Improve actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutX queries

actions/ql/lib/ext/config/poisonable_steps.yml

@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ extensions:
       - ["(source|sh|bash|zsh|fish)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\b", 2]
       - ["(node)\\s+([^\\s]+)(\\.js|\\.ts)\\b", 2]
       - ["(python[\\d\\.]*)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.py\\b", 2]
+      - ["(python[\\d\\.]*)\\s+([\\-m]+)\\s+(\\w+)\\b", 2] # eg: pythonX -m anything(dir or file)
       - ["(ruby)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.rb\\b", 2]
-      - ["(go)\\s+(generate|run)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.go\\b", 3]
+      - ["(go)\\s+(generate|run)\\s+([^\\s]+)", 3]
       - ["(dotnet)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.csproj\\b", 2]
-

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionMedium.ql

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
  * @name Code injection
  * @description Interpreting unsanitized user input as code allows a malicious user to perform arbitrary
  *              code execution.
- * @kind path-problem
+ * @ kind path-problem
  * @problem.severity warning
  * @security-severity 5.0
  * @precision medium
@@ -18,8 +18,13 @@ import actions
 import codeql.actions.security.CodeInjectionQuery
 import CodeInjectionFlow::PathGraph
 
-from CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode source, CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode sink
-where mediumSeverityCodeInjection(source, sink)
-select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
-  "Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user.", sink,
-  sink.getNode().asExpr().(Expression).getRawExpression()
+// from CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode source, CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode sink
+// where mediumSeverityCodeInjection(source, sink)
+// select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
+//   "Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user.", sink,
+//   sink.getNode().asExpr().(Expression).getRawExpression()
+from string test
+where
+  test.regexpMatch("(python[\\d\\.]*)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.py\\b") and
+  test = "python -m dir" //go run main/main.go //go run .
+select test

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ## Overview
 
-GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. A potentially dangerous misuse of the triggers such as `pull_request_target` or `issue_comment` followed by an explicit checkout of untrusted code (Pull Request HEAD) may lead to repository compromise if untrusted code gets executed (e.g., due to a modified build script) in a privileged job.
+GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. A dangerous misuse of event triggers such as `pull_request_target` or `issue_comment` followed by an explicit checkout of untrusted input from the PR may lead to repository compromise if untrusted code gets executed in a privileged job. Untrusted code may get executed due to a modified build script, workflow injection, or registry hijacking. **Carefully review** whether least privileges is used and whether input is taken from untrusted sources.
 
 ## Recommendation
 
@@ -133,3 +133,4 @@ jobs:
 ## References
 
 - GitHub Security Lab Research: [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/).
+- Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/).

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.ql

@@ -51,5 +51,5 @@ where
   event.getName() = checkoutTriggers() and
   not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(checkout, event, "untrusted-checkout")) and
   not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(poisonable, event, "untrusted-checkout"))
-select poisonable, checkout, poisonable,
+select checkout, checkout, poisonable,
   "Potential execution of untrusted code on a privileged workflow ($@)", event, event.getName()

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ## Overview
 
-GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. A potentially dangerous misuse of the triggers such as `pull_request_target` or `issue_comment` followed by an explicit checkout of untrusted code (Pull Request HEAD) may lead to repository compromise if untrusted code gets executed (e.g., due to a modified build script) in a privileged job.
+GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. A dangerous misuse of event triggers such as `pull_request_target` or `issue_comment` followed by an explicit checkout of untrusted input from the PR may lead to repository compromise if untrusted code gets executed in a privileged job. Untrusted code may get executed due to a modified build script, workflow injection, or registry hijacking. **Carefully review** whether least privileges is used and whether input is taken from untrusted sources.
 
 ## Recommendation
 
@@ -133,3 +133,4 @@ jobs:
 ## References
 
 - GitHub Security Lab Research: [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/).
+- Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/). 

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.ql

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /**
- * @name Checkout of untrusted code in trusted context
+ * @name Checkout of untrusted code in privileged context without privileged context use
  * @description Privileged workflows have read/write access to the base repository and access to secrets.
  *              By explicitly checking out and running the build script from a fork the untrusted code is running in an environment
  *              that is able to push to the base repository and to access secrets.

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutMedium.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ## Overview
 
-GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. A potentially dangerous misuse of the triggers such as `pull_request_target` or `issue_comment` followed by an explicit checkout of untrusted code (Pull Request HEAD) may lead to repository compromise if untrusted code gets executed (e.g., due to a modified build script) in a privileged job.
+GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. A dangerous misuse of event triggers such as `pull_request_target` or `issue_comment` followed by an explicit checkout of untrusted input from the PR may lead to repository compromise if untrusted code gets executed in a privileged job. Untrusted code may get executed due to a modified build script, workflow injection, or registry hijacking. **Carefully review** whether least privileges is used and whether input is taken from untrusted sources.
 
 ## Recommendation
 
@@ -133,3 +133,4 @@ jobs:
 ## References
 
 - GitHub Security Lab Research: [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/).
+- Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/).

actions/ql/src/change-notes/2026-04-15-untrusted-checkout-improvements.md

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+---
+category: majorAnalysis
+---
+* Fixed help file descriptions for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`. Previously the messages were unclear as to why and how the vulnerabilities could occur. Additionally alter 2 patterns in the detection such that now extra sinks are detected in the following cases: scripts executed via python modules and `go run` in directories are detected as potential mechanisms of injection. This may lead to more results being detected by all 3 queries.
+* Adjusted `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical` to align more with other untrusted resource queries, where the alert location is the location where the artifact is obtained from (the checkout point). This aligns with the other 2 related queries. This will cause the same alerts to re-open for closed alerts of this query.
+* Adjusted the name of `actions/untrusted-checkout/high` to more clearly describe which parts of the scenario are in a privileged context. This will cause the same alerts to re-open for closed alerts of this query.