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[DIFF-INFORMED] Actions: EnvPathInjection

Browse Source 
https://github.com/d10c/codeql/blob/d10c/diff-informed-phase-3/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionMedium.ql#L30
https://github.com/d10c/codeql/blob/d10c/diff-informed-phase-3/actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionCritical.ql#L37
This commit is contained in:
Nora Dimitrijević
2025-07-15 15:21:37 +02:00
parent f1b995a736
commit f1445eb52f
2 changed files with 33 additions and 8 deletions
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31
actions/ql/lib/codeql/actions/security/EnvPathInjectionQuery.qll
View File

@@ -72,6 +72,25 @@ class EnvPathInjectionFromMaDSink extends EnvPathInjectionSink {
EnvPathInjectionFromMaDSink() { madSink(this, "envpath-injection") } EnvPathInjectionFromMaDSink() { madSink(this, "envpath-injection") }
} }
/**
* Get the relevant event for a sink in EnvPathInjectionCritical.ql where the source type is "artifact".
*/
Event getRelevantArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(DataFlow::Node sink) {
inPrivilegedContext(sink.asExpr(), result) and
not exists(ControlCheck check |
check.protects(sink.asExpr(), result, ["untrusted-checkout", "artifact-poisoning"])
) and
sink instanceof EnvPathInjectionFromFileReadSink
}
/**
* Get the relevant event for a sink in EnvPathInjectionCritical.ql where the source type is not "artifact".
*/
Event getRelevantNonArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(DataFlow::Node sink) {
inPrivilegedContext(sink.asExpr(), result) and
not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(sink.asExpr(), result, "code-injection"))
}
/** /**
* A taint-tracking configuration for unsafe user input * A taint-tracking configuration for unsafe user input
* that is used to construct and evaluate an environment variable. * that is used to construct and evaluate an environment variable.
@@ -108,6 +127,18 @@ private module EnvPathInjectionConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
exists(run.getScript().getAFileReadCommand()) exists(run.getScript().getAFileReadCommand())
) )
} }
predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node source) { none() }
Location getASelectedSinkLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) {
result = sink.getLocation()
or
result = getRelevantArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(sink).getLocation()
or
result = getRelevantNonArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(sink).getLocation()
}
} }
/** Tracks flow of unsafe user input that is used to construct and evaluate the PATH environment variable. */ /** Tracks flow of unsafe user input that is used to construct and evaluate the PATH environment variable. */

10
actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionCritical.ql
View File

@@ -21,18 +21,12 @@ import codeql.actions.security.ControlChecks
from EnvPathInjectionFlow::PathNode source, EnvPathInjectionFlow::PathNode sink, Event event from EnvPathInjectionFlow::PathNode source, EnvPathInjectionFlow::PathNode sink, Event event
where where
EnvPathInjectionFlow::flowPath(source, sink) and EnvPathInjectionFlow::flowPath(source, sink) and
inPrivilegedContext(sink.getNode().asExpr(), event) and
( (
not source.getNode().(RemoteFlowSource).getSourceType() = "artifact" and not source.getNode().(RemoteFlowSource).getSourceType() = "artifact" and
not exists(ControlCheck check | event = getRelevantNonArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(sink.getNode())
check.protects(sink.getNode().asExpr(), event, "code-injection")
)
or or
source.getNode().(RemoteFlowSource).getSourceType() = "artifact" and source.getNode().(RemoteFlowSource).getSourceType() = "artifact" and
not exists(ControlCheck check | event = getRelevantArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(sink.getNode())
check.protects(sink.getNode().asExpr(), event, ["untrusted-checkout", "artifact-poisoning"])
) and
sink.getNode() instanceof EnvPathInjectionFromFileReadSink
) )
select sink.getNode(), source, sink, select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
"Potential PATH environment variable injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@).", "Potential PATH environment variable injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@).",