Decouple XsltInjection.qll to reuse the taint tracking configuration

This commit is contained in:
Tony Torralba
2021-07-19 13:16:11 +02:00
parent fc58ada92e
commit 6967b06dee
5 changed files with 43 additions and 54 deletions

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@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ private module Frameworks {
private import semmle.code.java.security.MvelInjection
private import semmle.code.java.security.OgnlInjection
private import semmle.code.java.security.XPath
private import semmle.code.java.security.XsltInjectionSinkModels
private import semmle.code.java.frameworks.android.Android
private import semmle.code.java.frameworks.android.SQLite
private import semmle.code.java.frameworks.Jdbc

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@@ -11,29 +11,9 @@
*/
import java
import semmle.code.java.dataflow.FlowSources
import semmle.code.java.security.XsltInjection
import semmle.code.java.security.XsltInjectionQuery
import DataFlow::PathGraph
/**
* A taint-tracking configuration for unvalidated user input that is used in XSLT transformation.
*/
class XsltInjectionFlowConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
XsltInjectionFlowConfig() { this = "XsltInjectionFlowConfig" }
override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof XsltInjectionSink }
override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) {
node.getType() instanceof PrimitiveType or node.getType() instanceof BoxedType
}
override predicate isAdditionalTaintStep(DataFlow::Node node1, DataFlow::Node node2) {
any(XsltInjectionAdditionalTaintStep c).step(node1, node2)
}
}
from DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink, XsltInjectionFlowConfig conf
where conf.hasFlowPath(source, sink)
select sink.getNode(), source, sink, "XSLT transformation might include stylesheet from $@.",

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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/** Provides classes to reason about XSLT injection vulnerabilities. */
import java
import semmle.code.java.dataflow.ExternalFlow
import semmle.code.java.dataflow.FlowSources
import semmle.code.java.security.XmlParsers
import semmle.code.java.dataflow.DataFlow
@@ -11,20 +11,6 @@ import semmle.code.java.dataflow.DataFlow
*/
abstract class XsltInjectionSink extends DataFlow::Node { }
private class DefaultXsltInjectionSinkModel extends SinkModelCsv {
override predicate row(string row) {
row =
[
"javax.xml.transform;Transformer;false;transform;;;Argument[-1];xslt",
"net.sf.saxon.s9api;XsltTransformer;false;transform;;;Argument[-1];xslt",
"net.sf.saxon.s9api;Xslt30Transformer;false;transform;;;Argument[-1];xslt",
"net.sf.saxon.s9api;Xslt30Transformer;false;applyTemplates;;;Argument[-1];xslt",
"net.sf.saxon.s9api;Xslt30Transformer;false;callFunction;;;Argument[-1];xslt",
"net.sf.saxon.s9api;Xslt30Transformer;false;callTemplate;;;Argument[-1];xslt"
]
}
}
/** A default sink representing methods susceptible to XSLT Injection attacks. */
private class DefaultXsltInjectionSink extends XsltInjectionSink {
DefaultXsltInjectionSink() { sinkNode(this, "xslt") }
@@ -59,6 +45,25 @@ private class DefaultXsltInjectionAdditionalTaintStep extends XsltInjectionAddit
}
}
/**
* A taint-tracking configuration for unvalidated user input that is used in XSLT transformation.
*/
class XsltInjectionFlowConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
XsltInjectionFlowConfig() { this = "XsltInjectionFlowConfig" }
override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof XsltInjectionSink }
override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) {
node.getType() instanceof PrimitiveType or node.getType() instanceof BoxedType
}
override predicate isAdditionalTaintStep(DataFlow::Node node1, DataFlow::Node node2) {
any(XsltInjectionAdditionalTaintStep c).step(node1, node2)
}
}
/**
* Holds if `n1` to `n2` is a dataflow step that converts between `InputStream` or `Reader` and
* `XMLStreamReader`, i.e. `XMLInputFactory.createXMLStreamReader(tainted)`.

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@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
/** Provides sink models relating to XSLT injection vulnerabilities. */
import semmle.code.java.dataflow.ExternalFlow
private class DefaultXsltInjectionSinkModel extends SinkModelCsv {
override predicate row(string row) {
row =
[
"javax.xml.transform;Transformer;false;transform;;;Argument[-1];xslt",
"net.sf.saxon.s9api;XsltTransformer;false;transform;;;Argument[-1];xslt",
"net.sf.saxon.s9api;Xslt30Transformer;false;transform;;;Argument[-1];xslt",
"net.sf.saxon.s9api;Xslt30Transformer;false;applyTemplates;;;Argument[-1];xslt",
"net.sf.saxon.s9api;Xslt30Transformer;false;callFunction;;;Argument[-1];xslt",
"net.sf.saxon.s9api;Xslt30Transformer;false;callTemplate;;;Argument[-1];xslt"
]
}
}

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@@ -1,25 +1,9 @@
import java
import semmle.code.java.dataflow.TaintTracking
import semmle.code.java.dataflow.FlowSources
import semmle.code.java.security.XsltInjection
import semmle.code.java.security.XsltInjectionQuery
import TestUtilities.InlineExpectationsTest
class Conf extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
Conf() { this = "test:cwe:xslt-injection" }
override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof XsltInjectionSink }
override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) {
node.getType() instanceof PrimitiveType or node.getType() instanceof BoxedType
}
override predicate isAdditionalTaintStep(DataFlow::Node node1, DataFlow::Node node2) {
any(XsltInjectionAdditionalTaintStep c).step(node1, node2)
}
}
class HasXsltInjectionTest extends InlineExpectationsTest {
HasXsltInjectionTest() { this = "HasXsltInjectionTest" }
@@ -27,7 +11,9 @@ class HasXsltInjectionTest extends InlineExpectationsTest {
override predicate hasActualResult(Location location, string element, string tag, string value) {
tag = "hasXsltInjection" and
exists(DataFlow::Node src, DataFlow::Node sink, Conf conf | conf.hasFlow(src, sink) |
exists(DataFlow::Node src, DataFlow::Node sink, XsltInjectionFlowConfig conf |
conf.hasFlow(src, sink)
|
sink.getLocation() = location and
element = sink.toString() and
value = ""