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30 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Taus
e2eb69ce8d Python: Port IllegalExceptionHandlerType.ql
A few relevant changes compared to the points-to version:
- we've lost `origin`, so we can no longer point to where the illegal
type lives. I opted to keep the output message the same, mirroring what
we were already doing in IllegalRaise.ql.
- We no longer track literal values flowing in from elsewhere, so we
lost a single test result where the handled "type" is the result of
calling a float-returning function.

Apart from that, the only test changes are cosmetic.
2026-03-09 17:22:01 +00:00
Taus
c4ec331e96 Python: Port IllegalRaise.ql
Adds a convenient way to get the class name for an immutable literal (to
maintain the same output format as was provided by the points-to
version). I don't know if people are in the habit of writing `raise 5`,
but I guess `raise "NotImplemented"` (wrong on so many levels) is not
entirely impossible.

No test changes.
2026-03-09 17:22:01 +00:00
Taus
4606d904ce Python: Extend ExceptionTypes API
Adds support for finding instances, and adds a `BaseException`
convenience class.
2026-03-09 17:22:01 +00:00
Taus
54af9dd10b Python: Port ConsistentReturns.ql
No test changes.
2026-03-09 17:22:01 +00:00
Taus
853df14468 Python: Port OverlyComplexDelMethod.ql
Only trivial test changes.
2026-03-09 17:22:01 +00:00
Taus
156d2c09a0 Python: Port getCyclomaticComplexity function
Note that this does not give the exact same results as the old function,
however it's not clear to me that the old results were actually correct
(it _looks_ like `read()` might be doing an IO operation, but in fact
`read` is not defined, so at best this will raise a NameError, not an
IOError).
2026-03-09 17:22:01 +00:00
Taus
7d8b4aca8b Python: Add Reachability module
The implementation is essentially the same as the one from
`BasicBlockWithPointsTo`, with the main difference being that this one
uses the exception machinery we just added (and some extensions added in
this commit).
2026-03-09 17:22:01 +00:00
Taus
f5361f43dc Python: Move exception modelling to DataFlowDispatch.qll
This analysis will is needed for the reachability modelling (which
tracks things like which exceptions are caught by which handles), so it
makes more sense for it to move to `DataFlowDispatch` for now.
2026-03-09 17:22:00 +00:00
Taus
f6cd63f508 Python: Port DocStrings.ql 2026-03-09 17:13:04 +00:00
Taus
5954287f89 Python: Port DeprecatedSliceMethod.ql
Only trivial test changes.
2026-03-09 17:13:04 +00:00
Taus
c837e1491a Python: Extend DuckTyping module
Adds `overridesMethod` and `isPropertyAccessor`.
2026-03-09 17:13:04 +00:00
Taus
d9693e70de Python: Remove missing results
These results are missing because we no longer (unlike the points-to
analysis) track how many elements a given tuple has. This is something
we might want to implement in the future (most likely through an
`int`-indexed type tracker).
2026-03-09 17:13:04 +00:00
Taus
0509ec6f0b Python: Port WrongNumberArgumentsInClassInstantiation.ql
Included test changes are trivial `toString` changes.
2026-03-09 17:13:03 +00:00
Taus
0094271966 Python: Port WrongNameForArgumentInClassInstantiation.ql 2026-03-09 17:13:03 +00:00
Taus
6c56882a75 Python: Port ShouldBeContextManager.ql
Only trivial test changes.
2026-03-09 17:13:03 +00:00
Taus
7ceb6a5748 Python: Port UselessClass.ql
No test changes.
2026-03-09 17:13:03 +00:00
Taus
c4a4e20be0 Python: Port HashedButNoHash.ql
This one is a bit more involved. Of note is the fact that it at present
only uses local flow when determining the origin of some value (whereas
the points-to version used global flow). It may be desirable to rewrite
this query to use global data-flow, but this should be done with some
care (as using "all unhashable objects" as the set of sources is
somewhat iffy with respect to performance). For that reason, I'm
sticking to mostly local flow (except for well behaved things like types
and built-ins).
2026-03-09 17:13:03 +00:00
Taus
e2dcfae3ee Python: Port InconsistentMRO.ql
For this one we actually lose a test result. However, this is kind of to
be expected since we no longer have the "precise" MRO that the points-to
analysis computes.

Honestly, I'm on the fence about even keeping this query at all. It
seems like it might be superfluous in a world with good Python type
checking.
2026-03-09 17:13:03 +00:00
Taus
8fe680c716 Python: Port PropertyInOldStyleClass.ql
Only trivial test changes.
2026-03-09 17:13:03 +00:00
Taus
8f154f6374 Python: Port SuperInOldStyleClass.ql 2026-03-09 17:13:03 +00:00
Taus
f4f217c993 Python: Port SlotsInOldStyleClass.ql
Only trivial test changes.
2026-03-09 17:13:03 +00:00
Taus
c1beca80e6 Python: Add declares/getAttribute API
These could arguably be moved to `Class` itself, but for now I'm
choosing to limit the changes to the `DuckTyping` module (until we
decide on a proper API).
2026-03-09 17:13:03 +00:00
Taus
793ecb6416 Python: Add DuckTyping::isNewStyle
Approximates the behaviour of `Types::isNewStyle` but without depending
on points-to
2026-03-09 17:13:03 +00:00
Taus
8ffcdfeb05 Python: Port UnusedExceptionObject.ql
Depending on whether other queries depend on this, we may end up moving
the exception utility functions to a more central location.
2026-03-09 17:13:02 +00:00
Taus
918e5e25ec Python: Port ShouldUseWithStatement.ql
Only trivial test changes.
2026-03-09 17:13:02 +00:00
Taus
485e949467 Python: Port NonIteratorInForLoop.ql
Same comment as for the preceding commit. We lose one test result due to
the fact that we don't know what to do about `for ... in 1` (because `1`
is an instance of a built-in). I'm going to defer addressing this until
we get some modelling of built-in types.
2026-03-09 17:13:02 +00:00
Taus
1159d20375 Python: Port ContainsNonContainer.ql
Uses the new `DuckTyping` module to handle recognising whether a class
is a container or not. Only trivial test changes (one version uses
"class", the other "Class").

Note that the ported query has no understanding of built-in classes. At
some point we'll likely want to replace `hasUnresolvedBase` (which will
hold for any class that extends a built-in) with something that's aware
of the built-in classes.
2026-03-09 17:13:02 +00:00
Taus
62d5cac6e0 Python: Introduce DuckTyping module
This module (which for convenience currently resides inside
`DataFlowDispatch`, but this may change later) contains convenience
predicates for bridging the gap between the data-flow layer and the old
points-to analysis.
2026-03-09 17:13:02 +00:00
Taus
452e189bbc Python: Port py/print-during-import
Uses a (perhaps) slightly coarser approximation of what modules are
imported, but it's probably fine.
2026-03-09 16:38:52 +00:00
Taus
5d5060b02b Python: Use API graphs instead of points-to for simple built-ins
Removes the use of points-to for accessing various built-ins from three
of the queries. In order for this to work I had to extend the lists of
known built-ins slightly.
2026-03-09 16:38:52 +00:00
2769 changed files with 141382 additions and 246791 deletions

View File

@@ -45,5 +45,3 @@ updates:
directory: "/"
schedule:
interval: weekly
exclude-paths:
- "misc/bazel/registry/**"

78
.github/workflows/compile-queries.yml vendored Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
name: "Compile all queries using the latest stable CodeQL CLI"
on:
push:
branches: # makes sure the cache gets populated - running on the branches people tend to merge into.
- main
- "rc/*"
- "codeql-cli-*"
pull_request:
paths:
- '**.ql'
- '**.qll'
- '**/qlpack.yml'
- '**.dbscheme'
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
detect-changes:
if: github.repository_owner == 'github'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
outputs:
languages: ${{ steps.detect.outputs.languages }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- name: Detect changed languages
id: detect
run: |
if [[ "${{ github.event_name }}" == "pull_request" ]]; then
# For PRs, detect which languages have changes
changed_files=$(gh pr view ${{ github.event.pull_request.number }} --json files --jq '.files.[].path')
languages=()
for lang in actions cpp csharp go java javascript python ql ruby rust swift; do
if echo "$changed_files" | grep -qE "^($lang/|shared/)" ; then
languages+=("$lang")
fi
done
echo "languages=$(jq -c -n '$ARGS.positional' --args "${languages[@]}")" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
else
# For pushes to main/rc branches, run all languages
echo 'languages=["actions","cpp","csharp","go","java","javascript","python","ql","ruby","rust","swift"]' >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
fi
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
compile-queries:
needs: detect-changes
if: github.repository_owner == 'github' && needs.detect-changes.outputs.languages != '[]'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest-xl
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
language: ${{ fromJson(needs.detect-changes.outputs.languages) }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- name: Setup CodeQL
uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
with:
channel: 'release'
- name: Cache compilation cache
id: query-cache
uses: ./.github/actions/cache-query-compilation
with:
key: ${{ matrix.language }}-queries
- name: check formatting
run: find shared ${{ matrix.language }}/ql -type f \( -name "*.qll" -o -name "*.ql" \) -print0 | xargs -0 -n 3000 -P 10 codeql query format -q --check-only
- name: compile queries - check-only
# run with --check-only if running in a PR (github.sha != main)
if : ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }}
shell: bash
run: codeql query compile -q -j0 ${{ matrix.language }}/ql/{src,examples} --keep-going --warnings=error --check-only --compilation-cache "${{ steps.query-cache.outputs.cache-dir }}" --compilation-cache-size=500 --ram=56000
- name: compile queries - full
# do full compile if running on main - this populates the cache
if : ${{ github.event_name != 'pull_request' }}
shell: bash
run: codeql query compile -q -j0 ${{ matrix.language }}/ql/{src,examples} --keep-going --warnings=error --compilation-cache "${{ steps.query-cache.outputs.cache-dir }}" --compilation-cache-size=500 --ram=56000

View File

@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ jobs:
SHORTNAME=`basename $DATABASE`
python misc/scripts/models-as-data/generate_mad.py --language java --with-summaries --with-sinks $DATABASE $SHORTNAME/$QL_VARIANT
mkdir -p $MODELS/$SHORTNAME
mv java/ql/lib/ext/generated/modelgenerator/$SHORTNAME/$QL_VARIANT $MODELS/$SHORTNAME
mv java/ql/lib/ext/generated/$SHORTNAME/$QL_VARIANT $MODELS/$SHORTNAME
cd ..
}

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ on:
paths:
- "misc/bazel/**"
- "misc/codegen/**"
- "misc/scripts/models-as-data/*.py"
- "misc/scripts/models-as-data/bulk_generate_mad.py"
- "*.bazel*"
- .github/workflows/codegen.yml
- .pre-commit-config.yaml

236
.github/workflows/ruby-build.yml vendored Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
name: "Ruby: Build"
on:
push:
paths:
- "ruby/**"
- .github/workflows/ruby-build.yml
- .github/actions/fetch-codeql/action.yml
- codeql-workspace.yml
- "shared/tree-sitter-extractor/**"
branches:
- main
- "rc/*"
pull_request:
paths:
- "ruby/**"
- .github/workflows/ruby-build.yml
- .github/actions/fetch-codeql/action.yml
- codeql-workspace.yml
- "shared/tree-sitter-extractor/**"
branches:
- main
- "rc/*"
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
tag:
description: "Version tag to create"
required: false
env:
CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
defaults:
run:
working-directory: ruby
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
build:
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
os: [ubuntu-latest, macos-latest, windows-latest]
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- name: Install GNU tar
if: runner.os == 'macOS'
run: |
brew install gnu-tar
echo "/usr/local/opt/gnu-tar/libexec/gnubin" >> $GITHUB_PATH
- name: Prepare Windows
if: runner.os == 'Windows'
shell: powershell
run: |
git config --global core.longpaths true
- uses: ./.github/actions/os-version
id: os_version
- name: Cache entire extractor
uses: actions/cache@v3
id: cache-extractor
with:
path: |
target/release/codeql-extractor-ruby
target/release/codeql-extractor-ruby.exe
ruby/extractor/ql/lib/codeql/ruby/ast/internal/TreeSitter.qll
key: ${{ runner.os }}-${{ steps.os_version.outputs.version }}-ruby-extractor-${{ hashFiles('ruby/extractor/rust-toolchain.toml', 'ruby/extractor/Cargo.lock') }}-${{ hashFiles('shared/tree-sitter-extractor') }}-${{ hashFiles('ruby/extractor/**/*.rs') }}
- uses: actions/cache@v3
if: steps.cache-extractor.outputs.cache-hit != 'true'
with:
path: |
~/.cargo/registry
~/.cargo/git
target
key: ${{ runner.os }}-${{ steps.os_version.outputs.version }}-ruby-rust-cargo-${{ hashFiles('ruby/extractor/rust-toolchain.toml', 'ruby/extractor/**/Cargo.lock') }}
- name: Check formatting
if: steps.cache-extractor.outputs.cache-hit != 'true'
run: cd extractor && cargo fmt -- --check
- name: Build
if: steps.cache-extractor.outputs.cache-hit != 'true'
run: cd extractor && cargo build --verbose
- name: Run tests
if: steps.cache-extractor.outputs.cache-hit != 'true'
run: cd extractor && cargo test --verbose
- name: Release build
if: steps.cache-extractor.outputs.cache-hit != 'true'
run: cd extractor && cargo build --release
- name: Generate dbscheme
if: ${{ matrix.os == 'ubuntu-latest' && steps.cache-extractor.outputs.cache-hit != 'true'}}
run: ../target/release/codeql-extractor-ruby generate --dbscheme ql/lib/ruby.dbscheme --library ql/lib/codeql/ruby/ast/internal/TreeSitter.qll
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
if: ${{ matrix.os == 'ubuntu-latest' }}
with:
name: ruby.dbscheme
path: ruby/ql/lib/ruby.dbscheme
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
if: ${{ matrix.os == 'ubuntu-latest' }}
with:
name: TreeSitter.qll
path: ruby/ql/lib/codeql/ruby/ast/internal/TreeSitter.qll
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: extractor-${{ matrix.os }}
path: |
target/release/codeql-extractor-ruby
target/release/codeql-extractor-ruby.exe
retention-days: 1
compile-queries:
if: github.repository_owner == 'github'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest-xl
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- name: Fetch CodeQL
uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
- name: Cache compilation cache
id: query-cache
uses: ./.github/actions/cache-query-compilation
with:
key: ruby-build
- name: Build Query Pack
run: |
PACKS=${{ runner.temp }}/query-packs
rm -rf $PACKS
codeql pack create ../misc/suite-helpers --output "$PACKS"
codeql pack create ../shared/regex --output "$PACKS"
codeql pack create ../shared/ssa --output "$PACKS"
codeql pack create ../shared/tutorial --output "$PACKS"
codeql pack create ql/lib --output "$PACKS"
codeql pack create -j0 ql/src --output "$PACKS" --compilation-cache "${{ steps.query-cache.outputs.cache-dir }}"
PACK_FOLDER=$(readlink -f "$PACKS"/codeql/ruby-queries/*)
codeql generate query-help --format=sarifv2.1.0 --output="${PACK_FOLDER}/rules.sarif" ql/src
(cd ql/src; find queries \( -name '*.qhelp' -o -name '*.rb' -o -name '*.erb' \) -exec bash -c 'mkdir -p "'"${PACK_FOLDER}"'/$(dirname "{}")"' \; -exec cp "{}" "${PACK_FOLDER}/{}" \;)
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: codeql-ruby-queries
path: |
${{ runner.temp }}/query-packs/*
retention-days: 1
include-hidden-files: true
package:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: [build, compile-queries]
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
with:
name: ruby.dbscheme
path: ruby/ruby
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
with:
name: extractor-ubuntu-latest
path: ruby/linux64
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
with:
name: extractor-windows-latest
path: ruby/win64
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
with:
name: extractor-macos-latest
path: ruby/osx64
- run: |
mkdir -p ruby
cp -r codeql-extractor.yml tools ql/lib/ruby.dbscheme.stats ruby/
mkdir -p ruby/tools/{linux64,osx64,win64}
cp linux64/codeql-extractor-ruby ruby/tools/linux64/extractor
cp osx64/codeql-extractor-ruby ruby/tools/osx64/extractor
cp win64/codeql-extractor-ruby.exe ruby/tools/win64/extractor.exe
chmod +x ruby/tools/{linux64,osx64}/extractor
zip -rq codeql-ruby.zip ruby
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: codeql-ruby-pack
path: ruby/codeql-ruby.zip
retention-days: 1
include-hidden-files: true
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
with:
name: codeql-ruby-queries
path: ruby/qlpacks
- run: |
echo '{
"provide": [
"ruby/codeql-extractor.yml",
"qlpacks/*/*/*/qlpack.yml"
]
}' > .codeqlmanifest.json
zip -rq codeql-ruby-bundle.zip .codeqlmanifest.json ruby qlpacks
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: codeql-ruby-bundle
path: ruby/codeql-ruby-bundle.zip
retention-days: 1
include-hidden-files: true
test:
defaults:
run:
working-directory: ${{ github.workspace }}
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
os: [ubuntu-latest, macos-latest, windows-latest]
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
needs: [package]
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- name: Fetch CodeQL
uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
- name: Download Ruby bundle
uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
with:
name: codeql-ruby-bundle
path: ${{ runner.temp }}
- name: Unzip Ruby bundle
shell: bash
run: unzip -q -d "${{ runner.temp }}/ruby-bundle" "${{ runner.temp }}/codeql-ruby-bundle.zip"
- name: Run QL test
shell: bash
run: |
codeql test run --search-path "${{ runner.temp }}/ruby-bundle" --additional-packs "${{ runner.temp }}/ruby-bundle" ruby/ql/test/library-tests/ast/constants/
- name: Create database
shell: bash
run: |
codeql database create --search-path "${{ runner.temp }}/ruby-bundle" --language ruby --source-root ruby/ql/test/library-tests/ast/constants/ ../database
- name: Analyze database
shell: bash
run: |
codeql database analyze --search-path "${{ runner.temp }}/ruby-bundle" --format=sarifv2.1.0 --output=out.sarif ../database ruby-code-scanning.qls

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
name: "Ruby: Collect database stats"
on:
push:
branches:
- main
- "rc/*"
paths:
- ruby/ql/lib/ruby.dbscheme
- .github/workflows/ruby-dataset-measure.yml
pull_request:
branches:
- main
- "rc/*"
paths:
- ruby/ql/lib/ruby.dbscheme
- .github/workflows/ruby-dataset-measure.yml
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
measure:
env:
CODEQL_THREADS: 4 # TODO: remove this once it's set by the CLI
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
repo: [rails/rails, discourse/discourse, spree/spree, ruby/ruby]
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
- uses: ./ruby/actions/create-extractor-pack
- name: Checkout ${{ matrix.repo }}
uses: actions/checkout@v5
with:
repository: ${{ matrix.repo }}
path: ${{ github.workspace }}/repo
- name: Create database
run: |
codeql database create \
--search-path "${{ github.workspace }}" \
--threads 4 \
--language ruby --source-root "${{ github.workspace }}/repo" \
"${{ runner.temp }}/database"
- name: Measure database
run: |
mkdir -p "stats/${{ matrix.repo }}"
codeql dataset measure --threads 4 --output "stats/${{ matrix.repo }}/stats.xml" "${{ runner.temp }}/database/db-ruby"
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: measurements-${{ hashFiles('stats/**') }}
path: stats
retention-days: 1
merge:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: measure
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
with:
path: stats
- run: |
python -m pip install --user lxml
find stats -name 'stats.xml' | sort | xargs python ruby/scripts/merge_stats.py --output ruby/ql/lib/ruby.dbscheme.stats --normalise ruby_tokeninfo
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: ruby.dbscheme.stats
path: ruby/ql/lib/ruby.dbscheme.stats

40
.github/workflows/ruby-qltest-rtjo.yml vendored Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
name: "Ruby: Run RTJO Language Tests"
on:
pull_request:
types:
- opened
- synchronize
- reopened
- labeled
env:
CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
defaults:
run:
working-directory: ruby
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
qltest-rtjo:
if: "github.repository_owner == 'github' && github.event.label.name == 'Run: RTJO Language Tests'"
runs-on: ubuntu-latest-xl
strategy:
fail-fast: false
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
- uses: ./ruby/actions/create-extractor-pack
- name: Cache compilation cache
id: query-cache
uses: ./.github/actions/cache-query-compilation
with:
key: ruby-qltest
- name: Run QL tests
run: |
codeql test run --dynamic-join-order-mode=all --threads=0 --ram 50000 --search-path "${{ github.workspace }}" --check-databases --check-diff-informed --check-undefined-labels --check-unused-labels --check-repeated-labels --check-redefined-labels --check-use-before-definition --consistency-queries ql/consistency-queries ql/test --compilation-cache "${{ steps.query-cache.outputs.cache-dir }}"
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}

73
.github/workflows/ruby-qltest.yml vendored Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
name: "Ruby: Run QL Tests"
on:
push:
paths:
- "ruby/**"
- "shared/**"
- .github/workflows/ruby-build.yml
- .github/actions/fetch-codeql/action.yml
- codeql-workspace.yml
branches:
- main
- "rc/*"
pull_request:
paths:
- "ruby/**"
- "shared/**"
- .github/workflows/ruby-qltest.yml
- .github/actions/fetch-codeql/action.yml
- codeql-workspace.yml
branches:
- main
- "rc/*"
env:
CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
defaults:
run:
working-directory: ruby
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
qlupgrade:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
- name: Check DB upgrade scripts
run: |
echo >empty.trap
codeql dataset import -S ql/lib/upgrades/initial/ruby.dbscheme testdb empty.trap
codeql dataset upgrade testdb --additional-packs ql/lib
diff -q testdb/ruby.dbscheme ql/lib/ruby.dbscheme
- name: Check DB downgrade scripts
run: |
echo >empty.trap
rm -rf testdb; codeql dataset import -S ql/lib/ruby.dbscheme testdb empty.trap
codeql resolve upgrades --format=lines --allow-downgrades --additional-packs downgrades \
--dbscheme=ql/lib/ruby.dbscheme --target-dbscheme=downgrades/initial/ruby.dbscheme |
xargs codeql execute upgrades testdb
diff -q testdb/ruby.dbscheme downgrades/initial/ruby.dbscheme
qltest:
if: github.repository_owner == 'github'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest-xl
strategy:
fail-fast: false
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
- uses: ./ruby/actions/create-extractor-pack
- name: Cache compilation cache
id: query-cache
uses: ./.github/actions/cache-query-compilation
with:
key: ruby-qltest
- name: Run QL tests
run: |
codeql test run --threads=0 --ram 50000 --search-path "${{ github.workspace }}" --check-databases --check-diff-informed --check-undefined-labels --check-unused-labels --check-repeated-labels --check-redefined-labels --check-use-before-definition --consistency-queries ql/consistency-queries ql/test --compilation-cache "${{ steps.query-cache.outputs.cache-dir }}"
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}

View File

@@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ repos:
rev: v3.2.0
hooks:
- id: trailing-whitespace
exclude: /test([^/]*)/.*$(?<!\.qlref)|.*\.patch$|.*\.qll?$
exclude: /test/.*$(?<!\.qlref)|.*\.patch$|.*\.qll?$
- id: end-of-file-fixer
exclude: Cargo.lock$|/test([^/]*)/.*$(?<!\.qlref)|.*\.patch$|.*\.qll?$
exclude: Cargo.lock$|/test/.*$(?<!\.qlref)|.*\.patch$|.*\.qll?$
- repo: https://github.com/pre-commit/mirrors-clang-format
rev: v17.0.6

442
Cargo.lock generated
View File

@@ -140,26 +140,6 @@ version = "0.22.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "72b3254f16251a8381aa12e40e3c4d2f0199f8c6508fbecb9d91f575e0fbb8c6"
[[package]]
name = "bindgen"
version = "0.72.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "993776b509cfb49c750f11b8f07a46fa23e0a1386ffc01fb1e7d343efc387895"
dependencies = [
"bitflags 2.9.4",
"cexpr",
"clang-sys",
"itertools 0.12.1",
"log 0.4.28",
"prettyplease",
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
"regex",
"rustc-hash 2.1.1",
"shlex",
"syn",
]
[[package]]
name = "bitflags"
version = "1.3.2"
@@ -260,9 +240,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "cc"
version = "1.2.61"
version = "1.2.37"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d16d90359e986641506914ba71350897565610e87ce0ad9e6f28569db3dd5c6d"
checksum = "65193589c6404eb80b450d618eaf9a2cafaaafd57ecce47370519ef674a7bd44"
dependencies = [
"find-msvc-tools",
"jobserver",
@@ -270,15 +250,6 @@ dependencies = [
"shlex",
]
[[package]]
name = "cexpr"
version = "0.6.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "6fac387a98bb7c37292057cffc56d62ecb629900026402633ae9160df93a8766"
dependencies = [
"nom",
]
[[package]]
name = "cfg-if"
version = "1.0.3"
@@ -357,7 +328,7 @@ dependencies = [
"chalk-derive 0.103.0",
"chalk-ir 0.103.0",
"ena",
"indexmap 2.14.0",
"indexmap 2.11.4",
"itertools 0.12.1",
"petgraph",
"rustc-hash 1.1.0",
@@ -378,17 +349,6 @@ dependencies = [
"windows-link 0.2.0",
]
[[package]]
name = "clang-sys"
version = "1.8.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "0b023947811758c97c59bf9d1c188fd619ad4718dcaa767947df1cadb14f39f4"
dependencies = [
"glob",
"libc",
"libloading",
]
[[package]]
name = "clap"
version = "4.5.48"
@@ -456,7 +416,6 @@ dependencies = [
"tree-sitter",
"tree-sitter-json",
"tree-sitter-ql",
"yeast",
"zstd",
]
@@ -478,25 +437,6 @@ dependencies = [
"tree-sitter-ruby",
]
[[package]]
name = "codeql-extractor-unified"
version = "0.1.0"
dependencies = [
"clap",
"codeql-extractor",
"encoding",
"lazy_static",
"rayon",
"regex",
"serde_json",
"tracing",
"tracing-subscriber",
"tree-sitter",
"tree-sitter-embedded-template",
"tree-sitter-swift",
"yeast",
]
[[package]]
name = "codeql-rust"
version = "0.1.0"
@@ -545,15 +485,6 @@ version = "1.0.4"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "b05b61dc5112cbb17e4b6cd61790d9845d13888356391624cbe7e41efeac1e75"
[[package]]
name = "convert_case"
version = "0.8.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "baaaa0ecca5b51987b9423ccdc971514dd8b0bb7b4060b983d3664dad3f1f89f"
dependencies = [
"unicode-segmentation",
]
[[package]]
name = "core-foundation-sys"
version = "0.8.7"
@@ -807,12 +738,6 @@ dependencies = [
"typeid",
]
[[package]]
name = "fastrand"
version = "2.4.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "9f1f227452a390804cdb637b74a86990f2a7d7ba4b7d5693aac9b4dd6defd8d6"
[[package]]
name = "figment"
version = "0.10.19"
@@ -829,9 +754,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "find-msvc-tools"
version = "0.1.9"
version = "0.1.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "5baebc0774151f905a1a2cc41989300b1e6fbb29aff0ceffa1064fdd3088d582"
checksum = "7fd99930f64d146689264c637b5af2f0233a933bef0d8570e2526bf9e083192d"
[[package]]
name = "fixedbitset"
@@ -861,12 +786,6 @@ version = "0.1.5"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d9c4f5dac5e15c24eb999c26181a6ca40b39fe946cbe4c263c7209467bc83af2"
[[package]]
name = "foldhash"
version = "0.2.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "77ce24cb58228fbb8aa041425bb1050850ac19177686ea6e0f41a70416f56fdb"
[[package]]
name = "form_urlencoded"
version = "1.2.2"
@@ -951,26 +870,9 @@ checksum = "9229cfe53dfd69f0609a49f65461bd93001ea1ef889cd5529dd176593f5338a1"
dependencies = [
"allocator-api2",
"equivalent",
"foldhash 0.1.5",
"foldhash",
]
[[package]]
name = "hashbrown"
version = "0.16.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "841d1cc9bed7f9236f321df977030373f4a4163ae1a7dbfe1a51a2c1a51d9100"
dependencies = [
"allocator-api2",
"equivalent",
"foldhash 0.2.0",
]
[[package]]
name = "hashbrown"
version = "0.17.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "ed5909b6e89a2db4456e54cd5f673791d7eca6732202bbf2a9cc504fe2f9b84a"
[[package]]
name = "hashlink"
version = "0.10.0"
@@ -1157,25 +1059,16 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "indexmap"
version = "2.14.0"
version = "2.11.4"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d466e9454f08e4a911e14806c24e16fba1b4c121d1ea474396f396069cf949d9"
checksum = "4b0f83760fb341a774ed326568e19f5a863af4a952def8c39f9ab92fd95b88e5"
dependencies = [
"equivalent",
"hashbrown 0.17.1",
"hashbrown 0.15.5",
"serde",
"serde_core",
]
[[package]]
name = "indoc"
version = "2.0.7"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "79cf5c93f93228cf8efb3ba362535fb11199ac548a09ce117c9b1adc3030d706"
dependencies = [
"rustversion",
]
[[package]]
name = "inlinable_string"
version = "0.1.15"
@@ -1305,16 +1198,6 @@ version = "0.2.175"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "6a82ae493e598baaea5209805c49bbf2ea7de956d50d7da0da1164f9c6d28543"
[[package]]
name = "libloading"
version = "0.8.9"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d7c4b02199fee7c5d21a5ae7d8cfa79a6ef5bb2fc834d6e9058e89c825efdc55"
dependencies = [
"cfg-if",
"windows-link 0.2.0",
]
[[package]]
name = "line-index"
version = "0.1.2"
@@ -1380,12 +1263,6 @@ dependencies = [
"autocfg",
]
[[package]]
name = "minimal-lexical"
version = "0.2.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "68354c5c6bd36d73ff3feceb05efa59b6acb7626617f4962be322a825e61f79a"
[[package]]
name = "miniz_oxide"
version = "0.8.9"
@@ -1432,16 +1309,6 @@ version = "0.2.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "2bf50223579dc7cdcfb3bfcacf7069ff68243f8c363f62ffa99cf000a6b9c451"
[[package]]
name = "nom"
version = "7.1.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d273983c5a657a70a3e8f2a01329822f3b8c8172b73826411a55751e404a0a4a"
dependencies = [
"memchr",
"minimal-lexical",
]
[[package]]
name = "notify"
version = "8.2.0"
@@ -1569,12 +1436,6 @@ dependencies = [
"windows-targets 0.52.6",
]
[[package]]
name = "pathdiff"
version = "0.2.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "df94ce210e5bc13cb6651479fa48d14f601d9858cfe0467f43ae157023b938d3"
[[package]]
name = "pear"
version = "0.2.9"
@@ -1630,36 +1491,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "b4c5cc86750666a3ed20bdaf5ca2a0344f9c67674cae0515bec2da16fbaa47db"
dependencies = [
"fixedbitset",
"indexmap 2.14.0",
]
[[package]]
name = "phf"
version = "0.13.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "c1562dc717473dbaa4c1f85a36410e03c047b2e7df7f45ee938fbef64ae7fadf"
dependencies = [
"phf_shared",
"serde",
]
[[package]]
name = "phf_generator"
version = "0.13.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "135ace3a761e564ec88c03a77317a7c6b80bb7f7135ef2544dbe054243b89737"
dependencies = [
"fastrand",
"phf_shared",
]
[[package]]
name = "phf_shared"
version = "0.13.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "e57fef6bc5981e38c2ce2d63bfa546861309f875b8a75f092d1d54ae2d64f266"
dependencies = [
"siphasher",
"indexmap 2.11.4",
]
[[package]]
@@ -1704,25 +1536,6 @@ dependencies = [
"zerocopy",
]
[[package]]
name = "prettyplease"
version = "0.2.37"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "479ca8adacdd7ce8f1fb39ce9ecccbfe93a3f1344b3d0d97f20bc0196208f62b"
dependencies = [
"proc-macro2",
"syn",
]
[[package]]
name = "proc-macro-crate"
version = "3.5.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "e67ba7e9b2b56446f1d419b1d807906278ffa1a658a8a5d8a39dcb1f5a78614f"
dependencies = [
"toml_edit 0.25.11+spec-1.1.0",
]
[[package]]
name = "proc-macro2"
version = "1.0.101"
@@ -1854,7 +1667,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "e876bb2c3e52a8d4e6684526a2d4e81f9d028b939ee4dc5dc775fe10deb44d59"
dependencies = [
"dashmap",
"indexmap 2.14.0",
"indexmap 2.11.4",
"la-arena",
"ra_ap_cfg",
"ra_ap_intern",
@@ -1896,7 +1709,7 @@ checksum = "ebffdc134eccabc17209d7760cfff7fd12ed18ab6e21188c5e084b97aa38504c"
dependencies = [
"arrayvec",
"either",
"indexmap 2.14.0",
"indexmap 2.11.4",
"itertools 0.14.0",
"ra_ap_base_db",
"ra_ap_cfg",
@@ -1926,7 +1739,7 @@ dependencies = [
"drop_bomb",
"either",
"fst",
"indexmap 2.14.0",
"indexmap 2.11.4",
"itertools 0.14.0",
"la-arena",
"ra-ap-rustc_abi",
@@ -1995,7 +1808,7 @@ dependencies = [
"cov-mark",
"either",
"ena",
"indexmap 2.14.0",
"indexmap 2.11.4",
"itertools 0.14.0",
"la-arena",
"oorandom",
@@ -2033,7 +1846,7 @@ dependencies = [
"crossbeam-channel",
"either",
"fst",
"indexmap 2.14.0",
"indexmap 2.11.4",
"itertools 0.14.0",
"line-index",
"memchr",
@@ -2135,7 +1948,7 @@ version = "0.0.301"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "45db9e2df587d56f0738afa89fb2c100ff7c1e9cbe49e07f6a8b62342832211b"
dependencies = [
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"indexmap 2.11.4",
"ra_ap_intern",
"ra_ap_paths",
"ra_ap_span",
@@ -2294,7 +2107,7 @@ checksum = "6c174d6b9b7a7f54687df7e00c3e75ed6f082a7943a9afb1d54f33c0c12773de"
dependencies = [
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"fst",
"indexmap 2.14.0",
"indexmap 2.11.4",
"nohash-hasher",
"ra_ap_paths",
"ra_ap_stdx",
@@ -2426,15 +2239,6 @@ version = "0.8.6"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "caf4aa5b0f434c91fe5c7f1ecb6a5ece2130b02ad2a590589dda5146df959001"
[[package]]
name = "relative-path"
version = "2.0.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "bca40a312222d8ba74837cb474edef44b37f561da5f773981007a10bbaa992b0"
dependencies = [
"serde",
]
[[package]]
name = "rowan"
version = "0.15.15"
@@ -2448,57 +2252,6 @@ dependencies = [
"text-size",
]
[[package]]
name = "rquickjs"
version = "0.10.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "a135375fbac5ba723bb6a48f432a72f81539cedde422f0121a86c7c4e96d8e0d"
dependencies = [
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"rquickjs-macro",
]
[[package]]
name = "rquickjs-core"
version = "0.10.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "bccb7121a123865c8ace4dea42e7ed84d78b90cbaf4ca32c59849d8d210c9672"
dependencies = [
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"phf",
"relative-path",
"rquickjs-sys",
]
[[package]]
name = "rquickjs-macro"
version = "0.10.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "89f93602cc3112c7f30bf5f29e722784232138692c7df4c52ebbac7e035d900d"
dependencies = [
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"fnv",
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"indexmap 2.14.0",
"phf_generator",
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"proc-macro-crate",
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
"rquickjs-core",
"syn",
]
[[package]]
name = "rquickjs-sys"
version = "0.10.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "57b1b6528590d4d65dc86b5159eae2d0219709546644c66408b2441696d1d725"
dependencies = [
"bindgen",
"cc",
]
[[package]]
name = "rust-extractor-macros"
version = "0.1.0"
@@ -2564,7 +2317,7 @@ dependencies = [
"crossbeam-utils",
"hashbrown 0.15.5",
"hashlink",
"indexmap 2.14.0",
"indexmap 2.11.4",
"intrusive-collections",
"papaya",
"parking_lot",
@@ -2653,12 +2406,11 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "semver"
version = "1.0.28"
version = "1.0.26"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "8a7852d02fc848982e0c167ef163aaff9cd91dc640ba85e263cb1ce46fae51cd"
checksum = "56e6fa9c48d24d85fb3de5ad847117517440f6beceb7798af16b4a87d616b8d0"
dependencies = [
"serde",
"serde_core",
]
[[package]]
@@ -2718,7 +2470,7 @@ version = "1.0.145"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "402a6f66d8c709116cf22f558eab210f5a50187f702eb4d7e5ef38d9a7f1c79c"
dependencies = [
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"indexmap 2.11.4",
"itoa",
"memchr",
"ryu",
@@ -2754,7 +2506,7 @@ dependencies = [
"chrono",
"hex",
"indexmap 1.9.3",
"indexmap 2.14.0",
"indexmap 2.11.4",
"schemars 0.9.0",
"schemars 1.0.4",
"serde",
@@ -2782,7 +2534,7 @@ version = "0.9.34+deprecated"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "6a8b1a1a2ebf674015cc02edccce75287f1a0130d394307b36743c2f5d504b47"
dependencies = [
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@@ -2804,18 +2556,6 @@ version = "1.3.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "0fda2ff0d084019ba4d7c6f371c95d8fd75ce3524c3cb8fb653a3023f6323e64"
[[package]]
name = "siphasher"
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source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
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[[package]]
name = "smallbitvec"
version = "2.6.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "9b0e903ee191d8f7a8fbf0d712c3a1699d19e04ceba5ad1eb673053c7d938a09"
[[package]]
name = "smallvec"
version = "1.15.1"
@@ -2892,18 +2632,18 @@ checksum = "144f754d318415ac792f9d69fc87abbbfc043ce2ef041c60f16ad828f638717d"
[[package]]
name = "thiserror"
version = "2.0.18"
version = "2.0.16"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "4288b5bcbc7920c07a1149a35cf9590a2aa808e0bc1eafaade0b80947865fbc4"
checksum = "3467d614147380f2e4e374161426ff399c91084acd2363eaf549172b3d5e60c0"
dependencies = [
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[[package]]
name = "thiserror-impl"
version = "2.0.18"
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source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
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dependencies = [
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@@ -2968,7 +2708,7 @@ dependencies = [
"serde",
"serde_spanned 0.6.9",
"toml_datetime 0.6.11",
"toml_edit 0.22.27",
"toml_edit",
]
[[package]]
@@ -2977,13 +2717,13 @@ version = "0.9.7"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "00e5e5d9bf2475ac9d4f0d9edab68cc573dc2fd644b0dba36b0c30a92dd9eaa0"
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]
[[package]]
@@ -3004,48 +2744,27 @@ dependencies = [
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]
[[package]]
name = "toml_datetime"
version = "1.1.1+spec-1.1.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "3165f65f62e28e0115a00b2ebdd37eb6f3b641855f9d636d3cd4103767159ad7"
dependencies = [
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]
[[package]]
name = "toml_edit"
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source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
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[[package]]
name = "toml_edit"
version = "0.25.11+spec-1.1.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "0b59c4d22ed448339746c59b905d24568fcbb3ab65a500494f7b8c3e97739f2b"
dependencies = [
"indexmap 2.14.0",
"toml_datetime 1.1.1+spec-1.1.0",
"toml_parser",
"winnow 1.0.2",
"winnow",
]
[[package]]
name = "toml_parser"
version = "1.1.2+spec-1.1.0"
version = "1.0.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "a2abe9b86193656635d2411dc43050282ca48aa31c2451210f4202550afb7526"
checksum = "4cf893c33be71572e0e9aa6dd15e6677937abd686b066eac3f8cd3531688a627"
dependencies = [
"winnow 1.0.2",
"winnow",
]
[[package]]
@@ -3060,12 +2779,6 @@ version = "1.0.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d163a63c116ce562a22cda521fcc4d79152e7aba014456fb5eb442f6d6a10109"
[[package]]
name = "topological-sort"
version = "0.2.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "ea68304e134ecd095ac6c3574494fc62b909f416c4fca77e440530221e549d3d"
[[package]]
name = "tracing"
version = "0.1.41"
@@ -3140,9 +2853,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "tree-sitter"
version = "0.26.8"
version = "0.25.9"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "887bd495d0582c5e3e0d8ece2233666169fa56a9644d172fc22ad179ab2d0538"
checksum = "ccd2a058a86cfece0bf96f7cce1021efef9c8ed0e892ab74639173e5ed7a34fa"
dependencies = [
"cc",
"regex",
@@ -3162,30 +2875,6 @@ dependencies = [
"tree-sitter-language",
]
[[package]]
name = "tree-sitter-generate"
version = "0.26.8"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "c3fb2e1bdb1d5f9d23cd5fa68cf98b3bedbd223c92a2edd60bbcf30bcf7180a5"
dependencies = [
"bitflags 2.9.4",
"dunce",
"indexmap 2.14.0",
"indoc",
"log 0.4.28",
"pathdiff",
"regex",
"regex-syntax",
"rquickjs",
"rustc-hash 2.1.1",
"semver",
"serde",
"serde_json",
"smallbitvec",
"thiserror",
"topological-sort",
]
[[package]]
name = "tree-sitter-json"
version = "0.24.8"
@@ -3202,16 +2891,6 @@ version = "0.1.5"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "c4013970217383f67b18aef68f6fb2e8d409bc5755227092d32efb0422ba24b8"
[[package]]
name = "tree-sitter-python"
version = "0.23.6"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "3d065aaa27f3aaceaf60c1f0e0ac09e1cb9eb8ed28e7bcdaa52129cffc7f4b04"
dependencies = [
"cc",
"tree-sitter-language",
]
[[package]]
name = "tree-sitter-ql"
version = "0.23.1"
@@ -3232,15 +2911,6 @@ dependencies = [
"tree-sitter-language",
]
[[package]]
name = "tree-sitter-swift"
version = "0.7.2"
dependencies = [
"cc",
"tree-sitter-generate",
"tree-sitter-language",
]
[[package]]
name = "triomphe"
version = "0.1.14"
@@ -3290,12 +2960,6 @@ version = "0.1.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "e70f2a8b45122e719eb623c01822704c4e0907e7e426a05927e1a1cfff5b75d0"
[[package]]
name = "unicode-segmentation"
version = "1.13.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "9629274872b2bfaf8d66f5f15725007f635594914870f65218920345aa11aa8c"
[[package]]
name = "unicode-xid"
version = "0.2.6"
@@ -3685,15 +3349,6 @@ dependencies = [
"memchr",
]
[[package]]
name = "winnow"
version = "1.0.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "2ee1708bef14716a11bae175f579062d4554d95be2c6829f518df847b7b3fdd0"
dependencies = [
"memchr",
]
[[package]]
name = "wit-bindgen"
version = "0.45.1"
@@ -3712,29 +3367,6 @@ version = "1.0.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "cfe53a6657fd280eaa890a3bc59152892ffa3e30101319d168b781ed6529b049"
[[package]]
name = "yeast"
version = "0.1.0"
dependencies = [
"clap",
"serde",
"serde_json",
"serde_yaml",
"tree-sitter",
"tree-sitter-python",
"tree-sitter-ruby",
"yeast-macros",
]
[[package]]
name = "yeast-macros"
version = "0.1.0"
dependencies = [
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
"syn",
]
[[package]]
name = "yoke"
version = "0.8.0"

View File

@@ -4,11 +4,7 @@
resolver = "2"
members = [
"shared/tree-sitter-extractor",
"shared/yeast",
"shared/yeast-macros",
"ruby/extractor",
"unified/extractor",
"unified/extractor/tree-sitter-swift",
"rust/extractor",
"rust/extractor/macros",
"rust/ast-generator",

View File

@@ -15,22 +15,22 @@ local_path_override(
# see https://registry.bazel.build/ for a list of available packages
bazel_dep(name = "platforms", version = "1.0.0")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_cc", version = "0.2.17")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_go", version = "0.60.0")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_java", version = "9.6.1")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_pkg", version = "1.2.0")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_cc", version = "0.2.16")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_go", version = "0.59.0")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_java", version = "9.0.3")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_pkg", version = "1.0.1")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_nodejs", version = "6.7.3")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_python", version = "1.9.0")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_shell", version = "0.7.1")
bazel_dep(name = "bazel_skylib", version = "1.9.0")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_shell", version = "0.5.0")
bazel_dep(name = "bazel_skylib", version = "1.8.1")
bazel_dep(name = "abseil-cpp", version = "20260107.1", repo_name = "absl")
bazel_dep(name = "nlohmann_json", version = "3.11.3", repo_name = "json")
bazel_dep(name = "fmt", version = "12.1.0-codeql.1")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_kotlin", version = "2.2.2-codeql.1")
bazel_dep(name = "gazelle", version = "0.50.0")
bazel_dep(name = "gazelle", version = "0.47.0")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_dotnet", version = "0.21.5-codeql.1")
bazel_dep(name = "googletest", version = "1.17.0.bcr.2")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_rust", version = "0.69.0")
bazel_dep(name = "googletest", version = "1.14.0.bcr.1")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_rust", version = "0.68.1.codeql.1")
bazel_dep(name = "zstd", version = "1.5.7.bcr.1")
bazel_dep(name = "buildifier_prebuilt", version = "6.4.0", dev_dependency = True)
@@ -102,7 +102,6 @@ use_repo(
tree_sitter_extractors_deps,
"vendor_ts__anyhow-1.0.100",
"vendor_ts__argfile-0.2.1",
"vendor_ts__cc-1.2.61",
"vendor_ts__chalk-ir-0.104.0",
"vendor_ts__chrono-0.4.42",
"vendor_ts__clap-4.5.48",
@@ -142,18 +141,14 @@ use_repo(
"vendor_ts__serde-1.0.228",
"vendor_ts__serde_json-1.0.145",
"vendor_ts__serde_with-3.14.1",
"vendor_ts__serde_yaml-0.9.34-deprecated",
"vendor_ts__syn-2.0.106",
"vendor_ts__toml-0.9.7",
"vendor_ts__tracing-0.1.41",
"vendor_ts__tracing-flame-0.2.0",
"vendor_ts__tracing-subscriber-0.3.20",
"vendor_ts__tree-sitter-0.26.8",
"vendor_ts__tree-sitter-0.25.9",
"vendor_ts__tree-sitter-embedded-template-0.25.0",
"vendor_ts__tree-sitter-generate-0.26.8",
"vendor_ts__tree-sitter-json-0.24.8",
"vendor_ts__tree-sitter-language-0.1.5",
"vendor_ts__tree-sitter-python-0.23.6",
"vendor_ts__tree-sitter-ql-0.23.1",
"vendor_ts__tree-sitter-ruby-0.23.1",
"vendor_ts__triomphe-0.1.14",
@@ -247,7 +242,6 @@ use_repo(
"kotlin-compiler-2.2.0-Beta1",
"kotlin-compiler-2.2.20-Beta2",
"kotlin-compiler-2.3.0",
"kotlin-compiler-2.3.20",
"kotlin-compiler-embeddable-1.8.0",
"kotlin-compiler-embeddable-1.9.0-Beta",
"kotlin-compiler-embeddable-1.9.20-Beta",
@@ -258,7 +252,6 @@ use_repo(
"kotlin-compiler-embeddable-2.2.0-Beta1",
"kotlin-compiler-embeddable-2.2.20-Beta2",
"kotlin-compiler-embeddable-2.3.0",
"kotlin-compiler-embeddable-2.3.20",
"kotlin-stdlib-1.8.0",
"kotlin-stdlib-1.9.0-Beta",
"kotlin-stdlib-1.9.20-Beta",
@@ -269,7 +262,6 @@ use_repo(
"kotlin-stdlib-2.2.0-Beta1",
"kotlin-stdlib-2.2.20-Beta2",
"kotlin-stdlib-2.3.0",
"kotlin-stdlib-2.3.20",
)
go_sdk = use_extension("@rules_go//go:extensions.bzl", "go_sdk")

View File

@@ -8,5 +8,5 @@
import actions
from UsesStep uses
where uses.getVersion().regexpMatch("^[A-Fa-f0-9]{40}([A-Fa-f0-9]{24})?$")
where uses.getVersion().regexpMatch("^[A-Fa-f0-9]{40}$")
select uses, "This 'uses' step has a pinned SHA version."

View File

@@ -1,41 +1,3 @@
## 0.4.37
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* The GitHub Actions analysis now recognizes more Bash regex checks that restrict a value to alphanumeric characters, include regexes like `^[0-9a-zA-Z]{40}([0-9a-zA-Z]{24})?$` which check for a sha1 or sha256 hash. This may reduce false positive results where command output is validated with grouped or optional alphanumeric patterns before being used.
## 0.4.36
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Altered 2 patterns in the `poisonable_steps` modelling. Extra sinks are detected in the following cases: scripts executed via python modules and `go run` in directories are detected as potential mechanisms of injection. For the go execution pattern, the pattern is updated to now ignore flags that occur between go and the specific command. This change may lead to more results being detected by the following queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/critical`, `actions/cache-poisoning/poisonable-step`, `actions/cache-poisoning/direct-cache` and `actions/artifact-poisoning/path-traversal`.
## 0.4.35
No user-facing changes.
## 0.4.34
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Removed false positive injection sink models for the `context` input of `docker/build-push-action` and the `allowed-endpoints` input of `step-security/harden-runner`.
## 0.4.33
No user-facing changes.
## 0.4.32
No user-facing changes.
## 0.4.31
No user-facing changes.
## 0.4.30
No user-facing changes.
## 0.4.29
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.4.30
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.4.31
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.4.32
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.4.33
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
## 0.4.34
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Removed false positive injection sink models for the `context` input of `docker/build-push-action` and the `allowed-endpoints` input of `step-security/harden-runner`.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.4.35
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
## 0.4.36
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Altered 2 patterns in the `poisonable_steps` modelling. Extra sinks are detected in the following cases: scripts executed via python modules and `go run` in directories are detected as potential mechanisms of injection. For the go execution pattern, the pattern is updated to now ignore flags that occur between go and the specific command. This change may lead to more results being detected by the following queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/critical`, `actions/cache-poisoning/poisonable-step`, `actions/cache-poisoning/direct-cache` and `actions/artifact-poisoning/path-traversal`.

View File

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
## 0.4.37
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* The GitHub Actions analysis now recognizes more Bash regex checks that restrict a value to alphanumeric characters, include regexes like `^[0-9a-zA-Z]{40}([0-9a-zA-Z]{24})?$` which check for a sha1 or sha256 hash. This may reduce false positive results where command output is validated with grouped or optional alphanumeric patterns before being used.

View File

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
---
lastReleaseVersion: 0.4.37
lastReleaseVersion: 0.4.29

View File

@@ -785,22 +785,7 @@ module Bash {
/**
* Holds if the given regex is used to match an alphanumeric string
* eg: `^[0-9a-zA-Z]{40}([0-9a-zA-Z]{24})?$`, `^[0-9]+$` or `^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$`
* eg: `^[0-9a-zA-Z]{40}$`, `^[0-9]+$` or `^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$`
*/
string alphaNumericRegex() {
exists(string r1, string r2, string r3, string r4 |
// An alphanumeric character class
r1 = "\\[([09azAZ_-]+)\\]" and
// The same as above, followed by a quantifier like `+` or `{20}`
r2 = r1 + "(\\+|\\{\\d+\\})" and
// The same as above, possibly with parentheses around it
r3 = "\\(?" + r2 + "\\)?" and
// The same as above, possibly with a `?` after it
r4 = r3 + "\\??"
|
// The same as above, repeated one or more times, and with `^` at the
// beginning and `$` at the end
result = "^\\^(" + r4 + ")+\\$$"
)
}
string alphaNumericRegex() { result = "^\\^\\[([09azAZ_-]+)\\](\\+|\\{\\d+\\})\\$$" }
}

View File

@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ extensions:
- ["(source|sh|bash|zsh|fish)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\b", 2]
- ["(node)\\s+([^\\s]+)(\\.js|\\.ts)\\b", 2]
- ["(python[\\d\\.]*)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.py\\b", 2]
- ["(python[\\d\\.]*)\\s+-m\\s+([A-Za-z_][\\w\\.]*)\\b", 2] # eg: pythonX -m anything(dir or file)
- ["(ruby)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.rb\\b", 2]
- ["(go)\\s+(generate|run)(?:\\s+-[^\\s]+)*\\s+([^\\s]+)", 3]
- ["(go)\\s+(generate|run)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.go\\b", 3]
- ["(dotnet)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.csproj\\b", 2]

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
extensions:
- addsTo:
pack: codeql/actions-all
extensible: actionsSinkModel
data:
- ["docker/build-push-action", "*", "input.context", "code-injection", "manual"]

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
extensions:
- addsTo:
pack: codeql/actions-all
extensible: actionsSinkModel
data:
- ["step-security/harden-runner", "*", "input.allowed-endpoints", "command-injection", "manual"]

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
name: codeql/actions-all
version: 0.4.37
version: 0.4.30-dev
library: true
warnOnImplicitThis: true
dependencies:

View File

@@ -1,66 +1,3 @@
## 0.6.29
### Query Metadata Changes
* Reversed adjustment of the name of `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, but kept the portion of the previous change for the word "trusted" to "privileged". Added a missing "a" to phrasing in `actions/untrusted-checkout/high` and `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`.
### Major Analysis Improvements
* Adjusted `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical` to align more with other untrusted resource queries, where the alert location is the location where the artifact is obtained from (the checkout point). This aligns with the other 2 related queries. This will cause the same alerts to re-open for closed alerts of this query.
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Altered the alert message for clarity for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`.
* The `actions/unpinned-tag` query now recognizes 64-character SHA-256 commit hashes as properly pinned references, in addition to 40-character SHA-1 hashes.
### Bug Fixes
* Adjusted (minor) help file descriptions for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`. Clarified wording on in minor point, added one more listed resource and added one more recommendation for things to check.
## 0.6.28
### Query Metadata Changes
* Adjusted the name of `actions/untrusted-checkout/high` to more clearly describe which parts of the scenario are in a privileged context.
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* The `actions/unpinned-tag` query now analyzes composite action metadata (`action.yml`/`action.yaml` files) in addition to workflow files, providing more comprehensive detection of unpinned action references across the entire Actions ecosystem.
### Bug Fixes
* Fixed help file descriptions for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`. Previously the messages were unclear as to why and how the vulnerabilities could occur.
## 0.6.27
No user-facing changes.
## 0.6.26
### Major Analysis Improvements
* Fixed alert messages in `actions/artifact-poisoning/critical` and `actions/artifact-poisoning/medium` as they previously included a redundant placeholder in the alert message that would on occasion contain a long block of yml that makes the alert difficult to understand. Also improved the wording to make it clearer that it is not the artifact that is being poisoned, but instead a potentially untrusted artifact that is consumed. Finally, changed the alert location to be the source, to align more with other queries reporting an artifact (e.g. zipslip) which is more useful.
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* The query `actions/missing-workflow-permissions` no longer produces false positive results on reusable workflows where all callers set permissions.
## 0.6.25
No user-facing changes.
## 0.6.24
No user-facing changes.
## 0.6.23
No user-facing changes.
## 0.6.22
No user-facing changes.
## 0.6.21
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -26,23 +26,10 @@ string permissionsForJob(Job job) {
"{" + concat(string permission | permission = jobNeedsPermission(job) | permission, ", ") + "}"
}
predicate jobHasPermissions(Job job) {
exists(job.getPermissions())
or
exists(job.getEnclosingWorkflow().getPermissions())
or
// The workflow is reusable and cannot be triggered in any other way; check callers
exists(ReusableWorkflow r | r = job.getEnclosingWorkflow() |
not exists(Event e | e = r.getOn().getAnEvent() | e.getName() != "workflow_call") and
forall(Job caller | caller = job.getEnclosingWorkflow().(ReusableWorkflow).getACaller() |
jobHasPermissions(caller)
)
)
}
from Job job, string permissions
where
not jobHasPermissions(job) and
not exists(job.getPermissions()) and
not exists(job.getEnclosingWorkflow().getPermissions()) and
// exists a trigger event that is not a workflow_call
exists(Event e |
e = job.getATriggerEvent() and

View File

@@ -20,6 +20,6 @@ from ArtifactPoisoningFlow::PathNode source, ArtifactPoisoningFlow::PathNode sin
where
ArtifactPoisoningFlow::flowPath(source, sink) and
event = getRelevantEventInPrivilegedContext(sink.getNode())
select source.getNode(), source, sink,
"Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@).",
event, event.getName()
select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
"Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@).", sink,
sink.getNode().toString(), event, event.getName()

View File

@@ -20,5 +20,6 @@ from ArtifactPoisoningFlow::PathNode source, ArtifactPoisoningFlow::PathNode sin
where
ArtifactPoisoningFlow::flowPath(source, sink) and
inNonPrivilegedContext(sink.getNode().asExpr())
select source.getNode(), source, sink,
"Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user."
select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
"Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user.", sink,
sink.getNode().toString()

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/**
* @name Unpinned tag for a non-immutable Action in workflow or composite action
* @name Unpinned tag for a non-immutable Action in workflow
* @description Using a tag for a non-immutable Action that is not pinned to a commit can lead to executing an untrusted Action through a supply chain attack.
* @kind problem
* @security-severity 5.0
@@ -15,9 +15,7 @@ import actions
import codeql.actions.security.UseOfUnversionedImmutableAction
bindingset[version]
private predicate isPinnedCommit(string version) {
version.regexpMatch("^[A-Fa-f0-9]{40}([A-Fa-f0-9]{24})?$")
}
private predicate isPinnedCommit(string version) { version.regexpMatch("^[A-Fa-f0-9]{40}$") }
bindingset[nwo]
private predicate isTrustedOwner(string nwo) {
@@ -33,26 +31,15 @@ private predicate isPinnedContainer(string version) {
bindingset[nwo]
private predicate isContainerImage(string nwo) { nwo.regexpMatch("^docker://.+") }
private predicate getStepContainerName(UsesStep uses, string name) {
exists(Workflow workflow |
uses.getEnclosingWorkflow() = workflow and
(
workflow.getName() = name
or
not exists(workflow.getName()) and workflow.getLocation().getFile().getBaseName() = name
)
)
or
exists(CompositeAction action |
uses.getEnclosingCompositeAction() = action and
name = action.getLocation().getFile().getBaseName()
)
}
from UsesStep uses, string nwo, string version, string name
from UsesStep uses, string nwo, string version, Workflow workflow, string name
where
uses.getCallee() = nwo and
getStepContainerName(uses, name) and
uses.getEnclosingWorkflow() = workflow and
(
workflow.getName() = name
or
not exists(workflow.getName()) and workflow.getLocation().getFile().getBaseName() = name
) and
uses.getVersion() = version and
not isTrustedOwner(nwo) and
not (if isContainerImage(nwo) then isPinnedContainer(version) else isPinnedCommit(version)) and

View File

@@ -1,35 +1,6 @@
## Overview
GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. Under certain conditions described below, attackers can take over a repository by opening malicious PRs from forks. The attacks can result in malicious code execution causing unauthorized changes to the repository or exfiltration of repository secrets and a compromise of connected systems.
## Workflow Security Model
In GitHub Actions, there is a distinction between unprivileged and privileged workflows. For example, a workflow with a `pull_request` trigger is unprivileged while a workflow with `pull_request_target` is privileged.
This is relevant especially for PRs from forks. Normal PRs can only be submitted by people who have write access to a repository, while PRs from forks can be submitted by anyone.
On a PR from a fork, an unprivileged `pull_request` workflow has only limited capabilities but a privileged `pull_request_target` workflow is much more dangerous. A privileged workflow:
* Runs in the context of the base repository
* Has access to organization and repository secrets (e.g., API keys, deployment tokens)
* Has a read/write `GITHUB_TOKEN` by default
* Can access private resources
Certain triggers automatically grant a workflow elevated privileges:
* `pull_request_target` as described above
* `workflow_run`: Triggered when another workflow completes.
* `issue_comment`: Triggered when a comment is made on an issue or PR.
## Attack Details
* A repository has a privileged workflow
* An attacker forks the repository and adds malicious code (e.g., in the build script)
* The attacker opens a PR from the fork, and, if needed, comments on the PR
* The workflow in the base repository checks out the forked code
* The workflow runs the malicious code
Please note that not only build scripts can be malicious code vectors. There is a large number of other possibilities. Some of them are listed in the [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/) catalog.
GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. A potentially dangerous misuse of the triggers such as `pull_request_target` or `issue_comment` followed by an explicit checkout of untrusted code (Pull Request HEAD) may lead to repository compromise if untrusted code gets executed (e.g., due to a modified build script) in a privileged job.
## Recommendation
@@ -41,8 +12,6 @@ The best practice is to handle the potentially untrusted pull request via the **
The artifacts downloaded from the first workflow should be considered untrusted and must be verified.
Additionally, ensure that least privilege are used both at the workflow level (through event triggers and workflow permissions) and job level (through job permissions).
## Example
### Incorrect Usage
@@ -164,6 +133,3 @@ jobs:
## References
- GitHub Security Lab Research: [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/).
- Mitigating risks of untrusted checkout: [GitHub Docs](https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/actions/reference/security/secure-use#mitigating-the-risks-of-untrusted-code-checkout).
- Securing with least privilege: [Workflow secure use](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/secure-use).
- Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/).

View File

@@ -51,6 +51,5 @@ where
event.getName() = checkoutTriggers() and
not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(checkout, event, "untrusted-checkout")) and
not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(poisonable, event, "untrusted-checkout"))
select checkout, checkout, poisonable,
"Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@).",
event, event.getName()
select poisonable, checkout, poisonable,
"Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@)", event, event.getName()

View File

@@ -1,35 +1,6 @@
## Overview
GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. Under certain conditions described below, attackers can take over a repository by opening malicious PRs from forks. The attacks can result in malicious code execution causing unauthorized changes to the repository or exfiltration of repository secrets and a compromise of connected systems.
## Workflow Security Model
In GitHub Actions, there is a distinction between unprivileged and privileged workflows. For example, a workflow with a `pull_request` trigger is unprivileged while a workflow with `pull_request_target` is privileged.
This is relevant especially for PRs from forks. Normal PRs can only be submitted by people who have write access to a repository, while PRs from forks can be submitted by anyone.
On a PR from a fork, an unprivileged `pull_request` workflow has only limited capabilities but a privileged `pull_request_target` workflow is much more dangerous. A privileged workflow:
* Runs in the context of the base repository
* Has access to organization and repository secrets (e.g., API keys, deployment tokens)
* Has a read/write `GITHUB_TOKEN` by default
* Can access private resources
Certain triggers automatically grant a workflow elevated privileges:
* `pull_request_target` as described above
* `workflow_run`: Triggered when another workflow completes.
* `issue_comment`: Triggered when a comment is made on an issue or PR.
## Attack Details
* A repository has a privileged workflow
* An attacker forks the repository and adds malicious code (e.g., in the build script)
* The attacker opens a PR from the fork, and, if needed, comments on the PR
* The workflow in the base repository checks out the forked code
* The workflow runs the malicious code
Please note that not only build scripts can be malicious code vectors. There is a large number of other possibilities. Some of them are listed in the [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/) catalog.
GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. A potentially dangerous misuse of the triggers such as `pull_request_target` or `issue_comment` followed by an explicit checkout of untrusted code (Pull Request HEAD) may lead to repository compromise if untrusted code gets executed (e.g., due to a modified build script) in a privileged job.
## Recommendation
@@ -41,8 +12,6 @@ The best practice is to handle the potentially untrusted pull request via the **
The artifacts downloaded from the first workflow should be considered untrusted and must be verified.
Additionally, ensure that least privilege are used both at the workflow level (through event triggers and workflow permissions) and job level (through job permissions).
## Example
### Incorrect Usage
@@ -164,6 +133,3 @@ jobs:
## References
- GitHub Security Lab Research: [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/).
- Mitigating risks of untrusted checkout: [GitHub Docs](https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/actions/reference/security/secure-use#mitigating-the-risks-of-untrusted-code-checkout).
- Securing with least privilege: [Workflow secure use](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/secure-use).
- Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/).

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/**
* @name Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged context
* @name Checkout of untrusted code in trusted context
* @description Privileged workflows have read/write access to the base repository and access to secrets.
* By explicitly checking out and running the build script from a fork the untrusted code is running in an environment
* that is able to push to the base repository and to access secrets.
@@ -42,6 +42,5 @@ where
not event.getName() = "issue_comment" and
not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(checkout, event, "untrusted-checkout"))
)
select checkout,
"Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@).",
event, event.getName()
select checkout, "Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@)", event,
event.getName()

View File

@@ -1,35 +1,6 @@
## Overview
GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. Under certain conditions described below, attackers can take over a repository by opening malicious PRs from forks. The attacks can result in malicious code execution causing unauthorized changes to the repository or exfiltration of repository secrets and a compromise of connected systems.
## Workflow Security Model
In GitHub Actions, there is a distinction between unprivileged and privileged workflows. For example, a workflow with a `pull_request` trigger is unprivileged while a workflow with `pull_request_target` is privileged.
This is relevant especially for PRs from forks. Normal PRs can only be submitted by people who have write access to a repository, while PRs from forks can be submitted by anyone.
On a PR from a fork, an unprivileged `pull_request` workflow has only limited capabilities but a privileged `pull_request_target` workflow is much more dangerous. A privileged workflow:
* Runs in the context of the base repository
* Has access to organization and repository secrets (e.g., API keys, deployment tokens)
* Has a read/write `GITHUB_TOKEN` by default
* Can access private resources
Certain triggers automatically grant a workflow elevated privileges:
* `pull_request_target` as described above
* `workflow_run`: Triggered when another workflow completes.
* `issue_comment`: Triggered when a comment is made on an issue or PR.
## Attack Details
* A repository has a privileged workflow
* An attacker forks the repository and adds malicious code (e.g., in the build script)
* The attacker opens a PR from the fork, and, if needed, comments on the PR
* The workflow in the base repository checks out the forked code
* The workflow runs the malicious code
Please note that not only build scripts can be malicious code vectors. There is a large number of other possibilities. Some of them are listed in the [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/) catalog.
GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. A potentially dangerous misuse of the triggers such as `pull_request_target` or `issue_comment` followed by an explicit checkout of untrusted code (Pull Request HEAD) may lead to repository compromise if untrusted code gets executed (e.g., due to a modified build script) in a privileged job.
## Recommendation
@@ -41,8 +12,6 @@ The best practice is to handle the potentially untrusted pull request via the **
The artifacts downloaded from the first workflow should be considered untrusted and must be verified.
Additionally, ensure that least privilege are used both at the workflow level (through event triggers and workflow permissions) and job level (through job permissions).
## Example
### Incorrect Usage
@@ -164,6 +133,3 @@ jobs:
## References
- GitHub Security Lab Research: [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/).
- Mitigating risks of untrusted checkout: [GitHub Docs](https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/actions/reference/security/secure-use#mitigating-the-risks-of-untrusted-code-checkout).
- Securing with least privilege: [Workflow secure use](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/secure-use).
- Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/).

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/**
* @name Checkout of untrusted code in a trusted context
* @name Checkout of untrusted code in trusted context
* @description Privileged workflows have read/write access to the base repository and access to secrets.
* By explicitly checking out and running the build script from a fork the untrusted code is running in an environment
* that is able to push to the base repository and to access secrets.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.6.22
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.6.23
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.6.24
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.6.25
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
## 0.6.26
### Major Analysis Improvements
* Fixed alert messages in `actions/artifact-poisoning/critical` and `actions/artifact-poisoning/medium` as they previously included a redundant placeholder in the alert message that would on occasion contain a long block of yml that makes the alert difficult to understand. Also improved the wording to make it clearer that it is not the artifact that is being poisoned, but instead a potentially untrusted artifact that is consumed. Finally, changed the alert location to be the source, to align more with other queries reporting an artifact (e.g. zipslip) which is more useful.
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* The query `actions/missing-workflow-permissions` no longer produces false positive results on reusable workflows where all callers set permissions.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.6.27
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
## 0.6.28
### Query Metadata Changes
* Adjusted the name of `actions/untrusted-checkout/high` to more clearly describe which parts of the scenario are in a privileged context.
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* The `actions/unpinned-tag` query now analyzes composite action metadata (`action.yml`/`action.yaml` files) in addition to workflow files, providing more comprehensive detection of unpinned action references across the entire Actions ecosystem.
### Bug Fixes
* Fixed help file descriptions for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`. Previously the messages were unclear as to why and how the vulnerabilities could occur.

View File

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
## 0.6.29
### Query Metadata Changes
* Reversed adjustment of the name of `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, but kept the portion of the previous change for the word "trusted" to "privileged". Added a missing "a" to phrasing in `actions/untrusted-checkout/high` and `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`.
### Major Analysis Improvements
* Adjusted `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical` to align more with other untrusted resource queries, where the alert location is the location where the artifact is obtained from (the checkout point). This aligns with the other 2 related queries. This will cause the same alerts to re-open for closed alerts of this query.
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Altered the alert message for clarity for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`.
* The `actions/unpinned-tag` query now recognizes 64-character SHA-256 commit hashes as properly pinned references, in addition to 40-character SHA-1 hashes.
### Bug Fixes
* Adjusted (minor) help file descriptions for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`. Clarified wording on in minor point, added one more listed resource and added one more recommendation for things to check.

View File

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
---
lastReleaseVersion: 0.6.29
lastReleaseVersion: 0.6.21

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
name: codeql/actions-queries
version: 0.6.29
version: 0.6.22-dev
library: false
warnOnImplicitThis: true
groups: [actions, queries]

View File

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
on:
workflow_call:
jobs:
build:
name: Build and test
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/deploy-pages

View File

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
on:
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write
pages: write
jobs:
call-workflow:
uses: ./.github/workflows/perms11.yml

View File

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
name: Composite unpinned tag test
runs:
using: "composite"
steps:
- uses: foo/bar@v2
- uses: foo/bar@25b062c917b0c75f8b47d8469aff6c94ffd89abb

View File

@@ -11,9 +11,3 @@ jobs:
- uses: foo/bar@25b062c917b0c75f8b47d8469aff6c94ffd89abb
- uses: docker://foo/bar@latest
- uses: docker://foo/bar@sha256:887a259a5a534f3c4f36cb02dca341673c6089431057242cdc931e9f133147e9
# SHA-256 pinned (64 hex chars) - should NOT be flagged
- uses: foo/bar@25b062c917b0c75f8b47d8469aff6c94ffd89abb25b062c917b0c75f8b47d84d
# SHA-1 pinned (40 hex chars) regression - should NOT be flagged
- uses: foo/bar@a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2
# Invalid 50-char hex string - should be flagged
- uses: foo/bar@a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2a1b2c3d4e5

View File

@@ -55,21 +55,21 @@ nodes
| .github/workflows/test25.yml:39:14:40:45 | ./gradlew buildScanPublishPrevious\n | semmle.label | ./gradlew buildScanPublishPrevious\n |
subpaths
#select
| .github/actions/download-artifact-2/action.yaml:6:7:25:4 | Uses Step | .github/actions/download-artifact-2/action.yaml:6:7:25:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:28:9:29:6 | Uses Step | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:3:3:3:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/actions/download-artifact-2/action.yaml:6:7:25:4 | Uses Step | .github/actions/download-artifact-2/action.yaml:6:7:25:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:29:14:29:26 | make snapshot | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:3:3:3:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning11.yml:13:9:32:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning11.yml:13:9:32:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning11.yml:38:11:38:77 | ./sonarcloud-data/x.py build -j$(nproc) --compiler gcc --skip-build | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning11.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning12.yml:13:9:32:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning12.yml:13:9:32:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning12.yml:38:11:38:25 | python foo/x.py | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning12.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:13:9:18:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:13:9:18:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:19:14:20:21 | sh foo/cmd\n | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning22.yml:13:9:17:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning22.yml:13:9:17:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning22.yml:18:14:18:19 | sh cmd | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning22.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning31.yml:13:9:15:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning31.yml:13:9:15:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning31.yml:19:14:19:22 | ./foo/cmd | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning31.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning32.yml:13:9:16:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning32.yml:13:9:16:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning32.yml:17:14:18:20 | ./bar/cmd\n | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning32.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning33.yml:13:9:16:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning33.yml:13:9:16:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning33.yml:17:14:18:20 | ./bar/cmd\n | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning33.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning34.yml:13:9:16:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning34.yml:13:9:16:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning34.yml:20:14:22:23 | npm install\nnpm run lint\n | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning34.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning41.yml:13:9:21:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning41.yml:13:9:21:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning41.yml:22:14:22:22 | ./foo/cmd | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning41.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning42.yml:13:9:21:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning42.yml:13:9:21:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning42.yml:22:14:22:18 | ./cmd | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning42.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning71.yml:9:9:16:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning71.yml:9:9:16:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning71.yml:17:14:18:40 | sed -f config foo.md > bar.md\n | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning71.yml:4:5:4:16 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning81.yml:28:9:31:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning81.yml:28:9:31:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning81.yml:31:14:31:27 | python test.py | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning81.yml:3:5:3:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning96.yml:13:9:18:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning96.yml:13:9:18:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning96.yml:18:14:18:24 | npm install | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning96.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning101.yml:10:9:16:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning101.yml:10:9:16:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning101.yml:17:14:19:59 | PR_NUMBER=$(./get_pull_request_number.sh pr_number.txt)\necho "PR_NUMBER=$PR_NUMBER" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT \n | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning101.yml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/test18.yml:12:15:33:12 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test18.yml:12:15:33:12 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test18.yml:36:15:40:58 | Uses Step | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/test18.yml:3:5:3:16 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/test25.yml:22:9:32:6 | Uses Step: downloadBuildScan | .github/workflows/test25.yml:22:9:32:6 | Uses Step: downloadBuildScan | .github/workflows/test25.yml:39:14:40:45 | ./gradlew buildScanPublishPrevious\n | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/test25.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning11.yml:38:11:38:77 | ./sonarcloud-data/x.py build -j$(nproc) --compiler gcc --skip-build | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning11.yml:13:9:32:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning11.yml:38:11:38:77 | ./sonarcloud-data/x.py build -j$(nproc) --compiler gcc --skip-build | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning11.yml:38:11:38:77 | ./sonarcloud-data/x.py build -j$(nproc) --compiler gcc --skip-build | ./sonarcloud-data/x.py build -j$(nproc) --compiler gcc --skip-build | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning11.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning12.yml:38:11:38:25 | python foo/x.py | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning12.yml:13:9:32:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning12.yml:38:11:38:25 | python foo/x.py | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning12.yml:38:11:38:25 | python foo/x.py | python foo/x.py | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning12.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:19:14:20:21 | sh foo/cmd\n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:13:9:18:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:19:14:20:21 | sh foo/cmd\n | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:19:14:20:21 | sh foo/cmd\n | sh foo/cmd\n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning22.yml:18:14:18:19 | sh cmd | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning22.yml:13:9:17:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning22.yml:18:14:18:19 | sh cmd | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning22.yml:18:14:18:19 | sh cmd | sh cmd | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning22.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning31.yml:19:14:19:22 | ./foo/cmd | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning31.yml:13:9:15:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning31.yml:19:14:19:22 | ./foo/cmd | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning31.yml:19:14:19:22 | ./foo/cmd | ./foo/cmd | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning31.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning32.yml:17:14:18:20 | ./bar/cmd\n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning32.yml:13:9:16:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning32.yml:17:14:18:20 | ./bar/cmd\n | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning32.yml:17:14:18:20 | ./bar/cmd\n | ./bar/cmd\n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning32.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning33.yml:17:14:18:20 | ./bar/cmd\n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning33.yml:13:9:16:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning33.yml:17:14:18:20 | ./bar/cmd\n | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning33.yml:17:14:18:20 | ./bar/cmd\n | ./bar/cmd\n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning33.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning34.yml:20:14:22:23 | npm install\nnpm run lint\n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning34.yml:13:9:16:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning34.yml:20:14:22:23 | npm install\nnpm run lint\n | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning34.yml:20:14:22:23 | npm install\nnpm run lint\n | npm install\nnpm run lint\n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning34.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning41.yml:22:14:22:22 | ./foo/cmd | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning41.yml:13:9:21:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning41.yml:22:14:22:22 | ./foo/cmd | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning41.yml:22:14:22:22 | ./foo/cmd | ./foo/cmd | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning41.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning42.yml:22:14:22:18 | ./cmd | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning42.yml:13:9:21:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning42.yml:22:14:22:18 | ./cmd | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning42.yml:22:14:22:18 | ./cmd | ./cmd | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning42.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning71.yml:17:14:18:40 | sed -f config foo.md > bar.md\n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning71.yml:9:9:16:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning71.yml:17:14:18:40 | sed -f config foo.md > bar.md\n | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning71.yml:17:14:18:40 | sed -f config foo.md > bar.md\n | sed -f config foo.md > bar.md\n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning71.yml:4:5:4:16 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning81.yml:31:14:31:27 | python test.py | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning81.yml:28:9:31:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning81.yml:31:14:31:27 | python test.py | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning81.yml:31:14:31:27 | python test.py | python test.py | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning81.yml:3:5:3:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:28:9:29:6 | Uses Step | .github/actions/download-artifact-2/action.yaml:6:7:25:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:28:9:29:6 | Uses Step | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:28:9:29:6 | Uses Step | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:3:3:3:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:29:14:29:26 | make snapshot | .github/actions/download-artifact-2/action.yaml:6:7:25:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:29:14:29:26 | make snapshot | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:29:14:29:26 | make snapshot | make snapshot | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:3:3:3:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning96.yml:18:14:18:24 | npm install | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning96.yml:13:9:18:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning96.yml:18:14:18:24 | npm install | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning96.yml:18:14:18:24 | npm install | npm install | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning96.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning101.yml:17:14:19:59 | PR_NUMBER=$(./get_pull_request_number.sh pr_number.txt)\necho "PR_NUMBER=$PR_NUMBER" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT \n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning101.yml:10:9:16:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning101.yml:17:14:19:59 | PR_NUMBER=$(./get_pull_request_number.sh pr_number.txt)\necho "PR_NUMBER=$PR_NUMBER" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT \n | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning101.yml:17:14:19:59 | PR_NUMBER=$(./get_pull_request_number.sh pr_number.txt)\necho "PR_NUMBER=$PR_NUMBER" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT \n | PR_NUMBER=$(./get_pull_request_number.sh pr_number.txt)\necho "PR_NUMBER=$PR_NUMBER" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT \n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning101.yml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/test18.yml:36:15:40:58 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test18.yml:12:15:33:12 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test18.yml:36:15:40:58 | Uses Step | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/test18.yml:36:15:40:58 | Uses Step | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test18.yml:3:5:3:16 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/test25.yml:39:14:40:45 | ./gradlew buildScanPublishPrevious\n | .github/workflows/test25.yml:22:9:32:6 | Uses Step: downloadBuildScan | .github/workflows/test25.yml:39:14:40:45 | ./gradlew buildScanPublishPrevious\n | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/test25.yml:39:14:40:45 | ./gradlew buildScanPublishPrevious\n | ./gradlew buildScanPublishPrevious\n | .github/workflows/test25.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
| .github/actions/unpinned-tag/action.yml:5:13:5:22 | foo/bar@v2 | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'action.yml' step $@ uses 'foo/bar' with ref 'v2', not a pinned commit hash | .github/actions/unpinned-tag/action.yml:5:7:6:4 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:19:13:19:36 | completely/fakeaction@v2 | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'actor_trusted_checkout.yml' step $@ uses 'completely/fakeaction' with ref 'v2', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:19:7:23:4 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:23:13:23:37 | fakerepo/comment-on-pr@v1 | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'actor_trusted_checkout.yml' step $@ uses 'fakerepo/comment-on-pr' with ref 'v1', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:23:7:26:21 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:13:15:13:49 | dawidd6/action-download-artifact@v2 | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'Pull Request Open' step $@ uses 'dawidd6/action-download-artifact' with ref 'v2', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:13:9:18:6 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
@@ -34,4 +33,3 @@
| .github/workflows/test18.yml:37:21:37:63 | sonarsource/sonarcloud-github-action@master | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'Sonar' step $@ uses 'sonarsource/sonarcloud-github-action' with ref 'master', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/test18.yml:36:15:40:58 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:10:13:10:22 | foo/bar@v1 | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'unpinned_tags.yml' step $@ uses 'foo/bar' with ref 'v1', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:10:7:11:4 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:12:13:12:35 | docker://foo/bar@latest | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'unpinned_tags.yml' step $@ uses 'docker://foo/bar' with ref 'latest', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:12:7:13:4 | Uses Step | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:19:13:19:70 | foo/bar@a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2a1b2c3d4e5 | Unpinned 3rd party Action 'unpinned_tags.yml' step $@ uses 'foo/bar' with ref 'a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2a1b2c3d4e5', not a pinned commit hash | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:19:7:19:71 | Uses Step | Uses Step |

View File

@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ edges
| .github/actions/download-artifact/action.yaml:25:7:29:4 | Run Step | .github/actions/download-artifact/action.yaml:29:7:32:18 | Run Step |
| .github/actions/download-artifact/action.yaml:29:7:32:18 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning91.yml:19:9:25:6 | Run Step: metadata |
| .github/actions/download-artifact/action.yaml:29:7:32:18 | Run Step | .github/workflows/resolve-args.yml:22:9:36:13 | Run Step: resolve-step |
| .github/actions/unpinned-tag/action.yml:5:7:6:4 | Uses Step | .github/actions/unpinned-tag/action.yml:6:7:6:61 | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:9:7:14:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:14:7:15:4 | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:14:7:15:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:15:7:19:4 | Run Step |
| .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:15:7:19:4 | Run Step | .github/workflows/actor_trusted_checkout.yml:19:7:23:4 | Uses Step |
@@ -312,10 +311,7 @@ edges
| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:9:7:10:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:10:7:11:4 | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:10:7:11:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:11:7:12:4 | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:11:7:12:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:12:7:13:4 | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:12:7:13:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:13:7:15:4 | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:13:7:15:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:15:7:17:4 | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:15:7:17:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:17:7:19:4 | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:17:7:19:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:19:7:19:71 | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:12:7:13:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/unpinned_tags.yml:13:7:13:101 | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:7:9:14:6 | Run Step: pr_number | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:14:9:19:72 | Run Step |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:11:9:12:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:12:9:13:6 | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:12:9:13:6 | Uses Step | .github/actions/dangerous-git-checkout/action.yml:6:7:11:4 | Uses Step |
@@ -338,42 +334,42 @@ edges
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_3.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_3.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step |
#select
| .github/actions/dangerous-git-checkout/action.yml:6:7:11:4 | Uses Step | .github/actions/dangerous-git-checkout/action.yml:6:7:11:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:13:9:13:23 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:32:9:37:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:48:9:52:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:79:9:84:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:84:9:93:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:15:9:20:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:15:9:20:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:25:9:48:6 | Run Step: set-milestone | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:3:5:3:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/reusable_caller1.yaml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:10:11:18:8 | Run Step | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:10:11:18:8 | Run Step | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:21:11:23:22 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:12:7:16:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:12:7:16:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:17:7:21:4 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/level0.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/level0.yml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/level0.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/level0.yml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:42:9:47:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:52:9:58:24 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:216:9:222:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:216:9:222:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:222:9:227:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:250:9:256:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:250:9:256:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:256:9:261:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:284:9:290:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:284:9:290:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:290:9:295:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:391:9:395:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:395:9:404:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:404:9:414:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:414:9:423:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:423:9:432:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/reusable_caller3.yaml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:33:9:36:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:36:9:39:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:49:9:59:6 | Run Step: benchmark-pr | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:59:9:60:6 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:60:9:60:37 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test10.yml:20:9:25:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test10.yml:20:9:25:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test10.yml:25:9:30:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test10.yml:8:3:8:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/test11.yml:84:7:90:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test11.yml:84:7:90:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test11.yml:90:7:93:54 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test11.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test17.yml:12:15:19:12 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test17.yml:12:15:19:12 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test17.yml:19:15:23:58 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test17.yml:3:5:3:16 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/test27.yml:18:9:21:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test27.yml:18:9:21:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test27.yml:21:9:22:16 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test26.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/test29.yml:8:7:14:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test29.yml:8:7:14:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test29.yml:14:7:21:11 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test29.yml:1:5:1:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:35:7:41:4 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:41:7:47:4 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:47:7:51:46 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:8:9:11:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:8:9:11:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:15:9:18:2 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:30:9:32:23 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:32:9:37:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:32:9:37:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:48:9:52:2 | Run Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:20:9:27:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:48:9:52:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:79:9:84:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:79:9:84:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:84:9:93:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:67:9:74:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:84:9:93:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/auto_ci.yml:6:3:6:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:25:9:48:6 | Run Step: set-milestone | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:15:9:20:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:25:9:48:6 | Run Step: set-milestone | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/dependabot3.yml:3:5:3:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/external/TestOrg/TestRepo/.github/workflows/reusable.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/reusable_caller1.yaml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:21:11:23:22 | Run Step | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:10:11:18:8 | Run Step | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:21:11:23:22 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/gitcheckout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:17:7:21:4 | Run Step | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:12:7:16:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:17:7:21:4 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/label_trusted_checkout2.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/level0.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:99:9:103:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:107:9:112:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/level0.yml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/level0.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:125:9:129:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/level0.yml:133:9:135:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/level0.yml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/poc2.yml:42:9:47:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:42:9:47:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/poc2.yml:52:9:58:24 | Run Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:37:9:42:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:52:9:58:24 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/poc2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:222:9:227:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:216:9:222:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:222:9:227:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:256:9:261:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:250:9:256:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:256:9:261:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:290:9:295:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:284:9:290:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:290:9:295:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:391:9:395:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:391:9:395:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:395:9:404:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:395:9:404:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:404:9:414:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:404:9:414:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:414:9:423:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:414:9:423:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:423:9:432:2 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:386:9:391:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:423:9:432:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/reusable_local.yml:26:9:29:7 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/reusable_caller3.yaml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:33:9:36:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:33:9:36:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:36:9:39:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:36:9:39:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:49:9:59:6 | Run Step: benchmark-pr | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:49:9:59:6 | Run Step: benchmark-pr | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:59:9:60:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:59:9:60:6 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test7.yml:60:9:60:37 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:19:9:24:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test7.yml:60:9:60:37 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test7.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test10.yml:25:9:30:2 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test10.yml:20:9:25:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test10.yml:25:9:30:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test10.yml:8:3:8:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/test11.yml:90:7:93:54 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test11.yml:84:7:90:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test11.yml:90:7:93:54 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test11.yml:5:3:5:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/test17.yml:19:15:23:58 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test17.yml:12:15:19:12 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test17.yml:19:15:23:58 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test17.yml:3:5:3:16 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/test27.yml:21:9:22:16 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test27.yml:18:9:21:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test27.yml:21:9:22:16 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test26.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/test29.yml:14:7:21:11 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test29.yml:8:7:14:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test29.yml:14:7:21:11 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test29.yml:1:5:1:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:13:9:13:23 | Run Step | .github/actions/dangerous-git-checkout/action.yml:6:7:11:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:13:9:13:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout3.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:35:7:41:4 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:35:7:41:4 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:41:7:47:4 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:41:7:47:4 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:47:7:51:46 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:29:7:35:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:47:7:51:46 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout4.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:15:9:18:2 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:8:9:11:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:15:9:18:2 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:30:9:32:23 | Run Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:23:9:26:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:30:9:32:23 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |

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@@ -1,23 +1,23 @@
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:12:9:16:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:20:9:24:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:28:9:32:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:35:9:40:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:43:9:46:126 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:28:9:33:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:48:7:50:46 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit2.yml:27:9:31:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:26:9:30:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:30:9:35:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:57:9:62:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:79:9:83:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:95:9:100:2 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:109:9:114:66 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:103:9:109:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:139:9:144:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:444:9:449:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/test13.yml:20:7:25:4 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/test13.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:14:9:19:72 | Run Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:1:5:1:17 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step | Checkout of untrusted code in a privileged workflow with later potential execution (event trigger: $@). | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:12:9:16:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:20:9:24:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:28:9:32:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:35:9:40:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:43:9:46:126 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_direct.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:28:9:33:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:48:7:50:46 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_heuristic.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit2.yml:27:9:31:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit2.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:26:9:30:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:30:9:35:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:57:9:62:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:79:9:83:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:95:9:100:2 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:109:9:114:66 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/issue_comment_octokit.yml:4:3:4:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:103:9:109:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:139:9:144:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/pr-workflow.yml:444:9:449:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/pr-workflow-fork.yaml:7:3:7:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
| .github/workflows/test13.yml:20:7:25:4 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/test13.yml:2:3:2:15 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:14:9:19:72 | Run Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/untrusted_checkout2.yml:1:5:1:17 | issue_comment | issue_comment |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:13:9:16:6 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:16:9:18:31 | Uses Step | Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@) | .github/workflows/workflow_run_untrusted_checkout_2.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |

View File

@@ -199,7 +199,6 @@ def annotate_as_appropriate(filename, lines):
# as overlay[local?]. It is not clear that these heuristics are exactly what we want,
# but they seem to work well enough for now (as determined by speed and accuracy numbers).
if (filename.endswith("Test.qll") or
re.search(r"go/ql/lib/semmle/go/security/[^/]+[.]qll$", filename.replace(os.sep, "/")) or
((filename.endswith("Query.qll") or filename.endswith("Config.qll")) and
any("implements DataFlow::ConfigSig" in line for line in lines))):
return None

View File

@@ -172,6 +172,10 @@
"cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/ir/implementation/raw/internal/reachability/PrintDominance.qll",
"cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/ir/implementation/unaliased_ssa/internal/reachability/PrintDominance.qll"
],
"C# ControlFlowReachability": [
"csharp/ql/lib/semmle/code/csharp/dataflow/internal/ControlFlowReachability.qll",
"csharp/ql/lib/semmle/code/csharp/dataflow/internal/rangeanalysis/ControlFlowReachability.qll"
],
"C++ ExternalAPIs": [
"cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-020/ExternalAPIs.qll",
"cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-020/ir/ExternalAPIs.qll"

View File

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
description: Support alias templates
compatibility: full
is_alias_template.rel: delete
alias_instantiation.rel: delete
alias_template_argument.rel: delete
alias_template_argument_value.rel: delete

View File

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
description: Capture information about one template being generated from another
compatibility: full
class_template_generated_from.rel: delete
function_template_generated_from.rel: delete
variable_template_generated_from.rel: delete
alias_template_generated_from.rel: delete

View File

@@ -7,12 +7,10 @@ ql/cpp/ql/src/Diagnostics/ExtractedFiles.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Diagnostics/ExtractionWarnings.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Diagnostics/FailedExtractorInvocations.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Arithmetic/BadAdditionOverflowCheck.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Arithmetic/IntMultToLong.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Arithmetic/SignedOverflowCheck.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Conversion/CastArrayPointerArithmetic.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Format/SnprintfOverflow.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Format/WrongNumberOfFormatArguments.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Format/WrongTypeFormatArguments.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Memory Management/AllocaInLoop.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Memory Management/PointerOverflow.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Memory Management/ReturnStackAllocatedMemory.ql
@@ -30,7 +28,6 @@ ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-120/VeryLikelyOverrunWrite.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-131/NoSpaceForZeroTerminator.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-134/UncontrolledFormatString.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-190/ArithmeticUncontrolled.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-190/ComparisonWithWiderType.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-191/UnsignedDifferenceExpressionComparedZero.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-253/HResultBooleanConversion.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-311/CleartextFileWrite.ql
@@ -43,7 +40,6 @@ ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-367/TOCTOUFilesystemRace.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-416/IteratorToExpiredContainer.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-416/UseOfStringAfterLifetimeEnds.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-416/UseOfUniquePointerAfterLifetimeEnds.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-468/SuspiciousAddWithSizeof.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-497/ExposedSystemData.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-611/XXE.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-676/DangerousFunctionOverflow.ql
@@ -56,6 +52,5 @@ ql/cpp/ql/src/Summary/LinesOfUserCode.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/CompilerErrors.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/DatabaseQuality.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/ExtractionMetrics.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/ExtractorInformation.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/MissingIncludes.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/SucceededIncludes.ql

View File

@@ -160,7 +160,6 @@ ql/cpp/ql/src/Summary/LinesOfUserCode.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/CompilerErrors.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/DatabaseQuality.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/ExtractionMetrics.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/ExtractorInformation.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/MissingIncludes.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/SucceededIncludes.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/jsf/4.06 Pre-Processing Directives/AV Rule 32.ql

View File

@@ -93,6 +93,5 @@ ql/cpp/ql/src/Summary/LinesOfUserCode.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/CompilerErrors.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/DatabaseQuality.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/ExtractionMetrics.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/ExtractorInformation.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/MissingIncludes.ql
ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/SucceededIncludes.ql

View File

@@ -1,81 +1,3 @@
## 10.2.0
### Deprecated APIs
* The `UsingAliasTypedefType` class has been deprecated. Use `TypeAliasType` instead.
### New Features
* Added a `getOriginalTemplate` predicate to `TemplateClass`, `TemplateFunction`, `TemplateVariable`, and `AliasTemplateType`, which yields the class member template the template was generated from. The predicates only have results for templates that are members of class template instantiations.
* Added `AliasTemplateType` and `AliasTemplateInstantiationType` classes, representing C++ alias templates and their instantiations.
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Added flow source models for `scanf_s` and related functions.
* Added a `Call` column to `LocalFlowSourceFunction::hasLocalFlowSource` and `RemoteFlowSourceFunction::hasRemoteFlowSource`. The old predicates without a `Call` column continue to be supported.
## 10.1.1
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* The `RemoteFlowSourceFunction` model for `fscanf` (and variants) now implements `hasSocketInput` to reflect that these functions may read from a socket.
## 10.1.0
### New Features
* A new predicate `getSwitchCase` was added to the `SwitchStmt` class, which yields the `n`th `case` statement from a `switch` statement.
* Data flow barriers and barrier guards can now be added using data extensions. For more information see [Customizing library models for C and C++](https://codeql.github.com/docs/codeql-language-guides/customizing-library-models-for-cpp/).
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Added taint flow models for the `Strsafe.h` header from the Windows SDK.
## 10.0.0
### Breaking Changes
* The deprecated `NonThrowingFunction` class has been removed, use `NonCppThrowingFunction` instead.
* The deprecated `ThrowingFunction` class has been removed, use `AlwaysSehThrowingFunction` instead.
### New Features
* Added a subclass `AutoconfConfigureTestFile` of `ConfigurationTestFile` that represents files created by GNU autoconf configure scripts to test the build configuration.
## 9.0.0
### Breaking Changes
* The `SourceModelCsv`, `SinkModelCsv`, and `SummaryModelCsv` classes and the associated CSV parsing infrastructure have been removed from `ExternalFlow.qll`. New models should be added as `.model.yml` files in the `ext/` directory.
### New Features
* Added a subclass `MesonPrivateTestFile` of `ConfigurationTestFile` that represents files created by Meson to test the build configuration.
* Added a class `ConstructorDirectFieldInit` to represent field initializations that occur in member initializer lists.
* Added a class `ConstructorDefaultFieldInit` to represent default field initializations.
* Added a class `DataFlow::IndirectParameterNode` to represent the indirection of a parameter as a dataflow node.
* Added a predicate `Node::asIndirectInstruction` which returns the `Instruction` that defines the indirect dataflow node, if any.
* Added a class `IndirectUninitializedNode` to represent the indirection of an uninitialized local variable as a dataflow node.
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Added `HttpReceiveHttpRequest`, `HttpReceiveRequestEntityBody`, and `HttpReceiveClientCertificate` from Win32's `http.h` as remote flow sources.
* Added dataflow through members initialized via non-static data member initialization (NSDMI).
## 8.0.3
No user-facing changes.
## 8.0.2
No user-facing changes.
## 8.0.1
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Inline expectations test comments, which are of the form `// $ tag` or `// $ tag=value`, are now parsed more strictly and will not be recognized if there isn't a space after the `$` symbol.
## 8.0.0
### Breaking Changes

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
## 8.0.1
### Minor Analysis Improvements
---
category: minorAnalysis
---
* Inline expectations test comments, which are of the form `// $ tag` or `// $ tag=value`, are now parsed more strictly and will not be recognized if there isn't a space after the `$` symbol.

View File

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
## 10.0.0
### Breaking Changes
* The deprecated `NonThrowingFunction` class has been removed, use `NonCppThrowingFunction` instead.
* The deprecated `ThrowingFunction` class has been removed, use `AlwaysSehThrowingFunction` instead.
### New Features
* Added a subclass `AutoconfConfigureTestFile` of `ConfigurationTestFile` that represents files created by GNU autoconf configure scripts to test the build configuration.

View File

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
## 10.1.0
### New Features
* A new predicate `getSwitchCase` was added to the `SwitchStmt` class, which yields the `n`th `case` statement from a `switch` statement.
* Data flow barriers and barrier guards can now be added using data extensions. For more information see [Customizing library models for C and C++](https://codeql.github.com/docs/codeql-language-guides/customizing-library-models-for-cpp/).
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Added taint flow models for the `Strsafe.h` header from the Windows SDK.

View File

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
## 10.1.1
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* The `RemoteFlowSourceFunction` model for `fscanf` (and variants) now implements `hasSocketInput` to reflect that these functions may read from a socket.

View File

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
## 10.2.0
### Deprecated APIs
* The `UsingAliasTypedefType` class has been deprecated. Use `TypeAliasType` instead.
### New Features
* Added a `getOriginalTemplate` predicate to `TemplateClass`, `TemplateFunction`, `TemplateVariable`, and `AliasTemplateType`, which yields the class member template the template was generated from. The predicates only have results for templates that are members of class template instantiations.
* Added `AliasTemplateType` and `AliasTemplateInstantiationType` classes, representing C++ alias templates and their instantiations.
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Added flow source models for `scanf_s` and related functions.
* Added a `Call` column to `LocalFlowSourceFunction::hasLocalFlowSource` and `RemoteFlowSourceFunction::hasRemoteFlowSource`. The old predicates without a `Call` column continue to be supported.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 8.0.2
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 8.0.3
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
## 9.0.0
### Breaking Changes
* The `SourceModelCsv`, `SinkModelCsv`, and `SummaryModelCsv` classes and the associated CSV parsing infrastructure have been removed from `ExternalFlow.qll`. New models should be added as `.model.yml` files in the `ext/` directory.
### New Features
* Added a subclass `MesonPrivateTestFile` of `ConfigurationTestFile` that represents files created by Meson to test the build configuration.
* Added a class `ConstructorDirectFieldInit` to represent field initializations that occur in member initializer lists.
* Added a class `ConstructorDefaultFieldInit` to represent default field initializations.
* Added a class `DataFlow::IndirectParameterNode` to represent the indirection of a parameter as a dataflow node.
* Added a predicate `Node::asIndirectInstruction` which returns the `Instruction` that defines the indirect dataflow node, if any.
* Added a class `IndirectUninitializedNode` to represent the indirection of an uninitialized local variable as a dataflow node.
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Added `HttpReceiveHttpRequest`, `HttpReceiveRequestEntityBody`, and `HttpReceiveClientCertificate` from Win32's `http.h` as remote flow sources.
* Added dataflow through members initialized via non-static data member initialization (NSDMI).

View File

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
---
lastReleaseVersion: 10.2.0
lastReleaseVersion: 8.0.0

View File

@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
# Models for strsafe.h safe string functions
extensions:
- addsTo:
pack: codeql/cpp-all
extensible: sourceModel
data: # namespace, type, subtypes, name, signature, ext, output, kind, provenance
# StringCchGets: (pszDest, cchDest)
- ["", "", False, "StringCchGetsA", "", "", "Argument[*0]", "local", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCchGetsW", "", "", "Argument[*0]", "local", "manual"]
# StringCbGets: (pszDest, cbDest)
- ["", "", False, "StringCbGetsA", "", "", "Argument[*0]", "local", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCbGetsW", "", "", "Argument[*0]", "local", "manual"]
# StringCchGetsEx: (pszDest, cchDest, ppszDestEnd, pcchRemaining, dwFlags)
- ["", "", False, "StringCchGetsExA", "", "", "Argument[*0]", "local", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCchGetsExW", "", "", "Argument[*0]", "local", "manual"]
# StringCbGetsEx: (pszDest, cbDest, ppszDestEnd, pcbRemaining, dwFlags)
- ["", "", False, "StringCbGetsExA", "", "", "Argument[*0]", "local", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCbGetsExW", "", "", "Argument[*0]", "local", "manual"]
- addsTo:
pack: codeql/cpp-all
extensible: summaryModel
data: # namespace, type, subtypes, name, signature, ext, input, output, kind, provenance
# StringCchCopy: (pszDest, cchDest, pszSrc)
- ["", "", False, "StringCchCopyA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCchCopyW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCbCopy: (pszDest, cbDest, pszSrc)
- ["", "", False, "StringCbCopyA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCbCopyW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCchCopyEx: (pszDest, cchDest, pszSrc, ppszDestEnd, pcchRemaining, dwFlags)
- ["", "", False, "StringCchCopyExA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCchCopyExW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCbCopyEx: (pszDest, cbDest, pszSrc, ppszDestEnd, pcbRemaining, dwFlags)
- ["", "", False, "StringCbCopyExA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCbCopyExW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCchCopyN: (pszDest, cchDest, pszSrc, cchToCopy)
- ["", "", False, "StringCchCopyNA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCchCopyNW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCbCopyN: (pszDest, cbDest, pszSrc, cbToCopy)
- ["", "", False, "StringCbCopyNA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCbCopyNW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCchCopyNEx: (pszDest, cchDest, pszSrc, cchToCopy, ppszDestEnd, pcchRemaining, dwFlags)
- ["", "", False, "StringCchCopyNExA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCchCopyNExW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCbCopyNEx: (pszDest, cbDest, pszSrc, cbToCopy, ppszDestEnd, pcbRemaining, dwFlags)
- ["", "", False, "StringCbCopyNExA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCbCopyNExW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCchCat: (pszDest, cchDest, pszSrc)
- ["", "", False, "StringCchCatA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCchCatW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCbCat: (pszDest, cbDest, pszSrc)
- ["", "", False, "StringCbCatA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCbCatW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCchCatEx: (pszDest, cchDest, pszSrc, ppszDestEnd, pcchRemaining, dwFlags)
- ["", "", False, "StringCchCatExA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCchCatExW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCbCatEx: (pszDest, cbDest, pszSrc, ppszDestEnd, pcbRemaining, dwFlags)
- ["", "", False, "StringCbCatExA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCbCatExW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCchCatN: (pszDest, cchDest, pszSrc, cchToAppend)
- ["", "", False, "StringCchCatNA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCchCatNW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCbCatN: (pszDest, cbDest, pszSrc, cbToAppend)
- ["", "", False, "StringCbCatNA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCbCatNW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCchCatNEx: (pszDest, cchDest, pszSrc, cchToAppend, ppszDestEnd, pcchRemaining, dwFlags)
- ["", "", False, "StringCchCatNExA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCchCatNExW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCbCatNEx: (pszDest, cbDest, pszSrc, cbToAppend, ppszDestEnd, pcbRemaining, dwFlags)
- ["", "", False, "StringCbCatNExA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCbCatNExW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCchPrintf: (pszDest, cchDest, pszFormat, ...)
- ["", "", False, "StringCchPrintfA", "", "", "Argument[*2..8]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCchPrintfW", "", "", "Argument[*2..8]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCbPrintf: (pszDest, cbDest, pszFormat, ...)
- ["", "", False, "StringCbPrintfA", "", "", "Argument[*2..8]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCbPrintfW", "", "", "Argument[*2..8]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCchPrintfEx: (pszDest, cchDest, ppszDestEnd, pcchRemaining, dwFlags, pszFormat, ...)
- ["", "", False, "StringCchPrintfExA", "", "", "Argument[*5..11]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCchPrintfExW", "", "", "Argument[*5..11]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCbPrintfEx: (pszDest, cbDest, ppszDestEnd, pcbRemaining, dwFlags, pszFormat, ...)
- ["", "", False, "StringCbPrintfExA", "", "", "Argument[*5..11]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCbPrintfExW", "", "", "Argument[*5..11]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCchVPrintf: (pszDest, cchDest, pszFormat, argList)
- ["", "", False, "StringCchVPrintfA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCchVPrintfW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCbVPrintf: (pszDest, cbDest, pszFormat, argList)
- ["", "", False, "StringCbVPrintfA", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCbVPrintfW", "", "", "Argument[*2]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCchVPrintfEx: (pszDest, cchDest, ppszDestEnd, pcchRemaining, dwFlags, pszFormat, argList)
- ["", "", False, "StringCchVPrintfExA", "", "", "Argument[*5]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCchVPrintfExW", "", "", "Argument[*5]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
# StringCbVPrintfEx: (pszDest, cbDest, ppszDestEnd, pcbRemaining, dwFlags, pszFormat, argList)
- ["", "", False, "StringCbVPrintfExA", "", "", "Argument[*5]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "StringCbVPrintfExW", "", "", "Argument[*5]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]

View File

@@ -31,9 +31,6 @@ extensions:
- ["", "", False, "WinHttpQueryHeadersEx", "", "", "Argument[*5]", "remote", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "WinHttpQueryHeadersEx", "", "", "Argument[*6]", "remote", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "WinHttpQueryHeadersEx", "", "", "Argument[**8]", "remote", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "HttpReceiveHttpRequest", "", "", "Argument[*3]", "remote", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "HttpReceiveRequestEntityBody", "", "", "Argument[*3]", "remote", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "HttpReceiveClientCertificate", "", "", "Argument[*3]", "remote", "manual"]
- addsTo:
pack: codeql/cpp-all
extensible: summaryModel

View File

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
# ZeroMQ networking library models
extensions:
- addsTo:
pack: codeql/cpp-all
extensible: sourceModel
data: # namespace, type, subtypes, name, signature, ext, output, kind, provenance
- ["", "", False, "zmq_recv", "", "", "Argument[*1]", "remote", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "zmq_recvmsg", "", "", "Argument[*1]", "remote", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "zmq_msg_recv", "", "", "Argument[*0]", "remote", "manual"]
- addsTo:
pack: codeql/cpp-all
extensible: sinkModel
data: # namespace, type, subtypes, name, signature, ext, input, kind, provenance
- ["", "", False, "zmq_send", "", "", "Argument[*1]", "remote-sink", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "zmq_sendmsg", "", "", "Argument[*1]", "remote-sink", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "zmq_msg_send", "", "", "Argument[*0]", "remote-sink", "manual"]
- addsTo:
pack: codeql/cpp-all
extensible: summaryModel
data: # namespace, type, subtypes, name, signature, ext, input, output, kind, provenance
- ["", "", False, "zmq_msg_init_data", "", "", "Argument[*1]", "Argument[*0]", "taint", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "zmq_msg_data", "", "", "Argument[*0]", "ReturnValue[*]", "taint", "manual"]

View File

@@ -12,7 +12,4 @@ extensions:
- ["", "", False, "_malloca", "0", "", "", False]
- ["", "", False, "calloc", "1", "0", "", True]
- ["std", "", False, "calloc", "1", "0", "", True]
- ["bsl", "", False, "calloc", "1", "0", "", True]
- ["", "", False, "aligned_alloc", "1", "", "", True]
- ["std", "", False, "aligned_alloc", "1", "", "", True]
- ["bsl", "", False, "aligned_alloc", "1", "", "", True]
- ["bsl", "", False, "calloc", "1", "0", "", True]

View File

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
# Models for getc and similar character-reading functions
extensions:
- addsTo:
pack: codeql/cpp-all
extensible: sourceModel
data: # namespace, type, subtypes, name, signature, ext, output, kind, provenance
- ["", "", False, "getc", "", "", "ReturnValue", "remote", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "getwc", "", "", "ReturnValue", "remote", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "_getc_nolock", "", "", "ReturnValue", "remote", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "_getwc_nolock", "", "", "ReturnValue", "remote", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "getch", "", "", "ReturnValue", "local", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "_getch", "", "", "ReturnValue", "local", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "_getwch", "", "", "ReturnValue", "local", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "_getch_nolock", "", "", "ReturnValue", "local", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "_getwch_nolock", "", "", "ReturnValue", "local", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "getchar", "", "", "ReturnValue", "local", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "getwchar", "", "", "ReturnValue", "local", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "_getchar_nolock", "", "", "ReturnValue", "local", "manual"]
- ["", "", False, "_getwchar_nolock", "", "", "ReturnValue", "local", "manual"]

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
name: codeql/cpp-all
version: 10.2.0
version: 8.0.1-dev
groups: cpp
dbscheme: semmlecode.cpp.dbscheme
extractor: cpp

View File

@@ -856,10 +856,8 @@ class AbstractClass extends Class {
/**
* A class template (this class also finds partial specializations
* of class templates).
*
* For example in the following code there is a `MyTemplateClass<T>`
* template:
* of class templates). For example in the following code there is a
* `MyTemplateClass<T>` template:
* ```
* template<class T>
* class MyTemplateClass {
@@ -895,29 +893,6 @@ class TemplateClass extends Class {
}
override string getAPrimaryQlClass() { result = "TemplateClass" }
/**
* Gets the class member template this template was generated from.
*
* This predicate only has results for templates that are members of class
* template instantiations. For example, for `MyTemplateClass<int>::C<S>`
* in the following code, the result is `MyTemplateClass<T>::C<S>`.
* ```cpp
* template<class T>
* class MyTemplateClass {
* template<class S>
* class C {
* ...
* };
* };
*
* template
* class MyTemplateClass<int>;
* ```
*/
TemplateClass getOriginalTemplate() {
class_template_generated_from(underlyingElement(this), unresolveElement(result))
}
}
/**

View File

@@ -26,26 +26,3 @@ class CmakeTryCompileFile extends ConfigurationTestFile {
)
}
}
/**
* A file created by Meson to test the system configuration.
*/
class MesonPrivateTestFile extends ConfigurationTestFile {
MesonPrivateTestFile() {
this.getBaseName() = "testfile.c" and
exists(Folder folder, Folder parent |
folder = this.getParentContainer() and
parent = folder.getParentContainer()
|
folder.getBaseName().matches("tmp%") and
parent.getBaseName() = "meson-private"
)
}
}
/**
* A file created by a GNU autoconf configure script to test the system configuration.
*/
class AutoconfConfigureTestFile extends ConfigurationTestFile {
AutoconfConfigureTestFile() { this.getBaseName().regexpMatch("conftest[0-9]*\\.c(pp)?") }
}

View File

@@ -278,8 +278,6 @@ class Declaration extends Locatable, @declaration {
or
variable_template_argument(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
or
alias_template_argument(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
or
template_template_argument(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
or
concept_template_argument(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
@@ -292,8 +290,6 @@ class Declaration extends Locatable, @declaration {
or
variable_template_argument_value(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
or
alias_template_argument_value(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
or
template_template_argument_value(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))
or
concept_template_argument_value(underlyingElement(this), index, unresolveElement(result))

View File

@@ -278,15 +278,6 @@ private predicate isFromTemplateInstantiationRec(Element e, Element instantiatio
instantiation.(Variable).isConstructedFrom(_) and
e = instantiation
or
instantiation.(TypeAliasType).isConstructedFrom(_) and
e = instantiation
or
instantiation.(TemplateTemplateParameterInstantiation).isConstructedFrom(_) and
e = instantiation
or
exists(instantiation.(ConceptIdExpr).getConcept()) and
e = instantiation
or
isFromTemplateInstantiationRec(e.getEnclosingElement(), instantiation)
}
@@ -300,15 +291,6 @@ private predicate isFromUninstantiatedTemplateRec(Element e, Element template) {
is_variable_template(unresolveElement(template)) and
e = template
or
is_alias_template(unresolveElement(template)) and
e = template
or
usertypes(unresolveElement(template), _, 8) and // template template parameter
e = template
or
template instanceof @concept_template and
e = template
or
isFromUninstantiatedTemplateRec(e.getEnclosingElement(), template)
}

View File

@@ -524,12 +524,6 @@ class Function extends Declaration, ControlFlowNode, AccessHolder, @function {
not exists(NewOrNewArrayExpr new | e = new.getAllocatorCall().getArgument(0))
)
}
/**
* Holds if this function has an ambiguous return type, meaning that zero or multiple return
* types for this function are present in the database (this can occur in `build-mode: none`).
*/
predicate hasAmbiguousReturnType() { count(this.getType()) != 1 }
}
pragma[noinline]
@@ -828,27 +822,6 @@ class TemplateFunction extends Function {
* such things -- see FunctionTemplateSpecialization for further details.
*/
FunctionTemplateSpecialization getASpecialization() { result.getPrimaryTemplate() = this }
/**
* Gets the class member template this template was generated from.
*
* This predicate only has results for templates that are members of class
* template instantiations. For example, for `MyTemplateClass<int>::f<S>`
* in the following code, the result is `MyTemplateClass<T>::f<S>`.
* ```cpp
* template<class T>
* class MyTemplateClass {
* template<class S>
* S f();
* };
*
* template
* class MyTemplateClass<int>;
* ```
*/
TemplateFunction getOriginalTemplate() {
function_template_generated_from(underlyingElement(this), unresolveElement(result))
}
}
/**

View File

@@ -64,123 +64,23 @@ class CTypedefType extends TypedefType {
}
/**
* DEPRECATED: Use `TypeAlias` instead.
*
* A C++ type alias or alias template.
*
* For example the type declared in the following code:
* A using alias C++ typedef type. For example the type declared in the following code:
* ```
* using my_int2 = int;
* ```
*/
deprecated class UsingAliasTypedefType = TypeAliasType;
class UsingAliasTypedefType extends TypedefType {
UsingAliasTypedefType() { usertype_alias_kind(underlyingElement(this), 1) }
/**
* A C++ type alias or alias template.
*
* For example the type declared in the following code:
* ```
* using my_int2 = int;
* ```
*/
class TypeAliasType extends TypedefType {
TypeAliasType() { usertype_alias_kind(underlyingElement(this), 1) }
override string getAPrimaryQlClass() { result = "TypeAliasType" }
override string getAPrimaryQlClass() { result = "UsingAliasTypedefType" }
override string explain() {
result = "using {" + this.getBaseType().explain() + "} as \"" + this.getName() + "\""
}
/**
* Holds if this alias is constructed from another alias as a result of
* template instantiation.
*/
predicate isConstructedFrom(TypeAliasType t) {
alias_instantiation(underlyingElement(this), unresolveElement(t))
}
}
/**
* A C++ alias template.
*
* For example the type declared in the following code:
* ```
* template <typename T>
* using my_type = T;
* ```
*/
class AliasTemplateType extends TypeAliasType {
AliasTemplateType() { is_alias_template(underlyingElement(this)) }
override string getAPrimaryQlClass() { result = "AliasTemplateType" }
/**
* Gets an alias instantiated from this template.
*
* For example for `MyAliasTemplate<T>` in the following code, the results are
* `MyAliasTemplate<int>` and `MyAliasTemplate<long>`:
* ```
* template<typename T>
* using MyAliasTemplate = ...;
*
* MyAliasTemplate<int> instance1;
*
* MyAliasTemplate<long> instance2;
* ```
*/
TypeAliasType getAnInstantiation() { result.isConstructedFrom(this) }
/**
* Gets the class member template this template was generated from.
*
* This predicate only has results for templates that are members of class
* template instantiations. For example, for `MyTemplateClass<int>::t<S>`
* in the following code, the result is `MyTemplateClass<T>::t<S>`.
* ```cpp
* template<class T>
* class MyTemplateClass {
* template<class S>
* using t = S;
* };
*
* template
* class MyTemplateClass<int>;
* ```
*/
AliasTemplateType getOriginalTemplate() {
alias_template_generated_from(underlyingElement(this), unresolveElement(result))
}
}
/**
* A C++ alias template instantiation.
*
* For example the `my_int_type` type declared in the following code:
* ```
* template <typename T>
* using my_type = T;
*
* using my_int_type = my_type<int>;
* ```
*/
class AliasTemplateInstantiationType extends TypeAliasType {
AliasTemplateType at;
AliasTemplateInstantiationType() { at.getAnInstantiation() = this }
override string getAPrimaryQlClass() { result = "AliasTemplateInstantiationType" }
/**
* Gets the alias template from which this instantiation was instantiated.
*/
AliasTemplateType getTemplate() { result = at }
}
/**
* A C++ `typedef` type that is directly enclosed by a function.
*
* For example the type declared inside the function `foo` in
* A C++ `typedef` type that is directly enclosed by a function. For example the type declared inside the function `foo` in
* the following code:
* ```
* int foo(void) { typedef int local; }

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