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Merge pull request #20937 from owen-mc/actions/fix/code-injection-privileged-context

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Actions: fix filtering of code injection results between medium and critical version of query
This commit is contained in:
Owen Mansel-Chan
2025-12-05 07:54:13 +00:00
committed by GitHub
parent d70c596c86 4a16de2bc8
commit 6d301f27d0
7 changed files with 94 additions and 19 deletions
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4
actions/ql/lib/change-notes/2025-11-28-fix-code-injection-alert-filtering.md Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
---
category: majorAnalysis
---
* The query `actions/code-injection/medium` has been updated to include results which were incorrectly excluded while filtering out results that are reported by `actions/code-injection/critical`.

42
actions/ql/lib/codeql/actions/security/CodeInjectionQuery.qll
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@@ -19,12 +19,7 @@ class CodeInjectionSink extends DataFlow::Node {
Event getRelevantCriticalEventForSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
inPrivilegedContext(sink.asExpr(), result) and
not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(sink.asExpr(), result, "code-injection")) and
// exclude cases where the sink is a JS script and the expression uses toJson
not exists(UsesStep script |
script.getCallee() = "actions/github-script" and
script.getArgumentExpr("script") = sink.asExpr() and
exists(getAToJsonReferenceExpression(sink.asExpr().(Expression).getExpression(), _))
)
not isGithubScriptUsingToJson(sink.asExpr())
}
/**
@@ -91,3 +86,38 @@ private module CodeInjectionConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
/** Tracks flow of unsafe user input that is used to construct and evaluate a code script. */
module CodeInjectionFlow = TaintTracking::Global<CodeInjectionConfig>;
/**
* Holds if there is a code injection flow from `source` to `sink` with
* critical severity, linked by `event`.
*/
predicate criticalSeverityCodeInjection(
CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode source, CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode sink, Event event
) {
CodeInjectionFlow::flowPath(source, sink) and
event = getRelevantCriticalEventForSink(sink.getNode()) and
source.getNode().(RemoteFlowSource).getEventName() = event.getName()
}
/**
* Holds if there is a code injection flow from `source` to `sink` with medium severity.
*/
predicate mediumSeverityCodeInjection(
CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode source, CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode sink
) {
CodeInjectionFlow::flowPath(source, sink) and
not criticalSeverityCodeInjection(source, sink, _) and
not isGithubScriptUsingToJson(sink.getNode().asExpr())
}
/**
* Holds if `expr` is the `script` input to `actions/github-script` and it uses
* `toJson`.
*/
predicate isGithubScriptUsingToJson(Expression expr) {
exists(UsesStep script |
script.getCallee() = "actions/github-script" and
script.getArgumentExpr("script") = expr and
exists(getAToJsonReferenceExpression(expr.getExpression(), _))
)
}

5
actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionCritical.ql
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@@ -20,10 +20,7 @@ import CodeInjectionFlow::PathGraph
import codeql.actions.security.ControlChecks
from CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode source, CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode sink, Event event
where
CodeInjectionFlow::flowPath(source, sink) and
event = getRelevantCriticalEventForSink(sink.getNode()) and
source.getNode().(RemoteFlowSource).getEventName() = event.getName()
where criticalSeverityCodeInjection(source, sink, event)
select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
"Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@).", sink,
sink.getNode().asExpr().(Expression).getRawExpression(), event, event.getName()

10
actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionMedium.ql
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@@ -19,15 +19,7 @@ import codeql.actions.security.CodeInjectionQuery
import CodeInjectionFlow::PathGraph
from CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode source, CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode sink
where
CodeInjectionFlow::flowPath(source, sink) and
inNonPrivilegedContext(sink.getNode().asExpr()) and
// exclude cases where the sink is a JS script and the expression uses toJson
not exists(UsesStep script |
script.getCallee() = "actions/github-script" and
script.getArgumentExpr("script") = sink.getNode().asExpr() and
exists(getAToJsonReferenceExpression(sink.getNode().asExpr().(Expression).getExpression(), _))
)
where mediumSeverityCodeInjection(source, sink)
select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
"Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user.", sink,
sink.getNode().asExpr().(Expression).getRawExpression()

18
actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-094/.github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml vendored Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
on:
push:
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
echo-chamber:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- run: echo '${{ github.event.commits[11].message }}'
- run: echo '${{ github.event.commits[11].author.email }}'
- run: echo '${{ github.event.commits[11].author.name }}'
- run: echo '${{ github.event.head_commit.message }}'
- run: echo '${{ github.event.head_commit.author.email }}'
- run: echo '${{ github.event.head_commit.author.name }}'
- run: echo '${{ github.event.head_commit.committer.email }}'
- run: echo '${{ github.event.head_commit.committer.name }}'
- run: echo '${{ github.event.commits[11].committer.email }}'
- run: echo '${{ github.event.commits[11].committer.name }}'

10
actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionCritical.expected
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@@ -435,6 +435,16 @@ nodes
| .github/workflows/push.yml:14:19:14:64 | github.event.head_commit.committer.name | semmle.label | github.event.head_commit.committer.name |
| .github/workflows/push.yml:15:19:15:65 | github.event.commits[11].committer.email | semmle.label | github.event.commits[11].committer.email |
| .github/workflows/push.yml:16:19:16:64 | github.event.commits[11].committer.name | semmle.label | github.event.commits[11].committer.name |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:9:19:9:57 | github.event.commits[11].message | semmle.label | github.event.commits[11].message |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:10:19:10:62 | github.event.commits[11].author.email | semmle.label | github.event.commits[11].author.email |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:11:19:11:61 | github.event.commits[11].author.name | semmle.label | github.event.commits[11].author.name |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:12:19:12:57 | github.event.head_commit.message | semmle.label | github.event.head_commit.message |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:13:19:13:62 | github.event.head_commit.author.email | semmle.label | github.event.head_commit.author.email |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:14:19:14:61 | github.event.head_commit.author.name | semmle.label | github.event.head_commit.author.name |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:15:19:15:65 | github.event.head_commit.committer.email | semmle.label | github.event.head_commit.committer.email |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:16:19:16:64 | github.event.head_commit.committer.name | semmle.label | github.event.head_commit.committer.name |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:17:19:17:65 | github.event.commits[11].committer.email | semmle.label | github.event.commits[11].committer.email |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:18:19:18:64 | github.event.commits[11].committer.name | semmle.label | github.event.commits[11].committer.name |
| .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:6:7:6:11 | input taint | semmle.label | input taint |
| .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:36:21:36:39 | inputs.taint | semmle.label | inputs.taint |
| .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:44:19:44:56 | github.event.pull_request.title | semmle.label | github.event.pull_request.title |

24
actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionMedium.expected
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@@ -435,6 +435,16 @@ nodes
| .github/workflows/push.yml:14:19:14:64 | github.event.head_commit.committer.name | semmle.label | github.event.head_commit.committer.name |
| .github/workflows/push.yml:15:19:15:65 | github.event.commits[11].committer.email | semmle.label | github.event.commits[11].committer.email |
| .github/workflows/push.yml:16:19:16:64 | github.event.commits[11].committer.name | semmle.label | github.event.commits[11].committer.name |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:9:19:9:57 | github.event.commits[11].message | semmle.label | github.event.commits[11].message |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:10:19:10:62 | github.event.commits[11].author.email | semmle.label | github.event.commits[11].author.email |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:11:19:11:61 | github.event.commits[11].author.name | semmle.label | github.event.commits[11].author.name |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:12:19:12:57 | github.event.head_commit.message | semmle.label | github.event.head_commit.message |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:13:19:13:62 | github.event.head_commit.author.email | semmle.label | github.event.head_commit.author.email |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:14:19:14:61 | github.event.head_commit.author.name | semmle.label | github.event.head_commit.author.name |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:15:19:15:65 | github.event.head_commit.committer.email | semmle.label | github.event.head_commit.committer.email |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:16:19:16:64 | github.event.head_commit.committer.name | semmle.label | github.event.head_commit.committer.name |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:17:19:17:65 | github.event.commits[11].committer.email | semmle.label | github.event.commits[11].committer.email |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:18:19:18:64 | github.event.commits[11].committer.name | semmle.label | github.event.commits[11].committer.name |
| .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:6:7:6:11 | input taint | semmle.label | input taint |
| .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:36:21:36:39 | inputs.taint | semmle.label | inputs.taint |
| .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:44:19:44:56 | github.event.pull_request.title | semmle.label | github.event.pull_request.title |
@@ -719,6 +729,16 @@ subpaths
| .github/workflows/push.yml:14:19:14:64 | github.event.head_commit.committer.name | .github/workflows/push.yml:14:19:14:64 | github.event.head_commit.committer.name | .github/workflows/push.yml:14:19:14:64 | github.event.head_commit.committer.name | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/push.yml:14:19:14:64 | github.event.head_commit.committer.name | ${{ github.event.head_commit.committer.name }} |
| .github/workflows/push.yml:15:19:15:65 | github.event.commits[11].committer.email | .github/workflows/push.yml:15:19:15:65 | github.event.commits[11].committer.email | .github/workflows/push.yml:15:19:15:65 | github.event.commits[11].committer.email | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/push.yml:15:19:15:65 | github.event.commits[11].committer.email | ${{ github.event.commits[11].committer.email }} |
| .github/workflows/push.yml:16:19:16:64 | github.event.commits[11].committer.name | .github/workflows/push.yml:16:19:16:64 | github.event.commits[11].committer.name | .github/workflows/push.yml:16:19:16:64 | github.event.commits[11].committer.name | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/push.yml:16:19:16:64 | github.event.commits[11].committer.name | ${{ github.event.commits[11].committer.name }} |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:9:19:9:57 | github.event.commits[11].message | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:9:19:9:57 | github.event.commits[11].message | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:9:19:9:57 | github.event.commits[11].message | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:9:19:9:57 | github.event.commits[11].message | ${{ github.event.commits[11].message }} |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:10:19:10:62 | github.event.commits[11].author.email | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:10:19:10:62 | github.event.commits[11].author.email | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:10:19:10:62 | github.event.commits[11].author.email | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:10:19:10:62 | github.event.commits[11].author.email | ${{ github.event.commits[11].author.email }} |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:11:19:11:61 | github.event.commits[11].author.name | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:11:19:11:61 | github.event.commits[11].author.name | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:11:19:11:61 | github.event.commits[11].author.name | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:11:19:11:61 | github.event.commits[11].author.name | ${{ github.event.commits[11].author.name }} |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:12:19:12:57 | github.event.head_commit.message | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:12:19:12:57 | github.event.head_commit.message | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:12:19:12:57 | github.event.head_commit.message | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:12:19:12:57 | github.event.head_commit.message | ${{ github.event.head_commit.message }} |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:13:19:13:62 | github.event.head_commit.author.email | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:13:19:13:62 | github.event.head_commit.author.email | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:13:19:13:62 | github.event.head_commit.author.email | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:13:19:13:62 | github.event.head_commit.author.email | ${{ github.event.head_commit.author.email }} |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:14:19:14:61 | github.event.head_commit.author.name | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:14:19:14:61 | github.event.head_commit.author.name | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:14:19:14:61 | github.event.head_commit.author.name | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:14:19:14:61 | github.event.head_commit.author.name | ${{ github.event.head_commit.author.name }} |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:15:19:15:65 | github.event.head_commit.committer.email | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:15:19:15:65 | github.event.head_commit.committer.email | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:15:19:15:65 | github.event.head_commit.committer.email | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:15:19:15:65 | github.event.head_commit.committer.email | ${{ github.event.head_commit.committer.email }} |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:16:19:16:64 | github.event.head_commit.committer.name | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:16:19:16:64 | github.event.head_commit.committer.name | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:16:19:16:64 | github.event.head_commit.committer.name | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:16:19:16:64 | github.event.head_commit.committer.name | ${{ github.event.head_commit.committer.name }} |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:17:19:17:65 | github.event.commits[11].committer.email | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:17:19:17:65 | github.event.commits[11].committer.email | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:17:19:17:65 | github.event.commits[11].committer.email | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:17:19:17:65 | github.event.commits[11].committer.email | ${{ github.event.commits[11].committer.email }} |
| .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:18:19:18:64 | github.event.commits[11].committer.name | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:18:19:18:64 | github.event.commits[11].committer.name | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:18:19:18:64 | github.event.commits[11].committer.name | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/push_and_workflow_dispatch.yml:18:19:18:64 | github.event.commits[11].committer.name | ${{ github.event.commits[11].committer.name }} |
| .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:36:21:36:39 | inputs.taint | .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-caller-1.yml:11:15:11:52 | github.event.pull_request.title | .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:36:21:36:39 | inputs.taint | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:36:21:36:39 | inputs.taint | ${{ inputs.taint }} |
| .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:53:26:53:39 | env.log | .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:44:19:44:56 | github.event.pull_request.title | .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:53:26:53:39 | env.log | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:53:26:53:39 | env.log | ${{ env.log }} |
| .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:66:34:66:52 | env.prev_log | .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:45:24:45:61 | github.event.changes.title.from | .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:66:34:66:52 | env.prev_log | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/reusable-workflow-1.yml:66:34:66:52 | env.prev_log | ${{ env.prev_log }} |
@@ -729,6 +749,10 @@ subpaths
| .github/workflows/test10.yml:333:34:333:77 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | .github/workflows/test10.yml:333:34:333:77 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | .github/workflows/test10.yml:333:34:333:77 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/test10.yml:333:34:333:77 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }} |
| .github/workflows/test10.yml:423:34:423:77 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | .github/workflows/test10.yml:423:34:423:77 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | .github/workflows/test10.yml:423:34:423:77 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/test10.yml:423:34:423:77 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }} |
| .github/workflows/test10.yml:518:34:518:77 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | .github/workflows/test10.yml:518:34:518:77 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | .github/workflows/test10.yml:518:34:518:77 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/test10.yml:518:34:518:77 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }} |
| .github/workflows/test20.yml:15:54:15:94 | github.event.pull_request.head.ref | .github/workflows/test20.yml:15:54:15:94 | github.event.pull_request.head.ref | .github/workflows/test20.yml:15:54:15:94 | github.event.pull_request.head.ref | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/test20.yml:15:54:15:94 | github.event.pull_request.head.ref | ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }} |
| .github/workflows/test21.yml:22:35:22:73 | github.event.head_commit.message | .github/workflows/test21.yml:22:35:22:73 | github.event.head_commit.message | .github/workflows/test21.yml:22:35:22:73 | github.event.head_commit.message | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/test21.yml:22:35:22:73 | github.event.head_commit.message | ${{ github.event.head_commit.message }} |
| .github/workflows/test21.yml:23:36:23:74 | github.event.head_commit.message | .github/workflows/test21.yml:23:36:23:74 | github.event.head_commit.message | .github/workflows/test21.yml:23:36:23:74 | github.event.head_commit.message | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/test21.yml:23:36:23:74 | github.event.head_commit.message | ${{ github.event.head_commit.message }} |
| .github/workflows/test21.yml:24:50:24:88 | github.event.head_commit.message | .github/workflows/test21.yml:24:50:24:88 | github.event.head_commit.message | .github/workflows/test21.yml:24:50:24:88 | github.event.head_commit.message | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/test21.yml:24:50:24:88 | github.event.head_commit.message | ${{ github.event.head_commit.message }} |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_branches1.yml:13:20:13:63 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | .github/workflows/workflow_run_branches1.yml:13:20:13:63 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | .github/workflows/workflow_run_branches1.yml:13:20:13:63 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/workflow_run_branches1.yml:13:20:13:63 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }} |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_branches2.yml:13:20:13:63 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | .github/workflows/workflow_run_branches2.yml:13:20:13:63 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | .github/workflows/workflow_run_branches2.yml:13:20:13:63 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/workflow_run_branches2.yml:13:20:13:63 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }} |
| .github/workflows/workflow_run_branches4.yml:13:20:13:63 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | .github/workflows/workflow_run_branches4.yml:13:20:13:63 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | .github/workflows/workflow_run_branches4.yml:13:20:13:63 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user. | .github/workflows/workflow_run_branches4.yml:13:20:13:63 | github.event.workflow_run.head_branch | ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }} |