rename 'overlay[caller]' => 'overlay[caller?]'

.bazelrc

@@ -30,9 +30,6 @@ common --registry=https://bcr.bazel.build
 
 common --@rules_dotnet//dotnet/settings:strict_deps=false
 
-# we only configure a nightly toolchain
-common --@rules_rust//rust/toolchain/channel=nightly
-
 # Reduce this eventually to empty, once we've fixed all our usages of java, and https://github.com/bazel-contrib/rules_go/issues/4193 is fixed
 common --incompatible_autoload_externally="+@rules_java,+@rules_shell"
 

.github/copilot-instructions.md

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-When reviewing code:
-* do not review changes in files with `.expected` extension (they are automatically ensured to be correct).
-* in `.ql` and `.qll` files, do not try to review the code itself as you don't understand the programming language
-  well enough to make comments in these languages. You can still check for typos or comment improvements.

.github/workflows/build-ripunzip.yml

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ jobs:
         os: [ubuntu-22.04, macos-13, windows-2022]
     runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
         with:
           repository: google/ripunzip
           ref: ${{ inputs.ripunzip-version }}
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ jobs:
       # see https://github.com/sfackler/rust-openssl/issues/183
       - if: runner.os == 'Linux'
         name: checkout openssl
-        uses: actions/checkout@v5
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
         with:
           repository: openssl/openssl
           path: openssl

.github/workflows/buildifier.yml

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ jobs:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
       - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v5
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - name: Check bazel formatting
         uses: pre-commit/action@646c83fcd040023954eafda54b4db0192ce70507
         with:

.github/workflows/check-implicit-this.yml

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ jobs:
   check:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - name: Check that implicit this warnings is enabled for all packs
         shell: bash
         run: |

.github/workflows/check-overlay-annotations.yml

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-name: Check overlay annotations
-
-on:
-  push:
-    branches:
-      - main
-      - 'rc/*'
-  pull_request:
-    branches:
-      - main
-      - 'rc/*'
-
-permissions:
-  contents: read
-
-jobs:
-  sync:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
-      - name: Check overlay annotations
-        run: python config/add-overlay-annotations.py --check java
-

.github/workflows/check-qldoc.yml

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ jobs:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
 
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
         with:
           fetch-depth: 2
 

.github/workflows/check-query-ids.yml

@@ -19,6 +19,6 @@ jobs:
     name: Check query IDs
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - name: Check for duplicate query IDs
         run: python3 misc/scripts/check-query-ids.py

.github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml

@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@ jobs:
     - name: Setup dotnet
       uses: actions/setup-dotnet@v4
       with:
-        dotnet-version: 9.0.300
+        dotnet-version: 9.0.100
 
     - name: Checkout repository
-      uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      uses: actions/checkout@v4
 
     # Initializes the CodeQL tools for scanning.
     - name: Initialize CodeQL

.github/workflows/compile-queries.yml

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ jobs:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest-xl
 
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - name: Setup CodeQL
         uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
         with:

.github/workflows/cpp-swift-analysis.yml

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ jobs:
 
     steps:
     - name: Checkout repository
-      uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      uses: actions/checkout@v4
 
     # Initializes the CodeQL tools for scanning.
     - name: Initialize CodeQL

.github/workflows/csharp-qltest.yml

@@ -39,23 +39,23 @@ jobs:
         os: [ubuntu-latest, windows-latest]
     runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - name: Setup dotnet
         uses: actions/setup-dotnet@v4
         with:
-          dotnet-version: 9.0.300
+          dotnet-version: 9.0.100
       - name: Extractor unit tests
         run: |
           dotnet tool restore
-          dotnet test -p:RuntimeFrameworkVersion=9.0.5 extractor/Semmle.Util.Tests
-          dotnet test -p:RuntimeFrameworkVersion=9.0.5 extractor/Semmle.Extraction.Tests
-          dotnet test -p:RuntimeFrameworkVersion=9.0.5 autobuilder/Semmle.Autobuild.CSharp.Tests
-          dotnet test -p:RuntimeFrameworkVersion=9.0.5 autobuilder/Semmle.Autobuild.Cpp.Tests
+          dotnet test -p:RuntimeFrameworkVersion=9.0.0 extractor/Semmle.Util.Tests
+          dotnet test -p:RuntimeFrameworkVersion=9.0.0 extractor/Semmle.Extraction.Tests
+          dotnet test -p:RuntimeFrameworkVersion=9.0.0 autobuilder/Semmle.Autobuild.CSharp.Tests
+          dotnet test -p:RuntimeFrameworkVersion=9.0.0 autobuilder/Semmle.Autobuild.Cpp.Tests
         shell: bash
   stubgentest:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - uses: ./csharp/actions/create-extractor-pack
       - name: Run stub generator tests
         run: |

.github/workflows/csv-coverage-metrics.yml

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ jobs:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
       - name: Checkout repository
-        uses: actions/checkout@v5
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - name: Setup CodeQL
         uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
       - name: Create empty database
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ jobs:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
       - name: Checkout repository
-        uses: actions/checkout@v5
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - name: Setup CodeQL
         uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
       - name: Create empty database

.github/workflows/csv-coverage-pr-artifacts.yml

@@ -35,11 +35,11 @@ jobs:
           GITHUB_CONTEXT: ${{ toJSON(github.event) }}
         run: echo "$GITHUB_CONTEXT"
       - name: Clone self (github/codeql) - MERGE
-        uses: actions/checkout@v5
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
         with:
           path: merge
       - name: Clone self (github/codeql) - BASE
-        uses: actions/checkout@v5
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
         with:
           fetch-depth: 2
           path: base

.github/workflows/csv-coverage-pr-comment.yml

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ jobs:
         GITHUB_CONTEXT: ${{ toJSON(github.event) }}
       run: echo "$GITHUB_CONTEXT"
     - name: Clone self (github/codeql)
-      uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      uses: actions/checkout@v4
     - name: Set up Python 3.8
       uses: actions/setup-python@v4
       with:

.github/workflows/csv-coverage-timeseries.yml

@@ -12,11 +12,11 @@ jobs:
 
     steps:
       - name: Clone self (github/codeql)
-        uses: actions/checkout@v5
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
         with:
           path: script
       - name: Clone self (github/codeql) for analysis
-        uses: actions/checkout@v5
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
         with:
           path: codeqlModels
           fetch-depth: 0

.github/workflows/csv-coverage-update.yml

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ jobs:
           GITHUB_CONTEXT: ${{ toJSON(github.event) }}
         run: echo "$GITHUB_CONTEXT"
       - name: Clone self (github/codeql)
-        uses: actions/checkout@v5
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
         with:
           path: ql
           fetch-depth: 0

.github/workflows/csv-coverage.yml

@@ -16,11 +16,11 @@ jobs:
 
     steps:
       - name: Clone self (github/codeql)
-        uses: actions/checkout@v5
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
         with:
           path: script
       - name: Clone self (github/codeql) for analysis
-        uses: actions/checkout@v5
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
         with:
           path: codeqlModels
           ref: ${{ github.event.inputs.qlModelShaOverride || github.ref }}

.github/workflows/fast-forward.yml

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ jobs:
           exit 1
 
       - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v5
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
 
       - name: Git config
         shell: bash

.github/workflows/go-tests-other-os.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+name: "Go: Run Tests - Other OS"
+on:
+  pull_request:
+    paths:
+      - "go/**"
+      - "!go/documentation/**"
+      - "!go/ql/**" # don't run other-os if only ql/ files changed
+      - .github/workflows/go-tests-other-os.yml
+      - .github/actions/**
+      - codeql-workspace.yml
+      - MODULE.bazel
+      - .bazelrc
+      - misc/bazel/**
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+jobs:
+  test-mac:
+    name: Test MacOS
+    runs-on: macos-latest
+    steps:
+      - name: Check out code
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - name: Run tests
+        uses: ./go/actions/test
+
+  test-win:
+    name: Test Windows
+    runs-on: windows-latest
+    steps:
+      - name: Check out code
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - name: Run tests
+        uses: ./go/actions/test

.github/workflows/go-tests-rtjo.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+name: "Go: Run RTJO Tests"
+on:
+  pull_request:
+    types:
+      - labeled
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+jobs:
+  test-linux:
+    if: "github.repository_owner == 'github' && github.event.label.name == 'Run: RTJO Language Tests'"
+    name: RTJO Test Linux (Ubuntu)
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest-xl
+    steps:
+      - name: Check out code
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - name: Run tests
+        uses: ./go/actions/test
+        with:
+          run-code-checks: true
+          dynamic-join-order-mode: all

.github/workflows/go-tests.yml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 name: "Go: Run Tests"
 on:
-  pull_request:
+  push:
     paths:
       - "go/**"
       - "!go/documentation/**"
@@ -8,6 +8,17 @@ on:
       - .github/workflows/go-tests.yml
       - .github/actions/**
       - codeql-workspace.yml
+    branches:
+      - main
+      - "rc/*"
+  pull_request:
+    paths:
+      - "go/**"
+      - "!go/documentation/**"      
+      - "shared/**"
+      - .github/workflows/go-tests.yml
+      - .github/actions/**
+      - codeql-workspace.yml
       - MODULE.bazel
       - .bazelrc
       - misc/bazel/**
@@ -22,7 +33,7 @@ jobs:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest-xl
     steps:
       - name: Check out code
-        uses: actions/checkout@v5
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - name: Run tests
         uses: ./go/actions/test
         with:

.github/workflows/kotlin-build.yml

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ jobs:
   build:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - run: |
           bazel query //java/kotlin-extractor/...
           # only build the default version as a quick check that we can build from `codeql`

.github/workflows/mad_modelDiff.yml

@@ -28,12 +28,12 @@ jobs:
         slug: ${{fromJson(github.event.inputs.projects || '["apache/commons-codec", "apache/commons-io", "apache/commons-beanutils", "apache/commons-logging", "apache/commons-fileupload", "apache/commons-lang", "apache/commons-validator", "apache/commons-csv", "apache/dubbo"]' )}}
     steps:
       - name: Clone github/codeql from PR
-        uses: actions/checkout@v5
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
         if: github.event.pull_request
         with:
           path: codeql-pr
       - name: Clone github/codeql from main
-        uses: actions/checkout@v5
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
         with:
           path: codeql-main
           ref: main

.github/workflows/mad_regenerate-models.yml

@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ jobs:
             ref: "placeholder"
     steps:
       - name: Clone self (github/codeql)
-        uses: actions/checkout@v5
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - name: Setup CodeQL binaries
         uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
       - name: Clone repositories
-        uses: actions/checkout@v5
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
         with:
           path: repos/${{ matrix.ref }}
           ref: ${{ matrix.ref }}

.github/workflows/python-tooling.yml

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ jobs:
   check-python-tooling:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - uses: actions/setup-python@v5
         with:
           python-version: '3.12'

.github/workflows/qhelp-pr-preview.yml

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ jobs:
           if-no-files-found: error
           retention-days: 1
 
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
         with:
           fetch-depth: 2
           persist-credentials: false

.github/workflows/ql-for-ql-build.yml

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ jobs:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest-xl
     steps:
       ### Build the queries ###
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
         with:
           fetch-depth: 0
       - name: Find codeql

.github/workflows/ql-for-ql-dataset_measure.yml

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ jobs:
           - github/codeql
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
 
       - name: Find codeql
         id: find-codeql
@@ -46,14 +46,14 @@ jobs:
         env:
           CODEQL: ${{ steps.find-codeql.outputs.codeql-path }}
       - name: Checkout ${{ matrix.repo }}
-        uses: actions/checkout@v5
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
         with:
           repository: ${{ matrix.repo }}
           path: ${{ github.workspace }}/repo
       - name: Create database
         run: |
           "${CODEQL}" database create \
-          --search-path "${{ github.workspace }}" \
+          --search-path "${{ github.workspace }}"
           --threads 4 \
             --language ql --source-root "${{ github.workspace }}/repo" \
             "${{ runner.temp }}/database"
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ jobs:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     needs: measure
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
         with:
           name: measurements

.github/workflows/ql-for-ql-tests.yml

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ jobs:
   qltest:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - name: Find codeql
         id: find-codeql
         uses: github/codeql-action/init@main
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ jobs:
     needs: [qltest]
     runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - name: Install GNU tar
         if: runner.os == 'macOS'
         run: |

.github/workflows/query-list.yml

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ jobs:
 
     steps:
     - name: Clone self (github/codeql)
-      uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      uses: actions/checkout@v4
       with:
         path: codeql 
     - name: Set up Python 3.8
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ jobs:
       with:
         python-version: 3.8
     - name: Download CodeQL CLI
-      # Look under the `codeql` directory, as this is where we checked out the `github/codeql` repo
+      # Look under the `codeql` directory, as this is where we checked out the `github/codeql` repo
       uses: ./codeql/.github/actions/fetch-codeql
     - name: Build code scanning query list
       run: |

.github/workflows/ruby-build.yml

@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ jobs:
     runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
 
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - name: Install GNU tar
         if: runner.os == 'macOS'
         run: |
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ jobs:
     if: github.repository_owner == 'github'
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest-xl
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - name: Fetch CodeQL
         uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
       - name: Cache compilation cache
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ jobs:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     needs: [build, compile-queries]
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
         with:
           name: ruby.dbscheme
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ jobs:
     runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
     needs: [package]
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - name: Fetch CodeQL
         uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
 

.github/workflows/ruby-dataset-measure.yml

@@ -30,14 +30,14 @@ jobs:
         repo: [rails/rails, discourse/discourse, spree/spree, ruby/ruby]
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
 
       - uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
 
       - uses: ./ruby/actions/create-extractor-pack
 
       - name: Checkout ${{ matrix.repo }}
-        uses: actions/checkout@v5
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
         with:
           repository: ${{ matrix.repo }}
           path: ${{ github.workspace }}/repo
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ jobs:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     needs: measure
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
         with:
           path: stats

.github/workflows/ruby-qltest-rtjo.yml

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ jobs:
     strategy:
       fail-fast: false
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
       - uses: ./ruby/actions/create-extractor-pack
       - name: Cache compilation cache

.github/workflows/ruby-qltest.yml

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ jobs:
   qlupgrade:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
       - name: Check DB upgrade scripts
         run: |
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ jobs:
     strategy:
       fail-fast: false
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
       - uses: ./ruby/actions/create-extractor-pack
       - name: Cache compilation cache

.github/workflows/rust-analysis.yml

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ jobs:
 
     steps:
     - name: Checkout repository
-      uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      uses: actions/checkout@v4
 
     - name: Query latest nightly CodeQL bundle
       shell: bash

.github/workflows/rust.yml

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ jobs:
         working-directory: rust/ast-generator
     steps:
       - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v5
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - name: Inject sources
         shell: bash
         run: |
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ jobs:
         working-directory: rust/extractor
     steps:
       - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v5
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - name: Format
         shell: bash
         run: |
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ jobs:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
       - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v5
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - name: Install CodeQL
         uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
       - name: Code generation

.github/workflows/swift.yml

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ jobs:
       fail-fast: false
     runs-on: ${{ matrix.runner }}
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - name: Setup (Linux)
         if: runner.os == 'Linux'
         run: |
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ jobs:
   clang-format:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - uses: pre-commit/action@646c83fcd040023954eafda54b4db0192ce70507
         name: Check that python code is properly formatted
         with:
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ jobs:
   codegen:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
       - uses: pre-commit/action@646c83fcd040023954eafda54b4db0192ce70507
         name: Check that QL generated code was checked in
@@ -77,6 +77,6 @@ jobs:
   check-no-override:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - name: Check that no override is present in load.bzl
         run: bazel test ... --test_tag_filters=override --test_output=errors

.github/workflows/sync-files.yml

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ jobs:
   sync:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - name: Check synchronized files
         run: python config/sync-files.py
       - name: Check dbscheme fragments

.github/workflows/tree-sitter-extractor-test.yml

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ jobs:
   test:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - name: Check formatting
         run: cargo fmt -- --check
       - name: Run tests
@@ -38,12 +38,12 @@ jobs:
   fmt:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - name: Check formatting
         run: cargo fmt --check
   clippy:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - name: Run clippy
         run: cargo clippy -- --no-deps -D warnings -A clippy::new_without_default -A clippy::too_many_arguments

.github/workflows/validate-change-notes.yml

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ jobs:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
       - name: Checkout repository
-        uses: actions/checkout@v5
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
 
       - name: Setup CodeQL
         uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql

.github/workflows/zipmerge-test.yml

@@ -18,6 +18,6 @@ jobs:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
 
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - run: |
           bazel test //misc/bazel/internal/zipmerge:test --test_output=all

.gitignore

@@ -76,6 +76,3 @@ node_modules/
 # some upgrade/downgrade checks create these files
 **/upgrades/*/*.dbscheme.stats
 **/downgrades/*/*.dbscheme.stats
-
-# Mergetool files
-*.orig

CODEOWNERS

@@ -1,7 +1,3 @@
-# Catch-all for anything which isn't matched by a line lower down
-* @github/code-scanning-alert-coverage
-
-# CodeQL language libraries
 /actions/ @github/codeql-dynamic
 /cpp/ @github/codeql-c-analysis
 /csharp/ @github/codeql-csharp
@@ -11,10 +7,8 @@
 /java/ @github/codeql-java
 /javascript/ @github/codeql-javascript
 /python/ @github/codeql-python
-/ql/ @github/codeql-ql-for-ql-reviewers
 /ruby/ @github/codeql-ruby
 /rust/ @github/codeql-rust
-/shared/ @github/codeql-shared-libraries-reviewers
 /swift/ @github/codeql-swift
 /misc/codegen/ @github/codeql-swift
 /java/kotlin-extractor/ @github/codeql-kotlin
@@ -31,6 +25,9 @@
 /docs/codeql/ql-language-reference/ @github/codeql-frontend-reviewers
 /docs/query-*-style-guide.md @github/codeql-analysis-reviewers
 
+# QL for QL reviewers
+/ql/ @github/codeql-ql-for-ql-reviewers
+
 # Bazel (excluding BUILD.bazel files)
 MODULE.bazel @github/codeql-ci-reviewers
 .bazelversion @github/codeql-ci-reviewers

MODULE.bazel

@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ local_path_override(
 
 # see https://registry.bazel.build/ for a list of available packages
 
-bazel_dep(name = "platforms", version = "1.0.0")
-bazel_dep(name = "rules_go", version = "0.56.1")
+bazel_dep(name = "platforms", version = "0.0.11")
+bazel_dep(name = "rules_go", version = "0.50.1")
 bazel_dep(name = "rules_pkg", version = "1.0.1")
 bazel_dep(name = "rules_nodejs", version = "6.2.0-codeql.1")
 bazel_dep(name = "rules_python", version = "0.40.0")
@@ -26,9 +26,9 @@ bazel_dep(name = "nlohmann_json", version = "3.11.3", repo_name = "json")
 bazel_dep(name = "fmt", version = "10.0.0")
 bazel_dep(name = "rules_kotlin", version = "2.1.3-codeql.1")
 bazel_dep(name = "gazelle", version = "0.40.0")
-bazel_dep(name = "rules_dotnet", version = "0.19.2-codeql.1")
+bazel_dep(name = "rules_dotnet", version = "0.17.4")
 bazel_dep(name = "googletest", version = "1.14.0.bcr.1")
-bazel_dep(name = "rules_rust", version = "0.63.0")
+bazel_dep(name = "rules_rust", version = "0.58.0")
 bazel_dep(name = "zstd", version = "1.5.5.bcr.1")
 
 bazel_dep(name = "buildifier_prebuilt", version = "6.4.0", dev_dependency = True)
@@ -37,11 +37,7 @@ bazel_dep(name = "buildifier_prebuilt", version = "6.4.0", dev_dependency = True
 # the versions there are canonical, the versions here are used for CI in github/codeql, as well as for the vendoring of dependencies.
 RUST_EDITION = "2024"
 
-# run buildutils-internal/scripts/fill-rust-sha256s.py when updating (internal repo)
-# a nightly toolchain is required to enable experimental_use_cc_common_link, which we require internally
-# we prefer to run the same version as internally, even if experimental_use_cc_common_link is not really
-# required in this repo
-RUST_VERSION = "nightly/2025-08-01"
+RUST_VERSION = "1.86.0"
 
 rust = use_extension("@rules_rust//rust:extensions.bzl", "rust")
 rust.toolchain(
@@ -51,29 +47,6 @@ rust.toolchain(
         "x86_64-apple-darwin",
         "aarch64-apple-darwin",
     ],
-    # generated by buildutils-internal/scripts/fill-rust-sha256s.py (internal repo)
-    sha256s = {
-        "2025-08-01/rustc-nightly-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.xz": "9bbeaf5d3fc7247d31463a9083aa251c995cc50662c8219e7a2254d76a72a9a4",
-        "2025-08-01/rustc-nightly-x86_64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "c9ea539a8eff0d5d162701f99f9e1aabe14dd0dfb420d62362817a5d09219de7",
-        "2025-08-01/rustc-nightly-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "ae83feebbc39cfd982e4ecc8297731fe79c185173aee138467b334c5404b3773",
-        "2025-08-01/rustc-nightly-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.tar.xz": "9f170c30d802a349be60cf52ec46260802093cb1013ad667fc0d528b7b10152f",
-        "2025-08-01/clippy-nightly-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.xz": "9ae5f3cd8f557c4f6df522597c69d14398cf604cfaed2b83e767c4b77a7eaaf6",
-        "2025-08-01/clippy-nightly-x86_64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "983cb9ee0b6b968188e04ab2d33743d54764b2681ce565e1b3f2b9135c696a3e",
-        "2025-08-01/clippy-nightly-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "ed2219dbc49d088225e1b7c5c4390fa295066e071fddaa2714018f6bb39ddbf0",
-        "2025-08-01/clippy-nightly-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.tar.xz": "911f40ab5cbdd686f40e00965271fe47c4805513a308ed01f30eafb25b448a50",
-        "2025-08-01/cargo-nightly-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.xz": "106463c284e48e4904c717471eeec2be5cc83a9d2cae8d6e948b52438cad2e69",
-        "2025-08-01/cargo-nightly-x86_64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "6ad35c40efc41a8c531ea43235058347b6902d98a9693bf0aed7fc16d5590cef",
-        "2025-08-01/cargo-nightly-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "dd28c365e9d298abc3154c797720ad36a0058f131265c9978b4c8e4e37012c8a",
-        "2025-08-01/cargo-nightly-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.tar.xz": "7b431286e12d6b3834b038f078389a00cac73f351e8c3152b2504a3c06420b3b",
-        "2025-08-01/llvm-tools-nightly-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.xz": "e342e305d7927cc288d386983b2bc253cfad3776b113386e903d0b302648ef47",
-        "2025-08-01/llvm-tools-nightly-x86_64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "e44dd3506524d85c37b3a54bcc91d01378fd2c590b2db5c5974d12f05c1b84d1",
-        "2025-08-01/llvm-tools-nightly-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "0c1b5f46dd81be4a9227b10283a0fcaa39c14fea7e81aea6fd6d9887ff6cdc41",
-        "2025-08-01/llvm-tools-nightly-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.tar.xz": "423e5fd11406adccbc31b8456ceb7375ce055cdf45e90d2c3babeb2d7f58383f",
-        "2025-08-01/rust-std-nightly-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.xz": "3c0ceb46a252647a1d4c7116d9ccae684fa5e42aaf3296419febd2c962c3b41d",
-        "2025-08-01/rust-std-nightly-x86_64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "3be416003cab10f767390a753d1d16ae4d26c7421c03c98992cf1943e5b0efe8",
-        "2025-08-01/rust-std-nightly-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "4046ac0ef951cb056b5028a399124f60999fa37792eab69d008d8d7965f389b4",
-        "2025-08-01/rust-std-nightly-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.tar.xz": "191ed9d8603c3a4fe5a7bbbc2feb72049078dae2df3d3b7d5dedf3abbf823e6e",
-    },
     versions = [RUST_VERSION],
 )
 use_repo(rust, "rust_toolchains")
@@ -89,8 +62,8 @@ use_repo(
     "vendor_py__cc-1.2.14",
     "vendor_py__clap-4.5.30",
     "vendor_py__regex-1.11.1",
-    "vendor_py__tree-sitter-0.24.7",
-    "vendor_py__tree-sitter-graph-0.12.0",
+    "vendor_py__tree-sitter-0.20.4",
+    "vendor_py__tree-sitter-graph-0.7.0",
 )
 
 # deps for ruby+rust
@@ -98,54 +71,54 @@ use_repo(
 tree_sitter_extractors_deps = use_extension("//misc/bazel/3rdparty:tree_sitter_extractors_extension.bzl", "r")
 use_repo(
     tree_sitter_extractors_deps,
-    "vendor_ts__anyhow-1.0.100",
+    "vendor_ts__anyhow-1.0.98",
     "vendor_ts__argfile-0.2.1",
-    "vendor_ts__chalk-ir-0.104.0",
-    "vendor_ts__chrono-0.4.42",
-    "vendor_ts__clap-4.5.48",
+    "vendor_ts__chalk-ir-0.103.0",
+    "vendor_ts__chrono-0.4.41",
+    "vendor_ts__clap-4.5.40",
     "vendor_ts__dunce-1.0.5",
     "vendor_ts__either-1.15.0",
     "vendor_ts__encoding-0.2.33",
     "vendor_ts__figment-0.10.19",
-    "vendor_ts__flate2-1.1.2",
-    "vendor_ts__glob-0.3.3",
-    "vendor_ts__globset-0.4.16",
+    "vendor_ts__flate2-1.1.0",
+    "vendor_ts__glob-0.3.2",
+    "vendor_ts__globset-0.4.15",
     "vendor_ts__itertools-0.14.0",
     "vendor_ts__lazy_static-1.5.0",
     "vendor_ts__mustache-0.9.0",
     "vendor_ts__num-traits-0.2.19",
     "vendor_ts__num_cpus-1.17.0",
-    "vendor_ts__proc-macro2-1.0.101",
-    "vendor_ts__quote-1.0.41",
-    "vendor_ts__ra_ap_base_db-0.0.301",
-    "vendor_ts__ra_ap_cfg-0.0.301",
-    "vendor_ts__ra_ap_hir-0.0.301",
-    "vendor_ts__ra_ap_hir_def-0.0.301",
-    "vendor_ts__ra_ap_hir_expand-0.0.301",
-    "vendor_ts__ra_ap_hir_ty-0.0.301",
-    "vendor_ts__ra_ap_ide_db-0.0.301",
-    "vendor_ts__ra_ap_intern-0.0.301",
-    "vendor_ts__ra_ap_load-cargo-0.0.301",
-    "vendor_ts__ra_ap_parser-0.0.301",
-    "vendor_ts__ra_ap_paths-0.0.301",
-    "vendor_ts__ra_ap_project_model-0.0.301",
-    "vendor_ts__ra_ap_span-0.0.301",
-    "vendor_ts__ra_ap_stdx-0.0.301",
-    "vendor_ts__ra_ap_syntax-0.0.301",
-    "vendor_ts__ra_ap_vfs-0.0.301",
-    "vendor_ts__rand-0.9.2",
-    "vendor_ts__rayon-1.11.0",
-    "vendor_ts__regex-1.11.3",
-    "vendor_ts__serde-1.0.228",
-    "vendor_ts__serde_json-1.0.145",
-    "vendor_ts__serde_with-3.14.1",
-    "vendor_ts__syn-2.0.106",
-    "vendor_ts__toml-0.9.7",
+    "vendor_ts__proc-macro2-1.0.95",
+    "vendor_ts__quote-1.0.40",
+    "vendor_ts__ra_ap_base_db-0.0.288",
+    "vendor_ts__ra_ap_cfg-0.0.288",
+    "vendor_ts__ra_ap_hir-0.0.288",
+    "vendor_ts__ra_ap_hir_def-0.0.288",
+    "vendor_ts__ra_ap_hir_expand-0.0.288",
+    "vendor_ts__ra_ap_hir_ty-0.0.288",
+    "vendor_ts__ra_ap_ide_db-0.0.288",
+    "vendor_ts__ra_ap_intern-0.0.288",
+    "vendor_ts__ra_ap_load-cargo-0.0.288",
+    "vendor_ts__ra_ap_parser-0.0.288",
+    "vendor_ts__ra_ap_paths-0.0.288",
+    "vendor_ts__ra_ap_project_model-0.0.288",
+    "vendor_ts__ra_ap_span-0.0.288",
+    "vendor_ts__ra_ap_stdx-0.0.288",
+    "vendor_ts__ra_ap_syntax-0.0.288",
+    "vendor_ts__ra_ap_vfs-0.0.288",
+    "vendor_ts__rand-0.9.1",
+    "vendor_ts__rayon-1.10.0",
+    "vendor_ts__regex-1.11.1",
+    "vendor_ts__serde-1.0.219",
+    "vendor_ts__serde_json-1.0.140",
+    "vendor_ts__serde_with-3.13.0",
+    "vendor_ts__syn-2.0.103",
+    "vendor_ts__toml-0.8.23",
     "vendor_ts__tracing-0.1.41",
     "vendor_ts__tracing-flame-0.2.0",
-    "vendor_ts__tracing-subscriber-0.3.20",
-    "vendor_ts__tree-sitter-0.25.9",
-    "vendor_ts__tree-sitter-embedded-template-0.25.0",
+    "vendor_ts__tracing-subscriber-0.3.19",
+    "vendor_ts__tree-sitter-0.24.6",
+    "vendor_ts__tree-sitter-embedded-template-0.23.2",
     "vendor_ts__tree-sitter-json-0.24.8",
     "vendor_ts__tree-sitter-ql-0.23.1",
     "vendor_ts__tree-sitter-ruby-0.23.1",
@@ -172,7 +145,7 @@ http_archive(
 )
 
 dotnet = use_extension("@rules_dotnet//dotnet:extensions.bzl", "dotnet")
-dotnet.toolchain(dotnet_version = "9.0.300")
+dotnet.toolchain(dotnet_version = "9.0.100")
 use_repo(dotnet, "dotnet_toolchains")
 
 register_toolchains("@dotnet_toolchains//:all")
@@ -233,7 +206,6 @@ use_repo(
     "kotlin-compiler-2.1.0-Beta1",
     "kotlin-compiler-2.1.20-Beta1",
     "kotlin-compiler-2.2.0-Beta1",
-    "kotlin-compiler-2.2.20-Beta2",
     "kotlin-compiler-embeddable-1.6.0",
     "kotlin-compiler-embeddable-1.6.20",
     "kotlin-compiler-embeddable-1.7.0",
@@ -246,7 +218,6 @@ use_repo(
     "kotlin-compiler-embeddable-2.1.0-Beta1",
     "kotlin-compiler-embeddable-2.1.20-Beta1",
     "kotlin-compiler-embeddable-2.2.0-Beta1",
-    "kotlin-compiler-embeddable-2.2.20-Beta2",
     "kotlin-stdlib-1.6.0",
     "kotlin-stdlib-1.6.20",
     "kotlin-stdlib-1.7.0",
@@ -259,11 +230,10 @@ use_repo(
     "kotlin-stdlib-2.1.0-Beta1",
     "kotlin-stdlib-2.1.20-Beta1",
     "kotlin-stdlib-2.2.0-Beta1",
-    "kotlin-stdlib-2.2.20-Beta2",
 )
 
 go_sdk = use_extension("@rules_go//go:extensions.bzl", "go_sdk")
-go_sdk.download(version = "1.25.0")
+go_sdk.download(version = "1.24.0")
 
 go_deps = use_extension("@gazelle//:extensions.bzl", "go_deps")
 go_deps.from_file(go_mod = "//go/extractor:go.mod")

actions/extractor/codeql-extractor.yml

@@ -1,17 +1,14 @@
 name: "actions"
+aliases: []
 display_name: "GitHub Actions"
 version: 0.0.1
 column_kind: "utf16"
 unicode_newlines: true
 build_modes:
   - none
-default_queries:
-  - codeql/actions-queries
-# Actions workflows are not reported separately by the GitHub API, so we can't
-# associate them with a specific language.
+file_coverage_languages: []
 github_api_languages: []
-scc_languages:
-  - YAML
+scc_languages: []
 file_types:
   - name: workflow
     display_name: GitHub Actions workflow files

actions/extractor/tools/baseline-config.json

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-{
-    "paths": [
-        ".github/workflows/*.yml",
-        ".github/workflows/*.yaml",
-        ".github/reusable_workflows/**/*.yml",
-        ".github/reusable_workflows/**/*.yaml",
-        "**/action.yml",
-        "**/action.yaml"
-    ]
-}

actions/extractor/tools/configure-baseline.cmd

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-@echo off
-type "%CODEQL_EXTRACTOR_ACTIONS_ROOT%\tools\baseline-config.json"

actions/extractor/tools/configure-baseline.sh

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-
-cat "$CODEQL_EXTRACTOR_ACTIONS_ROOT/tools/baseline-config.json"

actions/ql/integration-tests/query-suite/actions-code-scanning.qls.expected

@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-ql/actions/ql/src/Diagnostics/SuccessfullyExtractedFiles.ql
 ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionCritical.ql
 ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvVarInjectionCritical.ql
 ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionCritical.ql

actions/ql/integration-tests/query-suite/actions-security-and-quality.qls.expected

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
 ql/actions/ql/src/Debug/SyntaxError.ql
-ql/actions/ql/src/Diagnostics/SuccessfullyExtractedFiles.ql
 ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionCritical.ql
 ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionMedium.ql
 ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvVarInjectionCritical.ql

actions/ql/integration-tests/query-suite/actions-security-extended.qls.expected

@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-ql/actions/ql/src/Diagnostics/SuccessfullyExtractedFiles.ql
 ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionCritical.ql
 ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionMedium.ql
 ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvVarInjectionCritical.ql

actions/ql/lib/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,33 +1,3 @@
-## 0.4.19
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 0.4.18
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 0.4.17
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 0.4.16
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 0.4.15
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 0.4.14
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 0.4.13
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* The `actions/artifact-poisoning/critical` and `actions/artifact-poisoning/medium` queries now exclude artifacts downloaded to `$[{ runner.temp }}` in addition to `/tmp`.
-
 ## 0.4.12
 
 ### Minor Analysis Improvements

actions/ql/lib/change-notes/released/0.4.13.md

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-## 0.4.13
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* The `actions/artifact-poisoning/critical` and `actions/artifact-poisoning/medium` queries now exclude artifacts downloaded to `$[{ runner.temp }}` in addition to `/tmp`.

actions/ql/lib/change-notes/released/0.4.14.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-## 0.4.14
-
-No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/lib/change-notes/released/0.4.15.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-## 0.4.15
-
-No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/lib/change-notes/released/0.4.16.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-## 0.4.16
-
-No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/lib/change-notes/released/0.4.17.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-## 0.4.17
-
-No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/lib/change-notes/released/0.4.18.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-## 0.4.18
-
-No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/lib/change-notes/released/0.4.19.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-## 0.4.19
-
-No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/lib/codeql-pack.release.yml

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 ---
-lastReleaseVersion: 0.4.19
+lastReleaseVersion: 0.4.12

actions/ql/lib/codeql/Locations.qll

@@ -70,8 +70,8 @@ class Location extends TLocation, TBaseLocation {
 
   /**
    * Holds if this element is at the specified location.
-   * The location spans column `sc` of line `sl` to
-   * column `ec` of line `el` in file `p`.
+   * The location spans column `startcolumn` of line `startline` to
+   * column `endcolumn` of line `endline` in file `filepath`.
    * For more information, see
    * [Providing locations in CodeQL queries](https://codeql.github.com/docs/writing-codeql-queries/providing-locations-in-codeql-queries/).
    */

actions/ql/lib/codeql/actions/Ast.qll

@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ class If extends AstNode instanceof IfImpl {
 }
 
 /**
- * An Environment node representing a deployment environment.
+ * An Environemnt node representing a deployment environment.
  */
 class Environment extends AstNode instanceof EnvironmentImpl {
   string getName() { result = super.getName() }

actions/ql/lib/codeql/actions/Helper.qll

@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ string normalizePath(string path) {
       then result = path
       else
         // foo -> GITHUB_WORKSPACE/foo
-        if path.regexpMatch("^[^$/~].*")
+        if path.regexpMatch("^[^/~].*")
         then result = "GITHUB_WORKSPACE/" + path.regexpReplaceAll("/$", "")
         else
           // ~/foo -> ~/foo

actions/ql/lib/codeql/actions/ast/internal/Ast.qll

@@ -125,11 +125,12 @@ abstract class AstNodeImpl extends TAstNode {
    * Gets the enclosing Step.
    */
   StepImpl getEnclosingStep() {
-    this instanceof StepImpl and
-    result = this
-    or
-    this instanceof ScalarValueImpl and
-    result.getAChildNode*() = this.getParentNode()
+    if this instanceof StepImpl
+    then result = this
+    else
+      if this instanceof ScalarValueImpl
+      then result.getAChildNode*() = this.getParentNode()
+      else none()
   }
 
   /**
@@ -1415,8 +1416,9 @@ class ExternalJobImpl extends JobImpl, UsesImpl {
   override string getVersion() {
     exists(YamlString name |
       n.lookup("uses") = name and
-      not name.getValue().matches("\\.%") and
-      result = name.getValue().regexpCapture(repoUsesParser(), 4)
+      if not name.getValue().matches("\\.%")
+      then result = name.getValue().regexpCapture(repoUsesParser(), 4)
+      else none()
     )
   }
 }

actions/ql/lib/codeql/actions/controlflow/BasicBlocks.qll

@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ private module Cached {
   /**
    * Holds if `cfn` is the `i`th node in basic block `bb`.
    *
-   * In other words, `i` is the shortest distance from a node `bbStart`
+   * In other words, `i` is the shortest distance from a node `bb`
    * that starts a basic block to `cfn` along the `intraBBSucc` relation.
    */
   cached

actions/ql/lib/codeql/actions/controlflow/internal/Cfg.qll

@@ -3,8 +3,6 @@ private import codeql.controlflow.Cfg as CfgShared
 private import codeql.Locations
 
 module Completion {
-  import codeql.controlflow.SuccessorType
-
   private newtype TCompletion =
     TSimpleCompletion() or
     TBooleanCompletion(boolean b) { b in [false, true] } or
@@ -27,7 +25,7 @@ module Completion {
 
     override predicate isValidFor(AstNode e) { not any(Completion c).isValidForSpecific(e) }
 
-    override DirectSuccessor getAMatchingSuccessorType() { any() }
+    override NormalSuccessor getAMatchingSuccessorType() { any() }
   }
 
   class BooleanCompletion extends NormalCompletion, TBooleanCompletion {
@@ -51,6 +49,34 @@ module Completion {
 
     override ReturnSuccessor getAMatchingSuccessorType() { any() }
   }
+
+  cached
+  private newtype TSuccessorType =
+    TNormalSuccessor() or
+    TBooleanSuccessor(boolean b) { b in [false, true] } or
+    TReturnSuccessor()
+
+  class SuccessorType extends TSuccessorType {
+    string toString() { none() }
+  }
+
+  class NormalSuccessor extends SuccessorType, TNormalSuccessor {
+    override string toString() { result = "successor" }
+  }
+
+  class BooleanSuccessor extends SuccessorType, TBooleanSuccessor {
+    boolean value;
+
+    BooleanSuccessor() { this = TBooleanSuccessor(value) }
+
+    override string toString() { result = value.toString() }
+
+    boolean getValue() { result = value }
+  }
+
+  class ReturnSuccessor extends SuccessorType, TReturnSuccessor {
+    override string toString() { result = "return" }
+  }
 }
 
 module CfgScope {
@@ -101,8 +127,14 @@ private module Implementation implements CfgShared::InputSig<Location> {
     last(scope.(CompositeAction), e, c)
   }
 
+  predicate successorTypeIsSimple(SuccessorType t) { t instanceof NormalSuccessor }
+
+  predicate successorTypeIsCondition(SuccessorType t) { t instanceof BooleanSuccessor }
+
   SuccessorType getAMatchingSuccessorType(Completion c) { result = c.getAMatchingSuccessorType() }
 
+  predicate isAbnormalExitType(SuccessorType t) { none() }
+
   int idOfAstNode(AstNode node) { none() }
 
   int idOfCfgScope(CfgScope scope) { none() }

actions/ql/lib/codeql/actions/dataflow/ExternalFlow.qll

@@ -63,10 +63,10 @@ predicate madSource(DataFlow::Node source, string kind, string fieldName) {
     (
       if fieldName.trim().matches("env.%")
       then source.asExpr() = uses.getInScopeEnvVarExpr(fieldName.trim().replaceAll("env.", ""))
-      else (
-        fieldName.trim().matches("output.%") and
-        source.asExpr() = uses
-      )
+      else
+        if fieldName.trim().matches("output.%")
+        then source.asExpr() = uses
+        else none()
     )
   )
 }

actions/ql/lib/codeql/actions/dataflow/FlowSources.qll

@@ -31,14 +31,14 @@ abstract class RemoteFlowSource extends SourceNode {
 class GitHubCtxSource extends RemoteFlowSource {
   string flag;
   string event;
+  GitHubExpression e;
 
   GitHubCtxSource() {
-    exists(GitHubExpression e |
-      this.asExpr() = e and
-      // github.head_ref
-      e.getFieldName() = "head_ref" and
-      flag = "branch"
-    |
+    this.asExpr() = e and
+    // github.head_ref
+    e.getFieldName() = "head_ref" and
+    flag = "branch" and
+    (
       event = e.getATriggerEvent().getName() and
       event = "pull_request_target"
       or
@@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ class GhCLICommandSource extends RemoteFlowSource, CommandSource {
 class GitHubEventPathSource extends RemoteFlowSource, CommandSource {
   string cmd;
   string flag;
+  string access_path;
   Run run;
 
   // Examples
@@ -162,7 +163,7 @@ class GitHubEventPathSource extends RemoteFlowSource, CommandSource {
     run.getScript().getACommand() = cmd and
     cmd.matches("jq%") and
     cmd.matches("%GITHUB_EVENT_PATH%") and
-    exists(string regexp, string access_path |
+    exists(string regexp |
       untrustedEventPropertiesDataModel(regexp, flag) and
       not flag = "json" and
       access_path = "github.event" + cmd.regexpCapture(".*\\s+([^\\s]+)\\s+.*", 1) and

actions/ql/lib/codeql/actions/security/ArgumentInjectionQuery.qll

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 private import actions
 private import codeql.actions.TaintTracking
 private import codeql.actions.dataflow.ExternalFlow
-private import codeql.actions.security.ControlChecks
 import codeql.actions.dataflow.FlowSources
 import codeql.actions.DataFlow
 
@@ -19,6 +18,7 @@ abstract class ArgumentInjectionSink extends DataFlow::Node {
  */
 class ArgumentInjectionFromEnvVarSink extends ArgumentInjectionSink {
   string command;
+  string argument;
 
   ArgumentInjectionFromEnvVarSink() {
     exists(Run run, string var |
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ class ArgumentInjectionFromEnvVarSink extends ArgumentInjectionSink {
         exists(run.getInScopeEnvVarExpr(var)) or
         var = "GITHUB_HEAD_REF"
       ) and
-      run.getScript().getAnEnvReachingArgumentInjectionSink(var, command, _)
+      run.getScript().getAnEnvReachingArgumentInjectionSink(var, command, argument)
     )
   }
 
@@ -43,12 +43,13 @@ class ArgumentInjectionFromEnvVarSink extends ArgumentInjectionSink {
  */
 class ArgumentInjectionFromCommandSink extends ArgumentInjectionSink {
   string command;
+  string argument;
 
   ArgumentInjectionFromCommandSink() {
     exists(CommandSource source, Run run |
       run = source.getEnclosingRun() and
       this.asExpr() = run.getScript() and
-      run.getScript().getACmdReachingArgumentInjectionSink(source.getCommand(), command, _)
+      run.getScript().getACmdReachingArgumentInjectionSink(source.getCommand(), command, argument)
     )
   }
 
@@ -64,16 +65,6 @@ class ArgumentInjectionFromMaDSink extends ArgumentInjectionSink {
   override string getCommand() { result = "unknown" }
 }
 
-/**
- * Gets the event that is relevant for the given node in the context of argument injection.
- *
- * This is used to highlight the event in the query results when an alert is raised.
- */
-Event getRelevantEventInPrivilegedContext(DataFlow::Node node) {
-  inPrivilegedContext(node.asExpr(), result) and
-  not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(node.asExpr(), result, "argument-injection"))
-}
-
 /**
  * A taint-tracking configuration for unsafe user input
  * that is used to construct and evaluate a code script.
@@ -97,16 +88,6 @@ private module ArgumentInjectionConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
       run.getScript().getAnEnvReachingArgumentInjectionSink(var, _, _)
     )
   }
-
-  predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
-
-  Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node source) { none() }
-
-  Location getASelectedSinkLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) {
-    result = sink.getLocation()
-    or
-    result = getRelevantEventInPrivilegedContext(sink).getLocation()
-  }
 }
 
 /** Tracks flow of unsafe user input that is used to construct and evaluate a code script. */

actions/ql/lib/codeql/actions/security/ArtifactPoisoningQuery.qll

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import codeql.actions.DataFlow
 import codeql.actions.dataflow.FlowSources
 import codeql.actions.security.PoisonableSteps
 import codeql.actions.security.UntrustedCheckoutQuery
-import codeql.actions.security.ControlChecks
 
 string unzipRegexp() { result = "(unzip|tar)\\s+.*" }
 
@@ -125,6 +124,8 @@ class LegitLabsDownloadArtifactActionStep extends UntrustedArtifactDownloadStep,
 }
 
 class ActionsGitHubScriptDownloadStep extends UntrustedArtifactDownloadStep, UsesStep {
+  string script;
+
   ActionsGitHubScriptDownloadStep() {
     // eg:
     // - uses: actions/github-script@v6
@@ -147,14 +148,12 @@ class ActionsGitHubScriptDownloadStep extends UntrustedArtifactDownloadStep, Use
     //      var fs = require('fs');
     //      fs.writeFileSync('${{github.workspace}}/test-results.zip', Buffer.from(download.data));
     this.getCallee() = "actions/github-script" and
-    exists(string script |
-      this.getArgument("script") = script and
-      script.matches("%listWorkflowRunArtifacts(%") and
-      script.matches("%downloadArtifact(%") and
-      script.matches("%writeFileSync(%") and
-      // Filter out artifacts that were created by pull-request.
-      not script.matches("%exclude_pull_requests: true%")
-    )
+    this.getArgument("script") = script and
+    script.matches("%listWorkflowRunArtifacts(%") and
+    script.matches("%downloadArtifact(%") and
+    script.matches("%writeFileSync(%") and
+    // Filter out artifacts that were created by pull-request.
+    not script.matches("%exclude_pull_requests: true%")
   }
 
   override string getPath() {
@@ -171,10 +170,10 @@ class ActionsGitHubScriptDownloadStep extends UntrustedArtifactDownloadStep, Use
                 .getScript()
                 .getACommand()
                 .regexpCapture(unzipRegexp() + unzipDirArgRegexp(), 3)))
-    else (
-      this.getAFollowingStep().(Run).getScript().getACommand().regexpMatch(unzipRegexp()) and
-      result = "GITHUB_WORKSPACE/"
-    )
+    else
+      if this.getAFollowingStep().(Run).getScript().getACommand().regexpMatch(unzipRegexp())
+      then result = "GITHUB_WORKSPACE/"
+      else none()
   }
 }
 
@@ -207,13 +206,12 @@ class GHRunArtifactDownloadStep extends UntrustedArtifactDownloadStep, Run {
                 .getScript()
                 .getACommand()
                 .regexpCapture(unzipRegexp() + unzipDirArgRegexp(), 3)))
-    else (
-      (
+    else
+      if
         this.getAFollowingStep().(Run).getScript().getACommand().regexpMatch(unzipRegexp()) or
         this.getScript().getACommand().regexpMatch(unzipRegexp())
-      ) and
-      result = "GITHUB_WORKSPACE/"
-    )
+      then result = "GITHUB_WORKSPACE/"
+      else none()
   }
 }
 
@@ -260,15 +258,13 @@ class DirectArtifactDownloadStep extends UntrustedArtifactDownloadStep, Run {
 
 class ArtifactPoisoningSink extends DataFlow::Node {
   UntrustedArtifactDownloadStep download;
+  PoisonableStep poisonable;
 
   ArtifactPoisoningSink() {
-    exists(PoisonableStep poisonable |
-      download.getAFollowingStep() = poisonable and
-      // excluding artifacts downloaded to the temporary directory
-      not download.getPath().regexpMatch("^/tmp.*") and
-      not download.getPath().regexpMatch("^\\$\\{\\{\\s*runner\\.temp\\s*}}.*") and
-      not download.getPath().regexpMatch("^\\$RUNNER_TEMP.*")
-    |
+    download.getAFollowingStep() = poisonable and
+    // excluding artifacts downloaded to /tmp
+    not download.getPath().regexpMatch("^/tmp.*") and
+    (
       poisonable.(Run).getScript() = this.asExpr() and
       (
         // Check if the poisonable step is a local script execution step
@@ -294,16 +290,6 @@ class ArtifactPoisoningSink extends DataFlow::Node {
   string getPath() { result = download.getPath() }
 }
 
-/**
- * Gets the event that is relevant for the given node in the context of artifact poisoning.
- *
- * This is used to highlight the event in the query results when an alert is raised.
- */
-Event getRelevantEventInPrivilegedContext(DataFlow::Node node) {
-  inPrivilegedContext(node.asExpr(), result) and
-  not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(node.asExpr(), result, "artifact-poisoning"))
-}
-
 /**
  * A taint-tracking configuration for unsafe artifacts
  * that is used may lead to artifact poisoning
@@ -330,16 +316,6 @@ private module ArtifactPoisoningConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
       exists(run.getScript().getAFileReadCommand())
     )
   }
-
-  predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
-
-  Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node source) { none() }
-
-  Location getASelectedSinkLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) {
-    result = sink.getLocation()
-    or
-    result = getRelevantEventInPrivilegedContext(sink).getLocation()
-  }
 }
 
 /** Tracks flow of unsafe artifacts that is used in an insecure way. */

actions/ql/lib/codeql/actions/security/CodeInjectionQuery.qll

@@ -3,8 +3,6 @@ private import codeql.actions.TaintTracking
 private import codeql.actions.dataflow.ExternalFlow
 import codeql.actions.dataflow.FlowSources
 import codeql.actions.DataFlow
-import codeql.actions.security.ControlChecks
-import codeql.actions.security.CachePoisoningQuery
 
 class CodeInjectionSink extends DataFlow::Node {
   CodeInjectionSink() {
@@ -13,46 +11,6 @@ class CodeInjectionSink extends DataFlow::Node {
   }
 }
 
-/**
- * Get the relevant event for the sink in CodeInjectionCritical.ql.
- */
-Event getRelevantCriticalEventForSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
-  inPrivilegedContext(sink.asExpr(), result) and
-  not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(sink.asExpr(), result, "code-injection")) and
-  // exclude cases where the sink is a JS script and the expression uses toJson
-  not exists(UsesStep script |
-    script.getCallee() = "actions/github-script" and
-    script.getArgumentExpr("script") = sink.asExpr() and
-    exists(getAToJsonReferenceExpression(sink.asExpr().(Expression).getExpression(), _))
-  )
-}
-
-/**
- * Get the relevant event for the sink in CachePoisoningViaCodeInjection.ql.
- */
-Event getRelevantCachePoisoningEventForSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
-  exists(LocalJob job |
-    job = sink.asExpr().getEnclosingJob() and
-    job.getATriggerEvent() = result and
-    // job can be triggered by an external user
-    result.isExternallyTriggerable() and
-    // excluding privileged workflows since they can be exploited in easier circumstances
-    // which is covered by `actions/code-injection/critical`
-    not job.isPrivilegedExternallyTriggerable(result) and
-    (
-      // the workflow runs in the context of the default branch
-      runsOnDefaultBranch(result)
-      or
-      // the workflow caller runs in the context of the default branch
-      result.getName() = "workflow_call" and
-      exists(ExternalJob caller |
-        caller.getCallee() = job.getLocation().getFile().getRelativePath() and
-        runsOnDefaultBranch(caller.getATriggerEvent())
-      )
-    )
-  )
-}
-
 /**
  * A taint-tracking configuration for unsafe user input
  * that is used to construct and evaluate a code script.
@@ -77,18 +35,6 @@ private module CodeInjectionConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
       exists(run.getScript().getAFileReadCommand())
     )
   }
-
-  predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
-
-  Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node source) { none() }
-
-  Location getASelectedSinkLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) {
-    result = sink.getLocation()
-    or
-    result = getRelevantCriticalEventForSink(sink).getLocation()
-    or
-    result = getRelevantCachePoisoningEventForSink(sink).getLocation()
-  }
 }
 
 /** Tracks flow of unsafe user input that is used to construct and evaluate a code script. */

actions/ql/lib/codeql/actions/security/CommandInjectionQuery.qll

@@ -3,20 +3,11 @@ private import codeql.actions.TaintTracking
 private import codeql.actions.dataflow.ExternalFlow
 import codeql.actions.dataflow.FlowSources
 import codeql.actions.DataFlow
-import codeql.actions.security.ControlChecks
 
 private class CommandInjectionSink extends DataFlow::Node {
   CommandInjectionSink() { madSink(this, "command-injection") }
 }
 
-/** Get the relevant event for the sink in CommandInjectionCritical.ql. */
-Event getRelevantEventInPrivilegedContext(DataFlow::Node sink) {
-  inPrivilegedContext(sink.asExpr(), result) and
-  not exists(ControlCheck check |
-    check.protects(sink.asExpr(), result, ["command-injection", "code-injection"])
-  )
-}
-
 /**
  * A taint-tracking configuration for unsafe user input
  * that is used to construct and evaluate a system command.
@@ -25,16 +16,6 @@ private module CommandInjectionConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
   predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
 
   predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof CommandInjectionSink }
-
-  predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
-
-  Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node source) { none() }
-
-  Location getASelectedSinkLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) {
-    result = sink.getLocation()
-    or
-    result = getRelevantEventInPrivilegedContext(sink).getLocation()
-  }
 }
 
 /** Tracks flow of unsafe user input that is used to construct and evaluate a system command. */

actions/ql/lib/codeql/actions/security/ControlChecks.qll

@@ -159,8 +159,11 @@ abstract class CommentVsHeadDateCheck extends ControlCheck {
 
 /* Specific implementations of control checks */
 class LabelIfCheck extends LabelCheck instanceof If {
+  string condition;
+
   LabelIfCheck() {
-    exists(string condition | condition = normalizeExpr(this.getCondition()) |
+    condition = normalizeExpr(this.getCondition()) and
+    (
       // eg: contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'safe to test')
       condition.regexpMatch(".*(^|[^!])contains\\(\\s*github\\.event\\.pull_request\\.labels\\b.*")
       or

actions/ql/lib/codeql/actions/security/EnvPathInjectionQuery.qll

@@ -72,25 +72,6 @@ class EnvPathInjectionFromMaDSink extends EnvPathInjectionSink {
   EnvPathInjectionFromMaDSink() { madSink(this, "envpath-injection") }
 }
 
-/**
- * Get the relevant event for a sink in EnvPathInjectionCritical.ql where the source type is "artifact".
- */
-Event getRelevantArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(DataFlow::Node sink) {
-  inPrivilegedContext(sink.asExpr(), result) and
-  not exists(ControlCheck check |
-    check.protects(sink.asExpr(), result, ["untrusted-checkout", "artifact-poisoning"])
-  ) and
-  sink instanceof EnvPathInjectionFromFileReadSink
-}
-
-/**
- * Get the relevant event for a sink in EnvPathInjectionCritical.ql where the source type is not "artifact".
- */
-Event getRelevantNonArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(DataFlow::Node sink) {
-  inPrivilegedContext(sink.asExpr(), result) and
-  not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(sink.asExpr(), result, "code-injection"))
-}
-
 /**
  * A taint-tracking configuration for unsafe user input
  * that is used to construct and evaluate an environment variable.
@@ -127,18 +108,6 @@ private module EnvPathInjectionConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
       exists(run.getScript().getAFileReadCommand())
     )
   }
-
-  predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
-
-  Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node source) { none() }
-
-  Location getASelectedSinkLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) {
-    result = sink.getLocation()
-    or
-    result = getRelevantArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(sink).getLocation()
-    or
-    result = getRelevantNonArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(sink).getLocation()
-  }
 }
 
 /** Tracks flow of unsafe user input that is used to construct and evaluate the PATH environment variable. */

actions/ql/lib/codeql/actions/security/EnvVarInjectionQuery.qll

@@ -55,8 +55,12 @@ class EnvVarInjectionFromFileReadSink extends EnvVarInjectionSink {
  *          echo "COMMIT_MESSAGE=${COMMIT_MESSAGE}" >> $GITHUB_ENV
  */
 class EnvVarInjectionFromCommandSink extends EnvVarInjectionSink {
+  CommandSource inCommand;
+  string injectedVar;
+  string command;
+
   EnvVarInjectionFromCommandSink() {
-    exists(Run run, CommandSource inCommand, string injectedVar, string command |
+    exists(Run run |
       this.asExpr() = inCommand.getEnclosingRun().getScript() and
       run = inCommand.getEnclosingRun() and
       run.getScript().getACmdReachingGitHubEnvWrite(inCommand.getCommand(), injectedVar) and
@@ -82,8 +86,12 @@ class EnvVarInjectionFromCommandSink extends EnvVarInjectionSink {
  *      echo "FOO=$BODY" >> $GITHUB_ENV
  */
 class EnvVarInjectionFromEnvVarSink extends EnvVarInjectionSink {
+  string inVar;
+  string injectedVar;
+  string command;
+
   EnvVarInjectionFromEnvVarSink() {
-    exists(Run run, string inVar, string injectedVar, string command |
+    exists(Run run |
       run.getScript() = this.asExpr() and
       exists(run.getInScopeEnvVarExpr(inVar)) and
       run.getScript().getAnEnvReachingGitHubEnvWrite(inVar, injectedVar) and
@@ -118,32 +126,6 @@ class EnvVarInjectionFromMaDSink extends EnvVarInjectionSink {
   EnvVarInjectionFromMaDSink() { madSink(this, "envvar-injection") }
 }
 
-/**
- * Get the relevant event for a sink in EnvVarInjectionCritical.ql where the source type is "artifact".
- */
-Event getRelevantArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(DataFlow::Node sink) {
-  inPrivilegedContext(sink.asExpr(), result) and
-  not exists(ControlCheck check |
-    check
-        .protects(sink.asExpr(), result,
-          ["envvar-injection", "untrusted-checkout", "artifact-poisoning"])
-  ) and
-  (
-    sink instanceof EnvVarInjectionFromFileReadSink or
-    madSink(sink, "envvar-injection")
-  )
-}
-
-/**
- * Get the relevant event for a sink in EnvVarInjectionCritical.ql where the source type is not "artifact".
- */
-Event getRelevantNonArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(DataFlow::Node sink) {
-  inPrivilegedContext(sink.asExpr(), result) and
-  not exists(ControlCheck check |
-    check.protects(sink.asExpr(), result, ["envvar-injection", "code-injection"])
-  )
-}
-
 /**
  * A taint-tracking configuration for unsafe user input
  * that is used to construct and evaluate an environment variable.
@@ -181,18 +163,6 @@ private module EnvVarInjectionConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
       exists(run.getScript().getAFileReadCommand())
     )
   }
-
-  predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
-
-  Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node source) { none() }
-
-  Location getASelectedSinkLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) {
-    result = sink.getLocation()
-    or
-    result = getRelevantArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(sink).getLocation()
-    or
-    result = getRelevantNonArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(sink).getLocation()
-  }
 }
 
 /** Tracks flow of unsafe user input that is used to construct and evaluate an environment variable. */

actions/ql/lib/codeql/actions/security/OutputClobberingQuery.qll

@@ -99,14 +99,18 @@ class OutputClobberingFromEnvVarSink extends OutputClobberingSink {
  *          echo $BODY
  */
 class WorkflowCommandClobberingFromEnvVarSink extends OutputClobberingSink {
+  string clobbering_var;
+  string clobbered_value;
+
   WorkflowCommandClobberingFromEnvVarSink() {
-    exists(Run run, string workflow_cmd_stmt, string clobbering_stmt, string clobbering_var |
+    exists(Run run, string workflow_cmd_stmt, string clobbering_stmt |
       run.getScript() = this.asExpr() and
       run.getScript().getAStmt() = clobbering_stmt and
       clobbering_stmt.regexpMatch("echo\\s+(-e\\s+)?(\"|')?\\$(\\{)?" + clobbering_var + ".*") and
       exists(run.getInScopeEnvVarExpr(clobbering_var)) and
       run.getScript().getAStmt() = workflow_cmd_stmt and
-      exists(trimQuotes(workflow_cmd_stmt.regexpCapture(".*::set-output\\s+name=.*::(.*)", 1)))
+      clobbered_value =
+        trimQuotes(workflow_cmd_stmt.regexpCapture(".*::set-output\\s+name=.*::(.*)", 1))
     )
   }
 }

actions/ql/lib/codeql/actions/security/UseOfUnversionedImmutableAction.qll

@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
 import actions
 
 class UnversionedImmutableAction extends UsesStep {
+  string immutable_action;
+
   UnversionedImmutableAction() {
-    isImmutableAction(this, _) and
+    isImmutableAction(this, immutable_action) and
     not isSemVer(this.getVersion())
   }
 }

actions/ql/lib/qlpack.yml

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 name: codeql/actions-all
-version: 0.4.19
+version: 0.4.13-dev
 library: true
 warnOnImplicitThis: true
 dependencies:

actions/ql/src/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,33 +1,3 @@
-## 0.6.11
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 0.6.10
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 0.6.9
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* Actions analysis now reports file coverage information on the CodeQL status page.
-
-## 0.6.8
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 0.6.7
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 0.6.6
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 0.6.5
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
 ## 0.6.4
 
 No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/src/Diagnostics/SuccessfullyExtractedFiles.ql

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * @id actions/diagnostics/successfully-extracted-files
- * @name Extracted files
- * @description List all files that were extracted.
- * @kind diagnostic
- * @tags successfully-extracted-files
- */
-
-private import codeql.Locations
-
-from File f
-where exists(f.getRelativePath())
-select f, ""

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionCritical.md

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
-## Overview
+# Environment Path Injection
+
+## Description
 
 GitHub Actions allow to define the system PATH variable by writing to a file pointed to by the `GITHUB_PATH` environment variable. Writing to this file appends a directory to the system PATH variable and automatically makes it available to all subsequent actions in the current job.
 
@@ -10,11 +12,11 @@ echo "$HOME/.local/bin" >> $GITHUB_PATH
 
 If an attacker can control the contents of the system PATH, they are able to influence what commands are run in subsequent steps of the same job.
 
-## Recommendation
+## Recommendations
 
 Do not allow untrusted data to influence the system PATH: Avoid using untrusted data sources (e.g., artifact content) to define the system PATH.
 
-## Example
+## Examples
 
 ### Incorrect Usage
 
@@ -34,4 +36,4 @@ If an attacker can manipulate the value being set, such as through artifact down
 
 ## References
 
-- GitHub Docs: [Workflow commands for GitHub Actions](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/writing-workflows/choosing-what-your-workflow-does/workflow-commands-for-github-actions).
+- [Workflow commands for GitHub Actions](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/writing-workflows/choosing-what-your-workflow-does/workflow-commands-for-github-actions)

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionCritical.ql

@@ -21,12 +21,18 @@ import codeql.actions.security.ControlChecks
 from EnvPathInjectionFlow::PathNode source, EnvPathInjectionFlow::PathNode sink, Event event
 where
   EnvPathInjectionFlow::flowPath(source, sink) and
+  inPrivilegedContext(sink.getNode().asExpr(), event) and
   (
     not source.getNode().(RemoteFlowSource).getSourceType() = "artifact" and
-    event = getRelevantNonArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(sink.getNode())
+    not exists(ControlCheck check |
+      check.protects(sink.getNode().asExpr(), event, "code-injection")
+    )
     or
     source.getNode().(RemoteFlowSource).getSourceType() = "artifact" and
-    event = getRelevantArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(sink.getNode())
+    not exists(ControlCheck check |
+      check.protects(sink.getNode().asExpr(), event, ["untrusted-checkout", "artifact-poisoning"])
+    ) and
+    sink.getNode() instanceof EnvPathInjectionFromFileReadSink
   )
 select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
   "Potential PATH environment variable injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@).",

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionMedium.md

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
-## Overview
+# Environment Path Injection
+
+## Description
 
 GitHub Actions allow to define the system PATH variable by writing to a file pointed to by the `GITHUB_PATH` environment variable. Writing to this file appends a directory to the system PATH variable and automatically makes it available to all subsequent actions in the current job.
 
@@ -10,11 +12,11 @@ echo "$HOME/.local/bin" >> $GITHUB_PATH
 
 If an attacker can control the contents of the system PATH, they are able to influence what commands are run in subsequent steps of the same job.
 
-## Recommendation
+## Recommendations
 
 Do not allow untrusted data to influence the system PATH: Avoid using untrusted data sources (e.g., artifact content) to define the system PATH.
 
-## Example
+## Examples
 
 ### Incorrect Usage
 
@@ -34,4 +36,4 @@ If an attacker can manipulate the value being set, such as through artifact down
 
 ## References
 
-- GitHub Docs: [Workflow commands for GitHub Actions](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/writing-workflows/choosing-what-your-workflow-does/workflow-commands-for-github-actions).
+- [Workflow commands for GitHub Actions](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/writing-workflows/choosing-what-your-workflow-does/workflow-commands-for-github-actions)

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvVarInjectionCritical.md

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
-## Overview
+# Environment Variable Injection
+
+## Description
 
 GitHub Actions allow to define environment variables by writing to a file pointed to by the `GITHUB_ENV` environment variable:
 
@@ -35,7 +37,7 @@ steps:
 
 If an attacker can control the values assigned to environment variables and there is no sanitization in place, the attacker will be able to inject additional variables by injecting new lines or `{delimiters}`.
 
-## Recommendation
+## Recommendations
 
 1. **Do not allow untrusted data to influence environment variables**:
 
@@ -62,7 +64,7 @@ If an attacker can control the values assigned to environment variables and ther
           } >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
     ```
 
-## Example
+## Examples
 
 ### Example of Vulnerability
 
@@ -111,5 +113,5 @@ An attacker is be able to run arbitrary code by injecting environment variables
 
 ## References
 
-- GitHub Docs: [Workflow commands for GitHub Actions](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/writing-workflows/choosing-what-your-workflow-does/workflow-commands-for-github-actions).
-- Synacktiv: [GitHub Actions Exploitation: Repo Jacking and Environment Manipulation](https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/github-actions-exploitation-repo-jacking-and-environment-manipulation).
+- [Workflow commands for GitHub Actions](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/writing-workflows/choosing-what-your-workflow-does/workflow-commands-for-github-actions)
+- [GitHub Actions Exploitation: Repo Jacking and Environment Manipulation](https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/github-actions-exploitation-repo-jacking-and-environment-manipulation)

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvVarInjectionCritical.ql

@@ -22,15 +22,26 @@ import codeql.actions.security.ControlChecks
 from EnvVarInjectionFlow::PathNode source, EnvVarInjectionFlow::PathNode sink, Event event
 where
   EnvVarInjectionFlow::flowPath(source, sink) and
+  inPrivilegedContext(sink.getNode().asExpr(), event) and
   // exclude paths to file read sinks from non-artifact sources
   (
     // source is text
     not source.getNode().(RemoteFlowSource).getSourceType() = "artifact" and
-    event = getRelevantNonArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(sink.getNode())
+    not exists(ControlCheck check |
+      check.protects(sink.getNode().asExpr(), event, ["envvar-injection", "code-injection"])
+    )
     or
     // source is an artifact or a file from an untrusted checkout
     source.getNode().(RemoteFlowSource).getSourceType() = "artifact" and
-    event = getRelevantArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(sink.getNode())
+    not exists(ControlCheck check |
+      check
+          .protects(sink.getNode().asExpr(), event,
+            ["envvar-injection", "untrusted-checkout", "artifact-poisoning"])
+    ) and
+    (
+      sink.getNode() instanceof EnvVarInjectionFromFileReadSink or
+      madSink(sink.getNode(), "envvar-injection")
+    )
   )
 select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
   "Potential environment variable injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@).",

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvVarInjectionMedium.md

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
-## Overview
+# Environment Variable Injection
+
+## Description
 
 GitHub Actions allow to define environment variables by writing to a file pointed to by the `GITHUB_ENV` environment variable:
 
@@ -35,7 +37,7 @@ steps:
 
 If an attacker can control the values assigned to environment variables and there is no sanitization in place, the attacker will be able to inject additional variables by injecting new lines or `{delimiters}`.
 
-## Recommendation
+## Recommendations
 
 1. **Do not allow untrusted data to influence environment variables**:
 
@@ -62,7 +64,7 @@ If an attacker can control the values assigned to environment variables and ther
           } >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
     ```
 
-## Example
+## Examples
 
 ### Example of Vulnerability
 
@@ -111,5 +113,5 @@ An attacker would be able to run arbitrary code by injecting environment variabl
 
 ## References
 
-- GitHub Docs: [Workflow commands for GitHub Actions](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/writing-workflows/choosing-what-your-workflow-does/workflow-commands-for-github-actions).
-- Synacktiv: [GitHub Actions Exploitation: Repo Jacking and Environment Manipulation](https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/github-actions-exploitation-repo-jacking-and-environment-manipulation).
+- [Workflow commands for GitHub Actions](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/writing-workflows/choosing-what-your-workflow-does/workflow-commands-for-github-actions)
+- [GitHub Actions Exploitation: Repo Jacking and Environment Manipulation](https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/github-actions-exploitation-repo-jacking-and-environment-manipulation)

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionCritical.md

@@ -1,16 +1,18 @@
-## Overview
+# Code Injection in GitHub Actions
+
+## Description
 
 Using user-controlled input in GitHub Actions may lead to code injection in contexts like _run:_ or _script:_.
 
 Code injection in GitHub Actions may allow an attacker to exfiltrate any secrets used in the workflow and the temporary GitHub repository authorization token. The token may have write access to the repository, allowing an attacker to make changes to the repository.
 
-## Recommendation
+## Recommendations
 
 The best practice to avoid code injection vulnerabilities in GitHub workflows is to set the untrusted input value of the expression to an intermediate environment variable and then use the environment variable using the native syntax of the shell/script interpreter (that is, not _${{ env.VAR }}_).
 
 It is also recommended to limit the permissions of any tokens used by a workflow such as the GITHUB_TOKEN.
 
-## Example
+## Examples
 
 ### Incorrect Usage
 

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionCritical.ql

@@ -22,8 +22,15 @@ import codeql.actions.security.ControlChecks
 from CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode source, CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode sink, Event event
 where
   CodeInjectionFlow::flowPath(source, sink) and
-  event = getRelevantCriticalEventForSink(sink.getNode()) and
-  source.getNode().(RemoteFlowSource).getEventName() = event.getName()
+  inPrivilegedContext(sink.getNode().asExpr(), event) and
+  source.getNode().(RemoteFlowSource).getEventName() = event.getName() and
+  not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(sink.getNode().asExpr(), event, "code-injection")) and
+  // exclude cases where the sink is a JS script and the expression uses toJson
+  not exists(UsesStep script |
+    script.getCallee() = "actions/github-script" and
+    script.getArgumentExpr("script") = sink.getNode().asExpr() and
+    exists(getAToJsonReferenceExpression(sink.getNode().asExpr().(Expression).getExpression(), _))
+  )
 select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
   "Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@).", sink,
   sink.getNode().asExpr().(Expression).getRawExpression(), event, event.getName()

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionMedium.md

@@ -1,16 +1,18 @@
-## Overview
+# Code Injection in GitHub Actions
+
+## Description
 
 Using user-controlled input in GitHub Actions may lead to code injection in contexts like _run:_ or _script:_.
 
 Code injection in GitHub Actions may allow an attacker to exfiltrate any secrets used in the workflow and the temporary GitHub repository authorization token. The token may have write access to the repository, allowing an attacker to make changes to the repository.
 
-## Recommendation
+## Recommendations
 
 The best practice to avoid code injection vulnerabilities in GitHub workflows is to set the untrusted input value of the expression to an intermediate environment variable and then use the environment variable using the native syntax of the shell/script interpreter (that is, not _${{ env.VAR }}_).
 
 It is also recommended to limit the permissions of any tokens used by a workflow such as the GITHUB_TOKEN.
 
-## Example
+## Examples
 
 ### Incorrect Usage
 

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-1395/UseOfKnownVulnerableAction.md

@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
-## Overview
+# Use of Actions with known vulnerabilities
+
+## Description
 
 The security of the workflow and the repository could be compromised by GitHub Actions workflows that utilize GitHub Actions with known vulnerabilities.
 
-## Recommendation
+## Recommendations
 
 Either remove the component from the workflow or upgrade it to a version that is not vulnerable.
 
 ## References
 
-- GitHub Docs: [Keeping your actions up to date with Dependabot](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/working-with-dependabot/keeping-your-actions-up-to-date-with-dependabot).
+- [GitHub Docs: Keeping your actions up to date with Dependabot](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/working-with-dependabot/keeping-your-actions-up-to-date-with-dependabot)

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-275/MissingActionsPermissions.md

@@ -1,21 +1,12 @@
-## Overview
+# Actions Job and Workflow Permissions are not set
+
+## Description
 
 If a GitHub Actions job or workflow has no explicit permissions set, then the repository permissions are used. Repositories created under organizations inherit the organization permissions. The organizations or repositories created before February 2023 have the default permissions set to read-write. Often these permissions do not adhere to the principle of least privilege and can be reduced to read-only, leaving the `write` permission only to a specific types as `issues: write` or `pull-requests: write`.
 
-## Recommendation
+## Recommendations
 
-Add the `permissions` key to the job or the root of workflow (in this case it is applied to all jobs in the workflow that do not have their own `permissions` key) and assign the least privileges required to complete the task.
-
-## Example
-
-### Incorrect Usage
-
-```yaml
-name: "My workflow"
-# No permissions block
-```
-
-### Correct Usage
+Add the `permissions` key to the job or the root of workflow (in this case it is applied to all jobs in the workflow that do not have their own `permissions` key) and assign the least privileges required to complete the task:
 
 ```yaml
 name: "My workflow"
@@ -36,4 +27,4 @@ jobs:
 
 ## References
 
-- GitHub Docs: [Assigning permissions to jobs](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/writing-workflows/choosing-what-your-workflow-does/assigning-permissions-to-jobs).
+- [Assigning permissions to jobs](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/writing-workflows/choosing-what-your-workflow-does/assigning-permissions-to-jobs)

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-285/ImproperAccessControl.md

@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
-## Overview
+# Improper Access Control
+
+## Description
 
 Sometimes labels are used to approve GitHub Actions. An authorization check may not be properly implemented, allowing an attacker to mutate the code after it has been reviewed and approved by label.
 
-## Recommendation
+## Recommendations
 
 When using labels, make sure that the code cannot be modified after it has been reviewed and the label has been set.
 
-## Example
+## Examples
 
 ### Incorrect Usage
 
@@ -55,4 +57,4 @@ jobs:
 
 ## References
 
-- GitHub Docs: [Events that trigger workflows](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/writing-workflows/choosing-when-your-workflow-runs/events-that-trigger-workflows#pull_request_target).
+- [Events that trigger workflows](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/writing-workflows/choosing-when-your-workflow-runs/events-that-trigger-workflows#pull_request_target)

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-312/ExcessiveSecretsExposure.md

@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
-## Overview
+# Excessive Secrets Exposure
+
+## Description
 
 When the workflow runner cannot determine what secrets are needed to run the workflow, it will pass all the available secrets to the runner including organization and repository secrets. This violates the least privileged principle and increases the impact of a potential vulnerability affecting the workflow.
 
-## Recommendation
+## Recommendations
 
 Only pass those secrets that are needed by the workflow. Avoid using expressions such as `toJSON(secrets)` or dynamically accessed secrets such as `secrets[format('GH_PAT_%s', matrix.env)]` since the workflow will need to receive all secrets to decide at runtime which one needs to be used.
 
-## Example
+## Examples
 
 ### Incorrect Usage
 
@@ -46,5 +48,5 @@ env:
 
 ## References
 
-- GitHub Docs: [Using secrets in GitHub Actions](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-for-github-actions/security-guides/using-secrets-in-github-actions#using-encrypted-secrets-in-a-workflow).
-- poutine: [Job uses all secrets](https://github.com/boostsecurityio/poutine/blob/main/docs/content/en/rules/job_all_secrets.md).
+- [Using secrets in GitHub Actions](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-for-github-actions/security-guides/using-secrets-in-github-actions#using-encrypted-secrets-in-a-workflow)
+- [Job uses all secrets](https://github.com/boostsecurityio/poutine/blob/main/docs/content/en/rules/job_all_secrets.md)

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-312/SecretsInArtifacts.md

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
-## Overview
+# Storage of sensitive information in GitHub Actions artifact
+
+## Description
 
 Sensitive information included in a GitHub Actions artifact can allow an attacker to access the sensitive information if the artifact is published.
 
@@ -8,8 +10,6 @@ Only store information that is meant to be publicly available in a GitHub Action
 
 ## Example
 
-### Incorrect Usage
-
 The following example uses `actions/checkout` to checkout code which stores the GITHUB_TOKEN in the \`.git/config\` file and then stores the contents of the \`.git\` repository into the artifact:
 
 ```yaml
@@ -28,8 +28,6 @@ jobs:
           path: .
 ```
 
-### Correct Usage
-
 The issue has been fixed below, where the `actions/upload-artifact` uses a version (v4+) which does not include hidden files or directories into the artifact.
 
 ```yaml

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-312/UnmaskedSecretExposure.md

@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
-## Overview
+# Unmasked Secret Exposure
+
+## Description
 
 Secrets derived from other secrets are not known to the workflow runner, and therefore are not masked unless explicitly registered.
 
-## Recommendation
+## Recommendations
 
 Avoid defining non-plain secrets. For example, do not define a new secret containing a JSON object and then read properties out of it from the workflow, since these read values will not be masked by the workflow runner.
 
-## Example
+## Examples
 
 ### Incorrect Usage
 
@@ -32,4 +34,4 @@ Avoid defining non-plain secrets. For example, do not define a new secret contai
 
 ## References
 
-- GitHub Docs: [Using secrets in GitHub Actions](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-for-github-actions/security-guides/using-secrets-in-github-actions#using-encrypted-secrets-in-a-workflow).
+- [Using secrets in GitHub Actions](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-for-github-actions/security-guides/using-secrets-in-github-actions#using-encrypted-secrets-in-a-workflow)

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaCodeInjection.md

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
-## Overview
+# Cache Poisoning in GitHub Actions
+
+## Description
 
 GitHub Actions cache poisoning is a technique that allows an attacker to inject malicious content into the Action's cache from unprivileged workflow, potentially leading to code execution in privileged workflows.
 
@@ -21,7 +23,7 @@ In GitHub Actions, cache scopes are primarily determined by the branch structure
 
 Due to the above design, if something is cached in the context of the default branch (e.g., `main`), it becomes accessible to any feature branch derived from `main`.
 
-## Recommendation
+## Recommendations
 
 1. Avoid using caching in workflows that handle sensitive operations like releases.
 2. If caching must be used:
@@ -32,7 +34,7 @@ Due to the above design, if something is cached in the context of the default br
 4. Never run untrusted code in the context of the default branch.
 5. Sign the cache value cryptographically and verify the signature before usage.
 
-## Example
+## Examples
 
 ### Incorrect Usage
 
@@ -76,6 +78,6 @@ jobs:
 
 ## References
 
-- Adnan Khan's Blog: [The Monsters in Your Build Cache – GitHub Actions Cache Poisoning](https://adnanthekhan.com/2024/05/06/the-monsters-in-your-build-cache-github-actions-cache-poisoning/).
-- GitHub Docs: [GitHub Actions Caching Documentation](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-workflows/caching-dependencies-to-speed-up-workflows).
-- Scribe Security Blog: [Cache Poisoning in GitHub Actions](https://scribesecurity.com/blog/github-cache-poisoning/).
+- [The Monsters in Your Build Cache – GitHub Actions Cache Poisoning](https://adnanthekhan.com/2024/05/06/the-monsters-in-your-build-cache-github-actions-cache-poisoning/)
+- [GitHub Actions Caching Documentation](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-workflows/caching-dependencies-to-speed-up-workflows)
+- [Cache Poisoning in GitHub Actions](https://scribesecurity.com/blog/github-cache-poisoning/)

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaCodeInjection.ql

@@ -18,13 +18,30 @@ import codeql.actions.security.CachePoisoningQuery
 import CodeInjectionFlow::PathGraph
 import codeql.actions.security.ControlChecks
 
-from CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode source, CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode sink, Event event
+from CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode source, CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode sink, LocalJob job, Event event
 where
   CodeInjectionFlow::flowPath(source, sink) and
-  event = getRelevantCachePoisoningEventForSink(sink.getNode()) and
+  job = sink.getNode().asExpr().getEnclosingJob() and
+  job.getATriggerEvent() = event and
+  // job can be triggered by an external user
+  event.isExternallyTriggerable() and
   // the checkout is not controlled by an access check
   not exists(ControlCheck check |
     check.protects(source.getNode().asExpr(), event, "code-injection")
+  ) and
+  // excluding privileged workflows since they can be exploited in easier circumstances
+  // which is covered by `actions/code-injection/critical`
+  not job.isPrivilegedExternallyTriggerable(event) and
+  (
+    // the workflow runs in the context of the default branch
+    runsOnDefaultBranch(event)
+    or
+    // the workflow caller runs in the context of the default branch
+    event.getName() = "workflow_call" and
+    exists(ExternalJob caller |
+      caller.getCallee() = job.getLocation().getFile().getRelativePath() and
+      runsOnDefaultBranch(caller.getATriggerEvent())
+    )
   )
 select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
   "Unprivileged code injection in $@, which may lead to cache poisoning ($@).", sink,

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaDirectCache.md

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
-## Overview
+# Cache Poisoning in GitHub Actions
+
+## Description
 
 GitHub Actions cache poisoning is a technique that allows an attacker to inject malicious content into the Action's cache from unprivileged workflow, potentially leading to code execution in privileged workflows.
 
@@ -21,7 +23,7 @@ In GitHub Actions, cache scopes are primarily determined by the branch structure
 
 Due to the above design, if something is cached in the context of the default branch (e.g., `main`), it becomes accessible to any feature branch derived from `main`.
 
-## Recommendation
+## Recommendations
 
 1. Avoid using caching in workflows that handle sensitive operations like releases.
 2. If caching must be used:
@@ -32,7 +34,7 @@ Due to the above design, if something is cached in the context of the default br
 4. Never run untrusted code in the context of the default branch.
 5. Sign the cache value cryptographically and verify the signature before usage.
 
-## Example
+## Examples
 
 ### Incorrect Usage
 
@@ -121,6 +123,6 @@ jobs:
 
 ## References
 
-- Adnan Khan's Blog: [The Monsters in Your Build Cache – GitHub Actions Cache Poisoning](https://adnanthekhan.com/2024/05/06/the-monsters-in-your-build-cache-github-actions-cache-poisoning/).
-- GitHub Docs: [GitHub Actions Caching Documentation](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-workflows/caching-dependencies-to-speed-up-workflows).
-- Scribe Security Blog: [Cache Poisoning in GitHub Actions](https://scribesecurity.com/blog/github-cache-poisoning/).
+- [The Monsters in Your Build Cache – GitHub Actions Cache Poisoning](https://adnanthekhan.com/2024/05/06/the-monsters-in-your-build-cache-github-actions-cache-poisoning/)
+- [GitHub Actions Caching Documentation](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-workflows/caching-dependencies-to-speed-up-workflows)
+- [Cache Poisoning in GitHub Actions](https://scribesecurity.com/blog/github-cache-poisoning/)