Em-dash - of course :D

Remove redundant file
1. Rename AgentSDK -> AgentSdk
2026-06-10 15:31:12 +02:00 · 2026-06-08 14:03:12 +02:00 · 2026-06-08 13:47:44 +02:00 · 2026-06-08 12:55:52 +02:00 · 2026-06-08 12:38:28 +02:00 · 2026-06-08 12:15:50 +02:00
2113 changed files with 20713 additions and 97526 deletions
--- a/.github/workflows/go-version-update.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/go-version-update.yml
@@ -1,208 +0,0 @@
-name: Update Go version
-
-on:
-  workflow_dispatch:
-  schedule:
-    - cron: "0 3 * * 1"  # Run weekly on Mondays at 3 AM UTC (1 = Monday)
-
-permissions:
-  contents: write
-  pull-requests: write
-
-jobs:
-  update-go-version:
-    name: Check and update Go version
-    if: github.repository == 'github/codeql'
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout repository
-        uses: actions/checkout@v5
-        with:
-          fetch-depth: 0
-
-      - name: Set up Git
-        run: |
-          git config user.name "github-actions[bot]"
-          git config user.email "41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com"
-
-      - name: Fetch latest Go version
-        id: fetch-version
-        run: |
-          LATEST_GO_VERSION=$(curl -s https://go.dev/dl/?mode=json | jq -r '.[0].version')
-          
-          if [ -z "$LATEST_GO_VERSION" ] || [ "$LATEST_GO_VERSION" = "null" ]; then
-            echo "Error: Failed to fetch latest Go version from go.dev"
-            exit 1
-          fi
-          
-          echo "Latest Go version from go.dev: $LATEST_GO_VERSION"
-          echo "version=$LATEST_GO_VERSION" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
-          
-          # Extract version numbers (e.g., go1.26.0 -> 1.26.0)
-          LATEST_VERSION_NUM=$(echo $LATEST_GO_VERSION | sed 's/^go//')
-          echo "version_num=$LATEST_VERSION_NUM" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
-          
-          # Extract major.minor version (e.g., 1.26.0 -> 1.26)
-          LATEST_MAJOR_MINOR=$(echo $LATEST_VERSION_NUM | sed -E 's/^([0-9]+\.[0-9]+).*/\1/')
-          echo "major_minor=$LATEST_MAJOR_MINOR" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
-
-      - name: Check current Go version
-        id: current-version
-        run: |
-          CURRENT_VERSION=$(sed -n 's/.*go_sdk\.download(version = \"\([^\"]*\)\".*/\1/p' MODULE.bazel)
-          
-          if [ -z "$CURRENT_VERSION" ]; then
-            echo "Error: Could not extract Go version from MODULE.bazel"
-            exit 1
-          fi
-          
-          echo "Current Go version in MODULE.bazel: $CURRENT_VERSION"
-          echo "version=$CURRENT_VERSION" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
-          
-          # Extract major.minor version
-          CURRENT_MAJOR_MINOR=$(echo $CURRENT_VERSION | sed -E 's/^([0-9]+\.[0-9]+).*/\1/')
-          echo "major_minor=$CURRENT_MAJOR_MINOR" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
-
-      - name: Compare versions
-        id: compare
-        run: |
-          LATEST="${{ steps.fetch-version.outputs.version_num }}"
-          CURRENT="${{ steps.current-version.outputs.version }}"
-          
-          echo "Latest: $LATEST"
-          echo "Current: $CURRENT"
-          
-          if [ "$LATEST" = "$CURRENT" ]; then
-            echo "Go version is up to date"
-            echo "needs_update=false" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
-          else
-            echo "Go version needs update from $CURRENT to $LATEST"
-            echo "needs_update=true" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
-          fi
-
-      - name: Update Go version in files
-        if: steps.compare.outputs.needs_update == 'true'
-        run: |
-          LATEST_VERSION_NUM="${{ steps.fetch-version.outputs.version_num }}"
-          LATEST_MAJOR_MINOR="${{ steps.fetch-version.outputs.major_minor }}"
-          CURRENT_VERSION="${{ steps.current-version.outputs.version }}"
-          CURRENT_MAJOR_MINOR="${{ steps.current-version.outputs.major_minor }}"
-          
-          echo "Updating from $CURRENT_VERSION to $LATEST_VERSION_NUM"
-          
-          # Escape dots in current version strings for use in sed patterns
-          CURRENT_VERSION_ESCAPED=$(echo "$CURRENT_VERSION" | sed 's/\./\\./g')
-          CURRENT_MAJOR_MINOR_ESCAPED=$(echo "$CURRENT_MAJOR_MINOR" | sed 's/\./\\./g')
-          
-          # Update MODULE.bazel
-          sed -i "s/go_sdk\.download(version = \"$CURRENT_VERSION_ESCAPED\")/go_sdk.download(version = \"$LATEST_VERSION_NUM\")/" MODULE.bazel
-          if ! grep -q "go_sdk.download(version = \"$LATEST_VERSION_NUM\")" MODULE.bazel; then
-            echo "Error: Failed to update MODULE.bazel"
-            exit 1
-          fi
-          
-          # Update go/extractor/go.mod
-          if ! sed -i "s/^go $CURRENT_MAJOR_MINOR_ESCAPED\$/go $LATEST_MAJOR_MINOR/" go/extractor/go.mod; then
-            echo "Warning: Failed to update go directive in go.mod"
-          fi
-          if ! sed -i "s/^toolchain go$CURRENT_VERSION_ESCAPED\$/toolchain go$LATEST_VERSION_NUM/" go/extractor/go.mod; then
-            echo "Warning: Failed to update toolchain in go.mod"
-          fi
-          
-          # Update go/extractor/autobuilder/build-environment.go
-          if ! sed -i "s/var maxGoVersion = util\.NewSemVer(\"$CURRENT_MAJOR_MINOR_ESCAPED\")/var maxGoVersion = util.NewSemVer(\"$LATEST_MAJOR_MINOR\")/" go/extractor/autobuilder/build-environment.go; then
-            echo "Warning: Failed to update build-environment.go"
-          fi
-          
-          # Update go/actions/test/action.yml
-          if ! sed -i "s/default: \"~$CURRENT_VERSION_ESCAPED\"/default: \"~$LATEST_VERSION_NUM\"/" go/actions/test/action.yml; then
-            echo "Warning: Failed to update action.yml"
-          fi
-          
-          # Show what changed
-          git diff
-
-      - name: Check for changes
-        id: check-changes
-        if: steps.compare.outputs.needs_update == 'true'
-        run: |
-          if git diff --quiet; then
-            echo "No changes detected"
-            echo "has_changes=false" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
-          else
-            echo "Changes detected"
-            echo "has_changes=true" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
-          fi
-
-      - name: Check for existing PR
-        if: steps.check-changes.outputs.has_changes == 'true'
-        id: check-pr
-        env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-        run: |
-          BRANCH_NAME="workflow/go-version-update"
-          PR_NUMBER=$(gh pr list --head "$BRANCH_NAME" --state open --json number --jq '.[0].number')
-          
-          if [ -n "$PR_NUMBER" ]; then
-            echo "Existing PR found: #$PR_NUMBER"
-            echo "pr_exists=true" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
-            echo "pr_number=$PR_NUMBER" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
-          else
-            echo "No existing PR found"
-            echo "pr_exists=false" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
-          fi
-
-      - name: Commit and push changes
-        if: steps.check-changes.outputs.has_changes == 'true'
-        run: |
-          BRANCH_NAME="workflow/go-version-update"
-          LATEST_VERSION_NUM="${{ steps.fetch-version.outputs.version_num }}"
-          LATEST_MAJOR_MINOR="${{ steps.fetch-version.outputs.major_minor }}"
-          
-          # Create or switch to branch
-          git checkout -B "$BRANCH_NAME"
-          
-          # Stage and commit changes
-          git add MODULE.bazel go/extractor/go.mod go/extractor/autobuilder/build-environment.go go/actions/test/action.yml
-          git commit -m "Go: Update to $LATEST_VERSION_NUM"
-          
-          # Push changes
-          git push --force-with-lease origin "$BRANCH_NAME"
-
-      - name: Create or update PR
-        if: steps.check-changes.outputs.has_changes == 'true'
-        env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-        run: |
-          BRANCH_NAME="workflow/go-version-update"
-          LATEST_VERSION_NUM="${{ steps.fetch-version.outputs.version_num }}"
-          CURRENT_VERSION="${{ steps.current-version.outputs.version }}"
-          
-          PR_TITLE="Go: Update to $LATEST_VERSION_NUM"
-          
-          PR_BODY=$(cat <<EOF
-          This PR updates Go from $CURRENT_VERSION to $LATEST_VERSION_NUM.
-
-          Updated files:
-          - \`MODULE.bazel\` - go_sdk.download version
-          - \`go/extractor/go.mod\` - go directive and toolchain
-          - \`go/extractor/autobuilder/build-environment.go\` - maxGoVersion (only if MAJOR.MINOR changes)
-          - \`go/actions/test/action.yml\` - default go-test-version
-
-          This PR was automatically created by the [Go version update workflow](https://github.com/${{ github.repository }}/blob/main/.github/workflows/go-version-update.yml).
-          EOF
-          )
-          
-          if [ "${{ steps.check-pr.outputs.pr_exists }}" = "true" ]; then
-            echo "Updating existing PR #${{ steps.check-pr.outputs.pr_number }}"
-            gh pr edit "${{ steps.check-pr.outputs.pr_number }}" --title "$PR_TITLE" --body "$PR_BODY"
-          else
-            echo "Creating new PR"
-            gh pr create \
-              --title "$PR_TITLE" \
-              --body "$PR_BODY" \
-              --base main \
-              --head "$BRANCH_NAME" \
-              --label "Go"
-          fi
--- a/.github/workflows/mad_modelDiff.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/mad_modelDiff.yml
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ jobs:
            SHORTNAME=`basename $DATABASE`
            python misc/scripts/models-as-data/generate_mad.py --language java --with-summaries --with-sinks $DATABASE $SHORTNAME/$QL_VARIANT
            mkdir -p $MODELS/$SHORTNAME
-            mv java/ql/lib/ext/generated/modelgenerator/$SHORTNAME/$QL_VARIANT $MODELS/$SHORTNAME
+            mv java/ql/lib/ext/generated/$SHORTNAME/$QL_VARIANT $MODELS/$SHORTNAME
            cd ..
          }

--- a/.github/workflows/python-tooling.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/python-tooling.yml
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ on:
    paths:
      - "misc/bazel/**"
      - "misc/codegen/**"
-      - "misc/scripts/models-as-data/*.py"
+      - "misc/scripts/models-as-data/bulk_generate_mad.py"
      - "*.bazel*"
      - .github/workflows/codegen.yml
      - .pre-commit-config.yaml
--- a/Cargo.lock
+++ b/Cargo.lock
@@ -140,26 +140,6 @@ version = "0.22.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "72b3254f16251a8381aa12e40e3c4d2f0199f8c6508fbecb9d91f575e0fbb8c6"

-[[package]]
-name = "bindgen"
-version = "0.72.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "993776b509cfb49c750f11b8f07a46fa23e0a1386ffc01fb1e7d343efc387895"
-dependencies = [
- "bitflags 2.9.4",
- "cexpr",
- "clang-sys",
- "itertools 0.12.1",
- "log 0.4.28",
- "prettyplease",
- "proc-macro2",
- "quote",
- "regex",
- "rustc-hash 2.1.1",
- "shlex",
- "syn",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "bitflags"
 version = "1.3.2"
@@ -260,9 +240,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "cc"
-version = "1.2.61"
+version = "1.2.37"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "d16d90359e986641506914ba71350897565610e87ce0ad9e6f28569db3dd5c6d"
+checksum = "65193589c6404eb80b450d618eaf9a2cafaaafd57ecce47370519ef674a7bd44"
 dependencies = [
 "find-msvc-tools",
 "jobserver",
@@ -270,15 +250,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "shlex",
 ]

-[[package]]
-name = "cexpr"
-version = "0.6.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "6fac387a98bb7c37292057cffc56d62ecb629900026402633ae9160df93a8766"
-dependencies = [
- "nom",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "cfg-if"
 version = "1.0.3"
@@ -357,7 +328,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "chalk-derive 0.103.0",
 "chalk-ir 0.103.0",
 "ena",
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
+ "indexmap 2.11.4",
 "itertools 0.12.1",
 "petgraph",
 "rustc-hash 1.1.0",
@@ -378,17 +349,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "windows-link 0.2.0",
 ]

-[[package]]
-name = "clang-sys"
-version = "1.8.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "0b023947811758c97c59bf9d1c188fd619ad4718dcaa767947df1cadb14f39f4"
-dependencies = [
- "glob",
- "libc",
- "libloading",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "clap"
 version = "4.5.48"
@@ -456,7 +416,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "tree-sitter",
 "tree-sitter-json",
 "tree-sitter-ql",
- "yeast",
 "zstd",
 ]

@@ -478,25 +437,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "tree-sitter-ruby",
 ]

-[[package]]
-name = "codeql-extractor-unified"
-version = "0.1.0"
-dependencies = [
- "clap",
- "codeql-extractor",
- "encoding",
- "lazy_static",
- "rayon",
- "regex",
- "serde_json",
- "tracing",
- "tracing-subscriber",
- "tree-sitter",
- "tree-sitter-embedded-template",
- "tree-sitter-swift",
- "yeast",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "codeql-rust"
 version = "0.1.0"
@@ -545,15 +485,6 @@ version = "1.0.4"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "b05b61dc5112cbb17e4b6cd61790d9845d13888356391624cbe7e41efeac1e75"

-[[package]]
-name = "convert_case"
-version = "0.8.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "baaaa0ecca5b51987b9423ccdc971514dd8b0bb7b4060b983d3664dad3f1f89f"
-dependencies = [
- "unicode-segmentation",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "core-foundation-sys"
 version = "0.8.7"
@@ -807,12 +738,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "typeid",
 ]

-[[package]]
-name = "fastrand"
-version = "2.4.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "9f1f227452a390804cdb637b74a86990f2a7d7ba4b7d5693aac9b4dd6defd8d6"
-
 [[package]]
 name = "figment"
 version = "0.10.19"
@@ -829,9 +754,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "find-msvc-tools"
-version = "0.1.9"
+version = "0.1.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "5baebc0774151f905a1a2cc41989300b1e6fbb29aff0ceffa1064fdd3088d582"
+checksum = "7fd99930f64d146689264c637b5af2f0233a933bef0d8570e2526bf9e083192d"

 [[package]]
 name = "fixedbitset"
@@ -861,12 +786,6 @@ version = "0.1.5"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "d9c4f5dac5e15c24eb999c26181a6ca40b39fe946cbe4c263c7209467bc83af2"

-[[package]]
-name = "foldhash"
-version = "0.2.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "77ce24cb58228fbb8aa041425bb1050850ac19177686ea6e0f41a70416f56fdb"
-
 [[package]]
 name = "form_urlencoded"
 version = "1.2.2"
@@ -951,26 +870,9 @@ checksum = "9229cfe53dfd69f0609a49f65461bd93001ea1ef889cd5529dd176593f5338a1"
 dependencies = [
 "allocator-api2",
 "equivalent",
- "foldhash 0.1.5",
+ "foldhash",
 ]

-[[package]]
-name = "hashbrown"
-version = "0.16.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "841d1cc9bed7f9236f321df977030373f4a4163ae1a7dbfe1a51a2c1a51d9100"
-dependencies = [
- "allocator-api2",
- "equivalent",
- "foldhash 0.2.0",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "hashbrown"
-version = "0.17.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "ed5909b6e89a2db4456e54cd5f673791d7eca6732202bbf2a9cc504fe2f9b84a"
-
 [[package]]
 name = "hashlink"
 version = "0.10.0"
@@ -1157,25 +1059,16 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "indexmap"
-version = "2.14.0"
+version = "2.11.4"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "d466e9454f08e4a911e14806c24e16fba1b4c121d1ea474396f396069cf949d9"
+checksum = "4b0f83760fb341a774ed326568e19f5a863af4a952def8c39f9ab92fd95b88e5"
 dependencies = [
 "equivalent",
- "hashbrown 0.17.1",
+ "hashbrown 0.15.5",
 "serde",
 "serde_core",
 ]

-[[package]]
-name = "indoc"
-version = "2.0.7"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "79cf5c93f93228cf8efb3ba362535fb11199ac548a09ce117c9b1adc3030d706"
-dependencies = [
- "rustversion",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "inlinable_string"
 version = "0.1.15"
@@ -1305,16 +1198,6 @@ version = "0.2.175"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "6a82ae493e598baaea5209805c49bbf2ea7de956d50d7da0da1164f9c6d28543"

-[[package]]
-name = "libloading"
-version = "0.8.9"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "d7c4b02199fee7c5d21a5ae7d8cfa79a6ef5bb2fc834d6e9058e89c825efdc55"
-dependencies = [
- "cfg-if",
- "windows-link 0.2.0",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "line-index"
 version = "0.1.2"
@@ -1380,12 +1263,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "autocfg",
 ]

-[[package]]
-name = "minimal-lexical"
-version = "0.2.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "68354c5c6bd36d73ff3feceb05efa59b6acb7626617f4962be322a825e61f79a"
-
 [[package]]
 name = "miniz_oxide"
 version = "0.8.9"
@@ -1432,16 +1309,6 @@ version = "0.2.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "2bf50223579dc7cdcfb3bfcacf7069ff68243f8c363f62ffa99cf000a6b9c451"

-[[package]]
-name = "nom"
-version = "7.1.3"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "d273983c5a657a70a3e8f2a01329822f3b8c8172b73826411a55751e404a0a4a"
-dependencies = [
- "memchr",
- "minimal-lexical",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "notify"
 version = "8.2.0"
@@ -1569,12 +1436,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "windows-targets 0.52.6",
 ]

-[[package]]
-name = "pathdiff"
-version = "0.2.3"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "df94ce210e5bc13cb6651479fa48d14f601d9858cfe0467f43ae157023b938d3"
-
 [[package]]
 name = "pear"
 version = "0.2.9"
@@ -1630,36 +1491,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "b4c5cc86750666a3ed20bdaf5ca2a0344f9c67674cae0515bec2da16fbaa47db"
 dependencies = [
 "fixedbitset",
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "phf"
-version = "0.13.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "c1562dc717473dbaa4c1f85a36410e03c047b2e7df7f45ee938fbef64ae7fadf"
-dependencies = [
- "phf_shared",
- "serde",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "phf_generator"
-version = "0.13.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "135ace3a761e564ec88c03a77317a7c6b80bb7f7135ef2544dbe054243b89737"
-dependencies = [
- "fastrand",
- "phf_shared",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "phf_shared"
-version = "0.13.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "e57fef6bc5981e38c2ce2d63bfa546861309f875b8a75f092d1d54ae2d64f266"
-dependencies = [
- "siphasher",
+ "indexmap 2.11.4",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -1704,25 +1536,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "zerocopy",
 ]

-[[package]]
-name = "prettyplease"
-version = "0.2.37"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "479ca8adacdd7ce8f1fb39ce9ecccbfe93a3f1344b3d0d97f20bc0196208f62b"
-dependencies = [
- "proc-macro2",
- "syn",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "proc-macro-crate"
-version = "3.5.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "e67ba7e9b2b56446f1d419b1d807906278ffa1a658a8a5d8a39dcb1f5a78614f"
-dependencies = [
- "toml_edit 0.25.11+spec-1.1.0",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "proc-macro2"
 version = "1.0.101"
@@ -1854,7 +1667,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "e876bb2c3e52a8d4e6684526a2d4e81f9d028b939ee4dc5dc775fe10deb44d59"
 dependencies = [
 "dashmap",
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
+ "indexmap 2.11.4",
 "la-arena",
 "ra_ap_cfg",
 "ra_ap_intern",
@@ -1896,7 +1709,7 @@ checksum = "ebffdc134eccabc17209d7760cfff7fd12ed18ab6e21188c5e084b97aa38504c"
 dependencies = [
 "arrayvec",
 "either",
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
+ "indexmap 2.11.4",
 "itertools 0.14.0",
 "ra_ap_base_db",
 "ra_ap_cfg",
@@ -1926,7 +1739,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "drop_bomb",
 "either",
 "fst",
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
+ "indexmap 2.11.4",
 "itertools 0.14.0",
 "la-arena",
 "ra-ap-rustc_abi",
@@ -1995,7 +1808,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "cov-mark",
 "either",
 "ena",
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
+ "indexmap 2.11.4",
 "itertools 0.14.0",
 "la-arena",
 "oorandom",
@@ -2033,7 +1846,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "crossbeam-channel",
 "either",
 "fst",
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
+ "indexmap 2.11.4",
 "itertools 0.14.0",
 "line-index",
 "memchr",
@@ -2135,7 +1948,7 @@ version = "0.0.301"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "45db9e2df587d56f0738afa89fb2c100ff7c1e9cbe49e07f6a8b62342832211b"
 dependencies = [
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
+ "indexmap 2.11.4",
 "ra_ap_intern",
 "ra_ap_paths",
 "ra_ap_span",
@@ -2294,7 +2107,7 @@ checksum = "6c174d6b9b7a7f54687df7e00c3e75ed6f082a7943a9afb1d54f33c0c12773de"
 dependencies = [
 "crossbeam-channel",
 "fst",
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
+ "indexmap 2.11.4",
 "nohash-hasher",
 "ra_ap_paths",
 "ra_ap_stdx",
@@ -2426,15 +2239,6 @@ version = "0.8.6"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "caf4aa5b0f434c91fe5c7f1ecb6a5ece2130b02ad2a590589dda5146df959001"

-[[package]]
-name = "relative-path"
-version = "2.0.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "bca40a312222d8ba74837cb474edef44b37f561da5f773981007a10bbaa992b0"
-dependencies = [
- "serde",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "rowan"
 version = "0.15.15"
@@ -2448,57 +2252,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "text-size",
 ]

-[[package]]
-name = "rquickjs"
-version = "0.10.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "a135375fbac5ba723bb6a48f432a72f81539cedde422f0121a86c7c4e96d8e0d"
-dependencies = [
- "rquickjs-core",
- "rquickjs-macro",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "rquickjs-core"
-version = "0.10.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "bccb7121a123865c8ace4dea42e7ed84d78b90cbaf4ca32c59849d8d210c9672"
-dependencies = [
- "hashbrown 0.16.1",
- "phf",
- "relative-path",
- "rquickjs-sys",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "rquickjs-macro"
-version = "0.10.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "89f93602cc3112c7f30bf5f29e722784232138692c7df4c52ebbac7e035d900d"
-dependencies = [
- "convert_case",
- "fnv",
- "ident_case",
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
- "phf_generator",
- "phf_shared",
- "proc-macro-crate",
- "proc-macro2",
- "quote",
- "rquickjs-core",
- "syn",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "rquickjs-sys"
-version = "0.10.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "57b1b6528590d4d65dc86b5159eae2d0219709546644c66408b2441696d1d725"
-dependencies = [
- "bindgen",
- "cc",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "rust-extractor-macros"
 version = "0.1.0"
@@ -2564,7 +2317,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "crossbeam-utils",
 "hashbrown 0.15.5",
 "hashlink",
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
+ "indexmap 2.11.4",
 "intrusive-collections",
 "papaya",
 "parking_lot",
@@ -2653,12 +2406,11 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "semver"
-version = "1.0.28"
+version = "1.0.26"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "8a7852d02fc848982e0c167ef163aaff9cd91dc640ba85e263cb1ce46fae51cd"
+checksum = "56e6fa9c48d24d85fb3de5ad847117517440f6beceb7798af16b4a87d616b8d0"
 dependencies = [
 "serde",
- "serde_core",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -2718,7 +2470,7 @@ version = "1.0.145"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "402a6f66d8c709116cf22f558eab210f5a50187f702eb4d7e5ef38d9a7f1c79c"
 dependencies = [
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
+ "indexmap 2.11.4",
 "itoa",
 "memchr",
 "ryu",
@@ -2754,7 +2506,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "chrono",
 "hex",
 "indexmap 1.9.3",
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
+ "indexmap 2.11.4",
 "schemars 0.9.0",
 "schemars 1.0.4",
 "serde",
@@ -2782,7 +2534,7 @@ version = "0.9.34+deprecated"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "6a8b1a1a2ebf674015cc02edccce75287f1a0130d394307b36743c2f5d504b47"
 dependencies = [
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
+ "indexmap 2.11.4",
 "itoa",
 "ryu",
 "serde",
@@ -2804,18 +2556,6 @@ version = "1.3.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "0fda2ff0d084019ba4d7c6f371c95d8fd75ce3524c3cb8fb653a3023f6323e64"

-[[package]]
-name = "siphasher"
-version = "1.0.3"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "8ee5873ec9cce0195efcb7a4e9507a04cd49aec9c83d0389df45b1ef7ba2e649"
-
-[[package]]
-name = "smallbitvec"
-version = "2.6.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "9b0e903ee191d8f7a8fbf0d712c3a1699d19e04ceba5ad1eb673053c7d938a09"
-
 [[package]]
 name = "smallvec"
 version = "1.15.1"
@@ -2892,18 +2632,18 @@ checksum = "144f754d318415ac792f9d69fc87abbbfc043ce2ef041c60f16ad828f638717d"

 [[package]]
 name = "thiserror"
-version = "2.0.18"
+version = "2.0.16"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "4288b5bcbc7920c07a1149a35cf9590a2aa808e0bc1eafaade0b80947865fbc4"
+checksum = "3467d614147380f2e4e374161426ff399c91084acd2363eaf549172b3d5e60c0"
 dependencies = [
 "thiserror-impl",
 ]

 [[package]]
 name = "thiserror-impl"
-version = "2.0.18"
+version = "2.0.16"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "ebc4ee7f67670e9b64d05fa4253e753e016c6c95ff35b89b7941d6b856dec1d5"
+checksum = "6c5e1be1c48b9172ee610da68fd9cd2770e7a4056cb3fc98710ee6906f0c7960"
 dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
@@ -2968,7 +2708,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "serde",
 "serde_spanned 0.6.9",
 "toml_datetime 0.6.11",
- "toml_edit 0.22.27",
+ "toml_edit",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -2977,13 +2717,13 @@ version = "0.9.7"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "00e5e5d9bf2475ac9d4f0d9edab68cc573dc2fd644b0dba36b0c30a92dd9eaa0"
 dependencies = [
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
+ "indexmap 2.11.4",
 "serde_core",
 "serde_spanned 1.0.2",
 "toml_datetime 0.7.2",
 "toml_parser",
 "toml_writer",
- "winnow 0.7.13",
+ "winnow",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -3004,48 +2744,27 @@ dependencies = [
 "serde_core",
 ]

-[[package]]
-name = "toml_datetime"
-version = "1.1.1+spec-1.1.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "3165f65f62e28e0115a00b2ebdd37eb6f3b641855f9d636d3cd4103767159ad7"
-dependencies = [
- "serde_core",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "toml_edit"
 version = "0.22.27"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "41fe8c660ae4257887cf66394862d21dbca4a6ddd26f04a3560410406a2f819a"
 dependencies = [
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
+ "indexmap 2.11.4",
 "serde",
 "serde_spanned 0.6.9",
 "toml_datetime 0.6.11",
 "toml_write",
- "winnow 0.7.13",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "toml_edit"
-version = "0.25.11+spec-1.1.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "0b59c4d22ed448339746c59b905d24568fcbb3ab65a500494f7b8c3e97739f2b"
-dependencies = [
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
- "toml_datetime 1.1.1+spec-1.1.0",
- "toml_parser",
- "winnow 1.0.2",
+ "winnow",
 ]

 [[package]]
 name = "toml_parser"
-version = "1.1.2+spec-1.1.0"
+version = "1.0.3"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "a2abe9b86193656635d2411dc43050282ca48aa31c2451210f4202550afb7526"
+checksum = "4cf893c33be71572e0e9aa6dd15e6677937abd686b066eac3f8cd3531688a627"
 dependencies = [
- "winnow 1.0.2",
+ "winnow",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -3060,12 +2779,6 @@ version = "1.0.3"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "d163a63c116ce562a22cda521fcc4d79152e7aba014456fb5eb442f6d6a10109"

-[[package]]
-name = "topological-sort"
-version = "0.2.2"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "ea68304e134ecd095ac6c3574494fc62b909f416c4fca77e440530221e549d3d"
-
 [[package]]
 name = "tracing"
 version = "0.1.41"
@@ -3140,9 +2853,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "tree-sitter"
-version = "0.26.8"
+version = "0.25.9"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "887bd495d0582c5e3e0d8ece2233666169fa56a9644d172fc22ad179ab2d0538"
+checksum = "ccd2a058a86cfece0bf96f7cce1021efef9c8ed0e892ab74639173e5ed7a34fa"
 dependencies = [
 "cc",
 "regex",
@@ -3162,30 +2875,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "tree-sitter-language",
 ]

-[[package]]
-name = "tree-sitter-generate"
-version = "0.26.8"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "c3fb2e1bdb1d5f9d23cd5fa68cf98b3bedbd223c92a2edd60bbcf30bcf7180a5"
-dependencies = [
- "bitflags 2.9.4",
- "dunce",
- "indexmap 2.14.0",
- "indoc",
- "log 0.4.28",
- "pathdiff",
- "regex",
- "regex-syntax",
- "rquickjs",
- "rustc-hash 2.1.1",
- "semver",
- "serde",
- "serde_json",
- "smallbitvec",
- "thiserror",
- "topological-sort",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "tree-sitter-json"
 version = "0.24.8"
@@ -3202,16 +2891,6 @@ version = "0.1.5"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "c4013970217383f67b18aef68f6fb2e8d409bc5755227092d32efb0422ba24b8"

-[[package]]
-name = "tree-sitter-python"
-version = "0.23.6"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "3d065aaa27f3aaceaf60c1f0e0ac09e1cb9eb8ed28e7bcdaa52129cffc7f4b04"
-dependencies = [
- "cc",
- "tree-sitter-language",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "tree-sitter-ql"
 version = "0.23.1"
@@ -3232,15 +2911,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "tree-sitter-language",
 ]

-[[package]]
-name = "tree-sitter-swift"
-version = "0.7.2"
-dependencies = [
- "cc",
- "tree-sitter-generate",
- "tree-sitter-language",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "triomphe"
 version = "0.1.14"
@@ -3290,12 +2960,6 @@ version = "0.1.3"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "e70f2a8b45122e719eb623c01822704c4e0907e7e426a05927e1a1cfff5b75d0"

-[[package]]
-name = "unicode-segmentation"
-version = "1.13.2"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "9629274872b2bfaf8d66f5f15725007f635594914870f65218920345aa11aa8c"
-
 [[package]]
 name = "unicode-xid"
 version = "0.2.6"
@@ -3685,15 +3349,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "memchr",
 ]

-[[package]]
-name = "winnow"
-version = "1.0.2"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "2ee1708bef14716a11bae175f579062d4554d95be2c6829f518df847b7b3fdd0"
-dependencies = [
- "memchr",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "wit-bindgen"
 version = "0.45.1"
@@ -3712,29 +3367,6 @@ version = "1.0.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "cfe53a6657fd280eaa890a3bc59152892ffa3e30101319d168b781ed6529b049"

-[[package]]
-name = "yeast"
-version = "0.1.0"
-dependencies = [
- "clap",
- "serde",
- "serde_json",
- "serde_yaml",
- "tree-sitter",
- "tree-sitter-python",
- "tree-sitter-ruby",
- "yeast-macros",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "yeast-macros"
-version = "0.1.0"
-dependencies = [
- "proc-macro2",
- "quote",
- "syn",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "yoke"
 version = "0.8.0"
--- a/Cargo.toml
+++ b/Cargo.toml
@@ -4,11 +4,7 @@
 resolver = "2"
 members = [
    "shared/tree-sitter-extractor",
-    "shared/yeast",
-    "shared/yeast-macros",
    "ruby/extractor",
-    "unified/extractor",
-    "unified/extractor/tree-sitter-swift",
    "rust/extractor",
    "rust/extractor/macros",
    "rust/ast-generator",
--- a/MODULE.bazel
+++ b/MODULE.bazel
@@ -102,7 +102,6 @@ use_repo(
    tree_sitter_extractors_deps,
    "vendor_ts__anyhow-1.0.100",
    "vendor_ts__argfile-0.2.1",
-    "vendor_ts__cc-1.2.61",
    "vendor_ts__chalk-ir-0.104.0",
    "vendor_ts__chrono-0.4.42",
    "vendor_ts__clap-4.5.48",
@@ -142,18 +141,14 @@ use_repo(
    "vendor_ts__serde-1.0.228",
    "vendor_ts__serde_json-1.0.145",
    "vendor_ts__serde_with-3.14.1",
-    "vendor_ts__serde_yaml-0.9.34-deprecated",
    "vendor_ts__syn-2.0.106",
    "vendor_ts__toml-0.9.7",
    "vendor_ts__tracing-0.1.41",
    "vendor_ts__tracing-flame-0.2.0",
    "vendor_ts__tracing-subscriber-0.3.20",
-    "vendor_ts__tree-sitter-0.26.8",
+    "vendor_ts__tree-sitter-0.25.9",
    "vendor_ts__tree-sitter-embedded-template-0.25.0",
-    "vendor_ts__tree-sitter-generate-0.26.8",
    "vendor_ts__tree-sitter-json-0.24.8",
-    "vendor_ts__tree-sitter-language-0.1.5",
-    "vendor_ts__tree-sitter-python-0.23.6",
    "vendor_ts__tree-sitter-ql-0.23.1",
    "vendor_ts__tree-sitter-ruby-0.23.1",
    "vendor_ts__triomphe-0.1.14",
@@ -273,7 +268,7 @@ use_repo(
 )

 go_sdk = use_extension("@rules_go//go:extensions.bzl", "go_sdk")
-go_sdk.download(version = "1.26.4")
+go_sdk.download(version = "1.26.0")

 go_deps = use_extension("@gazelle//:extensions.bzl", "go_deps")
 go_deps.from_file(go_mod = "//go/extractor:go.mod")
--- a/actions/ql/examples/snippets/uses_pinned_sha.ql
+++ b/actions/ql/examples/snippets/uses_pinned_sha.ql
@@ -8,5 +8,5 @@
 import actions

 from UsesStep uses
-where uses.getVersion().regexpMatch("^[A-Fa-f0-9]{40}([A-Fa-f0-9]{24})?$")
+where uses.getVersion().regexpMatch("^[A-Fa-f0-9]{40}$")
 select uses, "This 'uses' step has a pinned SHA version."
--- a/actions/ql/lib/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/actions/ql/lib/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -1,19 +1,3 @@
-## 0.4.37
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* The GitHub Actions analysis now recognizes more Bash regex checks that restrict a value to alphanumeric characters, include regexes like `^[0-9a-zA-Z]{40}([0-9a-zA-Z]{24})?$` which check for a sha1 or sha256 hash. This may reduce false positive results where command output is validated with grouped or optional alphanumeric patterns before being used.
-
-## 0.4.36
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* Altered 2 patterns in the `poisonable_steps` modelling. Extra sinks are detected in the following cases: scripts executed via python modules and `go run` in directories are detected as potential mechanisms of injection. For the go execution pattern, the pattern is updated to now ignore flags that occur between go and the specific command. This change may lead to more results being detected by the following queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/critical`, `actions/cache-poisoning/poisonable-step`, `actions/cache-poisoning/direct-cache` and `actions/artifact-poisoning/path-traversal`.
-
-## 0.4.35
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
 ## 0.4.34

 ### Minor Analysis Improvements
--- a/actions/ql/lib/change-notes/released/0.4.35.md
+++ b/actions/ql/lib/change-notes/released/0.4.35.md
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-## 0.4.35
-
-No user-facing changes.
--- a/actions/ql/lib/change-notes/released/0.4.36.md
+++ b/actions/ql/lib/change-notes/released/0.4.36.md
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-## 0.4.36
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* Altered 2 patterns in the `poisonable_steps` modelling. Extra sinks are detected in the following cases: scripts executed via python modules and `go run` in directories are detected as potential mechanisms of injection. For the go execution pattern, the pattern is updated to now ignore flags that occur between go and the specific command. This change may lead to more results being detected by the following queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/critical`, `actions/cache-poisoning/poisonable-step`, `actions/cache-poisoning/direct-cache` and `actions/artifact-poisoning/path-traversal`.
--- a/actions/ql/lib/change-notes/released/0.4.37.md
+++ b/actions/ql/lib/change-notes/released/0.4.37.md
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-## 0.4.37
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* The GitHub Actions analysis now recognizes more Bash regex checks that restrict a value to alphanumeric characters, include regexes like `^[0-9a-zA-Z]{40}([0-9a-zA-Z]{24})?$` which check for a sha1 or sha256 hash. This may reduce false positive results where command output is validated with grouped or optional alphanumeric patterns before being used.
--- a/actions/ql/lib/codeql-pack.release.yml
+++ b/actions/ql/lib/codeql-pack.release.yml
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 ---
-lastReleaseVersion: 0.4.37
+lastReleaseVersion: 0.4.34
--- a/actions/ql/lib/codeql/actions/Bash.qll
+++ b/actions/ql/lib/codeql/actions/Bash.qll
@@ -785,22 +785,7 @@ module Bash {

  /**
   * Holds if the given regex is used to match an alphanumeric string
-   * eg: `^[0-9a-zA-Z]{40}([0-9a-zA-Z]{24})?$`, `^[0-9]+$` or `^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$`
+   * eg: `^[0-9a-zA-Z]{40}$`, `^[0-9]+$` or `^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$`
   */
-  string alphaNumericRegex() {
-    exists(string r1, string r2, string r3, string r4 |
-      // An alphanumeric character class
-      r1 = "\\[([09azAZ_-]+)\\]" and
-      // The same as above, followed by a quantifier like `+` or `{20}`
-      r2 = r1 + "(\\+|\\{\\d+\\})" and
-      // The same as above, possibly with parentheses around it
-      r3 = "\\(?" + r2 + "\\)?" and
-      // The same as above, possibly with a `?` after it
-      r4 = r3 + "\\??"
-    |
-      // The same as above, repeated one or more times, and with `^` at the
-      // beginning and `$` at the end
-      result = "^\\^(" + r4 + ")+\\$$"
-    )
-  }
+  string alphaNumericRegex() { result = "^\\^\\[([09azAZ_-]+)\\](\\+|\\{\\d+\\})\\$$" }
 }
--- a/actions/ql/lib/ext/config/poisonable_steps.yml
+++ b/actions/ql/lib/ext/config/poisonable_steps.yml
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ extensions:
      - ["(source|sh|bash|zsh|fish)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\b", 2]
      - ["(node)\\s+([^\\s]+)(\\.js|\\.ts)\\b", 2]
      - ["(python[\\d\\.]*)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.py\\b", 2]
-      - ["(python[\\d\\.]*)\\s+-m\\s+([A-Za-z_][\\w\\.]*)\\b", 2] # eg: pythonX -m anything(dir or file)
      - ["(ruby)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.rb\\b", 2]
-      - ["(go)\\s+(generate|run)(?:\\s+-[^\\s]+)*\\s+([^\\s]+)", 3]
+      - ["(go)\\s+(generate|run)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.go\\b", 3]
      - ["(dotnet)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.csproj\\b", 2]
+
--- a/actions/ql/lib/qlpack.yml
+++ b/actions/ql/lib/qlpack.yml
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 name: codeql/actions-all
-version: 0.4.38-dev
+version: 0.4.35-dev
 library: true
 warnOnImplicitThis: true
 dependencies:
--- a/actions/ql/src/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/actions/ql/src/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -1,40 +1,3 @@
-## 0.6.29
-
-### Query Metadata Changes
-
-* Reversed adjustment of the name of `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, but kept the portion of the previous change for the word "trusted" to "privileged". Added a missing "a" to phrasing in `actions/untrusted-checkout/high` and `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`.
-
-### Major Analysis Improvements
-
-* Adjusted `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical` to align more with other untrusted resource queries, where the alert location is the location where the artifact is obtained from (the checkout point). This aligns with the other 2 related queries. This will cause the same alerts to re-open for closed alerts of this query.
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* Altered the alert message for clarity for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`.
-* The `actions/unpinned-tag` query now recognizes 64-character SHA-256 commit hashes as properly pinned references, in addition to 40-character SHA-1 hashes.
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* Adjusted (minor) help file descriptions for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`. Clarified wording on in minor point, added one more listed resource and added one more recommendation for things to check.
-
-## 0.6.28
-
-### Query Metadata Changes
-
-* Adjusted the name of `actions/untrusted-checkout/high` to more clearly describe which parts of the scenario are in a privileged context.
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* The `actions/unpinned-tag` query now analyzes composite action metadata (`action.yml`/`action.yaml` files) in addition to workflow files, providing more comprehensive detection of unpinned action references across the entire Actions ecosystem.
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* Fixed help file descriptions for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`. Previously the messages were unclear as to why and how the vulnerabilities could occur. 
-
-## 0.6.27
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
 ## 0.6.26

 ### Major Analysis Improvements
@@ -210,7 +173,7 @@ No user-facing changes.
  * `actions/if-expression-always-true/critical`
  * `actions/if-expression-always-true/high`
  * `actions/unnecessary-use-of-advanced-config`
-  
+
 * The following query has been moved from the `code-scanning` suite to the `security-extended`
  suite. Any existing alerts for this query will be closed automatically unless the analysis is
  configured to use the `security-extended` suite.
--- a/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UnpinnedActionsTag.ql
+++ b/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UnpinnedActionsTag.ql
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /**
- * @name Unpinned tag for a non-immutable Action in workflow or composite action
+ * @name Unpinned tag for a non-immutable Action in workflow
 * @description Using a tag for a non-immutable Action that is not pinned to a commit can lead to executing an untrusted Action through a supply chain attack.
 * @kind problem
 * @security-severity 5.0
@@ -15,9 +15,7 @@ import actions
 import codeql.actions.security.UseOfUnversionedImmutableAction

 bindingset[version]
-private predicate isPinnedCommit(string version) {
-  version.regexpMatch("^[A-Fa-f0-9]{40}([A-Fa-f0-9]{24})?$")
-}
+private predicate isPinnedCommit(string version) { version.regexpMatch("^[A-Fa-f0-9]{40}$") }

 bindingset[nwo]
 private predicate isTrustedOwner(string nwo) {
@@ -33,26 +31,15 @@ private predicate isPinnedContainer(string version) {
 bindingset[nwo]
 private predicate isContainerImage(string nwo) { nwo.regexpMatch("^docker://.+") }

-private predicate getStepContainerName(UsesStep uses, string name) {
-  exists(Workflow workflow |
-    uses.getEnclosingWorkflow() = workflow and
-    (
-      workflow.getName() = name
-      or
-      not exists(workflow.getName()) and workflow.getLocation().getFile().getBaseName() = name
-    )
-  )
-  or
-  exists(CompositeAction action |
-    uses.getEnclosingCompositeAction() = action and
-    name = action.getLocation().getFile().getBaseName()
-  )
-}
-
-from UsesStep uses, string nwo, string version, string name
+from UsesStep uses, string nwo, string version, Workflow workflow, string name
 where
  uses.getCallee() = nwo and
-  getStepContainerName(uses, name) and
+  uses.getEnclosingWorkflow() = workflow and
+  (
+    workflow.getName() = name
+    or
+    not exists(workflow.getName()) and workflow.getLocation().getFile().getBaseName() = name
+  ) and
  uses.getVersion() = version and
  not isTrustedOwner(nwo) and
  not (if isContainerImage(nwo) then isPinnedContainer(version) else isPinnedCommit(version)) and
--- a/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.md
+++ b/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.md
@@ -1,35 +1,6 @@
 ## Overview

-GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. Under certain conditions described below, attackers can take over a repository by opening malicious PRs from forks. The attacks can result in malicious code execution causing unauthorized changes to the repository or exfiltration of repository secrets and a compromise of connected systems.
-
-## Workflow Security Model
-
-In GitHub Actions, there is a distinction between unprivileged and privileged workflows. For example, a workflow with a `pull_request` trigger is unprivileged while a workflow with `pull_request_target` is privileged.
-
-This is relevant especially for PRs from forks. Normal PRs can only be submitted by people who have write access to a repository, while PRs from forks can be submitted by anyone.
-
-On a PR from a fork, an unprivileged `pull_request` workflow has only limited capabilities but a privileged `pull_request_target` workflow is much more dangerous. A privileged workflow:
-
-  * Runs in the context of the base repository
-  * Has access to organization and repository secrets (e.g., API keys, deployment tokens)
-  * Has a read/write `GITHUB_TOKEN` by default
-  * Can access private resources
-
-Certain triggers automatically grant a workflow elevated privileges:
-
-  * `pull_request_target` as described above
-  * `workflow_run`: Triggered when another workflow completes.
-  * `issue_comment`: Triggered when a comment is made on an issue or PR.
-
-## Attack Details
-
-  * A repository has a privileged workflow
-  * An attacker forks the repository and adds malicious code (e.g., in the build script)
-  * The attacker opens a PR from the fork, and, if needed, comments on the PR
-  * The workflow in the base repository checks out the forked code
-  * The workflow runs the malicious code
-
-Please note that not only build scripts can be malicious code vectors. There is a large number of other possibilities. Some of them are listed in the [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/) catalog.
+GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. A potentially dangerous misuse of the triggers such as `pull_request_target` or `issue_comment` followed by an explicit checkout of untrusted code (Pull Request HEAD) may lead to repository compromise if untrusted code gets executed (e.g., due to a modified build script) in a privileged job.

 ## Recommendation

@@ -41,8 +12,6 @@ The best practice is to handle the potentially untrusted pull request via the **

 The artifacts downloaded from the first workflow should be considered untrusted and must be verified.

-Additionally, ensure that least privilege are used both at the workflow level (through event triggers and workflow permissions) and job level (through job permissions).
-
 ## Example

 ### Incorrect Usage
@@ -164,6 +133,3 @@ jobs:
 ## References

 - GitHub Security Lab Research: [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/).
- Mitigating risks of untrusted checkout: [GitHub Docs](https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/actions/reference/security/secure-use#mitigating-the-risks-of-untrusted-code-checkout).
- Securing with least privilege: [Workflow secure use](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/secure-use).
- Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/).
--- a/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.ql
+++ b/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.ql
@@ -51,6 +51,5 @@ where
  event.getName() = checkoutTriggers() and
  not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(checkout, event, "untrusted-checkout")) and
  not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(poisonable, event, "untrusted-checkout"))
-select checkout, checkout, poisonable,
-  "Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@).",
-  event, event.getName()
+select poisonable, checkout, poisonable,
+  "Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@)", event, event.getName()
--- a/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.md
+++ b/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.md
@@ -1,35 +1,6 @@
 ## Overview

-GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. Under certain conditions described below, attackers can take over a repository by opening malicious PRs from forks. The attacks can result in malicious code execution causing unauthorized changes to the repository or exfiltration of repository secrets and a compromise of connected systems.
-
-## Workflow Security Model
-
-In GitHub Actions, there is a distinction between unprivileged and privileged workflows. For example, a workflow with a `pull_request` trigger is unprivileged while a workflow with `pull_request_target` is privileged.
-
-This is relevant especially for PRs from forks. Normal PRs can only be submitted by people who have write access to a repository, while PRs from forks can be submitted by anyone.
-
-On a PR from a fork, an unprivileged `pull_request` workflow has only limited capabilities but a privileged `pull_request_target` workflow is much more dangerous. A privileged workflow:
-
-  * Runs in the context of the base repository
-  * Has access to organization and repository secrets (e.g., API keys, deployment tokens)
-  * Has a read/write `GITHUB_TOKEN` by default
-  * Can access private resources
-
-Certain triggers automatically grant a workflow elevated privileges:
-
-  * `pull_request_target` as described above
-  * `workflow_run`: Triggered when another workflow completes.
-  * `issue_comment`: Triggered when a comment is made on an issue or PR.
-
-## Attack Details
-
-  * A repository has a privileged workflow
-  * An attacker forks the repository and adds malicious code (e.g., in the build script)
-  * The attacker opens a PR from the fork, and, if needed, comments on the PR
-  * The workflow in the base repository checks out the forked code
-  * The workflow runs the malicious code
-
-Please note that not only build scripts can be malicious code vectors. There is a large number of other possibilities. Some of them are listed in the [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/) catalog.
+GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. A potentially dangerous misuse of the triggers such as `pull_request_target` or `issue_comment` followed by an explicit checkout of untrusted code (Pull Request HEAD) may lead to repository compromise if untrusted code gets executed (e.g., due to a modified build script) in a privileged job.

 ## Recommendation

@@ -41,8 +12,6 @@ The best practice is to handle the potentially untrusted pull request via the **

 The artifacts downloaded from the first workflow should be considered untrusted and must be verified.

-Additionally, ensure that least privilege are used both at the workflow level (through event triggers and workflow permissions) and job level (through job permissions).
-
 ## Example

 ### Incorrect Usage
@@ -164,6 +133,3 @@ jobs:
 ## References

 - GitHub Security Lab Research: [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/).
- Mitigating risks of untrusted checkout: [GitHub Docs](https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/actions/reference/security/secure-use#mitigating-the-risks-of-untrusted-code-checkout).
- Securing with least privilege: [Workflow secure use](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/secure-use).
- Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/).
--- a/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.ql
+++ b/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.ql
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /**
- * @name Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged context
+ * @name Checkout of untrusted code in trusted context
 * @description Privileged workflows have read/write access to the base repository and access to secrets.
 *              By explicitly checking out and running the build script from a fork the untrusted code is running in an environment
 *              that is able to push to the base repository and to access secrets.
@@ -42,6 +42,5 @@ where
    not event.getName() = "issue_comment" and
    not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(checkout, event, "untrusted-checkout"))
  )
-select checkout,
-  "Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@).",
-  event, event.getName()
+select checkout, "Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@)", event,
+  event.getName()
--- a/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutMedium.md
+++ b/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutMedium.md
@@ -1,35 +1,6 @@
 ## Overview

-GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. Under certain conditions described below, attackers can take over a repository by opening malicious PRs from forks. The attacks can result in malicious code execution causing unauthorized changes to the repository or exfiltration of repository secrets and a compromise of connected systems.
-
-## Workflow Security Model
-
-In GitHub Actions, there is a distinction between unprivileged and privileged workflows. For example, a workflow with a `pull_request` trigger is unprivileged while a workflow with `pull_request_target` is privileged.
-
-This is relevant especially for PRs from forks. Normal PRs can only be submitted by people who have write access to a repository, while PRs from forks can be submitted by anyone.
-
-On a PR from a fork, an unprivileged `pull_request` workflow has only limited capabilities but a privileged `pull_request_target` workflow is much more dangerous. A privileged workflow:
-
-  * Runs in the context of the base repository
-  * Has access to organization and repository secrets (e.g., API keys, deployment tokens)
-  * Has a read/write `GITHUB_TOKEN` by default
-  * Can access private resources
-
-Certain triggers automatically grant a workflow elevated privileges:
-
-  * `pull_request_target` as described above
-  * `workflow_run`: Triggered when another workflow completes.
-  * `issue_comment`: Triggered when a comment is made on an issue or PR.
-
-## Attack Details
-
-  * A repository has a privileged workflow
-  * An attacker forks the repository and adds malicious code (e.g., in the build script)
-  * The attacker opens a PR from the fork, and, if needed, comments on the PR
-  * The workflow in the base repository checks out the forked code
-  * The workflow runs the malicious code
-
-Please note that not only build scripts can be malicious code vectors. There is a large number of other possibilities. Some of them are listed in the [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/) catalog.
+GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. A potentially dangerous misuse of the triggers such as `pull_request_target` or `issue_comment` followed by an explicit checkout of untrusted code (Pull Request HEAD) may lead to repository compromise if untrusted code gets executed (e.g., due to a modified build script) in a privileged job.

 ## Recommendation

@@ -41,8 +12,6 @@ The best practice is to handle the potentially untrusted pull request via the **

 The artifacts downloaded from the first workflow should be considered untrusted and must be verified.

-Additionally, ensure that least privilege are used both at the workflow level (through event triggers and workflow permissions) and job level (through job permissions).
-
 ## Example

 ### Incorrect Usage
@@ -164,6 +133,3 @@ jobs:
 ## References

 - GitHub Security Lab Research: [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/).
- Mitigating risks of untrusted checkout: [GitHub Docs](https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/actions/reference/security/secure-use#mitigating-the-risks-of-untrusted-code-checkout).
- Securing with least privilege: [Workflow secure use](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/secure-use).
- Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/).
--- a/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutMedium.ql
+++ b/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutMedium.ql
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /**
- * @name Checkout of untrusted code in a trusted context
+ * @name Checkout of untrusted code in trusted context
 * @description Privileged workflows have read/write access to the base repository and access to secrets.
 *              By explicitly checking out and running the build script from a fork the untrusted code is running in an environment
 *              that is able to push to the base repository and to access secrets.
--- a/actions/ql/src/change-notes/released/0.6.27.md
+++ b/actions/ql/src/change-notes/released/0.6.27.md
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-## 0.6.27
-
-No user-facing changes.
--- a/actions/ql/src/change-notes/released/0.6.28.md
+++ b/actions/ql/src/change-notes/released/0.6.28.md
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-## 0.6.28
-
-### Query Metadata Changes
-
-* Adjusted the name of `actions/untrusted-checkout/high` to more clearly describe which parts of the scenario are in a privileged context.
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* The `actions/unpinned-tag` query now analyzes composite action metadata (`action.yml`/`action.yaml` files) in addition to workflow files, providing more comprehensive detection of unpinned action references across the entire Actions ecosystem.
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* Fixed help file descriptions for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`. Previously the messages were unclear as to why and how the vulnerabilities could occur. 
--- a/actions/ql/src/change-notes/released/0.6.29.md
+++ b/actions/ql/src/change-notes/released/0.6.29.md
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-## 0.6.29
-
-### Query Metadata Changes
-
-* Reversed adjustment of the name of `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, but kept the portion of the previous change for the word "trusted" to "privileged". Added a missing "a" to phrasing in `actions/untrusted-checkout/high` and `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`.
-
-### Major Analysis Improvements
-
-* Adjusted `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical` to align more with other untrusted resource queries, where the alert location is the location where the artifact is obtained from (the checkout point). This aligns with the other 2 related queries. This will cause the same alerts to re-open for closed alerts of this query.
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* Altered the alert message for clarity for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`.
-* The `actions/unpinned-tag` query now recognizes 64-character SHA-256 commit hashes as properly pinned references, in addition to 40-character SHA-1 hashes.
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* Adjusted (minor) help file descriptions for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`. Clarified wording on in minor point, added one more listed resource and added one more recommendation for things to check.
--- a/actions/ql/src/codeql-pack.release.yml
+++ b/actions/ql/src/codeql-pack.release.yml
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 ---
-lastReleaseVersion: 0.6.29
+lastReleaseVersion: 0.6.26
--- a/actions/ql/src/qlpack.yml
+++ b/actions/ql/src/qlpack.yml
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 name: codeql/actions-queries
-version: 0.6.30-dev
+version: 0.6.27-dev
 library: false
 warnOnImplicitThis: true
 groups: [actions, queries]
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Models/CompositeActionsSinks.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Models/CompositeActionsSinks.qlref
@@ -1 +1 @@
-query: Models/CompositeActionsSinks.ql
+Models/CompositeActionsSinks.ql
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Models/CompositeActionsSources.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Models/CompositeActionsSources.qlref
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
-query: Models/CompositeActionsSources.ql
+Models/CompositeActionsSources.ql
+
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Models/CompositeActionsSummaries.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Models/CompositeActionsSummaries.qlref
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
-query: Models/CompositeActionsSummaries.ql
+Models/CompositeActionsSummaries.ql
+
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Models/ReusableWorkflowsSinks.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Models/ReusableWorkflowsSinks.qlref
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
-query: Models/ReusableWorkflowsSinks.ql
+Models/ReusableWorkflowsSinks.ql
+
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Models/ReusableWorkflowsSources.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Models/ReusableWorkflowsSources.qlref
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
-query: Models/ReusableWorkflowsSources.ql
+Models/ReusableWorkflowsSources.ql
+
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Models/ReusableWorkflowsSummaries.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Models/ReusableWorkflowsSummaries.qlref
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
-query: Models/ReusableWorkflowsSummaries.ql
+Models/ReusableWorkflowsSummaries.ql
+
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-074/OutputClobberingHigh.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-074/OutputClobberingHigh.qlref
@@ -1 +1 @@
-query: experimental/Security/CWE-074/OutputClobberingHigh.ql
+experimental/Security/CWE-074/OutputClobberingHigh.ql
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionCritical.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionCritical.qlref
@@ -1 +1 @@
-query: Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionCritical.ql
+Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionCritical.ql
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionMedium.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionMedium.qlref
@@ -1 +1 @@
-query: Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionMedium.ql
+Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionMedium.ql
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-077/EnvVarInjectionCritical.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-077/EnvVarInjectionCritical.qlref
@@ -1 +1 @@
-query: Security/CWE-077/EnvVarInjectionCritical.ql
+Security/CWE-077/EnvVarInjectionCritical.ql
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-077/EnvVarInjectionMedium.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-077/EnvVarInjectionMedium.qlref
@@ -1 +1 @@
-query: Security/CWE-077/EnvVarInjectionMedium.ql
+Security/CWE-077/EnvVarInjectionMedium.ql
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-078/CommandInjectionCritical.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-078/CommandInjectionCritical.qlref
@@ -1 +1 @@
-query: experimental/Security/CWE-078/CommandInjectionCritical.ql
+experimental/Security/CWE-078/CommandInjectionCritical.ql
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-078/CommandInjectionMedium.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-078/CommandInjectionMedium.qlref
@@ -1 +1 @@
-query: experimental/Security/CWE-078/CommandInjectionMedium.ql
+experimental/Security/CWE-078/CommandInjectionMedium.ql
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-088/ArgumentInjectionCritical.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-088/ArgumentInjectionCritical.qlref
@@ -1 +1 @@
-query: experimental/Security/CWE-088/ArgumentInjectionCritical.ql
+experimental/Security/CWE-088/ArgumentInjectionCritical.ql
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-088/ArgumentInjectionMedium.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-088/ArgumentInjectionMedium.qlref
@@ -1 +1 @@
-query: experimental/Security/CWE-088/ArgumentInjectionMedium.ql
+experimental/Security/CWE-088/ArgumentInjectionMedium.ql
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionCritical.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionCritical.qlref
@@ -1 +1 @@
-query: Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionCritical.ql
+Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionCritical.ql
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionMedium.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionMedium.qlref
@@ -1 +1 @@
-query: Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionMedium.ql
+Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionMedium.ql
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-1395/UseOfKnownVulnerableAction.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-1395/UseOfKnownVulnerableAction.qlref
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
-query: Security/CWE-1395/UseOfKnownVulnerableAction.ql
+Security/CWE-1395/UseOfKnownVulnerableAction.ql
+
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-200/SecretExfiltration.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-200/SecretExfiltration.qlref
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
-query: experimental/Security/CWE-200/SecretExfiltration.ql
+experimental/Security/CWE-200/SecretExfiltration.ql
+
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-275/MissingActionsPermissions.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-275/MissingActionsPermissions.qlref
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
-query: Security/CWE-275/MissingActionsPermissions.ql
+Security/CWE-275/MissingActionsPermissions.ql
+
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-284/CodeExecutionOnSelfHostedRunner.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-284/CodeExecutionOnSelfHostedRunner.qlref
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
-query: experimental/Security/CWE-284/CodeExecutionOnSelfHostedRunner.ql
+experimental/Security/CWE-284/CodeExecutionOnSelfHostedRunner.ql
+
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-285/ImproperAccessControl.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-285/ImproperAccessControl.qlref
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
-query: Security/CWE-285/ImproperAccessControl.ql
+Security/CWE-285/ImproperAccessControl.ql
+
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-312/ExcessiveSecretsExposure.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-312/ExcessiveSecretsExposure.qlref
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
-query: Security/CWE-312/ExcessiveSecretsExposure.ql
+Security/CWE-312/ExcessiveSecretsExposure.ql
+
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-312/SecretsInArtifacts.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-312/SecretsInArtifacts.qlref
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
-query: Security/CWE-312/SecretsInArtifacts.ql
+Security/CWE-312/SecretsInArtifacts.ql
+
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-312/UnmaskedSecretExposure.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-312/UnmaskedSecretExposure.qlref
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
-query: Security/CWE-312/UnmaskedSecretExposure.ql
+Security/CWE-312/UnmaskedSecretExposure.ql
+
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaCodeInjection.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaCodeInjection.qlref
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
-query: Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaCodeInjection.ql
+Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaCodeInjection.ql
+
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaDirectCache.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaDirectCache.qlref
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
-query: Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaDirectCache.ql
+Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaDirectCache.ql
+
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaPoisonableStep.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaPoisonableStep.qlref
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
-query: Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaPoisonableStep.ql
+Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaPoisonableStep.ql
+
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-367/UntrustedCheckoutTOCTOUCritical.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-367/UntrustedCheckoutTOCTOUCritical.qlref
@@ -1 +1 @@
-query: Security/CWE-367/UntrustedCheckoutTOCTOUCritical.ql
+Security/CWE-367/UntrustedCheckoutTOCTOUCritical.ql
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-367/UntrustedCheckoutTOCTOUHigh.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-367/UntrustedCheckoutTOCTOUHigh.qlref
@@ -1 +1 @@
-query: Security/CWE-367/UntrustedCheckoutTOCTOUHigh.ql
+Security/CWE-367/UntrustedCheckoutTOCTOUHigh.ql
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-571/ExpressionIsAlwaysTrueCritical.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-571/ExpressionIsAlwaysTrueCritical.qlref
@@ -1 +1 @@
-query: Security/CWE-571/ExpressionIsAlwaysTrueCritical.ql
+Security/CWE-571/ExpressionIsAlwaysTrueCritical.ql
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-571/ExpressionIsAlwaysTrueHigh.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-571/ExpressionIsAlwaysTrueHigh.qlref
@@ -1 +1 @@
-query: Security/CWE-571/ExpressionIsAlwaysTrueHigh.ql
+Security/CWE-571/ExpressionIsAlwaysTrueHigh.ql
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/.github/actions/unpinned-tag/action.yml
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/.github/actions/unpinned-tag/action.yml
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-name: Composite unpinned tag test
-runs:
-  using: "composite"
-  steps:
-    - uses: foo/bar@v2
-    - uses: foo/bar@25b062c917b0c75f8b47d8469aff6c94ffd89abb
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/.github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/.github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml
@@ -11,9 +11,3 @@ jobs:
    - uses: foo/bar@25b062c917b0c75f8b47d8469aff6c94ffd89abb
    - uses: docker://foo/bar@latest
    - uses: docker://foo/bar@sha256:887a259a5a534f3c4f36cb02dca341673c6089431057242cdc931e9f133147e9
-    # SHA-256 pinned (64 hex chars) - should NOT be flagged
-    - uses: foo/bar@25b062c917b0c75f8b47d8469aff6c94ffd89abb25b062c917b0c75f8b47d84d
-    # SHA-1 pinned (40 hex chars) regression - should NOT be flagged
-    - uses: foo/bar@a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2
-    # Invalid 50-char hex string - should be flagged
-    - uses: foo/bar@a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2a1b2c3d4e5
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/ArtifactPoisoningCritical.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/ArtifactPoisoningCritical.qlref
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
-query: Security/CWE-829/ArtifactPoisoningCritical.ql
+Security/CWE-829/ArtifactPoisoningCritical.ql
+
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/ArtifactPoisoningMedium.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/ArtifactPoisoningMedium.qlref
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
-query: Security/CWE-829/ArtifactPoisoningMedium.ql
+Security/CWE-829/ArtifactPoisoningMedium.ql
+
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/ArtifactPoisoningPathTraversal.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/ArtifactPoisoningPathTraversal.qlref
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
-query: experimental/Security/CWE-829/ArtifactPoisoningPathTraversal.ql
+experimental/Security/CWE-829/ArtifactPoisoningPathTraversal.ql
+
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/UnpinnedActionsTag.expected
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/UnpinnedActionsTag.expected
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-| .github/actions/unpinned-tag/action.yml:5:13:5:22 | foo/bar@v2 | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'action.yml' step $@ uses 'foo/bar' with ref 'v2', not a pinned commit hash | .github/actions/unpinned-tag/action.yml:5:7:6:4 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:19:13:19:36 | completely/fakeaction@v2 | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'actor_trusted_checkout.yml' step $@ uses 'completely/fakeaction' with ref 'v2', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:19:7:23:4 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:23:13:23:37 | fakerepo/comment-on-pr@v1 | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'actor_trusted_checkout.yml' step $@ uses 'fakerepo/comment-on-pr' with ref 'v1', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:23:7:26:21 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:13:15:13:49 | dawidd6/action-download-artifact@v2 | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'Pull Request Open' step $@ uses 'dawidd6/action-download-artifact' with ref 'v2', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:13:9:18:6 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
@@ -34,4 +33,3 @@
 | .github/workflows/test18.yml:37:21:37:63 | sonarsource/sonarcloud-github-action@master | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'Sonar' step $@ uses 'sonarsource/sonarcloud-github-action' with ref 'master', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/test18.yml:36:15:40:58 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:10:13:10:22 | foo/bar@v1 | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'unpinned_tags.yml' step $@ uses 'foo/bar' with ref 'v1', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:10:7:11:4 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:12:13:12:35 | docker://foo/bar@latest | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'unpinned_tags.yml' step $@ uses 'docker://foo/bar' with ref 'latest', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:12:7:13:4 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
-| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:19:13:19:70 | foo/bar@a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2a1b2c3d4e5 | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'unpinned_tags.yml' step $@ uses 'foo/bar' with ref 'a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2a1b2c3d4e5', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:19:7:19:71 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/UnpinnedActionsTag.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/UnpinnedActionsTag.qlref
@@ -1 +1 @@
-query: Security/CWE-829/UnpinnedActionsTag.ql
+Security/CWE-829/UnpinnedActionsTag.ql
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.expected
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.expected
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ edges
 | .github/actions/download-artifact/action.yaml:25:7:29:4 | Run Step | .github/actions/download-artifact/action.yaml:29:7:32:18 | Run Step |
 | .github/actions/download-artifact/action.yaml:29:7:32:18 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning91.yml:19:9:25:6 | Run Step: metadata |
 | .github/actions/download-artifact/action.yaml:29:7:32:18 | Run Step | .github/workflows/resolve-args.yml:22:9:36:13 | Run Step: resolve-step |
-| .github/actions/unpinned-tag/action.yml:5:7:6:4 | Uses Step | .github/actions/unpinned-tag/action.yml:6:7:6:61 | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:9:7:14:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:14:7:15:4 | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:14:7:15:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:15:7:19:4 | Run Step |
 | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:15:7:19:4 | Run Step | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:19:7:23:4 | Uses Step |
@@ -312,10 +311,7 @@ edges
 | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:9:7:10:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:10:7:11:4 | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:10:7:11:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:11:7:12:4 | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:11:7:12:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:12:7:13:4 | Uses Step |
-| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:12:7:13:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:13:7:15:4 | Uses Step |
-| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:13:7:15:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:15:7:17:4 | Uses Step |
-| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:15:7:17:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:17:7:19:4 | Uses Step |
-| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:17:7:19:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:19:7:19:71 | Uses Step |
+| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:12:7:13:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:13:7:13:101 | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:7:9:14:6 | Run Step: pr_number | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:14:9:19:72 | Run Step |
 | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:11:9:12:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:12:9:13:6 | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:12:9:13:6 | Uses Step | .github/actions/dangerous-git-checkout/action.yml:6:7:11:4 | Uses Step |
@@ -338,42 +334,42 @@ edges
 | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step |
 | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_3.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_3.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step |
 #select
-| .github/actions/dangerous-git-checkout/action.yml:6:7:11:4 | Uses Step | .github/actions/dangerous-git-checkout/action.yml:6:7:11:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:13:9:13:23 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:32:9:37:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:48:9:52:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:79:9:84:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:84:9:93:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:15:9:20:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:15:9:20:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:25:9:48:6 | Run Step: set-milestone | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:3:5:3:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/reusable_caller1.yaml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:10:11:18:8 | Run Step | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:10:11:18:8 | Run Step | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:21:11:23:22 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:12:7:16:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:12:7:16:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:17:7:21:4 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/level0.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/level0.yml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/level0.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/level0.yml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:42:9:47:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:52:9:58:24 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:216:9:222:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:216:9:222:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:222:9:227:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:250:9:256:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:250:9:256:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:256:9:261:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:284:9:290:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:284:9:290:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:290:9:295:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:391:9:395:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:395:9:404:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:404:9:414:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:414:9:423:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:423:9:432:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/reusable_caller3.yaml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:33:9:36:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:36:9:39:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:49:9:59:6 | Run Step: benchmark-pr | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:59:9:60:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:60:9:60:37 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/test10.yml:20:9:25:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test10.yml:20:9:25:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test10.yml:25:9:30:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test10.yml:8:3:8:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/test11.yml:84:7:90:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test11.yml:84:7:90:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test11.yml:90:7:93:54 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test11.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/test17.yml:12:15:19:12 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test17.yml:12:15:19:12 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test17.yml:19:15:23:58 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test17.yml:3:5:3:16 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/test27.yml:18:9:21:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test27.yml:18:9:21:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test27.yml:21:9:22:16 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test26.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/test29.yml:8:7:14:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test29.yml:8:7:14:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test29.yml:14:7:21:11 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test29.yml:1:5:1:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:35:7:41:4 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:41:7:47:4 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:47:7:51:46 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:8:9:11:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:8:9:11:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:15:9:18:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:30:9:32:23 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:32:9:37:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:32:9:37:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:48:9:52:2 | Run Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:48:9:52:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:79:9:84:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:79:9:84:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:84:9:93:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:84:9:93:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:25:9:48:6 | Run Step: set-milestone | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:15:9:20:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:25:9:48:6 | Run Step: set-milestone | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:3:5:3:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/reusable_caller1.yaml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:21:11:23:22 | Run Step | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:10:11:18:8 | Run Step | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:21:11:23:22 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:17:7:21:4 | Run Step | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:12:7:16:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:17:7:21:4 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/level0.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/level0.yml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/level0.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/level0.yml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/poc2.yml:42:9:47:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:42:9:47:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/poc2.yml:52:9:58:24 | Run Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:52:9:58:24 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:222:9:227:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:216:9:222:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:222:9:227:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:256:9:261:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:250:9:256:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:256:9:261:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:290:9:295:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:284:9:290:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:290:9:295:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:391:9:395:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:391:9:395:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:395:9:404:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:395:9:404:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:404:9:414:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:404:9:414:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:414:9:423:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:414:9:423:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:423:9:432:2 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:423:9:432:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/reusable_caller3.yaml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/test7.yml:33:9:36:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:33:9:36:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/test7.yml:36:9:39:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:36:9:39:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/test7.yml:49:9:59:6 | Run Step: benchmark-pr | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:49:9:59:6 | Run Step: benchmark-pr | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/test7.yml:59:9:60:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:59:9:60:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/test7.yml:60:9:60:37 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:60:9:60:37 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/test10.yml:25:9:30:2 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test10.yml:20:9:25:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test10.yml:25:9:30:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test10.yml:8:3:8:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/test11.yml:90:7:93:54 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test11.yml:84:7:90:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test11.yml:90:7:93:54 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test11.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/test17.yml:19:15:23:58 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test17.yml:12:15:19:12 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test17.yml:19:15:23:58 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test17.yml:3:5:3:16 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/test27.yml:21:9:22:16 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test27.yml:18:9:21:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test27.yml:21:9:22:16 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test26.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/test29.yml:14:7:21:11 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test29.yml:8:7:14:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test29.yml:14:7:21:11 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test29.yml:1:5:1:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:13:9:13:23 | Run Step | .github/actions/dangerous-git-checkout/action.yml:6:7:11:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:13:9:13:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:35:7:41:4 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:35:7:41:4 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:41:7:47:4 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:41:7:47:4 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:47:7:51:46 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:47:7:51:46 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:15:9:18:2 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:8:9:11:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:15:9:18:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:30:9:32:23 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:30:9:32:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.qlref
@@ -1 +1 @@
-query: Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.ql
+Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.ql
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.expected
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.expected
@@ -1,23 +1,23 @@
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:12:9:16:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:20:9:24:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:28:9:32:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:35:9:40:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:43:9:46:126 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:28:9:33:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:48:7:50:46 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit2.yml:27:9:31:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:26:9:30:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:30:9:35:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:57:9:62:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:79:9:83:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:95:9:100:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:109:9:114:66 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:103:9:109:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:139:9:144:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:444:9:449:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/test13.yml:20:7:25:4 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test13.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:14:9:19:72 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:1:5:1:17 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
-| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:12:9:16:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:20:9:24:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:28:9:32:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:35:9:40:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:43:9:46:126 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:28:9:33:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:48:7:50:46 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit2.yml:27:9:31:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:26:9:30:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:30:9:35:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:57:9:62:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:79:9:83:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:95:9:100:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:109:9:114:66 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:103:9:109:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:139:9:144:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:444:9:449:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/test13.yml:20:7:25:4 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test13.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:14:9:19:72 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:1:5:1:17 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
+| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.qlref
@@ -1 +1 @@
-query: Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.ql
+Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.ql
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutMedium.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutMedium.qlref
@@ -1 +1 @@
-query: Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutMedium.ql
+Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutMedium.ql
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/UnversionedImmutableAction.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/UnversionedImmutableAction.qlref
@@ -1 +1 @@
-query: experimental/Security/CWE-829/UnversionedImmutableAction.ql
+experimental/Security/CWE-829/UnversionedImmutableAction.ql
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-918/RequestForgery.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-918/RequestForgery.qlref
@@ -1 +1 @@
-query: experimental/Security/CWE-918/RequestForgery.ql
+experimental/Security/CWE-918/RequestForgery.ql
--- a/actions/ql/test/query-tests/SyntaxError/SyntaxError.qlref
+++ b/actions/ql/test/query-tests/SyntaxError/SyntaxError.qlref
@@ -1 +1 @@
-query: Debug/SyntaxError.ql
+Debug/SyntaxError.ql
--- a/Practice/CodeQL/UnnecessaryUseOfAdvancedConfig.qlref
+++ b/Practice/CodeQL/UnnecessaryUseOfAdvancedConfig.qlref
@@ -1 +1 @@
-query: Violations Of Best Practice/CodeQL/UnnecessaryUseOfAdvancedConfig.ql
+Violations Of Best Practice/CodeQL/UnnecessaryUseOfAdvancedConfig.ql
--- a/config/identical-files.json
+++ b/config/identical-files.json
@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@
    "java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/dataflow/internal/rangeanalysis/SignAnalysisCommon.qll",
    "csharp/ql/lib/semmle/code/csharp/dataflow/internal/rangeanalysis/SignAnalysisCommon.qll"
  ],
+  "Bound Java/C#": [
+    "java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/dataflow/Bound.qll",
+    "csharp/ql/lib/semmle/code/csharp/dataflow/Bound.qll"
+  ],
  "ModulusAnalysis Java/C#": [
    "java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/dataflow/ModulusAnalysis.qll",
    "csharp/ql/lib/semmle/code/csharp/dataflow/ModulusAnalysis.qll"
--- a/cpp/downgrades/837c4e02326aee4582405d069263092e80a15d82/old.dbscheme
+++ b/cpp/downgrades/837c4e02326aee4582405d069263092e80a15d82/old.dbscheme
--- a/cpp/downgrades/837c4e02326aee4582405d069263092e80a15d82/semmlecode.cpp.dbscheme
+++ b/cpp/downgrades/837c4e02326aee4582405d069263092e80a15d82/semmlecode.cpp.dbscheme
--- a/cpp/downgrades/837c4e02326aee4582405d069263092e80a15d82/upgrade.properties
+++ b/cpp/downgrades/837c4e02326aee4582405d069263092e80a15d82/upgrade.properties
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-description: Support alias templates
-compatibility: full
-is_alias_template.rel: delete
-alias_instantiation.rel: delete
-alias_template_argument.rel: delete
-alias_template_argument_value.rel: delete
--- a/cpp/downgrades/ef8d209a22e27413aaaeff4446f0ecb9fa2c227b/old.dbscheme
+++ b/cpp/downgrades/ef8d209a22e27413aaaeff4446f0ecb9fa2c227b/old.dbscheme
--- a/cpp/downgrades/ef8d209a22e27413aaaeff4446f0ecb9fa2c227b/semmlecode.cpp.dbscheme
+++ b/cpp/downgrades/ef8d209a22e27413aaaeff4446f0ecb9fa2c227b/semmlecode.cpp.dbscheme
--- a/cpp/downgrades/ef8d209a22e27413aaaeff4446f0ecb9fa2c227b/upgrade.properties
+++ b/cpp/downgrades/ef8d209a22e27413aaaeff4446f0ecb9fa2c227b/upgrade.properties
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-description: Capture information about one template being generated from another
-compatibility: full
-class_template_generated_from.rel: delete
-function_template_generated_from.rel: delete
-variable_template_generated_from.rel: delete
-alias_template_generated_from.rel: delete
--- a/cpp/ql/lib/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/cpp/ql/lib/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -1,36 +1,3 @@
-## 10.2.0
-
-### Deprecated APIs
-
-* The `UsingAliasTypedefType` class has been deprecated. Use `TypeAliasType` instead.
-
-### New Features
-
-* Added a `getOriginalTemplate` predicate to `TemplateClass`, `TemplateFunction`, `TemplateVariable`, and `AliasTemplateType`, which yields the class member template the template was generated from. The predicates only have results for templates that are members of class template instantiations.
-* Added `AliasTemplateType` and `AliasTemplateInstantiationType` classes, representing C++ alias templates and their instantiations.
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* Added flow source models for `scanf_s` and related functions.
-* Added a `Call` column to `LocalFlowSourceFunction::hasLocalFlowSource` and `RemoteFlowSourceFunction::hasRemoteFlowSource`. The old predicates without a `Call` column continue to be supported.
-
-## 10.1.1
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* The `RemoteFlowSourceFunction` model for `fscanf` (and variants) now implements `hasSocketInput` to reflect that these functions may read from a socket.
-
-## 10.1.0
-
-### New Features
-
-* A new predicate `getSwitchCase` was added to the `SwitchStmt` class, which yields the `n`th `case` statement from a `switch` statement.
-* Data flow barriers and barrier guards can now be added using data extensions. For more information see [Customizing library models for C and C++](https://codeql.github.com/docs/codeql-language-guides/customizing-library-models-for-cpp/).
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* Added taint flow models for the `Strsafe.h` header from the Windows SDK.
-
 ## 10.0.0

 ### Breaking Changes
--- a/cpp/ql/lib/DefaultOptions.qll
+++ b/cpp/ql/lib/DefaultOptions.qll
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ class Options extends string {
  predicate overrideReturnsNull(Call call) {
    // Used in CVS:
    call.(FunctionCall).getTarget().hasGlobalName("Xstrdup")
+    or
+    CustomOptions::overrideReturnsNull(call) // old Options.qll
  }

  /**
@@ -43,6 +45,8 @@ class Options extends string {
    // Used in CVS:
    call.(FunctionCall).getTarget().hasGlobalName("Xstrdup") and
    nullValue(call.getArgument(0))
+    or
+    CustomOptions::returnsNull(call) // old Options.qll
  }

  /**
@@ -61,6 +65,8 @@ class Options extends string {
    f.hasGlobalOrStdName([
        "exit", "_exit", "_Exit", "abort", "__assert_fail", "longjmp", "__builtin_unreachable"
      ])
+    or
+    CustomOptions::exits(f) // old Options.qll
  }

  /**
@@ -73,7 +79,8 @@ class Options extends string {
   * runtime, the program's behavior is undefined)
   */
  predicate exprExits(Expr e) {
-    e.(AssumeExpr).getChild(0).(CompileTimeConstantInt).getIntValue() = 0
+    e.(AssumeExpr).getChild(0).(CompileTimeConstantInt).getIntValue() = 0 or
+    CustomOptions::exprExits(e) // old Options.qll
  }

  /**
@@ -81,7 +88,10 @@ class Options extends string {
   *
   * By default holds only for `fgets`.
   */
-  predicate alwaysCheckReturnValue(Function f) { f.hasGlobalOrStdName("fgets") }
+  predicate alwaysCheckReturnValue(Function f) {
+    f.hasGlobalOrStdName("fgets") or
+    CustomOptions::alwaysCheckReturnValue(f) // old Options.qll
+  }

  /**
   * Holds if it is reasonable to ignore the return value of function
@@ -97,6 +107,8 @@ class Options extends string {
    // common way of sleeping using select:
    fc.getTarget().hasGlobalName("select") and
    fc.getArgument(0).getValue() = "0"
+    or
+    CustomOptions::okToIgnoreReturnValue(fc) // old Options.qll
  }
 }

--- a/cpp/ql/lib/Options.qll
+++ b/cpp/ql/lib/Options.qll
@@ -98,3 +98,57 @@ class CustomMutexType extends MutexType {
   */
  override predicate unlockAccess(FunctionCall fc, Expr arg) { none() }
 }
+
+/**
+ * DEPRECATED: customize `CustomOptions.overrideReturnsNull` instead.
+ *
+ * This predicate is required to support backwards compatibility for
+ * older `Options.qll` files.  It should not be removed or modified by
+ * end users.
+ */
+predicate overrideReturnsNull(Call call) { none() }
+
+/**
+ * DEPRECATED: customize `CustomOptions.returnsNull` instead.
+ *
+ * This predicate is required to support backwards compatibility for
+ * older `Options.qll` files.  It should not be removed or modified by
+ * end users.
+ */
+predicate returnsNull(Call call) { none() }
+
+/**
+ * DEPRECATED: customize `CustomOptions.exits` instead.
+ *
+ * This predicate is required to support backwards compatibility for
+ * older `Options.qll` files.  It should not be removed or modified by
+ * end users.
+ */
+predicate exits(Function f) { none() }
+
+/**
+ * DEPRECATED: customize `CustomOptions.exprExits` instead.
+ *
+ * This predicate is required to support backwards compatibility for
+ * older `Options.qll` files.  It should not be removed or modified by
+ * end users.
+ */
+predicate exprExits(Expr e) { none() }
+
+/**
+ * DEPRECATED: customize `CustomOptions.alwaysCheckReturnValue` instead.
+ *
+ * This predicate is required to support backwards compatibility for
+ * older `Options.qll` files.  It should not be removed or modified by
+ * end users.
+ */
+predicate alwaysCheckReturnValue(Function f) { none() }
+
+/**
+ * DEPRECATED: customize `CustomOptions.okToIgnoreReturnValue` instead.
+ *
+ * This predicate is required to support backwards compatibility for
+ * older `Options.qll` files.  It should not be removed or modified by
+ * end users.
+ */
+predicate okToIgnoreReturnValue(FunctionCall fc) { none() }
--- a/cpp/ql/lib/change-notes/2026-03-20-data-extensions-barriers.md
+++ b/cpp/ql/lib/change-notes/2026-03-20-data-extensions-barriers.md
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+---
+category: feature
+---
+* Data flow barriers and barrier guards can now be added using data extensions. For more information see [Customizing library models for C and C++](https://codeql.github.com/docs/codeql-language-guides/customizing-library-models-for-cpp/).
--- a/cpp/ql/lib/change-notes/2026-03-28-switch-stmt.md
+++ b/cpp/ql/lib/change-notes/2026-03-28-switch-stmt.md
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+---
+category: feature
+---
+* A new predicate `getSwitchCase` was added to the `SwitchStmt` class, which yields the `n`th `case` statement from a `switch` statement.
--- a/cpp/ql/lib/change-notes/2026-04-28-strsafe.md
+++ b/cpp/ql/lib/change-notes/2026-04-28-strsafe.md
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+---
+category: minorAnalysis
+---
+* Added taint flow models for the `Strsafe.h` header from the Windows SDK.
--- a/cpp/ql/lib/change-notes/2026-05-27-deprecated-removal.md
+++ b/cpp/ql/lib/change-notes/2026-05-27-deprecated-removal.md
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
---
-category: breaking
---
-* Removed the deprecated `overrideReturnsNull` predicate from `Options.qll`. Use `CustomOptions.overrideReturnsNull` instead.
-* Removed the deprecated `returnsNull` predicate from `Options.qll`. Use `CustomOptions.returnsNull` instead.
-* Removed the deprecated `exits` predicate from `Options.qll`. Use `CustomOptions.exits` instead.
-* Removed the deprecated `exprExits` predicate from `Options.qll`. Use `CustomOptions.exprExits` instead.
-* Removed the deprecated `alwaysCheckReturnValue` predicate from `Options.qll`. Use `CustomOptions.alwaysCheckReturnValue` instead.
-* Removed the deprecated `okToIgnoreReturnValue` predicate from `Options.qll`. Use `CustomOptions.okToIgnoreReturnValue` instead.
-* Removed the deprecated `semmle.code.cpp.Member`. Import `semmle.code.cpp.Element` and/or `semmle.code.cpp.Type` directly.
-* Removed the deprecated `UnknownDefaultLocation` class. Use `UnknownLocation` instead.
-* Removed the deprecated `UnknownExprLocation` class. Use `UnknownLocation` instead.
-* Removed the deprecated `UnknownStmtLocation` class. Use `UnknownLocation` instead.
-* Removed the deprecated `TemplateParameter` class. Use `TypeTemplateParameter` instead.
-* Support for class resolution across link targets has been removed for databases which were created with CodeQL versions before 1.23.0.
--- a/cpp/ql/lib/change-notes/released/10.1.0.md
+++ b/cpp/ql/lib/change-notes/released/10.1.0.md
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-## 10.1.0
-
-### New Features
-
-* A new predicate `getSwitchCase` was added to the `SwitchStmt` class, which yields the `n`th `case` statement from a `switch` statement.
-* Data flow barriers and barrier guards can now be added using data extensions. For more information see [Customizing library models for C and C++](https://codeql.github.com/docs/codeql-language-guides/customizing-library-models-for-cpp/).
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* Added taint flow models for the `Strsafe.h` header from the Windows SDK.
--- a/cpp/ql/lib/change-notes/released/10.1.1.md
+++ b/cpp/ql/lib/change-notes/released/10.1.1.md
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-## 10.1.1
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* The `RemoteFlowSourceFunction` model for `fscanf` (and variants) now implements `hasSocketInput` to reflect that these functions may read from a socket.
--- a/cpp/ql/lib/change-notes/released/10.2.0.md
+++ b/cpp/ql/lib/change-notes/released/10.2.0.md
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-## 10.2.0
-
-### Deprecated APIs
-
-* The `UsingAliasTypedefType` class has been deprecated. Use `TypeAliasType` instead.
-
-### New Features
-
-* Added a `getOriginalTemplate` predicate to `TemplateClass`, `TemplateFunction`, `TemplateVariable`, and `AliasTemplateType`, which yields the class member template the template was generated from. The predicates only have results for templates that are members of class template instantiations.
-* Added `AliasTemplateType` and `AliasTemplateInstantiationType` classes, representing C++ alias templates and their instantiations.
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* Added flow source models for `scanf_s` and related functions.
-* Added a `Call` column to `LocalFlowSourceFunction::hasLocalFlowSource` and `RemoteFlowSourceFunction::hasRemoteFlowSource`. The old predicates without a `Call` column continue to be supported.
--- a/cpp/ql/lib/codeql-pack.release.yml
+++ b/cpp/ql/lib/codeql-pack.release.yml
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 ---
-lastReleaseVersion: 10.2.0
+lastReleaseVersion: 10.0.0
--- a/cpp/ql/lib/cpp.qll
+++ b/cpp/ql/lib/cpp.qll
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ import semmle.code.cpp.Class
 import semmle.code.cpp.Struct
 import semmle.code.cpp.Union
 import semmle.code.cpp.Enum
+import semmle.code.cpp.Member
 import semmle.code.cpp.Field
 import semmle.code.cpp.Function
 import semmle.code.cpp.MemberFunction
--- a/cpp/ql/lib/qlpack.yml
+++ b/cpp/ql/lib/qlpack.yml
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 name: codeql/cpp-all
-version: 10.2.1-dev
+version: 10.0.1-dev
 groups: cpp
 dbscheme: semmlecode.cpp.dbscheme
 extractor: cpp
--- a/cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/Class.qll
+++ b/cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/Class.qll
@@ -856,10 +856,8 @@ class AbstractClass extends Class {

 /**
 * A class template (this class also finds partial specializations
- * of class templates).
- *
- * For example in the following code there is a `MyTemplateClass<T>`
- * template:
+ * of class templates).  For example in the following code there is a
+ * `MyTemplateClass<T>` template:
 * ```
 * template<class T>
 * class MyTemplateClass {
@@ -895,29 +893,6 @@ class TemplateClass extends Class {
  }

  override string getAPrimaryQlClass() { result = "TemplateClass" }
-
-  /**
-   * Gets the class member template this template was generated from.
-   *
-   * This predicate only has results for templates that are members of class
-   * template instantiations. For example, for `MyTemplateClass<int>::C<S>`
-   * in the following code, the result is `MyTemplateClass<T>::C<S>`.
-   * ```cpp
-   * template<class T>
-   * class MyTemplateClass {
-   *   template<class S>
-   *   class C {
-   *     ...
-   *   };
-   * };
-   *
-   * template
-   * class MyTemplateClass<int>;
-   * ```
-   */
-  TemplateClass getOriginalTemplate() {
-    class_template_generated_from(underlyingElement(this), unresolveElement(result))
-  }
 }

 /**
--- a/cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/Declaration.qll
+++ b/cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/Declaration.qll
@@ -278,8 +278,6 @@ class Declaration extends Locatable, @declaration {
    or
    variable_template_argument(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
    or
-    alias_template_argument(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
-    or
    template_template_argument(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
    or
    concept_template_argument(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
@@ -292,8 +290,6 @@ class Declaration extends Locatable, @declaration {
    or
    variable_template_argument_value(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
    or
-    alias_template_argument_value(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
-    or
    template_template_argument_value(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
    or
    concept_template_argument_value(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
--- a/cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/Element.qll
+++ b/cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/Element.qll
@@ -278,15 +278,6 @@ private predicate isFromTemplateInstantiationRec(Element e, Element instantiatio
  instantiation.(Variable).isConstructedFrom(_) and
  e = instantiation
  or
-  instantiation.(TypeAliasType).isConstructedFrom(_) and
-  e = instantiation
-  or
-  instantiation.(TemplateTemplateParameterInstantiation).isConstructedFrom(_) and
-  e = instantiation
-  or
-  exists(instantiation.(ConceptIdExpr).getConcept()) and
-  e = instantiation
-  or
  isFromTemplateInstantiationRec(e.getEnclosingElement(), instantiation)
 }

@@ -300,15 +291,6 @@ private predicate isFromUninstantiatedTemplateRec(Element e, Element template) {
  is_variable_template(unresolveElement(template)) and
  e = template
  or
-  is_alias_template(unresolveElement(template)) and
-  e = template
-  or
-  usertypes(unresolveElement(template), _, 8) and // template template parameter
-  e = template
-  or
-  template instanceof @concept_template and
-  e = template
-  or
  isFromUninstantiatedTemplateRec(e.getEnclosingElement(), template)
 }

--- a/cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/Function.qll
+++ b/cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/Function.qll
@@ -828,27 +828,6 @@ class TemplateFunction extends Function {
   * such things -- see FunctionTemplateSpecialization for further details.
   */
  FunctionTemplateSpecialization getASpecialization() { result.getPrimaryTemplate() = this }
-
-  /**
-   * Gets the class member template this template was generated from.
-   *
-   * This predicate only has results for templates that are members of class
-   * template instantiations. For example, for `MyTemplateClass<int>::f<S>`
-   * in the following code, the result is `MyTemplateClass<T>::f<S>`.
-   * ```cpp
-   * template<class T>
-   * class MyTemplateClass {
-   *   template<class S>
-   *   S f();
-   * };
-   *
-   * template
-   * class MyTemplateClass<int>;
-   * ```
-   */
-  TemplateFunction getOriginalTemplate() {
-    function_template_generated_from(underlyingElement(this), unresolveElement(result))
-  }
 }

 /**
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
BazookaMusic	d0ffde8c45	Em-dash - of course :D	2026-06-08 14:03:12 +02:00
BazookaMusic	b6c951e90c	Remove redundant file	2026-06-08 13:47:44 +02:00
BazookaMusic	2cb0851900	1. Rename AgentSDK -> AgentSdk 2. Remove redundant constant comparison barriers. This is already happening by default by the taint tracking library.	2026-06-08 12:55:52 +02:00
BazookaMusic	e370af6444	QLDoc + include the queries in the correct expected files per query suite	2026-06-08 12:38:28 +02:00
BazookaMusic	61be37d718	Formatting	2026-06-08 12:15:50 +02:00
BazookaMusic	da05992a09	Better document the new queries	2026-06-08 11:27:40 +02:00
BazookaMusic	078d15e165	add openrouter support	2026-06-04 16:42:49 +02:00
BazookaMusic	6c5c8e1c9b	move system prompt injection to non-experimental	2026-05-20 10:48:07 +02:00
BazookaMusic	5ef09a102c	add tests for langchain and remove wrong model for guardrails agent	2026-05-15 12:49:36 +02:00
BazookaMusic	fe7eabd56f	Add run from agents into the user prompt and fix an issue with classifying it as a system prompt injection	2026-05-15 12:39:54 +02:00
BazookaMusic	535adc7a31	add barrier when data flows into user messages for system prompt detection, remove embeddings from user prompt injection query	2026-05-15 12:14:14 +02:00
BazookaMusic	9c136264de	remove guardrails sanitizer for now	2026-05-13 13:37:44 +02:00
BazookaMusic	34da804aee	Move structurally typed prompt injection sinks to Models as Data Move OpenAI, Anthropic, Google GenAI, and LangChain sinks that are structurally typed (identified by API name alone) into MaD YAML files. Role-filtered sinks that require inspecting a sibling 'role' property remain in QL code since MaD cannot express conditional logic. Use two distinct sink kinds: - user-prompt-injection: picked up by UserPromptInjection.ql - system-prompt-injection: picked up by SystemPromptInjection.ql New files: - javascript/ql/lib/ext/openai.model.yml - javascript/ql/lib/ext/anthropic.model.yml - javascript/ql/lib/ext/google-genai.model.yml - javascript/ql/lib/ext/langchain.model.yml	2026-05-13 11:08:25 +02:00
BazookaMusic	98379cffcb	Documentation	2026-05-12 16:11:31 +02:00
BazookaMusic	9006ddb793	default threat model	2026-05-12 15:28:08 +02:00
BazookaMusic	74a3ba1f0d	changes for spliting into system and user	2026-05-04 11:57:43 +02:00
BazookaMusic	0b7133c4ce	JS: Add prompt injection detection (CWE-1427) for OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google GenAI SDKs Add experimental CodeQL query detecting prompt injection vulnerabilities in JavaScript/TypeScript applications using AI SDK libraries. Modeled frameworks: - openai (OpenAI, AzureOpenAI): responses, chat.completions, completions, images, embeddings, beta.assistants, beta.threads, audio APIs - @openai/agents: Agent instructions, handoffDescription, run/Runner.run, asTool, tool() - @anthropic-ai/sdk: messages.create, beta.messages.create, beta.agents.create/update - @google/genai (GoogleGenAI): generateContent, generateContentStream, generateImages, editImage, chats, live.connect Includes role-based filtering (system/developer/assistant/model roles) and constant-comparison sanitizer guard.	2026-04-30 17:39:09 +02:00