Boost StoredXss and XssThroughDomATM

Produced with:
```
javascript/ql$tb boost src/Security/CWE-079/StoredXss.ql XssSink
javascript/ql$ tb boost src/Security/CWE-079/XssThroughDom.ql XssSink
```

javascript/ql/experimental/adaptivethreatmodeling/lib/experimental/adaptivethreatmodeling/StoredXssATM.qll

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/**
+ * Provides a taint-tracking configuration for reasoning about stored
+ * cross-site scripting vulnerabilities.
+ * Is boosted by ATM.
+ */
+
+import javascript
+import AdaptiveThreatModeling
+import semmle.javascript.security.dataflow.Xss::StoredXss
+
+/**
+ * This module provides logic to filter candidate sinks to those which are likely XSS sinks.
+ */
+module SinkEndpointFilter {
+  private import StandardEndpointFilters as StandardEndpointFilters
+
+  /**
+   * Provides a set of reasons why a given data flow node should be excluded as a sink candidate.
+   *
+   * If this predicate has no results for a sink candidate `n`, then we should treat `n` as an
+   * effective sink.
+   */
+  string getAReasonSinkExcluded(DataFlow::Node sinkCandidate) {
+    result = StandardEndpointFilters::getAReasonSinkExcluded(sinkCandidate)
+  }
+}
+
+class StoredXssATMConfig extends ATMConfig {
+  StoredXssATMConfig() { this = "StoredXssATMConfig" }
+
+  override predicate isKnownSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof Source }
+
+  override predicate isKnownSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof Sink }
+
+  override predicate isEffectiveSink(DataFlow::Node sinkCandidate) {
+    not exists(SinkEndpointFilter::getAReasonSinkExcluded(sinkCandidate))
+  }
+
+  override EndpointType getASinkEndpointType() { result instanceof XssSinkType }
+}
+
+/**
+ * A taint-tracking configuration for reasoning about XSS.
+ */
+class Configuration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
+  Configuration() { this = "StoredXssATMConfig" }
+
+  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof Source }
+
+  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+    (sink instanceof Sink or any(StoredXssATMConfig cfg).isEffectiveSink(sink))
+  }
+
+  override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) {
+    super.isSanitizer(node) or
+    node instanceof Sanitizer
+  }
+
+  override predicate isSanitizerGuard(TaintTracking::SanitizerGuardNode guard) {
+    guard instanceof SanitizerGuard
+  }
+}
+
+/** A file name, considered as a flow source for stored XSS. */
+class FileNameSourceAsSource extends Source {
+  FileNameSourceAsSource() { this instanceof FileNameSource }
+}
+
+/** An instance of user-controlled torrent information, considered as a flow source for stored XSS. */
+class UserControlledTorrentInfoAsSource extends Source {
+  UserControlledTorrentInfoAsSource() { this instanceof ParseTorrent::UserControlledTorrentInfo }
+}

javascript/ql/experimental/adaptivethreatmodeling/lib/experimental/adaptivethreatmodeling/XssThroughDomATM.qll

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/**
+ * Provides a taint-tracking configuration for reasoning about
+ * cross-site scripting vulnerabilities through the DOM.
+ * Is boosted by ATM.
+ */
+
+import javascript
+import AdaptiveThreatModeling
+private import semmle.javascript.dataflow.InferredTypes
+import semmle.javascript.security.dataflow.Xss::XssThroughDom
+private import semmle.javascript.security.dataflow.XssThroughDomCustomizations::XssThroughDom
+private import semmle.javascript.security.dataflow.Xss::DomBasedXss as DomBasedXss
+private import semmle.javascript.security.dataflow.UnsafeJQueryPluginCustomizations::UnsafeJQueryPlugin as UnsafeJQuery
+
+/**
+ * This module provides logic to filter candidate sinks to those which are likely XSS sinks.
+ */
+module SinkEndpointFilter {
+  private import StandardEndpointFilters as StandardEndpointFilters
+
+  /**
+   * Provides a set of reasons why a given data flow node should be excluded as a sink candidate.
+   *
+   * If this predicate has no results for a sink candidate `n`, then we should treat `n` as an
+   * effective sink.
+   */
+  string getAReasonSinkExcluded(DataFlow::Node sinkCandidate) {
+    result = StandardEndpointFilters::getAReasonSinkExcluded(sinkCandidate)
+  }
+}
+
+class XssThroughDOMATMConfig extends ATMConfig {
+  XssThroughDOMATMConfig() { this = "XssThroughDOMATMConfig" }
+
+  override predicate isKnownSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof Source }
+
+  override predicate isKnownSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof DomBasedXss::Sink }
+
+  override predicate isEffectiveSink(DataFlow::Node sinkCandidate) {
+    not exists(SinkEndpointFilter::getAReasonSinkExcluded(sinkCandidate))
+  }
+
+  override EndpointType getASinkEndpointType() { result instanceof XssSinkType }
+}
+
+/**
+ * A taint-tracking configuration for reasoning about XSS through the DOM.
+ */
+class Configuration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
+  Configuration() { this = "XssThroughDOMATMConfig" }
+
+  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof Source }
+
+  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+    (sink instanceof DomBasedXss::Sink or any(XssThroughDOMATMConfig cfg).isEffectiveSink(sink))
+  }
+
+  override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) {
+    super.isSanitizer(node) or
+    node instanceof DomBasedXss::Sanitizer
+  }
+
+  override predicate isSanitizerGuard(TaintTracking::SanitizerGuardNode guard) {
+    guard instanceof TypeTestGuard or
+    guard instanceof UnsafeJQuery::PropertyPresenceSanitizer or
+    guard instanceof DomBasedXss::SanitizerGuard
+  }
+
+  override predicate isSanitizerEdge(DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ) {
+    DomBasedXss::isOptionallySanitizedEdge(pred, succ)
+  }
+}

javascript/ql/experimental/adaptivethreatmodeling/src/StoredXssATM.ql

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+/**
+ * For internal use only.
+ *
+ * @name Stored cross-site scripting (boosted)
+ * @description Using uncontrolled stored values in HTML allows for a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability.
+ * @kind path-problem
+ * @scored
+ * @problem.severity error
+ * @security-severity 6.1
+ * @id adaptive-threat-modeling/js/stored-xss
+ * @tags experimental experimental/atm security external/cwe/cwe-079 external/cwe/cwe-116
+ */
+
+import experimental.adaptivethreatmodeling.StoredXssATM
+import ATM::ResultsInfo
+import DataFlow::PathGraph
+
+from
+  DataFlow::Configuration cfg, DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink, float score,
+  string scoreString
+where
+  cfg.hasFlowPath(source, sink) and
+  not isFlowLikelyInBaseQuery(source.getNode(), sink.getNode()) and
+  score = getScoreForFlow(source.getNode(), sink.getNode()) and
+  scoreString = getScoreStringForFlow(source.getNode(), sink.getNode())
+select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
+  "[Score = " + scoreString + "] This may be a js/stored-xss result depending on $@ " +
+    getAdditionalAlertInfo(source.getNode(), sink.getNode()), source.getNode(),
+  "a user-provided value", score

javascript/ql/experimental/adaptivethreatmodeling/src/XssThroughDomATM.ql

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+/**
+ * For internal use only.
+ *
+ * @name DOM text reinterpreted as HTML (boosted)
+ * @description Reinterpreting text from the DOM as HTML can lead to a cross-site scripting vulnerability.
+ * @kind path-problem
+ * @scored
+ * @problem.severity warning
+ * @security-severity 6.1
+ * @id adaptive-threat-modeling/js/xss-through-dom
+ * @tags experimental experimental/atm security external/cwe/cwe-079 external/cwe/cwe-116
+ */
+
+import experimental.adaptivethreatmodeling.XssThroughDomATM
+import ATM::ResultsInfo
+import DataFlow::PathGraph
+
+from
+  DataFlow::Configuration cfg, DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink, float score,
+  string scoreString
+where
+  cfg.hasFlowPath(source, sink) and
+  not isFlowLikelyInBaseQuery(source.getNode(), sink.getNode()) and
+  score = getScoreForFlow(source.getNode(), sink.getNode()) and
+  scoreString = getScoreStringForFlow(source.getNode(), sink.getNode())
+select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
+  "[Score = " + scoreString + "] This may be a js/xss-through-dom result depending on $@ " +
+    getAdditionalAlertInfo(source.getNode(), sink.getNode()), source.getNode(),
+  "a user-provided value", score