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Merge pull request #6162 from smowton/smowton/feature/jax-rs-content-type-sensitivity-fixes
Jax-RS: implement content-type tracking
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@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ class XSSConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
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override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) { node instanceof XssSanitizer }
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override predicate isSanitizerOut(DataFlow::Node node) { node instanceof XssSinkBarrier }
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override predicate isAdditionalTaintStep(DataFlow::Node node1, DataFlow::Node node2) {
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any(XssAdditionalTaintStep s).step(node1, node2)
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}
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@@ -283,6 +283,23 @@ class MessageBodyReaderRead extends Method {
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}
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}
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/**
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* Gets a constant content-type described by expression `e` (either a string constant or a Jax-RS MediaType field access).
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*/
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string getContentTypeString(Expr e) {
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result = e.(CompileTimeConstantExpr).getStringValue() and
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result != ""
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or
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exists(Field jaxMediaType |
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// Accesses to static fields on `MediaType` class do not have constant strings in the database
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// so convert the field name to a content type string
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jaxMediaType.getDeclaringType().hasQualifiedName(getAJaxRsPackage("core"), "MediaType") and
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jaxMediaType.getAnAccess() = e and
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// e.g. MediaType.TEXT_PLAIN => text/plain
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result = jaxMediaType.getName().toLowerCase().replaceAll("_value", "").replaceAll("_", "/")
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)
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}
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/** An `@Produces` annotation that describes which content types can be produced by this resource. */
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class JaxRSProducesAnnotation extends JaxRSAnnotation {
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JaxRSProducesAnnotation() { this.getType().hasQualifiedName(getAJaxRsPackage(), "Produces") }
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@@ -290,17 +307,10 @@ class JaxRSProducesAnnotation extends JaxRSAnnotation {
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/**
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* Gets a declared content type that can be produced by this resource.
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*/
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string getADeclaredContentType() {
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result = this.getAValue().(CompileTimeConstantExpr).getStringValue()
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Expr getADeclaredContentTypeExpr() {
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result = this.getAValue() and not result instanceof ArrayInit
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or
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exists(Field jaxMediaType |
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// Accesses to static fields on `MediaType` class do not have constant strings in the database
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// so convert the field name to a content type string
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jaxMediaType.getDeclaringType().hasQualifiedName(getAJaxRsPackage("core"), "MediaType") and
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jaxMediaType.getAnAccess() = this.getAValue() and
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// e.g. MediaType.TEXT_PLAIN => text/plain
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result = jaxMediaType.getName().toLowerCase().replaceAll("_", "/")
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)
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result = this.getAValue().(ArrayInit).getAnInit()
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}
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}
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@@ -319,7 +329,9 @@ private class JaxRSXssSink extends XssSink {
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not exists(resourceMethod.getProducesAnnotation())
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or
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resourceMethod.getProducesAnnotation().getADeclaredContentType() = "text/plain"
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isXssVulnerableContentType(getContentTypeString(resourceMethod
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.getProducesAnnotation()
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.getADeclaredContentTypeExpr()))
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)
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}
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}
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@@ -796,3 +808,150 @@ private class JaxRsUrlOpenSink extends SinkModelCsv {
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]
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}
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}
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private predicate isXssVulnerableContentTypeExpr(Expr e) {
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isXssVulnerableContentType(getContentTypeString(e))
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}
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private predicate isXssSafeContentTypeExpr(Expr e) { isXssSafeContentType(getContentTypeString(e)) }
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/**
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* Gets a builder expression or related type that is configured to use the given `contentType`.
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*
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* This could be an instance of `Response.ResponseBuilder`, `Variant`, `Variant.VariantListBuilder` or
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* a `List<Variant>`.
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*
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* This predicate is used to search forwards for response entities set after the content-type is configured.
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* It does not need to consider cases where the entity is set in the same call, or the entity has already
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* been set: these are handled by simple sanitization below.
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*/
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private DataFlow::Node getABuilderWithExplicitContentType(Expr contentType) {
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// Base case: ResponseBuilder.type(contentType)
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result.asExpr() =
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any(MethodAccess ma |
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ma.getCallee().hasQualifiedName(getAJaxRsPackage("core"), "Response$ResponseBuilder", "type") and
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contentType = ma.getArgument(0)
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)
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or
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// Base case: new Variant(contentType, ...)
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result.asExpr() =
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any(ClassInstanceExpr cie |
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cie.getConstructedType().hasQualifiedName(getAJaxRsPackage("core"), "Variant") and
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contentType = cie.getArgument(0)
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)
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or
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// Base case: Variant[.VariantListBuilder].mediaTypes(...)
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result.asExpr() =
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any(MethodAccess ma |
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ma.getCallee()
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.hasQualifiedName(getAJaxRsPackage("core"), ["Variant", "Variant$VariantListBuilder"],
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"mediaTypes") and
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contentType = ma.getAnArgument()
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)
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or
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// Recursive case: propagate through variant list building:
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result.asExpr() =
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any(MethodAccess ma |
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(
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ma.getType()
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.(RefType)
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.hasQualifiedName(getAJaxRsPackage("core"), "Variant$VariantListBuilder")
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or
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ma.getMethod()
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.hasQualifiedName(getAJaxRsPackage("core"), "Variant$VariantListBuilder", "build")
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) and
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[ma.getAnArgument(), ma.getQualifier()] =
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getABuilderWithExplicitContentType(contentType).asExpr()
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)
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or
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// Recursive case: propagate through a List.get operation
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result.asExpr() =
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any(MethodAccess ma |
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ma.getMethod().hasQualifiedName("java.util", "List<Variant>", "get") and
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ma.getQualifier() = getABuilderWithExplicitContentType(contentType).asExpr()
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)
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or
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// Recursive case: propagate through Response.ResponseBuilder operations, including the `variant(...)` operation.
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result.asExpr() =
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any(MethodAccess ma |
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ma.getType().(RefType).hasQualifiedName(getAJaxRsPackage("core"), "Response$ResponseBuilder") and
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[ma.getQualifier(), ma.getArgument(0)] =
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getABuilderWithExplicitContentType(contentType).asExpr()
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)
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or
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// Recursive case: ordinary local dataflow
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DataFlow::localFlowStep(getABuilderWithExplicitContentType(contentType), result)
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}
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private DataFlow::Node getASanitizedBuilder() {
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result = getABuilderWithExplicitContentType(any(Expr e | isXssSafeContentTypeExpr(e)))
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}
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private DataFlow::Node getAVulnerableBuilder() {
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result = getABuilderWithExplicitContentType(any(Expr e | isXssVulnerableContentTypeExpr(e)))
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}
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/**
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* A response builder sanitized by setting a safe content type.
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*
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* The content type could be set before the `entity(...)` call that needs sanitizing
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* (e.g. `Response.ok().type("application/json").entity(sanitizeMe)`)
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* or at the same time (e.g. `Response.ok(sanitizeMe, "application/json")`
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* or the content-type could be set afterwards (e.g. `Response.ok().entity(userControlled).type("application/json")`)
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*
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* This differs from `getASanitizedBuilder` in that we also include functions that must set the entity
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* at the same time, or the entity must already have been set, so propagating forwards to sanitize future
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* build steps is not necessary.
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*/
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private class SanitizedResponseBuilder extends XssSanitizer {
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SanitizedResponseBuilder() {
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// e.g. sanitizeMe.type("application/json")
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this = getASanitizedBuilder()
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or
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this.asExpr() =
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any(MethodAccess ma |
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ma.getMethod().hasQualifiedName(getAJaxRsPackage("core"), "Response", "ok") and
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(
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// e.g. Response.ok(sanitizeMe, new Variant("application/json", ...))
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ma.getArgument(1) = getASanitizedBuilder().asExpr()
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or
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// e.g. Response.ok(sanitizeMe, "application/json")
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isXssSafeContentTypeExpr(ma.getArgument(1))
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)
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)
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}
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}
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/**
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* An entity call that serves as a sink and barrier because it has a vulnerable content-type set.
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*
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* We flag these as direct sinks because otherwise it may be sanitized when it reaches a resource
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* method with a safe-looking `@Produces` annotation. They are barriers because otherwise if the
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* resource method does *not* have a safe-looking `@Produces` annotation then it would be doubly
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* reported, once at the `entity(...)` call and once on return from the resource method.
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*/
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private class VulnerableEntity extends XssSinkBarrier {
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VulnerableEntity() {
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this.asExpr() =
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any(MethodAccess ma |
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(
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// Vulnerable content-type already set:
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ma.getQualifier() = getAVulnerableBuilder().asExpr()
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or
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// Vulnerable content-type set in the future:
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getAVulnerableBuilder().asExpr().(MethodAccess).getQualifier*() = ma
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) and
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ma.getMethod().hasName("entity")
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).getArgument(0)
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or
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this.asExpr() =
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any(MethodAccess ma |
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(
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isXssVulnerableContentTypeExpr(ma.getArgument(1))
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or
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ma.getArgument(1) = getAVulnerableBuilder().asExpr()
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) and
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ma.getMethod().hasName("ok")
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).getArgument(0)
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}
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}
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@@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ abstract class XssSink extends DataFlow::Node { }
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/** A sanitizer that neutralizes dangerous characters that can be used to perform a XSS attack. */
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abstract class XssSanitizer extends DataFlow::Node { }
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/**
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* A sink that represent a method that outputs data without applying contextual output encoding,
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* and which should truncate flow paths such that downstream sinks are not flagged as well.
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*/
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abstract class XssSinkBarrier extends XssSink { }
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/**
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* A unit class for adding additional taint steps.
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*
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@@ -132,3 +138,20 @@ class ServletWriterSource extends MethodAccess {
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)
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}
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}
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/**
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* Holds if `s` is an HTTP Content-Type vulnerable to XSS.
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*/
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bindingset[s]
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predicate isXssVulnerableContentType(string s) {
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s.regexpMatch("(?i)text/(html|xml|xsl|rdf|vtt|cache-manifest).*") or
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s.regexpMatch("(?i)application/(.*\\+)?xml.*") or
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s.regexpMatch("(?i)cache-manifest.*") or
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s.regexpMatch("(?i)image/svg\\+xml.*")
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}
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/**
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* Holds if `s` is an HTTP Content-Type that is not vulnerable to XSS.
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*/
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bindingset[s]
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predicate isXssSafeContentType(string s) { not isXssVulnerableContentType(s) }
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