Merge pull request #23 from GitHubSecurityLab/IAC_queries

feat(queries): Migrate queries from AdvancedSecurity repo

ql/lib/codeql/actions/Ast.qll

@@ -54,8 +54,6 @@ class CompositeActionStmt extends Statement instanceof Actions::CompositeAction
   InputsStmt getInputsStmt() { result = this.(YamlMapping).lookup("inputs") }
 
   OutputsStmt getOutputsStmt() { result = this.(YamlMapping).lookup("outputs") }
-
-  string getName() { result = this.getLocation().getFile().getRelativePath() }
 }
 
 class RunsStmt extends Statement instanceof Actions::Runs {
@@ -68,6 +66,8 @@ class RunsStmt extends Statement instanceof Actions::Runs {
  * A Github Actions Workflow
  */
 class WorkflowStmt extends Statement instanceof Actions::Workflow {
+  string getName() { result = super.getName() }
+
   JobStmt getAJobStmt() { result = super.getJob(_) }
 
   JobStmt getJobStmt(string id) { result = super.getJob(id) }
@@ -79,6 +79,8 @@ class WorkflowStmt extends Statement instanceof Actions::Workflow {
   string getATriggerEvent() {
     exists(YamlNode n | n = super.getOn().(YamlMappingLikeNode).getNode(result))
   }
+
+  Statement getPermissionsStmt() { result = this.(YamlMapping).lookup("permissions") }
 }
 
 class ReusableWorkflowStmt extends WorkflowStmt {
@@ -91,8 +93,6 @@ class ReusableWorkflowStmt extends WorkflowStmt {
   InputsStmt getInputsStmt() { result = workflow_call.(YamlMapping).lookup("inputs") }
 
   OutputsStmt getOutputsStmt() { result = workflow_call.(YamlMapping).lookup("outputs") }
-
-  string getName() { result = this.getLocation().getFile().getRelativePath() }
 }
 
 class InputsStmt extends Statement instanceof YamlMapping {
@@ -189,6 +189,8 @@ class JobStmt extends Statement instanceof Actions::Job {
   }
 
   IfStmt getIfStmt() { result = super.getIf() }
+
+  Statement getPermissionsStmt() { result = this.(YamlMapping).lookup("permissions") }
 }
 
 /**

ql/lib/codeql/actions/dataflow/internal/DataFlowPrivate.qll

@@ -83,10 +83,10 @@ class DataFlowCallable instanceof Cfg::CfgScope {
 
   string getName() {
     if this instanceof ReusableWorkflowStmt
-    then result = this.(ReusableWorkflowStmt).getName()
+    then result = this.(ReusableWorkflowStmt).getLocation().getFile().getRelativePath()
     else
       if this instanceof CompositeActionStmt
-      then result = this.(CompositeActionStmt).getName()
+      then result = this.(CompositeActionStmt).getLocation().getFile().getRelativePath()
       else none()
   }
 }

ql/src/Security/CWE-094/UntrustedCheckout.ql

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
  * @kind problem
  * @problem.severity warning
  * @precision low
+ * @security-severity 9.3
  * @id actions/untrusted-checkout
  * @tags actions
  *       security

ql/src/Security/CWE-275/MissingActionsPermissions.md

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Actions Job and Workflow Permissions are not set
+
+A GitHub Actions job or workflow hasn't set permissions to restrict privileges to the workflow job.
+A workflow job by default without the `permissions` key or a root workflow `permissions` will run with all the permissions which can be given to a workflow.
+
+## Recommendation
+
+Add the `permissions` key to the job or workflow (applied to all jobs) and set the permissions to the least privilege required to complete the task:
+
+```yaml
+name: "My workflow"
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+  pull-requests: write
+
+# or
+jobs:
+  my-job:
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+      pull-requests: write
+```

ql/src/Security/CWE-275/MissingActionsPermissions.ql

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/**
+ * @name Workflow does not contain permissions
+ * @description Workflows should contain permissions to provide a clear understanding has permissions to run the workflow.
+ * @kind problem
+ * @security-severity 5.0
+ * @problem.severity warning
+ * @precision high
+ * @id actions/missing-workflow-permissions
+ * @tags actions
+ *       maintainability
+ *       external/cwe/cwe-275
+ */
+
+import actions
+
+from WorkflowStmt workflow, JobStmt job
+where
+  job = workflow.getAJobStmt() and
+  (
+    not exists(workflow.getPermissionsStmt()) and
+    not exists(job.getPermissionsStmt())
+  )
+select job, "Actions Job or Workflow does not set permissions"

ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UnpinnedActionsTag.md

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+# Unpinned tag for 3rd party Action in workflow
+
+The individual jobs in a GitHub Actions workflow can interact with (and compromise) other jobs. For example, a job querying the environment variables used by a later job, writing files to a shared directory that a later job processes, or even more directly by interacting with the Docker socket and inspecting other running containers and executing commands in them. This means that a compromise of a single action within a workflow can be very significant, as that compromised action would have access to all secrets configured on your repository, and may be able to use the `GITHUB_TOKEN` to write to the repository. Consequently, there is significant risk in sourcing actions from third-party repositories on GitHub. For information on some of the steps an attacker could take, see "Security hardening for GitHub Actions."
+
+## Recommendation
+
+Pin an action to a full length commit SHA. This is currently the only way to use an action as an immutable release. Pinning to a particular SHA helps mitigate the risk of a bad actor adding a backdoor to the action's repository, as they would need to generate a SHA-1 collision for a valid Git object payload. When selecting a SHA, you should verify it is from the action's repository and not a repository fork.
+
+## Example
+
+In this example, the Actions workflow uses an unpinned version.
+
+```yaml
+name: "Unpinned Action Example"
+
+jobs:
+  build:
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout repository
+        uses: actions-third-party-mirror/checkout@v3
+
+      - run: |
+          ./build.sh
+```
+
+The Action is pinned in the example below.
+
+```yaml
+name: "Pinned Action Example"
+
+jobs:
+  build:
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout repository
+        uses: actions-mirror-third-party/checkout@ac593985615ec2ede58e132d2e21d2b1cbd6127c
+
+      - run: |
+          ./build.sh
+```
+
+## References
+
+- GitHub: [Security hardening for GitHub Actions](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/security-hardening-for-github-actions)
+- Common Weakness Enumeration: [CWE-829](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/829.html).

ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UnpinnedActionsTag.ql

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/**
+ * @name Unpinned tag for 3rd party Action in workflow
+ * @description Using a tag for a 3rd party Action that is not pinned to a commit can lead to executing an untrusted Action through a supply chain attack.
+ * @kind problem
+ * @security-severity 5.0
+ * @problem.severity warning
+ * @precision high
+ * @id actions/unpinned-tag
+ * @tags security
+ *       actions
+ *       external/cwe/cwe-829
+ */
+
+import actions
+
+bindingset[version]
+private predicate isPinnedCommit(string version) { version.regexpMatch("^[A-Fa-f0-9]{40}$") }
+
+bindingset[repo]
+private predicate isTrustedOrg(string repo) {
+  exists(string org | org in ["actions", "github", "advanced-security"] | repo.matches(org + "/%"))
+}
+
+from StepUsesExpr uses, string repo, string version, WorkflowStmt workflow, string name
+where
+  uses.getCallee() = repo and
+  uses.getVersion() = version and
+  uses.getEnclosingWorkflowStmt() = workflow and
+  (
+    workflow.getName() = name
+    or
+    not exists(workflow.getName()) and workflow.getLocation().getFile().getBaseName() = name
+  ) and
+  not isPinnedCommit(version) and
+  not isTrustedOrg(repo)
+select uses,
+  "Unpinned 3rd party Action '" + name + "' step $@ uses '" + repo + "' with ref '" + version +
+    "', not a pinned commit hash", uses, uses.toString()

ql/src/test/.github/workflows/cross1.yml

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ name: Issue Workflow
 on: 
   issues:
     types: [opened,edited]
+permissions: {}
 jobs: 
   #This job will check the issue to determine if it should be moved to a different repository
   redirectIssue:

ql/src/test/.github/workflows/cross2.yml

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 name: Issue Type Predicter
 # This workflow uses https://github.com/DynamoDS/IssuesTypePredicter to predict the type of a github issue
 
+permissions: {}
 on:
   issues:
     types: [opened, edited]

ql/src/test/.github/workflows/cross3.yml

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ on:
   push:
     branches:
       - master
+permissions: {}
 jobs:
   cherry_pick:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest