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Merge pull request #615 from erik-krogh/explicit-this

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apply the implicit-this patch to the remaining go code
This commit is contained in:
Erik Krogh Kristensen
2021-11-29 17:16:43 +01:00
committed by GitHub
parent b37fa9c447 1ade6c55d8
commit adbe19878f
6 changed files with 14 additions and 14 deletions
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2
ql/lib/semmle/go/Decls.qll
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@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ class FuncDef extends @funcdef, StmtParent, ExprParent {
*/
DataFlow::CallNode getACall() { result.getACallee() = this }
predicate isVariadic() { getType().isVariadic() }
predicate isVariadic() { this.getType().isVariadic() }
override string getAPrimaryQlClass() { result = "FuncDef" }
}

4
ql/lib/semmle/go/security/IncorrectIntegerConversionLib.qll
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@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ class ConversionWithoutBoundsCheckConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
)
}
override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { isSink(sink, sinkBitSize) }
override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { this.isSink(sink, sinkBitSize) }
override predicate isSanitizerGuard(DataFlow::BarrierGuard guard) {
// To catch flows that only happen on 32-bit architectures we
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ class ConversionWithoutBoundsCheckConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
override predicate isSanitizerOut(DataFlow::Node node) {
exists(int bitSize | isIncorrectIntegerConversion(sourceBitSize, bitSize) |
isSink(node, bitSize)
this.isSink(node, bitSize)
)
}
}

4
ql/src/Security/CWE-322/InsecureHostKeyCallback.ql
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@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ class InsecureIgnoreHostKey extends Function {
class HostKeyCallbackFunc extends DataFlow::Node {
HostKeyCallbackFunc() {
exists(NamedType nt | nt.hasQualifiedName(CryptoSsh::packagePath(), "HostKeyCallback") |
getType().getUnderlyingType() = nt.getUnderlyingType()
this.getType().getUnderlyingType() = nt.getUnderlyingType()
) and
// Restrict possible sources to either function definitions or
// the result of some external function call (e.g. InsecureIgnoreHostKey())
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ class HostKeyCallbackAssignmentConfig extends DataFlow::Configuration {
)
}
override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { isSink(sink, _) }
override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { this.isSink(sink, _) }
}
/**

6
ql/src/Security/CWE-352/ConstantOauth2State.ql
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@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ class ConstantStateFlowConf extends DataFlow::Configuration {
)
}
override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { isSink(sink, _) }
override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { this.isSink(sink, _) }
}
/**
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ class PrivateUrlFlowsToAuthCodeUrlCall extends DataFlow::Configuration {
exists(AuthCodeURL m | call = m.getACall() | sink = call.getReceiver())
}
override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { isSink(sink, _) }
override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { this.isSink(sink, _) }
}
/**
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ class FlowToPrint extends DataFlow::Configuration {
source = any(AuthCodeURL m).getACall().getResult()
}
override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { isSink(sink, _) }
override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { this.isSink(sink, _) }
}
/** Holds if the provided `CallNode`'s result flows to an argument of a printer call. */

8
ql/src/experimental/CWE-327/CryptoLibraries.qll
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@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ abstract class CryptographicOperation extends DataFlow::Node {
* Models cryptographic operations of the `crypto/md5` package.
*/
class Md5 extends CryptographicOperation, DataFlow::CallNode {
Md5() { getTarget().hasQualifiedName("crypto/md5", ["New", "Sum"]) }
Md5() { this.getTarget().hasQualifiedName("crypto/md5", ["New", "Sum"]) }
override Expr getInput() { result = this.getArgument(0).asExpr() }
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ class Md5 extends CryptographicOperation, DataFlow::CallNode {
* Models cryptographic operations of the `crypto/sha1` package.
*/
class Sha1 extends CryptographicOperation, DataFlow::CallNode {
Sha1() { getTarget().hasQualifiedName("crypto/sha1", ["New", "Sum"]) }
Sha1() { this.getTarget().hasQualifiedName("crypto/sha1", ["New", "Sum"]) }
override Expr getInput() { result = this.getArgument(0).asExpr() }
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ class Sha1 extends CryptographicOperation, DataFlow::CallNode {
* Models cryptographic operations of the `crypto/des` package.
*/
class Des extends CryptographicOperation, DataFlow::CallNode {
Des() { getTarget().hasQualifiedName("crypto/des", ["NewCipher", "NewTripleDESCipher"]) }
Des() { this.getTarget().hasQualifiedName("crypto/des", ["NewCipher", "NewTripleDESCipher"]) }
override Expr getInput() { result = this.getArgument(0).asExpr() }
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ class Des extends CryptographicOperation, DataFlow::CallNode {
* Models cryptographic operations of the `crypto/rc4` package.
*/
class Rc4 extends CryptographicOperation, DataFlow::CallNode {
Rc4() { getTarget().hasQualifiedName("crypto/rc4", ["NewCipher"]) }
Rc4() { this.getTarget().hasQualifiedName("crypto/rc4", ["NewCipher"]) }
override Expr getInput() { result = this.getArgument(0).asExpr() }

4
ql/src/experimental/CWE-942/CorsMisconfiguration.ql
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@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ class FlowsUntrustedToAllowOriginHeader extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
)
}
override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { isSink(sink, _) }
override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { this.isSink(sink, _) }
}
/**
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ class FlowsFromUntrusted extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof UntrustedFlowSource }
override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { isSink(sink, _) }
override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { this.isSink(sink, _) }
predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink, ControlFlow::ConditionGuardNode cgn) {
exists(IfStmt ifs |