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https://github.com/github/codeql.git
synced 2026-04-30 11:15:13 +02:00
Move the definitions of isEffectiveSink and getAReasonSinkExcluded to the base class.
They can now be implemented generically for all sink types.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
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private import javascript as JS
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import EndpointTypes
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import EndpointCharacteristics
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import EndpointCharacteristics as EndpointCharacteristics
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/**
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* EXPERIMENTAL. This API may change in the future.
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@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ abstract class AtmConfig extends string {
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final predicate isKnownSink(JS::DataFlow::Node sink) {
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// If the list of characteristics includes positive indicators with maximal confidence for this class, then it's a
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// known sink for the class.
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exists(EndpointCharacteristic characteristic |
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exists(EndpointCharacteristics::EndpointCharacteristic characteristic |
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characteristic.getEndpoints(sink) and
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characteristic
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.getImplications(this.getASinkEndpointType(), true, characteristic.maximalConfidence())
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@@ -69,7 +69,26 @@ abstract class AtmConfig extends string {
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* Holds if the candidate sink `candidateSink` predicted by the machine learning model should be
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* an effective sink, i.e. one considered as a possible sink of flow in the boosted query.
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*/
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predicate isEffectiveSink(JS::DataFlow::Node candidateSink) { none() }
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final predicate isEffectiveSink(JS::DataFlow::Node candidateSink) {
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not exists(getAReasonSinkExcluded(candidateSink))
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}
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final EndpointCharacteristics::EndpointCharacteristic getAReasonSinkExcluded(
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JS::DataFlow::Node candidateSink
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) {
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// An endpoint is an effective sink if it has neither standard endpoint filter characteristics nor endpoint filter
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// characteristics that are specific to this sink type.
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exists(EndpointCharacteristics::StandardEndpointFilterCharacteristic standardFilter |
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standardFilter.getEndpoints(candidateSink) and
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result = standardFilter
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)
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or
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exists(EndpointCharacteristics::EndpointFilterCharacteristic specificFilter |
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specificFilter.getEndpoints(candidateSink) and
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specificFilter.getImplications(getASinkEndpointType(), false, _) and
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result = specificFilter
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)
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}
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/**
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* EXPERIMENTAL. This API may change in the future.
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@@ -11,81 +11,6 @@ import AdaptiveThreatModeling
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private import CoreKnowledge as CoreKnowledge
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private import StandardEndpointFilters as StandardEndpointFilters
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module SinkEndpointFilter {
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/**
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* Provides a set of reasons why a given data flow node should be excluded as a sink candidate.
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*
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* If this predicate has no results for a sink candidate `n`, then we should treat `n` as an
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* effective sink.
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*/
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string getAReasonSinkExcluded(DataFlow::Node sinkCandidate) {
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result = StandardEndpointFilters::getAReasonSinkExcluded(sinkCandidate)
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or
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exists(DataFlow::CallNode call | sinkCandidate = call.getAnArgument() |
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// additional databases accesses that aren't modeled yet
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call.(DataFlow::MethodCallNode).getMethodName() =
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["create", "createCollection", "createIndexes"] and
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result = "matches database access call heuristic"
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or
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// Remove modeled sinks
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CoreKnowledge::isArgumentToKnownLibrarySinkFunction(sinkCandidate) and
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result = "modeled sink"
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or
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// Remove common kinds of unlikely sinks
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CoreKnowledge::isKnownStepSrc(sinkCandidate) and
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result = "predecessor in a modeled flow step"
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or
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// Remove modeled database calls. Arguments to modeled calls are very likely to be modeled
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// as sinks if they are true positives. Therefore arguments that are not modeled as sinks
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// are unlikely to be true positives.
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call instanceof DatabaseAccess and
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result = "modeled database access"
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or
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// Remove calls to APIs that aren't relevant to NoSQL injection
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call.getReceiver() instanceof Http::RequestNode and
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result = "receiver is a HTTP request expression"
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or
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call.getReceiver() instanceof Http::ResponseNode and
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result = "receiver is a HTTP response expression"
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)
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or
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// Require NoSQL injection sink candidates to be (a) direct arguments to external library calls
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// or (b) heuristic sinks for NoSQL injection.
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//
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// ## Direct arguments to external library calls
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//
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// The `StandardEndpointFilters::flowsToArgumentOfLikelyExternalLibraryCall` endpoint filter
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// allows sink candidates which are within object literals or array literals, for example
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// `req.sendFile(_, { path: ENDPOINT })`.
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//
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// However, the NoSQL injection query deals differently with these types of sinks compared to
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// other security queries. Other security queries such as SQL injection tend to treat
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// `ENDPOINT` as the ground truth sink, but the NoSQL injection query instead treats
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// `{ path: ENDPOINT }` as the ground truth sink and defines an additional flow step to ensure
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// data flows from `ENDPOINT` to the ground truth sink `{ path: ENDPOINT }`.
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//
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// Therefore for the NoSQL injection boosted query, we must ignore sink candidates within object
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// literals or array literals, to avoid having multiple alerts for the same security
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// vulnerability (one FP where the sink is `ENDPOINT` and one TP where the sink is
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// `{ path: ENDPOINT }`). We accomplish this by directly testing that the sink candidate is an
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// argument of a likely external library call.
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//
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// ## Heuristic sinks
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//
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// We also allow heuristic sinks in addition to direct arguments to external library calls.
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// These are copied from the `HeuristicNosqlInjectionSink` class defined within
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// `codeql/javascript/ql/src/semmle/javascript/heuristics/AdditionalSinks.qll`.
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// We can't reuse the class because importing that file would cause us to treat these
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// heuristic sinks as known sinks.
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not sinkCandidate = StandardEndpointFilters::getALikelyExternalLibraryCall().getAnArgument() and
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not (
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isAssignedToOrConcatenatedWith(sinkCandidate, "(?i)(nosql|query)") or
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isArgTo(sinkCandidate, "(?i)(query)")
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) and
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result = "not a direct argument to a likely external library call or a heuristic sink"
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}
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}
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class NosqlInjectionAtmConfig extends AtmConfig {
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NosqlInjectionAtmConfig() { this = "NosqlInjectionATMConfig" }
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@@ -93,10 +18,6 @@ class NosqlInjectionAtmConfig extends AtmConfig {
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source instanceof NosqlInjection::Source or TaintedObject::isSource(source, _)
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}
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override predicate isEffectiveSink(DataFlow::Node sinkCandidate) {
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not exists(SinkEndpointFilter::getAReasonSinkExcluded(sinkCandidate))
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}
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override EndpointType getASinkEndpointType() { result instanceof NosqlInjectionSinkType }
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}
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@@ -10,65 +10,11 @@ import AdaptiveThreatModeling
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import CoreKnowledge as CoreKnowledge
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import StandardEndpointFilters as StandardEndpointFilters
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/**
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* This module provides logic to filter candidate sinks to those which are likely SQL injection
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* sinks.
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*/
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module SinkEndpointFilter {
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private import javascript
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private import SQL
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/**
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* Provides a set of reasons why a given data flow node should be excluded as a sink candidate.
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*
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* If this predicate has no results for a sink candidate `n`, then we should treat `n` as an
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* effective sink.
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*/
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string getAReasonSinkExcluded(DataFlow::Node sinkCandidate) {
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result = StandardEndpointFilters::getAReasonSinkExcluded(sinkCandidate)
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or
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exists(DataFlow::CallNode call | sinkCandidate = call.getAnArgument() |
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// prepared statements for SQL
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any(DataFlow::CallNode cn | cn.getCalleeName() = "prepare")
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.getAMethodCall("run")
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.getAnArgument() = sinkCandidate and
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result = "prepared SQL statement"
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or
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sinkCandidate instanceof DataFlow::ArrayCreationNode and
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result = "array creation"
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or
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// UI is unrelated to SQL
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call.getCalleeName().regexpMatch("(?i).*(render|html).*") and
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result = "HTML / rendering"
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)
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or
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// Require SQL injection sink candidates to be (a) arguments to external library calls
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// (possibly indirectly), or (b) heuristic sinks.
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//
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// Heuristic sinks are copied from the `HeuristicSqlInjectionSink` class defined within
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// `codeql/javascript/ql/src/semmle/javascript/heuristics/AdditionalSinks.qll`.
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// We can't reuse the class because importing that file would cause us to treat these
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// heuristic sinks as known sinks.
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not StandardEndpointFilters::flowsToArgumentOfLikelyExternalLibraryCall(sinkCandidate) and
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not (
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isAssignedToOrConcatenatedWith(sinkCandidate, "(?i)(sql|query)") or
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isArgTo(sinkCandidate, "(?i)(query)") or
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isConcatenatedWithString(sinkCandidate,
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"(?s).*(ALTER|COUNT|CREATE|DATABASE|DELETE|DISTINCT|DROP|FROM|GROUP|INSERT|INTO|LIMIT|ORDER|SELECT|TABLE|UPDATE|WHERE).*")
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) and
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result = "not an argument to a likely external library call or a heuristic sink"
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}
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}
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class SqlInjectionAtmConfig extends AtmConfig {
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SqlInjectionAtmConfig() { this = "SqlInjectionATMConfig" }
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override predicate isKnownSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof SqlInjection::Source }
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override predicate isEffectiveSink(DataFlow::Node sinkCandidate) {
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not exists(SinkEndpointFilter::getAReasonSinkExcluded(sinkCandidate))
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}
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override EndpointType getASinkEndpointType() { result instanceof SqlInjectionSinkType }
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}
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@@ -12,14 +12,6 @@ private import semmle.javascript.heuristics.SyntacticHeuristics
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private import CoreKnowledge as CoreKnowledge
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import EndpointCharacteristics as EndpointCharacteristics
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/** Provides a set of reasons why a given data flow node should be excluded as a sink candidate. */
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string getAReasonSinkExcluded(DataFlow::Node n) {
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exists(EndpointCharacteristics::StandardEndpointFilterCharacteristic characteristic |
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characteristic.getEndpoints(n) and
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result = characteristic
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)
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}
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/**
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* Holds if the node `n` is an argument to a function that has a manual model.
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*/
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@@ -77,7 +69,7 @@ private DataFlow::SourceNode getACallback(DataFlow::ParameterNode p, DataFlow::T
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* Get calls for which we do not have the callee (i.e. the definition of the called function). This
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* acts as a heuristic for identifying calls to external library functions.
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*/
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private DataFlow::CallNode getACallWithoutCallee() {
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DataFlow::CallNode getACallWithoutCallee() {
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forall(Function callee | callee = result.getACallee() | callee.getTopLevel().isExterns()) and
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not exists(DataFlow::ParameterNode param, DataFlow::FunctionNode callback |
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param.flowsTo(result.getCalleeNode()) and
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@@ -10,64 +10,11 @@ import AdaptiveThreatModeling
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import CoreKnowledge as CoreKnowledge
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import StandardEndpointFilters as StandardEndpointFilters
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/**
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* This module provides logic to filter candidate sinks to those which are likely path injection
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* sinks.
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*/
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module SinkEndpointFilter {
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private import javascript
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private import TaintedPath
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/**
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* Provides a set of reasons why a given data flow node should be excluded as a sink candidate.
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*
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* If this predicate has no results for a sink candidate `n`, then we should treat `n` as an
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* effective sink.
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*/
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string getAReasonSinkExcluded(DataFlow::Node sinkCandidate) {
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result = StandardEndpointFilters::getAReasonSinkExcluded(sinkCandidate)
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or
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// Require path injection sink candidates to be (a) arguments to external library calls
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// (possibly indirectly), or (b) heuristic sinks.
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//
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// Heuristic sinks are mostly copied from the `HeuristicTaintedPathSink` class defined within
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// `codeql/javascript/ql/src/semmle/javascript/heuristics/AdditionalSinks.qll`.
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// We can't reuse the class because importing that file would cause us to treat these
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// heuristic sinks as known sinks.
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not StandardEndpointFilters::flowsToArgumentOfLikelyExternalLibraryCall(sinkCandidate) and
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not (
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isAssignedToOrConcatenatedWith(sinkCandidate, "(?i)(file|folder|dir|absolute)")
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or
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isArgTo(sinkCandidate, "(?i)(get|read)file")
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or
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exists(string pathPattern |
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// paths with at least two parts, and either a trailing or leading slash
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pathPattern = "(?i)([a-z0-9_.-]+/){2,}" or
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pathPattern = "(?i)(/[a-z0-9_.-]+){2,}"
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|
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isConcatenatedWithString(sinkCandidate, pathPattern)
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)
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or
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isConcatenatedWithStrings(".*/", sinkCandidate, "/.*")
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or
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// In addition to the names from `HeuristicTaintedPathSink` in the
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// `isAssignedToOrConcatenatedWith` predicate call above, we also allow the noisier "path"
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// name.
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isAssignedToOrConcatenatedWith(sinkCandidate, "(?i)path")
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) and
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result = "not a direct argument to a likely external library call or a heuristic sink"
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}
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}
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class TaintedPathAtmConfig extends AtmConfig {
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TaintedPathAtmConfig() { this = "TaintedPathATMConfig" }
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override predicate isKnownSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof TaintedPath::Source }
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override predicate isEffectiveSink(DataFlow::Node sinkCandidate) {
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not exists(SinkEndpointFilter::getAReasonSinkExcluded(sinkCandidate))
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}
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override EndpointType getASinkEndpointType() { result instanceof TaintedPathSinkType }
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}
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@@ -10,65 +10,11 @@ import AdaptiveThreatModeling
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import CoreKnowledge as CoreKnowledge
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import StandardEndpointFilters as StandardEndpointFilters
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/**
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* This module provides logic to filter candidate sinks to those which are likely XSS sinks.
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*/
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module SinkEndpointFilter {
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private import javascript
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private import DomBasedXss
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/**
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* Provides a set of reasons why a given data flow node should be excluded as a sink candidate.
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*
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* If this predicate has no results for a sink candidate `n`, then we should treat `n` as an
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* effective sink.
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*/
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string getAReasonSinkExcluded(DataFlow::Node sinkCandidate) {
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result = StandardEndpointFilters::getAReasonSinkExcluded(sinkCandidate)
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or
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exists(DataFlow::CallNode call | sinkCandidate = call.getAnArgument() |
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call.getCalleeName() = "setState"
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) and
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result = "setState calls ought to be safe in react applications"
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or
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// Require XSS sink candidates to be (a) arguments to external library calls (possibly
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// indirectly), or (b) heuristic sinks.
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//
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// Heuristic sinks are copied from the `HeuristicDomBasedXssSink` class defined within
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// `codeql/javascript/ql/src/semmle/javascript/heuristics/AdditionalSinks.qll`.
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// We can't reuse the class because importing that file would cause us to treat these
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// heuristic sinks as known sinks.
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not StandardEndpointFilters::flowsToArgumentOfLikelyExternalLibraryCall(sinkCandidate) and
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not (
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isAssignedToOrConcatenatedWith(sinkCandidate, "(?i)(html|innerhtml)")
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or
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isArgTo(sinkCandidate, "(?i)(html|render)")
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or
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sinkCandidate instanceof StringOps::HtmlConcatenationLeaf
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or
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isConcatenatedWithStrings("(?is).*<[a-z ]+.*", sinkCandidate, "(?s).*>.*")
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or
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// In addition to the heuristic sinks from `HeuristicDomBasedXssSink`, explicitly allow
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// property writes like `elem.innerHTML = <TAINT>` that may not be picked up as HTML
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// concatenation leaves.
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exists(DataFlow::PropWrite pw |
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pw.getPropertyName().regexpMatch("(?i).*html*") and
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pw.getRhs() = sinkCandidate
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)
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) and
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result = "not a direct argument to a likely external library call or a heuristic sink"
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}
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}
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class DomBasedXssAtmConfig extends AtmConfig {
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DomBasedXssAtmConfig() { this = "DomBasedXssATMConfig" }
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override predicate isKnownSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof DomBasedXss::Source }
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override predicate isEffectiveSink(DataFlow::Node sinkCandidate) {
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not exists(SinkEndpointFilter::getAReasonSinkExcluded(sinkCandidate))
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}
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override EndpointType getASinkEndpointType() { result instanceof XssSinkType }
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}
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@@ -12,19 +12,23 @@
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import javascript
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import experimental.adaptivethreatmodeling.ATMConfig
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import extraction.ExtractEndpointDataTraining
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private import experimental.adaptivethreatmodeling.NosqlInjectionATM as NosqlInjectionAtm
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private import experimental.adaptivethreatmodeling.SqlInjectionATM as SqlInjectionAtm
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private import experimental.adaptivethreatmodeling.TaintedPathATM as TaintedPathAtm
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private import experimental.adaptivethreatmodeling.XssATM as XssAtm
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string getAReasonSinkExcluded(DataFlow::Node sinkCandidate, Query query) {
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query instanceof NosqlInjectionQuery and
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result = NosqlInjectionAtm::SinkEndpointFilter::getAReasonSinkExcluded(sinkCandidate)
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result = any(NosqlInjectionAtm::NosqlInjectionAtmConfig cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(sinkCandidate)
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or
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query instanceof SqlInjectionQuery and
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result = SqlInjectionAtm::SinkEndpointFilter::getAReasonSinkExcluded(sinkCandidate)
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result = any(SqlInjectionAtm::SqlInjectionAtmConfig cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(sinkCandidate)
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or
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query instanceof TaintedPathQuery and
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result = TaintedPathAtm::SinkEndpointFilter::getAReasonSinkExcluded(sinkCandidate)
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result = any(TaintedPathAtm::TaintedPathAtmConfig cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(sinkCandidate)
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or
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query instanceof XssQuery and
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result = XssAtm::SinkEndpointFilter::getAReasonSinkExcluded(sinkCandidate)
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result = any(XssAtm::DomBasedXssAtmConfig cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(sinkCandidate)
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}
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pragma[inline]
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@@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ import experimental.adaptivethreatmodeling.EndpointFeatures as EndpointFeatures
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import NoFeaturizationRestrictionsConfig
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private import Exclusions as Exclusions
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import Queries
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import experimental.adaptivethreatmodeling.NosqlInjectionATM as NosqlInjectionAtm
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import experimental.adaptivethreatmodeling.SqlInjectionATM as SqlInjectionAtm
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import experimental.adaptivethreatmodeling.TaintedPathATM as TaintedPathAtm
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import experimental.adaptivethreatmodeling.XssATM as XssAtm
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private import experimental.adaptivethreatmodeling.NosqlInjectionATM as NosqlInjectionAtm
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private import experimental.adaptivethreatmodeling.SqlInjectionATM as SqlInjectionAtm
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private import experimental.adaptivethreatmodeling.TaintedPathATM as TaintedPathAtm
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private import experimental.adaptivethreatmodeling.XssATM as XssAtm
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/**
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* Gets the set of featureName-featureValue pairs for each endpoint in the training set.
|
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|
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@@ -17,10 +17,10 @@ import extraction.NoFeaturizationRestrictionsConfig
|
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|
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query predicate tokenFeatures(DataFlow::Node endpoint, string featureName, string featureValue) {
|
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(
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not exists(NosqlInjectionAtm::SinkEndpointFilter::getAReasonSinkExcluded(endpoint)) or
|
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not exists(SqlInjectionAtm::SinkEndpointFilter::getAReasonSinkExcluded(endpoint)) or
|
||||
not exists(TaintedPathAtm::SinkEndpointFilter::getAReasonSinkExcluded(endpoint)) or
|
||||
not exists(XssAtm::SinkEndpointFilter::getAReasonSinkExcluded(endpoint)) or
|
||||
not exists(any(NosqlInjectionAtm::NosqlInjectionAtmConfig cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(endpoint)) or
|
||||
not exists(any(SqlInjectionAtm::SqlInjectionAtmConfig cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(endpoint)) or
|
||||
not exists(any(TaintedPathAtm::TaintedPathAtmConfig cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(endpoint)) or
|
||||
not exists(any(XssAtm::DomBasedXssAtmConfig cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(endpoint)) or
|
||||
StandardEndpointFilters::isArgumentToModeledFunction(endpoint)
|
||||
) and
|
||||
EndpointFeatures::tokenFeatures(endpoint, featureName, featureValue)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -24,24 +24,24 @@ import experimental.adaptivethreatmodeling.XssATM as XssAtm
|
||||
|
||||
query predicate nosqlFilteredTruePositives(DataFlow::Node endpoint, string reason) {
|
||||
endpoint instanceof NosqlInjection::Sink and
|
||||
reason = NosqlInjectionAtm::SinkEndpointFilter::getAReasonSinkExcluded(endpoint) and
|
||||
reason = any(NosqlInjectionAtm::NosqlInjectionAtmConfig cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(endpoint) and
|
||||
not reason = ["argument to modeled function", "modeled sink", "modeled database access"]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
query predicate sqlFilteredTruePositives(DataFlow::Node endpoint, string reason) {
|
||||
endpoint instanceof SqlInjection::Sink and
|
||||
reason = SqlInjectionAtm::SinkEndpointFilter::getAReasonSinkExcluded(endpoint) and
|
||||
reason = any(SqlInjectionAtm::SqlInjectionAtmConfig cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(endpoint) and
|
||||
reason != "argument to modeled function"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
query predicate taintedPathFilteredTruePositives(DataFlow::Node endpoint, string reason) {
|
||||
endpoint instanceof TaintedPath::Sink and
|
||||
reason = TaintedPathAtm::SinkEndpointFilter::getAReasonSinkExcluded(endpoint) and
|
||||
reason = any(TaintedPathAtm::TaintedPathAtmConfig cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(endpoint) and
|
||||
reason != "argument to modeled function"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
query predicate xssFilteredTruePositives(DataFlow::Node endpoint, string reason) {
|
||||
endpoint instanceof DomBasedXss::Sink and
|
||||
reason = XssAtm::SinkEndpointFilter::getAReasonSinkExcluded(endpoint) and
|
||||
reason = any(XssAtm::DomBasedXssAtmConfig cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(endpoint) and
|
||||
reason != "argument to modeled function"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@ import javascript
|
||||
import experimental.adaptivethreatmodeling.NosqlInjectionATM as NosqlInjectionAtm
|
||||
|
||||
query predicate effectiveSinks(DataFlow::Node node) {
|
||||
not exists(NosqlInjectionAtm::SinkEndpointFilter::getAReasonSinkExcluded(node))
|
||||
not exists(any(NosqlInjectionAtm::NosqlInjectionAtmConfig cfg).getAReasonSinkExcluded(node))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user