-* Removed the deprecated `UnknownExprLocation` class. Use `UnknownLocation` instead.
-* Removed the deprecated `UnknownStmtLocation` class. Use `UnknownLocation` instead.
-* Removed the deprecated `TemplateParameter` class. Use `TypeTemplateParameter` instead.
-* Support for class resolution across link targets has been removed for databases which were created with CodeQL versions before 1.23.0.

cpp/ql/lib/change-notes/released/10.0.0.md

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-## 10.0.0
-
-### Breaking Changes
-
-* The deprecated `NonThrowingFunction` class has been removed, use `NonCppThrowingFunction` instead.
-* The deprecated `ThrowingFunction` class has been removed, use `AlwaysSehThrowingFunction` instead.
-
-### New Features
-
-* Added a subclass `AutoconfConfigureTestFile` of `ConfigurationTestFile` that represents files created by GNU autoconf configure scripts to test the build configuration.

cpp/ql/lib/change-notes/released/10.1.0.md

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-## 10.1.0
-
-### New Features
-
-* A new predicate `getSwitchCase` was added to the `SwitchStmt` class, which yields the `n`th `case` statement from a `switch` statement.
-* Data flow barriers and barrier guards can now be added using data extensions. For more information see [Customizing library models for C and C++](https://codeql.github.com/docs/codeql-language-guides/customizing-library-models-for-cpp/).
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* Added taint flow models for the `Strsafe.h` header from the Windows SDK.

cpp/ql/lib/change-notes/released/10.1.1.md

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-## 10.1.1
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* The `RemoteFlowSourceFunction` model for `fscanf` (and variants) now implements `hasSocketInput` to reflect that these functions may read from a socket.

cpp/ql/lib/change-notes/released/10.2.0.md

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-## 10.2.0
-
-### Deprecated APIs
-
-* The `UsingAliasTypedefType` class has been deprecated. Use `TypeAliasType` instead.
-
-### New Features
-
-* Added a `getOriginalTemplate` predicate to `TemplateClass`, `TemplateFunction`, `TemplateVariable`, and `AliasTemplateType`, which yields the class member template the template was generated from. The predicates only have results for templates that are members of class template instantiations.
-* Added `AliasTemplateType` and `AliasTemplateInstantiationType` classes, representing C++ alias templates and their instantiations.
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* Added flow source models for `scanf_s` and related functions.
-* Added a `Call` column to `LocalFlowSourceFunction::hasLocalFlowSource` and `RemoteFlowSourceFunction::hasRemoteFlowSource`. The old predicates without a `Call` column continue to be supported.

cpp/ql/lib/change-notes/released/8.0.2.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-## 8.0.2
-
-No user-facing changes.

cpp/ql/lib/change-notes/released/8.0.3.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-## 8.0.3
-
-No user-facing changes.

cpp/ql/lib/change-notes/released/9.0.0.md

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-## 9.0.0
-
-### Breaking Changes
-
-* The `SourceModelCsv`, `SinkModelCsv`, and `SummaryModelCsv` classes and the associated CSV parsing infrastructure have been removed from `ExternalFlow.qll`. New models should be added as `.model.yml` files in the `ext/` directory.
-
-### New Features
-
-* Added a subclass `MesonPrivateTestFile` of `ConfigurationTestFile` that represents files created by Meson to test the build configuration.
-* Added a class `ConstructorDirectFieldInit` to represent field initializations that occur in member initializer lists.
-* Added a class `ConstructorDefaultFieldInit` to represent default field initializations.
-* Added a class `DataFlow::IndirectParameterNode` to represent the indirection of a parameter as a dataflow node.
-* Added a predicate `Node::asIndirectInstruction` which returns the `Instruction` that defines the indirect dataflow node, if any.
-* Added a class `IndirectUninitializedNode` to represent the indirection of an uninitialized local variable as a dataflow node.
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* Added `HttpReceiveHttpRequest`, `HttpReceiveRequestEntityBody`, and `HttpReceiveClientCertificate` from Win32's `http.h` as remote flow sources.
-* Added dataflow through members initialized via non-static data member initialization (NSDMI).

cpp/ql/lib/codeql-pack.release.yml

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 ---
-lastReleaseVersion: 10.2.0
+lastReleaseVersion: 8.0.1

cpp/ql/lib/cpp.qll

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ import semmle.code.cpp.Class
 import semmle.code.cpp.Struct
 import semmle.code.cpp.Union
 import semmle.code.cpp.Enum
+import semmle.code.cpp.Member
 import semmle.code.cpp.Field
 import semmle.code.cpp.Function
 import semmle.code.cpp.MemberFunction

cpp/ql/lib/ext/Strsafe.model.yml

@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
-# Models for strsafe.h safe string functions
-extensions:
-  - addsTo:
-      pack: codeql/cpp-all
-      extensible: sourceModel
-    data: # namespace, type, subtypes, name, signature, ext, output, kind, provenance
-      # StringCchGets: (pszDest, cchDest)
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCchGetsA", "", "", "Argument[*0]", "local", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCchGetsW", "", "", "Argument[*0]", "local", "manual"]
-      # StringCbGets: (pszDest, cbDest)
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCbGetsA", "", "", "Argument[*0]", "local", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCbGetsW", "", "", "Argument[*0]", "local", "manual"]
-      # StringCchGetsEx: (pszDest, cchDest, ppszDestEnd, pcchRemaining, dwFlags)
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCchGetsExA", "", "", "Argument[*0]", "local", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCchGetsExW", "", "", "Argument[*0]", "local", "manual"]
-      # StringCbGetsEx: (pszDest, cbDest, ppszDestEnd, pcbRemaining, dwFlags)
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCbGetsExA", "", "", "Argument[*0]", "local", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCbGetsExW", "", "", "Argument[*0]", "local", "manual"]
-  - addsTo:
-      pack: codeql/cpp-all
-      extensible: summaryModel
-    data: # namespace, type, subtypes, name, signature, ext, input, output, kind, provenance
-      # StringCchCopy: (pszDest, cchDest, pszSrc)
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCchCopyA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCchCopyW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      # StringCbCopy: (pszDest, cbDest, pszSrc)
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCbCopyA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCbCopyW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      # StringCchCopyEx: (pszDest, cchDest, pszSrc, ppszDestEnd, pcchRemaining, dwFlags)
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCchCopyExA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCchCopyExW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      # StringCbCopyEx: (pszDest, cbDest, pszSrc, ppszDestEnd, pcbRemaining, dwFlags)
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCbCopyExA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCbCopyExW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      # StringCchCopyN: (pszDest, cchDest, pszSrc, cchToCopy)
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCchCopyNA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCchCopyNW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      # StringCbCopyN: (pszDest, cbDest, pszSrc, cbToCopy)
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCbCopyNA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCbCopyNW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      # StringCchCopyNEx: (pszDest, cchDest, pszSrc, cchToCopy, ppszDestEnd, pcchRemaining, dwFlags)
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCchCopyNExA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCchCopyNExW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      # StringCbCopyNEx: (pszDest, cbDest, pszSrc, cbToCopy, ppszDestEnd, pcbRemaining, dwFlags)
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCbCopyNExA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCbCopyNExW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      # StringCchCat: (pszDest, cchDest, pszSrc)
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCchCatA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCchCatW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      # StringCbCat: (pszDest, cbDest, pszSrc)
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCbCatA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCbCatW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      # StringCchCatEx: (pszDest, cchDest, pszSrc, ppszDestEnd, pcchRemaining, dwFlags)
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCchCatExA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCchCatExW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      # StringCbCatEx: (pszDest, cbDest, pszSrc, ppszDestEnd, pcbRemaining, dwFlags)
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCbCatExA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCbCatExW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      # StringCchCatN: (pszDest, cchDest, pszSrc, cchToAppend)
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCchCatNA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCchCatNW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      # StringCbCatN: (pszDest, cbDest, pszSrc, cbToAppend)
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCbCatNA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCbCatNW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      # StringCchCatNEx: (pszDest, cchDest, pszSrc, cchToAppend, ppszDestEnd, pcchRemaining, dwFlags)
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCchCatNExA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCchCatNExW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      # StringCbCatNEx: (pszDest, cbDest, pszSrc, cbToAppend, ppszDestEnd, pcbRemaining, dwFlags)
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCbCatNExA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCbCatNExW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      # StringCchPrintf: (pszDest, cchDest, pszFormat, ...)
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCchPrintfA", "", "", "Argument[*2..8]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCchPrintfW", "", "", "Argument[*2..8]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      # StringCbPrintf: (pszDest, cbDest, pszFormat, ...)
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCbPrintfA", "", "", "Argument[*2..8]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCbPrintfW", "", "", "Argument[*2..8]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      # StringCchPrintfEx: (pszDest, cchDest, ppszDestEnd, pcchRemaining, dwFlags, pszFormat, ...)
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCchPrintfExA", "", "", "Argument[*5..11]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCchPrintfExW", "", "", "Argument[*5..11]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      # StringCbPrintfEx: (pszDest, cbDest, ppszDestEnd, pcbRemaining, dwFlags, pszFormat, ...)
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCbPrintfExA", "", "", "Argument[*5..11]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCbPrintfExW", "", "", "Argument[*5..11]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      # StringCchVPrintf: (pszDest, cchDest, pszFormat, argList)
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCchVPrintfA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCchVPrintfW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      # StringCbVPrintf: (pszDest, cbDest, pszFormat, argList)
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCbVPrintfA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCbVPrintfW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      # StringCchVPrintfEx: (pszDest, cchDest, ppszDestEnd, pcchRemaining, dwFlags, pszFormat, argList)
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCchVPrintfExA", "", "", "Argument[*5]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCchVPrintfExW", "", "", "Argument[*5]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      # StringCbVPrintfEx: (pszDest, cbDest, ppszDestEnd, pcbRemaining, dwFlags, pszFormat, argList)
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCbVPrintfExA", "", "", "Argument[*5]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "StringCbVPrintfExW", "", "", "Argument[*5]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]

cpp/ql/lib/ext/Windows.model.yml

@@ -31,9 +31,6 @@ extensions:
       - ["", "", False, "WinHttpQueryHeadersEx", "", "", "Argument[*5]", "remote", "manual"]
       - ["", "", False, "WinHttpQueryHeadersEx", "", "", "Argument[*6]", "remote", "manual"]
       - ["", "", False, "WinHttpQueryHeadersEx", "", "", "Argument[**8]", "remote", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "HttpReceiveHttpRequest", "", "", "Argument[*3]", "remote", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "HttpReceiveRequestEntityBody", "", "", "Argument[*3]", "remote", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "HttpReceiveClientCertificate", "", "", "Argument[*3]", "remote", "manual"]
   - addsTo:
       pack: codeql/cpp-all
       extensible: summaryModel

cpp/ql/lib/ext/ZMQ.model.yml

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-# ZeroMQ networking library models
-extensions:
-  - addsTo:
-      pack: codeql/cpp-all
-      extensible: sourceModel
-    data: # namespace, type, subtypes, name, signature, ext, output, kind, provenance
-      - ["", "", False, "zmq_recv", "", "", "Argument[*1]", "remote", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "zmq_recvmsg", "", "", "Argument[*1]", "remote", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "zmq_msg_recv", "", "", "Argument[*0]", "remote", "manual"]
-  - addsTo:
-      pack: codeql/cpp-all
-      extensible: sinkModel
-    data: # namespace, type, subtypes, name, signature, ext, input, kind, provenance
-      - ["", "", False, "zmq_send", "", "", "Argument[*1]", "remote-sink", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "zmq_sendmsg", "", "", "Argument[*1]", "remote-sink", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "zmq_msg_send", "", "", "Argument[*0]", "remote-sink", "manual"]
-  - addsTo:
-      pack: codeql/cpp-all
-      extensible: summaryModel
-    data: # namespace, type, subtypes, name, signature, ext, input, output, kind, provenance
-      - ["", "", False, "zmq_msg_init_data", "", "", "Argument[*1]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "zmq_msg_data", "", "", "Argument[*0]", "ReturnValue[*]", "taint", "manual"]

cpp/ql/lib/ext/allocation/Std.allocation.model.yml

@@ -12,7 +12,4 @@ extensions:
       - ["", "", False, "_malloca", "0", "", "", False]
       - ["", "", False, "calloc", "1", "0", "", True]
       - ["std", "", False, "calloc", "1", "0", "", True]
-      - ["bsl", "", False, "calloc", "1", "0", "", True]
-      - ["", "", False, "aligned_alloc", "1", "", "", True]
-      - ["std", "", False, "aligned_alloc", "1", "", "", True]
-      - ["bsl", "", False, "aligned_alloc", "1", "", "", True]
+      - ["bsl", "", False, "calloc", "1", "0", "", True]

cpp/ql/lib/ext/getc.model.yml

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-# Models for getc and similar character-reading functions
-extensions:
-  - addsTo:
-      pack: codeql/cpp-all
-      extensible: sourceModel
-    data: # namespace, type, subtypes, name, signature, ext, output, kind, provenance
-      - ["", "", False, "getc", "", "", "ReturnValue", "remote", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "getwc", "", "", "ReturnValue", "remote", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "_getc_nolock", "", "", "ReturnValue", "remote", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "_getwc_nolock", "", "", "ReturnValue", "remote", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "getch", "", "", "ReturnValue", "local", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "_getch", "", "", "ReturnValue", "local", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "_getwch", "", "", "ReturnValue", "local", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "_getch_nolock", "", "", "ReturnValue", "local", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "_getwch_nolock", "", "", "ReturnValue", "local", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "getchar", "", "", "ReturnValue", "local", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "getwchar", "", "", "ReturnValue", "local", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "_getchar_nolock", "", "", "ReturnValue", "local", "manual"]
-      - ["", "", False, "_getwchar_nolock", "", "", "ReturnValue", "local", "manual"]

cpp/ql/lib/qlpack.yml

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 name: codeql/cpp-all
-version: 10.2.1-dev
+version: 8.0.2-dev
 groups: cpp
 dbscheme: semmlecode.cpp.dbscheme
 extractor: cpp

cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/Class.qll

@@ -856,10 +856,8 @@ class AbstractClass extends Class {
 
 /**
  * A class template (this class also finds partial specializations
- * of class templates).
- *
- * For example in the following code there is a `MyTemplateClass<T>`
- * template:
+ * of class templates).  For example in the following code there is a
+ * `MyTemplateClass<T>` template:
  * ```
  * template<class T>
  * class MyTemplateClass {
@@ -895,29 +893,6 @@ class TemplateClass extends Class {
   }
 
   override string getAPrimaryQlClass() { result = "TemplateClass" }
-
-  /**
-   * Gets the class member template this template was generated from.
-   *
-   * This predicate only has results for templates that are members of class
-   * template instantiations. For example, for `MyTemplateClass<int>::C<S>`
-   * in the following code, the result is `MyTemplateClass<T>::C<S>`.
-   * ```cpp
-   * template<class T>
-   * class MyTemplateClass {
-   *   template<class S>
-   *   class C {
-   *     ...
-   *   };
-   * };
-   *
-   * template
-   * class MyTemplateClass<int>;
-   * ```
-   */
-  TemplateClass getOriginalTemplate() {
-    class_template_generated_from(underlyingElement(this), unresolveElement(result))
-  }
 }
 
 /**

cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/ConfigurationTestFile.qll

@@ -26,26 +26,3 @@ class CmakeTryCompileFile extends ConfigurationTestFile {
     )
   }
 }
-
-/**
- * A file created by Meson to test the system configuration.
- */
-class MesonPrivateTestFile extends ConfigurationTestFile {
-  MesonPrivateTestFile() {
-    this.getBaseName() = "testfile.c" and
-    exists(Folder folder, Folder parent |
-      folder = this.getParentContainer() and
-      parent = folder.getParentContainer()
-    |
-      folder.getBaseName().matches("tmp%") and
-      parent.getBaseName() = "meson-private"
-    )
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * A file created by a GNU autoconf configure script to test the system configuration.
- */
-class AutoconfConfigureTestFile extends ConfigurationTestFile {
-  AutoconfConfigureTestFile() { this.getBaseName().regexpMatch("conftest[0-9]*\\.c(pp)?") }
-}

cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/Declaration.qll

@@ -278,8 +278,6 @@ class Declaration extends Locatable, @declaration {
     or
     variable_template_argument(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
     or
-    alias_template_argument(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
-    or
     template_template_argument(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
     or
     concept_template_argument(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
@@ -292,8 +290,6 @@ class Declaration extends Locatable, @declaration {
     or
     variable_template_argument_value(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
     or
-    alias_template_argument_value(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
-    or
     template_template_argument_value(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
     or
     concept_template_argument_value(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))

cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/Element.qll

@@ -278,15 +278,6 @@ private predicate isFromTemplateInstantiationRec(Element e, Element instantiatio
   instantiation.(Variable).isConstructedFrom(_) and
   e = instantiation
   or
-  instantiation.(TypeAliasType).isConstructedFrom(_) and
-  e = instantiation
-  or
-  instantiation.(TemplateTemplateParameterInstantiation).isConstructedFrom(_) and
-  e = instantiation
-  or
-  exists(instantiation.(ConceptIdExpr).getConcept()) and
-  e = instantiation
-  or
   isFromTemplateInstantiationRec(e.getEnclosingElement(), instantiation)
 }
 
@@ -300,15 +291,6 @@ private predicate isFromUninstantiatedTemplateRec(Element e, Element template) {
   is_variable_template(unresolveElement(template)) and
   e = template
   or
-  is_alias_template(unresolveElement(template)) and
-  e = template
-  or
-  usertypes(unresolveElement(template), _, 8) and // template template parameter
-  e = template
-  or
-  template instanceof @concept_template and
-  e = template
-  or
   isFromUninstantiatedTemplateRec(e.getEnclosingElement(), template)
 }
 

cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/Function.qll

@@ -828,27 +828,6 @@ class TemplateFunction extends Function {
    * such things -- see FunctionTemplateSpecialization for further details.
    */
   FunctionTemplateSpecialization getASpecialization() { result.getPrimaryTemplate() = this }
-
-  /**
-   * Gets the class member template this template was generated from.
-   *
-   * This predicate only has results for templates that are members of class
-   * template instantiations. For example, for `MyTemplateClass<int>::f<S>`
-   * in the following code, the result is `MyTemplateClass<T>::f<S>`.
-   * ```cpp
-   * template<class T>
-   * class MyTemplateClass {
-   *   template<class S>
-   *   S f();
-   * };
-   *
-   * template
-   * class MyTemplateClass<int>;
-   * ```
-   */
-  TemplateFunction getOriginalTemplate() {
-    function_template_generated_from(underlyingElement(this), unresolveElement(result))
-  }
 }
 
 /**

cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/Location.qll

@@ -148,3 +148,28 @@ class UnknownLocation extends Location {
     this.getFile().getAbsolutePath() = "" and locations_default(this, _, 0, 0, 0, 0)
   }
 }
+
+/**
+ * A dummy location which is used when something doesn't have a location in
+ * the source code but needs to have a `Location` associated with it.
+ *
+ * DEPRECATED: use `UnknownLocation`
+ */
+deprecated class UnknownDefaultLocation extends UnknownLocation { }
+
+/**
+ * A dummy location which is used when an expression doesn't have a
+ * location in the source code but needs to have a `Location` associated
+ * with it.
+ *
+ * DEPRECATED: use `UnknownLocation`
+ */
+deprecated class UnknownExprLocation extends UnknownLocation { }
+
+/**
+ * A dummy location which is used when a statement doesn't have a location
+ * in the source code but needs to have a `Location` associated with it.
+ *
+ * DEPRECATED: use `UnknownLocation`
+ */
+deprecated class UnknownStmtLocation extends UnknownLocation { }

cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/Member.qll

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+/**
+ * DEPRECATED: import `semmle.code.cpp.Element` and/or `semmle.code.cpp.Type` directly as required.
+ */
+
+import semmle.code.cpp.Element
+import semmle.code.cpp.Type

cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/TemplateParameter.qll

@@ -35,6 +35,13 @@ class NonTypeTemplateParameter extends Literal, TemplateParameterImpl {
   override string getAPrimaryQlClass() { result = "NonTypeTemplateParameter" }
 }
 
+/**
+ * A C++ `typename` (or `class`) template parameter.
+ *
+ * DEPRECATED: Use `TypeTemplateParameter` instead.
+ */
+deprecated class TemplateParameter = TypeTemplateParameter;
+
 /**
  * A C++ `typename` (or `class`) template parameter.
  *

cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/TypedefType.qll

@@ -64,123 +64,23 @@ class CTypedefType extends TypedefType {
 }
 
 /**
- * DEPRECATED: Use `TypeAlias` instead.
- *
- * A C++ type alias or alias template.
- *
- * For example the type declared in the following code:
+ * A using alias C++ typedef type.  For example the type declared in the following code:
  * ```
  * using my_int2 = int;
  * ```
  */
-deprecated class UsingAliasTypedefType = TypeAliasType;
+class UsingAliasTypedefType extends TypedefType {
+  UsingAliasTypedefType() { usertype_alias_kind(underlyingElement(this), 1) }
 
-/**
- * A C++ type alias or alias template.
- *
- * For example the type declared in the following code:
- * ```
- * using my_int2 = int;
- * ```
- */
-class TypeAliasType extends TypedefType {
-  TypeAliasType() { usertype_alias_kind(underlyingElement(this), 1) }
-
-  override string getAPrimaryQlClass() { result = "TypeAliasType" }
+  override string getAPrimaryQlClass() { result = "UsingAliasTypedefType" }
 
   override string explain() {
     result = "using {" + this.getBaseType().explain() + "} as \"" + this.getName() + "\""
   }
-
-  /**
-   * Holds if this alias is constructed from another alias as a result of
-   * template instantiation.
-   */
-  predicate isConstructedFrom(TypeAliasType t) {
-    alias_instantiation(underlyingElement(this), unresolveElement(t))
-  }
 }
 
 /**
- * A C++ alias template.
- *
- * For example the type declared in the following code:
- * ```
- * template <typename T>
- * using my_type = T;
- * ```
- */
-class AliasTemplateType extends TypeAliasType {
-  AliasTemplateType() { is_alias_template(underlyingElement(this)) }
-
-  override string getAPrimaryQlClass() { result = "AliasTemplateType" }
-
-  /**
-   * Gets an alias instantiated from this template.
-   *
-   * For example for `MyAliasTemplate<T>` in the following code, the results are
-   * `MyAliasTemplate<int>` and `MyAliasTemplate<long>`:
-   * ```
-   * template<typename T>
-   * using MyAliasTemplate = ...;
-   *
-   * MyAliasTemplate<int> instance1;
-   *
-   * MyAliasTemplate<long> instance2;
-   * ```
-   */
-  TypeAliasType getAnInstantiation() { result.isConstructedFrom(this) }
-
-  /**
-   * Gets the class member template this template was generated from.
-   *
-   * This predicate only has results for templates that are members of class
-   * template instantiations. For example, for `MyTemplateClass<int>::t<S>`
-   * in the following code, the result is `MyTemplateClass<T>::t<S>`.
-   * ```cpp
-   * template<class T>
-   * class MyTemplateClass {
-   *   template<class S>
-   *   using t = S;
-   * };
-   *
-   * template
-   * class MyTemplateClass<int>;
-   * ```
-   */
-  AliasTemplateType getOriginalTemplate() {
-    alias_template_generated_from(underlyingElement(this), unresolveElement(result))
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * A C++ alias template instantiation.
- *
- * For example the `my_int_type` type declared in the following code:
- * ```
- * template <typename T>
- * using my_type = T;
- *
- * using my_int_type = my_type<int>;
- * ```
- */
-class AliasTemplateInstantiationType extends TypeAliasType {
-  AliasTemplateType at;
-
-  AliasTemplateInstantiationType() { at.getAnInstantiation() = this }
-
-  override string getAPrimaryQlClass() { result = "AliasTemplateInstantiationType" }
-
-  /**
-   * Gets the alias template from which this instantiation was instantiated.
-   */
-  AliasTemplateType getTemplate() { result = at }
-}
-
-/**
- * A C++ `typedef` type that is directly enclosed by a function.
- *
- * For example the type declared inside the function `foo` in
+ * A C++ `typedef` type that is directly enclosed by a function.  For example the type declared inside the function `foo` in
  * the following code:
  * ```
  * int foo(void) { typedef int local; }

cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/Variable.qll

@@ -614,27 +614,6 @@ class TemplateVariable extends Variable {
     result.isConstructedFrom(this) and
     not result.isSpecialization()
   }
-
-  /**
-   * Gets the class member template this template was generated from.
-   *
-   * This predicate only has results for templates that are members of class
-   * template instantiations. For example, for `MyTemplateClass<int>::x<S>`
-   * in the following code, the result is `MyTemplateClass<T>::x<S>`.
-   * ```cpp
-   * template<class T>
-   * class MyTemplateClass {
-   *   template<class S>
-   *   static S x;
-   * };
-   *
-   * template
-   * class MyTemplateClass<int>;
-   * ```
-   */
-  TemplateVariable getOriginalTemplate() {
-    variable_template_generated_from(underlyingElement(this), unresolveElement(result))
-  }
 }
 
 /**

cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/commons/Printf.qll

@@ -163,23 +163,12 @@ predicate primitiveVariadicFormatter(
   )
 }
 
-/**
- * Gets a function call whose target is a variadic formatter with the given
- * `type`, `format` parameter index and `output` parameter index.
- *
- * Join-order helper for `callsVariadicFormatter`.
- */
-pragma[nomagic]
-private predicate callsVariadicFormatterCall(FunctionCall fc, string type, int format, int output) {
-  variadicFormatter(fc.getTarget(), type, format, output)
-}
-
 private predicate callsVariadicFormatter(
   Function f, string type, int formatParamIndex, int outputParamIndex
 ) {
   // calls a variadic formatter with `formatParamIndex`, `outputParamIndex` linked
   exists(FunctionCall fc, int format, int output |
-    callsVariadicFormatterCall(fc, type, format, output) and
+    variadicFormatter(pragma[only_bind_into](fc.getTarget()), type, format, output) and
     fc.getEnclosingFunction() = f and
     fc.getArgument(format) = f.getParameter(formatParamIndex).getAnAccess() and
     fc.getArgument(output) = f.getParameter(outputParamIndex).getAnAccess()
@@ -187,7 +176,7 @@ private predicate callsVariadicFormatter(
   or
   // calls a variadic formatter with only `formatParamIndex` linked
   exists(FunctionCall fc, string calledType, int format, int output |
-    callsVariadicFormatterCall(fc, calledType, format, output) and
+    variadicFormatter(pragma[only_bind_into](fc.getTarget()), calledType, format, output) and
     fc.getEnclosingFunction() = f and
     fc.getArgument(format) = f.getParameter(formatParamIndex).getAnAccess() and
     not fc.getArgument(output) = f.getParameter(_).getAnAccess() and
@@ -459,13 +448,6 @@ class FormatLiteral extends Literal instanceof StringLiteral {
    */
   int getConvSpecOffset(int n) { result = this.getFormat().indexOf("%", n, 0) }
 
-  /**
-   * Gets the nth conversion specifier string.
-   */
-  private string getConvSpecString(int n) {
-    n >= 0 and result = "%" + this.getFormat().splitAt("%", n + 1)
-  }
-
   /*
    * Each of these predicates gets a regular expressions to match each individual
    * parts of a conversion specifier.
@@ -531,20 +513,22 @@ class FormatLiteral extends Literal instanceof StringLiteral {
     int n, string spec, string params, string flags, string width, string prec, string len,
     string conv
   ) {
-    exists(string convSpec, string regexp |
-      convSpec = this.getConvSpecString(n) and
+    exists(int offset, string fmt, string rst, string regexp |
+      offset = this.getConvSpecOffset(n) and
+      fmt = this.getFormat() and
+      rst = fmt.substring(offset, fmt.length()) and
       regexp = this.getConvSpecRegexp() and
       (
-        spec = convSpec.regexpCapture(regexp, 1) and
-        params = convSpec.regexpCapture(regexp, 2) and
-        flags = convSpec.regexpCapture(regexp, 3) and
-        width = convSpec.regexpCapture(regexp, 4) and
-        prec = convSpec.regexpCapture(regexp, 5) and
-        len = convSpec.regexpCapture(regexp, 6) and
-        conv = convSpec.regexpCapture(regexp, 7)
+        spec = rst.regexpCapture(regexp, 1) and
+        params = rst.regexpCapture(regexp, 2) and
+        flags = rst.regexpCapture(regexp, 3) and
+        width = rst.regexpCapture(regexp, 4) and
+        prec = rst.regexpCapture(regexp, 5) and
+        len = rst.regexpCapture(regexp, 6) and
+        conv = rst.regexpCapture(regexp, 7)
         or
-        spec = convSpec.regexpCapture(regexp, 1) and
-        not exists(convSpec.regexpCapture(regexp, 2)) and
+        spec = rst.regexpCapture(regexp, 1) and
+        not exists(rst.regexpCapture(regexp, 2)) and
         params = "" and
         flags = "" and
         width = "" and
@@ -559,10 +543,12 @@ class FormatLiteral extends Literal instanceof StringLiteral {
    * Gets the nth conversion specifier (including the initial `%`).
    */
   string getConvSpec(int n) {
-    exists(string convSpec, string regexp |
-      convSpec = this.getConvSpecString(n) and
+    exists(int offset, string fmt, string rst, string regexp |
+      offset = this.getConvSpecOffset(n) and
+      fmt = this.getFormat() and
+      rst = fmt.substring(offset, fmt.length()) and
       regexp = this.getConvSpecRegexp() and
-      result = convSpec.regexpCapture(regexp, 1)
+      result = rst.regexpCapture(regexp, 1)
     )
   }
 

cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/commons/Scanf.qll

@@ -25,15 +25,6 @@ abstract class ScanfFunction extends Function {
    * (rather than a `char*`).
    */
   predicate isWideCharDefault() { exists(this.getName().indexOf("wscanf")) }
-
-  /** Holds if this is one of the `scanf_s` variants. */
-  predicate isSVariant() {
-    exists(string name | name = this.getName() |
-      name.matches("%\\_s")
-      or
-      name.matches("%\\_s\\_l")
-    )
-  }
 }
 
 /**
@@ -43,12 +34,8 @@ class Scanf extends ScanfFunction instanceof TopLevelFunction {
   Scanf() {
     this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("scanf") or // scanf(format, args...)
     this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("wscanf") or // wscanf(format, args...)
-    this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("scanf_s") or // scanf_s(format, args...)
-    this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("wscanf_s") or // wscanf_s(format, args...)
     this.hasGlobalName("_scanf_l") or // _scanf_l(format, locale, args...)
-    this.hasGlobalName("_wscanf_l") or // _wscanf_l(format, locale, args...)
-    this.hasGlobalName("_scanf_s_l") or // _scanf_s_l(format, locale, args...)
-    this.hasGlobalName("_wscanf_s_l") // _wscanf_s_l(format, locale, args...)
+    this.hasGlobalName("_wscanf_l")
   }
 
   override int getInputParameterIndex() { none() }
@@ -63,12 +50,8 @@ class Fscanf extends ScanfFunction instanceof TopLevelFunction {
   Fscanf() {
     this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("fscanf") or // fscanf(src_stream, format, args...)
     this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("fwscanf") or // fwscanf(src_stream, format, args...)
-    this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("fscanf_s") or // fscanf_s(src_stream, format, args...)
-    this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("fwscanf_s") or // fwscanf_s(src_stream, format, args...)
     this.hasGlobalName("_fscanf_l") or // _fscanf_l(src_stream, format, locale, args...)
-    this.hasGlobalName("_fwscanf_l") or // _fwscanf_l(src_stream, format, locale, args...)
-    this.hasGlobalName("_fscanf_s_l") or // _fscanf_s_l(src_stream, format, locale, args...)
-    this.hasGlobalName("_fwscanf_s_l") // _fwscanf_s_l(src_stream, format, locale, args...)
+    this.hasGlobalName("_fwscanf_l")
   }
 
   override int getInputParameterIndex() { result = 0 }
@@ -83,12 +66,8 @@ class Sscanf extends ScanfFunction instanceof TopLevelFunction {
   Sscanf() {
     this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("sscanf") or // sscanf(src_stream, format, args...)
     this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("swscanf") or // swscanf(src, format, args...)
-    this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("sscanf_s") or // sscanf_s(src, format, args...)
-    this.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("swscanf_s") or // swscanf_s(src, format, args...)
     this.hasGlobalName("_sscanf_l") or // _sscanf_l(src, format, locale, args...)
-    this.hasGlobalName("_swscanf_l") or // _swscanf_l(src, format, locale, args...)
-    this.hasGlobalName("_sscanf_s_l") or // _sscanf_s_l(src, format, locale, args...)
-    this.hasGlobalName("_swscanf_s_l") // _swscanf_s_l(src, format, locale, args...)
+    this.hasGlobalName("_swscanf_l")
   }
 
   override int getInputParameterIndex() { result = 0 }
@@ -118,14 +97,6 @@ class Snscanf extends ScanfFunction instanceof TopLevelFunction {
   int getInputLengthParameterIndex() { result = 1 }
 }
 
-private predicate isCharLike(Type t) { t instanceof CharType or t instanceof Wchar_t }
-
-private predicate isStringLike(Type t) {
-  isCharLike(t.(PointerType).getBaseType())
-  or
-  isCharLike(t.(ArrayType).getBaseType())
-}
-
 /**
  * A call to one of the `scanf` functions.
  */
@@ -159,40 +130,14 @@ class ScanfFunctionCall extends FunctionCall {
    */
   predicate isWideCharDefault() { this.getScanfFunction().isWideCharDefault() }
 
-  bindingset[this, k]
-  pragma[inline_late]
-  private predicate isSizeArgument(int k) {
-    // The first vararg is never the size argument since a size argument must
-    // always follow a string buffer argument.
-    k > 0 and
-    isStringLike(this.getArgument(this.getScanfFunction().getNumberOfParameters() + k - 1)
-          .getUnspecifiedType())
-  }
-
   /**
    * Gets the output argument at position `n` in the vararg list of this call.
    *
    * The range of `n` is from `0` to `this.getNumberOfOutputArguments() - 1`.
    */
   Expr getOutputArgument(int n) {
-    exists(ScanfFunction target | target = this.getScanfFunction() |
-      // If this is an S variant then every string buffer argument has a
-      // corresponding size argument immediately following it, so we need to
-      // skip over those size arguments when counting the output arguments.
-      if target.isSVariant()
-      then
-        result =
-          rank[n + 1](Expr arg, int k |
-            k >= 0 and
-            arg = this.getArgument(target.getNumberOfParameters() + k) and
-            not this.isSizeArgument(k)
-          |
-            arg order by k
-          )
-      else (
-        n >= 0 and result = this.getArgument(target.getNumberOfParameters() + n)
-      )
-    )
+    result = this.getArgument(this.getTarget().getNumberOfParameters() + n) and
+    n >= 0
   }
 
   /**
@@ -249,13 +194,6 @@ class ScanfFormatLiteral extends Expr {
     )
   }
 
-  /**
-   * Gets the nth conversion specifier string.
-   */
-  private string getConvSpecString(int n) {
-    n >= 0 and result = "%" + this.getFormat().splitAt("%", n + 1)
-  }
-
   /**
    * Gets the regular expression to match each individual part of a conversion specifier.
    */
@@ -289,14 +227,16 @@ class ScanfFormatLiteral extends Expr {
    * specifier.
    */
   predicate parseConvSpec(int n, string spec, string width, string len, string conv) {
-    exists(string convSpec, string regexp |
-      convSpec = this.getConvSpecString(n) and
+    exists(int offset, string fmt, string rst, string regexp |
+      offset = this.getConvSpecOffset(n) and
+      fmt = this.getFormat() and
+      rst = fmt.substring(offset, fmt.length()) and
       regexp = this.getConvSpecRegexp() and
       (
-        spec = convSpec.regexpCapture(regexp, 1) and
-        width = convSpec.regexpCapture(regexp, 2) and
-        len = convSpec.regexpCapture(regexp, 3) and
-        conv = convSpec.regexpCapture(regexp, 4)
+        spec = rst.regexpCapture(regexp, 1) and
+        width = rst.regexpCapture(regexp, 2) and
+        len = rst.regexpCapture(regexp, 3) and
+        conv = rst.regexpCapture(regexp, 4)
       )
     )
   }

cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/dataflow/ExternalFlow.qll

@@ -1,20 +1,15 @@
 /**
  * INTERNAL use only. This is an experimental API subject to change without notice.
  *
- * Provides classes and predicates for dealing with flow models specified
- * in data extension files.
+ * Provides classes and predicates for dealing with flow models specified in CSV format.
  *
- * The extensible relations have the following columns:
+ * The CSV specification has the following columns:
  * - Sources:
- *   `namespace; type; subtypes; name; signature; ext; output; kind; provenance`
+ *   `namespace; type; subtypes; name; signature; ext; output; kind`
  * - Sinks:
- *   `namespace; type; subtypes; name; signature; ext; input; kind; provenance`
+ *   `namespace; type; subtypes; name; signature; ext; input; kind`
  * - Summaries:
- *   `namespace; type; subtypes; name; signature; ext; input; output; kind; provenance`
- * - Barriers:
- *   `namespace; type; subtypes; name; signature; ext; output; kind; provenance`
- * - BarrierGuards:
- *   `namespace; type; subtypes; name; signature; ext; input; acceptingValue; kind; provenance`
+ *   `namespace; type; subtypes; name; signature; ext; input; output; kind`
  *
  * The interpretation of a row is similar to API-graphs with a left-to-right
  * reading.
@@ -91,23 +86,11 @@
  *    value, and
  *    - flow from the _second_ indirection of the 0th argument to the first
  *    indirection of the return value, etc.
- * 8. The `acceptingValue` column of barrier guard models specifies the condition
- *    under which the guard blocks flow. It can be one of "true" or "false". In
- *    the future "no-exception", "not-zero", "null", "not-null" may be supported.
- * 9. The `kind` column is a tag that can be referenced from QL to determine to
+ * 8. The `kind` column is a tag that can be referenced from QL to determine to
  *    which classes the interpreted elements should be added. For example, for
  *    sources "remote" indicates a default remote flow source, and for summaries
  *    "taint" indicates a default additional taint step and "value" indicates a
  *    globally applicable value-preserving step.
- * 10. The `provenance` column is a tag to indicate the origin and verification of a model.
- *    The format is {origin}-{verification} or just "manual" where the origin describes
- *    the origin of the model and verification describes how the model has been verified.
- *    Some examples are:
- *    - "df-generated": The model has been generated by the model generator tool.
- *    - "df-manual": The model has been generated by the model generator and verified by a human.
- *    - "manual": The model has been written by hand.
- *    This information is used in a heuristic for dataflow analysis to determine, if a
- *    model or source code should be used for determining flow.
  */
 
 import cpp
@@ -121,9 +104,117 @@ private import internal.FlowSummaryImpl::Private
 private import internal.FlowSummaryImpl::Private::External
 private import internal.ExternalFlowExtensions::Extensions as Extensions
 private import codeql.mad.ModelValidation as SharedModelVal
+private import codeql.util.Unit
 private import codeql.mad.static.ModelsAsData as SharedMaD
 
+/**
+ * A unit class for adding additional source model rows.
+ *
+ * Extend this class to add additional source definitions.
+ */
+class SourceModelCsv extends Unit {
+  /** Holds if `row` specifies a source definition. */
+  abstract predicate row(string row);
+}
+
+/**
+ * A unit class for adding additional sink model rows.
+ *
+ * Extend this class to add additional sink definitions.
+ */
+class SinkModelCsv extends Unit {
+  /** Holds if `row` specifies a sink definition. */
+  abstract predicate row(string row);
+}
+
+/**
+ * A unit class for adding additional summary model rows.
+ *
+ * Extend this class to add additional flow summary definitions.
+ */
+class SummaryModelCsv extends Unit {
+  /** Holds if `row` specifies a summary definition. */
+  abstract predicate row(string row);
+}
+
+/** Holds if `row` is a source model. */
+predicate sourceModel(string row) { any(SourceModelCsv s).row(row) }
+
+/** Holds if `row` is a sink model. */
+predicate sinkModel(string row) { any(SinkModelCsv s).row(row) }
+
+/** Holds if `row` is a summary model. */
+predicate summaryModel(string row) { any(SummaryModelCsv s).row(row) }
+
 private module MadInput implements SharedMaD::InputSig {
+  /** Holds if a source model exists for the given parameters. */
+  predicate additionalSourceModel(
+    string namespace, string type, boolean subtypes, string name, string signature, string ext,
+    string output, string kind, string provenance, string model
+  ) {
+    exists(string row |
+      sourceModel(row) and
+      row.splitAt(";", 0) = namespace and
+      row.splitAt(";", 1) = type and
+      row.splitAt(";", 2) = subtypes.toString() and
+      subtypes = [true, false] and
+      row.splitAt(";", 3) = name and
+      row.splitAt(";", 4) = signature and
+      row.splitAt(";", 5) = ext and
+      row.splitAt(";", 6) = output and
+      row.splitAt(";", 7) = kind
+    ) and
+    provenance = "manual" and
+    model = ""
+  }
+
+  /** Holds if a sink model exists for the given parameters. */
+  predicate additionalSinkModel(
+    string namespace, string type, boolean subtypes, string name, string signature, string ext,
+    string input, string kind, string provenance, string model
+  ) {
+    exists(string row |
+      sinkModel(row) and
+      row.splitAt(";", 0) = namespace and
+      row.splitAt(";", 1) = type and
+      row.splitAt(";", 2) = subtypes.toString() and
+      subtypes = [true, false] and
+      row.splitAt(";", 3) = name and
+      row.splitAt(";", 4) = signature and
+      row.splitAt(";", 5) = ext and
+      row.splitAt(";", 6) = input and
+      row.splitAt(";", 7) = kind
+    ) and
+    provenance = "manual" and
+    model = ""
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Holds if a summary model exists for the given parameters.
+   *
+   * This predicate does not expand `@` to `*`s.
+   */
+  predicate additionalSummaryModel(
+    string namespace, string type, boolean subtypes, string name, string signature, string ext,
+    string input, string output, string kind, string provenance, string model
+  ) {
+    exists(string row |
+      summaryModel(row) and
+      row.splitAt(";", 0) = namespace and
+      row.splitAt(";", 1) = type and
+      row.splitAt(";", 2) = subtypes.toString() and
+      subtypes = [true, false] and
+      row.splitAt(";", 3) = name and
+      row.splitAt(";", 4) = signature and
+      row.splitAt(";", 5) = ext and
+      row.splitAt(";", 6) = input and
+      row.splitAt(";", 7) = output and
+      row.splitAt(";", 8) = kind
+    ) and
+    provenance = "manual" and
+    model = ""
+  }
+
   string namespaceSegmentSeparator() { result = "::" }
 }
 
@@ -159,8 +250,8 @@ predicate summaryModel(
   )
 }
 
-/** Provides a query predicate to check the data for validation errors. */
-module ModelValidation {
+/** Provides a query predicate to check the CSV data for validation errors. */
+module CsvValidation {
   private string getInvalidModelInput() {
     exists(string pred, AccessPath input, string part |
       sinkModel(_, _, _, _, _, _, input, _, _, _) and pred = "sink"
@@ -203,6 +294,40 @@ module ModelValidation {
 
   private module KindVal = SharedModelVal::KindValidation<KindValConfig>;
 
+  private string getInvalidModelSubtype() {
+    exists(string pred, string row |
+      sourceModel(row) and pred = "source"
+      or
+      sinkModel(row) and pred = "sink"
+      or
+      summaryModel(row) and pred = "summary"
+    |
+      exists(string b |
+        b = row.splitAt(";", 2) and
+        not b = ["true", "false"] and
+        result = "Invalid boolean \"" + b + "\" in " + pred + " model."
+      )
+    )
+  }
+
+  private string getInvalidModelColumnCount() {
+    exists(string pred, string row, int expect |
+      sourceModel(row) and expect = 8 and pred = "source"
+      or
+      sinkModel(row) and expect = 8 and pred = "sink"
+      or
+      summaryModel(row) and expect = 9 and pred = "summary"
+    |
+      exists(int cols |
+        cols = 1 + max(int n | exists(row.splitAt(";", n))) and
+        cols != expect and
+        result =
+          "Wrong number of columns in " + pred + " model row, expected " + expect + ", got " + cols +
+            "."
+      )
+    )
+  }
+
   private string getInvalidModelSignature() {
     exists(string pred, string namespace, string type, string name, string signature, string ext |
       sourceModel(namespace, type, _, name, signature, ext, _, _, _, _) and pred = "source"
@@ -241,12 +366,13 @@ module ModelValidation {
     )
   }
 
-  /** Holds if some row in a MaD flow model appears to contain typos. */
+  /** Holds if some row in a CSV-based flow model appears to contain typos. */
   query predicate invalidModelRow(string msg) {
     msg =
       [
         getInvalidModelSignature(), getInvalidModelInput(), getInvalidModelOutput(),
-        KindVal::getInvalidModelKind(), getIncorrectConstructorSummaryOutput()
+        getInvalidModelSubtype(), getInvalidModelColumnCount(), KindVal::getInvalidModelKind(),
+        getIncorrectConstructorSummaryOutput()
       ]
   }
 }
@@ -276,45 +402,6 @@ private predicate isClassConstructedFrom(Class c, Class templateClass) {
   not c.isConstructedFrom(_) and c = templateClass
 }
 
-/** Gets the fully templated version of `c`. */
-private Class getFullyTemplatedClassOld(Class c) {
-  not c.isFromUninstantiatedTemplate(_) and
-  isClassConstructedFrom(c, result)
-}
-
-private TemplateClass getOriginalClassTemplate(TemplateClass tc) {
-  result = tc.getOriginalTemplate()
-  or
-  not exists(tc.getOriginalTemplate()) and
-  result = tc
-}
-
-/** Gets the fully templated version of `c`. */
-private Class getFullyTemplatedClassNew(Class c) {
-  not c.isFromUninstantiatedTemplate(_) and
-  exists(Class mid |
-    c.isConstructedFrom(mid)
-    or
-    not c.isConstructedFrom(_) and c = mid
-  |
-    result = getOriginalClassTemplate(mid)
-    or
-    not mid instanceof TemplateClass and mid = result
-  )
-}
-
-/** Gets the fully templated version of `c`. */
-private Class getFullyTemplatedClass(Class c) {
-  // The `Class::getOriginalTemplate` predicate was introduced in CodeQL
-  // version 2.25.6 and the upgrade script leaves the
-  // `class_template_generated_from` extensionals empty if the database
-  // was generated with an older extractor. So we use the old implementation
-  // if the `class_template_generated_from` extensional is empty.
-  if class_template_generated_from(_, _)
-  then result = getFullyTemplatedClassNew(c)
-  else result = getFullyTemplatedClassOld(c)
-}
-
 /**
  * Holds if `f` is an instantiation of a function template `templateFunc`, or
  * holds with `f = templateFunc` if `f` is not an instantiation of any function
@@ -331,7 +418,7 @@ private predicate isFunctionConstructedFrom(Function f, Function templateFunc) {
 }
 
 /** Gets the fully templated version of `f`. */
-private Function getFullyTemplatedFunctionOld(Function f) {
+Function getFullyTemplatedFunction(Function f) {
   not f.isFromUninstantiatedTemplate(_) and
   (
     exists(Class c, Class templateClass, int i |
@@ -345,46 +432,13 @@ private Function getFullyTemplatedFunctionOld(Function f) {
   )
 }
 
-private TemplateFunction getOriginalFunctionTemplate(TemplateFunction tf) {
-  result = tf.getOriginalTemplate()
-  or
-  not exists(tf.getOriginalTemplate()) and
-  result = tf
-}
-
-/** Gets the fully templated version of `f`. */
-private Function getFullyTemplatedFunctionNew(Function f) {
-  not f.isFromUninstantiatedTemplate(_) and
-  exists(Function mid |
-    f.isConstructedFrom(mid)
-    or
-    not f.isConstructedFrom(_) and f = mid
-  |
-    result = getOriginalFunctionTemplate(mid)
-    or
-    not mid instanceof TemplateFunction and mid = result
-  )
-}
-
-/** Gets the fully templated version of `f`. */
-Function getFullyTemplatedFunction(Function f) {
-  // The `Function::getOriginalTemplate` predicate was introduced in CodeQL
-  // version 2.25.6 and the upgrade script leaves the
-  // `function_template_generated_from` extensionals empty if the database
-  // was generated with an older extractor. So we use the old implementation
-  // if the `function_template_generated_from` extensional is empty.
-  if function_template_generated_from(_, _)
-  then result = getFullyTemplatedFunctionNew(f)
-  else result = getFullyTemplatedFunctionOld(f)
-}
-
 /** Prefixes `const` to `s` if `t` is const, or returns `s` otherwise. */
 bindingset[s, t]
 private string withConst(string s, Type t) {
   if t.isConst() then result = "const " + s else result = s
 }
 
-/** Prefixes `volatile` to `s` if `t` is volatile, or returns `s` otherwise. */
+/** Prefixes `volatile` to `s` if `t` is const, or returns `s` otherwise. */
 bindingset[s, t]
 private string withVolatile(string s, Type t) {
   if t.isVolatile() then result = "volatile " + s else result = s
@@ -562,7 +616,7 @@ pragma[nomagic]
 private string getTypeNameWithoutClassTemplates(Function f, int n, int remaining) {
   // If there is a declaring type then we start by expanding the function templates
   exists(Class template |
-    template = getFullyTemplatedClass(f.getDeclaringType()) and
+    isClassConstructedFrom(f.getDeclaringType(), template) and
     remaining = getNumberOfSupportedClassTemplateArguments(template) and
     result = getTypeNameWithoutFunctionTemplates(f, n, 0)
   )
@@ -574,7 +628,7 @@ private string getTypeNameWithoutClassTemplates(Function f, int n, int remaining
   or
   exists(string mid, TypeTemplateParameter tp, Class template |
     mid = getTypeNameWithoutClassTemplates(f, n, remaining + 1) and
-    template = getFullyTemplatedClass(f.getDeclaringType()) and
+    isClassConstructedFrom(f.getDeclaringType(), template) and
     tp = getSupportedClassTemplateArgument(template, remaining)
   |
     result = mid.replaceAll(tp.getName(), "class:" + remaining.toString())
@@ -972,7 +1026,7 @@ private module Cached {
   }
 
   /**
-   * Holds if `node` is specified as a source with the given kind in a MaD flow
+   * Holds if `node` is specified as a source with the given kind in a CSV flow
    * model.
    */
   cached
@@ -983,7 +1037,7 @@ private module Cached {
   }
 
   /**
-   * Holds if `node` is specified as a sink with the given kind in a MaD flow
+   * Holds if `node` is specified as a sink with the given kind in a CSV flow
    * model.
    */
   cached
@@ -1019,13 +1073,13 @@ private module Cached {
 
   private predicate barrierGuardChecks(IRGuardCondition g, Expr e, boolean gv, TKindModelPair kmp) {
     exists(
-      SourceSinkInterpretationInput::InterpretNode n, Public::AcceptingValue acceptingValue,
+      SourceSinkInterpretationInput::InterpretNode n, Public::AcceptingValue acceptingvalue,
       string kind, string model
     |
-      isBarrierGuardNode(n, acceptingValue, kind, model) and
+      isBarrierGuardNode(n, acceptingvalue, kind, model) and
       n.asNode().asExpr() = e and
       kmp = TMkPair(kind, model) and
-      gv = convertAcceptingValue(acceptingValue).asBooleanValue() and
+      gv = convertAcceptingValue(acceptingvalue).asBooleanValue() and
       n.asNode().(Private::ArgumentNode).getCall().asCallInstruction() = g
     )
   }
@@ -1042,14 +1096,14 @@ private module Cached {
   ) {
     exists(
       SourceSinkInterpretationInput::InterpretNode interpretNode,
-      Public::AcceptingValue acceptingValue, string kind, string model, int indirectionIndex,
+      Public::AcceptingValue acceptingvalue, string kind, string model, int indirectionIndex,
       Private::ArgumentNode arg
     |
-      isBarrierGuardNode(interpretNode, acceptingValue, kind, model) and
+      isBarrierGuardNode(interpretNode, acceptingvalue, kind, model) and
       arg = interpretNode.asNode() and
       arg.asIndirectExpr(indirectionIndex) = e and
       kmp = MkKindModelPairIntPair(TMkPair(kind, model), indirectionIndex) and
-      gv = convertAcceptingValue(acceptingValue).asBooleanValue() and
+      gv = convertAcceptingValue(acceptingvalue).asBooleanValue() and
       arg.getCall().asCallInstruction() = g
     )
   }

cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/dataflow/internal/ExternalFlowExtensions.qll

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ extensible predicate barrierModel(
  */
 extensible predicate barrierGuardModel(
   string namespace, string type, boolean subtypes, string name, string signature, string ext,
-  string input, string acceptingValue, string kind, string provenance, QlBuiltins::ExtensionId madId
+  string input, string acceptingvalue, string kind, string provenance, QlBuiltins::ExtensionId madId
 );
 
 /**