Python: Fix broken queries

.bazelrc

@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@ build --compilation_mode opt
 common --override_module=semmle_code=%workspace%/misc/bazel/semmle_code_stub
 
 build --repo_env=CC=clang --repo_env=CXX=clang++
-# Disable Android SDK auto-detection (we don't use it, and rules_android has Bazel 9 compatibility issues)
-build --repo_env=ANDROID_HOME=
 
 # print test output, like sembuild does.
 # Set to `errors` if this is too verbose.
@@ -36,7 +34,7 @@ common --@rules_dotnet//dotnet/settings:strict_deps=false
 common --@rules_rust//rust/toolchain/channel=nightly
 
 # Reduce this eventually to empty, once we've fixed all our usages of java, and https://github.com/bazel-contrib/rules_go/issues/4193 is fixed
-common --incompatible_autoload_externally="+@rules_cc,+@rules_java,+@rules_shell"
+common --incompatible_autoload_externally="+@rules_java,+@rules_shell"
 
 build --java_language_version=17
 build --tool_java_language_version=17

.bazelversion

@@ -1 +1 @@
-9.0.0
+8.4.2

.github/dependabot.yml

@@ -45,5 +45,3 @@ updates:
     directory: "/"
     schedule:
       interval: weekly
-    exclude-paths:
-      - "misc/bazel/registry/**"

.github/workflows/compile-queries.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+name: "Compile all queries using the latest stable CodeQL CLI"
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches:  # makes sure the cache gets populated - running on the branches people tend to merge into.
+      - main
+      - "rc/*"
+      - "codeql-cli-*"
+  pull_request:
+    paths:
+      - '**.ql'
+      - '**.qll'
+      - '**/qlpack.yml'
+      - '**.dbscheme'
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+jobs:
+  detect-changes:
+    if: github.repository_owner == 'github'
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    outputs:
+      languages: ${{ steps.detect.outputs.languages }}
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - name: Detect changed languages
+        id: detect
+        run: |
+          if [[ "${{ github.event_name }}" == "pull_request" ]]; then
+            # For PRs, detect which languages have changes
+            changed_files=$(gh pr view ${{ github.event.pull_request.number }} --json files --jq '.files.[].path')
+            languages=()
+            for lang in actions cpp csharp go java javascript python ql ruby rust swift; do
+              if echo "$changed_files" | grep -qE "^($lang/|shared/)" ; then
+                languages+=("$lang")
+              fi
+            done
+            echo "languages=$(jq -c -n '$ARGS.positional' --args "${languages[@]}")" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
+          else
+            # For pushes to main/rc branches, run all languages
+            echo 'languages=["actions","cpp","csharp","go","java","javascript","python","ql","ruby","rust","swift"]' >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
+          fi
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
+
+  compile-queries:
+    needs: detect-changes
+    if: github.repository_owner == 'github' && needs.detect-changes.outputs.languages != '[]'
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest-xl
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+      matrix:
+        language: ${{ fromJson(needs.detect-changes.outputs.languages) }}
+
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - name: Setup CodeQL
+        uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
+        with:
+          channel: 'release'
+      - name: Cache compilation cache
+        id: query-cache
+        uses: ./.github/actions/cache-query-compilation
+        with: 
+          key: ${{ matrix.language }}-queries
+      - name: check formatting
+        run: find shared ${{ matrix.language }}/ql -type f \( -name "*.qll" -o -name "*.ql" \) -print0 | xargs -0 -n 3000 -P 10 codeql query format -q --check-only
+      - name: compile queries - check-only
+        # run with --check-only if running in a PR (github.sha != main)
+        if : ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }}
+        shell: bash
+        run: codeql query compile -q -j0 ${{ matrix.language }}/ql/{src,examples} --keep-going --warnings=error --check-only --compilation-cache "${{ steps.query-cache.outputs.cache-dir }}" --compilation-cache-size=500 --ram=56000
+      - name: compile queries - full
+        # do full compile if running on main - this populates the cache
+        if : ${{ github.event_name != 'pull_request' }}
+        shell: bash
+        run: codeql query compile -q -j0 ${{ matrix.language }}/ql/{src,examples} --keep-going --warnings=error --compilation-cache "${{ steps.query-cache.outputs.cache-dir }}" --compilation-cache-size=500 --ram=56000

.github/workflows/mad_modelDiff.yml

@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ jobs:
             SHORTNAME=`basename $DATABASE`
             python misc/scripts/models-as-data/generate_mad.py --language java --with-summaries --with-sinks $DATABASE $SHORTNAME/$QL_VARIANT
             mkdir -p $MODELS/$SHORTNAME
-            mv java/ql/lib/ext/generated/modelgenerator/$SHORTNAME/$QL_VARIANT $MODELS/$SHORTNAME
+            mv java/ql/lib/ext/generated/$SHORTNAME/$QL_VARIANT $MODELS/$SHORTNAME
             cd ..
           }
 

.github/workflows/python-tooling.yml

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ on:
     paths:
       - "misc/bazel/**"
       - "misc/codegen/**"
-      - "misc/scripts/models-as-data/*.py"
+      - "misc/scripts/models-as-data/bulk_generate_mad.py"
       - "*.bazel*"
       - .github/workflows/codegen.yml
       - .pre-commit-config.yaml

.github/workflows/ql-for-ql-build.yml

@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ jobs:
         uses: github/codeql-action/init@main
         with:
           languages: javascript # does not matter
-          tools: nightly
       - uses: ./.github/actions/os-version
         id: os_version
       ### Build the extractor ###

.github/workflows/ql-for-ql-tests.yml

@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ jobs:
         uses: github/codeql-action/init@main
         with:
           languages: javascript # does not matter
-          tools: nightly
       - uses: ./.github/actions/os-version
         id: os_version
       - uses: actions/cache@v3
@@ -76,7 +75,6 @@ jobs:
         uses: github/codeql-action/init@main
         with:
           languages: javascript # does not matter
-          tools: nightly
       - uses: ./.github/actions/os-version
         id: os_version
       - uses: actions/cache@v3

.github/workflows/ruby-build.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+name: "Ruby: Build"
+
+on:
+  push:
+    paths:
+      - "ruby/**"
+      - .github/workflows/ruby-build.yml
+      - .github/actions/fetch-codeql/action.yml
+      - codeql-workspace.yml
+      - "shared/tree-sitter-extractor/**"
+    branches:
+      - main
+      - "rc/*"
+  pull_request:
+    paths:
+      - "ruby/**"
+      - .github/workflows/ruby-build.yml
+      - .github/actions/fetch-codeql/action.yml
+      - codeql-workspace.yml
+      - "shared/tree-sitter-extractor/**"
+    branches:
+      - main
+      - "rc/*"
+  workflow_dispatch:
+    inputs:
+      tag:
+        description: "Version tag to create"
+        required: false
+
+env:
+  CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
+
+defaults:
+  run:
+    working-directory: ruby
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+jobs:
+  build:
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+      matrix:
+        os: [ubuntu-latest, macos-latest, windows-latest]
+
+    runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
+
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - name: Install GNU tar
+        if: runner.os == 'macOS'
+        run: |
+          brew install gnu-tar
+          echo "/usr/local/opt/gnu-tar/libexec/gnubin" >> $GITHUB_PATH
+      - name: Prepare Windows
+        if: runner.os == 'Windows'
+        shell: powershell
+        run: |
+          git config --global core.longpaths true
+      - uses: ./.github/actions/os-version
+        id: os_version
+      - name: Cache entire extractor
+        uses: actions/cache@v3
+        id: cache-extractor
+        with:
+          path: |
+            target/release/codeql-extractor-ruby
+            target/release/codeql-extractor-ruby.exe
+            ruby/extractor/ql/lib/codeql/ruby/ast/internal/TreeSitter.qll
+          key: ${{ runner.os }}-${{ steps.os_version.outputs.version }}-ruby-extractor-${{ hashFiles('ruby/extractor/rust-toolchain.toml', 'ruby/extractor/Cargo.lock') }}-${{ hashFiles('shared/tree-sitter-extractor') }}-${{ hashFiles('ruby/extractor/**/*.rs') }}
+      - uses: actions/cache@v3
+        if: steps.cache-extractor.outputs.cache-hit != 'true'
+        with:
+          path: |
+            ~/.cargo/registry
+            ~/.cargo/git
+            target
+          key: ${{ runner.os }}-${{ steps.os_version.outputs.version }}-ruby-rust-cargo-${{ hashFiles('ruby/extractor/rust-toolchain.toml', 'ruby/extractor/**/Cargo.lock') }}
+      - name: Check formatting
+        if: steps.cache-extractor.outputs.cache-hit != 'true'
+        run: cd extractor && cargo fmt -- --check
+      - name: Build
+        if: steps.cache-extractor.outputs.cache-hit != 'true'
+        run: cd extractor && cargo build --verbose
+      - name: Run tests
+        if: steps.cache-extractor.outputs.cache-hit != 'true'
+        run: cd extractor && cargo test --verbose
+      - name: Release build
+        if: steps.cache-extractor.outputs.cache-hit != 'true'
+        run: cd extractor && cargo build --release
+      - name: Generate dbscheme
+        if: ${{ matrix.os == 'ubuntu-latest' && steps.cache-extractor.outputs.cache-hit != 'true'}}
+        run: ../target/release/codeql-extractor-ruby generate --dbscheme ql/lib/ruby.dbscheme --library ql/lib/codeql/ruby/ast/internal/TreeSitter.qll
+      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+        if: ${{ matrix.os == 'ubuntu-latest' }}
+        with:
+          name: ruby.dbscheme
+          path: ruby/ql/lib/ruby.dbscheme
+      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+        if: ${{ matrix.os == 'ubuntu-latest' }}
+        with:
+          name: TreeSitter.qll
+          path: ruby/ql/lib/codeql/ruby/ast/internal/TreeSitter.qll
+      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+        with:
+          name: extractor-${{ matrix.os }}
+          path: |
+            target/release/codeql-extractor-ruby
+            target/release/codeql-extractor-ruby.exe
+          retention-days: 1
+  compile-queries:
+    if: github.repository_owner == 'github'
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest-xl
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - name: Fetch CodeQL
+        uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
+      - name: Cache compilation cache
+        id: query-cache
+        uses: ./.github/actions/cache-query-compilation
+        with:
+          key: ruby-build
+      - name: Build Query Pack
+        run: |
+          PACKS=${{ runner.temp }}/query-packs
+          rm -rf $PACKS
+          codeql pack create ../misc/suite-helpers --output "$PACKS"
+          codeql pack create ../shared/regex --output "$PACKS"
+          codeql pack create ../shared/ssa --output "$PACKS"
+          codeql pack create ../shared/tutorial --output "$PACKS"
+          codeql pack create ql/lib --output "$PACKS"
+          codeql pack create -j0 ql/src --output "$PACKS" --compilation-cache "${{ steps.query-cache.outputs.cache-dir }}"
+          PACK_FOLDER=$(readlink -f "$PACKS"/codeql/ruby-queries/*)
+          codeql generate query-help --format=sarifv2.1.0 --output="${PACK_FOLDER}/rules.sarif" ql/src
+          (cd ql/src; find queries \( -name '*.qhelp' -o -name '*.rb' -o -name '*.erb' \) -exec bash -c 'mkdir -p "'"${PACK_FOLDER}"'/$(dirname "{}")"' \; -exec cp "{}" "${PACK_FOLDER}/{}" \;)
+      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+        with:
+          name: codeql-ruby-queries
+          path: |
+            ${{ runner.temp }}/query-packs/*
+          retention-days: 1
+          include-hidden-files: true
+
+  package:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    needs: [build, compile-queries]
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
+        with:
+          name: ruby.dbscheme
+          path: ruby/ruby
+      - uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
+        with:
+          name: extractor-ubuntu-latest
+          path: ruby/linux64
+      - uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
+        with:
+          name: extractor-windows-latest
+          path: ruby/win64
+      - uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
+        with:
+          name: extractor-macos-latest
+          path: ruby/osx64
+      - run: |
+          mkdir -p ruby
+          cp -r codeql-extractor.yml tools ql/lib/ruby.dbscheme.stats ruby/
+          mkdir -p ruby/tools/{linux64,osx64,win64}
+          cp linux64/codeql-extractor-ruby ruby/tools/linux64/extractor
+          cp osx64/codeql-extractor-ruby ruby/tools/osx64/extractor
+          cp win64/codeql-extractor-ruby.exe ruby/tools/win64/extractor.exe
+          chmod +x ruby/tools/{linux64,osx64}/extractor
+          zip -rq codeql-ruby.zip ruby
+      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+        with:
+          name: codeql-ruby-pack
+          path: ruby/codeql-ruby.zip
+          retention-days: 1
+          include-hidden-files: true
+      - uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
+        with:
+          name: codeql-ruby-queries
+          path: ruby/qlpacks
+      - run: |
+          echo '{
+            "provide": [
+            "ruby/codeql-extractor.yml",
+            "qlpacks/*/*/*/qlpack.yml"
+            ]
+          }' > .codeqlmanifest.json
+          zip -rq codeql-ruby-bundle.zip .codeqlmanifest.json ruby qlpacks
+      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+        with:
+          name: codeql-ruby-bundle
+          path: ruby/codeql-ruby-bundle.zip
+          retention-days: 1
+          include-hidden-files: true
+
+  test:
+    defaults:
+      run:
+        working-directory: ${{ github.workspace }}
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+      matrix:
+        os: [ubuntu-latest, macos-latest, windows-latest]
+
+    runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
+    needs: [package]
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - name: Fetch CodeQL
+        uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
+
+      - name: Download Ruby bundle
+        uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
+        with:
+          name: codeql-ruby-bundle
+          path: ${{ runner.temp }}
+      - name: Unzip Ruby bundle
+        shell: bash
+        run: unzip -q -d "${{ runner.temp }}/ruby-bundle" "${{ runner.temp }}/codeql-ruby-bundle.zip"
+
+      - name: Run QL test
+        shell: bash
+        run: |
+          codeql test run --search-path "${{ runner.temp }}/ruby-bundle" --additional-packs "${{ runner.temp }}/ruby-bundle" ruby/ql/test/library-tests/ast/constants/
+      - name: Create database
+        shell: bash
+        run: |
+          codeql database create --search-path "${{ runner.temp }}/ruby-bundle" --language ruby --source-root ruby/ql/test/library-tests/ast/constants/ ../database
+      - name: Analyze database
+        shell: bash
+        run: |
+          codeql database analyze --search-path "${{ runner.temp }}/ruby-bundle" --format=sarifv2.1.0 --output=out.sarif ../database ruby-code-scanning.qls

.github/workflows/ruby-dataset-measure.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+name: "Ruby: Collect database stats"
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches:
+      - main
+      - "rc/*"
+    paths:
+      - ruby/ql/lib/ruby.dbscheme
+      - .github/workflows/ruby-dataset-measure.yml
+  pull_request:
+    branches:
+      - main
+      - "rc/*"
+    paths:
+      - ruby/ql/lib/ruby.dbscheme
+      - .github/workflows/ruby-dataset-measure.yml
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+jobs:
+  measure:
+    env:
+      CODEQL_THREADS: 4 # TODO: remove this once it's set by the CLI
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+      matrix:
+        repo: [rails/rails, discourse/discourse, spree/spree, ruby/ruby]
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+
+      - uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
+
+      - uses: ./ruby/actions/create-extractor-pack
+
+      - name: Checkout ${{ matrix.repo }}
+        uses: actions/checkout@v5
+        with:
+          repository: ${{ matrix.repo }}
+          path: ${{ github.workspace }}/repo
+      - name: Create database
+        run: |
+          codeql database create \
+            --search-path "${{ github.workspace }}" \
+            --threads 4 \
+            --language ruby --source-root "${{ github.workspace }}/repo" \
+            "${{ runner.temp }}/database"
+      - name: Measure database
+        run: |
+          mkdir -p "stats/${{ matrix.repo }}"
+          codeql dataset measure --threads 4 --output "stats/${{ matrix.repo }}/stats.xml" "${{ runner.temp }}/database/db-ruby"
+      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+        with:
+          name: measurements-${{ hashFiles('stats/**') }}
+          path: stats
+          retention-days: 1
+
+  merge:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    needs: measure
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
+        with:
+          path: stats
+      - run: |
+          python -m pip install --user lxml
+          find stats -name 'stats.xml' | sort | xargs python ruby/scripts/merge_stats.py --output ruby/ql/lib/ruby.dbscheme.stats --normalise ruby_tokeninfo
+      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+        with:
+          name: ruby.dbscheme.stats
+          path: ruby/ql/lib/ruby.dbscheme.stats

.github/workflows/ruby-qltest-rtjo.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+name: "Ruby: Run RTJO Language Tests"
+
+on:
+  pull_request:
+    types:
+      - opened
+      - synchronize
+      - reopened
+      - labeled
+
+env:
+  CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
+
+defaults:
+  run:
+    working-directory: ruby
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+jobs:
+  qltest-rtjo:
+    if: "github.repository_owner == 'github' && github.event.label.name == 'Run: RTJO Language Tests'"
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest-xl
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
+      - uses: ./ruby/actions/create-extractor-pack
+      - name: Cache compilation cache
+        id: query-cache
+        uses: ./.github/actions/cache-query-compilation
+        with:
+          key: ruby-qltest
+      - name: Run QL tests
+        run: |
+          codeql test run --dynamic-join-order-mode=all --threads=0 --ram 50000 --search-path "${{ github.workspace }}" --check-databases --check-diff-informed --check-undefined-labels --check-unused-labels --check-repeated-labels --check-redefined-labels --check-use-before-definition --consistency-queries ql/consistency-queries ql/test --compilation-cache "${{ steps.query-cache.outputs.cache-dir }}"
+        env:
+          GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}

.github/workflows/ruby-qltest.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+name: "Ruby: Run QL Tests"
+
+on:
+  push:
+    paths:
+      - "ruby/**"
+      - "shared/**"
+      - .github/workflows/ruby-build.yml
+      - .github/actions/fetch-codeql/action.yml
+      - codeql-workspace.yml
+    branches:
+      - main
+      - "rc/*"
+  pull_request:
+    paths:
+      - "ruby/**"
+      - "shared/**"
+      - .github/workflows/ruby-qltest.yml
+      - .github/actions/fetch-codeql/action.yml
+      - codeql-workspace.yml
+    branches:
+      - main
+      - "rc/*"
+
+env:
+  CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
+
+defaults:
+  run:
+    working-directory: ruby
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+jobs:
+  qlupgrade:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
+      - name: Check DB upgrade scripts
+        run: |
+          echo >empty.trap
+          codeql dataset import -S ql/lib/upgrades/initial/ruby.dbscheme testdb empty.trap
+          codeql dataset upgrade testdb --additional-packs ql/lib
+          diff -q testdb/ruby.dbscheme ql/lib/ruby.dbscheme
+      - name: Check DB downgrade scripts
+        run: |
+          echo >empty.trap
+          rm -rf testdb; codeql dataset import -S ql/lib/ruby.dbscheme testdb empty.trap
+          codeql resolve upgrades --format=lines --allow-downgrades --additional-packs downgrades \
+           --dbscheme=ql/lib/ruby.dbscheme --target-dbscheme=downgrades/initial/ruby.dbscheme |
+           xargs codeql execute upgrades testdb
+          diff -q testdb/ruby.dbscheme downgrades/initial/ruby.dbscheme
+  qltest:
+    if: github.repository_owner == 'github'
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest-xl
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+      - uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-codeql
+      - uses: ./ruby/actions/create-extractor-pack
+      - name: Cache compilation cache
+        id: query-cache
+        uses: ./.github/actions/cache-query-compilation
+        with:
+          key: ruby-qltest
+      - name: Run QL tests
+        run: |
+          codeql test run --threads=0 --ram 50000 --search-path "${{ github.workspace }}" --check-databases --check-diff-informed --check-undefined-labels --check-unused-labels --check-repeated-labels --check-redefined-labels --check-use-before-definition --consistency-queries ql/consistency-queries ql/test --compilation-cache "${{ steps.query-cache.outputs.cache-dir }}"
+        env:
+          GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}

.pre-commit-config.yaml

@@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ repos:
     rev: v3.2.0
     hooks:
       - id: trailing-whitespace
-        exclude: /test([^/]*)/.*$(?<!\.qlref)|.*\.patch$|.*\.qll?$
+        exclude: /test/.*$(?<!\.qlref)|.*\.patch$|.*\.qll?$
       - id: end-of-file-fixer
-        exclude: Cargo.lock$|/test([^/]*)/.*$(?<!\.qlref)|.*\.patch$|.*\.qll?$
+        exclude: Cargo.lock$|/test/.*$(?<!\.qlref)|.*\.patch$|.*\.qll?$
 
   - repo: https://github.com/pre-commit/mirrors-clang-format
     rev: v17.0.6

Cargo.lock

@@ -240,9 +240,9 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "cc"
-version = "1.2.61"
+version = "1.2.37"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "d16d90359e986641506914ba71350897565610e87ce0ad9e6f28569db3dd5c6d"
+checksum = "65193589c6404eb80b450d618eaf9a2cafaaafd57ecce47370519ef674a7bd44"
 dependencies = [
  "find-msvc-tools",
  "jobserver",
@@ -416,7 +416,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "tree-sitter",
  "tree-sitter-json",
  "tree-sitter-ql",
- "yeast",
  "zstd",
 ]
 
@@ -755,9 +754,9 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "find-msvc-tools"
-version = "0.1.9"
+version = "0.1.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "5baebc0774151f905a1a2cc41989300b1e6fbb29aff0ceffa1064fdd3088d582"
+checksum = "7fd99930f64d146689264c637b5af2f0233a933bef0d8570e2526bf9e083192d"
 
 [[package]]
 name = "fixedbitset"
@@ -2854,9 +2853,9 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "tree-sitter"
-version = "0.26.8"
+version = "0.25.9"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "887bd495d0582c5e3e0d8ece2233666169fa56a9644d172fc22ad179ab2d0538"
+checksum = "ccd2a058a86cfece0bf96f7cce1021efef9c8ed0e892ab74639173e5ed7a34fa"
 dependencies = [
  "cc",
  "regex",
@@ -2892,16 +2891,6 @@ version = "0.1.5"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "c4013970217383f67b18aef68f6fb2e8d409bc5755227092d32efb0422ba24b8"
 
-[[package]]
-name = "tree-sitter-python"
-version = "0.23.6"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "3d065aaa27f3aaceaf60c1f0e0ac09e1cb9eb8ed28e7bcdaa52129cffc7f4b04"
-dependencies = [
- "cc",
- "tree-sitter-language",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "tree-sitter-ql"
 version = "0.23.1"
@@ -3378,29 +3367,6 @@ version = "1.0.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "cfe53a6657fd280eaa890a3bc59152892ffa3e30101319d168b781ed6529b049"
 
-[[package]]
-name = "yeast"
-version = "0.1.0"
-dependencies = [
- "clap",
- "serde",
- "serde_json",
- "serde_yaml",
- "tree-sitter",
- "tree-sitter-python",
- "tree-sitter-ruby",
- "yeast-macros",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "yeast-macros"
-version = "0.1.0"
-dependencies = [
- "proc-macro2",
- "quote",
- "syn",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "yoke"
 version = "0.8.0"

Cargo.toml

@@ -4,8 +4,6 @@
 resolver = "2"
 members = [
     "shared/tree-sitter-extractor",
-    "shared/yeast",
-    "shared/yeast-macros",
     "ruby/extractor",
     "rust/extractor",
     "rust/extractor/macros",

MODULE.bazel

@@ -15,23 +15,21 @@ local_path_override(
 # see https://registry.bazel.build/ for a list of available packages
 
 bazel_dep(name = "platforms", version = "1.0.0")
-bazel_dep(name = "rules_cc", version = "0.2.17")
-bazel_dep(name = "rules_go", version = "0.60.0")
-bazel_dep(name = "rules_java", version = "9.6.1")
-bazel_dep(name = "rules_pkg", version = "1.2.0")
-bazel_dep(name = "rules_nodejs", version = "6.7.3")
-bazel_dep(name = "rules_python", version = "1.9.0")
-bazel_dep(name = "rules_shell", version = "0.7.1")
-bazel_dep(name = "bazel_skylib", version = "1.9.0")
-bazel_dep(name = "abseil-cpp", version = "20260107.1", repo_name = "absl")
+bazel_dep(name = "rules_go", version = "0.56.1")
+bazel_dep(name = "rules_pkg", version = "1.0.1")
+bazel_dep(name = "rules_nodejs", version = "6.2.0-codeql.1")
+bazel_dep(name = "rules_python", version = "0.40.0")
+bazel_dep(name = "rules_shell", version = "0.5.0")
+bazel_dep(name = "bazel_skylib", version = "1.8.1")
+bazel_dep(name = "abseil-cpp", version = "20240116.1", repo_name = "absl")
 bazel_dep(name = "nlohmann_json", version = "3.11.3", repo_name = "json")
 bazel_dep(name = "fmt", version = "12.1.0-codeql.1")
-bazel_dep(name = "rules_kotlin", version = "2.2.2-codeql.1")
-bazel_dep(name = "gazelle", version = "0.50.0")
+bazel_dep(name = "rules_kotlin", version = "2.1.3-codeql.1")
+bazel_dep(name = "gazelle", version = "0.40.0")
 bazel_dep(name = "rules_dotnet", version = "0.21.5-codeql.1")
-bazel_dep(name = "googletest", version = "1.17.0.bcr.2")
-bazel_dep(name = "rules_rust", version = "0.69.0")
-bazel_dep(name = "zstd", version = "1.5.7.bcr.1")
+bazel_dep(name = "googletest", version = "1.14.0.bcr.1")
+bazel_dep(name = "rules_rust", version = "0.66.0")
+bazel_dep(name = "zstd", version = "1.5.5.bcr.1")
 
 bazel_dep(name = "buildifier_prebuilt", version = "6.4.0", dev_dependency = True)
 
@@ -43,7 +41,7 @@ RUST_EDITION = "2024"
 # a nightly toolchain is required to enable experimental_use_cc_common_link, which we require internally
 # we prefer to run the same version as internally, even if experimental_use_cc_common_link is not really
 # required in this repo
-RUST_VERSION = "nightly/2026-01-22"
+RUST_VERSION = "nightly/2025-08-01"
 
 rust = use_extension("@rules_rust//rust:extensions.bzl", "rust")
 rust.toolchain(
@@ -55,26 +53,26 @@ rust.toolchain(
     ],
     # generated by buildutils-internal/scripts/fill-rust-sha256s.py (internal repo)
     sha256s = {
-        "2026-01-22/rustc-nightly-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.xz": "88db619323cc1321630d124efa51ed02fabc5e020f08cfa0eda2c0ac1afbe69a",
-        "2026-01-22/rustc-nightly-x86_64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "08484da3fa38db56f93629aeabdc0ae9ff8ed9704c0792d35259cbc849b3f54c",
-        "2026-01-22/rustc-nightly-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "a39c0b21b7058e364ea1bd43144e42e4bf1efade036b2e82455f2afce194ee81",
-        "2026-01-22/rustc-nightly-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.tar.xz": "d00248ee9850dbb6932b2578e32ff74fc7c429854c1aa071066ca31b65385a3b",
-        "2026-01-22/clippy-nightly-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.xz": "70656a0ce994ffff16d5a35a7b170a0acd41e9bb54a589c96ed45bf97b094a4d",
-        "2026-01-22/clippy-nightly-x86_64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "fe242519fa961522734733009705aec3c2d9a20cc57291f2aa614e5e6262c88f",
-        "2026-01-22/clippy-nightly-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "38bb226363ec97c9722edf966cd58774a683e19fd2ff2a6030094445d51e06f9",
-        "2026-01-22/clippy-nightly-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.tar.xz": "6da9b4470beea67abfebf046f141eee0d2a8db7c7a9e4e2294478734fd477228",
-        "2026-01-22/cargo-nightly-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.xz": "99004e9d10c43a01499642f53bb3184d41137a95d65bfb217098840a9e79e892",
-        "2026-01-22/cargo-nightly-x86_64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "6e021394cf8d8400ac6cfdfcef24e4d74f988e91eb8028b36de3a64ce3502990",
-        "2026-01-22/cargo-nightly-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "4b2494cb69ab64132cddbc411a38ea9f1105e54d6f986e43168d54f79510c673",
-        "2026-01-22/cargo-nightly-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.tar.xz": "c36613cf57407212d10d37b76e49a60ff42336e953cdff9e177283f530a83fc1",
-        "2026-01-22/llvm-tools-nightly-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.xz": "0b123c5027dbd833aae6845ffe9bd07d309bf798746a7176aadaea68fbcbd05d",
-        "2026-01-22/llvm-tools-nightly-x86_64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "a47864491ad5619158c950ab7570fb6e487d5117338585c27334d45824b406d8",
-        "2026-01-22/llvm-tools-nightly-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "db9bc826d6e2e7e914505d50157682e516ceb90357e83d77abddc32c2d962f41",
-        "2026-01-22/llvm-tools-nightly-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.tar.xz": "ffaa406932b2fe62e01dad61cf4ed34860a5d2a6f9306ca340d79e630d930039",
-        "2026-01-22/rust-std-nightly-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.xz": "e9c0d5e06e18a4b509391b3088f29293e310cdc8ccc865be8fa3f09733326925",
-        "2026-01-22/rust-std-nightly-x86_64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "25d75995cee679a4828ca9fe48c5a31a67c3b0846018440ef912e5a6208f53f6",
-        "2026-01-22/rust-std-nightly-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "e4132bf3f2eed4684c86756a02315bcf481c23e675e3e25630fc604c9cb4594c",
-        "2026-01-22/rust-std-nightly-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.tar.xz": "961bb535ef95ae8a5fa4e224cb94aff190f155c45a9bcf7a53e184b024aa41b1",
+        "2025-08-01/rustc-nightly-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.xz": "9bbeaf5d3fc7247d31463a9083aa251c995cc50662c8219e7a2254d76a72a9a4",
+        "2025-08-01/rustc-nightly-x86_64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "c9ea539a8eff0d5d162701f99f9e1aabe14dd0dfb420d62362817a5d09219de7",
+        "2025-08-01/rustc-nightly-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "ae83feebbc39cfd982e4ecc8297731fe79c185173aee138467b334c5404b3773",
+        "2025-08-01/rustc-nightly-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.tar.xz": "9f170c30d802a349be60cf52ec46260802093cb1013ad667fc0d528b7b10152f",
+        "2025-08-01/clippy-nightly-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.xz": "9ae5f3cd8f557c4f6df522597c69d14398cf604cfaed2b83e767c4b77a7eaaf6",
+        "2025-08-01/clippy-nightly-x86_64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "983cb9ee0b6b968188e04ab2d33743d54764b2681ce565e1b3f2b9135c696a3e",
+        "2025-08-01/clippy-nightly-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "ed2219dbc49d088225e1b7c5c4390fa295066e071fddaa2714018f6bb39ddbf0",
+        "2025-08-01/clippy-nightly-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.tar.xz": "911f40ab5cbdd686f40e00965271fe47c4805513a308ed01f30eafb25b448a50",
+        "2025-08-01/cargo-nightly-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.xz": "106463c284e48e4904c717471eeec2be5cc83a9d2cae8d6e948b52438cad2e69",
+        "2025-08-01/cargo-nightly-x86_64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "6ad35c40efc41a8c531ea43235058347b6902d98a9693bf0aed7fc16d5590cef",
+        "2025-08-01/cargo-nightly-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "dd28c365e9d298abc3154c797720ad36a0058f131265c9978b4c8e4e37012c8a",
+        "2025-08-01/cargo-nightly-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.tar.xz": "7b431286e12d6b3834b038f078389a00cac73f351e8c3152b2504a3c06420b3b",
+        "2025-08-01/llvm-tools-nightly-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.xz": "e342e305d7927cc288d386983b2bc253cfad3776b113386e903d0b302648ef47",
+        "2025-08-01/llvm-tools-nightly-x86_64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "e44dd3506524d85c37b3a54bcc91d01378fd2c590b2db5c5974d12f05c1b84d1",
+        "2025-08-01/llvm-tools-nightly-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "0c1b5f46dd81be4a9227b10283a0fcaa39c14fea7e81aea6fd6d9887ff6cdc41",
+        "2025-08-01/llvm-tools-nightly-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.tar.xz": "423e5fd11406adccbc31b8456ceb7375ce055cdf45e90d2c3babeb2d7f58383f",
+        "2025-08-01/rust-std-nightly-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.xz": "3c0ceb46a252647a1d4c7116d9ccae684fa5e42aaf3296419febd2c962c3b41d",
+        "2025-08-01/rust-std-nightly-x86_64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "3be416003cab10f767390a753d1d16ae4d26c7421c03c98992cf1943e5b0efe8",
+        "2025-08-01/rust-std-nightly-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.xz": "4046ac0ef951cb056b5028a399124f60999fa37792eab69d008d8d7965f389b4",
+        "2025-08-01/rust-std-nightly-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.tar.xz": "191ed9d8603c3a4fe5a7bbbc2feb72049078dae2df3d3b7d5dedf3abbf823e6e",
     },
     versions = [RUST_VERSION],
 )
@@ -141,16 +139,14 @@ use_repo(
     "vendor_ts__serde-1.0.228",
     "vendor_ts__serde_json-1.0.145",
     "vendor_ts__serde_with-3.14.1",
-    "vendor_ts__serde_yaml-0.9.34-deprecated",
     "vendor_ts__syn-2.0.106",
     "vendor_ts__toml-0.9.7",
     "vendor_ts__tracing-0.1.41",
     "vendor_ts__tracing-flame-0.2.0",
     "vendor_ts__tracing-subscriber-0.3.20",
-    "vendor_ts__tree-sitter-0.26.8",
+    "vendor_ts__tree-sitter-0.25.9",
     "vendor_ts__tree-sitter-embedded-template-0.25.0",
     "vendor_ts__tree-sitter-json-0.24.8",
-    "vendor_ts__tree-sitter-python-0.23.6",
     "vendor_ts__tree-sitter-ql-0.23.1",
     "vendor_ts__tree-sitter-ruby-0.23.1",
     "vendor_ts__triomphe-0.1.14",
@@ -192,15 +188,6 @@ pip.parse(
 )
 use_repo(pip, "codegen_deps")
 
-python = use_extension("@rules_python//python/extensions:python.bzl", "python")
-python.toolchain(
-    is_default = True,
-    python_version = "3.12",
-)
-use_repo(python, "python_3_12", "python_versions")
-
-register_toolchains("@python_versions//3.12:all")
-
 swift_deps = use_extension("//swift/third_party:load.bzl", "swift_deps")
 
 # following list can be kept in sync with `bazel mod tidy`
@@ -234,6 +221,10 @@ use_repo(
     kotlin_extractor_deps,
     "codeql_kotlin_defaults",
     "codeql_kotlin_embeddable",
+    "kotlin-compiler-1.6.0",
+    "kotlin-compiler-1.6.20",
+    "kotlin-compiler-1.7.0",
+    "kotlin-compiler-1.7.20",
     "kotlin-compiler-1.8.0",
     "kotlin-compiler-1.9.0-Beta",
     "kotlin-compiler-1.9.20-Beta",
@@ -243,8 +234,10 @@ use_repo(
     "kotlin-compiler-2.1.20-Beta1",
     "kotlin-compiler-2.2.0-Beta1",
     "kotlin-compiler-2.2.20-Beta2",
-    "kotlin-compiler-2.3.0",
-    "kotlin-compiler-2.3.20",
+    "kotlin-compiler-embeddable-1.6.0",
+    "kotlin-compiler-embeddable-1.6.20",
+    "kotlin-compiler-embeddable-1.7.0",
+    "kotlin-compiler-embeddable-1.7.20",
     "kotlin-compiler-embeddable-1.8.0",
     "kotlin-compiler-embeddable-1.9.0-Beta",
     "kotlin-compiler-embeddable-1.9.20-Beta",
@@ -254,8 +247,10 @@ use_repo(
     "kotlin-compiler-embeddable-2.1.20-Beta1",
     "kotlin-compiler-embeddable-2.2.0-Beta1",
     "kotlin-compiler-embeddable-2.2.20-Beta2",
-    "kotlin-compiler-embeddable-2.3.0",
-    "kotlin-compiler-embeddable-2.3.20",
+    "kotlin-stdlib-1.6.0",
+    "kotlin-stdlib-1.6.20",
+    "kotlin-stdlib-1.7.0",
+    "kotlin-stdlib-1.7.20",
     "kotlin-stdlib-1.8.0",
     "kotlin-stdlib-1.9.0-Beta",
     "kotlin-stdlib-1.9.20-Beta",
@@ -265,16 +260,14 @@ use_repo(
     "kotlin-stdlib-2.1.20-Beta1",
     "kotlin-stdlib-2.2.0-Beta1",
     "kotlin-stdlib-2.2.20-Beta2",
-    "kotlin-stdlib-2.3.0",
-    "kotlin-stdlib-2.3.20",
 )
 
 go_sdk = use_extension("@rules_go//go:extensions.bzl", "go_sdk")
-go_sdk.download(version = "1.26.0")
+go_sdk.download(version = "1.25.0")
 
 go_deps = use_extension("@gazelle//:extensions.bzl", "go_deps")
 go_deps.from_file(go_mod = "//go/extractor:go.mod")
-use_repo(go_deps, "com_github_stretchr_testify", "org_golang_x_mod", "org_golang_x_tools")
+use_repo(go_deps, "org_golang_x_mod", "org_golang_x_tools")
 
 ripunzip_archive = use_repo_rule("//misc/ripunzip:ripunzip.bzl", "ripunzip_archive")
 

actions/ql/lib/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,43 +1,3 @@
-## 0.4.35
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 0.4.34
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* Removed false positive injection sink models for the `context` input of `docker/build-push-action` and the `allowed-endpoints` input of `step-security/harden-runner`.
-
-## 0.4.33
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 0.4.32
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 0.4.31
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 0.4.30
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 0.4.29
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 0.4.28
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 0.4.27
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* Fixed a crash when analysing a `${{ ... }}` expression over around 300 characters in length.
-
 ## 0.4.26
 
 ### Major Analysis Improvements

actions/ql/lib/change-notes/2026-04-15-poisonable-steps-additions-alterations.md

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
----
-category: minorAnalysis
----
-* Altered 2 patterns in the `poisonable_steps` modelling. Extra sinks are detected in the following cases: scripts executed via python modules and `go run` in directories are detected as potential mechanisms of injection. For the go execution pattern, the pattern is updated to now ignore flags that occur between go and the specific command. This change may lead to more results being detected by the following queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout-toctou/critical`, `actions/cache-poisoning/poisonable-step`, `actions/cache-poisoning/direct-cache` and `actions/artifact-poisoning/path-traversal`.

actions/ql/lib/change-notes/released/0.4.27.md

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-## 0.4.27
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* Fixed a crash when analysing a `${{ ... }}` expression over around 300 characters in length.

actions/ql/lib/change-notes/released/0.4.28.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-## 0.4.28
-
-No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/lib/change-notes/released/0.4.29.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-## 0.4.29
-
-No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/lib/change-notes/released/0.4.30.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-## 0.4.30
-
-No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/lib/change-notes/released/0.4.31.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-## 0.4.31
-
-No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/lib/change-notes/released/0.4.32.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-## 0.4.32
-
-No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/lib/change-notes/released/0.4.33.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-## 0.4.33
-
-No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/lib/change-notes/released/0.4.34.md

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-## 0.4.34
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* Removed false positive injection sink models for the `context` input of `docker/build-push-action` and the `allowed-endpoints` input of `step-security/harden-runner`.

actions/ql/lib/change-notes/released/0.4.35.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-## 0.4.35
-
-No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/lib/codeql-pack.release.yml

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 ---
-lastReleaseVersion: 0.4.35
+lastReleaseVersion: 0.4.26

actions/ql/lib/codeql/actions/ast/internal/Ast.qll

@@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ string getADelimitedExpression(YamlString s, int offset) {
   // not just the last (greedy match) or first (reluctant match).
   result =
     s.getValue()
-        .regexpFind("\\$\\{\\{(?:[^}]|}(?!}))*+\\}\\}", _, offset)
-        .regexpCapture("(\\$\\{\\{(?:[^}]|}(?!}))*+\\}\\})", 1)
+        .regexpFind("\\$\\{\\{(?:[^}]|}(?!}))*\\}\\}", _, offset)
+        .regexpCapture("(\\$\\{\\{(?:[^}]|}(?!}))*\\}\\})", 1)
         .trim()
 }
 

actions/ql/lib/ext/config/poisonable_steps.yml

@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ extensions:
       - ["(source|sh|bash|zsh|fish)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\b", 2]
       - ["(node)\\s+([^\\s]+)(\\.js|\\.ts)\\b", 2]
       - ["(python[\\d\\.]*)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.py\\b", 2]
-      - ["(python[\\d\\.]*)\\s+-m\\s+([A-Za-z_][\\w\\.]*)\\b", 2] # eg: pythonX -m anything(dir or file)
       - ["(ruby)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.rb\\b", 2]
-      - ["(go)\\s+(generate|run)(?:\\s+-[^\\s]+)*\\s+([^\\s]+)", 3]
+      - ["(go)\\s+(generate|run)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.go\\b", 3]
       - ["(dotnet)\\s+([^\\s]+)\\.csproj\\b", 2]
+

actions/ql/lib/ext/manual/docker_build-push-action.model.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+extensions:
+  - addsTo:
+      pack: codeql/actions-all
+      extensible: actionsSinkModel
+    data:
+      - ["docker/build-push-action", "*", "input.context", "code-injection", "manual"]

actions/ql/lib/ext/manual/step-security_harden-runner.model.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+extensions:
+  - addsTo:
+      pack: codeql/actions-all
+      extensible: actionsSinkModel
+    data:
+      - ["step-security/harden-runner", "*", "input.allowed-endpoints", "command-injection", "manual"]

actions/ql/lib/qlpack.yml

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 name: codeql/actions-all
-version: 0.4.36-dev
+version: 0.4.27-dev
 library: true
 warnOnImplicitThis: true
 dependencies:

actions/ql/src/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,45 +1,3 @@
-## 0.6.27
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 0.6.26
-
-### Major Analysis Improvements
-
-* Fixed alert messages in `actions/artifact-poisoning/critical` and `actions/artifact-poisoning/medium` as they previously included a redundant placeholder in the alert message that would on occasion contain a long block of yml that makes the alert difficult to understand. Also improved the wording to make it clearer that it is not the artifact that is being poisoned, but instead a potentially untrusted artifact that is consumed. Finally, changed the alert location to be the source, to align more with other queries reporting an artifact (e.g. zipslip) which is more useful.
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* The query `actions/missing-workflow-permissions` no longer produces false positive results on reusable workflows where all callers set permissions.
-
-## 0.6.25
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 0.6.24
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 0.6.23
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 0.6.22
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 0.6.21
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 0.6.20
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 0.6.19
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
 ## 0.6.18
 
 No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-275/MissingActionsPermissions.ql

@@ -26,23 +26,10 @@ string permissionsForJob(Job job) {
     "{" + concat(string permission | permission = jobNeedsPermission(job) | permission, ", ") + "}"
 }
 
-predicate jobHasPermissions(Job job) {
-  exists(job.getPermissions())
-  or
-  exists(job.getEnclosingWorkflow().getPermissions())
-  or
-  // The workflow is reusable and cannot be triggered in any other way; check callers
-  exists(ReusableWorkflow r | r = job.getEnclosingWorkflow() |
-    not exists(Event e | e = r.getOn().getAnEvent() | e.getName() != "workflow_call") and
-    forall(Job caller | caller = job.getEnclosingWorkflow().(ReusableWorkflow).getACaller() |
-      jobHasPermissions(caller)
-    )
-  )
-}
-
 from Job job, string permissions
 where
-  not jobHasPermissions(job) and
+  not exists(job.getPermissions()) and
+  not exists(job.getEnclosingWorkflow().getPermissions()) and
   // exists a trigger event that is not a workflow_call
   exists(Event e |
     e = job.getATriggerEvent() and

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/ArtifactPoisoningCritical.ql

@@ -20,6 +20,6 @@ from ArtifactPoisoningFlow::PathNode source, ArtifactPoisoningFlow::PathNode sin
 where
   ArtifactPoisoningFlow::flowPath(source, sink) and
   event = getRelevantEventInPrivilegedContext(sink.getNode())
-select source.getNode(), source, sink,
-  "Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@).",
-  event, event.getName()
+select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
+  "Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@).", sink,
+  sink.getNode().toString(), event, event.getName()

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/ArtifactPoisoningMedium.ql

@@ -20,5 +20,6 @@ from ArtifactPoisoningFlow::PathNode source, ArtifactPoisoningFlow::PathNode sin
 where
   ArtifactPoisoningFlow::flowPath(source, sink) and
   inNonPrivilegedContext(sink.getNode().asExpr())
-select source.getNode(), source, sink,
-  "Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user."
+select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
+  "Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user.", sink,
+  sink.getNode().toString()

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.md

@@ -1,35 +1,6 @@
 ## Overview
 
-GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. Under certain conditions described below, attackers can take over a repository by opening malicious PRs from forks. The attacks can result in malicious code execution causing unauthorized changes to the repository or exfiltration of repository secrets and a compromise of connected systems.
-
-## Workflow Security Model
-
-In GitHub Actions, there is a distinction between unprivileged and privileged workflows. For example, a workflow with a `pull_request` trigger is unprivileged while a workflow with `pull_request_target` is privileged.
-
-This is relevant especially for PRs from forks. Normal PRs can only be submitted by people who have write access to a repository, while PRs from forks can be submitted by anyone.
-
-On a PR from a fork, an unprivileged `pull_request` workflow has only limited capabilities but a privileged `pull_request_target` workflow is much more dangerous. A privileged workflow:
-
-  * Runs in the context of the base repository
-  * Has access to organization and repository secrets (e.g., API keys, deployment tokens)
-  * Has a read/write `GITHUB_TOKEN` by default
-  * Can access private resources
-
-Certain triggers automatically grant a workflow elevated privileges:
-
-  * `pull_request_target` as described above
-  * `workflow_run`: Triggered when another workflow completes.
-  * `issue_comment`: Triggered when a comment is made on an issue or PR.
-
-## Attack Details
-
-  * A repository has a privileged workflow
-  * An attacker forks the repository and adds malicious code (e.g., in the build script)
-  * The attacker opens a PR from the fork, and, if needed, comments on the PR
-  * The workflow in the base repository checks out the forked code
-  * The workflow runs, (e.g. the build script etc.), which contains the malicious code
-
-Please note that not only build scripts can be malicious code vectors. There is a large number of other possibilities. Some of them are listed in the [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/) catalog.
+GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. A potentially dangerous misuse of the triggers such as `pull_request_target` or `issue_comment` followed by an explicit checkout of untrusted code (Pull Request HEAD) may lead to repository compromise if untrusted code gets executed (e.g., due to a modified build script) in a privileged job.
 
 ## Recommendation
 
@@ -162,5 +133,3 @@ jobs:
 ## References
 
 - GitHub Security Lab Research: [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/).
-- Mitigating risks of untrusted checkout: [GitHub Docs](https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/actions/reference/security/secure-use#mitigating-the-risks-of-untrusted-code-checkout).
-- Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/).

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.md

@@ -1,35 +1,6 @@
 ## Overview
 
-GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. Under certain conditions described below, attackers can take over a repository by opening malicious PRs from forks. The attacks can result in malicious code execution causing unauthorized changes to the repository or exfiltration of repository secrets and a compromise of connected systems.
-
-## Workflow Security Model
-
-In GitHub Actions, there is a distinction between unprivileged and privileged workflows. For example, a workflow with a `pull_request` trigger is unprivileged while a workflow with `pull_request_target` is privileged.
-
-This is relevant especially for PRs from forks. Normal PRs can only be submitted by people who have write access to a repository, while PRs from forks can be submitted by anyone.
-
-On a PR from a fork, an unprivileged `pull_request` workflow has only limited capabilities but a privileged `pull_request_target` workflow is much more dangerous. A privileged workflow:
-
-  * Runs in the context of the base repository
-  * Has access to organization and repository secrets (e.g., API keys, deployment tokens)
-  * Has a read/write `GITHUB_TOKEN` by default
-  * Can access private resources
-
-Certain triggers automatically grant a workflow elevated privileges:
-
-  * `pull_request_target` as described above
-  * `workflow_run`: Triggered when another workflow completes.
-  * `issue_comment`: Triggered when a comment is made on an issue or PR.
-
-## Attack Details
-
-  * A repository has a privileged workflow
-  * An attacker forks the repository and adds malicious code (e.g., in the build script)
-  * The attacker opens a PR from the fork, and, if needed, comments on the PR
-  * The workflow in the base repository checks out the forked code
-  * The workflow runs, (e.g. the build script etc.), which contains the malicious code
-
-Please note that not only build scripts can be malicious code vectors. There is a large number of other possibilities. Some of them are listed in the [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/) catalog.
+GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. A potentially dangerous misuse of the triggers such as `pull_request_target` or `issue_comment` followed by an explicit checkout of untrusted code (Pull Request HEAD) may lead to repository compromise if untrusted code gets executed (e.g., due to a modified build script) in a privileged job.
 
 ## Recommendation
 
@@ -162,5 +133,3 @@ jobs:
 ## References
 
 - GitHub Security Lab Research: [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/).
-- Mitigating risks of untrusted checkout: [GitHub Docs](https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/actions/reference/security/secure-use#mitigating-the-risks-of-untrusted-code-checkout).
-- Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/).

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.ql

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /**
- * @name Checkout of untrusted code in privileged context without privileged context use
+ * @name Checkout of untrusted code in trusted context
  * @description Privileged workflows have read/write access to the base repository and access to secrets.
  *              By explicitly checking out and running the build script from a fork the untrusted code is running in an environment
  *              that is able to push to the base repository and to access secrets.

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutMedium.md

@@ -1,35 +1,6 @@
 ## Overview
 
-GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. Under certain conditions described below, attackers can take over a repository by opening malicious PRs from forks. The attacks can result in malicious code execution causing unauthorized changes to the repository or exfiltration of repository secrets and a compromise of connected systems.
-
-## Workflow Security Model
-
-In GitHub Actions, there is a distinction between unprivileged and privileged workflows. For example, a workflow with a `pull_request` trigger is unprivileged while a workflow with `pull_request_target` is privileged.
-
-This is relevant especially for PRs from forks. Normal PRs can only be submitted by people who have write access to a repository, while PRs from forks can be submitted by anyone.
-
-On a PR from a fork, an unprivileged `pull_request` workflow has only limited capabilities but a privileged `pull_request_target` workflow is much more dangerous. A privileged workflow:
-
-  * Runs in the context of the base repository
-  * Has access to organization and repository secrets (e.g., API keys, deployment tokens)
-  * Has a read/write `GITHUB_TOKEN` by default
-  * Can access private resources
-
-Certain triggers automatically grant a workflow elevated privileges:
-
-  * `pull_request_target` as described above
-  * `workflow_run`: Triggered when another workflow completes.
-  * `issue_comment`: Triggered when a comment is made on an issue or PR.
-
-## Attack Details
-
-  * A repository has a privileged workflow
-  * An attacker forks the repository and adds malicious code (e.g., in the build script)
-  * The attacker opens a PR from the fork, and, if needed, comments on the PR
-  * The workflow in the base repository checks out the forked code
-  * The workflow runs, (e.g. the build script etc.), which contains the malicious code
-
-Please note that not only build scripts can be malicious code vectors. There is a large number of other possibilities. Some of them are listed in the [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/) catalog.
+GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. A potentially dangerous misuse of the triggers such as `pull_request_target` or `issue_comment` followed by an explicit checkout of untrusted code (Pull Request HEAD) may lead to repository compromise if untrusted code gets executed (e.g., due to a modified build script) in a privileged job.
 
 ## Recommendation
 
@@ -162,5 +133,3 @@ jobs:
 ## References
 
 - GitHub Security Lab Research: [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/).
-- Mitigating risks of untrusted checkout: [GitHub Docs](https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/actions/reference/security/secure-use#mitigating-the-risks-of-untrusted-code-checkout).
-- Living Off the Pipeline: [LOTP](https://boostsecurityio.github.io/lotp/).

actions/ql/src/change-notes/2026-04-15-untrusted-checkout-improvements-helpfile.md

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
----
-category: fix
----
-* Fixed help file descriptions for queries: `actions/untrusted-checkout/critical`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/high`, `actions/untrusted-checkout/medium`. Previously the messages were unclear as to why and how the vulnerabilities could occur. 

actions/ql/src/change-notes/2026-04-15-untrusted-checkout-improvements-metadata.md

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
----
-category: queryMetadata
----
-* Adjusted the name of `actions/untrusted-checkout/high` to more clearly describe which parts of the scenario are in a privileged context.

actions/ql/src/change-notes/released/0.6.19.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-## 0.6.19
-
-No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/src/change-notes/released/0.6.20.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-## 0.6.20
-
-No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/src/change-notes/released/0.6.21.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-## 0.6.21
-
-No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/src/change-notes/released/0.6.22.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-## 0.6.22
-
-No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/src/change-notes/released/0.6.23.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-## 0.6.23
-
-No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/src/change-notes/released/0.6.24.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-## 0.6.24
-
-No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/src/change-notes/released/0.6.25.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-## 0.6.25
-
-No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/src/change-notes/released/0.6.26.md

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-## 0.6.26
-
-### Major Analysis Improvements
-
-* Fixed alert messages in `actions/artifact-poisoning/critical` and `actions/artifact-poisoning/medium` as they previously included a redundant placeholder in the alert message that would on occasion contain a long block of yml that makes the alert difficult to understand. Also improved the wording to make it clearer that it is not the artifact that is being poisoned, but instead a potentially untrusted artifact that is consumed. Finally, changed the alert location to be the source, to align more with other queries reporting an artifact (e.g. zipslip) which is more useful.
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* The query `actions/missing-workflow-permissions` no longer produces false positive results on reusable workflows where all callers set permissions.

actions/ql/src/change-notes/released/0.6.27.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-## 0.6.27
-
-No user-facing changes.

actions/ql/src/codeql-pack.release.yml

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 ---
-lastReleaseVersion: 0.6.27
+lastReleaseVersion: 0.6.18

actions/ql/src/qlpack.yml

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 name: codeql/actions-queries
-version: 0.6.28-dev
+version: 0.6.19-dev
 library: false
 warnOnImplicitThis: true
 groups: [actions, queries]

actions/ql/test/library-tests/very-long-expression/very_long_expression_node.expected

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-| 97418 |

actions/ql/test/library-tests/very-long-expression/very_long_expression_node.ql

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-import codeql.actions.ast.internal.Ast
-
-int getAnExpressionLength() { result = any(ExpressionImpl e).toString().length() }
-
-select max(getAnExpressionLength())

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-275/.github/workflows/perms11.yml

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-on:
-  workflow_call:
-
-jobs:
-  build:
-    name: Build and test
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    steps:
-    - uses: actions/deploy-pages

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-275/.github/workflows/perms12.yml

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-on:
-  workflow_dispatch:
-
-permissions:
-  contents: read
-  id-token: write
-  pages: write
-
-jobs:
-  call-workflow:
-    uses: ./.github/workflows/perms11.yml

actions/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-829/ArtifactPoisoningCritical.expected

@@ -55,21 +55,21 @@ nodes
 | .github/workflows/test25.yml:39:14:40:45 | ./gradlew buildScanPublishPrevious\n | semmle.label | ./gradlew buildScanPublishPrevious\n |
 subpaths
 #select
-| .github/actions/download-artifact-2/action.yaml:6:7:25:4 | Uses Step | .github/actions/download-artifact-2/action.yaml:6:7:25:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:28:9:29:6 | Uses Step | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:3:3:3:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/actions/download-artifact-2/action.yaml:6:7:25:4 | Uses Step | .github/actions/download-artifact-2/action.yaml:6:7:25:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:29:14:29:26 | make snapshot | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:3:3:3:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning11.yml:13:9:32:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning11.yml:13:9:32:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning11.yml:38:11:38:77 | ./sonarcloud-data/x.py build -j$(nproc) --compiler gcc --skip-build | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning11.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning12.yml:13:9:32:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning12.yml:13:9:32:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning12.yml:38:11:38:25 | python foo/x.py | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning12.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:13:9:18:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:13:9:18:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:19:14:20:21 | sh foo/cmd\n | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning22.yml:13:9:17:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning22.yml:13:9:17:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning22.yml:18:14:18:19 | sh cmd | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning22.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning31.yml:13:9:15:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning31.yml:13:9:15:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning31.yml:19:14:19:22 | ./foo/cmd | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning31.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning32.yml:13:9:16:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning32.yml:13:9:16:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning32.yml:17:14:18:20 | ./bar/cmd\n | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning32.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning33.yml:13:9:16:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning33.yml:13:9:16:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning33.yml:17:14:18:20 | ./bar/cmd\n | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning33.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning34.yml:13:9:16:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning34.yml:13:9:16:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning34.yml:20:14:22:23 | npm install\nnpm run lint\n | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning34.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning41.yml:13:9:21:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning41.yml:13:9:21:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning41.yml:22:14:22:22 | ./foo/cmd | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning41.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning42.yml:13:9:21:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning42.yml:13:9:21:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning42.yml:22:14:22:18 | ./cmd | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning42.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning71.yml:9:9:16:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning71.yml:9:9:16:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning71.yml:17:14:18:40 | sed -f config foo.md > bar.md\n | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning71.yml:4:5:4:16 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning81.yml:28:9:31:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning81.yml:28:9:31:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning81.yml:31:14:31:27 | python test.py | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning81.yml:3:5:3:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning96.yml:13:9:18:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning96.yml:13:9:18:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning96.yml:18:14:18:24 | npm install | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning96.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning101.yml:10:9:16:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning101.yml:10:9:16:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning101.yml:17:14:19:59 | PR_NUMBER=$(./get_pull_request_number.sh pr_number.txt)\necho "PR_NUMBER=$PR_NUMBER" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT \n | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning101.yml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
-| .github/workflows/test18.yml:12:15:33:12 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test18.yml:12:15:33:12 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test18.yml:36:15:40:58 | Uses Step | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/test18.yml:3:5:3:16 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
-| .github/workflows/test25.yml:22:9:32:6 | Uses Step: downloadBuildScan | .github/workflows/test25.yml:22:9:32:6 | Uses Step: downloadBuildScan | .github/workflows/test25.yml:39:14:40:45 | ./gradlew buildScanPublishPrevious\n | Potential artifact poisoning; the artifact being consumed has contents that may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/test25.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning11.yml:38:11:38:77 | ./sonarcloud-data/x.py build -j$(nproc) --compiler gcc --skip-build | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning11.yml:13:9:32:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning11.yml:38:11:38:77 | ./sonarcloud-data/x.py build -j$(nproc) --compiler gcc --skip-build | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning11.yml:38:11:38:77 | ./sonarcloud-data/x.py build -j$(nproc) --compiler gcc --skip-build | ./sonarcloud-data/x.py build -j$(nproc) --compiler gcc --skip-build | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning11.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning12.yml:38:11:38:25 | python foo/x.py | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning12.yml:13:9:32:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning12.yml:38:11:38:25 | python foo/x.py | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning12.yml:38:11:38:25 | python foo/x.py | python foo/x.py | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning12.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:19:14:20:21 | sh foo/cmd\n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:13:9:18:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:19:14:20:21 | sh foo/cmd\n | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:19:14:20:21 | sh foo/cmd\n | sh foo/cmd\n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning21.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning22.yml:18:14:18:19 | sh cmd | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning22.yml:13:9:17:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning22.yml:18:14:18:19 | sh cmd | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning22.yml:18:14:18:19 | sh cmd | sh cmd | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning22.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning31.yml:19:14:19:22 | ./foo/cmd | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning31.yml:13:9:15:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning31.yml:19:14:19:22 | ./foo/cmd | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning31.yml:19:14:19:22 | ./foo/cmd | ./foo/cmd | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning31.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning32.yml:17:14:18:20 | ./bar/cmd\n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning32.yml:13:9:16:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning32.yml:17:14:18:20 | ./bar/cmd\n | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning32.yml:17:14:18:20 | ./bar/cmd\n | ./bar/cmd\n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning32.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning33.yml:17:14:18:20 | ./bar/cmd\n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning33.yml:13:9:16:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning33.yml:17:14:18:20 | ./bar/cmd\n | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning33.yml:17:14:18:20 | ./bar/cmd\n | ./bar/cmd\n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning33.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning34.yml:20:14:22:23 | npm install\nnpm run lint\n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning34.yml:13:9:16:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning34.yml:20:14:22:23 | npm install\nnpm run lint\n | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning34.yml:20:14:22:23 | npm install\nnpm run lint\n | npm install\nnpm run lint\n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning34.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning41.yml:22:14:22:22 | ./foo/cmd | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning41.yml:13:9:21:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning41.yml:22:14:22:22 | ./foo/cmd | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning41.yml:22:14:22:22 | ./foo/cmd | ./foo/cmd | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning41.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning42.yml:22:14:22:18 | ./cmd | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning42.yml:13:9:21:6 | Run Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning42.yml:22:14:22:18 | ./cmd | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning42.yml:22:14:22:18 | ./cmd | ./cmd | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning42.yml:4:3:4:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning71.yml:17:14:18:40 | sed -f config foo.md > bar.md\n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning71.yml:9:9:16:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning71.yml:17:14:18:40 | sed -f config foo.md > bar.md\n | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning71.yml:17:14:18:40 | sed -f config foo.md > bar.md\n | sed -f config foo.md > bar.md\n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning71.yml:4:5:4:16 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning81.yml:31:14:31:27 | python test.py | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning81.yml:28:9:31:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning81.yml:31:14:31:27 | python test.py | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning81.yml:31:14:31:27 | python test.py | python test.py | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning81.yml:3:5:3:23 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:28:9:29:6 | Uses Step | .github/actions/download-artifact-2/action.yaml:6:7:25:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:28:9:29:6 | Uses Step | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:28:9:29:6 | Uses Step | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:3:3:3:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:29:14:29:26 | make snapshot | .github/actions/download-artifact-2/action.yaml:6:7:25:4 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:29:14:29:26 | make snapshot | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:29:14:29:26 | make snapshot | make snapshot | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning92.yml:3:3:3:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning96.yml:18:14:18:24 | npm install | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning96.yml:13:9:18:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning96.yml:18:14:18:24 | npm install | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning96.yml:18:14:18:24 | npm install | npm install | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning96.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning101.yml:17:14:19:59 | PR_NUMBER=$(./get_pull_request_number.sh pr_number.txt)\necho "PR_NUMBER=$PR_NUMBER" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT \n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning101.yml:10:9:16:6 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning101.yml:17:14:19:59 | PR_NUMBER=$(./get_pull_request_number.sh pr_number.txt)\necho "PR_NUMBER=$PR_NUMBER" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT \n | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning101.yml:17:14:19:59 | PR_NUMBER=$(./get_pull_request_number.sh pr_number.txt)\necho "PR_NUMBER=$PR_NUMBER" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT \n | PR_NUMBER=$(./get_pull_request_number.sh pr_number.txt)\necho "PR_NUMBER=$PR_NUMBER" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT \n | .github/workflows/artifactpoisoning101.yml:4:3:4:21 | pull_request_target | pull_request_target |
+| .github/workflows/test18.yml:36:15:40:58 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test18.yml:12:15:33:12 | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test18.yml:36:15:40:58 | Uses Step | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/test18.yml:36:15:40:58 | Uses Step | Uses Step | .github/workflows/test18.yml:3:5:3:16 | workflow_run | workflow_run |
+| .github/workflows/test25.yml:39:14:40:45 | ./gradlew buildScanPublishPrevious\n | .github/workflows/test25.yml:22:9:32:6 | Uses Step: downloadBuildScan | .github/workflows/test25.yml:39:14:40:45 | ./gradlew buildScanPublishPrevious\n | Potential artifact poisoning in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@). | .github/workflows/test25.yml:39:14:40:45 | ./gradlew buildScanPublishPrevious\n | ./gradlew buildScanPublishPrevious\n | .github/workflows/test25.yml:2:3:2:14 | workflow_run | workflow_run |

config/add-overlay-annotations.py

@@ -199,7 +199,6 @@ def annotate_as_appropriate(filename, lines):
     # as overlay[local?].  It is not clear that these heuristics are exactly what we want,
     # but they seem to work well enough for now (as determined by speed and accuracy numbers).
     if (filename.endswith("Test.qll") or
-        re.search(r"go/ql/lib/semmle/go/security/[^/]+[.]qll$", filename.replace(os.sep, "/")) or
         ((filename.endswith("Query.qll") or filename.endswith("Config.qll")) and
          any("implements DataFlow::ConfigSig" in line for line in lines))):
         return None

config/identical-files.json

@@ -172,6 +172,10 @@
     "cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/ir/implementation/raw/internal/reachability/PrintDominance.qll",
     "cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/ir/implementation/unaliased_ssa/internal/reachability/PrintDominance.qll"
   ],
+  "C# ControlFlowReachability": [
+    "csharp/ql/lib/semmle/code/csharp/dataflow/internal/ControlFlowReachability.qll",
+    "csharp/ql/lib/semmle/code/csharp/dataflow/internal/rangeanalysis/ControlFlowReachability.qll"
+  ],
   "C++ ExternalAPIs": [
     "cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-020/ExternalAPIs.qll",
     "cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-020/ir/ExternalAPIs.qll"

cpp/downgrades/770002bb02322e04fa25345838ce6e82af285a0b/in_trap.ql

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-class Element extends @element {
-  string toString() { none() }
-}
-
-class Trap extends @trap {
-  string toString() { none() }
-}
-
-class Tag extends @tag {
-  string toString() { none() }
-}
-
-from Element e, Trap trap
-where
-  in_trap_or_tag(e, trap)
-  or
-  exists(Tag tag |
-    in_trap_or_tag(e, tag) and
-    trap_uses_tag(trap, tag)
-  )
-select e, trap

cpp/downgrades/770002bb02322e04fa25345838ce6e82af285a0b/source_file_uses_trap.ql

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-class SourceFile extends @source_file {
-  string toString() { none() }
-}
-
-class Trap extends @trap {
-  string toString() { none() }
-}
-
-from SourceFile source_file, string name, Trap trap
-where
-  source_file_uses_trap(source_file, trap) and
-  source_file_name(source_file, name)
-select name, trap

cpp/downgrades/770002bb02322e04fa25345838ce6e82af285a0b/upgrade.properties

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-description: Add source_file_name
-compatibility: backwards
-source_file_uses_trap.rel: run source_file_uses_trap.ql
-source_file_name.rel: delete
-tag_name.rel: delete
-trap_uses_tag.rel: delete
-in_trap.rel: run in_trap.ql
-in_trap_or_tag.rel: delete

cpp/downgrades/7e7c2f55670f8123d514cf542ccb1938118ac561/upgrade.properties

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-description: Add trap_filename, source_file_uses_trap and in_trap relations
-compatibility: full
-trap_filename.rel: delete
-source_file_uses_trap.rel: delete
-in_trap.rel: delete

cpp/downgrades/9439176c1d1312787926458dd54d65a849069118/preprocdirects.ql

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-class PreprocessorDirective extends @preprocdirect {
-  string toString() { none() }
-}
-
-class Location extends @location_default {
-  string toString() { none() }
-}
-
-from PreprocessorDirective ppd, int kind, int kind_new, Location l
-where
-  preprocdirects(ppd, kind, l) and
-  if kind = 17 then kind_new = /* ppd_warning */ 18 else kind_new = kind
-select ppd, kind_new, l

cpp/downgrades/9439176c1d1312787926458dd54d65a849069118/upgrade.properties

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-description: Support embed preprocessor directive
-compatibility: partial
-embeds.rel: delete
-preprocdirects.rel: run preprocdirects.qlo

cpp/ql/integration-tests/query-suite/cpp-code-scanning.qls.expected

@@ -7,12 +7,10 @@ ql/cpp/ql/src/Diagnostics/ExtractedFiles.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Diagnostics/ExtractionWarnings.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Diagnostics/FailedExtractorInvocations.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Arithmetic/BadAdditionOverflowCheck.ql
-ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Arithmetic/IntMultToLong.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Arithmetic/SignedOverflowCheck.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Conversion/CastArrayPointerArithmetic.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Format/SnprintfOverflow.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Format/WrongNumberOfFormatArguments.ql
-ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Format/WrongTypeFormatArguments.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Memory Management/AllocaInLoop.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Memory Management/PointerOverflow.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Likely Bugs/Memory Management/ReturnStackAllocatedMemory.ql
@@ -30,7 +28,6 @@ ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-120/VeryLikelyOverrunWrite.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-131/NoSpaceForZeroTerminator.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-134/UncontrolledFormatString.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-190/ArithmeticUncontrolled.ql
-ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-190/ComparisonWithWiderType.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-191/UnsignedDifferenceExpressionComparedZero.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-253/HResultBooleanConversion.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-311/CleartextFileWrite.ql
@@ -43,7 +40,6 @@ ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-367/TOCTOUFilesystemRace.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-416/IteratorToExpiredContainer.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-416/UseOfStringAfterLifetimeEnds.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-416/UseOfUniquePointerAfterLifetimeEnds.ql
-ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-468/SuspiciousAddWithSizeof.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-497/ExposedSystemData.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-611/XXE.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-676/DangerousFunctionOverflow.ql
@@ -56,6 +52,5 @@ ql/cpp/ql/src/Summary/LinesOfUserCode.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/CompilerErrors.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/DatabaseQuality.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/ExtractionMetrics.ql
-ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/ExtractorInformation.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/MissingIncludes.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/SucceededIncludes.ql

cpp/ql/integration-tests/query-suite/cpp-security-and-quality.qls.expected

@@ -160,7 +160,6 @@ ql/cpp/ql/src/Summary/LinesOfUserCode.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/CompilerErrors.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/DatabaseQuality.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/ExtractionMetrics.ql
-ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/ExtractorInformation.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/MissingIncludes.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/SucceededIncludes.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/jsf/4.06 Pre-Processing Directives/AV Rule 32.ql

cpp/ql/integration-tests/query-suite/cpp-security-extended.qls.expected

@@ -93,6 +93,5 @@ ql/cpp/ql/src/Summary/LinesOfUserCode.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/CompilerErrors.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/DatabaseQuality.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/ExtractionMetrics.ql
-ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/ExtractorInformation.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/MissingIncludes.ql
 ql/cpp/ql/src/Telemetry/SucceededIncludes.ql

cpp/ql/lib/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,98 +1,3 @@
-## 10.1.0
-
-### New Features
-
-* A new predicate `getSwitchCase` was added to the `SwitchStmt` class, which yields the `n`th `case` statement from a `switch` statement.
-* Data flow barriers and barrier guards can now be added using data extensions. For more information see [Customizing library models for C and C++](https://codeql.github.com/docs/codeql-language-guides/customizing-library-models-for-cpp/).
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* Added taint flow models for the `Strsafe.h` header from the Windows SDK.
-
-## 10.0.0
-
-### Breaking Changes
-
-* The deprecated `NonThrowingFunction` class has been removed, use `NonCppThrowingFunction` instead.
-* The deprecated `ThrowingFunction` class has been removed, use `AlwaysSehThrowingFunction` instead.
-
-### New Features
-
-* Added a subclass `AutoconfConfigureTestFile` of `ConfigurationTestFile` that represents files created by GNU autoconf configure scripts to test the build configuration.
-
-## 9.0.0
-
-### Breaking Changes
-
-* The `SourceModelCsv`, `SinkModelCsv`, and `SummaryModelCsv` classes and the associated CSV parsing infrastructure have been removed from `ExternalFlow.qll`. New models should be added as `.model.yml` files in the `ext/` directory.
-
-### New Features
-
-* Added a subclass `MesonPrivateTestFile` of `ConfigurationTestFile` that represents files created by Meson to test the build configuration.
-* Added a class `ConstructorDirectFieldInit` to represent field initializations that occur in member initializer lists.
-* Added a class `ConstructorDefaultFieldInit` to represent default field initializations.
-* Added a class `DataFlow::IndirectParameterNode` to represent the indirection of a parameter as a dataflow node.
-* Added a predicate `Node::asIndirectInstruction` which returns the `Instruction` that defines the indirect dataflow node, if any.
-* Added a class `IndirectUninitializedNode` to represent the indirection of an uninitialized local variable as a dataflow node.
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* Added `HttpReceiveHttpRequest`, `HttpReceiveRequestEntityBody`, and `HttpReceiveClientCertificate` from Win32's `http.h` as remote flow sources.
-* Added dataflow through members initialized via non-static data member initialization (NSDMI).
-
-## 8.0.3
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 8.0.2
-
-No user-facing changes.
-
-## 8.0.1
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* Inline expectations test comments, which are of the form `// $ tag` or `// $ tag=value`, are now parsed more strictly and will not be recognized if there isn't a space after the `$` symbol.
-
-## 8.0.0
-
-### Breaking Changes
-
-* CodeQL version 2.24.2 accidentally introduced a syntactical breaking change to `BarrierGuard<...>::getAnIndirectBarrierNode` and `InstructionBarrierGuard<...>::getAnIndirectBarrierNode`. These breaking changes have now been reverted so that the original code compiles again.
-* `MustFlow`, the inter-procedural must-flow data flow analysis library, has been re-worked to use parameterized modules. Like in the case of data flow and taint tracking, instead of extending the `MustFlowConfiguration` class, the user should now implement a module with the `MustFlow::ConfigSig` signature, and instantiate the `MustFlow::Global` parameterized module with the implemented module.
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* Refactored the "Year field changed using an arithmetic operation without checking for leap year" query (`cpp/leap-year/unchecked-after-arithmetic-year-modification`) to address large numbers of false positive results.
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* The `allowInterproceduralFlow` predicate of must-flow data flow configurations now correctly handles direct recursion.
-
-## 7.1.1
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* Added remote flow source models for the `winhttp.h` windows header and the Azure SDK core library for C/C++.
-
-## 7.1.0
-
-### New Features
-
-* Added a subclass `Embed` of `PreprocessorDirective` for C23 and C++26 `#embed` preprocessor directives.
-* Added modules `DataFlow::ParameterizedBarrierGuard` and `DataFlow::ParameterizedInstructionBarrierGuard`. These modules provide the same features as `DataFlow::BarrierGuard` and `DataFlow::InstructionBarrierGuard`, but allow for an additional parameter to support properly using them in dataflow configurations that uses flow states.
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* The `Buffer.qll` library will no longer report incorrect buffer sizes on certain malformed databases. As a result, the queries `cpp/static-buffer-overflow`, `cpp/overflow-buffer`, `cpp/badly-bounded-write`, `cpp/overrunning-write`, `cpp/overrunning-write-with-float`, and `cpp/very-likely-overrunning-write` will report fewer false positives on such databases.
-* Added `taint` summary models and `sql-injection` barrier models for the MySQL `mysql_real_escape_string` and `mysql_real_escape_string_quote` escaping functions.
-* The predicate `SummarizedCallable.propagatesFlow` has been extended with the columns `Provenance p` and `boolean isExact`, and as a consequence the predicates `SummarizedCallable.hasProvenance` and `SummarizedCallable.hasExactModel` have been removed.
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* Fixed a bug in the `GuardCondition` library which sometimes prevented binary logical operators from being recognized as guard conditions. As a result, queries using `GuardCondition` may see improved results.
-* Fixed a bug which caused `Node.asDefinition()` to not have a result for certain assignments.
-
 ## 7.0.0
 
 ### Breaking Changes

cpp/ql/lib/change-notes/released/10.0.0.md

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-## 10.0.0
-
-### Breaking Changes
-
-* The deprecated `NonThrowingFunction` class has been removed, use `NonCppThrowingFunction` instead.
-* The deprecated `ThrowingFunction` class has been removed, use `AlwaysSehThrowingFunction` instead.
-
-### New Features
-
-* Added a subclass `AutoconfConfigureTestFile` of `ConfigurationTestFile` that represents files created by GNU autoconf configure scripts to test the build configuration.

cpp/ql/lib/change-notes/released/10.1.0.md

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-## 10.1.0
-
-### New Features
-
-* A new predicate `getSwitchCase` was added to the `SwitchStmt` class, which yields the `n`th `case` statement from a `switch` statement.
-* Data flow barriers and barrier guards can now be added using data extensions. For more information see [Customizing library models for C and C++](https://codeql.github.com/docs/codeql-language-guides/customizing-library-models-for-cpp/).
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* Added taint flow models for the `Strsafe.h` header from the Windows SDK.

cpp/ql/lib/change-notes/released/7.1.0.md

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-## 7.1.0
-
-### New Features
-
-* Added a subclass `Embed` of `PreprocessorDirective` for C23 and C++26 `#embed` preprocessor directives.
-* Added modules `DataFlow::ParameterizedBarrierGuard` and `DataFlow::ParameterizedInstructionBarrierGuard`. These modules provide the same features as `DataFlow::BarrierGuard` and `DataFlow::InstructionBarrierGuard`, but allow for an additional parameter to support properly using them in dataflow configurations that uses flow states.
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* The `Buffer.qll` library will no longer report incorrect buffer sizes on certain malformed databases. As a result, the queries `cpp/static-buffer-overflow`, `cpp/overflow-buffer`, `cpp/badly-bounded-write`, `cpp/overrunning-write`, `cpp/overrunning-write-with-float`, and `cpp/very-likely-overrunning-write` will report fewer false positives on such databases.
-* Added `taint` summary models and `sql-injection` barrier models for the MySQL `mysql_real_escape_string` and `mysql_real_escape_string_quote` escaping functions.
-* The predicate `SummarizedCallable.propagatesFlow` has been extended with the columns `Provenance p` and `boolean isExact`, and as a consequence the predicates `SummarizedCallable.hasProvenance` and `SummarizedCallable.hasExactModel` have been removed.
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* Fixed a bug in the `GuardCondition` library which sometimes prevented binary logical operators from being recognized as guard conditions. As a result, queries using `GuardCondition` may see improved results.
-* Fixed a bug which caused `Node.asDefinition()` to not have a result for certain assignments.

cpp/ql/lib/change-notes/released/7.1.1.md

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-## 7.1.1
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* Added remote flow source models for the `winhttp.h` windows header and the Azure SDK core library for C/C++.

cpp/ql/lib/change-notes/released/8.0.0.md

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-## 8.0.0
-
-### Breaking Changes
-
-* CodeQL version 2.24.2 accidentally introduced a syntactical breaking change to `BarrierGuard<...>::getAnIndirectBarrierNode` and `InstructionBarrierGuard<...>::getAnIndirectBarrierNode`. These breaking changes have now been reverted so that the original code compiles again.
-* `MustFlow`, the inter-procedural must-flow data flow analysis library, has been re-worked to use parameterized modules. Like in the case of data flow and taint tracking, instead of extending the `MustFlowConfiguration` class, the user should now implement a module with the `MustFlow::ConfigSig` signature, and instantiate the `MustFlow::Global` parameterized module with the implemented module.
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* Refactored the "Year field changed using an arithmetic operation without checking for leap year" query (`cpp/leap-year/unchecked-after-arithmetic-year-modification`) to address large numbers of false positive results.
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* The `allowInterproceduralFlow` predicate of must-flow data flow configurations now correctly handles direct recursion.

cpp/ql/lib/change-notes/released/8.0.1.md

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-## 8.0.1
-
-### Minor Analysis Improvements
-
-* Inline expectations test comments, which are of the form `// $ tag` or `// $ tag=value`, are now parsed more strictly and will not be recognized if there isn't a space after the `$` symbol.