Files
codeql/javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/UnsafeDeserializationCustomizations.qll
Rasmus Wriedt Larsen f733ac19a9 JS: Make (most) queries use ActiveThreatModelSource
7 cases looks something like this:

```
class RemoteFlowSourceAsSource extends Source instanceof RemoteFlowSource {
  RemoteFlowSourceAsSource() { not this instanceof ClientSideRemoteFlowSource }
}
```

(some have variations like `not this.(ClientSideRemoteFlowSource).getKind().isPathOrUrl()`)

javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/ClientSideUrlRedirectCustomizations.qll
javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/CommandInjectionCustomizations.qll
javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/CorsMisconfigurationForCredentialsCustomizations.qll
javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/RegExpInjectionCustomizations.qll
javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/RequestForgeryCustomizations.qll
javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/ResourceExhaustionCustomizations.qll
javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/TaintedPathCustomizations.qll
2024-10-25 15:03:42 +02:00

73 lines
2.3 KiB
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/**
* Provides default sources, sinks and sanitizers for reasoning about
* unsafe deserialization, as well as extension points for
* adding your own.
*/
import javascript
module UnsafeDeserialization {
/**
* A data flow source for unsafe deserialization vulnerabilities.
*/
abstract class Source extends DataFlow::Node { }
/**
* A data flow sink for unsafe deserialization vulnerabilities.
*/
abstract class Sink extends DataFlow::Node { }
/**
* A sanitizer for unsafe deserialization vulnerabilities.
*/
abstract class Sanitizer extends DataFlow::Node { }
/**
* DEPRECATED: Use `ActiveThreatModelSource` from Concepts instead!
*/
deprecated class RemoteFlowSourceAsSource = ActiveThreatModelSourceAsSource;
/**
* An active threat-model source, considered as a flow source.
*/
private class ActiveThreatModelSourceAsSource extends Source, ActiveThreatModelSource { }
private API::Node unsafeYamlSchema() {
result = API::moduleImport("js-yaml").getMember("DEFAULT_FULL_SCHEMA") // from older versions
or
result = API::moduleImport("js-yaml-js-types").getMember(["all", "function"])
or
result = unsafeYamlSchema().getMember("extend").getReturn()
or
exists(API::CallNode call |
call.getAParameter().refersTo(unsafeYamlSchema()) and
call.getCalleeName() = "extend" and
result = call.getReturn()
)
}
/**
* An expression passed to one of the unsafe load functions of the `js-yaml` package.
*
* `js-yaml` since v4 defaults to being safe, but is unsafe when invoked with a schema
* that permits unsafe values.
*/
class JsYamlUnsafeLoad extends Sink {
JsYamlUnsafeLoad() {
exists(API::CallNode call |
// Note: we include the old 'safeLoad' and 'safeLoadAll' functon because they were also unsafe when invoked with an unsafe schema.
call =
API::moduleImport("js-yaml")
.getMember(["load", "loadAll", "safeLoad", "safeLoadAll"])
.getACall() and
call.getAParameter().getMember("schema").refersTo(unsafeYamlSchema()) and
this = call.getArgument(0)
)
}
}
private class SinkFromModel extends Sink {
SinkFromModel() { this = ModelOutput::getASinkNode("unsafe-deserialization").asSink() }
}
}