Napalys
5f8ff125e9
Added change notes
2024-11-12 12:21:39 +01:00
Napalys
7427a24ca1
Added test case for Array.prototype.toReversed, which is currently not flagged as a taint sink.
2024-11-12 12:02:37 +01:00
Napalys
3215967cbc
Added toReserved test case
2024-11-12 12:02:20 +01:00
Napalys
3f0a54c2e8
Added support for Array.prototype.toSorted function
2024-11-12 12:02:04 +01:00
Napalys
def8d75cb8
Added test case for Array.prototype.toSorted, which is currently not flagged as a taint sink.
2024-11-12 12:01:51 +01:00
Napalys Klicius
6266dab518
Merge pull request #17951 from Napalys/napalys/reverse-support
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JS: Added support for reverse function
2024-11-12 10:09:18 +01:00
Napalys
00790bf3f4
Added change notes
2024-11-11 15:43:54 +01:00
Napalys Klicius
1eabb6cbdd
Update javascript/ql/test/experimental/Security/CWE-918/check-regex.js
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Co-authored-by: Erik Krogh Kristensen <erik-krogh@github.com >
2024-11-11 15:40:22 +01:00
Napalys Klicius
42f7f73ae1
Update ArrayInPlaceManipulationTaintStep documentation
2024-11-11 15:38:57 +01:00
Napalys
ae57c12b15
Added change notes
2024-11-11 10:38:14 +01:00
Napalys
82f09f1f8b
Updated TS version to 5.7.1-release candidate
2024-11-11 10:19:32 +01:00
Napalys
81bc7cd19f
Refactored SortTaintStep to ArrayInPlaceManipulationTaintStep to support both sort and reverse functions. Fixed newly added test case. from 8026a99db7
2024-11-11 08:32:03 +01:00
Napalys
1c298f0231
Added test case for Array.prototype.reverse, which is currently not flagged as a potential sink.
2024-11-11 08:32:02 +01:00
Napalys
f1c6dc1d9b
Moved SortTaintStep to more appropriate home TaintTracking->Arrays
2024-11-11 08:32:01 +01:00
Napalys
70cf1a57bc
Now catches usage of RegExp. after matchAll usage.
2024-11-08 08:59:31 +01:00
Napalys
c2baf0bd6d
Added test where RegExp. is used after matchAll but it not flagged as potential issue
2024-11-08 08:56:12 +01:00
Napalys
dbd57e3870
Fixed issue where TaintTracking was not catching matchAll vulnerability
2024-11-07 13:40:10 +01:00
Napalys
a4fe728af2
Added matchAll test which is not marked as vulnurability by CodeQL
2024-11-07 13:35:09 +01:00
Napalys
514375dbf9
Fixes false positives from commit 42600c93ff
2024-11-07 13:00:54 +01:00
Napalys
42600c93ff
Added tests which shows false positive SSRF via matchAll
2024-11-07 11:40:20 +01:00
Napalys
449cee91c8
Fixes false positives from commit 445552d3b53ec9592e8e3892cb337d1004b6a432
2024-11-07 10:33:13 +01:00
Napalys
4106663d89
Added tests for regex sanitization to identify false positives matchAll
2024-11-07 10:27:58 +01:00
Mikaël Barbero
881fe0ba57
fix: add "actions" tag to ActionsArtifactLeak
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Similar to javascript/ql/src/Security/CWE-094/ExpressionInjection.ql
2024-11-05 15:58:46 +01:00
Napalys Klicius
5e8b1b061f
Update javascript/ql/src/Security/CWE-020/MissingRegExpAnchor.ql
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Co-authored-by: Erik Krogh Kristensen <erik-krogh@github.com >
2024-11-05 10:29:22 +01:00
Napalys Klicius
7825a46085
Merge branch 'github:main' into napalys/matchAll-support
2024-11-05 09:31:30 +01:00
Napalys
b239bfabf1
Added tests forIncompleteHostnameRegExp and normalizedPaths using matchAll
2024-11-05 09:22:26 +01:00
Napalys
ccee34d6d3
Added support for matchAll in CWE-020 including new test cases
2024-11-05 08:51:24 +01:00
github-actions[bot]
f107d16b4e
Post-release preparation for codeql-cli-2.19.3
2024-11-04 17:20:08 +00:00
github-actions[bot]
cc7b724123
Release preparation for version 2.19.3
2024-11-04 16:37:28 +00:00
Rasmus Wriedt Larsen
c0ad9ba529
Merge branch 'main' into js-threat-models
2024-11-01 10:48:32 +01:00
Rasmus Wriedt Larsen
dc8e645594
JS: Convert remaining queries to use ActiveThreatModelSourceAsSource
2024-11-01 10:47:10 +01:00
Rasmus Wriedt Larsen
19fae76a94
JS: Remove dummy comment
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Co-authored-by: Asger F <asgerf@github.com >
2024-11-01 10:24:22 +01:00
Rasmus Wriedt Larsen
61e60de969
JS: Model readline as a stdin threat-model source
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Technically not always true, but my assumption is that +90% of the time
that's what it will be used for, so while we could be more precise by
adding a taint-step from the `input` part of the construction, I'm not
sure it's worth it in this case.
Furthermore, doing so would break with the current way we model
threat-model sources, and how sources are generally modeled in JS... so
for a very pretty setup it would require changing all the other `file`
threat-model sources to start at the constructors such as
`fs.createReadStream()` and have taint-propagation steps towards the
actual use (like we do in Python)...
I couldn't see an easy path forwards for doing this while keeping the
Concepts integration, so I opted for the simpler solution here.
2024-10-31 14:29:30 +01:00
Rasmus Wriedt Larsen
eca8bf5a35
JS: Do simple modeling of process.stdin as threat-model source
2024-10-31 14:26:45 +01:00
Rasmus Wriedt Larsen
34b86c39c1
JS: Model fs.promises.readFile as file source
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You could argue that proper modeling be done in the same way as
`NodeJSFileSystemAccessRead` is done for the callback based `fs` API (in
NodeJSLib.qll). However, that work is straying from the core goals I'm
working towards right now, so I'll argue that "perfect is the enemy of
good", and leave this as is for now.
2024-10-31 14:09:38 +01:00
Rasmus Wriedt Larsen
971f53870e
JS: Include fs externs
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Makes a difference due to the modeling of NodeJSFileSystemAccessRead depending on these, see
412e841d69/javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/frameworks/NodeJSLib.qll (L479-L488)7cef4322e7/javascript/externs/nodejs/fs.js
2024-10-31 13:51:22 +01:00
Rasmus Wriedt Larsen
b47fa77dc6
JS: Add tests for stdin threat-model sources
2024-10-31 12:59:21 +01:00
Rasmus Wriedt Larsen
2b6c27eb60
JS: Add initial file threat-model support
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However, as indicated by the `MISSING` annotations, we could do better.
2024-10-29 15:14:39 +01:00
Rasmus Wriedt Larsen
3656864695
JS: Add database threat-model source modeling
2024-10-29 15:11:09 +01:00
Tom Hvitved
1259b7e8e7
JS: Post-processing query for inline test expectations
2024-10-29 13:35:38 +01:00
Rasmus Wriedt Larsen
7c7420a9a4
JS: Add change-note
2024-10-29 11:35:56 +01:00
Rasmus Wriedt Larsen
84f6b89ced
JS: Minor improvements to threat-model Concepts
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Mirroring what was done for Python
2024-10-29 11:29:48 +01:00
Asger F
6aef571c17
JS: Bump extractor version string
2024-10-29 11:28:06 +01:00
Asger F
3cc6b11e6b
JS: Expand attribute regex to include some Vue attributes
2024-10-29 11:19:01 +01:00
Asger F
560b3da851
JS: Add test with some special Vue attributes
2024-10-29 11:18:17 +01:00
erik-krogh
2ee88f6774
fix the RAM setting on Windows
2024-10-28 20:39:34 +01:00
Rasmus Wriedt Larsen
1726287bf4
JS: Add e2e threat-model test
2024-10-25 15:03:44 +02:00
Rasmus Wriedt Larsen
d3ae4c930e
JS: Model newer yargs command-line parsing pattern
2024-10-25 15:03:43 +02:00
Rasmus Wriedt Larsen
3448751b4c
JS: Consolidate command-line argument modeling
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Such that we can reuse the existing modeling, but have it globally
applied as a threat-model as well.
I Basically just moved the modeling. One important aspect is that this
changes is that the previously query-specific `argsParseStep` is now a
globally applied taint-step. This seems reasonable, if someone applied
the argument parsing to any user-controlled string, it seems correct to
propagate that taint for _any_ query.
2024-10-25 15:03:43 +02:00
Rasmus Wriedt Larsen
412e841d69
JS: Add environment threat-model source
2024-10-25 15:03:43 +02:00
