Add Secret exfiltration query

This commit is contained in:
Alvaro Muñoz
2024-04-12 13:07:54 +02:00
parent db86c40c50
commit e45010ec5b
6 changed files with 125 additions and 0 deletions

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private import actions
private import codeql.actions.TaintTracking
private import codeql.actions.dataflow.ExternalFlow
import codeql.actions.dataflow.FlowSources
private import codeql.actions.security.ArtifactPoisoningQuery
import codeql.actions.DataFlow
private class SecretExfiltrationSink extends DataFlow::Node {
SecretExfiltrationSink() { externallyDefinedSink(this, "secret-exfiltration") }
}
/**
* A taint-tracking configuration for untrusted data that reaches a sink where it may lead to secret exfiltration
*/
private module SecretExfiltrationConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof SecretExfiltrationSink }
}
/** Tracks flow of unsafe user input that is used in a context where it may lead to a secret exfiltration. */
module SecretExfiltrationFlow = TaintTracking::Global<SecretExfiltrationConfig>;

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extensions:
- addsTo:
pack: githubsecuritylab/actions-all
extensible: sinkModel
data:
- ["SonarSource/sonarcloud-github-action", "*", "input.args", "secret-exfiltration", "manual"]

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/**
* @name Secret exfiltration
* @description Secrets may be exfiltrated by an attacker who can control the data sent to an external service.
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity error
* @security-severity 9.0
* @precision high
* @id actions/secret-exfiltration
* @tags actions
* security
* external/cwe/cwe-200
*/
import actions
import codeql.actions.security.SecretExfiltrationQuery
import SecretExfiltrationFlow::PathGraph
from SecretExfiltrationFlow::PathNode source, SecretExfiltrationFlow::PathNode sink
where SecretExfiltrationFlow::flowPath(source, sink)
select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
"Potential secret exfiltration in $@, which may be be leaked to an attacker-controlled resource.",
sink, sink.getNode().asExpr().(Expression).getRawExpression()

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name: Sonar Code Coverage Upload
on:
workflow_run:
workflows: ["Build/Test"]
types: [completed]
jobs:
sonar:
name: Sonar
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
if: github.event.workflow_run.conclusion == 'success'
steps:
- name: 'Download code coverage'
uses: actions/github-script@v7
with:
script: |
let allArtifacts = await github.rest.actions.listWorkflowRunArtifacts({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
run_id: context.payload.workflow_run.id,
});
let matchArtifact = allArtifacts.data.artifacts.filter((artifact) => {
return artifact.name == "oc-code-coverage"
})[0];
let download = await github.rest.actions.downloadArtifact({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
artifact_id: matchArtifact.id,
archive_format: 'zip',
});
let fs = require('fs');
fs.writeFileSync(`${process.env.GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/oc-code-coverage.zip`, Buffer.from(download.data));
- name: 'Unzip code coverage'
run: unzip oc-code-coverage.zip -d coverage
- name: set env vars
run: |
echo "SONAR_PR_NUM=$(cat coverage/pr_num.txt)" >> $GITHUB_ENV
echo "SONAR_BASE=$(cat coverage/base.txt)" >> $GITHUB_ENV
echo "SONAR_HEAD=$(cat coverage/head.txt)" >> $GITHUB_ENV
- name: SonarCloud Scan (PR)
uses: sonarsource/sonarcloud-github-action@master
if: env.SONAR_HEAD != 'develop'
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
SONAR_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SONAR_TOKEN }}
with:
args: >
-Dsonar.scm.revision=${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_sha }}
-Dsonar.pullrequest.key=${{ env.SONAR_PR_NUM }}
-Dsonar.pullrequest.branch=${{ env.SONAR_HEAD }}
-Dsonar.pullrequest.base=${{ env.SONAR_BASE }}

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edges
| .github/workflows/test1.yml:8:5:50:59 | Job: sonar [SONAR_BASE] | .github/workflows/test1.yml:47:11:50:59 | env.SONAR_BASE |
| .github/workflows/test1.yml:8:5:50:59 | Job: sonar [SONAR_HEAD] | .github/workflows/test1.yml:47:11:50:59 | env.SONAR_HEAD |
| .github/workflows/test1.yml:8:5:50:59 | Job: sonar [SONAR_PR_NUM] | .github/workflows/test1.yml:47:11:50:59 | env.SONAR_PR_NUM |
| .github/workflows/test1.yml:12:9:32:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test1.yml:34:9:39:6 | Run Step |
| .github/workflows/test1.yml:34:9:39:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test1.yml:8:5:50:59 | Job: sonar [SONAR_BASE] |
| .github/workflows/test1.yml:34:9:39:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test1.yml:8:5:50:59 | Job: sonar [SONAR_HEAD] |
| .github/workflows/test1.yml:34:9:39:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/test1.yml:8:5:50:59 | Job: sonar [SONAR_PR_NUM] |
nodes
| .github/workflows/test1.yml:8:5:50:59 | Job: sonar [SONAR_BASE] | semmle.label | Job: sonar [SONAR_BASE] |
| .github/workflows/test1.yml:8:5:50:59 | Job: sonar [SONAR_HEAD] | semmle.label | Job: sonar [SONAR_HEAD] |
| .github/workflows/test1.yml:8:5:50:59 | Job: sonar [SONAR_PR_NUM] | semmle.label | Job: sonar [SONAR_PR_NUM] |
| .github/workflows/test1.yml:12:9:32:6 | Uses Step | semmle.label | Uses Step |
| .github/workflows/test1.yml:34:9:39:6 | Run Step | semmle.label | Run Step |
| .github/workflows/test1.yml:47:11:50:59 | env.SONAR_BASE | semmle.label | env.SONAR_BASE |
| .github/workflows/test1.yml:47:11:50:59 | env.SONAR_HEAD | semmle.label | env.SONAR_HEAD |
| .github/workflows/test1.yml:47:11:50:59 | env.SONAR_PR_NUM | semmle.label | env.SONAR_PR_NUM |
subpaths
#select
| .github/workflows/test1.yml:47:11:50:59 | env.SONAR_BASE | .github/workflows/test1.yml:12:9:32:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test1.yml:47:11:50:59 | env.SONAR_BASE | Potential secret exfiltration in $@, which may be be leaked to an attacker-controlled resource. | .github/workflows/test1.yml:47:11:50:59 | env.SONAR_BASE | ${{ env.SONAR_BASE }} |
| .github/workflows/test1.yml:47:11:50:59 | env.SONAR_HEAD | .github/workflows/test1.yml:12:9:32:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test1.yml:47:11:50:59 | env.SONAR_HEAD | Potential secret exfiltration in $@, which may be be leaked to an attacker-controlled resource. | .github/workflows/test1.yml:47:11:50:59 | env.SONAR_HEAD | ${{ env.SONAR_HEAD }} |
| .github/workflows/test1.yml:47:11:50:59 | env.SONAR_PR_NUM | .github/workflows/test1.yml:12:9:32:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test1.yml:47:11:50:59 | env.SONAR_PR_NUM | Potential secret exfiltration in $@, which may be be leaked to an attacker-controlled resource. | .github/workflows/test1.yml:47:11:50:59 | env.SONAR_PR_NUM | ${{ env.SONAR_PR_NUM }} |

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Security/CWE-200/SecretExfiltration.ql