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remove standalone archive api query
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thiggy1342
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
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/**
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* @name User-controlled filename in archive library
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* @description User-controlled data that flows into File I/O of archive libraries could be dangerous
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* @kind path-problem
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* @problem.severity error
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* @security-severity 7.5
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* @precision medium
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* @id rb/user-controlled-path-traversal-archive-library
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* @tags security external/cwe/cwe-22
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*/
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import ruby
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import codeql.ruby.ApiGraphs
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import codeql.ruby.DataFlow
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import codeql.ruby.dataflow.RemoteFlowSources
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import codeql.ruby.dataflow.BarrierGuards
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import codeql.ruby.TaintTracking
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import DataFlow::PathGraph
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class ArchiveApiFileOpen extends DataFlow::Node {
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// this should find the first argument of Zlib::Inflate.inflate or Zip::File.extract
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ArchiveApiFileOpen() {
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this instanceof RubyZipFileOpen or
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this instanceof TarReaderFileOpen
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}
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}
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class RubyZipFileOpen extends DataFlow::Node {
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// find any use of Zip::File.open()
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RubyZipFileOpen() {
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this = API::getTopLevelMember("Zip").getMember("File").getAMethodCall("open").getArgument(0)
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}
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}
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class TarReaderFileOpen extends DataFlow::Node {
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// this should find a use of File.open() in context of a block opened in context of Gem::Package::TarReader.new()
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TarReaderFileOpen() {
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this = API::getTopLevelMember("File").getAMethodCall("open").getArgument(0) and
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this.asExpr().getExpr().getParent+() = API::getTopLevelMember("Gem").getMember("Package").getMember("TarReader").getAnInstantiation().asExpr().getExpr()
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}
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}
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class Configuration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
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Configuration() { this = "ArchiveApiFileOpen" }
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// this predicate will be used to contstrain our query to find instances where only remote user-controlled data flows to the sink
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override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) {
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source instanceof RemoteFlowSource
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}
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// our Decompression APIs defined above will the the sinks we use for this query
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override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
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sink instanceof ArchiveApiFileOpen
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}
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// I think it would also be helpful to reduce false positives by adding a simple sanitizer config in the event
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// that the code first checks the file name against a string literal or array of string literals before calling
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// the decompression API
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override predicate isSanitizerGuard(DataFlow::BarrierGuard guard) {
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guard instanceof StringConstCompare or
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guard instanceof StringConstArrayInclusionCall
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}
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}
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from Configuration config, DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink
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where
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config.hasFlowPath(source, sink)
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select sink.getNode(), source, sink, "This call to $@ appears to extract an archive using user-controlled data $@ to set the filename. If the filename is not properly handled, they could end up writing to unintended places in the filesystem.", sink.getNode().asExpr().getExpr().getParent().toString(), sink.getNode().asExpr().getExpr().getParent().toString(), source.toString(), source.toString()
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@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
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edges
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| ArchiveApiPathTraversal.rb:5:26:5:31 | call to params : | ArchiveApiPathTraversal.rb:5:26:5:42 | ...[...] : |
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| ArchiveApiPathTraversal.rb:5:26:5:42 | ...[...] : | ArchiveApiPathTraversal.rb:43:17:43:27 | destination : |
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| ArchiveApiPathTraversal.rb:10:11:10:16 | call to params : | ArchiveApiPathTraversal.rb:10:11:10:23 | ...[...] : |
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| ArchiveApiPathTraversal.rb:10:11:10:23 | ...[...] : | ArchiveApiPathTraversal.rb:61:13:61:16 | file : |
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| ArchiveApiPathTraversal.rb:43:17:43:27 | destination : | ArchiveApiPathTraversal.rb:46:38:46:48 | destination : |
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| ArchiveApiPathTraversal.rb:46:28:46:67 | call to join : | ArchiveApiPathTraversal.rb:53:21:53:36 | destination_file |
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| ArchiveApiPathTraversal.rb:46:38:46:48 | destination : | ArchiveApiPathTraversal.rb:46:28:46:67 | call to join : |
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| ArchiveApiPathTraversal.rb:61:13:61:16 | file : | ArchiveApiPathTraversal.rb:62:20:62:23 | file |
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nodes
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| ArchiveApiPathTraversal.rb:5:26:5:31 | call to params : | semmle.label | call to params : |
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| ArchiveApiPathTraversal.rb:5:26:5:42 | ...[...] : | semmle.label | ...[...] : |
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| ArchiveApiPathTraversal.rb:10:11:10:16 | call to params : | semmle.label | call to params : |
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| ArchiveApiPathTraversal.rb:10:11:10:23 | ...[...] : | semmle.label | ...[...] : |
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| ArchiveApiPathTraversal.rb:43:17:43:27 | destination : | semmle.label | destination : |
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| ArchiveApiPathTraversal.rb:46:28:46:67 | call to join : | semmle.label | call to join : |
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| ArchiveApiPathTraversal.rb:46:38:46:48 | destination : | semmle.label | destination : |
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| ArchiveApiPathTraversal.rb:53:21:53:36 | destination_file | semmle.label | destination_file |
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| ArchiveApiPathTraversal.rb:61:13:61:16 | file : | semmle.label | file : |
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| ArchiveApiPathTraversal.rb:62:20:62:23 | file | semmle.label | file |
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subpaths
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#select
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| ArchiveApiPathTraversal.rb:53:21:53:36 | destination_file | ArchiveApiPathTraversal.rb:5:26:5:31 | call to params : | ArchiveApiPathTraversal.rb:53:21:53:36 | destination_file | This call to $@ appears to extract an archive using user-controlled data $@ to set the filename. If the filename is not properly handled, they could end up writing to unintended places in the filesystem. | call to open | call to open | call to params : | call to params : |
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| ArchiveApiPathTraversal.rb:62:20:62:23 | file | ArchiveApiPathTraversal.rb:10:11:10:16 | call to params : | ArchiveApiPathTraversal.rb:62:20:62:23 | file | This call to $@ appears to extract an archive using user-controlled data $@ to set the filename. If the filename is not properly handled, they could end up writing to unintended places in the filesystem. | call to open | call to open | call to params : | call to params : |
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@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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experimental/archive-api-path-traversal/ArchiveApiPathTraversal.ql
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@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
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class TestContoller < ActionController::Base
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# this is vulnerable
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def upload
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untar params[:file], params[:filename]
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end
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# this is vulnerable
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def unpload_zip
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unzip params[:file]
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end
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# these are not vulnerable because of the string compare sanitizer
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def safe_upload_string_compare
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filename = params[:filename]
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if filename == "safefile.tar"
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untar params[:file], filename
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end
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end
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def safe_upload_zip_string_compare
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filename = params[:filename]
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if filename == "safefile.zip"
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unzip filename
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end
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end
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# these are not vulnerable beacuse of the string array compare sanitizer
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def safe_upload_string_array_compare
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filename = params[:filename]
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if ["safefile1.tar", "safefile2.tar"].include? filename
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untar params[:file], filename
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end
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end
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def safe_upload_zip_string_array_compare
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filename = params[:filename]
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if ["safefile1.zip", "safefile2.zip"].include? filename
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unzip filename
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end
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end
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def untar(io, destination)
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Gem::Package::TarReader.new io do |tar|
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tar.each do |tarfile|
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destination_file = File.join destination, tarfile.full_name
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if tarfile.directory?
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FileUtils.mkdir_p destination_file
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else
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destination_directory = File.dirname(destination_file)
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FileUtils.mkdir_p destination_directory unless File.directory?(destination_directory)
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File.open destination_file, "wb" do |f|
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f.print tarfile.read
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end
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end
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end
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end
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end
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def unzip(file)
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Zip::File.open(file) do |zip_file|
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zip_file.each do |entry|
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entry.extract
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end
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end
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end
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end
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