mirror of
https://github.com/github/codeql.git
synced 2026-05-21 06:37:10 +02:00
AtmConfig inherits from TaintTracking::Configuration.
That way the specific configs which inherit from `AtmConfig` also inherit from `TaintTracking::Configuration`. This removes the need for two separate config classes for each query.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ import EndpointCharacteristics as EndpointCharacteristics
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* `isAdditionalFlowStep` with a more generalised definition of additional edges. See
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* `NosqlInjectionATM.qll` for an example of doing this.
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*/
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abstract class AtmConfig extends string {
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abstract class AtmConfig extends JS::TaintTracking::Configuration {
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bindingset[this]
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AtmConfig() { any() }
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@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
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/**
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* For internal use only.
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*
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* A taint-tracking configuration for reasoning about NoSQL injection vulnerabilities.
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* Defines shared code used by the NoSQL injection boosted query.
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*/
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@@ -9,61 +10,20 @@ private import semmle.javascript.heuristics.SyntacticHeuristics
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private import semmle.javascript.security.dataflow.NosqlInjectionCustomizations
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import AdaptiveThreatModeling
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class NosqlInjectionAtmConfig extends AtmConfig {
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NosqlInjectionAtmConfig() { this = "NosqlInjectionATMConfig" }
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class Configuration extends AtmConfig {
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Configuration() { this = "NosqlInjectionATMConfig" }
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override predicate isKnownSource(DataFlow::Node source) {
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source instanceof NosqlInjection::Source or TaintedObject::isSource(source, _)
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}
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override EndpointType getASinkEndpointType() { result instanceof NosqlInjectionSinkType }
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}
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/** DEPRECATED: Alias for NosqlInjectionAtmConfig */
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deprecated class NosqlInjectionATMConfig = NosqlInjectionAtmConfig;
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/** Holds if src -> trg is an additional flow step in the non-boosted NoSql injection security query. */
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predicate isBaseAdditionalFlowStep(
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DataFlow::Node src, DataFlow::Node trg, DataFlow::FlowLabel inlbl, DataFlow::FlowLabel outlbl
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) {
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TaintedObject::step(src, trg, inlbl, outlbl)
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or
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// additional flow step to track taint through NoSQL query objects
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inlbl = TaintedObject::label() and
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outlbl = TaintedObject::label() and
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exists(NoSql::Query query, DataFlow::SourceNode queryObj |
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queryObj.flowsTo(query) and
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queryObj.flowsTo(trg) and
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src = queryObj.getAPropertyWrite().getRhs()
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)
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}
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/**
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* Gets a value that is (transitively) written to `query`, where `query` is a NoSQL sink.
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*
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* This predicate allows us to propagate data flow through property writes and array constructors
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* within a query object, enabling the security query to pick up NoSQL injection vulnerabilities
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* involving more complex queries.
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*/
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DataFlow::Node getASubexpressionWithinQuery(DataFlow::Node query) {
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any(NosqlInjectionAtmConfig cfg).isEffectiveSink(query) and
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exists(DataFlow::SourceNode receiver |
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receiver = [getASubexpressionWithinQuery(query), query].getALocalSource()
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|
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result =
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[receiver.getAPropertyWrite().getRhs(), receiver.(DataFlow::ArrayCreationNode).getAnElement()]
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)
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}
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/**
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* A taint-tracking configuration for reasoning about NoSQL injection vulnerabilities.
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*
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* This is largely a copy of the taint tracking configuration for the standard NoSQL injection
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* query, except additional ATM sinks have been added and the additional flow step has been
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* generalised to cover the sinks predicted by ATM.
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*/
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class Configuration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
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Configuration() { this = "NosqlInjectionATM" }
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/*
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* This is largely a copy of the taint tracking configuration for the standard NoSQL injection
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* query, except additional ATM sinks have been added and the additional flow step has been
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* generalised to cover the sinks predicted by ATM.
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*/
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override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof NosqlInjection::Source }
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@@ -75,7 +35,7 @@ class Configuration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
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sink.(NosqlInjection::Sink).getAFlowLabel() = label
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or
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// Allow effective sinks to have any taint label
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any(NosqlInjectionAtmConfig cfg).isEffectiveSink(sink)
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isEffectiveSink(sink)
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}
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override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) {
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@@ -94,7 +54,43 @@ class Configuration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
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isBaseAdditionalFlowStep(src, trg, inlbl, outlbl)
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or
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// relaxed version of previous step to track taint through unmodeled NoSQL query objects
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any(NosqlInjectionAtmConfig cfg).isEffectiveSink(trg) and
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isEffectiveSink(trg) and
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src = getASubexpressionWithinQuery(trg)
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}
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/** Holds if src -> trg is an additional flow step in the non-boosted NoSql injection security query. */
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private predicate isBaseAdditionalFlowStep(
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DataFlow::Node src, DataFlow::Node trg, DataFlow::FlowLabel inlbl, DataFlow::FlowLabel outlbl
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) {
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TaintedObject::step(src, trg, inlbl, outlbl)
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or
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// additional flow step to track taint through NoSQL query objects
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inlbl = TaintedObject::label() and
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outlbl = TaintedObject::label() and
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exists(NoSql::Query query, DataFlow::SourceNode queryObj |
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queryObj.flowsTo(query) and
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queryObj.flowsTo(trg) and
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src = queryObj.getAPropertyWrite().getRhs()
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)
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}
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/**
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* Gets a value that is (transitively) written to `query`, where `query` is a NoSQL sink.
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*
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* This predicate allows us to propagate data flow through property writes and array constructors
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* within a query object, enabling the security query to pick up NoSQL injection vulnerabilities
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* involving more complex queries.
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*/
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private DataFlow::Node getASubexpressionWithinQuery(DataFlow::Node query) {
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isEffectiveSink(query) and
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exists(DataFlow::SourceNode receiver |
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receiver = [getASubexpressionWithinQuery(query), query].getALocalSource()
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result =
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[
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receiver.getAPropertyWrite().getRhs(),
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receiver.(DataFlow::ArrayCreationNode).getAnElement()
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]
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)
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}
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}
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@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
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/**
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* For internal use only.
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*
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* A taint-tracking configuration for reasoning about SQL injection vulnerabilities.
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* Defines shared code used by the SQL injection boosted query.
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*/
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@@ -8,30 +9,21 @@ import semmle.javascript.heuristics.SyntacticHeuristics
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import semmle.javascript.security.dataflow.SqlInjectionCustomizations
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import AdaptiveThreatModeling
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class SqlInjectionAtmConfig extends AtmConfig {
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SqlInjectionAtmConfig() { this = "SqlInjectionATMConfig" }
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class Configuration extends AtmConfig {
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Configuration() { this = "SqlInjectionATMConfig" }
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override predicate isKnownSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof SqlInjection::Source }
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override EndpointType getASinkEndpointType() { result instanceof SqlInjectionSinkType }
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}
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/** DEPRECATED: Alias for SqlInjectionAtmConfig */
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deprecated class SqlInjectionATMConfig = SqlInjectionAtmConfig;
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/**
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* A taint-tracking configuration for reasoning about SQL injection vulnerabilities.
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*
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* This is largely a copy of the taint tracking configuration for the standard SQL injection
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* query, except additional sinks have been added using the sink endpoint filter.
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*/
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class Configuration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
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Configuration() { this = "SqlInjectionATM" }
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/**
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* This is largely a copy of the taint tracking configuration for the standard SQL injection
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* query, except additional sinks have been added using the sink endpoint filter.
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*/
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override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof SqlInjection::Source }
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override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
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sink instanceof SqlInjection::Sink or any(SqlInjectionAtmConfig cfg).isEffectiveSink(sink)
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sink instanceof SqlInjection::Sink or isEffectiveSink(sink)
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}
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override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) {
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@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
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/**
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* For internal use only.
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*
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* A taint-tracking configuration for reasoning about path injection vulnerabilities.
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* Defines shared code used by the path injection boosted query.
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*/
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@@ -8,33 +9,24 @@ import semmle.javascript.heuristics.SyntacticHeuristics
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import semmle.javascript.security.dataflow.TaintedPathCustomizations
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import AdaptiveThreatModeling
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class TaintedPathAtmConfig extends AtmConfig {
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TaintedPathAtmConfig() { this = "TaintedPathATMConfig" }
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class Configuration extends AtmConfig {
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Configuration() { this = "TaintedPathATMConfig" }
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override predicate isKnownSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof TaintedPath::Source }
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override EndpointType getASinkEndpointType() { result instanceof TaintedPathSinkType }
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}
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/** DEPRECATED: Alias for TaintedPathAtmConfig */
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deprecated class TaintedPathATMConfig = TaintedPathAtmConfig;
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/**
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* A taint-tracking configuration for reasoning about path injection vulnerabilities.
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*
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* This is largely a copy of the taint tracking configuration for the standard path injection
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* query, except additional ATM sinks have been added to the `isSink` predicate.
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*/
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class Configuration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
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Configuration() { this = "TaintedPathATM" }
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/**
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* This is largely a copy of the taint tracking configuration for the standard path injection
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* query, except additional ATM sinks have been added to the `isSink` predicate.
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*/
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override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof TaintedPath::Source }
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override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink, DataFlow::FlowLabel label) {
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label = sink.(TaintedPath::Sink).getAFlowLabel()
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or
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// Allow effective sinks to have any taint label
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any(TaintedPathAtmConfig cfg).isEffectiveSink(sink)
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isEffectiveSink(sink)
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}
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override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) { node instanceof TaintedPath::Sanitizer }
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@@ -60,7 +52,7 @@ class Configuration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
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* of barrier guards, we port the barrier guards for the boosted query from the standard library to
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* sanitizer guards here.
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*/
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class BarrierGuardNodeAsSanitizerGuardNode extends TaintTracking::LabeledSanitizerGuardNode {
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private class BarrierGuardNodeAsSanitizerGuardNode extends TaintTracking::LabeledSanitizerGuardNode {
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BarrierGuardNodeAsSanitizerGuardNode() { this instanceof TaintedPath::BarrierGuardNode }
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override predicate sanitizes(boolean outcome, Expr e) {
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@@ -8,31 +8,24 @@ private import semmle.javascript.heuristics.SyntacticHeuristics
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private import semmle.javascript.security.dataflow.DomBasedXssCustomizations
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import AdaptiveThreatModeling
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class DomBasedXssAtmConfig extends AtmConfig {
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DomBasedXssAtmConfig() { this = "DomBasedXssATMConfig" }
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class Configuration extends AtmConfig {
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Configuration() { this = "DomBasedXssATMConfig" }
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override predicate isKnownSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof DomBasedXss::Source }
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override EndpointType getASinkEndpointType() { result instanceof XssSinkType }
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}
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/** DEPRECATED: Alias for DomBasedXssAtmConfig */
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deprecated class DomBasedXssATMConfig = DomBasedXssAtmConfig;
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/**
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* A taint-tracking configuration for reasoning about XSS vulnerabilities.
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*
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* This is largely a copy of the taint tracking configuration for the standard XSSThroughDom query,
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* except additional ATM sinks have been added to the `isSink` predicate.
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*/
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class Configuration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
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Configuration() { this = "DomBasedXssATMConfiguration" }
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/**
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* A taint-tracking configuration for reasoning about XSS vulnerabilities.
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*
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* This is largely a copy of the taint tracking configuration for the standard XSSThroughDom query,
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* except additional ATM sinks have been added to the `isSink` predicate.
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*/
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override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof DomBasedXss::Source }
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override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
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sink instanceof DomBasedXss::Sink or
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any(DomBasedXssAtmConfig cfg).isEffectiveSink(sink)
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isEffectiveSink(sink)
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}
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override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) {
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@@ -19,16 +19,16 @@ private import experimental.adaptivethreatmodeling.XssATM as XssAtm
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string getAReasonSinkExcluded(DataFlow::Node sinkCandidate, Query query) {
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query instanceof NosqlInjectionQuery and
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result = any(NosqlInjectionAtm::NosqlInjectionAtmConfig cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(sinkCandidate)
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result = any(NosqlInjectionAtm::Configuration cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(sinkCandidate)
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or
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query instanceof SqlInjectionQuery and
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result = any(SqlInjectionAtm::SqlInjectionAtmConfig cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(sinkCandidate)
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result = any(SqlInjectionAtm::Configuration cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(sinkCandidate)
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or
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query instanceof TaintedPathQuery and
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result = any(TaintedPathAtm::TaintedPathAtmConfig cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(sinkCandidate)
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result = any(TaintedPathAtm::Configuration cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(sinkCandidate)
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or
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query instanceof XssQuery and
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result = any(XssAtm::DomBasedXssAtmConfig cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(sinkCandidate)
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result = any(XssAtm::Configuration cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(sinkCandidate)
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}
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pragma[inline]
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@@ -14,15 +14,15 @@ from string queryName, AtmConfig c, EndpointType e
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where
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(
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queryName = "SqlInjection" and
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c instanceof SqlInjectionAtm::SqlInjectionAtmConfig
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c instanceof SqlInjectionAtm::Configuration
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or
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queryName = "NosqlInjection" and
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c instanceof NosqlInjectionAtm::NosqlInjectionAtmConfig
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c instanceof NosqlInjectionAtm::Configuration
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or
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queryName = "TaintedPath" and
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c instanceof TaintedPathAtm::TaintedPathAtmConfig
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c instanceof TaintedPathAtm::Configuration
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or
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queryName = "Xss" and c instanceof XssAtm::DomBasedXssAtmConfig
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queryName = "Xss" and c instanceof XssAtm::Configuration
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) and
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e = c.getASinkEndpointType()
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select queryName, e.getEncoding() as label
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@@ -17,10 +17,10 @@ private import experimental.adaptivethreatmodeling.EndpointCharacteristics as En
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query predicate tokenFeatures(DataFlow::Node endpoint, string featureName, string featureValue) {
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(
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not exists(any(NosqlInjectionAtm::NosqlInjectionAtmConfig cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(endpoint)) or
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not exists(any(SqlInjectionAtm::SqlInjectionAtmConfig cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(endpoint)) or
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not exists(any(TaintedPathAtm::TaintedPathAtmConfig cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(endpoint)) or
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not exists(any(XssAtm::DomBasedXssAtmConfig cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(endpoint)) or
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not exists(any(NosqlInjectionAtm::Configuration cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(endpoint)) or
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not exists(any(SqlInjectionAtm::Configuration cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(endpoint)) or
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not exists(any(TaintedPathAtm::Configuration cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(endpoint)) or
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not exists(any(XssAtm::Configuration cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(endpoint)) or
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any(EndpointCharacteristics::IsArgumentToModeledFunctionCharacteristic characteristic)
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.getEndpoints(endpoint)
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) and
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@@ -23,24 +23,24 @@ import experimental.adaptivethreatmodeling.XssATM as XssAtm
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query predicate nosqlFilteredTruePositives(DataFlow::Node endpoint, string reason) {
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endpoint instanceof NosqlInjection::Sink and
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reason = any(NosqlInjectionAtm::NosqlInjectionAtmConfig cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(endpoint) and
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reason = any(NosqlInjectionAtm::Configuration cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(endpoint) and
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not reason = ["argument to modeled function", "modeled sink", "modeled database access"]
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}
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query predicate sqlFilteredTruePositives(DataFlow::Node endpoint, string reason) {
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endpoint instanceof SqlInjection::Sink and
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reason = any(SqlInjectionAtm::SqlInjectionAtmConfig cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(endpoint) and
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reason = any(SqlInjectionAtm::Configuration cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(endpoint) and
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reason != "argument to modeled function"
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}
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query predicate taintedPathFilteredTruePositives(DataFlow::Node endpoint, string reason) {
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endpoint instanceof TaintedPath::Sink and
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reason = any(TaintedPathAtm::TaintedPathAtmConfig cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(endpoint) and
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reason = any(TaintedPathAtm::Configuration cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(endpoint) and
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reason != "argument to modeled function"
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}
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query predicate xssFilteredTruePositives(DataFlow::Node endpoint, string reason) {
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endpoint instanceof DomBasedXss::Sink and
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reason = any(XssAtm::DomBasedXssAtmConfig cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(endpoint) and
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reason = any(XssAtm::Configuration cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(endpoint) and
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reason != "argument to modeled function"
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}
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@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@ import javascript
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import experimental.adaptivethreatmodeling.NosqlInjectionATM as NosqlInjectionAtm
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query predicate effectiveSinks(DataFlow::Node node) {
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not exists(any(NosqlInjectionAtm::NosqlInjectionAtmConfig cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(node))
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not exists(any(NosqlInjectionAtm::Configuration cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(node))
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}
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