JS: Add qhelp

javascript/ql/src/Security/CWE-400/PrototypePollution.qhelp

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+<!DOCTYPE qhelp PUBLIC
+"-//Semmle//qhelp//EN"
+"qhelp.dtd">
+<qhelp>
+
+<overview>
+	<p>
+    Most JavaScript objects inherit the properties of the built-in <code>Object.prototype</code> object.
+    If an attacker is be able to modify <code>Object.prototype</code>, they can tamper with the
+    application logic and often escalate to remote code execution or cross-site scripting.
+	</p>
+
+	<p>
+    One way to cause prototype pollution is through use of an unsafe <em>merge</em> or <em>extend</em> function
+    to recursively copy properties from an untrusted source object.
+    Such a call can modify any object reachable from the destination object, and
+    the built-in <code>Object.prototype</code> is usually reachable through the special properties
+    <code>__proto__</code> and <code>constructor.prototype</code>.
+    An attacker can abuse this by sending an object with these property names and thereby modify <code>Object.prototype</code>.
+	</p>
+</overview>
+
+<recommendation>
+	<p>
+    Update your library dependencies in order to use a safe version of the <em>merge</em> or <em>extend</em> function.
+    If you library has no fixed version, switch to another library.
+	</p>
+</recommendation>
+
+<example>
+	<p>
+    In the example below, the untrusted value <code>req.query.prefs</code> is parsed as JSON
+    and then copied into a new object:
+	</p>
+
+  <sample src="examples/PrototypePollution1.js"/>
+
+	<p>
+    Prior to lodash 4.17.11 this would be vulnerable to prototype pollution. An attacker could send
+    the value <code>{"constructor": {"prototype": {"xxx": true}}}</code> to inject <code>xxx</code>
+    in <code>Object.prototype</code>.
+    Fix this by updating the lodash version:
+  </p>
+
+  <sample src="examples/PrototypePollution_fixed.json"/>
+
+  <p>
+    Note that some web frameworks, such as Express, parse query parameters using extended URL-encoding
+    by default.
+    In this case, the application may be vulnerable even if not using <code>JSON.parse</code>.
+    The example below would also be susceptible to prototype pollution:
+  </p>
+
+  <sample src="examples/PrototypePollution2.js"/>
+</example>
+
+<references>
+	<li>Prototype pollution attacks:
+		<a href="https://hackerone.com/reports/380873">lodash</a>,
+    <a href="https://hackerone.com/reports/454365">jQuery</a>,
+    <a href="https://hackerone.com/reports/381185">extend</a>,
+    <a href="https://hackerone.com/reports/430291">just-extend</a>,
+    <a href="https://hackerone.com/reports/381194">merge.recursive</a>,
+	</li>
+	<li>Express:
+		<a href="https://expressjs.com/en/api.html#express.urlencoded">urlencoded()</a>
+	</li>
+</references>
+</qhelp>

javascript/ql/src/Security/CWE-400/examples/PrototypePollution1.js

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+app.get('/news', (req, res) => {
+  let prefs = lodash.merge({}, JSON.parse(req.query.prefs));
+})

javascript/ql/src/Security/CWE-400/examples/PrototypePollution2.js

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+app.get('/news', (req, res) => {
+  let prefs = lodash.merge({}, {
+    topic: req.query.topic
+  });
+})

javascript/ql/src/Security/CWE-400/examples/PrototypePollution_fixed.json

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+{
+  "dependencies": {
+    "lodash": "^4.17.11"
+  }
+}