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2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Philip Ginsbach
8cdd8b6ae0 use instanceof extensions in javascript 2021-05-12 18:58:45 +01:00
Erik Krogh Kristensen
0194af9432 convert field based range pattern to casting based range pattern 2021-05-12 16:49:43 +02:00
1938 changed files with 23934 additions and 211240 deletions

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@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
{ "provide": [ "*/ql/src/qlpack.yml",
"*/ql/test/qlpack.yml",
"cpp/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE/CWE-190/semmle/tainted/qlpack.yml",
"*/ql/examples/qlpack.yml",
"*/upgrades/qlpack.yml",
"misc/legacy-support/*/qlpack.yml",

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@@ -19,5 +19,5 @@ jobs:
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
run: |
gh api 'repos/${{github.repository}}/pulls/${{github.event.number}}/files' --paginate --jq 'any(.[].filename ; test("/change-notes/.*[.]md$"))' |
grep true -c
gh api 'repos/${{github.repository}}/pulls/${{github.event.number}}/files' --paginate |
jq 'any(.[].filename ; test("/change-notes/.*[.]md$"))' --exit-status

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@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
name: Check framework coverage changes
on:
pull_request:
paths:
- '.github/workflows/csv-coverage-pr-comment.yml'
- '*/ql/src/**/*.ql'
- '*/ql/src/**/*.qll'
- 'misc/scripts/library-coverage/*.py'
# input data files
- '*/documentation/library-coverage/cwe-sink.csv'
- '*/documentation/library-coverage/frameworks.csv'
branches:
- main
- 'rc/*'
jobs:
generate:
name: Generate framework coverage artifacts
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Dump GitHub context
env:
GITHUB_CONTEXT: ${{ toJSON(github.event) }}
run: echo "$GITHUB_CONTEXT"
- name: Clone self (github/codeql) - MERGE
uses: actions/checkout@v2
with:
path: merge
- name: Clone self (github/codeql) - BASE
uses: actions/checkout@v2
with:
fetch-depth: 2
path: base
- run: |
git checkout HEAD^1
git log -1 --format='%H'
working-directory: base
- name: Set up Python 3.8
uses: actions/setup-python@v2
with:
python-version: 3.8
- name: Download CodeQL CLI
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
run: |
gh release download --repo "github/codeql-cli-binaries" --pattern "codeql-linux64.zip"
- name: Unzip CodeQL CLI
run: unzip -d codeql-cli codeql-linux64.zip
- name: Generate CSV files on merge commit of the PR
run: |
echo "Running generator on merge"
PATH="$PATH:codeql-cli/codeql" python merge/misc/scripts/library-coverage/generate-report.py ci merge merge
mkdir out_merge
cp framework-coverage-*.csv out_merge/
cp framework-coverage-*.rst out_merge/
- name: Generate CSV files on base commit of the PR
run: |
echo "Running generator on base"
PATH="$PATH:codeql-cli/codeql" python base/misc/scripts/library-coverage/generate-report.py ci base base
mkdir out_base
cp framework-coverage-*.csv out_base/
cp framework-coverage-*.rst out_base/
- name: Generate diff of coverage reports
run: |
python base/misc/scripts/library-coverage/compare-folders.py out_base out_merge comparison.md
- name: Upload CSV package list
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v2
with:
name: csv-framework-coverage-merge
path: |
out_merge/framework-coverage-*.csv
out_merge/framework-coverage-*.rst
- name: Upload CSV package list
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v2
with:
name: csv-framework-coverage-base
path: |
out_base/framework-coverage-*.csv
out_base/framework-coverage-*.rst
- name: Upload comparison results
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v2
with:
name: comparison
path: |
comparison.md
- name: Save PR number
run: |
mkdir -p pr
echo ${{ github.event.pull_request.number }} > pr/NR
- name: Upload PR number
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v2
with:
name: pr
path: pr/

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@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
name: Comment on PR with framework coverage changes
on:
workflow_run:
workflows: ["Check framework coverage changes"]
types:
- completed
jobs:
check:
name: Check framework coverage differences and comment
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
if: >
${{ github.event.workflow_run.event == 'pull_request' &&
github.event.workflow_run.conclusion == 'success' }}
steps:
- name: Dump GitHub context
env:
GITHUB_CONTEXT: ${{ toJSON(github.event) }}
run: echo "$GITHUB_CONTEXT"
- name: Clone self (github/codeql)
uses: actions/checkout@v2
- name: Set up Python 3.8
uses: actions/setup-python@v2
with:
python-version: 3.8
- name: Check coverage difference file and comment
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
RUN_ID: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.id }}
run: |
python misc/scripts/library-coverage/comment-pr.py "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" "$RUN_ID"

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@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
name: Build framework coverage timeseries reports
on:
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Clone self (github/codeql)
uses: actions/checkout@v2
with:
path: script
- name: Clone self (github/codeql) for analysis
uses: actions/checkout@v2
with:
path: codeqlModels
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Set up Python 3.8
uses: actions/setup-python@v2
with:
python-version: 3.8
- name: Download CodeQL CLI
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
run: |
gh release download --repo "github/codeql-cli-binaries" --pattern "codeql-linux64.zip"
- name: Unzip CodeQL CLI
run: unzip -d codeql-cli codeql-linux64.zip
- name: Build modeled package list
run: |
CLI=$(realpath "codeql-cli/codeql")
echo $CLI
PATH="$PATH:$CLI" python script/misc/scripts/library-coverage/generate-timeseries.py codeqlModels
- name: Upload timeseries CSV
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v2
with:
name: framework-coverage-timeseries
path: framework-coverage-timeseries-*.csv

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@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
name: Update framework coverage reports
on:
workflow_dispatch:
schedule:
- cron: "0 0 * * *"
jobs:
update:
name: Update framework coverage report
if: github.event.repository.fork == false
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Dump GitHub context
env:
GITHUB_CONTEXT: ${{ toJSON(github.event) }}
run: echo "$GITHUB_CONTEXT"
- name: Clone self (github/codeql)
uses: actions/checkout@v2
with:
path: ql
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Set up Python 3.8
uses: actions/setup-python@v2
with:
python-version: 3.8
- name: Download CodeQL CLI
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
run: |
gh release download --repo "github/codeql-cli-binaries" --pattern "codeql-linux64.zip"
- name: Unzip CodeQL CLI
run: unzip -d codeql-cli codeql-linux64.zip
- name: Generate coverage files
run: |
PATH="$PATH:codeql-cli/codeql" python ql/misc/scripts/library-coverage/generate-report.py ci ql ql
- name: Create pull request with changes
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
run: |
python ql/misc/scripts/library-coverage/create-pr.py ql "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY"

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@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
name: Build framework coverage reports
on:
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
qlModelShaOverride:
description: 'github/codeql repo SHA used for looking up the CSV models'
required: false
jobs:
build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Clone self (github/codeql)
uses: actions/checkout@v2
with:
path: script
- name: Clone self (github/codeql) for analysis
uses: actions/checkout@v2
with:
path: codeqlModels
ref: ${{ github.event.inputs.qlModelShaOverride || github.ref }}
- name: Set up Python 3.8
uses: actions/setup-python@v2
with:
python-version: 3.8
- name: Download CodeQL CLI
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
run: |
gh release download --repo "github/codeql-cli-binaries" --pattern "codeql-linux64.zip"
- name: Unzip CodeQL CLI
run: unzip -d codeql-cli codeql-linux64.zip
- name: Build modeled package list
run: |
PATH="$PATH:codeql-cli/codeql" python script/misc/scripts/library-coverage/generate-report.py ci codeqlModels script
- name: Upload CSV package list
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v2
with:
name: framework-coverage-csv
path: framework-coverage-*.csv
- name: Upload RST package list
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v2
with:
name: framework-coverage-rst
path: framework-coverage-*.rst

View File

@@ -250,10 +250,6 @@
"cpp/ql/src/semmle/code/cpp/ir/implementation/aliased_ssa/internal/AliasAnalysis.qll",
"csharp/ql/src/experimental/ir/implementation/unaliased_ssa/internal/AliasAnalysis.qll"
],
"SSA PrintAliasAnalysis": [
"cpp/ql/src/semmle/code/cpp/ir/implementation/unaliased_ssa/internal/PrintAliasAnalysis.qll",
"cpp/ql/src/semmle/code/cpp/ir/implementation/aliased_ssa/internal/PrintAliasAnalysis.qll"
],
"C++ SSA AliasAnalysisImports": [
"cpp/ql/src/semmle/code/cpp/ir/implementation/unaliased_ssa/internal/AliasAnalysisImports.qll",
"cpp/ql/src/semmle/code/cpp/ir/implementation/aliased_ssa/internal/AliasAnalysisImports.qll"
@@ -443,7 +439,7 @@
],
"CryptoAlgorithms Python/JS": [
"javascript/ql/src/semmle/javascript/security/CryptoAlgorithms.qll",
"python/ql/src/semmle/python/concepts/CryptoAlgorithms.qll"
"python/ql/src/semmle/crypto/Crypto.qll"
],
"SensitiveDataHeuristics Python/JS": [
"javascript/ql/src/semmle/javascript/security/internal/SensitiveDataHeuristics.qll",

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@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
lgtm,codescanning
* The query "Uncontrolled arithmetic" (`cpp/uncontrolled-arithmetic`) has been improved to produce fewer false positives.

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@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
lgtm
* The "Tainted allocation size" query (cpp/uncontrolled-allocation-size) has been improved to produce fewer false positives.

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@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
lgtm
* The "Static buffer overflow" query (cpp/static-buffer-overflow) has been improved to produce fewer false positives.

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@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
lgtm,codescanning
* The "Use of a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm" (`cpp/weak-cryptographic-algorithm`) query has been enhanced to reduce false positive results, and (rarely) find more true positive results.

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@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
lgtm
* A new query (`cpp/incorrect-allocation-error-handling`) has been added. The query finds incorrect error-handling of calls to `operator new`. This query was originally [submitted as an experimental query by @ihsinme](https://github.com/github/codeql/pull/5010).

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@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
lgtm,codescanning
* lvalue/rvalue ref qualifiers are now accessible via the new predicates on `MemberFunction`(`.isLValueRefQualified`, `.isRValueRefQualified`, and `isRefQualified`).

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@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
lgtm
* The "Potentially unsafe call to strncat" query (cpp/unsafe-strncat) query has been improved to detect more cases of unsafe calls to `strncat`.

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@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
lgtm,codescanning
* Added definitions for types found in `cstdint`. Added types `FixedWidthIntegralType`, `MinimumWidthIntegralType`, `FastestMinimumWidthIntegralType`, and `MaximumWidthIntegralType` to describe types such as `int8_t`, `int_least8_t`, `int_fast8_t`, and `intmax_t` respectively.
* Changed definition of `Intmax_t` and `Uintmax_t` to be part of the new type structure.
* Added a type `FixedWidthEnumType` which describes enums based on a fixed-width integer type. For instance, `enum e: uint8_t = { a, b };`.

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@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
lgtm,codescanning
* The "Use of a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm" (`cpp/weak-cryptographic-algorithm`) query has been further improved to reduce false positives and its `@precision` increased to `high`.

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@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
lgtm,codescanning
* The DataFlow libraries have been augmented with support for `Configuration`-specific in-place read steps at, for example, sinks and custom taint steps. This means that it is now possible to specify sinks that accept flow with non-empty access paths.

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
* @kind problem
* @id cpp/offset-use-before-range-check
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 8.2
* @precision medium
* @tags reliability
* security

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@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
* @kind problem
* @id cpp/descriptor-may-not-be-closed
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 7.8
* @tags efficiency
* security
* external/cwe/cwe-775

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@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
* @kind problem
* @id cpp/descriptor-never-closed
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 7.8
* @tags efficiency
* security
* external/cwe/cwe-775

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@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
* @kind problem
* @id cpp/file-may-not-be-closed
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 7.8
* @tags efficiency
* security
* external/cwe/cwe-775

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
* @kind problem
* @id cpp/file-never-closed
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 7.8
* @tags efficiency
* security
* external/cwe/cwe-775

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
* @kind problem
* @id cpp/global-use-before-init
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 7.8
* @tags reliability
* security
* external/cwe/cwe-457

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
* @kind problem
* @id cpp/inconsistent-nullness-testing
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 7.5
* @tags reliability
* security
* external/cwe/cwe-476

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@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
* @kind problem
* @id cpp/initialization-not-run
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 7.5
* @tags reliability
* security
* external/cwe/cwe-456

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@
* @kind problem
* @id cpp/late-negative-test
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 9.3
* @tags reliability
* security
* external/cwe/cwe-823

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
* @kind problem
* @id cpp/memory-may-not-be-freed
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 7.5
* @tags efficiency
* security
* external/cwe/cwe-401

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@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
* @kind problem
* @id cpp/memory-never-freed
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 7.5
* @tags efficiency
* security
* external/cwe/cwe-401

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@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
* @kind problem
* @id cpp/missing-negativity-test
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 9.3
* @tags reliability
* security
* external/cwe/cwe-823

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@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
* @kind problem
* @id cpp/missing-null-test
* @problem.severity recommendation
* @security-severity 7.5
* @tags reliability
* security
* external/cwe/cwe-476

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
* @description An object that was allocated with 'malloc' or 'new' is being freed using a mismatching 'free' or 'delete'.
* @kind problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 7.5
* @precision high
* @id cpp/new-free-mismatch
* @tags reliability

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@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
* @kind problem
* @id cpp/overflow-calculated
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 9.8
* @tags reliability
* security
* external/cwe/cwe-131

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@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
* @kind problem
* @id cpp/overflow-destination
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 9.3
* @precision low
* @tags reliability
* security

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@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
* may result in a buffer overflow.
* @kind problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 9.3
* @precision medium
* @id cpp/static-buffer-overflow
* @tags reliability
@@ -15,7 +14,6 @@
import cpp
import semmle.code.cpp.commons.Buffer
import semmle.code.cpp.rangeanalysis.SimpleRangeAnalysis
import LoopBounds
private predicate staticBufferBase(VariableAccess access, Variable v) {
@@ -53,8 +51,6 @@ predicate overflowOffsetInLoop(BufferAccess bufaccess, string msg) {
loop.getStmt().getAChild*() = bufaccess.getEnclosingStmt() and
loop.limit() >= bufaccess.bufferSize() and
loop.counter().getAnAccess() = bufaccess.getArrayOffset() and
// Ensure that we don't have an upper bound on the array index that's less than the buffer size.
not upperBound(bufaccess.getArrayOffset().getFullyConverted()) < bufaccess.bufferSize() and
msg =
"Potential buffer-overflow: counter '" + loop.counter().toString() + "' <= " +
loop.limit().toString() + " but '" + bufaccess.buffer().getName() + "' has " +
@@ -98,22 +94,17 @@ class CallWithBufferSize extends FunctionCall {
}
int statedSizeValue() {
// `upperBound(e)` defaults to `exprMaxVal(e)` when `e` isn't analyzable. So to get a meaningful
// result in this case we pick the minimum value obtainable from dataflow and range analysis.
result =
upperBound(statedSizeExpr())
.minimum(min(Expr statedSizeSrc |
DataFlow::localExprFlow(statedSizeSrc, statedSizeExpr())
|
statedSizeSrc.getValue().toInt()
))
exists(Expr statedSizeSrc |
DataFlow::localExprFlow(statedSizeSrc, statedSizeExpr()) and
result = statedSizeSrc.getValue().toInt()
)
}
}
predicate wrongBufferSize(Expr error, string msg) {
exists(CallWithBufferSize call, int bufsize, Variable buf, int statedSize |
staticBuffer(call.buffer(), buf, bufsize) and
statedSize = call.statedSizeValue() and
statedSize = min(call.statedSizeValue()) and
statedSize > bufsize and
error = call.statedSizeExpr() and
msg =

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@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
* @kind problem
* @id cpp/return-stack-allocated-object
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 2.1
* @tags reliability
* security
* external/cwe/cwe-562

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@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
<overview>
<p>
This rule finds calls to a function that ignore the return value. A function call is only marked
as a violation if at least 90% of the total calls to that function check the return value. Not
as a violation if at least 80% of the total calls to that function check the return value. Not
checking a return value is a common source of defects from standard library functions like <code>malloc</code> or <code>fread</code>.
These functions return the status information and the return values should always be checked
to see if the operation succeeded before operating on any data modified or resources allocated by these functions.

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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/**
* @name Return value of a function is ignored
* @description A call to a function ignores its return value, but at least 90% of the total number of calls to the function check the return value. Check the return value of functions consistently, especially for functions like 'fread' or the 'scanf' functions that return the status of the operation.
* @description A call to a function ignores its return value, but more than 80% of the total number of calls to the function check the return value. Check the return value of functions consistently, especially for functions like 'fread' or the 'scanf' functions that return the status of the operation.
* @kind problem
* @id cpp/return-value-ignored
* @problem.severity recommendation

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@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
* an instance of the type of the pointer may result in a buffer overflow
* @kind problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 8.1
* @precision medium
* @id cpp/allocation-too-small
* @tags reliability

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@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
* multiple instances of the type of the pointer may result in a buffer overflow
* @kind problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 8.1
* @precision medium
* @id cpp/suspicious-allocation-size
* @tags reliability

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@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
* @kind problem
* @id cpp/use-after-free
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 9.3
* @tags reliability
* security
* external/cwe/cwe-416

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@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@
* to a larger type.
* @kind problem
* @problem.severity error
* @security-severity 8.1
* @precision very-high
* @id cpp/bad-addition-overflow-check
* @tags reliability

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@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
* be a sign that the result can overflow the type converted from.
* @kind problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 8.1
* @precision high
* @id cpp/integer-multiplication-cast-to-long
* @tags reliability

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@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
* unsigned integer values.
* @kind problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 8.1
* @precision high
* @id cpp/signed-overflow-check
* @tags correctness

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@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@
* use the width of the base type, leading to misaligned reads.
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 9.3
* @precision high
* @id cpp/upcast-array-pointer-arithmetic
* @tags correctness

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@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@
* from an untrusted source, this can be used for exploits.
* @kind problem
* @problem.severity recommendation
* @security-severity 9.3
* @precision high
* @id cpp/non-constant-format
* @tags maintainability

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@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
* @description Using the return value from snprintf without proper checks can cause overflow.
* @kind problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 8.1
* @precision high
* @id cpp/overflowing-snprintf
* @tags reliability

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@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
* a source of security issues.
* @kind problem
* @problem.severity error
* @security-severity 5.0
* @precision high
* @id cpp/wrong-number-format-arguments
* @tags reliability

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@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
* behavior.
* @kind problem
* @problem.severity error
* @security-severity 7.5
* @precision high
* @id cpp/wrong-type-format-argument
* @tags reliability

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@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@
* @kind problem
* @id cpp/incorrect-not-operator-usage
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 7.5
* @precision medium
* @tags security
* external/cwe/cwe-480

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@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
* @description Using alloca in a loop can lead to a stack overflow
* @kind problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 7.5
* @precision high
* @id cpp/alloca-in-loop
* @tags reliability

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@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
* @kind problem
* @id cpp/improper-null-termination
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 7.8
* @tags security
* external/cwe/cwe-170
* external/cwe/cwe-665

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@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
* on undefined behavior and may lead to memory corruption.
* @kind problem
* @problem.severity error
* @security-severity 2.1
* @precision high
* @id cpp/pointer-overflow-check
* @tags reliability

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@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@
* @kind problem
* @id cpp/potential-buffer-overflow
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 10.0
* @tags reliability
* security
* external/cwe/cwe-676

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@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
* as the third argument may result in a buffer overflow.
* @kind problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 9.3
* @precision medium
* @id cpp/bad-strncpy-size
* @tags reliability

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@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@
* @kind problem
* @id cpp/suspicious-call-to-memset
* @problem.severity recommendation
* @security-severity 10.0
* @precision medium
* @tags reliability
* correctness

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@@ -2,7 +2,3 @@ strncat(dest, src, strlen(dest)); //wrong: should use remaining size of dest
strncat(dest, src, sizeof(dest)); //wrong: should use remaining size of dest.
//Also fails if dest is a pointer and not an array.
strncat(dest, source, sizeof(dest) - strlen(dest)); // wrong: writes a zero byte past the `dest` buffer.
strncat(dest, source, sizeof(dest) - strlen(dest) - 1); // correct: reserves space for the zero byte.

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@@ -4,17 +4,7 @@
<qhelp>
<overview>
<p>The standard library function <code>strncat</code> appends a source string to a target string.
The third argument defines the maximum number of characters to append and should be less than or equal
to the remaining space in the destination buffer.</p>
<p>Calls of the form <code>strncat(dest, src, strlen(dest))</code> or <code>strncat(dest, src, sizeof(dest))</code> set
the third argument to the entire size of the destination buffer.
Executing a call of this type may cause a buffer overflow unless the buffer is known to be empty.</p>
<p>Similarly, calls of the form <code>strncat(dest, src, sizeof (dest) - strlen (dest))</code> allow one
byte to be written ouside the <code>dest</code> buffer.</p>
<p>Buffer overflows can lead to anything from a segmentation fault to a security vulnerability.</p>
The third argument defines the maximum number of characters to append and should be less than or equal to the remaining space in the destination buffer. Calls of the form <code>strncat(dest, src, strlen(dest))</code> or <code>strncat(dest, src, sizeof(dest))</code> set the third argument to the entire size of the destination buffer. Executing a call of this type may cause a buffer overflow unless the buffer is known to be empty. Buffer overflows can lead to anything from a segmentation fault to a security vulnerability.</p>
</overview>
<recommendation>
@@ -35,10 +25,6 @@ byte to be written ouside the <code>dest</code> buffer.</p>
<li>
M. Donaldson, <em>Inside the Buffer Overflow Attack: Mechanism, Method &amp; Prevention</em>. SANS Institute InfoSec Reading Room, 2002.
</li>
<li>
CERT C Coding Standard:
<a href="https://wiki.sei.cmu.edu/confluence/display/c/STR31-C.+Guarantee+that+storage+for+strings+has+sufficient+space+for+character+data+and+the+null+terminator">STR31-C. Guarantee that storage for strings has sufficient space for character data and the null terminator</a>.
</li>
</references>

View File

@@ -1,15 +1,14 @@
/**
* @name Potentially unsafe call to strncat
* @description Calling 'strncat' with an incorrect size argument may result in a buffer overflow.
* @description Calling 'strncat' with the size of the destination buffer
* as the third argument may result in a buffer overflow.
* @kind problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 9.3
* @precision medium
* @id cpp/unsafe-strncat
* @tags reliability
* correctness
* security
* external/cwe/cwe-788
* external/cwe/cwe-676
* external/cwe/cwe-119
* external/cwe/cwe-251
@@ -17,53 +16,11 @@
import cpp
import Buffer
import semmle.code.cpp.models.implementations.Strcat
import semmle.code.cpp.valuenumbering.GlobalValueNumbering
/**
* Holds if `call` is a call to `strncat` such that `sizeArg` and `destArg` are the size and
* destination arguments, respectively.
*/
predicate interestringCallWithArgs(Call call, Expr sizeArg, Expr destArg) {
exists(StrcatFunction strcat |
strcat = call.getTarget() and
sizeArg = call.getArgument(strcat.getParamSize()) and
destArg = call.getArgument(strcat.getParamDest())
)
}
/**
* Holds if `fc` is a call to `strncat` with size argument `sizeArg` and destination
* argument `destArg`, and `destArg` is the size of the buffer pointed to by `destArg`.
*/
predicate case1(FunctionCall fc, Expr sizeArg, VariableAccess destArg) {
interestringCallWithArgs(fc, sizeArg, destArg) and
exists(VariableAccess va |
va = sizeArg.(BufferSizeExpr).getArg() and
destArg.getTarget() = va.getTarget()
)
}
/**
* Holds if `fc` is a call to `strncat` with size argument `sizeArg` and destination
* argument `destArg`, and `sizeArg` computes the value `sizeof (dest) - strlen (dest)`.
*/
predicate case2(FunctionCall fc, Expr sizeArg, VariableAccess destArg) {
interestringCallWithArgs(fc, sizeArg, destArg) and
exists(SubExpr sub, int n |
// The destination buffer is an array of size n
destArg.getUnspecifiedType().(ArrayType).getSize() = n and
// The size argument is equivalent to a subtraction
globalValueNumber(sizeArg).getAnExpr() = sub and
// ... where the left side of the subtraction is the constant n
globalValueNumber(sub.getLeftOperand()).getAnExpr().getValue().toInt() = n and
// ... and the right side of the subtraction is a call to `strlen` where the argument is the
// destination buffer.
globalValueNumber(sub.getRightOperand()).getAnExpr().(StrlenCall).getStringExpr() =
globalValueNumber(destArg).getAnExpr()
)
}
from FunctionCall fc, Expr sizeArg, Expr destArg
where case1(fc, sizeArg, destArg) or case2(fc, sizeArg, destArg)
from FunctionCall fc, VariableAccess va1, VariableAccess va2
where
fc.getTarget().(Function).hasName("strncat") and
va1 = fc.getArgument(0) and
va2 = fc.getArgument(2).(BufferSizeExpr).getArg() and
va1.getTarget() = va2.getTarget()
select fc, "Potentially unsafe call to strncat."

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
* the machine pointer size.
* @kind problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 8.8
* @precision medium
* @id cpp/suspicious-sizeof
* @tags reliability

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
* @kind problem
* @id cpp/uninitialized-local
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 7.8
* @precision medium
* @tags security
* external/cwe/cwe-665

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
* may result in a buffer overflow
* @kind problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 9.8
* @precision medium
* @id cpp/unsafe-strcat
* @tags reliability

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@
* @kind problem
* @id cpp/self-assignment-check
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 7.0
* @tags reliability
* security
* external/cwe/cwe-826

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@
* @kind path-problem
* @id cpp/unsafe-use-of-this
* @problem.severity error
* @security-severity 7.5
* @precision very-high
* @tags correctness
* language-features

View File

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@
* undefined data.
* @kind problem
* @problem.severity error
* @security-severity 5.0
* @precision very-high
* @id cpp/too-few-arguments
* @tags correctness

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
* @kind problem
* @id cpp/memset-may-be-deleted
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 7.8
* @precision high
* @tags security
* external/cwe/cwe-14

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
* @kind path-problem
* @precision low
* @problem.severity error
* @security-severity 7.8
* @tags security external/cwe/cwe-20
*/

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
* @kind path-problem
* @precision low
* @problem.severity error
* @security-severity 7.8
* @tags security external/cwe/cwe-20
*/

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
* attacker to access unexpected resources.
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 7.5
* @precision medium
* @id cpp/path-injection
* @tags security

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
* to command injection.
* @kind problem
* @problem.severity error
* @security-severity 9.8
* @precision low
* @id cpp/command-line-injection
* @tags security

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
* allows for a cross-site scripting vulnerability.
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity error
* @security-severity 6.1
* @precision high
* @id cpp/cgi-xss
* @tags security

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
* to SQL Injection.
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity error
* @security-severity 8.8
* @precision high
* @id cpp/sql-injection
* @tags security

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
* commands.
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 8.2
* @precision medium
* @id cpp/uncontrolled-process-operation
* @tags security

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@
* @kind problem
* @id cpp/overflow-buffer
* @problem.severity recommendation
* @security-severity 9.3
* @tags security
* external/cwe/cwe-119
* external/cwe/cwe-121

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
* overflow.
* @kind problem
* @problem.severity error
* @security-severity 9.3
* @precision high
* @id cpp/badly-bounded-write
* @tags reliability

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
* of data written may overflow.
* @kind problem
* @problem.severity error
* @security-severity 9.3
* @precision medium
* @id cpp/overrunning-write
* @tags reliability

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
* take extreme values.
* @kind problem
* @problem.severity error
* @security-severity 9.3
* @precision medium
* @id cpp/overrunning-write-with-float
* @tags reliability

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
* of data written may overflow.
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity error
* @security-severity 9.3
* @precision medium
* @id cpp/unbounded-write
* @tags reliability

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
* a specific value to terminate the argument list.
* @kind problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 8.8
* @precision medium
* @id cpp/unterminated-variadic-call
* @tags reliability

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@
* @kind problem
* @id cpp/unclear-array-index-validation
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 8.8
* @tags security
* external/cwe/cwe-129
*/

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
* terminator can cause a buffer overrun.
* @kind problem
* @problem.severity error
* @security-severity 9.8
* @precision high
* @id cpp/no-space-for-terminator
* @tags reliability

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
* or data representation problems.
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 9.3
* @precision high
* @id cpp/tainted-format-string
* @tags reliability

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
* or data representation problems.
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 9.3
* @precision high
* @id cpp/tainted-format-string-through-global
* @tags reliability

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
* @kind problem
* @id cpp/user-controlled-null-termination-tainted
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 10.0
* @tags security
* external/cwe/cwe-170
*/

View File

@@ -2,9 +2,8 @@
* @name User-controlled data in arithmetic expression
* @description Arithmetic operations on user-controlled data that is
* not validated can cause overflows.
* @kind path-problem
* @kind problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 8.6
* @precision low
* @id cpp/tainted-arithmetic
* @tags security
@@ -16,39 +15,22 @@ import cpp
import semmle.code.cpp.security.Overflow
import semmle.code.cpp.security.Security
import semmle.code.cpp.security.TaintTracking
import TaintedWithPath
import Bounded
bindingset[op]
predicate missingGuard(Operation op, Expr e, string effect) {
missingGuardAgainstUnderflow(op, e) and effect = "underflow"
or
missingGuardAgainstOverflow(op, e) and effect = "overflow"
or
not e instanceof VariableAccess and effect = "overflow"
}
class Configuration extends TaintTrackingConfiguration {
override predicate isSink(Element e) {
exists(Operation op |
missingGuard(op, e, _) and
op.getAnOperand() = e
|
op instanceof UnaryArithmeticOperation or
op instanceof BinaryArithmeticOperation
)
}
override predicate isBarrier(Expr e) {
super.isBarrier(e) or bounded(e) or e.getUnspecifiedType().(IntegralType).getSize() <= 1
}
}
from Expr origin, Expr e, string effect, PathNode sourceNode, PathNode sinkNode, Operation op
from Expr origin, Operation op, Expr e, string effect
where
taintedWithPath(origin, e, sourceNode, sinkNode) and
isUserInput(origin, _) and
tainted(origin, e) and
op.getAnOperand() = e and
missingGuard(op, e, effect)
select e, sourceNode, sinkNode,
"$@ flows to here and is used in arithmetic, potentially causing an " + effect + ".", origin,
"User-provided value"
(
missingGuardAgainstUnderflow(op, e) and effect = "underflow"
or
missingGuardAgainstOverflow(op, e) and effect = "overflow"
or
not e instanceof VariableAccess and effect = "overflow"
) and
(
op instanceof UnaryArithmeticOperation or
op instanceof BinaryArithmeticOperation
)
select e, "$@ flows to here and is used in arithmetic, potentially causing an " + effect + ".",
origin, "User-provided value"

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
* validated can cause overflows.
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 8.6
* @precision medium
* @id cpp/uncontrolled-arithmetic
* @tags security
@@ -17,38 +16,33 @@ import semmle.code.cpp.security.Overflow
import semmle.code.cpp.security.Security
import semmle.code.cpp.security.TaintTracking
import TaintedWithPath
import Bounded
predicate isUnboundedRandCall(FunctionCall fc) {
exists(Function func | func = fc.getTarget() |
func.hasGlobalOrStdOrBslName("rand") and
not bounded(fc) and
func.getNumberOfParameters() = 0
)
predicate isRandCall(FunctionCall fc) { fc.getTarget().getName() = "rand" }
predicate isRandCallOrParent(Expr e) {
isRandCall(e) or
isRandCallOrParent(e.getAChild())
}
predicate isUnboundedRandCallOrParent(Expr e) {
isUnboundedRandCall(e)
or
isUnboundedRandCallOrParent(e.getAChild())
}
predicate isUnboundedRandValue(Expr e) {
isUnboundedRandCall(e)
predicate isRandValue(Expr e) {
isRandCall(e)
or
exists(MacroInvocation mi |
e = mi.getExpr() and
isUnboundedRandCallOrParent(e)
isRandCallOrParent(e)
)
}
class SecurityOptionsArith extends SecurityOptions {
override predicate isUserInput(Expr expr, string cause) {
isUnboundedRandValue(expr) and
cause = "rand"
isRandValue(expr) and
cause = "rand" and
not expr.getParent*() instanceof DivExpr
}
}
predicate isDiv(VariableAccess va) { exists(AssignDivExpr div | div.getLValue() = va) }
predicate missingGuard(VariableAccess va, string effect) {
exists(Operation op | op.getAnOperand() = va |
missingGuardAgainstUnderflow(op, va) and effect = "underflow"
@@ -58,15 +52,29 @@ predicate missingGuard(VariableAccess va, string effect) {
}
class Configuration extends TaintTrackingConfiguration {
override predicate isSink(Element e) { missingGuard(e, _) }
override predicate isSink(Element e) {
isDiv(e)
or
missingGuard(e, _)
}
}
override predicate isBarrier(Expr e) { super.isBarrier(e) or bounded(e) }
/**
* A value that undergoes division is likely to be bounded within a safe
* range.
*/
predicate guardedByAssignDiv(Expr origin) {
exists(VariableAccess va |
taintedWithPath(origin, va, _, _) and
isDiv(va)
)
}
from Expr origin, VariableAccess va, string effect, PathNode sourceNode, PathNode sinkNode
where
taintedWithPath(origin, va, sourceNode, sinkNode) and
missingGuard(va, effect)
missingGuard(va, effect) and
not guardedByAssignDiv(origin)
select va, sourceNode, sinkNode,
"$@ flows to here and is used in arithmetic, potentially causing an " + effect + ".", origin,
"Uncontrolled value"

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@
* @kind problem
* @id cpp/arithmetic-with-extreme-values
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 8.6
* @precision low
* @tags security
* reliability

View File

@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
/**
* This file provides the `bounded` predicate that is used in both `cpp/uncontrolled-arithmetic`
* and `cpp/tainted-arithmetic`.
*/
private import cpp
private import semmle.code.cpp.rangeanalysis.SimpleRangeAnalysis
private import semmle.code.cpp.rangeanalysis.RangeAnalysisUtils
/**
* An operand `e` of a division expression (i.e., `e` is an operand of either a `DivExpr` or
* a `AssignDivExpr`) is bounded when `e` is the left-hand side of the division.
*/
pragma[inline]
private predicate boundedDiv(Expr e, Expr left) { e = left }
/**
* An operand `e` of a remainder expression `rem` (i.e., `rem` is either a `RemExpr` or
* an `AssignRemExpr`) with left-hand side `left` and right-ahnd side `right` is bounded
* when `e` is `left` and `right` is upper bounded by some number that is less than the maximum integer
* allowed by the result type of `rem`.
*/
pragma[inline]
private predicate boundedRem(Expr e, Expr rem, Expr left, Expr right) {
e = left and
upperBound(right.getFullyConverted()) < exprMaxVal(rem.getFullyConverted())
}
/**
* An operand `e` of a bitwise and expression `andExpr` (i.e., `andExpr` is either an `BitwiseAndExpr`
* or an `AssignAndExpr`) with operands `operand1` and `operand2` is the operand that is not `e` is upper
* bounded by some number that is less than the maximum integer allowed by the result type of `andExpr`.
*/
pragma[inline]
private predicate boundedBitwiseAnd(Expr e, Expr andExpr, Expr operand1, Expr operand2) {
operand1 != operand2 and
e = operand1 and
upperBound(operand2.getFullyConverted()) < exprMaxVal(andExpr.getFullyConverted())
}
/**
* Holds if `e` is an arithmetic expression that cannot overflow, or if `e` is an operand of an
* operation that may greatly reduce the range of possible values.
*/
predicate bounded(Expr e) {
(
e instanceof UnaryArithmeticOperation or
e instanceof BinaryArithmeticOperation or
e instanceof AssignArithmeticOperation
) and
not convertedExprMightOverflow(e)
or
// For `%` and `&` we require that `e` is bounded by a value that is strictly smaller than the
// maximum possible value of the result type of the operation.
// For example, the function call `rand()` is considered bounded in the following program:
// ```
// int i = rand() % (UINT8_MAX + 1);
// ```
// but not in:
// ```
// unsigned char uc = rand() % (UINT8_MAX + 1);
// ```
exists(RemExpr rem | boundedRem(e, rem, rem.getLeftOperand(), rem.getRightOperand()))
or
exists(AssignRemExpr rem | boundedRem(e, rem, rem.getLValue(), rem.getRValue()))
or
exists(BitwiseAndExpr andExpr |
boundedBitwiseAnd(e, andExpr, andExpr.getAnOperand(), andExpr.getAnOperand())
)
or
exists(AssignAndExpr andExpr |
boundedBitwiseAnd(e, andExpr, andExpr.getAnOperand(), andExpr.getAnOperand())
)
or
// Optimitically assume that a division always yields a much smaller value.
boundedDiv(e, any(DivExpr div).getLeftOperand())
or
boundedDiv(e, any(AssignDivExpr div).getLValue())
or
boundedDiv(e, any(RShiftExpr shift).getLeftOperand())
or
boundedDiv(e, any(AssignRShiftExpr div).getLValue())
}

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
* @id cpp/comparison-with-wider-type
* @kind problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 7.8
* @precision high
* @tags reliability
* security

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
* @kind problem
* @id cpp/integer-overflow-tainted
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 8.1
* @precision low
* @tags security
* external/cwe/cwe-190

View File

@@ -4,17 +4,14 @@
* user can result in integer overflow.
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity error
* @security-severity 8.1
* @precision medium
* @id cpp/uncontrolled-allocation-size
* @tags reliability
* security
* external/cwe/cwe-190
* external/cwe/cwe-789
*/
import cpp
import semmle.code.cpp.rangeanalysis.SimpleRangeAnalysis
import semmle.code.cpp.security.TaintTracking
import TaintedWithPath
@@ -30,27 +27,6 @@ predicate allocSink(Expr alloc, Expr tainted) {
class TaintedAllocationSizeConfiguration extends TaintTrackingConfiguration {
override predicate isSink(Element tainted) { allocSink(_, tainted) }
override predicate isBarrier(Expr e) {
super.isBarrier(e)
or
// There can be two separate reasons for `convertedExprMightOverflow` not holding:
// 1. `e` really cannot overflow.
// 2. `e` isn't analyzable.
// If we didn't rule out case 2 we would place barriers on anything that isn't analyzable.
(
e instanceof UnaryArithmeticOperation or
e instanceof BinaryArithmeticOperation or
e instanceof AssignArithmeticOperation
) and
not convertedExprMightOverflow(e)
or
// Subtracting two pointers is either well-defined (and the result will likely be small), or
// terribly undefined and dangerous. Here, we assume that the programmer has ensured that the
// result is well-defined (i.e., the two pointers point to the same object), and thus the result
// will likely be small.
e = any(PointerDiffExpr diff).getAnOperand()
}
}
predicate taintedAllocSize(

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
* @kind problem
* @id cpp/unsigned-difference-expression-compared-zero
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 9.8
* @precision medium
* @tags security
* correctness

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
* @kind problem
* @id cpp/hresult-boolean-conversion
* @problem.severity error
* @security-severity 7.5
* @precision high
* @tags security
* external/cwe/cwe-253

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
* vulnerable to spoofing attacks.
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 8.1
* @precision medium
* @id cpp/user-controlled-bypass
* @tags security

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
* to an attacker.
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 7.5
* @precision medium
* @id cpp/cleartext-storage-buffer
* @tags security

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
* to an attacker.
* @kind problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 7.5
* @precision medium
* @id cpp/cleartext-storage-file
* @tags security

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
* database can expose it to an attacker.
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 7.5
* @precision medium
* @id cpp/cleartext-storage-database
* @tags security

View File

@@ -4,8 +4,7 @@
* an attacker to compromise security.
* @kind problem
* @problem.severity error
* @security-severity 7.5
* @precision high
* @precision medium
* @id cpp/weak-cryptographic-algorithm
* @tags security
* external/cwe/cwe-327
@@ -14,155 +13,39 @@
import cpp
import semmle.code.cpp.security.Encryption
/**
* A function which may relate to an insecure encryption algorithm.
*/
Function getAnInsecureEncryptionFunction() {
(
isInsecureEncryption(result.getName()) or
isInsecureEncryption(result.getAParameter().getName()) or
isInsecureEncryption(result.getDeclaringType().getName())
) and
abstract class InsecureCryptoSpec extends Locatable {
abstract string description();
}
Function getAnInsecureFunction() {
result.getName().regexpMatch(getInsecureAlgorithmRegex()) and
exists(result.getACallToThisFunction())
}
/**
* A function with additional evidence it is related to encryption.
*/
Function getAnAdditionalEvidenceFunction() {
(
isEncryptionAdditionalEvidence(result.getName()) or
isEncryptionAdditionalEvidence(result.getAParameter().getName())
) and
exists(result.getACallToThisFunction())
class InsecureFunctionCall extends InsecureCryptoSpec, FunctionCall {
InsecureFunctionCall() { this.getTarget() = getAnInsecureFunction() }
override string description() { result = "function call" }
override string toString() { result = FunctionCall.super.toString() }
override Location getLocation() { result = FunctionCall.super.getLocation() }
}
/**
* A macro which may relate to an insecure encryption algorithm.
*/
Macro getAnInsecureEncryptionMacro() {
isInsecureEncryption(result.getName()) and
Macro getAnInsecureMacro() {
result.getName().regexpMatch(getInsecureAlgorithmRegex()) and
exists(result.getAnInvocation())
}
/**
* A macro with additional evidence it is related to encryption.
*/
Macro getAnAdditionalEvidenceMacro() {
isEncryptionAdditionalEvidence(result.getName()) and
exists(result.getAnInvocation())
class InsecureMacroSpec extends InsecureCryptoSpec, MacroInvocation {
InsecureMacroSpec() { this.getMacro() = getAnInsecureMacro() }
override string description() { result = "macro invocation" }
override string toString() { result = MacroInvocation.super.toString() }
override Location getLocation() { result = MacroInvocation.super.getLocation() }
}
/**
* An enum constant which may relate to an insecure encryption algorithm.
*/
EnumConstant getAnInsecureEncryptionEnumConst() { isInsecureEncryption(result.getName()) }
/**
* An enum constant with additional evidence it is related to encryption.
*/
EnumConstant getAdditionalEvidenceEnumConst() { isEncryptionAdditionalEvidence(result.getName()) }
/**
* A function call we have a high confidence is related to use of an insecure encryption algorithm, along
* with an associated `Element` which might be the best point to blame, and a description of that element.
*/
predicate getInsecureEncryptionEvidence(FunctionCall fc, Element blame, string description) {
// find use of an insecure algorithm name
(
exists(FunctionCall fc2 |
fc.getAChild*() = fc2 and
fc2.getTarget() = getAnInsecureEncryptionFunction() and
blame = fc2 and
description = "call to " + fc.getTarget().getName()
)
or
exists(MacroInvocation mi |
(
mi.getAnExpandedElement() = fc or
mi.getAnExpandedElement() = fc.getAnArgument()
) and
mi.getMacro() = getAnInsecureEncryptionMacro() and
blame = mi and
description = "invocation of macro " + mi.getMacro().getName()
)
or
exists(EnumConstantAccess ec |
ec = fc.getAnArgument() and
ec.getTarget() = getAnInsecureEncryptionEnumConst() and
blame = ec and
description = "access of enum constant " + ec.getTarget().getName()
)
) and
// find additional evidence that this function is related to encryption.
(
exists(FunctionCall fc2 |
fc.getAChild*() = fc2 and
fc2.getTarget() = getAnAdditionalEvidenceFunction()
)
or
exists(MacroInvocation mi |
(
mi.getAnExpandedElement() = fc or
mi.getAnExpandedElement() = fc.getAnArgument()
) and
mi.getMacro() = getAnAdditionalEvidenceMacro()
)
or
exists(EnumConstantAccess ec |
ec = fc.getAnArgument() and
ec.getTarget() = getAdditionalEvidenceEnumConst()
)
) and
// exclude calls from templates as this is rarely the right place to flag an
// issue
not fc.isFromTemplateInstantiation(_) and
(
// the function should have an input that looks like a non-constant buffer
exists(Expr e |
fc.getAnArgument() = e and
(
e.getUnspecifiedType() instanceof PointerType or
e.getUnspecifiedType() instanceof ReferenceType or
e.getUnspecifiedType() instanceof ArrayType
) and
not e.getType().isDeeplyConstBelow() and
not e.isConstant()
)
or
// or be a non-const member function of an object
fc.getTarget() instanceof MemberFunction and
not fc.getTarget() instanceof ConstMemberFunction and
not fc.getTarget().isStatic()
)
}
/**
* An element that is the `blame` of an `InsecureFunctionCall`.
*/
class BlamedElement extends Element {
string description;
BlamedElement() { getInsecureEncryptionEvidence(_, this, description) }
/**
* Holds if this is the `num`-th `BlamedElement` in `f`.
*/
predicate hasFileRank(File f, int num) {
exists(int loc |
getLocation().charLoc(f, loc, _) and
loc =
rank[num](BlamedElement other, int loc2 | other.getLocation().charLoc(f, loc2, _) | loc2)
)
}
string getDescription() { result = description }
}
from File f, BlamedElement firstResult, BlamedElement thisResult
where
firstResult.hasFileRank(f, 1) and
thisResult.hasFileRank(f, _)
select firstResult,
"This file makes use of a broken or weak cryptographic algorithm (specified by $@).", thisResult,
thisResult.getDescription()
from InsecureCryptoSpec c
select c, "This " + c.description() + " specifies a broken or weak cryptographic algorithm."

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