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Merge pull request #10223 from atorralba/atorralba/unsafe-content-resolver
Java: New Android query to detect unsafe content URI resolution
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@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
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/** Provides classes to reason about vulnerabilites related to content URIs. */
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import java
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private import semmle.code.java.dataflow.TaintTracking
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private import semmle.code.java.frameworks.android.Android
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private import semmle.code.java.security.PathSanitizer
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/** A URI that gets resolved by a `ContentResolver`. */
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abstract class ContentUriResolutionSink extends DataFlow::Node { }
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/** A sanitizer for content URIs. */
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abstract class ContentUriResolutionSanitizer extends DataFlow::Node { }
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/**
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* A unit class for adding additional taint steps to configurations related to
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* content URI resolution vulnerabilities.
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*/
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class ContentUriResolutionAdditionalTaintStep extends Unit {
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/** Holds if the step from `node1` to `node2` should be considered an additional taint step. */
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abstract predicate step(DataFlow::Node node1, DataFlow::Node node2);
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}
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/** The URI argument of a call to a `ContentResolver` URI-opening method. */
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private class DefaultContentUriResolutionSink extends ContentUriResolutionSink {
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DefaultContentUriResolutionSink() {
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exists(MethodAccess ma |
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ma.getMethod() instanceof UriOpeningContentResolverMethod and
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this.asExpr() = ma.getAnArgument() and
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this.getType().(RefType).hasQualifiedName("android.net", "Uri")
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)
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}
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}
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/** A `ContentResolver` method that resolves a URI. */
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private class UriOpeningContentResolverMethod extends Method {
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UriOpeningContentResolverMethod() {
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this.hasName([
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"openInputStream", "openOutputStream", "openAssetFile", "openAssetFileDescriptor",
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"openFile", "openFileDescriptor", "openTypedAssetFile", "openTypedAssetFileDescriptor",
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]) and
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this.getDeclaringType() instanceof AndroidContentResolver
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}
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}
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private class UninterestingTypeSanitizer extends ContentUriResolutionSanitizer {
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UninterestingTypeSanitizer() {
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this.getType() instanceof BoxedType or
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this.getType() instanceof PrimitiveType or
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this.getType() instanceof NumberType
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}
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}
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private class PathSanitizer extends ContentUriResolutionSanitizer instanceof PathInjectionSanitizer {
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}
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private class FilenameOnlySanitizer extends ContentUriResolutionSanitizer {
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FilenameOnlySanitizer() {
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exists(Method m | this.asExpr().(MethodAccess).getMethod() = m |
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m.hasQualifiedName("java.io", "File", "getName") or
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m.hasQualifiedName("kotlin.io", "FilesKt", ["getNameWithoutExtension", "getExtension"]) or
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m.hasQualifiedName("org.apache.commons.io", "FilenameUtils", "getName")
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)
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}
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}
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/**
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* A `ContentUriResolutionSink` that flows to an image-decoding function.
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* Such functions raise exceptions when the input is not a valid image,
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* which prevents accessing arbitrary non-image files.
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*/
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private class DecodedAsAnImageSanitizer extends ContentUriResolutionSanitizer {
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DecodedAsAnImageSanitizer() {
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exists(Argument decodeArg, MethodAccess decode |
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decode.getArgument(0) = decodeArg and
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decode
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.getMethod()
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.hasQualifiedName("android.graphics", "BitmapFactory",
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[
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"decodeByteArray", "decodeFile", "decodeFileDescriptor", "decodeResource",
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"decodeStream"
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])
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TaintTracking::localExprTaint(this.(ContentUriResolutionSink).asExpr().(Argument).getCall(),
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decodeArg)
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)
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}
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
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/** Provides taint tracking configurations to be used in unsafe content URI resolution queries. */
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import java
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import semmle.code.java.dataflow.ExternalFlow
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import semmle.code.java.dataflow.FlowSources
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import semmle.code.java.dataflow.TaintTracking
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import semmle.code.java.security.UnsafeContentUriResolution
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/** A taint-tracking configuration to find paths from remote sources to content URI resolutions. */
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class UnsafeContentResolutionConf extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
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UnsafeContentResolutionConf() { this = "UnsafeContentResolutionConf" }
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override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
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override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof ContentUriResolutionSink }
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override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node sanitizer) {
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sanitizer instanceof ContentUriResolutionSanitizer
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}
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override predicate isAdditionalTaintStep(DataFlow::Node node1, DataFlow::Node node2) {
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any(ContentUriResolutionAdditionalTaintStep s).step(node1, node2)
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}
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}
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