Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream/master' into Expr-location-workaround

This commit is contained in:
Jonas Jensen
2020-05-28 09:37:15 +02:00
1667 changed files with 86295 additions and 53447 deletions

2
.gitignore vendored
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@@ -19,5 +19,5 @@
# It's useful (though not required) to be able to unpack codeql in the ql checkout itself
/codeql/
.vscode/settings.json
csharp/extractor/Semmle.Extraction.CSharp.Driver/Properties/launchSettings.json

1
.vscode/.gitattributes vendored Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
*.json linguist-language=JSON-with-Comments

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.vscode/extensions.json vendored Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
{
// See https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=827846 to learn about workspace recommendations.
// Extension identifier format: ${publisher}.${name}. Example: vscode.csharp
// List of extensions which should be recommended for users of this workspace.
"recommendations": [
"github.vscode-codeql"
],
// List of extensions recommended by VS Code that should not be recommended for users of this workspace.
"unwantedRecommendations": []
}

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.vscode/tasks.json vendored Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
{
// To run a task, select the `Terminal | Run Task...` menu option, and then select the task from
// the list in the dropdown, or invoke the `Tasks: Run Task` command from the command palette/
// To bind a keyboard shortcut to invoke a task, see https://code.visualstudio.com/docs/editor/tasks#_binding-keyboard-shortcuts-to-tasks.
// See https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=733558
// for the documentation about the tasks.json format
"version": "2.0.0",
"tasks": [
{
"label": "Sync Identical Files",
"type": "process",
// Non-Windows OS will usually have Python 3 already installed at /usr/bin/python3.
"command": "python3",
"args": [
"config/sync-files.py",
"--latest"
],
"group": "build",
"windows": {
// On Windows, use whatever Python interpreter is configured for this workspace. The default is
// just `python`, so if Python is already on the path, this will find it.
"command": "${config:python.pythonPath}",
},
"problemMatcher": []
}
]
}

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@@ -1,11 +1,20 @@
/cpp/ @Semmle/cpp-analysis
/csharp/ @Semmle/cs
/java/ @Semmle/java
/javascript/ @Semmle/js
/python/ @Semmle/python
/cpp/ @github/codeql-c-analysis
/csharp/ @github/codeql-csharp
/java/ @github/codeql-java
/javascript/ @github/codeql-javascript
/python/ @github/codeql-python
# Assign query help for docs review
/cpp/**/*.qhelp @hubwriter
/csharp/**/*.qhelp @jf205
/java/**/*.qhelp @felicitymay
/javascript/**/*.qhelp @mchammer01
/python/**/*.qhelp @felicitymay
/docs/language/ @shati-patel @jf205
# Exclude help for experimental queries from docs review
/cpp/**/experimental/**/*.qhelp @github/codeql-c-analysis
/csharp/**/experimental/**/*.qhelp @github/codeql-csharp
/java/**/experimental/**/*.qhelp @github/codeql-java
/javascript/**/experimental/**/*.qhelp @github/codeql-javascript
/python/**/experimental/**/*.qhelp @github/codeql-python

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@@ -1,39 +1,126 @@
# Code of Conduct
## Our Pledge
This code of conduct outlines expectations for participation in the Semmle open source community, including any open source repositories on GitHub.com, as well as steps for reporting unacceptable behavior. We are committed to providing a welcoming and inspiring community for all.
We as members, contributors, and leaders pledge to make participation in our
community a harassment-free experience for everyone, regardless of age, body
size, visible or invisible disability, ethnicity, sex characteristics, gender
identity and expression, level of experience, education, socio-economic status,
nationality, personal appearance, race, religion, or sexual identity
and orientation.
People violating this code of conduct may be banned from the community.
We pledge to act and interact in ways that contribute to an open, welcoming,
diverse, inclusive, and healthy community.
Our community strives to:
* Be friendly and patient: Remember you might not be communicating in someone elses primary spoken or programming language, and others may not have your level of understanding.
* Be welcoming: Our community welcomes and supports people of all backgrounds and identities. This includes, but is not limited to members of any race, ethnicity, culture, national origin, color, immigration status, social and economic class, educational level, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, age, size, family status, political belief, religion, and mental and physical ability.
* Be respectful: We are a world-wide community of professionals, and we conduct ourselves professionally. Disagreement is no excuse for poor behavior and poor manners. Disrespectful and unacceptable behavior includes, but is not limited to:
* Violent threats or language.
* Discriminatory or derogatory jokes and language.
* Posting sexually explicit or violent material.
* Posting, or threatening to post, peoples personally identifying information (“doxing”).
* Insults, especially those using discriminatory terms or slurs.
* Behavior that could be perceived as sexual attention.
* Advocating for or encouraging any of the above behaviors.
* Understand disagreements: Disagreements, both social and technical, are useful learning opportunities. Seek to understand others viewpoints and resolve differences constructively.
## Our Standards
This code is not exhaustive or complete. It serves to capture our common understanding of a productive, collaborative environment. We expect the code to be followed in spirit as much as in the letter.
Examples of behavior that contributes to a positive environment for our
community include:
# Scope
* Demonstrating empathy and kindness toward other people
* Being respectful of differing opinions, viewpoints, and experiences
* Giving and gracefully accepting constructive feedback
* Accepting responsibility and apologizing to those affected by our mistakes,
and learning from the experience
* Focusing on what is best not just for us as individuals, but for the
overall community
This code of conduct applies to all repositories and communities for Semmle open source projects, regardless of whether or not the repository explicitly calls out its use of this code. The code also applies in public spaces when an individual is representing the Semmle open source community. Examples include using an official project email address, posting via an official social media account, or acting as an appointed representative at an online or offline event.
Examples of unacceptable behavior include:
* The use of sexualized language or imagery, and sexual attention or
advances of any kind
* Trolling, insulting or derogatory comments, and personal or political attacks
* Public or private harassment
* Publishing others' private information, such as a physical or email
address, without their explicit permission
* Other conduct which could reasonably be considered inappropriate in a
professional setting
# Reporting Code of Conduct Issues
We encourage members of the community to resolve issues on their own whenever possible. This builds a broader and deeper understanding and ultimately a healthier interaction. In the event that an issue cannot be resolved locally, please feel free to report your concerns by contacting code-of-conduct@semmle.com.
In your report please include:
* Your contact information.
* Names (real, usernames or pseudonyms) of any individuals involved. If there are additional witnesses, please include them as well.
* Your account of what occurred, and if you believe the incident is ongoing. If there is a publicly available record (e.g. a mailing list archive or a public chat log), please include a link or attachment.
* Any additional information that may be helpful.
## Enforcement Responsibilities
All reports will be reviewed by a multi-person team and will result in a response that is deemed necessary and appropriate to the circumstances. Where additional perspectives are needed, the team may seek insight from others with relevant expertise or experience. The confidentiality of the person reporting the incident will be kept at all times. Involved parties are never part of the review team.
Community leaders are responsible for clarifying and enforcing our standards of
acceptable behavior and will take appropriate and fair corrective action in
response to any behavior that they deem inappropriate, threatening, offensive,
or harmful.
Anyone asked to stop unacceptable behavior is expected to comply immediately. If an individual engages in unacceptable behavior, the review team may take any action they deem appropriate, including a permanent ban from the community.
Community leaders have the right and responsibility to remove, edit, or reject
comments, commits, code, wiki edits, issues, and other contributions that are
not aligned to this Code of Conduct, and will communicate reasons for moderation
decisions when appropriate.
*This text is licensed under the [CC-BY-4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) license. It is based on a template established by the [TODO Group](http://todogroup.org/) and variants thereof used by numerous other large communities (e.g., [Microsoft](https://microsoft.github.io/codeofconduct/), [Facebook](https://code.fb.com/codeofconduct/), [Yahoo](https://yahoo.github.io/codeofconduct), [Twitter](https://github.com/twitter/code-of-conduct), [GitHub](https://blog.github.com/2015-07-20-adopting-the-open-code-of-conduct/)) and the Scope section from the [Contributor Covenant version 1.4](http://contributor-covenant.org/version/1/4/).*
## Scope
This Code of Conduct applies within all community spaces, and also applies when
an individual is officially representing the community in public spaces.
Examples of representing our community include using an official e-mail address,
posting via an official social media account, or acting as an appointed
representative at an online or offline event.
## Enforcement
Instances of abusive, harassing, or otherwise unacceptable behavior may be
reported to the community leaders responsible for enforcement at
opensource@github.com.
All complaints will be reviewed and investigated promptly and fairly.
All community leaders are obligated to respect the privacy and security of the
reporter of any incident.
## Enforcement Guidelines
Community leaders will follow these Community Impact Guidelines in determining
the consequences for any action they deem in violation of this Code of Conduct:
### 1. Correction
**Community Impact**: Use of inappropriate language or other behavior deemed
unprofessional or unwelcome in the community.
**Consequence**: A private, written warning from community leaders, providing
clarity around the nature of the violation and an explanation of why the
behavior was inappropriate. A public apology may be requested.
### 2. Warning
**Community Impact**: A violation through a single incident or series
of actions.
**Consequence**: A warning with consequences for continued behavior. No
interaction with the people involved, including unsolicited interaction with
those enforcing the Code of Conduct, for a specified period of time. This
includes avoiding interactions in community spaces as well as external channels
like social media. Violating these terms may lead to a temporary or
permanent ban.
### 3. Temporary Ban
**Community Impact**: A serious violation of community standards, including
sustained inappropriate behavior.
**Consequence**: A temporary ban from any sort of interaction or public
communication with the community for a specified period of time. No public or
private interaction with the people involved, including unsolicited interaction
with those enforcing the Code of Conduct, is allowed during this period.
Violating these terms may lead to a permanent ban.
### 4. Permanent Ban
**Community Impact**: Demonstrating a pattern of violation of community
standards, including sustained inappropriate behavior, harassment of an
individual, or aggression toward or disparagement of classes of individuals.
**Consequence**: A permanent ban from any sort of public interaction within
the community.
## Attribution
This Code of Conduct is adapted from the [Contributor Covenant][homepage],
version 2.0, available at
https://www.contributor-covenant.org/version/2/0/code_of_conduct.html.
Community Impact Guidelines were inspired by [Mozilla's code of conduct
enforcement ladder](https://github.com/mozilla/diversity).
[homepage]: https://www.contributor-covenant.org
For answers to common questions about this code of conduct, see the FAQ at
https://www.contributor-covenant.org/faq. Translations are available at
https://www.contributor-covenant.org/translations.

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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Contributing to CodeQL
We welcome contributions to our CodeQL libraries and queries. Got an idea for a new check, or how to improve an existing query? Then please go ahead and open a pull request!
We welcome contributions to our CodeQL libraries and queries. Got an idea for a new check, or how to improve an existing query? Then please go ahead and open a pull request! Contributions to this project are [released](https://help.github.com/articles/github-terms-of-service/#6-contributions-under-repository-license) to the public under the [project's open source license](LICENSE).
There is lots of useful documentation to help you write queries, ranging from information about query file structure to tutorials for specific target languages. For more information on the documentation available, see [Writing CodeQL queries](https://help.semmle.com/QL/learn-ql/writing-queries/writing-queries.html) on [help.semmle.com](https://help.semmle.com).
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ If you have an idea for a query that you would like to share with other CodeQL u
* Python: `python/ql/src`
Each language-specific directory contains further subdirectories that group queries based on their `@tags` or purpose.
- Experimental queries and libraries are stored in the `experimental` subdirectory within each language-specific directory in the [CodeQL repository](https://github.com/Semmle/ql). For example, experimental Java queries and libraries are stored in `java/ql/src/experimental` and any corresponding tests in `java/ql/test/experimental`.
- Experimental queries and libraries are stored in the `experimental` subdirectory within each language-specific directory in the [CodeQL repository](https://github.com/github/codeql). For example, experimental Java queries and libraries are stored in `java/ql/src/experimental` and any corresponding tests in `java/ql/test/experimental`.
- The structure of an `experimental` subdirectory mirrors the structure of its parent directory.
- Select or create an appropriate directory in `experimental` based on the existing directory structure of `experimental` or its parent directory.
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ If you have an idea for a query that you would like to share with other CodeQL u
3. **Formatting**
- The queries and libraries must be [autoformatted](https://help.semmle.com/codeql/codeql-for-vscode/reference/editor.html#autoformatting).
- The queries and libraries must be autoformatted, for example using the "Format Document" command in [CodeQL for Visual Studio Code](https://help.semmle.com/codeql/codeql-for-vscode/procedures/about-codeql-for-vscode.html).
4. **Compilation**
@@ -47,10 +47,6 @@ If you have an idea for a query that you would like to share with other CodeQL u
- The query must have at least one true positive result on some revision of a real project.
6. **Contributor License Agreement**
- The contributor can satisfy the [CLA](#contributor-license-agreement).
Experimental queries and libraries may not be actively maintained as the [supported](docs/supported-queries.md) libraries evolve. They may also be changed in backwards-incompatible ways or may be removed entirely in the future without deprecation warnings.
After the experimental query is merged, we welcome pull requests to improve it. Before a query can be moved out of the `experimental` subdirectory, it must satisfy [the requirements for being a supported query](docs/supported-queries.md).
@@ -65,33 +61,6 @@ normal course of software development. We also store records of your
CLA agreements. Under GDPR legislation, we do this
on the basis of our legitimate interest in creating the CodeQL product.
Please do get in touch (privacy@semmle.com) if you have any questions about
Please do get in touch (privacy@github.com) if you have any questions about
this or our data protection policies.
## Contributor License Agreement
This Contributor License Agreement (“Agreement”) is entered into between Semmle Limited (“Semmle,” “we” or “us” etc.), and You (as defined and further identified below).
Accordingly, You hereby agree to the following terms for Your present and future Contributions submitted to Semmle:
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* "You" (or "Your") shall mean the Contribution copyright owner (whether an individual or organization) or legal entity authorized by the copyright owner that is making this Agreement with Semmle. For legal entities, the entity making a Contribution and all other entities that control, are controlled by, or are under common control with that entity are considered to be a single Contributor. For the purposes of this definition, "control" means (i) the power, direct or indirect, to cause the direction or management of such entity, whether by contract or otherwise, or (ii) ownership of fifty percent (50%) or more of the outstanding shares, or (iii) beneficial ownership of such entity.
* "Contribution(s)" shall mean the code, documentation or other original works of authorship, including any modifications or additions to an existing work, submitted by You to Semmle for inclusion in, or documentation of, any of the products or projects owned or managed by Semmle (the "Work(s)"). For the purposes of this definition, "submitted" means any form of electronic, verbal, or written communication sent to Semmle or its representatives, including but not limited to communication on electronic mailing lists, source code control systems, and issue tracking systems that are managed by, or on behalf of, Semmle for the purpose of discussing and/or improving the Work, but excluding communication that is conspicuously marked or otherwise designated in writing by You as "Not a Contribution."
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@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
Copyright (c) Semmle Inc and other contributors. All rights reserved.
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See the Apache Version 2.0 License for specific language governing permissions
and limitations under the License.

189
LICENSE
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@@ -1,176 +1,21 @@
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# CodeQL
This open source repository contains the standard CodeQL libraries and queries that power [LGTM](https://lgtm.com) and the other CodeQL products that [GitHub](https://github.com) makes available to its customers worldwide.
This open source repository contains the standard CodeQL libraries and queries that power [LGTM](https://lgtm.com) and the other CodeQL products that [GitHub](https://github.com) makes available to its customers worldwide. For the queries, libraries, and extractor that power Go analysis, visit the [CodeQL for Go repository](https://github.com/github/codeql-go).
## How do I learn CodeQL and run queries?
@@ -9,8 +9,20 @@ You can use the [interactive query console](https://lgtm.com/help/lgtm/using-que
## Contributing
We welcome contributions to our standard library and standard checks. Do you have an idea for a new check, or how to improve an existing query? Then please go ahead and open a pull request! Before you do, though, please take the time to read our [contributing guidelines](CONTRIBUTING.md). You can also consult our [style guides](https://github.com/Semmle/ql/tree/master/docs) to learn how to format your code for consistency and clarity, how to write query metadata, and how to write query help documentation for your query.
We welcome contributions to our standard library and standard checks. Do you have an idea for a new check, or how to improve an existing query? Then please go ahead and open a pull request! Before you do, though, please take the time to read our [contributing guidelines](CONTRIBUTING.md). You can also consult our [style guides](https://github.com/github/codeql/tree/master/docs) to learn how to format your code for consistency and clarity, how to write query metadata, and how to write query help documentation for your query.
## License
The code in this repository is licensed under [Apache License 2.0](LICENSE) by [GitHub](https://github.com).
The code in this repository is licensed under the [MIT License](LICENSE) by [GitHub](https://github.com).
## Visual Studio Code integration
If you use Visual Studio Code to work in this repository, there are a few integration features to make development easier.
### CodeQL for Visual Studio Code
You can install the [CodeQL for Visual Studio Code](https://marketplace.visualstudio.com/items?itemName=GitHub.vscode-codeql) extension to get syntax highlighting, IntelliSense, and code navigation for the QL language, as well as unit test support for testing CodeQL libraries and queries.
### Tasks
The `.vscode/tasks.json` file defines custom tasks specific to working in this repository. To invoke one of these tasks, select the `Terminal | Run Task...` menu option, and then select the desired task from the dropdown. You can also invoke the `Tasks: Run Task` command from the command palette.

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@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ The following changes in version 1.24 affect C/C++ analysis in all applications.
## General improvements
You can now suppress alerts using either single-line block comments (`/* ... */`) or line comments (`// ...`).
## New queries
| **Query** | **Tags** | **Purpose** |
@@ -12,44 +14,71 @@ The following changes in version 1.24 affect C/C++ analysis in all applications.
## Changes to existing queries
A new taint-tracking library is used by all the security queries that track tainted values
(`cpp/path-injection`, `cpp/cgi-xss`, `cpp/sql-injection`, `cpp/uncontrolled-process-operation`,
`cpp/unbounded-write`, `cpp/tainted-format-string`, `cpp/tainted-format-string-through-global`,
`cpp/uncontrolled-arithmetic`, `cpp/uncontrolled-allocation-size`, `cpp/user-controlled-bypass`,
`cpp/cleartext-storage-buffer`, `cpp/tainted-permissions-check`).
These queries now have more precise results and also offer _path explanations_ so you can explore the results easily.
There is a performance cost to this, and the LGTM query suite will overall run slower than before.
| **Query** | **Expected impact** | **Change** |
|----------------------------|------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Boost\_asio TLS Settings Misconfiguration (`cpp/boost/tls-settings-misconfiguration`) | Query id change | The identifier was updated to use dashes in place of underscores (previous identifier `cpp/boost/tls_settings_misconfiguration`). |
| Buffer not sufficient for string (`cpp/overflow-calculated`) | More true positive results | This query now identifies a wider variety of buffer allocations using the `semmle.code.cpp.models.interfaces.Allocation` library. |
| No space for zero terminator (`cpp/no-space-for-terminator`) | More true positive results | This query now identifies a wider variety of buffer allocations using the `semmle.code.cpp.models.interfaces.Allocation` library. |
| Hard-coded Japanese era start date (`cpp/japanese-era/exact-era-date`) | | This query is no longer run on LGTM. |
| Memory is never freed (`cpp/memory-never-freed`) | More true positive results | This query now identifies a wider variety of buffer allocations using the `semmle.code.cpp.models.interfaces.Allocation` library. |
| Memory may not be freed (`cpp/memory-may-not-be-freed`) | More true positive results | This query now identifies a wider variety of buffer allocations using the `semmle.code.cpp.models.interfaces.Allocation` library. |
| Mismatching new/free or malloc/delete (`cpp/new-free-mismatch`) | Fewer false positive results | Fixed false positive results in template code. |
| Missing return statement (`cpp/missing-return`) | Fewer false positive results | Functions containing `asm` statements are no longer highlighted by this query. |
| Missing return statement (`cpp/missing-return`) | More accurate locations | Locations reported by this query are now more accurate in some cases. |
| No space for zero terminator (`cpp/no-space-for-terminator`) | More correct results | String arguments to formatting functions are now (usually) expected to be null terminated strings. |
| Hard-coded Japanese era start date (`cpp/japanese-era/exact-era-date`) | | This query is no longer run on LGTM. |
| No space for zero terminator (`cpp/no-space-for-terminator`) | Fewer false positive results | This query has been modified to be more conservative when identifying which pointers point to null-terminated strings. This approach produces fewer, more accurate results. |
| Mismatching new/free or malloc/delete (`cpp/new-free-mismatch`) | Fewer false positive results | Improved handling of template code gives greater precision. |
| Missing return statement (`cpp/missing-return`) | Fewer false positive results and more accurate locations | Functions containing `asm` statements are no longer highlighted by this query. The locations reported by this query are now more accurate in some cases. |
| No space for zero terminator (`cpp/no-space-for-terminator`) | More results with greater precision | The query gives more precise results for a wider variety of buffer allocations. String arguments to formatting functions are now (usually) expected to be null terminated strings. Use of the `semmle.code.cpp.models.interfaces.Allocation` library identifies problems with a wider variety of buffer allocations. This query is also more conservative when identifying which pointers point to null-terminated strings. |
| Overflow in uncontrolled allocation size (`cpp/uncontrolled-allocation-size`) | Fewer false positive results | The query now produces fewer, more accurate results. Cases where the tainted allocation size is range checked are more reliably excluded. |
| Overloaded assignment does not return 'this' (`cpp/assignment-does-not-return-this`) | Fewer false positive results | This query no longer reports incorrect results in template classes. |
| Pointer overflow check (`cpp/pointer-overflow-check`),<br> Possibly wrong buffer size in string copy (`cpp/bad-strncpy-size`),<br> Signed overflow check (`cpp/signed-overflow-check`) | More correct results | A new library is used for determining which expressions have identical value, giving more precise results. There is a performance cost to this, and the LGTM suite will overall run slower than before. |
| Unsafe array for days of the year (`cpp/leap-year/unsafe-array-for-days-of-the-year`) | | This query is no longer run on LGTM. |
| Unsigned comparison to zero (`cpp/unsigned-comparison-zero`) | More correct results | This query now also looks for comparisons of the form `0 <= x`. |
## Changes to libraries
* The data-flow library has been improved, which affects and improves some security queries. The improvements are:
- Track flow through functions that combine taint tracking with flow through fields.
- Track flow through clone-like functions, that is, functions that read contents of a field from a
parameter and stores the value in the field of a returned object.
* Created the `semmle.code.cpp.models.interfaces.Allocation` library to model allocation such as `new` expressions and calls to `malloc`. This in intended to replace the functionality in `semmle.code.cpp.commons.Alloc` with a more consistent and useful interface.
* Created the `semmle.code.cpp.models.interfaces.Deallocation` library to model deallocation such as `delete` expressions and calls to `free`. This in intended to replace the functionality in `semmle.code.cpp.commons.Alloc` with a more consistent and useful interface.
* The built-in C++20 "spaceship operator" (`<=>`) is now supported via the QL
class `SpaceshipExpr`. Overloaded forms are modeled as calls to functions
named `operator<=>`.
* The data-flow library (`semmle.code.cpp.dataflow.DataFlow` and
`semmle.code.cpp.dataflow.TaintTracking`) has been improved, which affects
and improves some security queries. The improvements are:
- Track flow through functions that combine taint tracking with flow through fields.
- Track flow through clone-like functions, that is, functions that read contents of a field from a
parameter and stores the value in the field of a returned object.
* The security pack taint tracking library
(`semmle.code.cpp.security.TaintTracking`) uses a new intermediate
representation. This provides a more precise analysis of flow through
parameters and pointers. For new queries, however, we continue to recommend
using `semmle.code.cpp.dataflow.TaintTracking`.
* The global value numbering library
(`semmle.code.cpp.valuenumbering.GlobalValueNumbering`) uses a new
intermediate representation to provide a more precise analysis of
heap-allocated memory and pointers to stack variables.
* New libraries have been created to provide a more consistent and useful interface
for modeling allocation and deallocation. These replace the old
`semmle.code.cpp.commons.Alloc` library.
* The new `semmle.code.cpp.models.interfaces.Allocation` library models
allocations, such as `new` expressions and calls to `malloc`.
* The new `semmle.code.cpp.models.interfaces.Deallocation` library
models deallocations, such as `delete` expressions and calls to `free`.
* The predicate `freeCall` in `semmle.code.cpp.commons.Alloc` has been
deprecated. The `Allocation` and `Deallocation` models in
`semmle.code.cpp.models.interfaces` should be used instead.
* The new class `StackVariable` should be used in place of `LocalScopeVariable`
in most cases. The difference is that `StackVariable` does not include
variables declared with `static` or `thread_local`.
* As a rule of thumb, custom queries about the _values_ of variables should
be changed from `LocalScopeVariable` to `StackVariable`, while queries
about the _name or scope_ of variables should remain unchanged.
* The `LocalScopeVariableReachability` library is deprecated in favor of
`StackVariableReachability`. The functionality is the same.
* The models library models `strlen` in more detail, and includes common variations such as `wcslen`.
* The models library models `gets` and similar functions.
* The models library now partially models `std::string`.
* The taint tracking library (`semmle.code.cpp.dataflow.TaintTracking`) has had
the following improvements:
* The library now models data flow through `strdup` and similar functions.
* The library now models data flow through formatting functions such as `sprintf`.
* The security pack taint tracking library (`semmle.code.cpp.security.TaintTracking`) uses a new intermediate representation. This provides a more precise analysis of pointers to stack variables and flow through parameters, improving the results of many security queries.
* The global value numbering library (`semmle.code.cpp.valuenumbering.GlobalValueNumbering`) uses a new intermediate representation to provide a more precise analysis of heap allocated memory and pointers to stack variables.
* As a rule of thumb, custom queries about the _values_ of variables should
be changed from `LocalScopeVariable` to `StackVariable`, while queries
about the _name or scope_ of variables should remain unchanged.
* The `LocalScopeVariableReachability` library is deprecated in favor of
`StackVariableReachability`. The functionality is the same.
* Taint tracking and data flow now features better modeling of commonly-used
library functions:
* `gets` and similar functions,
* the most common operations on `std::string`,
* `strdup` and similar functions, and
* formatting functions such as `sprintf`.

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@@ -2,29 +2,32 @@
The following changes in version 1.24 affect C# analysis in all applications.
## General improvements
You can now suppress alerts using either single-line block comments (`/* ... */`) or line comments (`// ...`).
## New queries
| **Query** | **Tags** | **Purpose** |
|-----------------------------|-----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Assembly path injection (`cs/assembly-path-injection`) | security, external/cwe/cwe-114 | Finds user-controlled data used to load an assembly. |
| Insecure configuration for ASP.NET requestValidationMode (`cs/insecure-request-validation-mode`) | security, external/cwe/cwe-016 | Finds where this attribute has been set to a value less than 4.5, which turns off some validation features and makes the application less secure. |
| Insecure SQL connection (`cs/insecure-sql-connection`) | security, external/cwe/cwe-327 | Finds unencrypted SQL connection strings. |
| Page request validation is disabled (`cs/web/request-validation-disabled`) | security, frameworks/asp.net, external/cwe/cwe-016 | Finds where ASP.NET page request validation has been disabled, which could make the application less secure. |
| Serialization check bypass (`cs/serialization-check-bypass`) | security, external/cwe/cwe-20 | Finds where data is not validated in a deserialization method. |
| XML injection (`cs/xml-injection`) | security, external/cwe/cwe-091 | Finds user-controlled data that is used to write directly to an XML document. |
| Assembly path injection (`cs/assembly-path-injection`) | security, external/cwe/cwe-114 | Finds user-controlled data used to load an assembly. Results are shown on LGTM by default. |
| Insecure configuration for ASP.NET requestValidationMode (`cs/insecure-request-validation-mode`) | security, external/cwe/cwe-016 | Finds where this attribute has been set to a value less than 4.5, which turns off some validation features and makes the application less secure. By default, the query is not run on LGTM. |
| Insecure SQL connection (`cs/insecure-sql-connection`) | security, external/cwe/cwe-327 | Finds unencrypted SQL connection strings. Results are not shown on LGTM by default. |
| Page request validation is disabled (`cs/web/request-validation-disabled`) | security, frameworks/asp.net, external/cwe/cwe-016 | Finds where ASP.NET page request validation has been disabled, which could make the application less secure. By default, the query is not run on LGTM. |
| Serialization check bypass (`cs/serialization-check-bypass`) | security, external/cwe/cwe-20 | Finds where data is not validated in a deserialization method. Results are not shown on LGTM by default. |
| XML injection (`cs/xml-injection`) | security, external/cwe/cwe-091 | Finds user-controlled data that is used to write directly to an XML document. Results are shown on LGTM by default. |
## Changes to existing queries
| **Query** | **Expected impact** | **Change** |
|------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Useless assignment to local variable (`cs/useless-assignment-to-local`) | Fewer false positive results | Results have been removed when the variable is named `_` in a `foreach` statement. |
| Potentially dangerous use of non-short-circuit logic (`cs/non-short-circuit`) | Fewer false positive results | Results have been removed when the expression contains an `out` parameter. |
| Dereferenced variable may be null (`cs/dereferenced-value-may-be-null`) | More results | Results are reported from parameters with a default value of `null`. |
| Useless assignment to local variable (`cs/useless-assignment-to-local`) | Fewer false positive results | Results have been removed when the value assigned is an (implicitly or explicitly) cast default-like value. For example, `var s = (string)null` and `string s = default`. |
| Information exposure through an exception (`cs/information-exposure-through-exception`) | More results | The query now recognizes writes to cookies, writes to ASP.NET (`Inner`)`Text` properties, and email contents as additional sinks. |
| Information exposure through transmitted data (`cs/sensitive-data-transmission`) | More results | The query now recognizes writes to cookies and writes to ASP.NET (`Inner`)`Text` properties as additional sinks. |
| Potentially dangerous use of non-short-circuit logic (`cs/non-short-circuit`) | Fewer false positive results | Results have been removed when the expression contains an `out` parameter. |
| Useless assignment to local variable (`cs/useless-assignment-to-local`) | Fewer false positive results | Results have been removed when the value assigned is an (implicitly or explicitly) cast default-like value. For example, `var s = (string)null` and `string s = default`. Results have also been removed when the variable is named `_` in a `foreach` statement. |
| XPath injection (`cs/xml/xpath-injection`) | More results | The query now recognizes calls to methods on `System.Xml.XPath.XPathNavigator` objects. |
## Removal of old queries
## Changes to code extraction
* Tuple expressions, for example `(int,bool)` in `default((int,bool))` are now extracted correctly.
@@ -35,12 +38,11 @@ The following changes in version 1.24 affect C# analysis in all applications.
## Changes to libraries
* The data-flow library has been improved, which affects and improves most security queries. The improvements are:
- Track flow through methods that combine taint tracking with flow through fields.
- Track flow through clone-like methods, that is, methods that read contents of a field from a
parameter and stores the value in the field of a returned object.
- Track flow through methods that combine taint tracking with flow through fields.
- Track flow through clone-like methods, that is, methods that read the contents of a field from a
parameter and store the value in the field of a returned object.
* The taint tracking library now tracks flow through (implicit or explicit) conversion operator calls.
* [Code contracts](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/debug-trace-profile/code-contracts) are now recognized, and are treated like any other assertion methods.
* Expression nullability flow state is given by the predicates `Expr.hasNotNullFlowState()` and `Expr.hasMaybeNullFlowState()`.
* `stackalloc` array creations are now represented by the QL class `Stackalloc`. Previously they were represented by the class `ArrayCreation`.
## Changes to autobuilder
* A new class `RemoteFlowSink` has been added to model sinks where data might be exposed to external users. Examples include web page output, emails, and cookies.

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@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ The following changes in version 1.24 affect Java analysis in all applications.
## General improvements
* Alert suppression can now be done with single-line block comments (`/* ... */`) as well as line comments (`// ...`).
* You can now suppress alerts using either single-line block comments (`/* ... */`) or line comments (`// ...`).
* A `Customizations.qll` file has been added to allow customizations of the standard library that apply to all queries.
## New queries
@@ -21,16 +21,16 @@ The following changes in version 1.24 affect Java analysis in all applications.
| **Query** | **Expected impact** | **Change** |
|------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Dereferenced variable may be null (`java/dereferenced-value-may-be-null`) | Fewer false positives | Final fields with a non-null initializer are no longer reported. |
| Expression always evaluates to the same value (`java/evaluation-to-constant`) | Fewer false positives | Expressions of the form `0 * x` are usually intended and no longer reported. Also left shift of ints by 32 bits and longs by 64 bits are no longer reported as they are not constant, these results are instead reported by the new query `java/lshift-larger-than-type-width`. |
| Useless null check (`java/useless-null-check`) | More true positives | Useless checks on final fields with a non-null initializer are now reported. |
| Dereferenced variable may be null (`java/dereferenced-value-may-be-null`) | Fewer false positive results | Final fields with a non-null initializer are no longer reported. |
| Expression always evaluates to the same value (`java/evaluation-to-constant`) | Fewer false positive results | Expressions of the form `0 * x` are usually intended and no longer reported. Also left shift of ints by 32 bits and longs by 64 bits are no longer reported as they are not constant, these results are instead reported by the new query `java/lshift-larger-than-type-width`. |
| Useless null check (`java/useless-null-check`) | More true positive results | Useless checks on final fields with a non-null initializer are now reported. |
## Changes to libraries
* The data-flow library has been improved, which affects and improves most security queries. The improvements are:
- Track flow through methods that combine taint tracking with flow through fields.
- Track flow through clone-like methods, that is, methods that read contents of a field from a
parameter and stores the value in the field of a returned object.
- Track flow through methods that combine taint tracking with flow through fields.
- Track flow through clone-like methods, that is, methods that read contents of a field from a
parameter and stores the value in the field of a returned object.
* Identification of test classes has been improved. Previously, one of the
match conditions would classify any class with a name containing the string
"Test" as a test class, but now this matching has been replaced with one that
@@ -38,6 +38,6 @@ The following changes in version 1.24 affect Java analysis in all applications.
general file classification mechanism and thus suppression of alerts, and
also any security queries using taint tracking, as test classes act as
default barriers stopping taint flow.
* Parentheses are now no longer modelled directly in the AST, that is, the
* Parentheses are now no longer modeled directly in the AST, that is, the
`ParExpr` class is empty. Instead, a parenthesized expression can be
identified with the `Expr.isParenthesized()` member predicate.

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@@ -4,67 +4,68 @@
* TypeScript 3.8 is now supported.
* Alert suppression can now be done with single-line block comments (`/* ... */`) as well as line comments (`// ...`).
* You can now suppress alerts using either single-line block comments (`/* ... */`) or line comments (`// ...`).
* Resolution of imports has improved, leading to more results from the security queries:
- Imports with the `.js` extension can now be resolved to a TypeScript file,
when the import refers to a file generated by TypeScript.
- Imports that rely on path-mappings from a `tsconfig.json` file can now be resolved.
- Export declarations of the form `export * as ns from "x"` are now analyzed more precisely.
- Imports with the `.js` extension can now be resolved to a TypeScript file,
when the import refers to a file generated by TypeScript.
- Imports that rely on path-mappings from a `tsconfig.json` file can now be resolved.
- Export declarations of the form `export * as ns from "x"` are now analyzed more precisely.
* The analysis of sanitizers has improved, leading to more accurate results from the security queries.
In particular:
- Sanitizer guards now act across function boundaries in more cases.
- Sanitizers can now better distinguish between a tainted value and an object _containing_ a tainted value.
- Sanitizer guards now act across function boundaries in more cases.
- Sanitizers can now better distinguish between a tainted value and an object _containing_ a tainted value.
* Call graph construction has been improved, leading to more results from the security queries:
- Calls can now be resolved to indirectly-defined class members in more cases.
- Calls through partial invocations such as `.bind` can now be resolved in more cases.
- Calls can now be resolved to indirectly-defined class members in more cases.
- Calls through partial invocations such as `.bind` can now be resolved in more cases.
* Support for flow summaries has been more clearly marked as being experimental and moved to the new `experimental` folder.
* Support for the following frameworks and libraries has been improved:
- [Electron](https://electronjs.org/)
- [fstream](https://www.npmjs.com/package/fstream)
- [Handlebars](https://www.npmjs.com/package/handlebars)
- [jsonfile](https://www.npmjs.com/package/jsonfile)
- [Koa](https://www.npmjs.com/package/koa)
- [Node.js](https://nodejs.org/)
- [Socket.IO](https://socket.io/)
- [WebSocket](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/WebSockets_API)
- [chrome-remote-interface](https://www.npmjs.com/package/chrome-remote-interface)
- [for-in](https://www.npmjs.com/package/for-in)
- [for-own](https://www.npmjs.com/package/for-own)
- [http2](https://nodejs.org/api/http2.html)
- [jQuery](https://jquery.com/)
- [lazy-cache](https://www.npmjs.com/package/lazy-cache)
- [mongodb](https://www.npmjs.com/package/mongodb)
- [ncp](https://www.npmjs.com/package/ncp)
- [node-dir](https://www.npmjs.com/package/node-dir)
- [path-exists](https://www.npmjs.com/package/path-exists)
- [pg](https://www.npmjs.com/package/pg)
- [react](https://www.npmjs.com/package/react)
- [recursive-readdir](https://www.npmjs.com/package/recursive-readdir)
- [request](https://www.npmjs.com/package/request)
- [rimraf](https://www.npmjs.com/package/rimraf)
- [send](https://www.npmjs.com/package/send)
- [SockJS](https://www.npmjs.com/package/sockjs)
- [SockJS-client](https://www.npmjs.com/package/sockjs-client)
- [typeahead.js](https://www.npmjs.com/package/typeahead.js)
- [vinyl-fs](https://www.npmjs.com/package/vinyl-fs)
- [write-file-atomic](https://www.npmjs.com/package/write-file-atomic)
- [ws](https://github.com/websockets/ws)
- [chrome-remote-interface](https://www.npmjs.com/package/chrome-remote-interface)
- [Electron](https://electronjs.org/)
- [for-in](https://www.npmjs.com/package/for-in)
- [for-own](https://www.npmjs.com/package/for-own)
- [fstream](https://www.npmjs.com/package/fstream)
- [Handlebars](https://www.npmjs.com/package/handlebars)
- [http2](https://nodejs.org/api/http2.html)
- [jQuery](https://jquery.com/)
- [jsonfile](https://www.npmjs.com/package/jsonfile)
- [Koa](https://www.npmjs.com/package/koa)
- [lazy-cache](https://www.npmjs.com/package/lazy-cache)
- [mongodb](https://www.npmjs.com/package/mongodb)
- [ncp](https://www.npmjs.com/package/ncp)
- [Node.js](https://nodejs.org/)
- [node-dir](https://www.npmjs.com/package/node-dir)
- [path-exists](https://www.npmjs.com/package/path-exists)
- [pg](https://www.npmjs.com/package/pg)
- [react](https://www.npmjs.com/package/react)
- [recursive-readdir](https://www.npmjs.com/package/recursive-readdir)
- [request](https://www.npmjs.com/package/request)
- [rimraf](https://www.npmjs.com/package/rimraf)
- [send](https://www.npmjs.com/package/send)
- [Socket.IO](https://socket.io/)
- [SockJS](https://www.npmjs.com/package/sockjs)
- [SockJS-client](https://www.npmjs.com/package/sockjs-client)
- [typeahead.js](https://www.npmjs.com/package/typeahead.js)
- [vinyl-fs](https://www.npmjs.com/package/vinyl-fs)
- [WebSocket](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/WebSockets_API)
- [write-file-atomic](https://www.npmjs.com/package/write-file-atomic)
- [ws](https://github.com/websockets/ws)
## New queries
| **Query** | **Tags** | **Purpose** |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Cross-site scripting through exception (`js/xss-through-exception`) | security, external/cwe/cwe-079, external/cwe/cwe-116 | Highlights potential XSS vulnerabilities where an exception is written to the DOM. Results are not shown on LGTM by default. |
| Regular expression always matches (`js/regex/always-matches`) | correctness, regular-expressions | Highlights regular expression checks that trivially succeed by matching an empty substring. Results are shown on LGTM by default. |
| Missing await (`js/missing-await`) | correctness | Highlights expressions that operate directly on a promise object in a nonsensical way, instead of awaiting its result. Results are shown on LGTM by default. |
| Polynomial regular expression used on uncontrolled data (`js/polynomial-redos`) | security, external/cwe/cwe-730, external/cwe/cwe-400 | Highlights expensive regular expressions that may be used on malicious input. Results are shown on LGTM by default. |
| Prototype pollution in utility function (`js/prototype-pollution-utility`) | security, external/cwe/cwe-400, external/cwe/cwe-471 | Highlights recursive assignment operations that are susceptible to prototype pollution. Results are shown on LGTM by default. |
| Unsafe jQuery plugin (`js/unsafe-jquery-plugin`) | Highlights potential XSS vulnerabilities in unsafely designed jQuery plugins. Results are shown on LGTM by default. |
| Regular expression always matches (`js/regex/always-matches`) | correctness, regular-expressions | Highlights regular expression checks that trivially succeed by matching an empty substring. Results are shown on LGTM by default. |
| Unsafe jQuery plugin (`js/unsafe-jquery-plugin`) | | Highlights potential XSS vulnerabilities in unsafely designed jQuery plugins. Results are shown on LGTM by default. |
| Unnecessary use of `cat` process (`js/unnecessary-use-of-cat`) | correctness, security, maintainability | Highlights command executions of `cat` where the fs API should be used instead. Results are shown on LGTM by default. |
@@ -73,19 +74,20 @@
| **Query** | **Expected impact** | **Change** |
|--------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Clear-text logging of sensitive information (`js/clear-text-logging`) | More results | More results involving `process.env` and indirect calls to logging methods are recognized. |
| Duplicate parameter names (`js/duplicate-parameter-name`) | Fewer results | This query now recognizes additional parameters that reasonably can have duplicated names. |
| Incomplete string escaping or encoding (`js/incomplete-sanitization`) | Fewer false positive results | This query now recognizes additional cases where a single replacement is likely to be intentional. |
| Unbound event handler receiver (`js/unbound-event-handler-receiver`) | Fewer false positive results | This query now recognizes additional ways event handler receivers can be bound. |
| Duplicate parameter names (`js/duplicate-parameter-name`) | Fewer results | This query now ignores additional parameters that reasonably can have duplicated names. |
| Expression has no effect (`js/useless-expression`) | Fewer false positive results | The query now recognizes block-level flow type annotations and ignores the first statement of a try block. |
| Use of call stack introspection in strict mode (`js/strict-mode-call-stack-introspection`) | Fewer false positive results | The query no longer flags expression statements. |
| Identical operands (`js/redundant-operation`) | Fewer results | This query now excludes cases where the operands change a value using ++/-- expressions. |
| Incomplete string escaping or encoding (`js/incomplete-sanitization`) | Fewer false positive results | This query now recognizes and excludes additional cases where a single replacement is likely to be intentional. |
| Incomplete URL scheme check (`js/incomplete-url-scheme-check`) | More results | This query now recognizes additional variations of URL scheme checks. |
| Missing CSRF middleware (`js/missing-token-validation`) | Fewer false positive results | The query reports fewer duplicates and only flags handlers that explicitly access cookie data. |
| Uncontrolled data used in path expression (`js/path-injection`) | More results | This query now recognizes additional ways dangerous paths can be constructed and used. |
| Uncontrolled command line (`js/command-line-injection`) | More results | This query now recognizes additional ways of constructing arguments to `cmd.exe` and `/bin/sh`. |
| Superfluous trailing arguments (`js/superfluous-trailing-arguments`) | Fewer results | This query now excludes cases where a function uses the `Function.arguments` value to process a variable number of parameters. |
| Syntax error (`js/syntax-error`) | Lower severity | This results of this query are now displayed with lower severity. |
| Use of password hash with insufficient computational effort (`js/insufficient-password-hash`) | Fewer false positive results | This query now recognizes additional cases that do not require secure hashing. |
| Useless regular-expression character escape (`js/useless-regexp-character-escape`) | Fewer false positive results | This query now distinguishes escapes in strings and regular expression literals. |
| Identical operands (`js/redundant-operation`) | Fewer results | This query now recognizes cases where the operands change a value using ++/-- expressions. |
| Superfluous trailing arguments (`js/superfluous-trailing-arguments`) | Fewer results | This query now recognizes cases where a function uses the `Function.arguments` value to process a variable number of parameters. |
| Unbound event handler receiver (`js/unbound-event-handler-receiver`) | Fewer false positive results | This query now recognizes additional ways event handler receivers can be bound. |
| Uncontrolled command line (`js/command-line-injection`) | More results | This query now recognizes additional ways of constructing arguments to `cmd.exe` and `/bin/sh`. |
| Uncontrolled data used in path expression (`js/path-injection`) | More results | This query now recognizes additional ways dangerous paths can be constructed and used. |
| Use of call stack introspection in strict mode (`js/strict-mode-call-stack-introspection`) | Fewer false positive results | The query no longer flags expression statements. |
| Use of password hash with insufficient computational effort (`js/insufficient-password-hash`) | Fewer false positive results | This query now recognizes and excludes additional cases that do not require secure hashing. |
| Useless regular-expression character escape (`js/useless-regexp-character-escape`) | Fewer false positive results | This query now distinguishes between escapes in strings and regular expression literals. |
## Changes to libraries
@@ -93,6 +95,6 @@
* An extensible model of the `EventEmitter` pattern has been implemented.
* Taint-tracking configurations now interact differently with the `data` flow label, which may affect queries
that combine taint-tracking and flow labels.
- Sources added by the 1-argument `isSource` predicate are associated with the `taint` label now, instead of the `data` label.
- Sanitizers now only block the `taint` label. As a result, sanitizers no longer block the flow of tainted values wrapped inside a property of an object.
To retain the old behavior, instead use a barrier, or block the `data` flow label using a labeled sanitizer.
- Sources added by the 1-argument `isSource` predicate are associated with the `taint` label now, instead of the `data` label.
- Sanitizers now only block the `taint` label. As a result, sanitizers no longer block the flow of tainted values wrapped inside a property of an object.
To retain the old behavior, instead use a barrier, or block the `data` flow label using a labeled sanitizer.

View File

@@ -4,37 +4,52 @@ The following changes in version 1.24 affect Python analysis in all applications
## General improvements
Support for Django version 2.x and 3.x
- Support for Django version 2.x and 3.x
## New queries
- Taint tracking now correctly tracks taint in destructuring assignments. For example, if `tainted_list` is a list of tainted tainted elements, then
```python
head, *tail = tainted_list
```
will result in `tail` being tainted with the same taint as `tainted_list`, and `head` being tainted with the taint of the elements of `tainted_list`.
- A large number of libraries and queries have been moved to the new `Value` API, which should result in more precise results.
- The `Value` interface has been extended in various ways:
- A new `StringValue` class has been added, for tracking string literals.
- Values now have a `booleanValue` method which returns the boolean interpretation of the given value.
- Built-in methods for which the return type is not fixed are now modeled as returning an unknown value by default.
| **Query** | **Tags** | **Purpose** |
|-----------------------------|-----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|
## Changes to existing queries
| **Query** | **Expected impact** | **Change** |
|----------------------------|------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Uncontrolled command line (`py/command-line-injection`) | More results | We now model the `fabric` and `invoke` pacakges for command execution. |
| Arbitrary file write during tarfile extraction (`py/tarslip`) | Fewer false negative results | Negations are now handled correctly in conditional expressions that may sanitize tainted values. |
| First parameter of a method is not named 'self' (`py/not-named-self`) | Fewer false positive results | `__class_getitem__` is now recognized as a class method. |
| Import of deprecated module (`py/import-deprecated-module`) | Fewer false positive results | Deprecated modules that are used to provide backwards compatibility are no longer reported.|
| Module imports itself (`py/import-own-module`) | Fewer false positive results | Imports local to a given package are no longer classified as self-imports. |
| Uncontrolled command line (`py/command-line-injection`) | More results | We now model the `fabric` and `invoke` packages for command execution. |
### Web framework support
The QL-library support for the web frameworks Bottle, CherryPy, Falcon, Pyramid, TurboGears, Tornado, and Twisted have
been fixed so they provide a proper HttpRequestTaintSource, instead of a TaintSource. This will enable results for the following queries:
The CodeQL library has improved support for the web frameworks: Bottle, CherryPy, Falcon, Pyramid, TurboGears, Tornado, and Twisted. They now provide a proper `HttpRequestTaintSource`, instead of a `TaintSource`. This will enable results for the following queries:
- py/path-injection
- py/command-line-injection
- py/reflective-xss
- py/sql-injection
- py/code-injection
- py/unsafe-deserialization
- py/url-redirection
- `py/path-injection`
- `py/command-line-injection`
- `py/reflective-xss`
- `py/sql-injection`
- `py/code-injection`
- `py/unsafe-deserialization`
- `py/url-redirection`
The QL-library support for the web framework Twisted have been fixed so they provide a proper
HttpResponseTaintSink, instead of a TaintSink. This will enable results for the following
The library also has improved support for the web framework Twisted. It now provides a proper
`HttpResponseTaintSink`, instead of a `TaintSink`. This will enable results for the following
queries:
- py/reflective-xss
- py/stack-trace-exposure
- `py/reflective-xss`
- `py/stack-trace-exposure`
## Changes to libraries
### Taint tracking
- The `urlsplit` and `urlparse` functions now propagate taint appropriately.
- HTTP requests using the `requests` library are now modeled.

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
# Improvements to C/C++ analysis
The following changes in version 1.25 affect C/C++ analysis in all applications.
## General improvements
## New queries
| **Query** | **Tags** | **Purpose** |
|-----------------------------|-----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|
## Changes to existing queries
| **Query** | **Expected impact** | **Change** |
|----------------------------|------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
## Changes to libraries
* The library `VCS.qll` and all queries that imported it have been removed.
* The data-flow library has been improved, which affects most security queries by potentially
adding more results. Flow through functions now takes nested field reads/writes into account.
For example, the library is able to track flow from `taint()` to `sink()` via the method
`getf2f1()` in
```c
struct C {
int f1;
};
struct C2
{
C f2;
int getf2f1() {
return f2.f1; // Nested field read
}
void m() {
f2.f1 = taint();
sink(getf2f1()); // NEW: taint() reaches here
}
};
```
* The security pack taint tracking library (`semmle.code.cpp.security.TaintTracking`) now considers that equality checks may block the flow of taint. This results in fewer false positive results from queries that use this library.

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
# Improvements to C# analysis
The following changes in version 1.25 affect C# analysis in all applications.
## New queries
| **Query** | **Tags** | **Purpose** |
|-----------------------------|-----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|
## Changes to existing queries
| **Query** | **Expected impact** | **Change** |
|------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------------|
## Removal of old queries
## Changes to code extraction
* Index initializers, of the form `{ [1] = "one" }`, are extracted correctly. Previously, the kind of the
expression was incorrect, and the index was not extracted.
## Changes to libraries
* The class `UnboundGeneric` has been refined to only be those declarations that actually
have type parameters. This means that non-generic nested types inside constructed types,
such as `A<int>.B`, no longer are considered unbound generics. (Such nested types do,
however, still have relevant `.getSourceDeclaration()`s, for example `A<>.B`.)
* The data-flow library has been improved, which affects most security queries by potentially
adding more results. Flow through methods now takes nested field reads/writes into account.
For example, the library is able to track flow from `"taint"` to `Sink()` via the method
`GetF2F1()` in
```csharp
class C1
{
string F1;
}
class C2
{
C1 F2;
string GetF2F1() => F2.F1; // Nested field read
void M()
{
F2 = new C1() { F1 = "taint" };
Sink(GetF2F1()); // NEW: "taint" reaches here
}
}
```
## Changes to autobuilder

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
# Improvements to Java analysis
The following changes in version 1.25 affect Java analysis in all applications.
## General improvements
## New queries
| **Query** | **Tags** | **Purpose** |
|-----------------------------|-----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|
## Changes to existing queries
| **Query** | **Expected impact** | **Change** |
|------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------------|
## Changes to libraries
* The data-flow library has been improved, which affects most security queries by potentially
adding more results. Flow through methods now takes nested field reads/writes into account.
For example, the library is able to track flow from `"taint"` to `sink()` via the method
`getF2F1()` in
```java
class C1 {
String f1;
C1(String f1) { this.f1 = f1; }
}
class C2 {
C1 f2;
String getF2F1() {
return this.f2.f1; // Nested field read
}
void m() {
this.f2 = new C1("taint");
sink(this.getF2F1()); // NEW: "taint" reaches here
}
}
```

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
# Improvements to JavaScript analysis
## General improvements
* Support for the following frameworks and libraries has been improved:
- [Promise](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Global_Objects/Promise)
- [bluebird](http://bluebirdjs.com/)
- [express](https://www.npmjs.com/package/express)
- [fastify](https://www.npmjs.com/package/fastify)
- [fstream](https://www.npmjs.com/package/fstream)
- [jGrowl](https://github.com/stanlemon/jGrowl)
- [jQuery](https://jquery.com/)
- [marsdb](https://www.npmjs.com/package/marsdb)
- [minimongo](https://www.npmjs.com/package/minimongo/)
- [mssql](https://www.npmjs.com/package/mssql)
- [mysql](https://www.npmjs.com/package/mysql)
- [pg](https://www.npmjs.com/package/pg)
- [sequelize](https://www.npmjs.com/package/sequelize)
- [spanner](https://www.npmjs.com/package/spanner)
- [sqlite](https://www.npmjs.com/package/sqlite)
- [ssh2-streams](https://www.npmjs.com/package/ssh2-streams)
- [ssh2](https://www.npmjs.com/package/ssh2)
* TypeScript 3.9 is now supported.
## New queries
| **Query** | **Tags** | **Purpose** |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Cross-site scripting through DOM (`js/xss-through-dom`) | security, external/cwe/cwe-079, external/cwe/cwe-116 | Highlights potential XSS vulnerabilities where existing text from the DOM is used as HTML. Results are not shown on LGTM by default. |
| Incomplete HTML attribute sanitization (`js/incomplete-html-attribute-sanitization`) | security, external/cwe/cwe-20, external/cwe/cwe-079, external/cwe/cwe-116 | Highlights potential XSS vulnerabilities due to incomplete sanitization of HTML meta-characters. Results are shown on LGTM by default. |
| Unsafe expansion of self-closing HTML tag (`js/unsafe-html-expansion`) | security, external/cwe/cwe-079, external/cwe/cwe-116 | Highlights potential XSS vulnerabilities caused by unsafe expansion of self-closing HTML tags. |
| Unsafe shell command constructed from library input (`js/shell-command-constructed-from-input`) | correctness, security, external/cwe/cwe-078, external/cwe/cwe-088 | Highlights potential command injections due to a shell command being constructed from library inputs. Results are shown on LGTM by default. |
## Changes to existing queries
| **Query** | **Expected impact** | **Change** |
|--------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Client-side cross-site scripting (`js/xss`) | Fewer results | This query no longer flags optionally sanitized values. |
| Client-side URL redirect (`js/client-side-unvalidated-url-redirection`) | Fewer results | This query now recognizes additional safe patterns of doing URL redirects. |
| Client-side cross-site scripting (`js/xss`) | Fewer results | This query now recognizes additional safe patterns of constructing HTML. |
| Code injection (`js/code-injection`) | More results | More potential vulnerabilities involving NoSQL code operators are now recognized. |
| Expression has no effect (`js/useless-expression`) | Fewer results | This query no longer flags an expression when that expression is the only content of the containing file. |
| Incomplete URL scheme check (`js/incomplete-url-scheme-check`) | More results | This query now recognizes additional url scheme checks. |
| Misspelled variable name (`js/misspelled-variable-name`) | Message changed | The message for this query now correctly identifies the misspelled variable in additional cases. |
| Prototype pollution in utility function (`js/prototype-pollution-utility`) | More results | This query now recognizes additional utility functions as vulnerable to prototype polution. |
| Prototype pollution in utility function (`js/prototype-pollution-utility`) | More results | This query now recognizes more coding patterns that are vulnerable to prototype pollution. |
| Uncontrolled command line (`js/command-line-injection`) | More results | This query now recognizes additional command execution calls. |
| Uncontrolled data used in path expression (`js/path-injection`) | More results | This query now recognizes additional file system calls. |
| Unknown directive (`js/unknown-directive`) | Fewer results | This query no longer flags directives generated by the Babel compiler. |
| Unused property (`js/unused-property`) | Fewer results | This query no longer flags properties of objects that are operands of `yield` expressions. |
| Zip Slip (`js/zipslip`) | More results | This query now recognizes additional vulnerabilities. |
The following low-precision queries are no longer run by default on LGTM (their results already were not displayed):
- `js/angular/dead-event-listener`
- `js/angular/unused-dependency`
- `js/bitwise-sign-check`
- `js/comparison-of-identical-expressions`
- `js/conflicting-html-attribute`
- `js/ignored-setter-parameter`
- `js/jsdoc/malformed-param-tag`
- `js/jsdoc/missing-parameter`
- `js/jsdoc/unknown-parameter`
- `js/json-in-javascript-file`
- `js/misspelled-identifier`
- `js/nested-loops-with-same-variable`
- `js/node/cyclic-import`
- `js/node/unused-npm-dependency`
- `js/omitted-array-element`
- `js/return-outside-function`
- `js/single-run-loop`
- `js/too-many-parameters`
- `js/unused-property`
- `js/useless-assignment-to-global`
## Changes to libraries
* A library `semmle.javascript.explore.CallGraph` has been added to help write queries for exploring the call graph.
* Added data flow for `Map` and `Set`, and added matching type-tracking steps that can accessed using the `CollectionsTypeTracking` module.
* The data-flow node representing a parameter or destructuring pattern is now always the `ValueNode` corresponding to that AST node. This has a few consequences:
- `Parameter.flow()` now gets the correct data flow node for a parameter. Previously this had a result, but the node was disconnected from the data flow graph.
- `ParameterNode.asExpr()` and `.getAstNode()` now gets the parameter's AST node, whereas previously it had no result.
- `Expr.flow()` now has a more meaningful result for destructuring patterns. Previously this node was disconnected from the data flow graph. Now it represents the values being destructured by the pattern.
* The global data-flow and taint-tracking libraries now model indirect parameter accesses through the `arguments` object in some cases, which may lead to additional results from some of the security queries, particularly "Prototype pollution in utility function".

View File

@@ -111,12 +111,12 @@
"csharp/ql/src/semmle/code/csharp/ir/implementation/raw/IR.qll",
"csharp/ql/src/semmle/code/csharp/ir/implementation/unaliased_ssa/IR.qll"
],
"IR IRSanity": [
"cpp/ql/src/semmle/code/cpp/ir/implementation/raw/IRSanity.qll",
"cpp/ql/src/semmle/code/cpp/ir/implementation/unaliased_ssa/IRSanity.qll",
"cpp/ql/src/semmle/code/cpp/ir/implementation/aliased_ssa/IRSanity.qll",
"csharp/ql/src/semmle/code/csharp/ir/implementation/raw/IRSanity.qll",
"csharp/ql/src/semmle/code/csharp/ir/implementation/unaliased_ssa/IRSanity.qll"
"IR IRConsistency": [
"cpp/ql/src/semmle/code/cpp/ir/implementation/raw/IRConsistency.qll",
"cpp/ql/src/semmle/code/cpp/ir/implementation/unaliased_ssa/IRConsistency.qll",
"cpp/ql/src/semmle/code/cpp/ir/implementation/aliased_ssa/IRConsistency.qll",
"csharp/ql/src/semmle/code/csharp/ir/implementation/raw/IRConsistency.qll",
"csharp/ql/src/semmle/code/csharp/ir/implementation/unaliased_ssa/IRConsistency.qll"
],
"IR PrintIR": [
"cpp/ql/src/semmle/code/cpp/ir/implementation/raw/PrintIR.qll",
@@ -157,10 +157,10 @@
"cpp/ql/src/semmle/code/cpp/ir/implementation/Opcode.qll",
"csharp/ql/src/semmle/code/csharp/ir/implementation/Opcode.qll"
],
"IR SSASanity": [
"cpp/ql/src/semmle/code/cpp/ir/implementation/unaliased_ssa/internal/SSASanity.qll",
"cpp/ql/src/semmle/code/cpp/ir/implementation/aliased_ssa/internal/SSASanity.qll",
"csharp/ql/src/semmle/code/csharp/ir/implementation/unaliased_ssa/internal/SSASanity.qll"
"IR SSAConsistency": [
"cpp/ql/src/semmle/code/cpp/ir/implementation/unaliased_ssa/internal/SSAConsistency.qll",
"cpp/ql/src/semmle/code/cpp/ir/implementation/aliased_ssa/internal/SSAConsistency.qll",
"csharp/ql/src/semmle/code/csharp/ir/implementation/unaliased_ssa/internal/SSAConsistency.qll"
],
"C++ IR InstructionImports": [
"cpp/ql/src/semmle/code/cpp/ir/implementation/raw/internal/InstructionImports.qll",

View File

@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ def choose_latest_file(files):
local_error_count = 0
def emit_local_error(path, line, error):
print('ERROR: ' + path + ':' + line + " - " + error)
print('ERROR: ' + path + ':' + str(line) + " - " + error)
global local_error_count
local_error_count += 1

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
import semmle.code.cpp.pointsto.PointsTo
/** Holds if there exists a call to a function that might close the file specified by `e`. */
predicate closed(Expr e) {
fcloseCall(_, e) or
exists(ExprCall c |
@@ -8,10 +9,19 @@ predicate closed(Expr e) {
)
}
/** An expression for which there exists a function call that might close it. */
class ClosedExpr extends PointsToExpr {
ClosedExpr() { closed(this) }
override predicate interesting() { closed(this) }
}
/**
* Holds if `fc` is a call to a function that opens a file that might be closed. For example:
* ```
* FILE* f = fopen("file.txt", "r");
* ...
* fclose(f);
* ```
*/
predicate fopenCallMayBeClosed(FunctionCall fc) { fopenCall(fc) and anythingPointsTo(fc) }

View File

@@ -2,12 +2,24 @@
import cpp
/**
* An assignment to a variable with the value `0`. For example:
* ```
* int x;
* x = 0;
* ```
* but not:
* ```
* int x = 0;
* ```
*/
class ZeroAssignment extends AssignExpr {
ZeroAssignment() {
this.getAnOperand() instanceof VariableAccess and
this.getAnOperand() instanceof Zero
}
/** Gets a variable that is assigned the value `0`. */
Variable assignedVariable() { result.getAnAccess() = this.getAnOperand() }
}

View File

@@ -4,15 +4,24 @@ private predicate freed(Expr e) {
e = any(DeallocationExpr de).getFreedExpr()
or
exists(ExprCall c |
// cautiously assume that any ExprCall could be a freeCall.
// cautiously assume that any `ExprCall` could be a deallocation expression.
c.getAnArgument() = e
)
}
/** An expression that might be deallocated. */
class FreedExpr extends PointsToExpr {
FreedExpr() { freed(this) }
override predicate interesting() { freed(this) }
}
/**
* An allocation expression that might be deallocated. For example:
* ```
* int* p = new int;
* ...
* delete p;
* ```
*/
predicate allocMayBeFreed(AllocationExpr alloc) { anythingPointsTo(alloc) }

View File

@@ -1,10 +1,19 @@
import cpp
/**
* Holds if `val` is an access to the variable `v`, or if `val`
* is an assignment with an access to `v` on the left-hand side.
*/
predicate valueOfVar(Variable v, Expr val) {
val = v.getAnAccess() or
val.(AssignExpr).getLValue() = v.getAnAccess()
}
/**
* Holds if either:
* - `cond` is an (in)equality expression that compares the variable `v` to the value `-1`, or
* - `cond` is a relational expression that compares the variable `v` to a constant.
*/
predicate boundsCheckExpr(Variable v, Expr cond) {
exists(EQExpr eq |
cond = eq and
@@ -43,6 +52,18 @@ predicate boundsCheckExpr(Variable v, Expr cond) {
)
}
/**
* Holds if `node` is an expression in a conditional statement and `succ` is an
* immediate successor of `node` that may be reached after evaluating `node`.
* For example, given
* ```
* if (a < 10 && b) func1();
* else func2();
* ```
* this predicate holds when either:
* - `node` is `a < 10` and `succ` is `func2()` or `b`, or
* - `node` is `b` and `succ` is `func1()` or `func2()`
*/
predicate conditionalSuccessor(ControlFlowNode node, ControlFlowNode succ) {
if node.isCondition()
then succ = node.getATrueSuccessor() or succ = node.getAFalseSuccessor()
@@ -52,6 +73,12 @@ predicate conditionalSuccessor(ControlFlowNode node, ControlFlowNode succ) {
)
}
/**
* Holds if the current value of the variable `v` at control-flow
* node `n` has been used either in:
* - an (in)equality comparison with the value `-1`, or
* - a relational comparison that compares `v` to a constant.
*/
predicate boundsChecked(Variable v, ControlFlowNode node) {
exists(Expr test |
boundsCheckExpr(v, test) and
@@ -63,6 +90,14 @@ predicate boundsChecked(Variable v, ControlFlowNode node) {
)
}
/**
* Holds if `cond` compares `v` to some common error values. Specifically, this
* predicate holds when:
* - `cond` checks that `v` is equal to `-1`, or
* - `cond` checks that `v` is less than `0`, or
* - `cond` checks that `v` is less than or equal to `-1`, or
* - `cond` checks that `v` is not some common success value (see `successCondition`).
*/
predicate errorCondition(Variable v, Expr cond) {
exists(EQExpr eq |
cond = eq and
@@ -88,6 +123,14 @@ predicate errorCondition(Variable v, Expr cond) {
)
}
/**
* Holds if `cond` compares `v` to some common success values. Specifically, this
* predicate holds when:
* - `cond` checks that `v` is not equal to `-1`, or
* - `cond` checks that `v` is greater than or equal than `0`, or
* - `cond` checks that `v` is greater than `-1`, or
* - `cond` checks that `v` is not some common error value (see `errorCondition`).
*/
predicate successCondition(Variable v, Expr cond) {
exists(NEExpr ne |
cond = ne and
@@ -113,6 +156,11 @@ predicate successCondition(Variable v, Expr cond) {
)
}
/**
* Holds if there exists a comparison operation that checks whether `v`
* represents some common *error* values, and `n` may be reached
* immediately following the comparison operation.
*/
predicate errorSuccessor(Variable v, ControlFlowNode n) {
exists(Expr cond |
errorCondition(v, cond) and n = cond.getATrueSuccessor()
@@ -121,6 +169,11 @@ predicate errorSuccessor(Variable v, ControlFlowNode n) {
)
}
/**
* Holds if there exists a comparison operation that checks whether `v`
* represents some common *success* values, and `n` may be reached
* immediately following the comparison operation.
*/
predicate successSuccessor(Variable v, ControlFlowNode n) {
exists(Expr cond |
successCondition(v, cond) and n = cond.getATrueSuccessor()
@@ -129,6 +182,10 @@ predicate successSuccessor(Variable v, ControlFlowNode n) {
)
}
/**
* Holds if the current value of the variable `v` at control-flow node
* `n` may have been checked against a common set of *error* values.
*/
predicate checkedError(Variable v, ControlFlowNode n) {
errorSuccessor(v, n)
or
@@ -139,6 +196,10 @@ predicate checkedError(Variable v, ControlFlowNode n) {
)
}
/**
* Holds if the current value of the variable `v` at control-flow node
* `n` may have been checked against a common set of *success* values.
*/
predicate checkedSuccess(Variable v, ControlFlowNode n) {
successSuccessor(v, n)
or

View File

@@ -5,17 +5,34 @@
import cpp
import semmle.code.cpp.controlflow.SSA
import semmle.code.cpp.dataflow.DataFlow
import semmle.code.cpp.models.implementations.Allocation
import semmle.code.cpp.models.implementations.Deallocation
/**
* Holds if `alloc` is a use of `malloc` or `new`. `kind` is
* a string describing the type of the allocation.
*/
predicate allocExpr(Expr alloc, string kind) {
isAllocationExpr(alloc) and
not alloc.isFromUninstantiatedTemplate(_) and
(
alloc instanceof FunctionCall and
kind = "malloc"
exists(Function target |
alloc.(AllocationExpr).(FunctionCall).getTarget() = target and
(
target.getName() = "operator new" and
kind = "new" and
// exclude placement new and custom overloads as they
// may not conform to assumptions
not target.getNumberOfParameters() > 1
or
target.getName() = "operator new[]" and
kind = "new[]" and
// exclude placement new and custom overloads as they
// may not conform to assumptions
not target.getNumberOfParameters() > 1
or
not target instanceof OperatorNewAllocationFunction and
kind = "malloc"
)
)
or
alloc instanceof NewExpr and
kind = "new" and
@@ -28,7 +45,8 @@ predicate allocExpr(Expr alloc, string kind) {
// exclude placement new and custom overloads as they
// may not conform to assumptions
not alloc.(NewArrayExpr).getAllocatorCall().getTarget().getNumberOfParameters() > 1
)
) and
not alloc.isFromUninstantiatedTemplate(_)
}
/**
@@ -110,8 +128,20 @@ predicate allocReaches(Expr e, Expr alloc, string kind) {
* describing the type of that free or delete.
*/
predicate freeExpr(Expr free, Expr freed, string kind) {
freeCall(free, freed) and
kind = "free"
exists(Function target |
freed = free.(DeallocationExpr).getFreedExpr() and
free.(FunctionCall).getTarget() = target and
(
target.getName() = "operator delete" and
kind = "delete"
or
target.getName() = "operator delete[]" and
kind = "delete[]"
or
not target instanceof OperatorDeleteDeallocationFunction and
kind = "free"
)
)
or
free.(DeleteExpr).getExpr() = freed and
kind = "delete"

View File

@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@
import cpp
/**
* Gets a string representation of the comment `c` containing the caption 'TODO' or 'FIXME'.
* If `c` spans multiple lines, all lines after the first are abbreviated as [...].
*/
string getCommentTextCaptioned(Comment c, string caption) {
(caption = "TODO" or caption = "FIXME") and
exists(

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
/**
* Provides classes and predicates for identifying C/C++ comments that look like code.
*/
import cpp
/**
@@ -137,8 +141,14 @@ class CommentBlock extends Comment {
)
}
/**
* Gets the last comment associated with this comment block.
*/
Comment lastComment() { result = this.getComment(max(int i | exists(this.getComment(i)))) }
/**
* Gets the contents of the `i`'th comment associated with this comment block.
*/
string getLine(int i) {
this instanceof CStyleComment and
result = this.getContents().regexpCapture("(?s)/\\*+(.*)\\*+/", 1).splitAt("\n", i)
@@ -146,14 +156,24 @@ class CommentBlock extends Comment {
this instanceof CppStyleComment and result = this.getComment(i).getContents().suffix(2)
}
/**
* Gets the number of lines in the comments associated with this comment block.
*/
int numLines() {
result = strictcount(int i, string line | line = this.getLine(i) and line.trim() != "")
}
/**
* Gets the number of lines that look like code in the comments associated with this comment block.
*/
int numCodeLines() {
result = strictcount(int i, string line | line = this.getLine(i) and looksLikeCode(line))
}
/**
* Holds if the comment block is a C-style comment, and each
* comment line starts with a *.
*/
predicate isDocumentation() {
// If a C-style comment starts each line with a *, then it's
// probably documentation rather than code.
@@ -161,6 +181,12 @@ class CommentBlock extends Comment {
forex(int i | i in [1 .. this.numLines() - 1] | this.getLine(i).trim().matches("*%"))
}
/**
* Holds if this comment block looks like code that has been commented out. Specifically:
* 1. It does not look like documentation (see `isDocumentation`).
* 2. It is not in a header file without any declaration entries or top level declarations.
* 3. More than half of the lines in the comment block look like code.
*/
predicate isCommentedOutCode() {
not this.isDocumentation() and
not this.getFile().(HeaderFile).noTopLevelCode() and

View File

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ predicate allowedTypedefs(TypedefType t) {
* Gets a type which appears literally in the declaration of `d`.
*/
Type getAnImmediateUsedType(Declaration d) {
d.isDefined() and
d.hasDefinition() and
(
result = d.(Function).getType() or
result = d.(Variable).getType()

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
* @description Using the TLS or SSLv23 protocol from the boost::asio library, but not disabling deprecated protocols, or disabling minimum-recommended protocols.
* @kind problem
* @problem.severity error
* @id cpp/boost/tls_settings_misconfiguration
* @id cpp/boost/tls-settings-misconfiguration
* @tags security
*/

View File

@@ -8,6 +8,6 @@ struct S {
// Whereas here it does make a semantic difference.
auto getValCorrect() const -> int {
return val
return val;
}
};

View File

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
import cpp
pragma[inline]
private predicate arithTypesMatch(Type arg, Type parm) {
arg = parm
or

View File

@@ -6,29 +6,50 @@
import cpp
// True if function was ()-declared, but not (void)-declared or K&R-defined
/**
* Holds if `fde` has a parameter declaration that's clear on the minimum
* number of parameters. This is essentially true for everything except
* `()`-declarations.
*/
private predicate hasDefiniteNumberOfParameters(FunctionDeclarationEntry fde) {
fde.hasVoidParamList()
or
fde.getNumberOfParameters() > 0
or
fde.isDefinition()
}
/* Holds if function was ()-declared, but not (void)-declared or K&R-defined. */
private predicate hasZeroParamDecl(Function f) {
exists(FunctionDeclarationEntry fde | fde = f.getADeclarationEntry() |
not fde.hasVoidParamList() and fde.getNumberOfParameters() = 0 and not fde.isDefinition()
not hasDefiniteNumberOfParameters(fde)
)
}
// True if this file (or header) was compiled as a C file
/* Holds if this file (or header) was compiled as a C file. */
private predicate isCompiledAsC(File f) {
f.compiledAsC()
or
exists(File src | isCompiledAsC(src) | src.getAnIncludedFile() = f)
}
/** Holds if `fc` is a call to `f` with too few arguments. */
predicate tooFewArguments(FunctionCall fc, Function f) {
f = fc.getTarget() and
not f.isVarargs() and
not f instanceof BuiltInFunction and
// This query should only have results on C (not C++) functions that have a
// `()` parameter list somewhere. If it has results on other functions, then
// it's probably because the extractor only saw a partial compilation.
hasZeroParamDecl(f) and
isCompiledAsC(f.getFile()) and
// There is an explicit declaration of the function whose parameter count is larger
// than the number of call arguments
exists(FunctionDeclarationEntry fde | fde = f.getADeclarationEntry() |
// Produce an alert when all declarations that are authoritative on the
// parameter count specify a parameter count larger than the number of call
// arguments.
forex(FunctionDeclarationEntry fde |
fde = f.getADeclarationEntry() and
hasDefiniteNumberOfParameters(fde)
|
fde.getNumberOfParameters() > fc.getNumberOfArguments()
)
}

View File

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
/**
* @name Churned lines per file
* @description Number of churned lines per file, across the revision
* history in the database.
* @kind treemap
* @id cpp/historical-churn
* @treemap.warnOn highValues
* @metricType file
* @metricAggregate avg sum max
* @tags external-data
* @deprecated
*/
import cpp
import external.VCS
from File f, int n
where
n =
sum(Commit entry, int churn |
churn = entry.getRecentChurnForFile(f) and
not artificialChange(entry)
|
churn
) and
exists(f.getMetrics().getNumberOfLinesOfCode())
select f, n order by n desc

View File

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
/**
* @name Added lines per file
* @description Number of added lines per file, across the revision
* history in the database.
* @kind treemap
* @id cpp/historical-lines-added
* @treemap.warnOn highValues
* @metricType file
* @metricAggregate avg sum max
* @tags external-data
* @deprecated
*/
import cpp
import external.VCS
from File f, int n
where
n =
sum(Commit entry, int churn |
churn = entry.getRecentAdditionsForFile(f) and
not artificialChange(entry)
|
churn
) and
exists(f.getMetrics().getNumberOfLinesOfCode())
select f, n order by n desc

View File

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
/**
* @name Deleted lines per file
* @description Number of deleted lines per file, across the revision
* history in the database.
* @kind treemap
* @id cpp/historical-lines-deleted
* @treemap.warnOn highValues
* @metricType file
* @metricAggregate avg sum max
* @tags external-data
* @deprecated
*/
import cpp
import external.VCS
from File f, int n
where
n =
sum(Commit entry, int churn |
churn = entry.getRecentDeletionsForFile(f) and
not artificialChange(entry)
|
churn
) and
exists(f.getMetrics().getNumberOfLinesOfCode())
select f, n order by n desc

View File

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
/**
* @name Number of authors
* @description Number of distinct authors for each file.
* @kind treemap
* @id cpp/historical-number-of-authors
* @treemap.warnOn highValues
* @metricType file
* @metricAggregate avg min max
* @tags external-data
* @deprecated
*/
import cpp
import external.VCS
from File f
where exists(f.getMetrics().getNumberOfLinesOfCode())
select f, count(Author author | author.getAnEditedFile() = f)

View File

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
/**
* @name Number of file-level changes
* @description The number of file-level changes made (by version
* control history).
* @kind treemap
* @id cpp/historical-number-of-changes
* @treemap.warnOn highValues
* @metricType file
* @metricAggregate avg min max sum
* @tags external-data
* @deprecated
*/
import cpp
import external.VCS
from File f
where exists(f.getMetrics().getNumberOfLinesOfCode())
select f, count(Commit svn | f = svn.getAnAffectedFile() and not artificialChange(svn))

View File

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
/**
* @name Number of co-committed files
* @description The average number of other files that are touched
* whenever a file is affected by a commit.
* @kind treemap
* @id cpp/historical-number-of-co-commits
* @treemap.warnOn highValues
* @metricType file
* @metricAggregate avg min max
* @tags external-data
* @deprecated
*/
import cpp
import external.VCS
int committedFiles(Commit commit) { result = count(commit.getAnAffectedFile()) }
from File f
where exists(f.getMetrics().getNumberOfLinesOfCode())
select f, avg(Commit commit | commit.getAnAffectedFile() = f | committedFiles(commit) - 1)

View File

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
/**
* @name Number of re-commits for each file
* @description A re-commit is taken to mean a commit to a file that
* was touched less than five days ago.
* @kind treemap
* @id cpp/historical-number-of-re-commits
* @treemap.warnOn highValues
* @metricType file
* @metricAggregate avg min max
* @tags external-data
* @deprecated
*/
import cpp
import external.VCS
predicate inRange(Commit first, Commit second) {
first.getAnAffectedFile() = second.getAnAffectedFile() and
first != second and
exists(int n |
n = first.getDate().daysTo(second.getDate()) and
n >= 0 and
n < 5
)
}
int recommitsForFile(File f) {
result =
count(Commit recommit |
f = recommit.getAnAffectedFile() and
exists(Commit prev | inRange(prev, recommit))
)
}
from File f
where exists(f.getMetrics().getNumberOfLinesOfCode())
select f, recommitsForFile(f)

View File

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
/**
* @name Number of recent authors
* @description Number of distinct authors that have recently made
* changes.
* @kind treemap
* @id cpp/historical-number-of-recent-authors
* @treemap.warnOn highValues
* @metricType file
* @metricAggregate avg min max
* @tags external-data
* @deprecated
*/
import cpp
import external.VCS
from File f
where exists(f.getMetrics().getNumberOfLinesOfCode())
select f,
count(Author author |
exists(Commit e |
e = author.getACommit() and
f = e.getAnAffectedFile() and
e.daysToNow() <= 180 and
not artificialChange(e)
)
)

View File

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
/**
* @name Recently changed files
* @description Number of files recently edited.
* @kind treemap
* @id cpp/historical-number-of-recent-changed-files
* @treemap.warnOn highValues
* @metricType file
* @metricAggregate avg min max sum
* @tags external-data
* @deprecated
*/
import cpp
import external.VCS
from File f
where
exists(Commit e |
e.getAnAffectedFile() = f and
e.daysToNow() <= 180 and
not artificialChange(e)
) and
exists(f.getMetrics().getNumberOfLinesOfCode())
select f, 1

View File

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
/**
* @name Recent changes
* @description Number of recent commits to this file.
* @kind treemap
* @id cpp/historical-number-of-recent-changes
* @treemap.warnOn highValues
* @metricType file
* @metricAggregate avg min max sum
* @tags external-data
* @deprecated
*/
import cpp
import external.VCS
from File f, int n
where
n =
count(Commit e |
e.getAnAffectedFile() = f and
e.daysToNow() <= 180 and
not artificialChange(e)
) and
exists(f.getMetrics().getNumberOfLinesOfCode())
select f, n order by n desc

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
*
* By default they fall back to the reasonable defaults provided in
* `DefaultOptions.qll`, but by modifying this file, you can customize
* the standard Semmle analyses to give better results for your project.
* the standard analyses to give better results for your project.
*/
import cpp

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* @name Uncontrolled data used in path expression
* @description Accessing paths influenced by users can allow an
* attacker to access unexpected resources.
* @kind problem
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @precision medium
* @id cpp/path-injection
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import cpp
import semmle.code.cpp.security.FunctionWithWrappers
import semmle.code.cpp.security.Security
import semmle.code.cpp.security.TaintTracking
import TaintedWithPath
/**
* A function for opening a file.
@@ -51,12 +52,19 @@ class FileFunction extends FunctionWithWrappers {
override predicate interestingArg(int arg) { arg = 0 }
}
class TaintedPathConfiguration extends TaintTrackingConfiguration {
override predicate isSink(Element tainted) {
exists(FileFunction fileFunction | fileFunction.outermostWrapperFunctionCall(tainted, _))
}
}
from
FileFunction fileFunction, Expr taintedArg, Expr taintSource, string taintCause, string callChain
FileFunction fileFunction, Expr taintedArg, Expr taintSource, PathNode sourceNode,
PathNode sinkNode, string taintCause, string callChain
where
fileFunction.outermostWrapperFunctionCall(taintedArg, callChain) and
tainted(taintSource, taintedArg) and
taintedWithPath(taintSource, taintedArg, sourceNode, sinkNode) and
isUserInput(taintSource, taintCause)
select taintedArg,
select taintedArg, sourceNode, sinkNode,
"This argument to a file access function is derived from $@ and then passed to " + callChain,
taintSource, "user input (" + taintCause + ")"

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* @name CGI script vulnerable to cross-site scripting
* @description Writing user input directly to a web page
* allows for a cross-site scripting vulnerability.
* @kind problem
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity error
* @precision high
* @id cpp/cgi-xss
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
import cpp
import semmle.code.cpp.commons.Environment
import semmle.code.cpp.security.TaintTracking
import TaintedWithPath
/** A call that prints its arguments to `stdout`. */
class PrintStdoutCall extends FunctionCall {
@@ -27,8 +28,13 @@ class QueryString extends EnvironmentRead {
QueryString() { getEnvironmentVariable() = "QUERY_STRING" }
}
from QueryString query, PrintStdoutCall call, Element printedArg
where
call.getAnArgument() = printedArg and
tainted(query, printedArg)
select printedArg, "Cross-site scripting vulnerability due to $@.", query, "this query data"
class Configuration extends TaintTrackingConfiguration {
override predicate isSink(Element tainted) {
exists(PrintStdoutCall call | call.getAnArgument() = tainted)
}
}
from QueryString query, Element printedArg, PathNode sourceNode, PathNode sinkNode
where taintedWithPath(query, printedArg, sourceNode, sinkNode)
select printedArg, sourceNode, sinkNode, "Cross-site scripting vulnerability due to $@.", query,
"this query data"

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
* @description Including user-supplied data in a SQL query without
* neutralizing special elements can make code vulnerable
* to SQL Injection.
* @kind problem
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity error
* @precision high
* @id cpp/sql-injection
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import cpp
import semmle.code.cpp.security.Security
import semmle.code.cpp.security.FunctionWithWrappers
import semmle.code.cpp.security.TaintTracking
import TaintedWithPath
class SQLLikeFunction extends FunctionWithWrappers {
SQLLikeFunction() { sqlArgument(this.getName(), _) }
@@ -22,11 +23,19 @@ class SQLLikeFunction extends FunctionWithWrappers {
override predicate interestingArg(int arg) { sqlArgument(this.getName(), arg) }
}
from SQLLikeFunction runSql, Expr taintedArg, Expr taintSource, string taintCause, string callChain
class Configuration extends TaintTrackingConfiguration {
override predicate isSink(Element tainted) {
exists(SQLLikeFunction runSql | runSql.outermostWrapperFunctionCall(tainted, _))
}
}
from
SQLLikeFunction runSql, Expr taintedArg, Expr taintSource, PathNode sourceNode, PathNode sinkNode,
string taintCause, string callChain
where
runSql.outermostWrapperFunctionCall(taintedArg, callChain) and
tainted(taintSource, taintedArg) and
taintedWithPath(taintSource, taintedArg, sourceNode, sinkNode) and
isUserInput(taintSource, taintCause)
select taintedArg,
select taintedArg, sourceNode, sinkNode,
"This argument to a SQL query function is derived from $@ and then passed to " + callChain,
taintSource, "user input (" + taintCause + ")"

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
* @description Using externally controlled strings in a process
* operation can allow an attacker to execute malicious
* commands.
* @kind problem
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @precision medium
* @id cpp/uncontrolled-process-operation
@@ -14,13 +14,24 @@
import cpp
import semmle.code.cpp.security.Security
import semmle.code.cpp.security.TaintTracking
import TaintedWithPath
from string processOperation, int processOperationArg, FunctionCall call, Expr arg, Element source
predicate isProcessOperationExplanation(Expr arg, string processOperation) {
exists(int processOperationArg, FunctionCall call |
isProcessOperationArgument(processOperation, processOperationArg) and
call.getTarget().getName() = processOperation and
call.getArgument(processOperationArg) = arg
)
}
class Configuration extends TaintTrackingConfiguration {
override predicate isSink(Element arg) { isProcessOperationExplanation(arg, _) }
}
from string processOperation, Expr arg, Expr source, PathNode sourceNode, PathNode sinkNode
where
isProcessOperationArgument(processOperation, processOperationArg) and
call.getTarget().getName() = processOperation and
call.getArgument(processOperationArg) = arg and
tainted(source, arg)
select arg,
isProcessOperationExplanation(arg, processOperation) and
taintedWithPath(source, arg, sourceNode, sinkNode)
select arg, sourceNode, sinkNode,
"The value of this argument may come from $@ and is being passed to " + processOperation, source,
source.toString()

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* @name Unbounded write
* @description Buffer write operations that do not control the length
* of data written may overflow.
* @kind problem
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity error
* @precision medium
* @id cpp/unbounded-write
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
import semmle.code.cpp.security.BufferWrite
import semmle.code.cpp.security.Security
import semmle.code.cpp.security.TaintTracking
import TaintedWithPath
/*
* --- Summary of CWE-120 alerts ---
@@ -54,32 +55,48 @@ predicate isUnboundedWrite(BufferWrite bw) {
* }
*/
/**
* Holds if `e` is a source buffer going into an unbounded write `bw` or a
* qualifier of (a qualifier of ...) such a source.
*/
predicate unboundedWriteSource(Expr e, BufferWrite bw) {
isUnboundedWrite(bw) and e = bw.getASource()
or
exists(FieldAccess fa | unboundedWriteSource(fa, bw) and e = fa.getQualifier())
}
/*
* --- user input reach ---
*/
/**
* Identifies expressions that are potentially tainted with user
* input. Most of the work for this is actually done by the
* TaintTracking library.
*/
predicate tainted2(Expr expr, Expr inputSource, string inputCause) {
taintedIncludingGlobalVars(inputSource, expr, _) and
inputCause = inputSource.toString()
or
exists(Expr e | tainted2(e, inputSource, inputCause) |
// field accesses of a tainted struct are tainted
e = expr.(FieldAccess).getQualifier()
)
class Configuration extends TaintTrackingConfiguration {
override predicate isSink(Element tainted) { unboundedWriteSource(tainted, _) }
override predicate taintThroughGlobals() { any() }
}
/*
* --- put it together ---
*/
from BufferWrite bw, Expr inputSource, string inputCause
/*
* An unbounded write is, for example `strcpy(..., tainted)`. We're looking
* for a tainted source buffer of an unbounded write, where this source buffer
* is a sink in the taint-tracking analysis.
*
* In the case of `gets` and `scanf`, where the source buffer is implicit, the
* `BufferWrite` library reports the source buffer to be the same as the
* destination buffer. Since those destination-buffer arguments are also
* modeled in the taint-tracking library as being _sources_ of taint, they are
* in practice reported as being tainted because the `security.TaintTracking`
* library does not distinguish between taint going into an argument and out of
* an argument. Thus, we get the desired alerts.
*/
from BufferWrite bw, Expr inputSource, Expr tainted, PathNode sourceNode, PathNode sinkNode
where
isUnboundedWrite(bw) and
tainted2(bw.getASource(), inputSource, inputCause)
select bw, "This '" + bw.getBWDesc() + "' with input from $@ may overflow the destination.",
inputSource, inputCause
taintedWithPath(inputSource, tainted, sourceNode, sinkNode) and
unboundedWriteSource(tainted, bw)
select bw, sourceNode, sinkNode,
"This '" + bw.getBWDesc() + "' with input from $@ may overflow the destination.", inputSource,
inputSource.toString()

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
* @description Using externally-controlled format strings in
* printf-style functions can lead to buffer overflows
* or data representation problems.
* @kind problem
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @precision medium
* @id cpp/tainted-format-string
@@ -16,12 +16,21 @@ import cpp
import semmle.code.cpp.security.Security
import semmle.code.cpp.security.FunctionWithWrappers
import semmle.code.cpp.security.TaintTracking
import TaintedWithPath
from PrintfLikeFunction printf, Expr arg, string printfFunction, Expr userValue, string cause
class Configuration extends TaintTrackingConfiguration {
override predicate isSink(Element tainted) {
exists(PrintfLikeFunction printf | printf.outermostWrapperFunctionCall(tainted, _))
}
}
from
PrintfLikeFunction printf, Expr arg, PathNode sourceNode, PathNode sinkNode,
string printfFunction, Expr userValue, string cause
where
printf.outermostWrapperFunctionCall(arg, printfFunction) and
tainted(userValue, arg) and
taintedWithPath(userValue, arg, sourceNode, sinkNode) and
isUserInput(userValue, cause)
select arg,
select arg, sourceNode, sinkNode,
"The value of this argument may come from $@ and is being used as a formatting argument to " +
printfFunction, userValue, cause

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
* @description Using externally-controlled format strings in
* printf-style functions can lead to buffer overflows
* or data representation problems.
* @kind problem
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @precision medium
* @id cpp/tainted-format-string-through-global
@@ -16,15 +16,24 @@ import cpp
import semmle.code.cpp.security.FunctionWithWrappers
import semmle.code.cpp.security.Security
import semmle.code.cpp.security.TaintTracking
import TaintedWithPath
class Configuration extends TaintTrackingConfiguration {
override predicate isSink(Element tainted) {
exists(PrintfLikeFunction printf | printf.outermostWrapperFunctionCall(tainted, _))
}
override predicate taintThroughGlobals() { any() }
}
from
PrintfLikeFunction printf, Expr arg, string printfFunction, Expr userValue, string cause,
string globalVar
PrintfLikeFunction printf, Expr arg, PathNode sourceNode, PathNode sinkNode,
string printfFunction, Expr userValue, string cause
where
printf.outermostWrapperFunctionCall(arg, printfFunction) and
not tainted(_, arg) and
taintedIncludingGlobalVars(userValue, arg, globalVar) and
not taintedWithoutGlobals(arg) and
taintedWithPath(userValue, arg, sourceNode, sinkNode) and
isUserInput(userValue, cause)
select arg,
"This value may flow through $@, originating from $@, and is a formatting argument to " +
printfFunction + ".", globalVarFromId(globalVar), globalVar, userValue, cause
select arg, sourceNode, sinkNode,
"The value of this argument may come from $@ and is being used as a formatting argument to " +
printfFunction, userValue, cause

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* @name Uncontrolled data in arithmetic expression
* @description Arithmetic operations on uncontrolled data that is not
* validated can cause overflows.
* @kind problem
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @precision medium
* @id cpp/uncontrolled-arithmetic
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import cpp
import semmle.code.cpp.security.Overflow
import semmle.code.cpp.security.Security
import semmle.code.cpp.security.TaintTracking
import TaintedWithPath
predicate isRandCall(FunctionCall fc) { fc.getTarget().getName() = "rand" }
@@ -40,9 +41,22 @@ class SecurityOptionsArith extends SecurityOptions {
}
}
predicate taintedVarAccess(Expr origin, VariableAccess va) {
isUserInput(origin, _) and
tainted(origin, va)
predicate isDiv(VariableAccess va) { exists(AssignDivExpr div | div.getLValue() = va) }
predicate missingGuard(VariableAccess va, string effect) {
exists(Operation op | op.getAnOperand() = va |
missingGuardAgainstUnderflow(op, va) and effect = "underflow"
or
missingGuardAgainstOverflow(op, va) and effect = "overflow"
)
}
class Configuration extends TaintTrackingConfiguration {
override predicate isSink(Element e) {
isDiv(e)
or
missingGuard(e, _)
}
}
/**
@@ -50,19 +64,17 @@ predicate taintedVarAccess(Expr origin, VariableAccess va) {
* range.
*/
predicate guardedByAssignDiv(Expr origin) {
isUserInput(origin, _) and
exists(AssignDivExpr div, VariableAccess va | tainted(origin, va) and div.getLValue() = va)
exists(VariableAccess va |
taintedWithPath(origin, va, _, _) and
isDiv(va)
)
}
from Expr origin, Operation op, VariableAccess va, string effect
from Expr origin, VariableAccess va, string effect, PathNode sourceNode, PathNode sinkNode
where
taintedVarAccess(origin, va) and
op.getAnOperand() = va and
(
missingGuardAgainstUnderflow(op, va) and effect = "underflow"
or
missingGuardAgainstOverflow(op, va) and effect = "overflow"
) and
taintedWithPath(origin, va, sourceNode, sinkNode) and
missingGuard(va, effect) and
not guardedByAssignDiv(origin)
select va, "$@ flows to here and is used in arithmetic, potentially causing an " + effect + ".",
origin, "Uncontrolled value"
select va, sourceNode, sinkNode,
"$@ flows to here and is used in arithmetic, potentially causing an " + effect + ".", origin,
"Uncontrolled value"

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* @name Overflow in uncontrolled allocation size
* @description Allocating memory with a size controlled by an external
* user can result in integer overflow.
* @kind problem
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity error
* @precision high
* @id cpp/uncontrolled-allocation-size
@@ -13,21 +13,33 @@
import cpp
import semmle.code.cpp.security.TaintTracking
import TaintedWithPath
predicate taintedAllocSize(Expr e, Expr source, string taintCause) {
(
isAllocationExpr(e) or
any(MulExpr me | me.getAChild() instanceof SizeofOperator) = e
) and
/**
* Holds if `alloc` is an allocation, and `tainted` is a child of it that is a
* taint sink.
*/
predicate allocSink(Expr alloc, Expr tainted) {
isAllocationExpr(alloc) and
tainted = alloc.getAChild() and
tainted.getUnspecifiedType() instanceof IntegralType
}
class TaintedAllocationSizeConfiguration extends TaintTrackingConfiguration {
override predicate isSink(Element tainted) { allocSink(_, tainted) }
}
predicate taintedAllocSize(
Expr source, Expr alloc, PathNode sourceNode, PathNode sinkNode, string taintCause
) {
isUserInput(source, taintCause) and
exists(Expr tainted |
tainted = e.getAChild() and
tainted.getUnspecifiedType() instanceof IntegralType and
isUserInput(source, taintCause) and
tainted(source, tainted)
allocSink(alloc, tainted) and
taintedWithPath(source, tainted, sourceNode, sinkNode)
)
}
from Expr e, Expr source, string taintCause
where taintedAllocSize(e, source, taintCause)
select e, "This allocation size is derived from $@ and might overflow", source,
"user input (" + taintCause + ")"
from Expr source, Expr alloc, PathNode sourceNode, PathNode sinkNode, string taintCause
where taintedAllocSize(source, alloc, sourceNode, sinkNode, taintCause)
select alloc, sourceNode, sinkNode, "This allocation size is derived from $@ and might overflow",
source, "user input (" + taintCause + ")"

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
* @description Authentication by checking that the peer's address
* matches a known IP or web address is unsafe as it is
* vulnerable to spoofing attacks.
* @kind problem
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @precision medium
* @id cpp/user-controlled-bypass
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
*/
import semmle.code.cpp.security.TaintTracking
import TaintedWithPath
predicate hardCodedAddressOrIP(StringLiteral txt) {
exists(string s | s = txt.getValueText() |
@@ -102,16 +103,21 @@ predicate useOfHardCodedAddressOrIP(Expr use) {
* untrusted input then it might be vulnerable to a spoofing
* attack.
*/
predicate hardCodedAddressInCondition(Expr source, Expr condition) {
// One of the sub-expressions of the condition is tainted.
exists(Expr taintedExpr | taintedExpr.getParent+() = condition | tainted(source, taintedExpr)) and
predicate hardCodedAddressInCondition(Expr subexpression, Expr condition) {
subexpression = condition.getAChild+() and
// One of the sub-expressions of the condition is a hard-coded
// IP or web-address.
exists(Expr use | use.getParent+() = condition | useOfHardCodedAddressOrIP(use)) and
exists(Expr use | use = condition.getAChild+() | useOfHardCodedAddressOrIP(use)) and
condition = any(IfStmt ifStmt).getCondition()
}
from Expr source, Expr condition
where hardCodedAddressInCondition(source, condition)
select condition, "Untrusted input $@ might be vulnerable to a spoofing attack.", source,
source.toString()
class Configuration extends TaintTrackingConfiguration {
override predicate isSink(Element sink) { hardCodedAddressInCondition(sink, _) }
}
from Expr subexpression, Expr source, Expr condition, PathNode sourceNode, PathNode sinkNode
where
hardCodedAddressInCondition(subexpression, condition) and
taintedWithPath(source, subexpression, sourceNode, sinkNode)
select condition, sourceNode, sinkNode,
"Untrusted input $@ might be vulnerable to a spoofing attack.", source, source.toString()

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* @name Cleartext storage of sensitive information in buffer
* @description Storing sensitive information in cleartext can expose it
* to an attacker.
* @kind problem
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @precision medium
* @id cpp/cleartext-storage-buffer
@@ -14,12 +14,20 @@ import cpp
import semmle.code.cpp.security.BufferWrite
import semmle.code.cpp.security.TaintTracking
import semmle.code.cpp.security.SensitiveExprs
import TaintedWithPath
from BufferWrite w, Expr taintedArg, Expr taintSource, string taintCause, SensitiveExpr dest
class Configuration extends TaintTrackingConfiguration {
override predicate isSink(Element tainted) { exists(BufferWrite w | w.getASource() = tainted) }
}
from
BufferWrite w, Expr taintedArg, Expr taintSource, PathNode sourceNode, PathNode sinkNode,
string taintCause, SensitiveExpr dest
where
tainted(taintSource, taintedArg) and
taintedWithPath(taintSource, taintedArg, sourceNode, sinkNode) and
isUserInput(taintSource, taintCause) and
w.getASource() = taintedArg and
dest = w.getDest()
select w, "This write into buffer '" + dest.toString() + "' may contain unencrypted data from $@",
select w, sourceNode, sinkNode,
"This write into buffer '" + dest.toString() + "' may contain unencrypted data from $@",
taintSource, "user input (" + taintCause + ")"

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* @name Cleartext storage of sensitive information in an SQLite database
* @description Storing sensitive information in a non-encrypted
* database can expose it to an attacker.
* @kind problem
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @precision medium
* @id cpp/cleartext-storage-database
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
import cpp
import semmle.code.cpp.security.SensitiveExprs
import semmle.code.cpp.security.TaintTracking
import TaintedWithPath
class UserInputIsSensitiveExpr extends SecurityOptions {
override predicate isUserInput(Expr expr, string cause) {
@@ -32,10 +33,21 @@ predicate sqlite_encryption_used() {
any(FunctionCall fc).getTarget().getName().matches("sqlite%\\_key\\_%")
}
from SensitiveExpr taintSource, Expr taintedArg, SqliteFunctionCall sqliteCall
class Configuration extends TaintTrackingConfiguration {
override predicate isSink(Element taintedArg) {
exists(SqliteFunctionCall sqliteCall |
taintedArg = sqliteCall.getASource() and
not sqlite_encryption_used()
)
}
}
from
SensitiveExpr taintSource, Expr taintedArg, SqliteFunctionCall sqliteCall, PathNode sourceNode,
PathNode sinkNode
where
tainted(taintSource, taintedArg) and
taintedArg = sqliteCall.getASource() and
not sqlite_encryption_used()
select sqliteCall, "This SQLite call may store $@ in a non-encrypted SQLite database", taintSource,
taintedWithPath(taintSource, taintedArg, sourceNode, sinkNode) and
taintedArg = sqliteCall.getASource()
select sqliteCall, sourceNode, sinkNode,
"This SQLite call may store $@ in a non-encrypted SQLite database", taintSource,
"sensitive information"

View File

@@ -198,12 +198,12 @@ class InitializationFunction extends Function {
)
or
// If we have no definition, we look at SAL annotations
not this.isDefined() and
not this.hasDefinition() and
this.getParameter(i).(SALParameter).isOut() and
evidence = SuggestiveSALAnnotation()
or
// We have some external information that this function conditionally initializes
not this.isDefined() and
not this.hasDefinition() and
any(ValidatedExternalCondInitFunction vc).isExternallyVerified(this, i) and
evidence = ExternalEvidence()
}
@@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ class ConditionalInitializationFunction extends InitializationFunction {
* Explicitly ignore pure virtual functions.
*/
this.isDefined() and
this.hasDefinition() and
this.paramNotReassignedAt(this, i, c) and
not this instanceof PureVirtualFunction
)
@@ -616,11 +616,11 @@ private predicate functionSignature(Function f, string qualifiedName, string typ
* are never statically linked together.
*/
private Function getAPossibleDefinition(Function undefinedFunction) {
not undefinedFunction.isDefined() and
not undefinedFunction.hasDefinition() and
exists(string qn, string typeSig |
functionSignature(undefinedFunction, qn, typeSig) and functionSignature(result, qn, typeSig)
) and
result.isDefined()
result.hasDefinition()
}
/**
@@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ private Function getAPossibleDefinition(Function undefinedFunction) {
*/
private Function getTarget1(Call c) {
result = VirtualDispatch::getAViableTarget(c) and
result.isDefined()
result.hasDefinition()
}
/**

View File

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ where
destBase = baseType(destType) and
destBase.getSize() != sourceBase.getSize() and
not dest.isInMacroExpansion() and
// If the source type is a char* or void* then don't
// If the source type is a `char*` or `void*` then don't
// produce a result, because it is likely to be a false
// positive.
not sourceBase instanceof CharType and

View File

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ where
destBase = baseType(destType) and
destBase.getSize() != sourceBase.getSize() and
not dest.isInMacroExpansion() and
// If the source type is a char* or void* then don't
// If the source type is a `char*` or `void*` then don't
// produce a result, because it is likely to be a false
// positive.
not sourceBase instanceof CharType and

View File

@@ -24,9 +24,9 @@ private predicate isCharSzPtrExpr(Expr e) {
from Expr sizeofExpr, Expr e
where
// If we see an addWithSizeof then we expect the type of
// the pointer expression to be char* or void*. Otherwise it
// the pointer expression to be `char*` or `void*`. Otherwise it
// is probably a mistake.
addWithSizeof(e, sizeofExpr, _) and not isCharSzPtrExpr(e)
select sizeofExpr,
"Suspicious sizeof offset in a pointer arithmetic expression. " + "The type of the pointer is " +
e.getFullyConverted().getType().toString() + "."
"Suspicious sizeof offset in a pointer arithmetic expression. The type of the pointer is $@.",
e.getFullyConverted().getType() as t, t.toString()

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
* @description Using untrusted inputs in a statement that makes a
* security decision makes code vulnerable to
* attack.
* @kind problem
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @precision medium
* @id cpp/tainted-permissions-check
@@ -12,14 +12,9 @@
*/
import semmle.code.cpp.security.TaintTracking
import TaintedWithPath
/**
* Holds if there is an 'if' statement whose condition `condition`
* is influenced by tainted data `source`, and the body contains
* `raise` which escalates privilege.
*/
predicate cwe807violation(Expr source, Expr condition, Expr raise) {
tainted(source, condition) and
predicate sensitiveCondition(Expr condition, Expr raise) {
raisesPrivilege(raise) and
exists(IfStmt ifstmt |
ifstmt.getCondition() = condition and
@@ -27,7 +22,19 @@ predicate cwe807violation(Expr source, Expr condition, Expr raise) {
)
}
from Expr source, Expr condition, Expr raise
where cwe807violation(source, condition, raise)
select condition, "Reliance on untrusted input $@ to raise privilege at $@", source,
source.toString(), raise, raise.toString()
class Configuration extends TaintTrackingConfiguration {
override predicate isSink(Element tainted) { sensitiveCondition(tainted, _) }
}
/*
* Produce an alert if there is an 'if' statement whose condition `condition`
* is influenced by tainted data `source`, and the body contains
* `raise` which escalates privilege.
*/
from Expr source, Expr condition, Expr raise, PathNode sourceNode, PathNode sinkNode
where
taintedWithPath(source, condition, sourceNode, sinkNode) and
sensitiveCondition(condition, raise)
select condition, sourceNode, sinkNode, "Reliance on untrusted input $@ to raise privilege at $@",
source, source.toString(), raise, raise.toString()

View File

@@ -12,3 +12,8 @@
- Critical/FileNeverClosed.ql
- Critical/MemoryMayNotBeFreed.ql
- Critical/MemoryNeverFreed.ql
# These are only for IDE use.
- exclude:
tags contain:
- ide-contextual-queries/local-definitions
- ide-contextual-queries/local-references

View File

@@ -1 +1,7 @@
/**
* DEPRECATED: use `import cpp` instead of `import default`.
*
* Provides classes and predicates for working with C/C++ code.
*/
import cpp

View File

@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ private predicate constructorCallTypeMention(ConstructorCall cc, TypeMention tm)
* - `"X"` for macro accesses
* - `"I"` for import / include directives
*/
cached
Top definitionOf(Top e, string kind) {
(
// call -> function called
@@ -213,3 +214,11 @@ Top definitionOf(Top e, string kind) {
// later on.
strictcount(result.getLocation()) < 10
}
/**
* Returns an appropriately encoded version of a filename `name`
* passed by the VS Code extension in order to coincide with the
* output of `.getFile()` on locatable entities.
*/
cached
File getEncodedFile(string name) { result.getAbsolutePath().replaceAll(":", "_") = name }

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,282 @@
/**
* Provides precise tracking of how big the memory pointed to by pointers is.
* For each pointer, we start tracking (starting from the allocation or an array declaration)
* 1) how long is the chunk of memory allocated
* 2) where the current pointer is in this chunk of memory
* As computing this information is obviously not possible for all pointers,
* we do not guarantee the existence of length/offset information for all pointers.
* However, when it exists it is guaranteed to be accurate.
*
* The length and offset are tracked in a similar way to the Rangeanalysis.
* Each length is a `ValueNumber + delta`, and each Offset is an `Operand + delta`.
* We choose to track a `ValueNumber` for length, because the Rangeanalysis offers
* integer bounds on instructions and operands in terms of `ValueNumber`s,
* and `Operand` for offset because integer bounds on `Operand`s are
* tighter than bounds on `Instruction`s.
*/
import cpp
import semmle.code.cpp.ir.IR
private import semmle.code.cpp.ir.ValueNumbering
private import semmle.code.cpp.ir.internal.CppType
private import semmle.code.cpp.models.interfaces.Allocation
private import semmle.code.cpp.rangeanalysis.RangeUtils
private newtype TLength =
TZeroLength() or
TVNLength(ValueNumber vn) {
not vn.getAnInstruction() instanceof ConstantInstruction and
exists(Instruction i |
vn.getAnInstruction() = i and
(
i.getResultIRType() instanceof IRSignedIntegerType or
i.getResultIRType() instanceof IRUnsignedIntegerType
)
|
i instanceof PhiInstruction
or
i instanceof InitializeParameterInstruction
or
i instanceof CallInstruction
or
i.(LoadInstruction).getSourceAddress() instanceof VariableAddressInstruction
or
i.(LoadInstruction).getSourceAddress() instanceof FieldAddressInstruction
or
i.getAUse() instanceof ArgumentOperand
)
}
/**
* Array lengths are represented in a ValueNumber | Zero + delta format.
* This class keeps track of the ValueNumber or Zero.
* The delta is tracked in the predicate `knownArrayLength`.
*/
class Length extends TLength {
string toString() { none() } // overridden in subclasses
}
/**
* This length class corresponds to an array having a constant length
* that is tracked by the delta value.
*/
class ZeroLength extends Length, TZeroLength {
override string toString() { result = "ZeroLength" }
}
/**
* This length class corresponds to an array having variable length, i.e. the
* length is tracked by a value number. One example is an array having length
* `count` for an integer variable `count` in the program.
*/
class VNLength extends Length, TVNLength {
ValueNumber vn;
VNLength() { this = TVNLength(vn) }
/** Gets an instruction with this value number bound. */
Instruction getInstruction() { this = TVNLength(valueNumber(result)) }
ValueNumber getValueNumber() { result = vn }
override string toString() { result = "VNLength(" + vn.getExampleInstruction().toString() + ")" }
}
private newtype TOffset =
TZeroOffset() or
TOpOffset(Operand op) {
op.getAnyDef().getResultIRType() instanceof IRSignedIntegerType or
op.getAnyDef().getResultIRType() instanceof IRUnsignedIntegerType
}
/**
* This class describes the offset of a pointer in a chunk of memory.
* It is either an `Operand` or zero, an additional integer delta is added later.
*/
class Offset extends TOffset {
string toString() { none() } // overridden in subclasses
}
/**
* This class represents a fixed offset, only specified by a delta.
*/
class ZeroOffset extends Offset, TZeroOffset {
override string toString() { result = "ZeroOffset" }
}
/**
* This class represents an offset of an operand.
*/
class OpOffset extends Offset, TOpOffset {
Operand op;
OpOffset() { this = TOpOffset(op) }
Operand getOperand() { result = op }
override string toString() { result = "OpOffset(" + op.getDef().toString() + ")" }
}
private int getBaseSizeForPointerType(PointerType type) { result = type.getBaseType().getSize() }
/**
* Holds if pointer `prev` that points at offset `prevOffset + prevOffsetDelta`
* steps to `array` that points to `offset + offsetDelta` in one step.
* This predicate does not contain any recursive steps.
*/
bindingset[prevOffset, prevOffsetDelta]
predicate simpleArrayLengthStep(
Instruction array, Offset offset, int offsetDelta, Instruction prev, Offset prevOffset,
int prevOffsetDelta
) {
// array assign
array.(CopyInstruction).getSourceValue() = prev and
offset = prevOffset and
offsetDelta = prevOffsetDelta
or
// pointer add with constant
array.(PointerAddInstruction).getLeft() = prev and
offset = prevOffset and
offsetDelta = prevOffsetDelta + getConstantValue(array.(PointerAddInstruction).getRight())
or
// pointer add with variable
array.(PointerAddInstruction).getLeft() = prev and
prevOffset instanceof ZeroOffset and
offset.(OpOffset).getOperand() = array.(PointerAddInstruction).getRightOperand() and
offsetDelta = prevOffsetDelta and
not exists(getConstantValue(array.(PointerAddInstruction).getRight()))
or
// pointer sub with constant
array.(PointerSubInstruction).getLeft() = prev and
offset = prevOffset and
offsetDelta = prevOffsetDelta - getConstantValue(array.(PointerSubInstruction).getRight())
or
// array to pointer decay
array.(ConvertInstruction).getUnary() = prev and
array.getConvertedResultExpression() instanceof ArrayToPointerConversion and
offset = prevOffset and
offsetDelta = prevOffsetDelta
or
// cast of pointer to pointer with the same element size
exists(PointerType fromTyp, PointerType toTyp |
array.(PtrToPtrCastInstruction).getUnary() = prev and
prev.getResultLanguageType().hasType(fromTyp, false) and
array.getResultLanguageType().hasType(toTyp, false) and
offset = prevOffset and
offsetDelta = prevOffsetDelta and
if fromTyp instanceof VoidPointerType
then getBaseSizeForPointerType(toTyp) = 1
else (
if toTyp instanceof VoidPointerType
then getBaseSizeForPointerType(fromTyp) = 1
else getBaseSizeForPointerType(toTyp) = getBaseSizeForPointerType(fromTyp)
)
)
}
/**
* Parses a `sizeExpr` of malloc into a variable part (`lengthExpr`) and an integer offset (`delta`).
*/
private predicate deconstructMallocSizeExpr(Expr sizeExpr, Expr lengthExpr, int delta) {
sizeExpr instanceof AddExpr and
exists(Expr constantExpr |
lengthExpr = sizeExpr.(AddExpr).getAnOperand() and
constantExpr = sizeExpr.(AddExpr).getAnOperand() and
lengthExpr != constantExpr and
delta = constantExpr.getValue().toInt()
)
or
sizeExpr instanceof SubExpr and
exists(Expr constantExpr |
lengthExpr = sizeExpr.(SubExpr).getLeftOperand() and
constantExpr = sizeExpr.(SubExpr).getRightOperand() and
delta = -constantExpr.getValue().toInt()
)
}
/**
* Holds if the instruction `array` is a dynamic memory allocation of `length`+`delta` elements.
*/
private predicate allocation(Instruction array, Length length, int delta) {
exists(AllocationExpr alloc, Type ptrTyp |
array.getUnconvertedResultExpression() = alloc and
array.getResultLanguageType().hasType(ptrTyp, false) and
// ensure that we have the same type of the allocation and the pointer
ptrTyp.stripTopLevelSpecifiers().(PointerType).getBaseType().getUnspecifiedType() =
alloc.getAllocatedElementType().getUnspecifiedType() and
// ensure that the size multiplier of the allocation is the same as the
// size of the type we are allocating
alloc.getSizeMult() = getBaseSizeForPointerType(ptrTyp) and
(
length instanceof ZeroLength and
delta = alloc.getSizeExpr().getValue().toInt()
or
not exists(alloc.getSizeExpr().getValue().toInt()) and
(
exists(Expr lengthExpr |
deconstructMallocSizeExpr(alloc.getSizeExpr(), lengthExpr, delta) and
length.(VNLength).getInstruction().getConvertedResultExpression() = lengthExpr
)
or
not exists(int d | deconstructMallocSizeExpr(alloc.getSizeExpr(), _, d)) and
length.(VNLength).getInstruction().getConvertedResultExpression() = alloc.getSizeExpr() and
delta = 0
)
)
)
}
/**
* Holds if `array` is declared as an array with length `length + lengthDelta`
*/
private predicate arrayDeclaration(Instruction array, Length length, int lengthDelta) {
(
array instanceof VariableAddressInstruction or
array instanceof FieldAddressInstruction
) and
exists(ArrayType type | array.getResultLanguageType().hasType(type, _) |
length instanceof ZeroLength and
lengthDelta = type.getArraySize()
)
}
/**
* Holds if `array` is declared as an array or allocated
* with length `length + lengthDelta`
*/
predicate arrayAllocationOrDeclaration(Instruction array, Length length, int lengthDelta) {
allocation(array, length, lengthDelta)
or
// declaration of variable of array type
arrayDeclaration(array, length, lengthDelta)
}
/**
* Holds if the instruction `array` represents a pointer to a chunk of memory that holds
* `length + lengthDelta` elements, using only local analysis.
* `array` points at `offset + offsetDelta` in the chunk of memory.
* The pointer is in-bounds if `offset + offsetDelta < length + lengthDelta` and
* `offset + offsetDelta >= 0` holds.
* The pointer is out-of-bounds if `offset + offsetDelta >= length + lengthDelta`
* or `offset + offsetDelta < 0` holds.
* All pointers in this predicate are guaranteed to be non-null,
* but are not guaranteed to be live.
*/
predicate knownArrayLength(
Instruction array, Length length, int lengthDelta, Offset offset, int offsetDelta
) {
arrayAllocationOrDeclaration(array, length, lengthDelta) and
offset instanceof ZeroOffset and
offsetDelta = 0
or
// simple step (no phi nodes)
exists(Instruction prev, Offset prevOffset, int prevOffsetDelta |
knownArrayLength(prev, length, lengthDelta, prevOffset, prevOffsetDelta) and
simpleArrayLengthStep(array, offset, offsetDelta, prev, prevOffset, prevOffsetDelta)
)
or
// merge control flow after phi node - but only if all the bounds agree
forex(Instruction input | array.(PhiInstruction).getAnInput() = input |
knownArrayLength(input, length, lengthDelta, offset, offsetDelta)
)
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
/**
* This library proves that a subset of pointer dereferences in a program are
* safe, i.e. in-bounds.
* It does so by first defining what a pointer dereference is (on the IR
* `Instruction` level), and then using the array length analysis and the range
* analysis together to prove that some of these pointer dereferences are safe.
*
* The analysis is soundy, i.e. it is sound if no undefined behaviour is present
* in the program.
* Furthermore, it crucially depends on the soundiness of the range analysis and
* the array length analysis.
*/
import cpp
private import experimental.semmle.code.cpp.rangeanalysis.ArrayLengthAnalysis
private import semmle.code.cpp.rangeanalysis.RangeAnalysis
/**
* Gets the instruction that computes the address of memory that `i` accesses.
* Only holds if `i` dereferences a pointer, not when the computation of the
* memory address is constant, or if the address of a local variable is loaded/stored to.
*/
private Instruction getMemoryAddressInstruction(Instruction i) {
(
result = i.(FieldAddressInstruction).getObjectAddress() or
result = i.(LoadInstruction).getSourceAddress() or
result = i.(StoreInstruction).getDestinationAddress()
) and
not result instanceof FieldAddressInstruction and
not result instanceof VariableAddressInstruction and
not result instanceof ConstantValueInstruction
}
/**
* All instructions that dereference a pointer.
*/
class PointerDereferenceInstruction extends Instruction {
PointerDereferenceInstruction() { exists(getMemoryAddressInstruction(this)) }
Instruction getAddress() { result = getMemoryAddressInstruction(this) }
}
/**
* Holds if `ptrDeref` can be proven to always access allocated memory.
*/
predicate inBounds(PointerDereferenceInstruction ptrDeref) {
exists(Length length, int lengthDelta, Offset offset, int offsetDelta |
knownArrayLength(ptrDeref.getAddress(), length, lengthDelta, offset, offsetDelta) and
// lower bound - note that we treat a pointer that accesses an array of
// length 0 as on upper-bound violation, but not as a lower-bound violation
(
offset instanceof ZeroOffset and
offsetDelta >= 0
or
offset instanceof OpOffset and
exists(int lowerBoundDelta |
boundedOperand(offset.(OpOffset).getOperand(), any(ZeroBound b), lowerBoundDelta,
/*upper*/ false, _) and
lowerBoundDelta + offsetDelta >= 0
)
) and
// upper bound
(
// both offset and length are only integers
length instanceof ZeroLength and
offset instanceof ZeroOffset and
offsetDelta < lengthDelta
or
exists(int lengthBound |
// array length is variable+integer, and there's a fixed (integer-only)
// lower bound on the variable, so we can guarantee this access is always in-bounds
length instanceof VNLength and
offset instanceof ZeroOffset and
boundedInstruction(length.(VNLength).getInstruction(), any(ZeroBound b), lengthBound,
/* upper*/ false, _) and
offsetDelta < lengthBound + lengthDelta
)
or
exists(int offsetBoundDelta |
length instanceof ZeroLength and
offset instanceof OpOffset and
boundedOperand(offset.(OpOffset).getOperand(), any(ZeroBound b), offsetBoundDelta,
/* upper */ true, _) and
// offset <= offsetBoundDelta, so offset + offsetDelta <= offsetDelta + offsetBoundDelta
// Thus, in-bounds if offsetDelta + offsetBoundDelta < lengthDelta
// as we have length instanceof ZeroLength
offsetDelta + offsetBoundDelta < lengthDelta
)
or
exists(ValueNumberBound b, int offsetBoundDelta |
length instanceof VNLength and
offset instanceof OpOffset and
b.getValueNumber() = length.(VNLength).getValueNumber() and
// It holds that offset <= length + offsetBoundDelta
boundedOperand(offset.(OpOffset).getOperand(), b, offsetBoundDelta, /*upper*/ true, _) and
// it also holds that
offsetDelta < lengthDelta - offsetBoundDelta
// taking both inequalities together we get
// offset <= length + offsetBoundDelta
// => offset + offsetDelta <= length + offsetBoundDelta + offsetDelta < length + offsetBoundDelta + lengthDelta - offsetBoundDelta
// as required
)
)
)
}

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
/** Provides classes for detecting duplicate or similar code. */
import cpp
private string relativePath(File file) { result = file.getRelativePath().replaceAll("\\", "/") }
@@ -8,9 +10,12 @@ private predicate tokenLocation(string path, int sl, int sc, int ec, int el, Cop
tokens(copy, index, sl, sc, ec, el)
}
/** A token block used for detection of duplicate and similar code. */
class Copy extends @duplication_or_similarity {
/** Gets the index of the last token in this block. */
private int lastToken() { result = max(int i | tokens(this, i, _, _, _, _) | i) }
/** Gets the index of the token in this block starting at the location `loc`, if any. */
int tokenStartingAt(Location loc) {
exists(string filepath, int startline, int startcol |
loc.hasLocationInfo(filepath, startline, startcol, _, _) and
@@ -18,6 +23,7 @@ class Copy extends @duplication_or_similarity {
)
}
/** Gets the index of the token in this block ending at the location `loc`, if any. */
int tokenEndingAt(Location loc) {
exists(string filepath, int endline, int endcol |
loc.hasLocationInfo(filepath, _, _, endline, endcol) and
@@ -25,24 +31,38 @@ class Copy extends @duplication_or_similarity {
)
}
/** Gets the line on which the first token in this block starts. */
int sourceStartLine() { tokens(this, 0, result, _, _, _) }
/** Gets the column on which the first token in this block starts. */
int sourceStartColumn() { tokens(this, 0, _, result, _, _) }
/** Gets the line on which the last token in this block ends. */
int sourceEndLine() { tokens(this, lastToken(), _, _, result, _) }
/** Gets the column on which the last token in this block ends. */
int sourceEndColumn() { tokens(this, lastToken(), _, _, _, result) }
/** Gets the number of lines containing at least (part of) one token in this block. */
int sourceLines() { result = this.sourceEndLine() + 1 - this.sourceStartLine() }
/** Gets an opaque identifier for the equivalence class of this block. */
int getEquivalenceClass() { duplicateCode(this, _, result) or similarCode(this, _, result) }
/** Gets the source file in which this block appears. */
File sourceFile() {
exists(string name | duplicateCode(this, name, _) or similarCode(this, name, _) |
name.replaceAll("\\", "/") = relativePath(result)
)
}
/**
* Holds if this element is at the specified location.
* The location spans column `startcolumn` of line `startline` to
* column `endcolumn` of line `endline` in file `filepath`.
* For more information, see
* [Locations](https://help.semmle.com/QL/learn-ql/ql/locations.html).
*/
predicate hasLocationInfo(
string filepath, int startline, int startcolumn, int endline, int endcolumn
) {
@@ -53,25 +73,30 @@ class Copy extends @duplication_or_similarity {
endcolumn = sourceEndColumn()
}
/** Gets a textual representation of this element. */
string toString() { none() }
}
/** A block of duplicated code. */
class DuplicateBlock extends Copy, @duplication {
override string toString() { result = "Duplicate code: " + sourceLines() + " duplicated lines." }
}
/** A block of similar code. */
class SimilarBlock extends Copy, @similarity {
override string toString() {
result = "Similar code: " + sourceLines() + " almost duplicated lines."
}
}
/** Gets a function with a body and a location. */
FunctionDeclarationEntry sourceMethod() {
result.isDefinition() and
exists(result.getLocation()) and
numlines(unresolveElement(result.getFunction()), _, _, _)
}
/** Gets the number of member functions in `c` with a body and a location. */
int numberOfSourceMethods(Class c) {
result =
count(FunctionDeclarationEntry m |
@@ -108,6 +133,10 @@ private predicate duplicateStatement(
)
}
/**
* Holds if `m1` is a function with `total` lines, and `m2` is a function
* that has `duplicate` lines in common with `m1`.
*/
predicate duplicateStatements(
FunctionDeclarationEntry m1, FunctionDeclarationEntry m2, int duplicate, int total
) {
@@ -115,13 +144,16 @@ predicate duplicateStatements(
total = strictcount(statementInMethod(m1))
}
/**
* Find pairs of methods are identical
*/
/** Holds if `m` and other are identical functions. */
predicate duplicateMethod(FunctionDeclarationEntry m, FunctionDeclarationEntry other) {
exists(int total | duplicateStatements(m, other, total, total))
}
/**
* INTERNAL: do not use.
*
* Holds if `line` in `f` is similar to a line somewhere else.
*/
predicate similarLines(File f, int line) {
exists(SimilarBlock b | b.sourceFile() = f and line in [b.sourceStartLine() .. b.sourceEndLine()])
}
@@ -152,6 +184,7 @@ private predicate similarLinesCoveredFiles(File f, File otherFile) {
)
}
/** Holds if `coveredLines` lines of `f` are similar to lines in `otherFile`. */
predicate similarLinesCovered(File f, int coveredLines, File otherFile) {
exists(int numLines | numLines = f.getMetrics().getNumberOfLines() |
similarLinesCoveredFiles(f, otherFile) and
@@ -166,6 +199,11 @@ predicate similarLinesCovered(File f, int coveredLines, File otherFile) {
)
}
/**
* INTERNAL: do not use.
*
* Holds if `line` in `f` is duplicated by a line somewhere else.
*/
predicate duplicateLines(File f, int line) {
exists(DuplicateBlock b |
b.sourceFile() = f and line in [b.sourceStartLine() .. b.sourceEndLine()]
@@ -182,6 +220,7 @@ private predicate duplicateLinesPerEquivalenceClass(int equivClass, int lines, F
)
}
/** Holds if `coveredLines` lines of `f` are duplicates of lines in `otherFile`. */
predicate duplicateLinesCovered(File f, int coveredLines, File otherFile) {
exists(int numLines | numLines = f.getMetrics().getNumberOfLines() |
exists(int coveredApprox |
@@ -206,6 +245,7 @@ predicate duplicateLinesCovered(File f, int coveredLines, File otherFile) {
)
}
/** Holds if most of `f` (`percent`%) is similar to `other`. */
predicate similarFiles(File f, File other, int percent) {
exists(int covered, int total |
similarLinesCovered(f, covered, other) and
@@ -216,6 +256,7 @@ predicate similarFiles(File f, File other, int percent) {
not duplicateFiles(f, other, _)
}
/** Holds if most of `f` (`percent`%) is duplicated by `other`. */
predicate duplicateFiles(File f, File other, int percent) {
exists(int covered, int total |
duplicateLinesCovered(f, covered, other) and
@@ -225,6 +266,10 @@ predicate duplicateFiles(File f, File other, int percent) {
)
}
/**
* Holds if most member functions of `c` (`numDup` out of `total`) are
* duplicates of member functions in `other`.
*/
predicate mostlyDuplicateClassBase(Class c, Class other, int numDup, int total) {
numDup =
strictcount(FunctionDeclarationEntry m1 |
@@ -240,6 +285,11 @@ predicate mostlyDuplicateClassBase(Class c, Class other, int numDup, int total)
(numDup * 100) / total > 80
}
/**
* Holds if most member functions of `c` are duplicates of member functions in
* `other`. Provides the human-readable `message` to describe the amount of
* duplication.
*/
predicate mostlyDuplicateClass(Class c, Class other, string message) {
exists(int numDup, int total |
mostlyDuplicateClassBase(c, other, numDup, total) and
@@ -264,12 +314,21 @@ predicate mostlyDuplicateClass(Class c, Class other, string message) {
)
}
/** Holds if `f` and `other` are similar or duplicates. */
predicate fileLevelDuplication(File f, File other) {
similarFiles(f, other, _) or duplicateFiles(f, other, _)
}
/**
* Holds if most member functions of `c` are duplicates of member functions in
* `other`.
*/
predicate classLevelDuplication(Class c, Class other) { mostlyDuplicateClass(c, other, _) }
/**
* Holds if `line` in `f` should be allowed to be duplicated. This is the case
* for `#include` directives.
*/
predicate whitelistedLineForDuplication(File f, int line) {
exists(Include i | i.getFile() = f and i.getLocation().getStartLine() = line)
}

View File

@@ -1,31 +1,52 @@
/** Provides a class for working with defect query results stored in dashboard databases. */
import cpp
/**
* Holds if `id` in the opaque identifier of a result reported by query `queryPath`,
* such that `message` is the associated message and the location of the result spans
* column `startcolumn` of line `startline` to column `endcolumn` of line `endline`
* in file `filepath`.
*
* For more information, see [Locations](https://help.semmle.com/QL/learn-ql/ql/locations.html).
*/
external predicate defectResults(
int id, string queryPath, string file, int startline, int startcol, int endline, int endcol,
string message
);
/**
* A defect query result stored in a dashboard database.
*/
class DefectResult extends int {
DefectResult() { defectResults(this, _, _, _, _, _, _, _) }
/** Gets the path of the query that reported the result. */
string getQueryPath() { defectResults(this, result, _, _, _, _, _, _) }
/** Gets the file in which this query result was reported. */
File getFile() {
exists(string path |
defectResults(this, _, path, _, _, _, _, _) and result.getAbsolutePath() = path
)
}
/** Gets the line on which the location of this query result starts. */
int getStartLine() { defectResults(this, _, _, result, _, _, _, _) }
/** Gets the column on which the location of this query result starts. */
int getStartColumn() { defectResults(this, _, _, _, result, _, _, _) }
/** Gets the line on which the location of this query result ends. */
int getEndLine() { defectResults(this, _, _, _, _, result, _, _) }
/** Gets the column on which the location of this query result ends. */
int getEndColumn() { defectResults(this, _, _, _, _, _, result, _) }
/** Gets the message associated with this query result. */
string getMessage() { defectResults(this, _, _, _, _, _, _, result) }
/** Gets the URL corresponding to the location of this query result. */
string getURL() {
result =
"file://" + getFile().getAbsolutePath() + ":" + getStartLine() + ":" + getStartColumn() + ":" +

View File

@@ -1,26 +1,45 @@
/**
* Provides classes for working with external data.
*/
import cpp
/**
* An external data item.
*/
class ExternalData extends @externalDataElement {
/** Gets the path of the file this data was loaded from. */
string getDataPath() { externalData(this, result, _, _) }
/**
* Gets the path of the file this data was loaded from, with its
* extension replaced by `.ql`.
*/
string getQueryPath() { result = getDataPath().regexpReplaceAll("\\.[^.]*$", ".ql") }
/** Gets the number of fields in this data item. */
int getNumFields() { result = 1 + max(int i | externalData(this, _, i, _) | i) }
string getField(int index) { externalData(this, _, index, result) }
/** Gets the value of the `i`th field of this data item. */
string getField(int i) { externalData(this, _, i, result) }
int getFieldAsInt(int index) { result = getField(index).toInt() }
/** Gets the integer value of the `i`th field of this data item. */
int getFieldAsInt(int i) { result = getField(i).toInt() }
float getFieldAsFloat(int index) { result = getField(index).toFloat() }
/** Gets the floating-point value of the `i`th field of this data item. */
float getFieldAsFloat(int i) { result = getField(i).toFloat() }
date getFieldAsDate(int index) { result = getField(index).toDate() }
/** Gets the value of the `i`th field of this data item, interpreted as a date. */
date getFieldAsDate(int i) { result = getField(i).toDate() }
/** Gets a textual representation of this data item. */
string toString() { result = getQueryPath() + ": " + buildTupleString(0) }
private string buildTupleString(int start) {
start = getNumFields() - 1 and result = getField(start)
/** Gets a textual representation of this data item, starting with the `n`th field. */
private string buildTupleString(int n) {
n = getNumFields() - 1 and result = getField(n)
or
start < getNumFields() - 1 and result = getField(start) + "," + buildTupleString(start + 1)
n < getNumFields() - 1 and result = getField(n) + "," + buildTupleString(n + 1)
}
}
@@ -33,7 +52,9 @@ class DefectExternalData extends ExternalData {
this.getNumFields() = 2
}
/** Gets the URL associated with this data item. */
string getURL() { result = getField(0) }
/** Gets the message associated with this data item. */
string getMessage() { result = getField(1) }
}

View File

@@ -1,31 +1,58 @@
/** Provides a class for working with metric query results stored in dashboard databases. */
import cpp
/**
* Holds if `id` in the opaque identifier of a result reported by query `queryPath`,
* such that `value` is the reported metric value and the location of the result spans
* column `startcolumn` of line `startline` to column `endcolumn` of line `endline`
* in file `filepath`.
*
* For more information, see [Locations](https://help.semmle.com/QL/learn-ql/ql/locations.html).
*/
external predicate metricResults(
int id, string queryPath, string file, int startline, int startcol, int endline, int endcol,
float value
);
/**
* A metric query result stored in a dashboard database.
*/
class MetricResult extends int {
MetricResult() { metricResults(this, _, _, _, _, _, _, _) }
/** Gets the path of the query that reported the result. */
string getQueryPath() { metricResults(this, result, _, _, _, _, _, _) }
/** Gets the file in which this query result was reported. */
File getFile() {
exists(string path |
metricResults(this, _, path, _, _, _, _, _) and result.getAbsolutePath() = path
)
}
/** Gets the line on which the location of this query result starts. */
int getStartLine() { metricResults(this, _, _, result, _, _, _, _) }
/** Gets the column on which the location of this query result starts. */
int getStartColumn() { metricResults(this, _, _, _, result, _, _, _) }
/** Gets the line on which the location of this query result ends. */
int getEndLine() { metricResults(this, _, _, _, _, result, _, _) }
/** Gets the column on which the location of this query result ends. */
int getEndColumn() { metricResults(this, _, _, _, _, _, result, _) }
/**
* Holds if there is a `Location` entity whose location is the same as
* the location of this query result.
*/
predicate hasMatchingLocation() { exists(this.getMatchingLocation()) }
/**
* Gets the `Location` entity whose location is the same as the location
* of this query result.
*/
Location getMatchingLocation() {
result.getFile() = this.getFile() and
result.getStartLine() = this.getStartLine() and
@@ -34,8 +61,10 @@ class MetricResult extends int {
result.getEndColumn() = this.getEndColumn()
}
/** Gets the value associated with this query result. */
float getValue() { metricResults(this, _, _, _, _, _, _, result) }
/** Gets the URL corresponding to the location of this query result. */
string getURL() {
result =
"file://" + getFile().getAbsolutePath() + ":" + getStartLine() + ":" + getStartColumn() + ":" +

View File

@@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
import cpp
class Commit extends @svnentry {
Commit() {
svnaffectedfiles(this, _, _) and
exists(date svnDate, date snapshotDate |
svnentries(this, _, _, svnDate, _) and
snapshotDate(snapshotDate) and
svnDate <= snapshotDate
)
}
string toString() { result = this.getRevisionName() }
string getRevisionName() { svnentries(this, result, _, _, _) }
string getAuthor() { svnentries(this, _, result, _, _) }
date getDate() { svnentries(this, _, _, result, _) }
int getChangeSize() { svnentries(this, _, _, _, result) }
string getMessage() { svnentrymsg(this, result) }
string getAnAffectedFilePath(string action) {
exists(File rawFile | svnaffectedfiles(this, unresolveElement(rawFile), action) |
result = rawFile.getAbsolutePath()
)
}
string getAnAffectedFilePath() { result = getAnAffectedFilePath(_) }
File getAnAffectedFile(string action) {
// Workaround for incorrect keys in SVN data
exists(File svnFile | svnFile.getAbsolutePath() = result.getAbsolutePath() |
svnaffectedfiles(this, unresolveElement(svnFile), action)
) and
exists(result.getMetrics().getNumberOfLinesOfCode())
}
File getAnAffectedFile() { exists(string action | result = this.getAnAffectedFile(action)) }
private predicate churnForFile(File f, int added, int deleted) {
// Workaround for incorrect keys in SVN data
exists(File svnFile | svnFile.getAbsolutePath() = f.getAbsolutePath() |
svnchurn(this, unresolveElement(svnFile), added, deleted)
) and
exists(f.getMetrics().getNumberOfLinesOfCode())
}
int getRecentChurnForFile(File f) {
exists(int added, int deleted | churnForFile(f, added, deleted) and result = added + deleted)
}
int getRecentAdditionsForFile(File f) { churnForFile(f, result, _) }
int getRecentDeletionsForFile(File f) { churnForFile(f, _, result) }
predicate isRecent() { recentCommit(this) }
int daysToNow() {
exists(date now | snapshotDate(now) | result = getDate().daysTo(now) and result >= 0)
}
}
class Author extends string {
Author() { exists(Commit e | this = e.getAuthor()) }
Commit getACommit() { result.getAuthor() = this }
File getAnEditedFile() { result = this.getACommit().getAnAffectedFile() }
}
predicate recentCommit(Commit e) {
exists(date snapshotDate, date commitDate, int days |
snapshotDate(snapshotDate) and
e.getDate() = commitDate and
days = commitDate.daysTo(snapshotDate) and
days >= 0 and
days <= 60
)
}
date firstChange(File f) {
result = min(Commit e, date toMin | f = e.getAnAffectedFile() and toMin = e.getDate() | toMin)
}
predicate firstCommit(Commit e) {
not exists(File f | f = e.getAnAffectedFile() | firstChange(f) < e.getDate())
}
predicate artificialChange(Commit e) { firstCommit(e) or e.getChangeSize() >= 50000 }

View File

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
/**
* @name Defect from SVN
* @description A test case for creating a defect from SVN data.
* @kind problem
* @problem.severity warning
* @tags external-data
* @deprecated
*/
import cpp
import external.ExternalArtifact
import external.VCS
predicate numCommits(File f, int i) { i = count(Commit e | e.getAnAffectedFile() = f) }
predicate maxCommits(int i) { i = max(File f, int j | numCommits(f, j) | j) }
from File f, int i
where numCommits(f, i) and maxCommits(i)
select f, "This file has " + i + " commits."

View File

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
/**
* @name Metric from SVN
* @description Find number of commits for a file
* @treemap.warnOn lowValues
* @metricType file
* @tags external-data
* @deprecated
*/
import cpp
import external.VCS
predicate numCommits(File f, int i) { i = count(Commit e | e.getAnAffectedFile() = f) }
from File f, int i
where numCommits(f, i)
select f, i

View File

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
/**
* @name Filter: exclude results from files that have not recently been
* edited
* @description Use this filter to return results only if they are
* located in files that have been modified in the 60 days
* before the date of the snapshot.
* @kind problem
* @id cpp/recent-defects-filter
* @tags filter
* external-data
* @deprecated
*/
import cpp
import external.DefectFilter
import external.VCS
pragma[noopt]
private predicate recent(File file) {
exists(Commit e | file = e.getAnAffectedFile() | e.isRecent() and not artificialChange(e))
}
from DefectResult res
where recent(res.getFile())
select res, res.getMessage()

View File

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
/**
* @name Metric filter: exclude results from files that have not
* recently been edited
* @description Use this filter to return results only if they are
* located in files that have been modified in the 60 days
* before the snapshot.
* @kind treemap
* @id cpp/recent-defects-for-metric-filter
* @tags filter
* external-data
* @deprecated
*/
import cpp
import external.MetricFilter
import external.VCS
pragma[noopt]
private predicate recent(File file) {
exists(Commit e | file = e.getAnAffectedFile() | e.isRecent() and not artificialChange(e))
}
from MetricResult res
where recent(res.getFile())
select res, res.getValue()

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
/**
* @name Jump-to-definition links
* @description Generates use-definition pairs that provide the data
* for jump-to-definition in the code viewer.
* @kind definitions
* @id cpp/ide-jump-to-definition
* @tags ide-contextual-queries/local-definitions
*/
import definitions
external string selectedSourceFile();
from Top e, Top def, string kind
where def = definitionOf(e, kind) and e.getFile() = getEncodedFile(selectedSourceFile())
select e, def, kind

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
/**
* @name Find-references links
* @description Generates use-definition pairs that provide the data
* for find-references in the code viewer.
* @kind definitions
* @id cpp/ide-find-references
* @tags ide-contextual-queries/local-references
*/
import definitions
external string selectedSourceFile();
from Top e, Top def, string kind
where def = definitionOf(e, kind) and def.getFile() = getEncodedFile(selectedSourceFile())
select e, def, kind

View File

@@ -1 +1,7 @@
/**
* DEPRECATED: Objective C is no longer supported.
*
* Import `cpp` instead of `objc`.
*/
import cpp

View File

@@ -2,3 +2,4 @@ name: codeql-cpp
version: 0.0.0
dbscheme: semmlecode.cpp.dbscheme
suites: codeql-suites
extractor: cpp

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
/**
* @name AST Consistency Check
* @description Performs consistency checks on the Abstract Syntax Tree. This query should have no results.
* @kind table
* @id cpp/ast-consistency-check
*/
import cpp
import CastConsistency

View File

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
/**
* @name AST Sanity Check
* @description Performs sanity checks on the Abstract Syntax Tree. This query should have no results.
* @kind table
* @id cpp/ast-sanity-check
*/
import cpp
import CastSanity

View File

@@ -458,6 +458,15 @@ class Class extends UserType {
exists(ClassDerivation d | d.getDerivedClass() = this and d = result)
}
/**
* Gets class derivation number `index` of this class/struct, for example the
* `public B` is derivation 1 in the following code:
* ```
* class D : public A, public B, public C {
* ...
* };
* ```
*/
ClassDerivation getDerivation(int index) {
exists(ClassDerivation d | d.getDerivedClass() = this and d.getIndex() = index and d = result)
}
@@ -900,6 +909,22 @@ class AbstractClass extends Class {
class TemplateClass extends Class {
TemplateClass() { usertypes(underlyingElement(this), _, 6) }
/**
* Gets a class instantiated from this template.
*
* For example for `MyTemplateClass<T>` in the following code, the results are
* `MyTemplateClass<int>` and `MyTemplateClass<long>`:
* ```
* template<class T>
* class MyTemplateClass {
* ...
* };
*
* MyTemplateClass<int> instance;
*
* MyTemplateClass<long> instance;
* ```
*/
Class getAnInstantiation() {
result.isConstructedFrom(this) and
exists(result.getATemplateArgument())

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@@ -13,8 +13,20 @@ class Comment extends Locatable, @comment {
override Location getLocation() { comments(underlyingElement(this), _, result) }
/**
* Gets the text of this comment, including the opening `//` or `/*`, and the closing `*``/` if
* present.
*/
string getContents() { comments(underlyingElement(this), result, _) }
/**
* Gets the AST element this comment is associated with. For example, the comment in the
* following code is associated with the declaration of `j`.
* ```
* int i;
* int j; // Comment on j
* ```
*/
Element getCommentedElement() {
commentbinding(underlyingElement(this), unresolveElement(result))
}

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@@ -21,9 +21,9 @@ private predicate idOf(@compilation x, int y) = equivalenceRelation(id/2)(x, y)
* Three things happen to each file during a compilation:
*
* 1. The file is compiled by a real compiler, such as gcc or VC.
* 2. The file is parsed by Semmle's C++ front-end.
* 2. The file is parsed by the CodeQL C++ front-end.
* 3. The parsed representation is converted to database tables by
* Semmle's extractor.
* the CodeQL extractor.
*
* This class provides CPU and elapsed time information for steps 2 and 3,
* but not for step 1.
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ class Compilation extends @compilation {
/** Gets a file compiled during this invocation. */
File getAFileCompiled() { result = getFileCompiled(_) }
/** Gets the `i`th file compiled during this invocation */
File getFileCompiled(int i) { compilation_compiling_files(this, i, unresolveElement(result)) }
/**

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@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ private import semmle.code.cpp.internal.QualifiedName as Q
* `DeclarationEntry`, because they always have a unique source location.
* `EnumConstant` and `FriendDecl` are both examples of this.
*/
abstract class Declaration extends Locatable, @declaration {
class Declaration extends Locatable, @declaration {
/**
* Gets the innermost namespace which contains this declaration.
*
@@ -98,7 +98,12 @@ abstract class Declaration extends Locatable, @declaration {
this.hasQualifiedName(namespaceQualifier, "", baseName)
}
override string toString() { result = this.getName() }
/**
* Gets a description of this `Declaration` for display purposes.
*/
string getDescription() { result = this.getName() }
final override string toString() { result = this.getDescription() }
/**
* Gets the name of this declaration.
@@ -161,6 +166,7 @@ abstract class Declaration extends Locatable, @declaration {
/** Holds if the declaration has a definition. */
predicate hasDefinition() { exists(this.getDefinition()) }
/** DEPRECATED: Use `hasDefinition` instead. */
predicate isDefined() { hasDefinition() }
/** Gets the preferred location of this declaration, if any. */
@@ -303,7 +309,7 @@ abstract class DeclarationEntry extends Locatable {
* available), or the name declared by this entry otherwise.
*/
string getCanonicalName() {
if getDeclaration().isDefined()
if getDeclaration().hasDefinition()
then result = getDeclaration().getDefinition().getName()
else result = getName()
}

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@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ class Diagnostic extends Locatable, @diagnostic {
/** Gets the error code for this compiler message. */
string getTag() { diagnostics(underlyingElement(this), _, result, _, _, _) }
/** Holds if `s` is the error code for this compiler message. */
predicate hasTag(string s) { this.getTag() = s }
/**

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@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import semmle.code.cpp.Declaration
import semmle.code.cpp.metrics.MetricFile
/** A file or folder. */
abstract class Container extends Locatable, @container {
class Container extends Locatable, @container {
/**
* Gets the absolute, canonical path of this container, using forward slashes
* as path separator.
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ abstract class Container extends Locatable, @container {
* a bare root prefix, that is, the path has no path segments. A container
* whose absolute path has no segments is always a `Folder`, not a `File`.
*/
abstract string getAbsolutePath();
string getAbsolutePath() { none() } // overridden by subclasses
/**
* DEPRECATED: Use `getLocation` instead.
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ abstract class Container extends Locatable, @container {
*
* For more information see [Providing URLs](https://help.semmle.com/QL/learn-ql/ql/locations.html#providing-urls).
*/
abstract deprecated string getURL();
deprecated string getURL() { none() } // overridden by subclasses
/**
* Gets the relative path of this file or folder from the root folder of the
@@ -261,18 +261,6 @@ class File extends Container, @file {
/** Holds if this file was compiled as C++ (at any point). */
predicate compiledAsCpp() { fileannotations(underlyingElement(this), 1, "compiled as c++", "1") }
/**
* DEPRECATED: Objective-C is no longer supported.
* Holds if this file was compiled as Objective C (at any point).
*/
deprecated predicate compiledAsObjC() { none() }
/**
* DEPRECATED: Objective-C is no longer supported.
* Holds if this file was compiled as Objective C++ (at any point).
*/
deprecated predicate compiledAsObjCpp() { none() }
/**
* Holds if this file was compiled by a Microsoft compiler (at any point).
*
@@ -316,14 +304,6 @@ class File extends Container, @file {
exists(Include i | i.getFile() = this and i.getIncludedFile() = result)
}
/**
* DEPRECATED: use `getParentContainer` instead.
* Gets the folder which contains this file.
*/
deprecated Folder getParent() {
containerparent(unresolveElement(result), underlyingElement(this))
}
/**
* Holds if this file may be from source. This predicate holds for all files
* except the dummy file, whose name is the empty string, which contains
@@ -341,28 +321,6 @@ class File extends Container, @file {
/** Gets the metric file. */
MetricFile getMetrics() { result = this }
/**
* DEPRECATED: Use `getAbsolutePath` instead.
* Gets the full name of this file, for example:
* "/usr/home/me/myprogram.c".
*/
deprecated string getName() { files(underlyingElement(this), result, _, _, _) }
/**
* DEPRECATED: Use `getAbsolutePath` instead.
* Holds if this file has the specified full name.
*
* Example usage: `f.hasName("/usr/home/me/myprogram.c")`.
*/
deprecated predicate hasName(string name) { name = this.getName() }
/**
* DEPRECATED: Use `getAbsolutePath` instead.
* Gets the full name of this file, for example
* "/usr/home/me/myprogram.c".
*/
deprecated string getFullName() { result = this.getName() }
/**
* Gets the remainder of the base name after the first dot character. Note
* that the name of this predicate is in plural form, unlike `getExtension`,
@@ -377,22 +335,6 @@ class File extends Container, @file {
*/
string getExtensions() { files(underlyingElement(this), _, _, result, _) }
/**
* DEPRECATED: Use `getBaseName` instead.
* Gets the name and extension(s), but not path, of a file. For example,
* if the full name is "/path/to/filename.a.bcd" then the filename is
* "filename.a.bcd".
*/
deprecated string getFileName() {
// [a/b.c/d/]fileName
// ^ beginAfter
exists(string fullName, int beginAfter |
fullName = this.getName() and
beginAfter = max(int i | i = -1 or fullName.charAt(i) = "/" | i) and
result = fullName.suffix(beginAfter + 1)
)
}
/**
* Gets the short name of this file, that is, the prefix of its base name up
* to (but not including) the first dot character if there is one, or the

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@@ -103,6 +103,9 @@ class Function extends Declaration, ControlFlowNode, AccessHolder, @function {
/**
* Holds if this function is declared to be `constexpr`.
*
* Note that this does not hold if the function has been declared
* `consteval`.
*/
predicate isDeclaredConstexpr() { this.hasSpecifier("declared_constexpr") }
@@ -115,9 +118,16 @@ class Function extends Declaration, ControlFlowNode, AccessHolder, @function {
* template <typename T> constexpr int g(T x) { return f(x); }
* ```
* `g<int>` is declared constexpr, but is not constexpr.
*
* Will also hold if this function is `consteval`.
*/
predicate isConstexpr() { this.hasSpecifier("is_constexpr") }
/**
* Holds if this function is declared to be `consteval`.
*/
predicate isConsteval() { this.hasSpecifier("is_consteval") }
/**
* Holds if this function is declared with `__attribute__((naked))` or
* `__declspec(naked)`.
@@ -174,17 +184,8 @@ class Function extends Declaration, ControlFlowNode, AccessHolder, @function {
* For example: for a function `int Foo(int p1, int p2)` this would
* return `int p1, int p2`.
*/
string getParameterString() { result = getParameterStringFrom(0) }
private string getParameterStringFrom(int index) {
index = getNumberOfParameters() and
result = ""
or
index = getNumberOfParameters() - 1 and
result = getParameter(index).getTypedName()
or
index < getNumberOfParameters() - 1 and
result = getParameter(index).getTypedName() + ", " + getParameterStringFrom(index + 1)
string getParameterString() {
result = concat(int i | | min(getParameter(i).getTypedName()), ", " order by i)
}
/** Gets a call to this function. */
@@ -606,18 +607,8 @@ class FunctionDeclarationEntry extends DeclarationEntry, @fun_decl {
* For example: for a function 'int Foo(int p1, int p2)' this would
* return 'int p1, int p2'.
*/
string getParameterString() { result = getParameterStringFrom(0) }
private string getParameterStringFrom(int index) {
index = getNumberOfParameters() and
result = ""
or
index = getNumberOfParameters() - 1 and
result = getParameterDeclarationEntry(index).getTypedName()
or
index < getNumberOfParameters() - 1 and
result =
getParameterDeclarationEntry(index).getTypedName() + ", " + getParameterStringFrom(index + 1)
string getParameterString() {
result = concat(int i | | min(getParameterDeclarationEntry(i).getTypedName()), ", " order by i)
}
/**

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@@ -79,7 +79,10 @@ class Namespace extends NameQualifyingElement, @namespace {
/** Gets the metric namespace. */
MetricNamespace getMetrics() { result = this }
override string toString() { result = this.getQualifiedName() }
/** Gets a version of the `QualifiedName` that is more suitable for display purposes. */
string getFriendlyName() { result = this.getQualifiedName() }
final override string toString() { result = getFriendlyName() }
/** Gets a declaration of (part of) this namespace. */
NamespaceDeclarationEntry getADeclarationEntry() { result.getNamespace() = this }
@@ -104,7 +107,7 @@ class NamespaceDeclarationEntry extends Locatable, @namespace_decl {
namespace_decls(underlyingElement(this), unresolveElement(result), _, _)
}
override string toString() { result = this.getNamespace().toString() }
override string toString() { result = this.getNamespace().getFriendlyName() }
/**
* Gets the location of the token preceding the namespace declaration
@@ -130,7 +133,7 @@ class NamespaceDeclarationEntry extends Locatable, @namespace_decl {
/**
* A C++ `using` directive or `using` declaration.
*/
abstract class UsingEntry extends Locatable, @using {
class UsingEntry extends Locatable, @using {
override Location getLocation() { usings(underlyingElement(this), _, result) }
}
@@ -150,7 +153,7 @@ class UsingDeclarationEntry extends UsingEntry {
*/
Declaration getDeclaration() { usings(underlyingElement(this), unresolveElement(result), _) }
override string toString() { result = "using " + this.getDeclaration().toString() }
override string toString() { result = "using " + this.getDeclaration().getDescription() }
}
/**
@@ -169,7 +172,7 @@ class UsingDirectiveEntry extends UsingEntry {
*/
Namespace getNamespace() { usings(underlyingElement(this), unresolveElement(result), _) }
override string toString() { result = "using namespace " + this.getNamespace().toString() }
override string toString() { result = "using namespace " + this.getNamespace().getFriendlyName() }
}
/**
@@ -204,7 +207,7 @@ class GlobalNamespace extends Namespace {
*/
deprecated string getFullName() { result = this.getName() }
override string toString() { result = "(global namespace)" }
override string getFriendlyName() { result = "(global namespace)" }
}
/**

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@@ -376,6 +376,8 @@ private predicate isIntegralType(@builtintype type, int kind) {
kind = 43
or
kind = 44
or
kind = 51
)
}
@@ -463,6 +465,8 @@ private predicate integralTypeMapping(int original, int canonical, int unsigned,
original = 43 and canonical = 43 and unsigned = -1 and signed = -1 // char16_t
or
original = 44 and canonical = 44 and unsigned = -1 and signed = -1 // char32_t
or
original = 51 and canonical = 51 and unsigned = -1 and signed = -1 // char8_t
}
/**
@@ -697,28 +701,188 @@ class Int128Type extends IntegralType {
override string getCanonicalQLClass() { result = "Int128Type" }
}
private newtype TTypeDomain =
TRealDomain() or
TComplexDomain() or
TImaginaryDomain()
/**
* The C/C++ floating point types. See 4.5. This includes `float`,
* `double` and `long double` types.
* ```
* float f;
* double d;
* long double ld;
* ```
* The type domain of a floating-point type. One of `RealDomain`, `ComplexDomain`, or
* `ImaginaryDomain`.
*/
class TypeDomain extends TTypeDomain {
/** Gets a textual representation of this type domain. */
string toString() { none() }
}
/**
* The type domain of a floating-point type that represents a real number.
*/
class RealDomain extends TypeDomain, TRealDomain {
final override string toString() { result = "real" }
}
/**
* The type domain of a floating-point type that represents a complex number.
*/
class ComplexDomain extends TypeDomain, TComplexDomain {
final override string toString() { result = "complex" }
}
/**
* The type domain of a floating-point type that represents an imaginary number.
*/
class ImaginaryDomain extends TypeDomain, TImaginaryDomain {
final override string toString() { result = "imaginary" }
}
/**
* Data for floating-point types.
*
* kind: The original type kind. Can be any floating-point type kind.
* base: The numeric base of the number's representation. Can be 2 (binary) or 10 (decimal).
* domain: The type domain of the type. Can be `RealDomain`, `ComplexDomain`, or `ImaginaryDomain`.
* realKind: The type kind of the corresponding real type. For example, the corresponding real type
* of `_Complex double` is `double`.
* extended: `true` if the number is an extended-precision floating-point number, such as
* `_Float32x`.
*/
private predicate floatingPointTypeMapping(
int kind, int base, TTypeDomain domain, int realKind, boolean extended
) {
// float
kind = 24 and base = 2 and domain = TRealDomain() and realKind = 24 and extended = false
or
// double
kind = 25 and base = 2 and domain = TRealDomain() and realKind = 25 and extended = false
or
// long double
kind = 26 and base = 2 and domain = TRealDomain() and realKind = 26 and extended = false
or
// _Complex float
kind = 27 and base = 2 and domain = TComplexDomain() and realKind = 24 and extended = false
or
// _Complex double
kind = 28 and base = 2 and domain = TComplexDomain() and realKind = 25 and extended = false
or
// _Complex long double
kind = 29 and base = 2 and domain = TComplexDomain() and realKind = 26 and extended = false
or
// _Imaginary float
kind = 30 and base = 2 and domain = TImaginaryDomain() and realKind = 24 and extended = false
or
// _Imaginary double
kind = 31 and base = 2 and domain = TImaginaryDomain() and realKind = 25 and extended = false
or
// _Imaginary long double
kind = 32 and base = 2 and domain = TImaginaryDomain() and realKind = 26 and extended = false
or
// __float128
kind = 38 and base = 2 and domain = TRealDomain() and realKind = 38 and extended = false
or
// _Complex __float128
kind = 39 and base = 2 and domain = TComplexDomain() and realKind = 38 and extended = false
or
// _Decimal32
kind = 40 and base = 10 and domain = TRealDomain() and realKind = 40 and extended = false
or
// _Decimal64
kind = 41 and base = 10 and domain = TRealDomain() and realKind = 41 and extended = false
or
// _Decimal128
kind = 42 and base = 10 and domain = TRealDomain() and realKind = 42 and extended = false
or
// _Float32
kind = 45 and base = 2 and domain = TRealDomain() and realKind = 45 and extended = false
or
// _Float32x
kind = 46 and base = 2 and domain = TRealDomain() and realKind = 46 and extended = true
or
// _Float64
kind = 47 and base = 2 and domain = TRealDomain() and realKind = 47 and extended = false
or
// _Float64x
kind = 48 and base = 2 and domain = TRealDomain() and realKind = 48 and extended = true
or
// _Float128
kind = 49 and base = 2 and domain = TRealDomain() and realKind = 49 and extended = false
or
// _Float128x
kind = 50 and base = 2 and domain = TRealDomain() and realKind = 50 and extended = true
}
/**
* The C/C++ floating point types. See 4.5. This includes `float`, `double` and `long double`, the
* fixed-size floating-point types like `_Float32`, the extended-precision floating-point types like
* `_Float64x`, and the decimal floating-point types like `_Decimal32`. It also includes the complex
* and imaginary versions of all of these types.
*/
class FloatingPointType extends ArithmeticType {
final int base;
final TypeDomain domain;
final int realKind;
final boolean extended;
FloatingPointType() {
exists(int kind |
builtintypes(underlyingElement(this), _, kind, _, _, _) and
(
kind >= 24 and kind <= 32
or
kind >= 38 and kind <= 42
or
kind >= 45 and kind <= 50
)
floatingPointTypeMapping(kind, base, domain, realKind, extended)
)
}
/** Gets the numeric base of this type's representation: 2 (binary) or 10 (decimal). */
final int getBase() { result = base }
/**
* Gets the type domain of this type. Can be `RealDomain`, `ComplexDomain`, or `ImaginaryDomain`.
*/
final TypeDomain getDomain() { result = domain }
/**
* Gets the corresponding real type of this type. For example, the corresponding real type of
* `_Complex double` is `double`.
*/
final RealNumberType getRealType() {
builtintypes(unresolveElement(result), _, realKind, _, _, _)
}
/** Holds if this type is an extended precision floating-point type, such as `_Float32x`. */
final predicate isExtendedPrecision() { extended = true }
}
/**
* A floating-point type representing a real number.
*/
class RealNumberType extends FloatingPointType {
RealNumberType() { domain instanceof RealDomain }
}
/**
* A floating-point type representing a complex number.
*/
class ComplexNumberType extends FloatingPointType {
ComplexNumberType() { domain instanceof ComplexDomain }
}
/**
* A floating-point type representing an imaginary number.
*/
class ImaginaryNumberType extends FloatingPointType {
ImaginaryNumberType() { domain instanceof ImaginaryDomain }
}
/**
* A floating-point type whose representation is base 2.
*/
class BinaryFloatingPointType extends FloatingPointType {
BinaryFloatingPointType() { base = 2 }
}
/**
* A floating-point type whose representation is base 10.
*/
class DecimalFloatingPointType extends FloatingPointType {
DecimalFloatingPointType() { base = 10 }
}
/**
@@ -727,7 +891,7 @@ class FloatingPointType extends ArithmeticType {
* float f;
* ```
*/
class FloatType extends FloatingPointType {
class FloatType extends RealNumberType, BinaryFloatingPointType {
FloatType() { builtintypes(underlyingElement(this), _, 24, _, _, _) }
override string getCanonicalQLClass() { result = "FloatType" }
@@ -739,7 +903,7 @@ class FloatType extends FloatingPointType {
* double d;
* ```
*/
class DoubleType extends FloatingPointType {
class DoubleType extends RealNumberType, BinaryFloatingPointType {
DoubleType() { builtintypes(underlyingElement(this), _, 25, _, _, _) }
override string getCanonicalQLClass() { result = "DoubleType" }
@@ -751,7 +915,7 @@ class DoubleType extends FloatingPointType {
* long double ld;
* ```
*/
class LongDoubleType extends FloatingPointType {
class LongDoubleType extends RealNumberType, BinaryFloatingPointType {
LongDoubleType() { builtintypes(underlyingElement(this), _, 26, _, _, _) }
override string getCanonicalQLClass() { result = "LongDoubleType" }
@@ -763,7 +927,7 @@ class LongDoubleType extends FloatingPointType {
* __float128 f128;
* ```
*/
class Float128Type extends FloatingPointType {
class Float128Type extends RealNumberType, BinaryFloatingPointType {
Float128Type() { builtintypes(underlyingElement(this), _, 38, _, _, _) }
override string getCanonicalQLClass() { result = "Float128Type" }
@@ -775,7 +939,7 @@ class Float128Type extends FloatingPointType {
* _Decimal32 d32;
* ```
*/
class Decimal32Type extends FloatingPointType {
class Decimal32Type extends RealNumberType, DecimalFloatingPointType {
Decimal32Type() { builtintypes(underlyingElement(this), _, 40, _, _, _) }
override string getCanonicalQLClass() { result = "Decimal32Type" }
@@ -787,7 +951,7 @@ class Decimal32Type extends FloatingPointType {
* _Decimal64 d64;
* ```
*/
class Decimal64Type extends FloatingPointType {
class Decimal64Type extends RealNumberType, DecimalFloatingPointType {
Decimal64Type() { builtintypes(underlyingElement(this), _, 41, _, _, _) }
override string getCanonicalQLClass() { result = "Decimal64Type" }
@@ -799,7 +963,7 @@ class Decimal64Type extends FloatingPointType {
* _Decimal128 d128;
* ```
*/
class Decimal128Type extends FloatingPointType {
class Decimal128Type extends RealNumberType, DecimalFloatingPointType {
Decimal128Type() { builtintypes(underlyingElement(this), _, 42, _, _, _) }
override string getCanonicalQLClass() { result = "Decimal128Type" }
@@ -833,6 +997,18 @@ class WideCharType extends IntegralType {
override string getCanonicalQLClass() { result = "WideCharType" }
}
/**
* The C/C++ `char8_t` type. This is available starting with C++20.
* ```
* char8_t c8;
* ```
*/
class Char8Type extends IntegralType {
Char8Type() { builtintypes(underlyingElement(this), _, 51, _, _, _) }
override string getCanonicalQLClass() { result = "Char8Type" }
}
/**
* The C/C++ `char16_t` type. This is available starting with C11 and C++11.
* ```

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@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ class UserType extends Type, Declaration, NameQualifyingElement, AccessHolder, @
override Specifier getASpecifier() { result = Type.super.getASpecifier() }
override Location getLocation() {
if isDefined()
if hasDefinition()
then result = this.getDefinitionLocation()
else result = this.getADeclarationLocation()
}

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@@ -126,10 +126,7 @@ class Variable extends Declaration, @variable {
or
exists(AssignExpr ae | ae.getLValue().(Access).getTarget() = this and result = ae.getRValue())
or
exists(AggregateLiteral l |
this.getDeclaringType() = l.getType() and
result = l.getChild(this.(Field).getInitializationOrder())
)
exists(ClassAggregateLiteral l | result = l.getFieldExpr(this))
}
/**
@@ -263,24 +260,33 @@ class ParameterDeclarationEntry extends VariableDeclarationEntry {
*/
int getIndex() { param_decl_bind(underlyingElement(this), result, _) }
private string getAnonymousParameterDescription() {
not exists(getName()) and
exists(string idx |
idx =
((getIndex() + 1).toString() + "th")
.replaceAll("1th", "1st")
.replaceAll("2th", "2nd")
.replaceAll("3th", "3rd")
.replaceAll("11st", "11th")
.replaceAll("12nd", "12th")
.replaceAll("13rd", "13th") and
if exists(getCanonicalName())
then result = "declaration of " + getCanonicalName() + " as anonymous " + idx + " parameter"
else result = "declaration of " + idx + " parameter"
)
}
override string toString() {
if exists(getName())
then result = super.toString()
else
exists(string idx |
idx =
((getIndex() + 1).toString() + "th")
.replaceAll("1th", "1st")
.replaceAll("2th", "2nd")
.replaceAll("3th", "3rd")
.replaceAll("11st", "11th")
.replaceAll("12nd", "12th")
.replaceAll("13rd", "13th")
|
if exists(getCanonicalName())
then result = "declaration of " + getCanonicalName() + " as anonymous " + idx + " parameter"
else result = "declaration of " + idx + " parameter"
)
isDefinition() and
result = "definition of " + getName()
or
not isDefinition() and
if getName() = getCanonicalName()
then result = "declaration of " + getName()
else result = "declaration of " + getCanonicalName() + " as " + getName()
or
result = getAnonymousParameterDescription()
}
/**

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@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ class XMLFile extends XMLParent, File {
XMLFile() { xmlEncoding(this, _) }
/** Gets a printable representation of this XML file. */
override string toString() { result = XMLParent.super.toString() }
override string toString() { result = getName() }
/** Gets the name of this XML file. */
override string getName() { result = File.super.getAbsolutePath() }
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ class XMLElement extends @xmlelement, XMLParent, XMLLocatable {
string getAttributeValue(string name) { result = this.getAttribute(name).getValue() }
/** Gets a printable representation of this XML element. */
override string toString() { result = XMLParent.super.toString() }
override string toString() { result = getName() }
}
/**

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@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ predicate freeFunction(Function f, int argNum) { argNum = f.(DeallocationFunctio
/**
* A call to a library routine that frees memory.
*
* DEPRECATED: Use `DeallocationExpr` instead (this also includes `delete` expressions).
*/
predicate freeCall(FunctionCall fc, Expr arg) { arg = fc.(DeallocationExpr).getFreedExpr() }

View File

@@ -12,12 +12,12 @@ abstract class Assertion extends Locatable {
}
/**
* A libc assert, as defined in assert.h. A macro with the head
* "assert(expr)" that expands to a conditional expression which
* may terminate the program.
* A libc assert, as defined in assert.h. A macro with a head
* that matches the prefix "assert(", and expands to a conditional
* expression which may terminate the program.
*/
class LibcAssert extends MacroInvocation, Assertion {
LibcAssert() { this.getMacro().getHead() = "assert(expr)" }
LibcAssert() { this.getMacro().getHead().matches("assert(%") }
override Expr getAsserted() {
exists(ConditionalExpr ce | this.getAGeneratedElement() = ce | result = ce.getCondition())

View File

@@ -92,13 +92,7 @@ int getBufferSize(Expr bufferExpr, Element why) {
// dataflow (all sources must be the same size)
bufferExprNode = DataFlow::exprNode(bufferExpr) and
result =
min(Expr def |
DataFlow::localFlowStep(DataFlow::exprNode(def), bufferExprNode)
|
getBufferSize(def, _)
) and
result =
max(Expr def |
unique(Expr def |
DataFlow::localFlowStep(DataFlow::exprNode(def), bufferExprNode)
|
getBufferSize(def, _)

View File

@@ -532,13 +532,7 @@ library class ExprEvaluator extends int {
interestingVariableAccess(e, va, v, true) and
// All assignments must have the same int value
result =
min(Expr value |
value = v.getAnAssignedValue() and not ignoreVariableAssignment(e, v, value)
|
getValueInternalNonSubExpr(value)
) and
result =
max(Expr value |
unique(Expr value |
value = v.getAnAssignedValue() and not ignoreVariableAssignment(e, v, value)
|
getValueInternalNonSubExpr(value)

View File

@@ -4,6 +4,14 @@
* passed to a function, or similar.
*/
/*
* Maintainer note: this file is one of several files that are similar but not
* identical. Many changes to this file will also apply to the others:
* - AddressConstantExpression.qll
* - AddressFlow.qll
* - EscapesTree.qll
*/
private import cpp
/**
@@ -11,15 +19,13 @@ private import cpp
* template functions, these functions are essentially casts, so we treat them
* as such.
*/
private predicate stdIdentityFunction(Function f) {
f.getNamespace().getParentNamespace() instanceof GlobalNamespace and
f.getNamespace().getName() = "std" and
(
f.getName() = "move"
or
f.getName() = "forward"
)
}
private predicate stdIdentityFunction(Function f) { f.hasQualifiedName("std", ["move", "forward"]) }
/**
* Holds if `f` is an instantiation of `std::addressof`, which effectively
* converts a reference to a pointer.
*/
private predicate stdAddressOf(Function f) { f.hasQualifiedName("std", "addressof") }
private predicate lvalueToLvalueStepPure(Expr lvalueIn, Expr lvalueOut) {
lvalueIn = lvalueOut.(DotFieldAccess).getQualifier().getFullyConverted()
@@ -91,12 +97,17 @@ private predicate lvalueToReferenceStep(Expr lvalueIn, Expr referenceOut) {
}
private predicate referenceToLvalueStep(Expr referenceIn, Expr lvalueOut) {
// This probably cannot happen. It would require an expression to be
// converted to a reference and back again without an intermediate variable
// assignment.
referenceIn.getConversion() = lvalueOut.(ReferenceDereferenceExpr)
}
private predicate referenceToPointerStep(Expr referenceIn, Expr pointerOut) {
pointerOut =
any(FunctionCall call |
stdAddressOf(call.getTarget()) and
referenceIn = call.getArgument(0).getFullyConverted()
)
}
private predicate referenceToReferenceStep(Expr referenceIn, Expr referenceOut) {
referenceOut =
any(FunctionCall call |
@@ -145,6 +156,12 @@ private predicate pointerFromVariableAccess(VariableAccess va, Expr pointer) {
pointerToPointerStep(prev, pointer)
)
or
// reference -> pointer
exists(Expr prev |
referenceFromVariableAccess(va, prev) and
referenceToPointerStep(prev, pointer)
)
or
// lvalue -> pointer
exists(Expr prev |
lvalueFromVariableAccess(va, prev) and
@@ -166,10 +183,14 @@ private predicate referenceFromVariableAccess(VariableAccess va, Expr reference)
)
}
private predicate valueMayEscapeAt(Expr e) {
private predicate addressMayEscapeAt(Expr e) {
exists(Call call |
e = call.getAnArgument().getFullyConverted() and
not stdIdentityFunction(call.getTarget())
not stdIdentityFunction(call.getTarget()) and
not stdAddressOf(call.getTarget())
or
e = call.getQualifier().getFullyConverted() and
e.getUnderlyingType() instanceof PointerType
)
or
exists(AssignExpr assign | e = assign.getRValue().getFullyConverted())
@@ -187,8 +208,8 @@ private predicate valueMayEscapeAt(Expr e) {
exists(AsmStmt asm | e = asm.getAChild().(Expr).getFullyConverted())
}
private predicate valueMayEscapeMutablyAt(Expr e) {
valueMayEscapeAt(e) and
private predicate addressMayEscapeMutablyAt(Expr e) {
addressMayEscapeAt(e) and
exists(Type t | t = e.getType().getUnderlyingType() |
exists(PointerType pt |
pt = t
@@ -207,6 +228,22 @@ private predicate valueMayEscapeMutablyAt(Expr e) {
)
}
private predicate lvalueMayEscapeAt(Expr e) {
// A call qualifier, like `q` in `q.f()`, is special in that the address of
// `q` escapes even though `q` is not a pointer or a reference.
exists(Call call |
e = call.getQualifier().getFullyConverted() and
e.getType().getUnspecifiedType() instanceof Class
)
}
private predicate lvalueMayEscapeMutablyAt(Expr e) {
lvalueMayEscapeAt(e) and
// A qualifier of a call to a const member function is converted to a const
// class type.
not e.getType().isConst()
}
private predicate addressFromVariableAccess(VariableAccess va, Expr e) {
pointerFromVariableAccess(va, e)
or
@@ -253,8 +290,11 @@ private module EscapesTree_Cached {
*/
cached
predicate variableAddressEscapesTree(VariableAccess va, Expr e) {
valueMayEscapeAt(e) and
addressMayEscapeAt(e) and
addressFromVariableAccess(va, e)
or
lvalueMayEscapeAt(e) and
lvalueFromVariableAccess(va, e)
}
/**
@@ -283,8 +323,11 @@ private module EscapesTree_Cached {
*/
cached
predicate variableAddressEscapesTreeNonConst(VariableAccess va, Expr e) {
valueMayEscapeMutablyAt(e) and
addressMayEscapeMutablyAt(e) and
addressFromVariableAccess(va, e)
or
lvalueMayEscapeMutablyAt(e) and
lvalueFromVariableAccess(va, e)
}
/**

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/**
* DEPRECATED: Recursion through `DataFlow::Configuration` is impossible in
* Semmle Core 1.17 and above. There is no need for this module because it's
* any supported tooling. There is no need for this module because it's
* impossible to accidentally depend on recursion through
* `DataFlow::Configuration` in current releases.
*

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
/**
* Provides a local analysis for identifying where a variable address
* is effectively taken. Array-like offsets are allowed to pass through but
* not field-like offsets.
*
* This library is specialized to meet the needs of `FlowVar.qll`.
*/
/*
* Maintainer note: this file is one of several files that are similar but not
* identical. Many changes to this file will also apply to the others:
* - AddressConstantExpression.qll
* - AddressFlow.qll
* - EscapesTree.qll
*/
private import cpp
/**
* Holds if `f` is an instantiation of the `std::move` or `std::forward`
* template functions, these functions are essentially casts, so we treat them
* as such.
*/
private predicate stdIdentityFunction(Function f) { f.hasQualifiedName("std", ["move", "forward"]) }
/**
* Holds if `f` is an instantiation of `std::addressof`, which effectively
* converts a reference to a pointer.
*/
private predicate stdAddressOf(Function f) { f.hasQualifiedName("std", "addressof") }
private predicate lvalueToLvalueStep(Expr lvalueIn, Expr lvalueOut) {
lvalueIn.getConversion() = lvalueOut.(ParenthesisExpr)
or
// When an object is implicitly converted to a reference to one of its base
// classes, it gets two `Conversion`s: there is first an implicit
// `CStyleCast` to its base class followed by a `ReferenceToExpr` to a
// reference to its base class. Whereas an explicit cast to the base class
// would produce an rvalue, which would not be convertible to an lvalue
// reference, this implicit cast instead produces an lvalue. The following
// case ensures that we propagate the property of being an lvalue through
// such casts.
lvalueIn.getConversion() = lvalueOut and
lvalueOut.(CStyleCast).isImplicit()
or
// C++ only
lvalueIn = lvalueOut.(PrefixCrementOperation).getOperand().getFullyConverted()
or
// C++ only
lvalueIn = lvalueOut.(Assignment).getLValue().getFullyConverted()
}
private predicate pointerToLvalueStep(Expr pointerIn, Expr lvalueOut) {
pointerIn = lvalueOut.(ArrayExpr).getArrayBase().getFullyConverted()
or
pointerIn = lvalueOut.(PointerDereferenceExpr).getOperand().getFullyConverted()
}
private predicate lvalueToPointerStep(Expr lvalueIn, Expr pointerOut) {
lvalueIn.getConversion() = pointerOut.(ArrayToPointerConversion)
or
lvalueIn = pointerOut.(AddressOfExpr).getOperand().getFullyConverted()
}
private predicate pointerToPointerStep(Expr pointerIn, Expr pointerOut) {
(
pointerOut instanceof PointerAddExpr
or
pointerOut instanceof PointerSubExpr
) and
pointerIn = pointerOut.getAChild().getFullyConverted() and
pointerIn.getUnspecifiedType() instanceof PointerType
or
pointerIn = pointerOut.(UnaryPlusExpr).getOperand().getFullyConverted()
or
pointerIn.getConversion() = pointerOut.(Cast)
or
pointerIn.getConversion() = pointerOut.(ParenthesisExpr)
or
pointerIn = pointerOut.(ConditionalExpr).getThen().getFullyConverted()
or
pointerIn = pointerOut.(ConditionalExpr).getElse().getFullyConverted()
or
pointerIn = pointerOut.(CommaExpr).getRightOperand().getFullyConverted()
or
pointerIn = pointerOut.(StmtExpr).getResultExpr().getFullyConverted()
}
private predicate lvalueToReferenceStep(Expr lvalueIn, Expr referenceOut) {
lvalueIn.getConversion() = referenceOut.(ReferenceToExpr)
}
private predicate referenceToLvalueStep(Expr referenceIn, Expr lvalueOut) {
referenceIn.getConversion() = lvalueOut.(ReferenceDereferenceExpr)
}
private predicate referenceToPointerStep(Expr referenceIn, Expr pointerOut) {
pointerOut =
any(FunctionCall call |
stdAddressOf(call.getTarget()) and
referenceIn = call.getArgument(0).getFullyConverted()
)
}
private predicate referenceToReferenceStep(Expr referenceIn, Expr referenceOut) {
referenceOut =
any(FunctionCall call |
stdIdentityFunction(call.getTarget()) and
referenceIn = call.getArgument(0).getFullyConverted()
)
or
referenceIn.getConversion() = referenceOut.(Cast)
or
referenceIn.getConversion() = referenceOut.(ParenthesisExpr)
}
private predicate assignmentTo(Expr updated, ControlFlowNode node) {
updated = node.(Assignment).getLValue().getFullyConverted()
or
updated = node.(CrementOperation).getOperand().getFullyConverted()
}
private predicate lvalueToUpdate(Expr lvalue, Expr outer, ControlFlowNode node) {
(
exists(Call call | node = call |
outer = call.getQualifier().getFullyConverted() and
outer.getUnspecifiedType() instanceof Class and
not call.getTarget().hasSpecifier("const")
)
or
assignmentTo(outer, node)
or
exists(DotFieldAccess fa |
// `fa.otherField = ...` or `f(&fa)` or similar
outer = fa.getQualifier().getFullyConverted() and
valueToUpdate(fa, _, node)
)
) and
lvalue = outer
or
exists(Expr lvalueMid |
lvalueToLvalueStep(lvalue, lvalueMid) and
lvalueToUpdate(lvalueMid, outer, node)
)
or
exists(Expr pointerMid |
lvalueToPointerStep(lvalue, pointerMid) and
pointerToUpdate(pointerMid, outer, node)
)
or
exists(Expr referenceMid |
lvalueToReferenceStep(lvalue, referenceMid) and
referenceToUpdate(referenceMid, outer, node)
)
}
private predicate pointerToUpdate(Expr pointer, Expr outer, ControlFlowNode node) {
(
exists(Call call | node = call |
outer = call.getAnArgument().getFullyConverted() and
exists(PointerType pt | pt = outer.getType().stripTopLevelSpecifiers() |
not pt.getBaseType().isConst()
)
or
outer = call.getQualifier().getFullyConverted() and
outer.getUnspecifiedType() instanceof PointerType and
not call.getTarget().hasSpecifier("const")
)
or
exists(PointerFieldAccess fa |
// `fa.otherField = ...` or `f(&fa)` or similar
outer = fa.getQualifier().getFullyConverted() and
valueToUpdate(fa, _, node)
)
) and
pointer = outer
or
exists(Expr lvalueMid |
pointerToLvalueStep(pointer, lvalueMid) and
lvalueToUpdate(lvalueMid, outer, node)
)
or
exists(Expr pointerMid |
pointerToPointerStep(pointer, pointerMid) and
pointerToUpdate(pointerMid, outer, node)
)
}
private predicate referenceToUpdate(Expr reference, Expr outer, ControlFlowNode node) {
exists(Call call |
node = call and
outer = call.getAnArgument().getFullyConverted() and
not stdIdentityFunction(call.getTarget()) and
not stdAddressOf(call.getTarget()) and
exists(ReferenceType rt | rt = outer.getType().stripTopLevelSpecifiers() |
not rt.getBaseType().isConst()
)
) and
reference = outer
or
exists(Expr lvalueMid |
referenceToLvalueStep(reference, lvalueMid) and
lvalueToUpdate(lvalueMid, outer, node)
)
or
exists(Expr pointerMid |
referenceToPointerStep(reference, pointerMid) and
pointerToUpdate(pointerMid, outer, node)
)
or
exists(Expr referenceMid |
referenceToReferenceStep(reference, referenceMid) and
referenceToUpdate(referenceMid, outer, node)
)
}
/**
* Holds if `node` is a control-flow node that may modify `inner` (or what it
* points to) through `outer`. The two expressions may be `Conversion`s. Plain
* assignments to variables are not included in this predicate since they are
* assumed to be analyzed by SSA or similar means.
*
* For example, in `f(& (*a).x)`, there are two results:
* - `inner` = `... .x`, `outer` = `&...`, `node` = `f(...)`.
* - `inner` = `a`, `outer` = `(...)`, `node` = `f(...)`.
*/
cached
predicate valueToUpdate(Expr inner, Expr outer, ControlFlowNode node) {
(
lvalueToUpdate(inner, outer, node)
or
pointerToUpdate(inner, outer, node)
or
referenceToUpdate(inner, outer, node)
) and
(
inner instanceof VariableAccess and
// Don't track non-field assignments
(assignmentTo(outer, _) implies inner instanceof FieldAccess)
or
inner instanceof ThisExpr
or
inner instanceof Call
// `inner` could also be `*` or `ReferenceDereferenceExpr`, but we
// can't do anything useful with those at the moment.
)
}

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