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3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Philip Ginsbach
8724f90206 set compileForOverlayEval true for java 2025-04-25 13:20:18 +01:00
Philip Ginsbach
7808763681 update python and csharp via config/sync-files.py 2025-04-22 17:24:53 +01:00
Philip Ginsbach
e3379dbe92 annotate .qll files in java and shared via script 2025-04-22 17:24:51 +01:00
7577 changed files with 166869 additions and 709933 deletions

View File

@@ -30,9 +30,6 @@ common --registry=https://bcr.bazel.build
common --@rules_dotnet//dotnet/settings:strict_deps=false
# we only configure a nightly toolchain
common --@rules_rust//rust/toolchain/channel=nightly
# Reduce this eventually to empty, once we've fixed all our usages of java, and https://github.com/bazel-contrib/rules_go/issues/4193 is fixed
common --incompatible_autoload_externally="+@rules_java,+@rules_shell"

View File

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
When reviewing code:
* do not review changes in files with `.expected` extension (they are automatically ensured to be correct).
* in `.ql` and `.qll` files, do not try to review the code itself as you don't understand the programming language
well enough to make comments in these languages. You can still check for typos or comment improvements.

View File

@@ -6,21 +6,21 @@ on:
ripunzip-version:
description: "what reference to checktout from google/runzip"
required: false
default: v2.0.2
default: v1.2.1
openssl-version:
description: "what reference to checkout from openssl/openssl for Linux"
required: false
default: openssl-3.5.0
default: openssl-3.3.0
jobs:
build:
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
os: [ubuntu-22.04, macos-13, windows-2022]
os: [ubuntu-22.04, macos-13, windows-2019]
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
repository: google/ripunzip
ref: ${{ inputs.ripunzip-version }}
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ jobs:
# see https://github.com/sfackler/rust-openssl/issues/183
- if: runner.os == 'Linux'
name: checkout openssl
uses: actions/checkout@v5
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
repository: openssl/openssl
path: openssl

View File

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v5
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Check bazel formatting
uses: pre-commit/action@646c83fcd040023954eafda54b4db0192ce70507
with:

View File

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ on:
- "shared/**/*.qll"
- "!**/experimental/**"
- "!ql/**"
- "!rust/**"
- ".github/workflows/check-change-note.yml"
jobs:

View File

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ jobs:
check:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Check that implicit this warnings is enabled for all packs
shell: bash
run: |

View File

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
name: Check overlay annotations
on:
push:
branches:
- main
- 'rc/*'
pull_request:
branches:
- main
- 'rc/*'
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
sync:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- name: Check overlay annotations
run: python config/add-overlay-annotations.py --check java

View File

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 2

View File

@@ -19,6 +19,6 @@ jobs:
name: Check query IDs
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Check for duplicate query IDs
run: python3 misc/scripts/check-query-ids.py

34
.github/workflows/codegen.yml vendored Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
name: Codegen
on:
pull_request:
paths:
- "misc/bazel/**"
- "misc/codegen/**"
- "*.bazel*"
- .github/workflows/codegen.yml
- .pre-commit-config.yaml
branches:
- main
- rc/*
- codeql-cli-*
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
codegen:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/setup-python@v4
with:
python-version-file: 'misc/codegen/.python-version'
- uses: pre-commit/action@646c83fcd040023954eafda54b4db0192ce70507
name: Check that python code is properly formatted
with:
extra_args: autopep8 --all-files
- name: Run codegen tests
shell: bash
run: |
bazel test //misc/codegen/...

View File

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ jobs:
dotnet-version: 9.0.100
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v5
uses: actions/checkout@v4
# Initializes the CodeQL tools for scanning.
- name: Initialize CodeQL

View File

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest-xl
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Setup CodeQL
uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
with:

View File

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v5
uses: actions/checkout@v4
# Initializes the CodeQL tools for scanning.
- name: Initialize CodeQL

View File

@@ -36,10 +36,10 @@ jobs:
unit-tests:
strategy:
matrix:
os: [ubuntu-latest, windows-latest]
os: [ubuntu-latest, windows-2019]
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Setup dotnet
uses: actions/setup-dotnet@v4
with:
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ jobs:
stubgentest:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: ./csharp/actions/create-extractor-pack
- name: Run stub generator tests
run: |
@@ -66,6 +66,6 @@ jobs:
# Update existing stubs in the repo with the freshly generated ones
mv "$STUBS_PATH/output/stubs/_frameworks" ql/test/resources/stubs/
git status
codeql test run --threads=0 --search-path "${{ github.workspace }}" --check-databases --check-diff-informed --check-undefined-labels --check-repeated-labels --check-redefined-labels --consistency-queries ql/consistency-queries -- ql/test/library-tests/dataflow/flowsources/aspremote
codeql test run --threads=0 --search-path "${{ github.workspace }}" --check-databases --check-undefined-labels --check-repeated-labels --check-redefined-labels --consistency-queries ql/consistency-queries -- ql/test/library-tests/dataflow/flowsources/aspremote
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}

View File

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v5
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Setup CodeQL
uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
- name: Create empty database
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v5
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Setup CodeQL
uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
- name: Create empty database

View File

@@ -35,11 +35,11 @@ jobs:
GITHUB_CONTEXT: ${{ toJSON(github.event) }}
run: echo "$GITHUB_CONTEXT"
- name: Clone self (github/codeql) - MERGE
uses: actions/checkout@v5
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
path: merge
- name: Clone self (github/codeql) - BASE
uses: actions/checkout@v5
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 2
path: base

View File

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ jobs:
GITHUB_CONTEXT: ${{ toJSON(github.event) }}
run: echo "$GITHUB_CONTEXT"
- name: Clone self (github/codeql)
uses: actions/checkout@v5
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Set up Python 3.8
uses: actions/setup-python@v4
with:

View File

@@ -12,11 +12,11 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Clone self (github/codeql)
uses: actions/checkout@v5
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
path: script
- name: Clone self (github/codeql) for analysis
uses: actions/checkout@v5
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
path: codeqlModels
fetch-depth: 0

View File

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ jobs:
GITHUB_CONTEXT: ${{ toJSON(github.event) }}
run: echo "$GITHUB_CONTEXT"
- name: Clone self (github/codeql)
uses: actions/checkout@v5
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
path: ql
fetch-depth: 0

View File

@@ -16,11 +16,11 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Clone self (github/codeql)
uses: actions/checkout@v5
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
path: script
- name: Clone self (github/codeql) for analysis
uses: actions/checkout@v5
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
path: codeqlModels
ref: ${{ github.event.inputs.qlModelShaOverride || github.ref }}

View File

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ jobs:
exit 1
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v5
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Git config
shell: bash

36
.github/workflows/go-tests-other-os.yml vendored Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
name: "Go: Run Tests - Other OS"
on:
pull_request:
paths:
- "go/**"
- "!go/documentation/**"
- "!go/ql/**" # don't run other-os if only ql/ files changed
- .github/workflows/go-tests-other-os.yml
- .github/actions/**
- codeql-workspace.yml
- MODULE.bazel
- .bazelrc
- misc/bazel/**
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
test-mac:
name: Test MacOS
runs-on: macos-latest
steps:
- name: Check out code
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Run tests
uses: ./go/actions/test
test-win:
if: github.repository_owner == 'github'
name: Test Windows
runs-on: windows-latest-xl
steps:
- name: Check out code
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Run tests
uses: ./go/actions/test

22
.github/workflows/go-tests-rtjo.yml vendored Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
name: "Go: Run RTJO Tests"
on:
pull_request:
types:
- labeled
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
test-linux:
if: "github.repository_owner == 'github' && github.event.label.name == 'Run: RTJO Language Tests'"
name: RTJO Test Linux (Ubuntu)
runs-on: ubuntu-latest-xl
steps:
- name: Check out code
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Run tests
uses: ./go/actions/test
with:
run-code-checks: true
dynamic-join-order-mode: all

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
name: "Go: Run Tests"
on:
pull_request:
push:
paths:
- "go/**"
- "!go/documentation/**"
@@ -8,6 +8,17 @@ on:
- .github/workflows/go-tests.yml
- .github/actions/**
- codeql-workspace.yml
branches:
- main
- "rc/*"
pull_request:
paths:
- "go/**"
- "!go/documentation/**"
- "shared/**"
- .github/workflows/go-tests.yml
- .github/actions/**
- codeql-workspace.yml
- MODULE.bazel
- .bazelrc
- misc/bazel/**
@@ -22,7 +33,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest-xl
steps:
- name: Check out code
uses: actions/checkout@v5
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Run tests
uses: ./go/actions/test
with:

View File

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ jobs:
build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- run: |
bazel query //java/kotlin-extractor/...
# only build the default version as a quick check that we can build from `codeql`

View File

@@ -28,12 +28,12 @@ jobs:
slug: ${{fromJson(github.event.inputs.projects || '["apache/commons-codec", "apache/commons-io", "apache/commons-beanutils", "apache/commons-logging", "apache/commons-fileupload", "apache/commons-lang", "apache/commons-validator", "apache/commons-csv", "apache/dubbo"]' )}}
steps:
- name: Clone github/codeql from PR
uses: actions/checkout@v5
uses: actions/checkout@v4
if: github.event.pull_request
with:
path: codeql-pr
- name: Clone github/codeql from main
uses: actions/checkout@v5
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
path: codeql-main
ref: main
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ jobs:
DATABASE=$2
cd codeql-$QL_VARIANT
SHORTNAME=`basename $DATABASE`
python misc/scripts/models-as-data/generate_mad.py --language java --with-summaries --with-sinks $DATABASE $SHORTNAME/$QL_VARIANT
python java/ql/src/utils/modelgenerator/GenerateFlowModel.py --with-summaries --with-sinks $DATABASE $SHORTNAME/$QL_VARIANT
mkdir -p $MODELS/$SHORTNAME
mv java/ql/lib/ext/generated/$SHORTNAME/$QL_VARIANT $MODELS/$SHORTNAME
cd ..

View File

@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ jobs:
ref: "placeholder"
steps:
- name: Clone self (github/codeql)
uses: actions/checkout@v5
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Setup CodeQL binaries
uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
- name: Clone repositories
uses: actions/checkout@v5
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
path: repos/${{ matrix.ref }}
ref: ${{ matrix.ref }}

View File

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
name: Python tooling
on:
pull_request:
paths:
- "misc/bazel/**"
- "misc/codegen/**"
- "misc/scripts/models-as-data/bulk_generate_mad.py"
- "*.bazel*"
- .github/workflows/codegen.yml
- .pre-commit-config.yaml
branches:
- main
- rc/*
- codeql-cli-*
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
check-python-tooling:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/setup-python@v5
with:
python-version: '3.12'
- uses: pre-commit/action@646c83fcd040023954eafda54b4db0192ce70507
name: Check that python code is properly formatted
with:
extra_args: black --all-files
- name: Run codegen tests
shell: bash
run: |
bazel test //misc/codegen/...

View File

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ jobs:
if-no-files-found: error
retention-days: 1
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 2
persist-credentials: false

View File

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest-xl
steps:
### Build the queries ###
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Find codeql

View File

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ jobs:
- github/codeql
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Find codeql
id: find-codeql
@@ -46,14 +46,14 @@ jobs:
env:
CODEQL: ${{ steps.find-codeql.outputs.codeql-path }}
- name: Checkout ${{ matrix.repo }}
uses: actions/checkout@v5
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
repository: ${{ matrix.repo }}
path: ${{ github.workspace }}/repo
- name: Create database
run: |
"${CODEQL}" database create \
--search-path "${{ github.workspace }}" \
--search-path "${{ github.workspace }}"
--threads 4 \
--language ql --source-root "${{ github.workspace }}/repo" \
"${{ runner.temp }}/database"
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: measure
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
with:
name: measurements

View File

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ jobs:
qltest:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Find codeql
id: find-codeql
uses: github/codeql-action/init@main
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ jobs:
needs: [qltest]
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Install GNU tar
if: runner.os == 'macOS'
run: |

View File

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Clone self (github/codeql)
uses: actions/checkout@v5
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
path: codeql
- name: Set up Python 3.8

View File

@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Install GNU tar
if: runner.os == 'macOS'
run: |
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ jobs:
if: github.repository_owner == 'github'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest-xl
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Fetch CodeQL
uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
- name: Cache compilation cache
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: [build, compile-queries]
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
with:
name: ruby.dbscheme
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
needs: [package]
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Fetch CodeQL
uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql

View File

@@ -30,14 +30,14 @@ jobs:
repo: [rails/rails, discourse/discourse, spree/spree, ruby/ruby]
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
- uses: ./ruby/actions/create-extractor-pack
- name: Checkout ${{ matrix.repo }}
uses: actions/checkout@v5
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
repository: ${{ matrix.repo }}
path: ${{ github.workspace }}/repo
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: measure
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
with:
path: stats

View File

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ jobs:
strategy:
fail-fast: false
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
- uses: ./ruby/actions/create-extractor-pack
- name: Cache compilation cache
@@ -35,6 +35,6 @@ jobs:
key: ruby-qltest
- name: Run QL tests
run: |
codeql test run --dynamic-join-order-mode=all --threads=0 --ram 50000 --search-path "${{ github.workspace }}" --check-databases --check-diff-informed --check-undefined-labels --check-unused-labels --check-repeated-labels --check-redefined-labels --check-use-before-definition --consistency-queries ql/consistency-queries ql/test --compilation-cache "${{ steps.query-cache.outputs.cache-dir }}"
codeql test run --dynamic-join-order-mode=all --threads=0 --ram 50000 --search-path "${{ github.workspace }}" --check-databases --check-undefined-labels --check-unused-labels --check-repeated-labels --check-redefined-labels --check-use-before-definition --consistency-queries ql/consistency-queries ql/test --compilation-cache "${{ steps.query-cache.outputs.cache-dir }}"
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}

View File

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ jobs:
qlupgrade:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
- name: Check DB upgrade scripts
run: |
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ jobs:
strategy:
fail-fast: false
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
- uses: ./ruby/actions/create-extractor-pack
- name: Cache compilation cache
@@ -68,6 +68,6 @@ jobs:
key: ruby-qltest
- name: Run QL tests
run: |
codeql test run --threads=0 --ram 50000 --search-path "${{ github.workspace }}" --check-databases --check-diff-informed --check-undefined-labels --check-unused-labels --check-repeated-labels --check-redefined-labels --check-use-before-definition --consistency-queries ql/consistency-queries ql/test --compilation-cache "${{ steps.query-cache.outputs.cache-dir }}"
codeql test run --threads=0 --ram 50000 --search-path "${{ github.workspace }}" --check-databases --check-undefined-labels --check-unused-labels --check-repeated-labels --check-redefined-labels --check-use-before-definition --consistency-queries ql/consistency-queries ql/test --compilation-cache "${{ steps.query-cache.outputs.cache-dir }}"
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}

View File

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v5
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Query latest nightly CodeQL bundle
shell: bash

View File

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ jobs:
working-directory: rust/ast-generator
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v5
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Inject sources
shell: bash
run: |
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ jobs:
working-directory: rust/extractor
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v5
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Format
shell: bash
run: |
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v5
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Install CodeQL
uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
- name: Code generation

View File

@@ -32,11 +32,11 @@ jobs:
if: github.repository_owner == 'github'
strategy:
matrix:
runner: [ubuntu-latest, macos-15-xlarge]
runner: [ubuntu-latest, macos-13-xlarge]
fail-fast: false
runs-on: ${{ matrix.runner }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Setup (Linux)
if: runner.os == 'Linux'
run: |
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ jobs:
clang-format:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: pre-commit/action@646c83fcd040023954eafda54b4db0192ce70507
name: Check that python code is properly formatted
with:
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ jobs:
codegen:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
- uses: pre-commit/action@646c83fcd040023954eafda54b4db0192ce70507
name: Check that QL generated code was checked in
@@ -77,6 +77,6 @@ jobs:
check-no-override:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Check that no override is present in load.bzl
run: bazel test ... --test_tag_filters=override --test_output=errors

View File

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ jobs:
sync:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Check synchronized files
run: python config/sync-files.py
- name: Check dbscheme fragments

View File

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ jobs:
test:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Check formatting
run: cargo fmt -- --check
- name: Run tests
@@ -38,12 +38,12 @@ jobs:
fmt:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Check formatting
run: cargo fmt --check
clippy:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Run clippy
run: cargo clippy -- --no-deps -D warnings -A clippy::new_without_default -A clippy::too_many_arguments

View File

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v5
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Setup CodeQL
uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
@@ -31,4 +31,4 @@ jobs:
- name: Fail if there are any errors with existing change notes
run: |
codeql pack release --groups actions,cpp,csharp,go,java,javascript,python,ruby,shared,swift -examples,-test,-experimental
codeql pack release --groups cpp,csharp,java,javascript,python,ruby,-examples,-test,-experimental

View File

@@ -18,6 +18,6 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- run: |
bazel test //misc/bazel/internal/zipmerge:test --test_output=all

5
.gitignore vendored
View File

@@ -62,7 +62,6 @@ node_modules/
# Temporary folders for working with generated models
.model-temp
/mad-generation-build
# bazel-built in-tree extractor packs
/*/extractor-pack
@@ -72,7 +71,3 @@ node_modules/
# cargo build directory
/target
# some upgrade/downgrade checks create these files
**/upgrades/*/*.dbscheme.stats
**/downgrades/*/*.dbscheme.stats

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
# See https://pre-commit.com for more information
# See https://pre-commit.com/hooks.html for more hooks
default_language_version:
python: python3.12
repos:
- repo: https://github.com/pre-commit/pre-commit-hooks
rev: v3.2.0
@@ -9,18 +7,18 @@ repos:
- id: trailing-whitespace
exclude: /test/.*$(?<!\.qlref)|.*\.patch$|.*\.qll?$
- id: end-of-file-fixer
exclude: Cargo.lock$|/test/.*$(?<!\.qlref)|.*\.patch$|.*\.qll?$
exclude: /test/.*$(?<!\.qlref)|.*\.patch$|.*\.qll?$
- repo: https://github.com/pre-commit/mirrors-clang-format
rev: v17.0.6
hooks:
- id: clang-format
- repo: https://github.com/psf/black
rev: 25.1.0
- repo: https://github.com/pre-commit/mirrors-autopep8
rev: v2.0.4
hooks:
- id: black
files: ^(misc/codegen/.*|misc/scripts/models-as-data/.*)\.py$
- id: autopep8
files: ^misc/codegen/.*\.py
- repo: local
hooks:

View File

@@ -16,8 +16,7 @@
/java/ql/test-kotlin2/ @github/codeql-kotlin
# Experimental CodeQL cryptography
**/experimental/**/quantum/ @github/ps-codeql
/shared/quantum/ @github/ps-codeql
**/experimental/quantum/ @github/ps-codeql
# CodeQL tools and associated docs
/docs/codeql/codeql-cli/ @github/codeql-cli-reviewers

1362
Cargo.lock generated

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -10,4 +10,8 @@ members = [
"rust/ast-generator",
"rust/autobuild",
]
exclude = ["mad-generation-build"]
[patch.crates-io]
# patch for build script bug preventing bazel build
# see https://github.com/rust-lang/rustc_apfloat/pull/17
rustc_apfloat = { git = "https://github.com/redsun82/rustc_apfloat.git", rev = "32968f16ef1b082243f9bf43a3fbd65c381b3e27" }

View File

@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ local_path_override(
# see https://registry.bazel.build/ for a list of available packages
bazel_dep(name = "platforms", version = "1.0.0")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_go", version = "0.56.1")
bazel_dep(name = "platforms", version = "0.0.11")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_go", version = "0.50.1")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_pkg", version = "1.0.1")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_nodejs", version = "6.2.0-codeql.1")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_python", version = "0.40.0")
@@ -24,11 +24,11 @@ bazel_dep(name = "bazel_skylib", version = "1.7.1")
bazel_dep(name = "abseil-cpp", version = "20240116.1", repo_name = "absl")
bazel_dep(name = "nlohmann_json", version = "3.11.3", repo_name = "json")
bazel_dep(name = "fmt", version = "10.0.0")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_kotlin", version = "2.1.3-codeql.1")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_kotlin", version = "2.0.0-codeql.1")
bazel_dep(name = "gazelle", version = "0.40.0")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_dotnet", version = "0.17.4")
bazel_dep(name = "googletest", version = "1.14.0.bcr.1")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_rust", version = "0.63.0")
bazel_dep(name = "rules_rust", version = "0.58.0")
bazel_dep(name = "zstd", version = "1.5.5.bcr.1")
bazel_dep(name = "buildifier_prebuilt", version = "6.4.0", dev_dependency = True)
@@ -37,11 +37,7 @@ bazel_dep(name = "buildifier_prebuilt", version = "6.4.0", dev_dependency = True
# the versions there are canonical, the versions here are used for CI in github/codeql, as well as for the vendoring of dependencies.
RUST_EDITION = "2024"
# run buildutils-internal/scripts/fill-rust-sha256s.py when updating (internal repo)
# a nightly toolchain is required to enable experimental_use_cc_common_link, which we require internally
# we prefer to run the same version as internally, even if experimental_use_cc_common_link is not really
# required in this repo
RUST_VERSION = "nightly/2025-08-01"
RUST_VERSION = "1.85.0"
rust = use_extension("@rules_rust//rust:extensions.bzl", "rust")
rust.toolchain(
@@ -51,29 +47,6 @@ rust.toolchain(
"x86_64-apple-darwin",
"aarch64-apple-darwin",
],
# generated by buildutils-internal/scripts/fill-rust-sha256s.py (internal repo)
sha256s = {
"2025-08-01/rustc-nightly-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.xz": "9bbeaf5d3fc7247d31463a9083aa251c995cc50662c8219e7a2254d76a72a9a4",
"2025-08-01/rustc-nightly-x86_64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "c9ea539a8eff0d5d162701f99f9e1aabe14dd0dfb420d62362817a5d09219de7",
"2025-08-01/rustc-nightly-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "ae83feebbc39cfd982e4ecc8297731fe79c185173aee138467b334c5404b3773",
"2025-08-01/rustc-nightly-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.tar.xz": "9f170c30d802a349be60cf52ec46260802093cb1013ad667fc0d528b7b10152f",
"2025-08-01/clippy-nightly-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.xz": "9ae5f3cd8f557c4f6df522597c69d14398cf604cfaed2b83e767c4b77a7eaaf6",
"2025-08-01/clippy-nightly-x86_64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "983cb9ee0b6b968188e04ab2d33743d54764b2681ce565e1b3f2b9135c696a3e",
"2025-08-01/clippy-nightly-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "ed2219dbc49d088225e1b7c5c4390fa295066e071fddaa2714018f6bb39ddbf0",
"2025-08-01/clippy-nightly-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.tar.xz": "911f40ab5cbdd686f40e00965271fe47c4805513a308ed01f30eafb25b448a50",
"2025-08-01/cargo-nightly-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.xz": "106463c284e48e4904c717471eeec2be5cc83a9d2cae8d6e948b52438cad2e69",
"2025-08-01/cargo-nightly-x86_64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "6ad35c40efc41a8c531ea43235058347b6902d98a9693bf0aed7fc16d5590cef",
"2025-08-01/cargo-nightly-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "dd28c365e9d298abc3154c797720ad36a0058f131265c9978b4c8e4e37012c8a",
"2025-08-01/cargo-nightly-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.tar.xz": "7b431286e12d6b3834b038f078389a00cac73f351e8c3152b2504a3c06420b3b",
"2025-08-01/llvm-tools-nightly-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.xz": "e342e305d7927cc288d386983b2bc253cfad3776b113386e903d0b302648ef47",
"2025-08-01/llvm-tools-nightly-x86_64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "e44dd3506524d85c37b3a54bcc91d01378fd2c590b2db5c5974d12f05c1b84d1",
"2025-08-01/llvm-tools-nightly-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "0c1b5f46dd81be4a9227b10283a0fcaa39c14fea7e81aea6fd6d9887ff6cdc41",
"2025-08-01/llvm-tools-nightly-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.tar.xz": "423e5fd11406adccbc31b8456ceb7375ce055cdf45e90d2c3babeb2d7f58383f",
"2025-08-01/rust-std-nightly-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.xz": "3c0ceb46a252647a1d4c7116d9ccae684fa5e42aaf3296419febd2c962c3b41d",
"2025-08-01/rust-std-nightly-x86_64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "3be416003cab10f767390a753d1d16ae4d26c7421c03c98992cf1943e5b0efe8",
"2025-08-01/rust-std-nightly-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "4046ac0ef951cb056b5028a399124f60999fa37792eab69d008d8d7965f389b4",
"2025-08-01/rust-std-nightly-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.tar.xz": "191ed9d8603c3a4fe5a7bbbc2feb72049078dae2df3d3b7d5dedf3abbf823e6e",
},
versions = [RUST_VERSION],
)
use_repo(rust, "rust_toolchains")
@@ -98,49 +71,49 @@ use_repo(
tree_sitter_extractors_deps = use_extension("//misc/bazel/3rdparty:tree_sitter_extractors_extension.bzl", "r")
use_repo(
tree_sitter_extractors_deps,
"vendor_ts__anyhow-1.0.99",
"vendor_ts__anyhow-1.0.97",
"vendor_ts__argfile-0.2.1",
"vendor_ts__chalk-ir-0.104.0",
"vendor_ts__chrono-0.4.41",
"vendor_ts__clap-4.5.44",
"vendor_ts__chalk-ir-0.100.0",
"vendor_ts__chrono-0.4.40",
"vendor_ts__clap-4.5.35",
"vendor_ts__dunce-1.0.5",
"vendor_ts__either-1.15.0",
"vendor_ts__encoding-0.2.33",
"vendor_ts__figment-0.10.19",
"vendor_ts__flate2-1.1.0",
"vendor_ts__glob-0.3.3",
"vendor_ts__glob-0.3.2",
"vendor_ts__globset-0.4.15",
"vendor_ts__itertools-0.14.0",
"vendor_ts__lazy_static-1.5.0",
"vendor_ts__mustache-0.9.0",
"vendor_ts__num-traits-0.2.19",
"vendor_ts__num_cpus-1.17.0",
"vendor_ts__proc-macro2-1.0.97",
"vendor_ts__num_cpus-1.16.0",
"vendor_ts__proc-macro2-1.0.94",
"vendor_ts__quote-1.0.40",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_base_db-0.0.300",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_cfg-0.0.300",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_hir-0.0.300",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_hir_def-0.0.300",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_hir_expand-0.0.300",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_hir_ty-0.0.300",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_ide_db-0.0.300",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_intern-0.0.300",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_load-cargo-0.0.300",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_parser-0.0.300",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_paths-0.0.300",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_project_model-0.0.300",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_span-0.0.300",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_stdx-0.0.300",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_syntax-0.0.300",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_vfs-0.0.300",
"vendor_ts__rand-0.9.2",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_base_db-0.0.273",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_cfg-0.0.273",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_hir-0.0.273",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_hir_def-0.0.273",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_hir_expand-0.0.273",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_hir_ty-0.0.273",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_ide_db-0.0.273",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_intern-0.0.273",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_load-cargo-0.0.273",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_parser-0.0.273",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_paths-0.0.273",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_project_model-0.0.273",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_span-0.0.273",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_stdx-0.0.273",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_syntax-0.0.273",
"vendor_ts__ra_ap_vfs-0.0.273",
"vendor_ts__rand-0.9.0",
"vendor_ts__rayon-1.10.0",
"vendor_ts__regex-1.11.1",
"vendor_ts__serde-1.0.219",
"vendor_ts__serde_json-1.0.142",
"vendor_ts__serde_with-3.14.0",
"vendor_ts__syn-2.0.104",
"vendor_ts__toml-0.9.5",
"vendor_ts__serde_json-1.0.140",
"vendor_ts__serde_with-3.12.0",
"vendor_ts__syn-2.0.100",
"vendor_ts__toml-0.8.20",
"vendor_ts__tracing-0.1.41",
"vendor_ts__tracing-flame-0.2.0",
"vendor_ts__tracing-subscriber-0.3.19",
@@ -151,7 +124,6 @@ use_repo(
"vendor_ts__tree-sitter-ruby-0.23.1",
"vendor_ts__triomphe-0.1.14",
"vendor_ts__ungrammar-1.16.1",
"vendor_ts__zstd-0.13.3",
)
http_archive = use_repo_rule("@bazel_tools//tools/build_defs/repo:http.bzl", "http_archive")
@@ -221,6 +193,10 @@ use_repo(
kotlin_extractor_deps,
"codeql_kotlin_defaults",
"codeql_kotlin_embeddable",
"kotlin-compiler-1.5.0",
"kotlin-compiler-1.5.10",
"kotlin-compiler-1.5.20",
"kotlin-compiler-1.5.30",
"kotlin-compiler-1.6.0",
"kotlin-compiler-1.6.20",
"kotlin-compiler-1.7.0",
@@ -232,8 +208,10 @@ use_repo(
"kotlin-compiler-2.0.20-Beta2",
"kotlin-compiler-2.1.0-Beta1",
"kotlin-compiler-2.1.20-Beta1",
"kotlin-compiler-2.2.0-Beta1",
"kotlin-compiler-2.2.20-Beta2",
"kotlin-compiler-embeddable-1.5.0",
"kotlin-compiler-embeddable-1.5.10",
"kotlin-compiler-embeddable-1.5.20",
"kotlin-compiler-embeddable-1.5.30",
"kotlin-compiler-embeddable-1.6.0",
"kotlin-compiler-embeddable-1.6.20",
"kotlin-compiler-embeddable-1.7.0",
@@ -245,8 +223,10 @@ use_repo(
"kotlin-compiler-embeddable-2.0.20-Beta2",
"kotlin-compiler-embeddable-2.1.0-Beta1",
"kotlin-compiler-embeddable-2.1.20-Beta1",
"kotlin-compiler-embeddable-2.2.0-Beta1",
"kotlin-compiler-embeddable-2.2.20-Beta2",
"kotlin-stdlib-1.5.0",
"kotlin-stdlib-1.5.10",
"kotlin-stdlib-1.5.20",
"kotlin-stdlib-1.5.30",
"kotlin-stdlib-1.6.0",
"kotlin-stdlib-1.6.20",
"kotlin-stdlib-1.7.0",
@@ -258,35 +238,33 @@ use_repo(
"kotlin-stdlib-2.0.20-Beta2",
"kotlin-stdlib-2.1.0-Beta1",
"kotlin-stdlib-2.1.20-Beta1",
"kotlin-stdlib-2.2.0-Beta1",
"kotlin-stdlib-2.2.20-Beta2",
)
go_sdk = use_extension("@rules_go//go:extensions.bzl", "go_sdk")
go_sdk.download(version = "1.25.0")
go_sdk.download(version = "1.24.0")
go_deps = use_extension("@gazelle//:extensions.bzl", "go_deps")
go_deps.from_file(go_mod = "//go/extractor:go.mod")
use_repo(go_deps, "org_golang_x_mod", "org_golang_x_tools")
lfs_archive = use_repo_rule("//misc/bazel:lfs.bzl", "lfs_archive")
lfs_files = use_repo_rule("//misc/bazel:lfs.bzl", "lfs_files")
lfs_archive(
lfs_files(
name = "ripunzip-linux",
src = "//misc/ripunzip:ripunzip-Linux.zip",
build_file = "//misc/ripunzip:BUILD.ripunzip.bazel",
srcs = ["//misc/ripunzip:ripunzip-linux"],
executable = True,
)
lfs_archive(
lfs_files(
name = "ripunzip-windows",
src = "//misc/ripunzip:ripunzip-Windows.zip",
build_file = "//misc/ripunzip:BUILD.ripunzip.bazel",
srcs = ["//misc/ripunzip:ripunzip-windows.exe"],
executable = True,
)
lfs_archive(
lfs_files(
name = "ripunzip-macos",
src = "//misc/ripunzip:ripunzip-macOS.zip",
build_file = "//misc/ripunzip:BUILD.ripunzip.bazel",
srcs = ["//misc/ripunzip:ripunzip-macos"],
executable = True,
)
register_toolchains(

View File

@@ -6,8 +6,6 @@ column_kind: "utf16"
unicode_newlines: true
build_modes:
- none
default_queries:
- codeql/actions-queries
file_coverage_languages: []
github_api_languages: []
scc_languages: []

View File

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionCritical.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvVarInjectionCritical.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionCritical.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-1395/UseOfKnownVulnerableAction.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-275/MissingActionsPermissions.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-285/ImproperAccessControl.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-312/ExcessiveSecretsExposure.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-312/SecretsInArtifacts.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-312/UnmaskedSecretExposure.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaCodeInjection.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaDirectCache.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaPoisonableStep.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-367/UntrustedCheckoutTOCTOUCritical.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-367/UntrustedCheckoutTOCTOUHigh.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/ArtifactPoisoningCritical.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.ql

View File

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
ql/actions/ql/src/Debug/SyntaxError.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionCritical.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionMedium.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvVarInjectionCritical.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvVarInjectionMedium.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionCritical.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionMedium.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-1395/UseOfKnownVulnerableAction.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-275/MissingActionsPermissions.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-285/ImproperAccessControl.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-312/ExcessiveSecretsExposure.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-312/SecretsInArtifacts.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-312/UnmaskedSecretExposure.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaCodeInjection.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaDirectCache.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaPoisonableStep.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-367/UntrustedCheckoutTOCTOUCritical.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-367/UntrustedCheckoutTOCTOUHigh.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-571/ExpressionIsAlwaysTrueCritical.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-571/ExpressionIsAlwaysTrueHigh.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/ArtifactPoisoningCritical.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/ArtifactPoisoningMedium.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UnpinnedActionsTag.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutMedium.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Violations Of Best Practice/CodeQL/UnnecessaryUseOfAdvancedConfig.ql

View File

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionCritical.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionMedium.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvVarInjectionCritical.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvVarInjectionMedium.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionCritical.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionMedium.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-1395/UseOfKnownVulnerableAction.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-275/MissingActionsPermissions.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-285/ImproperAccessControl.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-312/ExcessiveSecretsExposure.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-312/SecretsInArtifacts.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-312/UnmaskedSecretExposure.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaCodeInjection.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaDirectCache.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaPoisonableStep.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-367/UntrustedCheckoutTOCTOUCritical.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-367/UntrustedCheckoutTOCTOUHigh.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/ArtifactPoisoningCritical.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/ArtifactPoisoningMedium.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UnpinnedActionsTag.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutMedium.ql

View File

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
ql/actions/ql/src/Debug/partial.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Models/CompositeActionsSinks.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Models/CompositeActionsSources.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Models/CompositeActionsSummaries.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Models/ReusableWorkflowsSinks.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Models/ReusableWorkflowsSources.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/Models/ReusableWorkflowsSummaries.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/experimental/Security/CWE-074/OutputClobberingHigh.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/experimental/Security/CWE-078/CommandInjectionCritical.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/experimental/Security/CWE-078/CommandInjectionMedium.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/experimental/Security/CWE-088/ArgumentInjectionCritical.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/experimental/Security/CWE-088/ArgumentInjectionMedium.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/experimental/Security/CWE-200/SecretExfiltration.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/experimental/Security/CWE-284/CodeExecutionOnSelfHostedRunner.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/experimental/Security/CWE-829/ArtifactPoisoningPathTraversal.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/experimental/Security/CWE-829/UnversionedImmutableAction.ql
ql/actions/ql/src/experimental/Security/CWE-918/RequestForgery.ql

View File

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
import runs_on
import pytest
from query_suites import *
well_known_query_suites = ['actions-code-quality.qls', 'actions-code-quality-extended.qls', 'actions-security-and-quality.qls', 'actions-security-extended.qls', 'actions-code-scanning.qls']
@runs_on.posix
@pytest.mark.parametrize("query_suite", well_known_query_suites)
def test(codeql, actions, check_query_suite, query_suite):
check_query_suite(query_suite)
@runs_on.posix
def test_not_included_queries(codeql, actions, check_queries_not_included):
check_queries_not_included('actions', well_known_query_suites)

View File

@@ -1,50 +1,6 @@
## 0.4.16
No user-facing changes.
## 0.4.15
No user-facing changes.
## 0.4.14
No user-facing changes.
## 0.4.13
### Bug Fixes
* The `actions/artifact-poisoning/critical` and `actions/artifact-poisoning/medium` queries now exclude artifacts downloaded to `$[{ runner.temp }}` in addition to `/tmp`.
## 0.4.12
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Fixed performance issues in the parsing of Bash scripts in workflow files,
which led to out-of-disk errors when analysing certain workflow files with
complex interpolations of shell commands or quoted strings.
## 0.4.11
No user-facing changes.
## 0.4.10
No user-facing changes.
## 0.4.9
No user-facing changes.
## 0.4.8
No user-facing changes.
## 0.4.7
### New Features
* CodeQL and Copilot Autofix support for GitHub Actions is now Generally Available.
No user-facing changes.
## 0.4.6

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.4.10
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.4.11
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
## 0.4.12
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* Fixed performance issues in the parsing of Bash scripts in workflow files,
which led to out-of-disk errors when analysing certain workflow files with
complex interpolations of shell commands or quoted strings.

View File

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
## 0.4.13
### Bug Fixes
* The `actions/artifact-poisoning/critical` and `actions/artifact-poisoning/medium` queries now exclude artifacts downloaded to `$[{ runner.temp }}` in addition to `/tmp`.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.4.14
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.4.15
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.4.16
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
## 0.4.7
### New Features
* CodeQL and Copilot Autofix support for GitHub Actions is now Generally Available.
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.4.8
No user-facing changes.

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@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
## 0.4.9
No user-facing changes.

View File

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
---
lastReleaseVersion: 0.4.16
lastReleaseVersion: 0.4.7

View File

@@ -50,8 +50,8 @@ class Expression extends AstNode instanceof ExpressionImpl {
string getNormalizedExpression() { result = normalizeExpr(expression) }
}
/** An `env` in workflow, job or step. */
class Env extends AstNode instanceof EnvImpl {
/** A common class for `env` in workflow, job or step. */
abstract class Env extends AstNode instanceof EnvImpl {
/** Gets an environment variable value given its name. */
ScalarValueImpl getEnvVarValue(string name) { result = super.getEnvVarValue(name) }

View File

@@ -8,64 +8,35 @@ class BashShellScript extends ShellScript {
)
}
/**
* Gets the line at 0-based index `lineIndex` within this shell script,
* assuming newlines as separators.
*/
private string lineProducer(int lineIndex) {
result = this.getRawScript().regexpReplaceAll("\\\\\\s*\n", "").splitAt("\n", lineIndex)
private string lineProducer(int i) {
result = this.getRawScript().regexpReplaceAll("\\\\\\s*\n", "").splitAt("\n", i)
}
private predicate cmdSubstitutionReplacement(string command, string id, int lineIndex) {
this.commandInSubstitution(lineIndex, command, id)
or
this.commandInBackticks(lineIndex, command, id)
}
/**
* Holds if there is a command substitution `$(command)` in
* the line at `lineIndex` in the shell script,
* and `id` is a unique identifier for this command.
*/
private predicate commandInSubstitution(int lineIndex, string command, string id) {
exists(int occurrenceIndex, int occurrenceOffset |
command =
// Look for the command inside a $(...) command substitution
this.lineProducer(lineIndex)
.regexpFind("\\$\\((?:[^()]+|\\((?:[^()]+|\\([^()]*\\))*\\))*\\)", occurrenceIndex,
occurrenceOffset)
// trim starting $( - TODO do this in first regex
.regexpReplaceAll("^\\$\\(", "")
// trim ending ) - TODO do this in first regex
.regexpReplaceAll("\\)$", "") and
id = "cmdsubs:" + lineIndex + ":" + occurrenceIndex + ":" + occurrenceOffset
private predicate cmdSubstitutionReplacement(string cmdSubs, string id, int k) {
exists(string line | line = this.lineProducer(k) |
exists(int i, int j |
cmdSubs =
// $() cmd substitution
line.regexpFind("\\$\\((?:[^()]+|\\((?:[^()]+|\\([^()]*\\))*\\))*\\)", i, j)
.regexpReplaceAll("^\\$\\(", "")
.regexpReplaceAll("\\)$", "") and
id = "cmdsubs:" + k + ":" + i + ":" + j
)
or
exists(int i, int j |
// `...` cmd substitution
cmdSubs =
line.regexpFind("\\`[^\\`]+\\`", i, j)
.regexpReplaceAll("^\\`", "")
.regexpReplaceAll("\\`$", "") and
id = "cmd:" + k + ":" + i + ":" + j
)
)
}
/**
* Holds if `command` is a command in backticks `` `...` `` in
* the line at `lineIndex` in the shell script,
* and `id` is a unique identifier for this command.
*/
private predicate commandInBackticks(int lineIndex, string command, string id) {
exists(int occurrenceIndex, int occurrenceOffset |
command =
this.lineProducer(lineIndex)
.regexpFind("\\`[^\\`]+\\`", occurrenceIndex, occurrenceOffset)
// trim leading backtick - TODO do this in first regex
.regexpReplaceAll("^\\`", "")
// trim trailing backtick - TODO do this in first regex
.regexpReplaceAll("\\`$", "") and
id = "cmd:" + lineIndex + ":" + occurrenceIndex + ":" + occurrenceOffset
)
}
private predicate rankedCmdSubstitutionReplacements(int i, string command, string commandId) {
// rank commands by their unique IDs
commandId = rank[i](string c, string id | this.cmdSubstitutionReplacement(c, id, _) | id) and
// since we cannot output (command, ID) tuples from the rank operation,
// we need to work out the specific command associated with the resulting ID
this.cmdSubstitutionReplacement(command, commandId, _)
private predicate rankedCmdSubstitutionReplacements(int i, string old, string new) {
old = rank[i](string old2 | this.cmdSubstitutionReplacement(old2, _, _) | old2) and
this.cmdSubstitutionReplacement(old, new, _)
}
private predicate doReplaceCmdSubstitutions(int line, int round, string old, string new) {
@@ -93,56 +64,31 @@ class BashShellScript extends ShellScript {
this.cmdSubstitutionReplacement(result, _, i)
}
/**
* Holds if `quotedStr` is a string in double quotes in
* the line at `lineIndex` in the shell script,
* and `id` is a unique identifier for this quoted string.
*/
private predicate doubleQuotedString(int lineIndex, string quotedStr, string id) {
exists(int occurrenceIndex, int occurrenceOffset |
// double quoted string
quotedStr =
this.cmdSubstitutedLineProducer(lineIndex)
.regexpFind("\"((?:[^\"\\\\]|\\\\.)*)\"", occurrenceIndex, occurrenceOffset) and
id =
"qstr:" + lineIndex + ":" + occurrenceIndex + ":" + occurrenceOffset + ":" +
quotedStr.length() + ":" + quotedStr.regexpReplaceAll("[^a-zA-Z0-9]", "")
)
}
/**
* Holds if `quotedStr` is a string in single quotes in
* the line at `lineIndex` in the shell script,
* and `id` is a unique identifier for this quoted string.
*/
private predicate singleQuotedString(int lineIndex, string quotedStr, string id) {
exists(int occurrenceIndex, int occurrenceOffset |
// single quoted string
quotedStr =
this.cmdSubstitutedLineProducer(lineIndex)
.regexpFind("'((?:\\\\.|[^'\\\\])*)'", occurrenceIndex, occurrenceOffset) and
id =
"qstr:" + lineIndex + ":" + occurrenceIndex + ":" + occurrenceOffset + ":" +
quotedStr.length() + ":" + quotedStr.regexpReplaceAll("[^a-zA-Z0-9]", "")
)
}
private predicate quotedStringReplacement(string quotedStr, string id) {
exists(int lineIndex |
this.doubleQuotedString(lineIndex, quotedStr, id)
exists(string line, int k | line = this.cmdSubstitutedLineProducer(k) |
exists(int i, int j |
// double quoted string
quotedStr = line.regexpFind("\"((?:[^\"\\\\]|\\\\.)*)\"", i, j) and
id =
"qstr:" + k + ":" + i + ":" + j + ":" + quotedStr.length() + ":" +
quotedStr.regexpReplaceAll("[^a-zA-Z0-9]", "")
)
or
this.singleQuotedString(lineIndex, quotedStr, id)
exists(int i, int j |
// single quoted string
quotedStr = line.regexpFind("'((?:\\\\.|[^'\\\\])*)'", i, j) and
id =
"qstr:" + k + ":" + i + ":" + j + ":" + quotedStr.length() + ":" +
quotedStr.regexpReplaceAll("[^a-zA-Z0-9]", "")
)
) and
// Only do this for strings that might otherwise disrupt subsequent parsing
quotedStr.regexpMatch("[\"'].*[$\n\r'\"" + Bash::separator() + "].*[\"']")
}
private predicate rankedQuotedStringReplacements(int i, string quotedString, string quotedStringId) {
// rank quoted strings by their nearly-unique IDs
quotedStringId = rank[i](string s, string id | this.quotedStringReplacement(s, id) | id) and
// since we cannot output (string, ID) tuples from the rank operation,
// we need to work out the specific string associated with the resulting ID
this.quotedStringReplacement(quotedString, quotedStringId)
private predicate rankedQuotedStringReplacements(int i, string old, string new) {
old = rank[i](string old2 | this.quotedStringReplacement(old2, _) | old2) and
this.quotedStringReplacement(old, new)
}
private predicate doReplaceQuotedStrings(int line, int round, string old, string new) {

View File

@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ string normalizePath(string path) {
then result = path
else
// foo -> GITHUB_WORKSPACE/foo
if path.regexpMatch("^[^$/~].*")
if path.regexpMatch("^[^/~].*")
then result = "GITHUB_WORKSPACE/" + path.regexpReplaceAll("/$", "")
else
// ~/foo -> ~/foo

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
private import actions
private import codeql.actions.TaintTracking
private import codeql.actions.dataflow.ExternalFlow
private import codeql.actions.security.ControlChecks
import codeql.actions.dataflow.FlowSources
import codeql.actions.DataFlow
@@ -66,16 +65,6 @@ class ArgumentInjectionFromMaDSink extends ArgumentInjectionSink {
override string getCommand() { result = "unknown" }
}
/**
* Gets the event that is relevant for the given node in the context of argument injection.
*
* This is used to highlight the event in the query results when an alert is raised.
*/
Event getRelevantEventInPrivilegedContext(DataFlow::Node node) {
inPrivilegedContext(node.asExpr(), result) and
not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(node.asExpr(), result, "argument-injection"))
}
/**
* A taint-tracking configuration for unsafe user input
* that is used to construct and evaluate a code script.
@@ -99,16 +88,6 @@ private module ArgumentInjectionConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
run.getScript().getAnEnvReachingArgumentInjectionSink(var, _, _)
)
}
predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node source) { none() }
Location getASelectedSinkLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) {
result = sink.getLocation()
or
result = getRelevantEventInPrivilegedContext(sink).getLocation()
}
}
/** Tracks flow of unsafe user input that is used to construct and evaluate a code script. */

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import codeql.actions.DataFlow
import codeql.actions.dataflow.FlowSources
import codeql.actions.security.PoisonableSteps
import codeql.actions.security.UntrustedCheckoutQuery
import codeql.actions.security.ControlChecks
string unzipRegexp() { result = "(unzip|tar)\\s+.*" }
@@ -263,10 +262,8 @@ class ArtifactPoisoningSink extends DataFlow::Node {
ArtifactPoisoningSink() {
download.getAFollowingStep() = poisonable and
// excluding artifacts downloaded to the temporary directory
// excluding artifacts downloaded to /tmp
not download.getPath().regexpMatch("^/tmp.*") and
not download.getPath().regexpMatch("^\\$\\{\\{\\s*runner\\.temp\\s*}}.*") and
not download.getPath().regexpMatch("^\\$RUNNER_TEMP.*") and
(
poisonable.(Run).getScript() = this.asExpr() and
(
@@ -293,16 +290,6 @@ class ArtifactPoisoningSink extends DataFlow::Node {
string getPath() { result = download.getPath() }
}
/**
* Gets the event that is relevant for the given node in the context of artifact poisoning.
*
* This is used to highlight the event in the query results when an alert is raised.
*/
Event getRelevantEventInPrivilegedContext(DataFlow::Node node) {
inPrivilegedContext(node.asExpr(), result) and
not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(node.asExpr(), result, "artifact-poisoning"))
}
/**
* A taint-tracking configuration for unsafe artifacts
* that is used may lead to artifact poisoning
@@ -329,16 +316,6 @@ private module ArtifactPoisoningConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
exists(run.getScript().getAFileReadCommand())
)
}
predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node source) { none() }
Location getASelectedSinkLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) {
result = sink.getLocation()
or
result = getRelevantEventInPrivilegedContext(sink).getLocation()
}
}
/** Tracks flow of unsafe artifacts that is used in an insecure way. */

View File

@@ -3,8 +3,6 @@ private import codeql.actions.TaintTracking
private import codeql.actions.dataflow.ExternalFlow
import codeql.actions.dataflow.FlowSources
import codeql.actions.DataFlow
import codeql.actions.security.ControlChecks
import codeql.actions.security.CachePoisoningQuery
class CodeInjectionSink extends DataFlow::Node {
CodeInjectionSink() {
@@ -13,46 +11,6 @@ class CodeInjectionSink extends DataFlow::Node {
}
}
/**
* Get the relevant event for the sink in CodeInjectionCritical.ql.
*/
Event getRelevantCriticalEventForSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
inPrivilegedContext(sink.asExpr(), result) and
not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(sink.asExpr(), result, "code-injection")) and
// exclude cases where the sink is a JS script and the expression uses toJson
not exists(UsesStep script |
script.getCallee() = "actions/github-script" and
script.getArgumentExpr("script") = sink.asExpr() and
exists(getAToJsonReferenceExpression(sink.asExpr().(Expression).getExpression(), _))
)
}
/**
* Get the relevant event for the sink in CachePoisoningViaCodeInjection.ql.
*/
Event getRelevantCachePoisoningEventForSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
exists(LocalJob job |
job = sink.asExpr().getEnclosingJob() and
job.getATriggerEvent() = result and
// job can be triggered by an external user
result.isExternallyTriggerable() and
// excluding privileged workflows since they can be exploited in easier circumstances
// which is covered by `actions/code-injection/critical`
not job.isPrivilegedExternallyTriggerable(result) and
(
// the workflow runs in the context of the default branch
runsOnDefaultBranch(result)
or
// the workflow caller runs in the context of the default branch
result.getName() = "workflow_call" and
exists(ExternalJob caller |
caller.getCallee() = job.getLocation().getFile().getRelativePath() and
runsOnDefaultBranch(caller.getATriggerEvent())
)
)
)
}
/**
* A taint-tracking configuration for unsafe user input
* that is used to construct and evaluate a code script.
@@ -77,18 +35,6 @@ private module CodeInjectionConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
exists(run.getScript().getAFileReadCommand())
)
}
predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node source) { none() }
Location getASelectedSinkLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) {
result = sink.getLocation()
or
result = getRelevantCriticalEventForSink(sink).getLocation()
or
result = getRelevantCachePoisoningEventForSink(sink).getLocation()
}
}
/** Tracks flow of unsafe user input that is used to construct and evaluate a code script. */

View File

@@ -3,20 +3,11 @@ private import codeql.actions.TaintTracking
private import codeql.actions.dataflow.ExternalFlow
import codeql.actions.dataflow.FlowSources
import codeql.actions.DataFlow
import codeql.actions.security.ControlChecks
private class CommandInjectionSink extends DataFlow::Node {
CommandInjectionSink() { madSink(this, "command-injection") }
}
/** Get the relevant event for the sink in CommandInjectionCritical.ql. */
Event getRelevantEventInPrivilegedContext(DataFlow::Node sink) {
inPrivilegedContext(sink.asExpr(), result) and
not exists(ControlCheck check |
check.protects(sink.asExpr(), result, ["command-injection", "code-injection"])
)
}
/**
* A taint-tracking configuration for unsafe user input
* that is used to construct and evaluate a system command.
@@ -25,16 +16,6 @@ private module CommandInjectionConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof CommandInjectionSink }
predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node source) { none() }
Location getASelectedSinkLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) {
result = sink.getLocation()
or
result = getRelevantEventInPrivilegedContext(sink).getLocation()
}
}
/** Tracks flow of unsafe user input that is used to construct and evaluate a system command. */

View File

@@ -72,25 +72,6 @@ class EnvPathInjectionFromMaDSink extends EnvPathInjectionSink {
EnvPathInjectionFromMaDSink() { madSink(this, "envpath-injection") }
}
/**
* Get the relevant event for a sink in EnvPathInjectionCritical.ql where the source type is "artifact".
*/
Event getRelevantArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(DataFlow::Node sink) {
inPrivilegedContext(sink.asExpr(), result) and
not exists(ControlCheck check |
check.protects(sink.asExpr(), result, ["untrusted-checkout", "artifact-poisoning"])
) and
sink instanceof EnvPathInjectionFromFileReadSink
}
/**
* Get the relevant event for a sink in EnvPathInjectionCritical.ql where the source type is not "artifact".
*/
Event getRelevantNonArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(DataFlow::Node sink) {
inPrivilegedContext(sink.asExpr(), result) and
not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(sink.asExpr(), result, "code-injection"))
}
/**
* A taint-tracking configuration for unsafe user input
* that is used to construct and evaluate an environment variable.
@@ -127,18 +108,6 @@ private module EnvPathInjectionConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
exists(run.getScript().getAFileReadCommand())
)
}
predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node source) { none() }
Location getASelectedSinkLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) {
result = sink.getLocation()
or
result = getRelevantArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(sink).getLocation()
or
result = getRelevantNonArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(sink).getLocation()
}
}
/** Tracks flow of unsafe user input that is used to construct and evaluate the PATH environment variable. */

View File

@@ -126,32 +126,6 @@ class EnvVarInjectionFromMaDSink extends EnvVarInjectionSink {
EnvVarInjectionFromMaDSink() { madSink(this, "envvar-injection") }
}
/**
* Get the relevant event for a sink in EnvVarInjectionCritical.ql where the source type is "artifact".
*/
Event getRelevantArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(DataFlow::Node sink) {
inPrivilegedContext(sink.asExpr(), result) and
not exists(ControlCheck check |
check
.protects(sink.asExpr(), result,
["envvar-injection", "untrusted-checkout", "artifact-poisoning"])
) and
(
sink instanceof EnvVarInjectionFromFileReadSink or
madSink(sink, "envvar-injection")
)
}
/**
* Get the relevant event for a sink in EnvVarInjectionCritical.ql where the source type is not "artifact".
*/
Event getRelevantNonArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(DataFlow::Node sink) {
inPrivilegedContext(sink.asExpr(), result) and
not exists(ControlCheck check |
check.protects(sink.asExpr(), result, ["envvar-injection", "code-injection"])
)
}
/**
* A taint-tracking configuration for unsafe user input
* that is used to construct and evaluate an environment variable.
@@ -189,18 +163,6 @@ private module EnvVarInjectionConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
exists(run.getScript().getAFileReadCommand())
)
}
predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node source) { none() }
Location getASelectedSinkLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) {
result = sink.getLocation()
or
result = getRelevantArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(sink).getLocation()
or
result = getRelevantNonArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(sink).getLocation()
}
}
/** Tracks flow of unsafe user input that is used to construct and evaluate an environment variable. */

View File

@@ -214,10 +214,6 @@ private module OutputClobberingConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
)
)
}
predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) { none() }
}
/** Tracks flow of unsafe user input that is used to construct and evaluate an environment variable. */

View File

@@ -16,10 +16,6 @@ private module RequestForgeryConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof RequestForgerySink }
predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) { none() }
}
/** Tracks flow of unsafe user input that is used to construct and evaluate a system command. */

View File

@@ -15,10 +15,6 @@ private module SecretExfiltrationConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof SecretExfiltrationSink }
predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) { none() }
}
/** Tracks flow of unsafe user input that is used in a context where it may lead to a secret exfiltration. */

View File

@@ -22,21 +22,16 @@ extensions:
- ["actions/stale", "pull-requests: write"]
- ["actions/attest-build-provenance", "id-token: write"]
- ["actions/attest-build-provenance", "attestations: write"]
- ["actions/deploy-pages", "pages: write"]
- ["actions/deploy-pages", "id-token: write"]
- ["actions/delete-package-versions", "packages: write"]
- ["actions/jekyll-build-pages", "contents: read"]
- ["actions/jekyll-build-pages", "pages: write"]
- ["actions/jekyll-build-pages", "id-token: write"]
- ["actions/publish-action", "contents: write"]
- ["actions/versions-package-tools", "contents: read"]
- ["actions/versions-package-tools", "contents: read"]
- ["actions/versions-package-tools", "actions: read"]
- ["actions/reusable-workflows", "contents: read"]
- ["actions/reusable-workflows", "contents: read"]
- ["actions/reusable-workflows", "actions: read"]
- ["actions/ai-inference", "contents: read"]
- ["actions/ai-inference", "models: read"]
# TODO: Add permissions for actions/download-artifact
# TODO: Add permissions for actions/upload-artifact
# No permissions needed for actions/upload-pages-artifact
# TODO: Add permissions for actions/cache
# No permissions needed for actions/configure-pages

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
name: codeql/actions-all
version: 0.4.16
version: 0.4.8-dev
library: true
warnOnImplicitThis: true
dependencies:

View File

@@ -1,63 +1,5 @@
## 0.6.8
No user-facing changes.
## 0.6.7
No user-facing changes.
## 0.6.6
No user-facing changes.
## 0.6.5
No user-facing changes.
## 0.6.4
No user-facing changes.
## 0.6.3
No user-facing changes.
## 0.6.2
### Minor Analysis Improvements
* The query `actions/missing-workflow-permissions` is now aware of the minimal permissions needed for the actions `deploy-pages`, `delete-package-versions`, `ai-inference`. This should lead to better alert messages and better fix suggestions.
## 0.6.1
No user-facing changes.
## 0.6.0
### Breaking Changes
* The following queries have been removed from the `security-and-quality` suite.
They are not intended to produce user-facing
alerts describing vulnerabilities.
Any existing alerts for these queries will be closed automatically.
* `actions/composite-action-sinks`
* `actions/composite-action-sources`
* `actions/composite-action-summaries`
* `actions/reusable-workflow-sinks`
(renamed from `actions/reusable-wokflow-sinks`)
* `actions/reusable-workflow-sources`
* `actions/reusable-workflow-summaries`
### Bug Fixes
* Assigned a `security-severity` to the query `actions/excessive-secrets-exposure`.
## 0.5.4
### New Features
* CodeQL and Copilot Autofix support for GitHub Actions is now Generally Available.
### Bug Fixes
* Alerts produced by the query `actions/missing-workflow-permissions` now include a minimal set of recommended permissions in the alert message, based on well-known actions seen within the workflow file.

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@@ -24,10 +24,6 @@ private module MyConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
sink instanceof CodeInjectionSink and not madSink(sink, "code-injection")
}
predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) { none() }
}
module MyFlow = TaintTracking::Global<MyConfig>;

View File

@@ -34,10 +34,6 @@ private module MyConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
isSink(node) and
set instanceof DataFlow::FieldContent
}
predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) { none() }
}
module MyFlow = TaintTracking::Global<MyConfig>;

View File

@@ -25,10 +25,6 @@ private module MyConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
exists(CompositeAction c | c.getAnOutputExpr() = sink.asExpr())
}
predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) { none() }
}
module MyFlow = TaintTracking::Global<MyConfig>;

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
* @problem.severity warning
* @security-severity 9.3
* @precision high
* @id actions/reusable-workflow-sinks
* @id actions/reusable-wokflow-sinks
* @tags actions
* model-generator
* external/cwe/cwe-020
@@ -24,10 +24,6 @@ private module MyConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
sink instanceof CodeInjectionSink and not madSink(sink, "code-injection")
}
predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) { none() }
}
module MyFlow = TaintTracking::Global<MyConfig>;

View File

@@ -34,10 +34,6 @@ private module MyConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
isSink(node) and
set instanceof DataFlow::FieldContent
}
predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) { none() }
}
module MyFlow = TaintTracking::Global<MyConfig>;

View File

@@ -25,10 +25,6 @@ private module MyConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
exists(ReusableWorkflow w | w.getAnOutputExpr() = sink.asExpr())
}
predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) { none() }
}
module MyFlow = TaintTracking::Global<MyConfig>;

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
## Overview
# Environment Path Injection
## Description
GitHub Actions allow to define the system PATH variable by writing to a file pointed to by the `GITHUB_PATH` environment variable. Writing to this file appends a directory to the system PATH variable and automatically makes it available to all subsequent actions in the current job.
@@ -10,11 +12,11 @@ echo "$HOME/.local/bin" >> $GITHUB_PATH
If an attacker can control the contents of the system PATH, they are able to influence what commands are run in subsequent steps of the same job.
## Recommendation
## Recommendations
Do not allow untrusted data to influence the system PATH: Avoid using untrusted data sources (e.g., artifact content) to define the system PATH.
## Example
## Examples
### Incorrect Usage
@@ -34,4 +36,4 @@ If an attacker can manipulate the value being set, such as through artifact down
## References
- GitHub Docs: [Workflow commands for GitHub Actions](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/writing-workflows/choosing-what-your-workflow-does/workflow-commands-for-github-actions).
- [Workflow commands for GitHub Actions](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/writing-workflows/choosing-what-your-workflow-does/workflow-commands-for-github-actions)

View File

@@ -21,12 +21,18 @@ import codeql.actions.security.ControlChecks
from EnvPathInjectionFlow::PathNode source, EnvPathInjectionFlow::PathNode sink, Event event
where
EnvPathInjectionFlow::flowPath(source, sink) and
inPrivilegedContext(sink.getNode().asExpr(), event) and
(
not source.getNode().(RemoteFlowSource).getSourceType() = "artifact" and
event = getRelevantNonArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(sink.getNode())
not exists(ControlCheck check |
check.protects(sink.getNode().asExpr(), event, "code-injection")
)
or
source.getNode().(RemoteFlowSource).getSourceType() = "artifact" and
event = getRelevantArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(sink.getNode())
not exists(ControlCheck check |
check.protects(sink.getNode().asExpr(), event, ["untrusted-checkout", "artifact-poisoning"])
) and
sink.getNode() instanceof EnvPathInjectionFromFileReadSink
)
select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
"Potential PATH environment variable injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@).",

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
## Overview
# Environment Path Injection
## Description
GitHub Actions allow to define the system PATH variable by writing to a file pointed to by the `GITHUB_PATH` environment variable. Writing to this file appends a directory to the system PATH variable and automatically makes it available to all subsequent actions in the current job.
@@ -10,11 +12,11 @@ echo "$HOME/.local/bin" >> $GITHUB_PATH
If an attacker can control the contents of the system PATH, they are able to influence what commands are run in subsequent steps of the same job.
## Recommendation
## Recommendations
Do not allow untrusted data to influence the system PATH: Avoid using untrusted data sources (e.g., artifact content) to define the system PATH.
## Example
## Examples
### Incorrect Usage
@@ -34,4 +36,4 @@ If an attacker can manipulate the value being set, such as through artifact down
## References
- GitHub Docs: [Workflow commands for GitHub Actions](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/writing-workflows/choosing-what-your-workflow-does/workflow-commands-for-github-actions).
- [Workflow commands for GitHub Actions](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/writing-workflows/choosing-what-your-workflow-does/workflow-commands-for-github-actions)

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
## Overview
# Environment Variable Injection
## Description
GitHub Actions allow to define environment variables by writing to a file pointed to by the `GITHUB_ENV` environment variable:
@@ -35,7 +37,7 @@ steps:
If an attacker can control the values assigned to environment variables and there is no sanitization in place, the attacker will be able to inject additional variables by injecting new lines or `{delimiters}`.
## Recommendation
## Recommendations
1. **Do not allow untrusted data to influence environment variables**:
@@ -62,7 +64,7 @@ If an attacker can control the values assigned to environment variables and ther
} >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
```
## Example
## Examples
### Example of Vulnerability
@@ -111,5 +113,5 @@ An attacker is be able to run arbitrary code by injecting environment variables
## References
- GitHub Docs: [Workflow commands for GitHub Actions](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/writing-workflows/choosing-what-your-workflow-does/workflow-commands-for-github-actions).
- Synacktiv: [GitHub Actions Exploitation: Repo Jacking and Environment Manipulation](https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/github-actions-exploitation-repo-jacking-and-environment-manipulation).
- [Workflow commands for GitHub Actions](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/writing-workflows/choosing-what-your-workflow-does/workflow-commands-for-github-actions)
- [GitHub Actions Exploitation: Repo Jacking and Environment Manipulation](https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/github-actions-exploitation-repo-jacking-and-environment-manipulation)

View File

@@ -22,15 +22,26 @@ import codeql.actions.security.ControlChecks
from EnvVarInjectionFlow::PathNode source, EnvVarInjectionFlow::PathNode sink, Event event
where
EnvVarInjectionFlow::flowPath(source, sink) and
inPrivilegedContext(sink.getNode().asExpr(), event) and
// exclude paths to file read sinks from non-artifact sources
(
// source is text
not source.getNode().(RemoteFlowSource).getSourceType() = "artifact" and
event = getRelevantNonArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(sink.getNode())
not exists(ControlCheck check |
check.protects(sink.getNode().asExpr(), event, ["envvar-injection", "code-injection"])
)
or
// source is an artifact or a file from an untrusted checkout
source.getNode().(RemoteFlowSource).getSourceType() = "artifact" and
event = getRelevantArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(sink.getNode())
not exists(ControlCheck check |
check
.protects(sink.getNode().asExpr(), event,
["envvar-injection", "untrusted-checkout", "artifact-poisoning"])
) and
(
sink.getNode() instanceof EnvVarInjectionFromFileReadSink or
madSink(sink.getNode(), "envvar-injection")
)
)
select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
"Potential environment variable injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@).",

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
## Overview
# Environment Variable Injection
## Description
GitHub Actions allow to define environment variables by writing to a file pointed to by the `GITHUB_ENV` environment variable:
@@ -35,7 +37,7 @@ steps:
If an attacker can control the values assigned to environment variables and there is no sanitization in place, the attacker will be able to inject additional variables by injecting new lines or `{delimiters}`.
## Recommendation
## Recommendations
1. **Do not allow untrusted data to influence environment variables**:
@@ -62,7 +64,7 @@ If an attacker can control the values assigned to environment variables and ther
} >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
```
## Example
## Examples
### Example of Vulnerability
@@ -111,5 +113,5 @@ An attacker would be able to run arbitrary code by injecting environment variabl
## References
- GitHub Docs: [Workflow commands for GitHub Actions](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/writing-workflows/choosing-what-your-workflow-does/workflow-commands-for-github-actions).
- Synacktiv: [GitHub Actions Exploitation: Repo Jacking and Environment Manipulation](https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/github-actions-exploitation-repo-jacking-and-environment-manipulation).
- [Workflow commands for GitHub Actions](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/writing-workflows/choosing-what-your-workflow-does/workflow-commands-for-github-actions)
- [GitHub Actions Exploitation: Repo Jacking and Environment Manipulation](https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/github-actions-exploitation-repo-jacking-and-environment-manipulation)

View File

@@ -1,16 +1,18 @@
## Overview
# Code Injection in GitHub Actions
## Description
Using user-controlled input in GitHub Actions may lead to code injection in contexts like _run:_ or _script:_.
Code injection in GitHub Actions may allow an attacker to exfiltrate any secrets used in the workflow and the temporary GitHub repository authorization token. The token may have write access to the repository, allowing an attacker to make changes to the repository.
## Recommendation
## Recommendations
The best practice to avoid code injection vulnerabilities in GitHub workflows is to set the untrusted input value of the expression to an intermediate environment variable and then use the environment variable using the native syntax of the shell/script interpreter (that is, not _${{ env.VAR }}_).
It is also recommended to limit the permissions of any tokens used by a workflow such as the GITHUB_TOKEN.
## Example
## Examples
### Incorrect Usage

View File

@@ -22,8 +22,15 @@ import codeql.actions.security.ControlChecks
from CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode source, CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode sink, Event event
where
CodeInjectionFlow::flowPath(source, sink) and
event = getRelevantCriticalEventForSink(sink.getNode()) and
source.getNode().(RemoteFlowSource).getEventName() = event.getName()
inPrivilegedContext(sink.getNode().asExpr(), event) and
source.getNode().(RemoteFlowSource).getEventName() = event.getName() and
not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(sink.getNode().asExpr(), event, "code-injection")) and
// exclude cases where the sink is a JS script and the expression uses toJson
not exists(UsesStep script |
script.getCallee() = "actions/github-script" and
script.getArgumentExpr("script") = sink.getNode().asExpr() and
exists(getAToJsonReferenceExpression(sink.getNode().asExpr().(Expression).getExpression(), _))
)
select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
"Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@).", sink,
sink.getNode().asExpr().(Expression).getRawExpression(), event, event.getName()

View File

@@ -1,16 +1,18 @@
## Overview
# Code Injection in GitHub Actions
## Description
Using user-controlled input in GitHub Actions may lead to code injection in contexts like _run:_ or _script:_.
Code injection in GitHub Actions may allow an attacker to exfiltrate any secrets used in the workflow and the temporary GitHub repository authorization token. The token may have write access to the repository, allowing an attacker to make changes to the repository.
## Recommendation
## Recommendations
The best practice to avoid code injection vulnerabilities in GitHub workflows is to set the untrusted input value of the expression to an intermediate environment variable and then use the environment variable using the native syntax of the shell/script interpreter (that is, not _${{ env.VAR }}_).
It is also recommended to limit the permissions of any tokens used by a workflow such as the GITHUB_TOKEN.
## Example
## Examples
### Incorrect Usage

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