Files
codeql/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/SensitiveLoggingQuery.qll
MarkLee131 51e2a5418b Java: move EncryptedSensitiveMethodCall into Sanitizers.qll
Address review feedback by moving the shared method-name-based encryption/hash/digest
check into Sanitizers.qll, and reference it from both CleartextStorageQuery.qll and
SensitiveLoggingQuery.qll instead of duplicating the definition.
2026-04-29 20:56:36 +08:00

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/** Provides configurations for sensitive logging queries. */
import java
private import semmle.code.java.dataflow.ExternalFlow
import semmle.code.java.dataflow.TaintTracking
import semmle.code.java.security.SensitiveActions
import semmle.code.java.frameworks.android.Compose
private import semmle.code.java.security.Sanitizers
private import semmle.code.java.dataflow.RangeAnalysis
/** A data flow source node for sensitive logging sources. */
abstract class SensitiveLoggerSource extends DataFlow::Node { }
/** A data flow barrier node for sensitive logging sanitizers. */
abstract class SensitiveLoggerBarrier extends DataFlow::Node { }
/** A variable that may hold sensitive information, judging by its name. */
class VariableWithSensitiveName extends Variable {
VariableWithSensitiveName() {
exists(string name | name = this.getName() |
name.regexpMatch(getCommonSensitiveInfoRegex()) and
not name.regexpMatch(getCommonSensitiveInfoFPRegex())
)
}
}
/** A reference to a variable that may hold sensitive information, judging by its name. */
class CredentialExpr extends VarAccess {
CredentialExpr() {
this.getVariable() instanceof VariableWithSensitiveName and
not this instanceof CompileTimeConstantExpr
}
}
private class CredentialExprSource extends SensitiveLoggerSource {
CredentialExprSource() { this.asExpr() instanceof CredentialExpr }
}
/** An instantiation of a (reflexive, transitive) subtype of `java.lang.reflect.Type`. */
private class TypeType extends RefType {
pragma[nomagic]
TypeType() {
this.getSourceDeclaration().getASourceSupertype*().hasQualifiedName("java.lang.reflect", "Type")
}
}
/**
* A sanitizer that may remove sensitive information from a string before logging.
*
* It allows for substring operations taking the first N (or last N, for Kotlin) characters, limited to 7 or fewer.
*/
private class PrefixSuffixBarrier extends SensitiveLoggerBarrier {
PrefixSuffixBarrier() {
exists(MethodCall mc, Method m, int limit |
limit = 7 and
mc.getMethod() = m
|
// substring in Java
(
m.hasQualifiedName("java.lang", "String", "substring") or
m.hasQualifiedName("java.lang", "StringBuffer", "substring") or
m.hasQualifiedName("java.lang", "StringBuilder", "substring")
) and
(
twoArgLimit(mc, limit, false) or
singleArgLimit(mc, limit, false)
) and
this.asExpr() = mc.getQualifier()
or
// Kotlin string operations, which use extension methods (so the string is the first argument)
(
m.hasQualifiedName("kotlin.text", "StringsKt", "substring") and
(
twoArgLimit(mc, limit, true) or
singleArgLimit(mc, limit, true)
)
or
m.hasQualifiedName("kotlin.text", "StringsKt", ["take", "takeLast"]) and
singleArgLimit(mc, limit, true)
) and
this.asExpr() = mc.getArgument(0)
)
}
}
/** A predicate to check single-argument method calls for a constant integer below a set limit. */
bindingset[limit, isKotlin]
private predicate singleArgLimit(MethodCall mc, int limit, boolean isKotlin) {
mc.getNumArgument() = 1 and
exists(int firstArgIndex, int delta |
if isKotlin = true then firstArgIndex = 1 else firstArgIndex = 0
|
bounded(mc.getArgument(firstArgIndex), any(ZeroBound z), delta, true, _) and
delta <= limit
)
}
/** A predicate to check two-argument method calls for zero and a constant integer below a set limit. */
bindingset[limit, isKotlin]
private predicate twoArgLimit(MethodCall mc, int limit, boolean isKotlin) {
mc.getNumArgument() = 2 and
exists(int firstArgIndex, int secondArgIndex, int delta |
isKotlin = true and firstArgIndex = 1 and secondArgIndex = 2
or
isKotlin = false and firstArgIndex = 0 and secondArgIndex = 1
|
// mc.getArgument(firstArgIndex).(CompileTimeConstantExpr).getIntValue() = 0 and
bounded(mc.getArgument(firstArgIndex), any(ZeroBound z), 0, true, _) and
bounded(mc.getArgument(firstArgIndex), any(ZeroBound z), 0, false, _) and
bounded(mc.getArgument(secondArgIndex), any(ZeroBound z), delta, true, _) and
delta <= limit
)
}
private class DefaultSensitiveLoggerBarrier extends SensitiveLoggerBarrier {
DefaultSensitiveLoggerBarrier() {
this.asExpr() instanceof LiveLiteral or
this instanceof SimpleTypeSanitizer or
this.getType() instanceof TypeType
}
}
/**
* A barrier for sensitive data that has been hashed, encrypted, or digested before logging.
* This is consistent with the treatment of encryption in `CleartextStorageQuery.qll` (CWE-312).
*/
private class EncryptionBarrier extends SensitiveLoggerBarrier {
EncryptionBarrier() { this.asExpr() instanceof EncryptedSensitiveMethodCall }
}
/** A data-flow configuration for identifying potentially-sensitive data flowing to a log output. */
module SensitiveLoggerConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof SensitiveLoggerSource }
predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sinkNode(sink, "log-injection") }
predicate isBarrier(DataFlow::Node sanitizer) { sanitizer instanceof SensitiveLoggerBarrier }
predicate isBarrierIn(DataFlow::Node node) { isSource(node) }
predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
}
module SensitiveLoggerFlow = TaintTracking::Global<SensitiveLoggerConfig>;