Merge branch 'main' into py-mad-xss

cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/dataflow/internal/DataFlowImpl.qll

@@ -2706,7 +2706,7 @@ module Impl<FullStateConfigSig Config> {
 
     ParamNodeEx getParamNode() { result = p }
 
-    override string toString() { result = p + ": " + ap }
+    override string toString() { result = p + concat(" : " + ppReprType(t)) + " " + ap }
 
     predicate hasLocationInfo(
       string filepath, int startline, int startcolumn, int endline, int endcolumn
@@ -2758,12 +2758,21 @@ module Impl<FullStateConfigSig Config> {
     )
   }
 
+  private predicate forceUnfold(AccessPathApprox apa) {
+    forceHighPrecision(apa.getHead())
+    or
+    exists(Content c2 |
+      apa = TConsCons(_, _, c2, _) and
+      forceHighPrecision(c2)
+    )
+  }
+
   /**
    * Holds with `unfold = false` if a precise head-tail representation of `apa` is
    * expected to be expensive. Holds with `unfold = true` otherwise.
    */
   private predicate evalUnfold(AccessPathApprox apa, boolean unfold) {
-    if forceHighPrecision(apa.getHead())
+    if forceUnfold(apa)
     then unfold = true
     else
       exists(int aps, int nodes, int apLimit, int tupleLimit |
@@ -3092,6 +3101,12 @@ module Impl<FullStateConfigSig Config> {
       result = " <" + this.(PathNodeMid).getCallContext().toString() + ">"
     }
 
+    private string ppSummaryCtx() {
+      this instanceof PathNodeSink and result = ""
+      or
+      result = " <" + this.(PathNodeMid).getSummaryCtx().toString() + ">"
+    }
+
     /** Gets a textual representation of this element. */
     string toString() { result = this.getNodeEx().toString() + this.ppType() + this.ppAp() }
 
@@ -3100,7 +3115,9 @@ module Impl<FullStateConfigSig Config> {
      * representation of the call context.
      */
     string toStringWithContext() {
-      result = this.getNodeEx().toString() + this.ppType() + this.ppAp() + this.ppCtx()
+      result =
+        this.getNodeEx().toString() + this.ppType() + this.ppAp() + this.ppCtx() +
+          this.ppSummaryCtx()
     }
 
     /**

cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/ir/dataflow/internal/DataFlowImpl.qll

@@ -2706,7 +2706,7 @@ module Impl<FullStateConfigSig Config> {
 
     ParamNodeEx getParamNode() { result = p }
 
-    override string toString() { result = p + ": " + ap }
+    override string toString() { result = p + concat(" : " + ppReprType(t)) + " " + ap }
 
     predicate hasLocationInfo(
       string filepath, int startline, int startcolumn, int endline, int endcolumn
@@ -2758,12 +2758,21 @@ module Impl<FullStateConfigSig Config> {
     )
   }
 
+  private predicate forceUnfold(AccessPathApprox apa) {
+    forceHighPrecision(apa.getHead())
+    or
+    exists(Content c2 |
+      apa = TConsCons(_, _, c2, _) and
+      forceHighPrecision(c2)
+    )
+  }
+
   /**
    * Holds with `unfold = false` if a precise head-tail representation of `apa` is
    * expected to be expensive. Holds with `unfold = true` otherwise.
    */
   private predicate evalUnfold(AccessPathApprox apa, boolean unfold) {
-    if forceHighPrecision(apa.getHead())
+    if forceUnfold(apa)
     then unfold = true
     else
       exists(int aps, int nodes, int apLimit, int tupleLimit |
@@ -3092,6 +3101,12 @@ module Impl<FullStateConfigSig Config> {
       result = " <" + this.(PathNodeMid).getCallContext().toString() + ">"
     }
 
+    private string ppSummaryCtx() {
+      this instanceof PathNodeSink and result = ""
+      or
+      result = " <" + this.(PathNodeMid).getSummaryCtx().toString() + ">"
+    }
+
     /** Gets a textual representation of this element. */
     string toString() { result = this.getNodeEx().toString() + this.ppType() + this.ppAp() }
 
@@ -3100,7 +3115,9 @@ module Impl<FullStateConfigSig Config> {
      * representation of the call context.
      */
     string toStringWithContext() {
-      result = this.getNodeEx().toString() + this.ppType() + this.ppAp() + this.ppCtx()
+      result =
+        this.getNodeEx().toString() + this.ppType() + this.ppAp() + this.ppCtx() +
+          this.ppSummaryCtx()
     }
 
     /**

csharp/ql/lib/semmle/code/csharp/dataflow/internal/DataFlowImpl.qll

@@ -2706,7 +2706,7 @@ module Impl<FullStateConfigSig Config> {
 
     ParamNodeEx getParamNode() { result = p }
 
-    override string toString() { result = p + ": " + ap }
+    override string toString() { result = p + concat(" : " + ppReprType(t)) + " " + ap }
 
     predicate hasLocationInfo(
       string filepath, int startline, int startcolumn, int endline, int endcolumn
@@ -2758,12 +2758,21 @@ module Impl<FullStateConfigSig Config> {
     )
   }
 
+  private predicate forceUnfold(AccessPathApprox apa) {
+    forceHighPrecision(apa.getHead())
+    or
+    exists(Content c2 |
+      apa = TConsCons(_, _, c2, _) and
+      forceHighPrecision(c2)
+    )
+  }
+
   /**
    * Holds with `unfold = false` if a precise head-tail representation of `apa` is
    * expected to be expensive. Holds with `unfold = true` otherwise.
    */
   private predicate evalUnfold(AccessPathApprox apa, boolean unfold) {
-    if forceHighPrecision(apa.getHead())
+    if forceUnfold(apa)
     then unfold = true
     else
       exists(int aps, int nodes, int apLimit, int tupleLimit |
@@ -3092,6 +3101,12 @@ module Impl<FullStateConfigSig Config> {
       result = " <" + this.(PathNodeMid).getCallContext().toString() + ">"
     }
 
+    private string ppSummaryCtx() {
+      this instanceof PathNodeSink and result = ""
+      or
+      result = " <" + this.(PathNodeMid).getSummaryCtx().toString() + ">"
+    }
+
     /** Gets a textual representation of this element. */
     string toString() { result = this.getNodeEx().toString() + this.ppType() + this.ppAp() }
 
@@ -3100,7 +3115,9 @@ module Impl<FullStateConfigSig Config> {
      * representation of the call context.
      */
     string toStringWithContext() {
-      result = this.getNodeEx().toString() + this.ppType() + this.ppAp() + this.ppCtx()
+      result =
+        this.getNodeEx().toString() + this.ppType() + this.ppAp() + this.ppCtx() +
+          this.ppSummaryCtx()
     }
 
     /**

go/ql/lib/change-notes/2023-06-28--add-support-for-gqlgen-framework.md

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+lgtm,codescanning
+* Support for [gqlgen](https://github.com/99designs/gqlgen) has been added.

go/ql/lib/go.qll

@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ import semmle.go.frameworks.Gin
 import semmle.go.frameworks.Glog
 import semmle.go.frameworks.GoMicro
 import semmle.go.frameworks.GoRestfulHttp
+import semmle.go.frameworks.Gqlgen
 import semmle.go.frameworks.K8sIoApimachineryPkgRuntime
 import semmle.go.frameworks.K8sIoApiCoreV1
 import semmle.go.frameworks.K8sIoClientGo

go/ql/lib/semmle/go/dataflow/internal/DataFlowImpl.qll

@@ -2706,7 +2706,7 @@ module Impl<FullStateConfigSig Config> {
 
     ParamNodeEx getParamNode() { result = p }
 
-    override string toString() { result = p + ": " + ap }
+    override string toString() { result = p + concat(" : " + ppReprType(t)) + " " + ap }
 
     predicate hasLocationInfo(
       string filepath, int startline, int startcolumn, int endline, int endcolumn
@@ -2758,12 +2758,21 @@ module Impl<FullStateConfigSig Config> {
     )
   }
 
+  private predicate forceUnfold(AccessPathApprox apa) {
+    forceHighPrecision(apa.getHead())
+    or
+    exists(Content c2 |
+      apa = TConsCons(_, _, c2, _) and
+      forceHighPrecision(c2)
+    )
+  }
+
   /**
    * Holds with `unfold = false` if a precise head-tail representation of `apa` is
    * expected to be expensive. Holds with `unfold = true` otherwise.
    */
   private predicate evalUnfold(AccessPathApprox apa, boolean unfold) {
-    if forceHighPrecision(apa.getHead())
+    if forceUnfold(apa)
     then unfold = true
     else
       exists(int aps, int nodes, int apLimit, int tupleLimit |
@@ -3092,6 +3101,12 @@ module Impl<FullStateConfigSig Config> {
       result = " <" + this.(PathNodeMid).getCallContext().toString() + ">"
     }
 
+    private string ppSummaryCtx() {
+      this instanceof PathNodeSink and result = ""
+      or
+      result = " <" + this.(PathNodeMid).getSummaryCtx().toString() + ">"
+    }
+
     /** Gets a textual representation of this element. */
     string toString() { result = this.getNodeEx().toString() + this.ppType() + this.ppAp() }
 
@@ -3100,7 +3115,9 @@ module Impl<FullStateConfigSig Config> {
      * representation of the call context.
      */
     string toStringWithContext() {
-      result = this.getNodeEx().toString() + this.ppType() + this.ppAp() + this.ppCtx()
+      result =
+        this.getNodeEx().toString() + this.ppType() + this.ppAp() + this.ppCtx() +
+          this.ppSummaryCtx()
     }
 
     /**

go/ql/lib/semmle/go/frameworks/Gqlgen.qll

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/** Provides models of commonly used functions and types in the gqlgen packages. */
+
+import go
+
+/** Provides models of commonly used functions and types in the gqlgen packages. */
+module Gqlgen {
+  /** An autogenerated file containing gqlgen code. */
+  private class GqlgenGeneratedFile extends File {
+    GqlgenGeneratedFile() {
+      exists(DataFlow::CallNode call |
+        call.getReceiver().getType().hasQualifiedName("github.com/99designs/gqlgen/graphql", _) and
+        call.getFile() = this
+      )
+    }
+  }
+
+  /** A resolver interface. */
+  private class ResolverInterface extends Type {
+    ResolverInterface() {
+      this.getQualifiedName().matches("%Resolver") and
+      this.getEntity().getDeclaration().getFile() instanceof GqlgenGeneratedFile
+    }
+  }
+
+  /** A resolver implementation. */
+  private class ResolverInterfaceMethod extends Method {
+    ResolverInterfaceMethod() { this.getReceiver().getType() instanceof ResolverInterface }
+  }
+
+  /** A resolver method which is exposed as a Graphql endpoint */
+  private class ResolverImplementationMethod extends Method {
+    ResolverImplementationMethod() { this.implements(any(ResolverInterfaceMethod r)) }
+
+    Parameter getAnUntrustedParameter() {
+      result.getFunction() = this.getFuncDecl() and
+      not result.getType().hasQualifiedName("context", "Context") and
+      result.getIndex() > 0
+    }
+  }
+
+  /** A parameter of a resolver method which receives untrusted input. */
+  class ResolverParameter extends UntrustedFlowSource::Range instanceof DataFlow::ParameterNode {
+    ResolverParameter() {
+      this.asParameter() = any(ResolverImplementationMethod h).getAnUntrustedParameter()
+    }
+  }
+}

go/ql/test/library-tests/semmle/go/frameworks/gqlgen/go.mod

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+module pwntester/gqlgen-todos
+
+go 1.19
+
+require (
+	github.com/99designs/gqlgen v0.17.3
+	github.com/vektah/gqlparser/v2 v2.5.4
+)
+
+require (
+	github.com/agnivade/levenshtein v1.1.1 // indirect
+	github.com/cpuguy83/go-md2man/v2 v2.0.2 // indirect
+	github.com/gorilla/websocket v1.5.0 // indirect
+	github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru v0.5.0 // indirect
+	github.com/kr/text v0.2.0 // indirect
+	github.com/matryer/moq v0.2.3 // indirect
+	github.com/mitchellh/mapstructure v1.5.0 // indirect
+	github.com/niemeyer/pretty v0.0.0-20200227124842-a10e7caefd8e // indirect
+	github.com/russross/blackfriday/v2 v2.1.0 // indirect
+	github.com/stretchr/testify v1.6.0 // indirect
+	github.com/urfave/cli/v2 v2.25.5 // indirect
+	github.com/xrash/smetrics v0.0.0-20201216005158-039620a65673 // indirect
+	golang.org/x/mod v0.6.0-dev // indirect
+	golang.org/x/sys v0.8.0 // indirect
+	golang.org/x/tools v0.1.9 // indirect
+	golang.org/x/xerrors v0.0.0-20200804184101-5ec99f83aff1 // indirect
+	gopkg.in/check.v1 v1.0.0-20200227125254-8fa46927fb4f // indirect
+	gopkg.in/yaml.v2 v2.4.0 // indirect
+)

go/ql/test/library-tests/semmle/go/frameworks/gqlgen/gqlgen.expected

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+failures
+testFailures

go/ql/test/library-tests/semmle/go/frameworks/gqlgen/gqlgen.ql

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+import go
+import TestUtilities.InlineExpectationsTest
+
+module ResolveParameterTest implements TestSig {
+  string getARelevantTag() { result = "resolverParameter" }
+
+  predicate hasActualResult(Location location, string element, string tag, string value) {
+    tag = "resolverParameter" and
+    exists(Gqlgen::ResolverParameter p |
+      element = p.toString() and
+      value = "\"" + p.toString() + "\"" and
+      p.hasLocationInfo(location.getFile().getAbsolutePath(), location.getStartLine(),
+        location.getStartColumn(), location.getEndLine(), location.getEndColumn())
+    )
+  }
+}
+
+import MakeTest<ResolveParameterTest>

go/ql/test/library-tests/semmle/go/frameworks/gqlgen/graph/generated.go

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+// Code generated by github.com/99designs/gqlgen, DO NOT EDIT.
+
+package graph
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"pwntester/gqlgen-todos/graph/model"
+
+	"github.com/99designs/gqlgen/graphql"
+)
+
+type ResolverRoot interface {
+	Mutation() MutationResolver
+	Query() QueryResolver
+}
+
+type MutationResolver interface {
+	CreateTodo(ctx context.Context, input model.NewTodo) (*model.Todo, error)
+}
+type QueryResolver interface {
+	Todos(ctx context.Context) ([]*model.Todo, error)
+}
+
+func stub(dg graphql.CollectedField) {
+	dg.GetPosition()
+}
+
+// endregion ***************************** type.gotpl *****************************

go/ql/test/library-tests/semmle/go/frameworks/gqlgen/graph/model/models_gen.go

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+// Code generated by github.com/99designs/gqlgen, DO NOT EDIT.
+
+package model
+
+type NewTodo struct {
+	Text   string `json:"text"`
+	UserID string `json:"userId"`
+}
+
+type Todo struct {
+	ID   string `json:"id"`
+	Text string `json:"text"`
+	Done bool   `json:"done"`
+	User *User  `json:"user"`
+}
+
+type User struct {
+	ID   string `json:"id"`
+	Name string `json:"name"`
+}

go/ql/test/library-tests/semmle/go/frameworks/gqlgen/graph/resolver.go

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+package graph
+
+// This file will not be regenerated automatically.
+//
+// It serves as dependency injection for your app, add any dependencies you require here.
+
+type Resolver struct{}

go/ql/test/library-tests/semmle/go/frameworks/gqlgen/graph/schema.graphqls

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# GraphQL schema example
+#
+# https://gqlgen.com/getting-started/
+
+type Todo {
+  id: ID!
+  text: String!
+  done: Boolean!
+  user: User!
+}
+
+type User {
+  id: ID!
+  name: String!
+}
+
+type Query {
+  todos: [Todo!]!
+}
+
+input NewTodo {
+  text: String!
+  userId: String!
+}
+
+type Mutation {
+  createTodo(input: NewTodo!): Todo!
+}

go/ql/test/library-tests/semmle/go/frameworks/gqlgen/graph/schema.resolvers.go

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+package graph
+
+// This file will be automatically regenerated based on the schema, any resolver implementations
+// will be copied through when generating and any unknown code will be moved to the end.
+// Code generated by github.com/99designs/gqlgen version v0.17.34
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"pwntester/gqlgen-todos/graph/model"
+)
+
+// CreateTodo is the resolver for the createTodo field.
+func (r *mutationResolver) CreateTodo(ctx context.Context, input model.NewTodo) (*model.Todo, error) { // $ resolverParameter="definition of input"
+	panic(fmt.Errorf("not implemented: CreateTodo - createTodo %v", input))
+}
+
+// Todos is the resolver for the todos field.
+func (r *queryResolver) Todos(ctx context.Context) ([]*model.Todo, error) {
+	panic(fmt.Errorf("not implemented: Todos - todos"))
+}
+
+// Mutation returns MutationResolver implementation.
+func (r *Resolver) Mutation() MutationResolver { return &mutationResolver{r} }
+
+// Query returns QueryResolver implementation.
+func (r *Resolver) Query() QueryResolver { return &queryResolver{r} }
+
+type mutationResolver struct{ *Resolver }
+type queryResolver struct{ *Resolver }

go/ql/test/library-tests/semmle/go/frameworks/gqlgen/vendor/github.com/99designs/gqlgen/graphql/stub.go

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+// Code generated by depstubber. DO NOT EDIT.
+// This is a simple stub for github.com/99designs/gqlgen/graphql, strictly for use in testing.
+
+// See the LICENSE file for information about the licensing of the original library.
+// Source: github.com/99designs/gqlgen/graphql (exports: CollectedField; functions: )
+
+// Package graphql is a stub of github.com/99designs/gqlgen/graphql, generated by depstubber.
+package graphql
+
+type CollectedField struct {
+	Field      interface{}
+	Selections interface{}
+}
+
+func (_ CollectedField) ArgumentMap(_ map[string]interface{}) map[string]interface{} {
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (_ CollectedField) GetPosition() interface{} {
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (_ CollectedField) UnmarshalJSON(_ []byte) error {
+	return nil
+}

go/ql/test/library-tests/semmle/go/frameworks/gqlgen/vendor/modules.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+# github.com/99designs/gqlgen v0.17.3
+## explicit
+github.com/99designs/gqlgen
+# github.com/vektah/gqlparser/v2 v2.5.4
+## explicit
+github.com/vektah/gqlparser/v2
+# github.com/agnivade/levenshtein v1.1.1
+## explicit
+github.com/agnivade/levenshtein
+# github.com/cpuguy83/go-md2man/v2 v2.0.2
+## explicit
+github.com/cpuguy83/go-md2man/v2
+# github.com/gorilla/websocket v1.5.0
+## explicit
+github.com/gorilla/websocket
+# github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru v0.5.0
+## explicit
+github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru
+# github.com/kr/text v0.2.0
+## explicit
+github.com/kr/text
+# github.com/matryer/moq v0.2.3
+## explicit
+github.com/matryer/moq
+# github.com/mitchellh/mapstructure v1.5.0
+## explicit
+github.com/mitchellh/mapstructure
+# github.com/niemeyer/pretty v0.0.0-20200227124842-a10e7caefd8e
+## explicit
+github.com/niemeyer/pretty
+# github.com/russross/blackfriday/v2 v2.1.0
+## explicit
+github.com/russross/blackfriday/v2
+# github.com/stretchr/testify v1.6.0
+## explicit
+github.com/stretchr/testify
+# github.com/urfave/cli/v2 v2.25.5
+## explicit
+github.com/urfave/cli/v2
+# github.com/xrash/smetrics v0.0.0-20201216005158-039620a65673
+## explicit
+github.com/xrash/smetrics
+# golang.org/x/mod v0.6.0-dev
+## explicit
+golang.org/x/mod
+# golang.org/x/sys v0.8.0
+## explicit
+golang.org/x/sys
+# golang.org/x/tools v0.1.9
+## explicit
+golang.org/x/tools
+# golang.org/x/xerrors v0.0.0-20200804184101-5ec99f83aff1
+## explicit
+golang.org/x/xerrors
+# gopkg.in/check.v1 v1.0.0-20200227125254-8fa46927fb4f
+## explicit
+gopkg.in/check.v1
+# gopkg.in/yaml.v2 v2.4.0
+## explicit
+gopkg.in/yaml.v2

java/documentation/library-coverage/coverage.csv

@@ -55,12 +55,12 @@ jakarta.ws.rs.container,,9,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,9,,
 jakarta.ws.rs.core,2,,149,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,2,,,,,,94,55
 java.awt,,,3,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,3
 java.beans,,,1,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,1,
-java.io,49,,45,,,22,,,,,,,,,,,,,,27,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,43,2
-java.lang,31,,92,,13,,,,,,,,,,,,8,,,5,,,4,,,1,,,,,,,,,,,,,56,36
-java.net,13,3,21,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,13,,,,,,,,,3,21,
-java.nio,47,,35,,,3,,,,,,,,,,,,,,44,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,35,
+java.io,50,,45,,,22,,,,,,,,,,,,,,28,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,43,2
+java.lang,31,,93,,13,,,,,,,,,,,,8,,,5,,,4,,,1,,,,,,,,,,,,,57,36
+java.net,13,3,23,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,13,,,,,,,,,3,23,
+java.nio,53,,36,,,5,,,,,,,,,,,,,,47,,,,,,,,,1,,,,,,,,,,36,
 java.sql,13,,2,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,4,,9,,,,,,,,2,
-java.util,44,,484,,,,,,,,,,,,,,34,,,,,,,5,2,,1,2,,,,,,,,,,,44,440
+java.util,45,,485,,,1,,,,,,,,,,,34,,,,,,,5,2,,1,2,,,,,,,,,,,45,440
 javafx.scene.web,1,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,1,,,,,,,,,,,
 javax.faces.context,2,7,,,,,,,,2,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,7,,
 javax.imageio.stream,,,1,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,1,
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ kotlin,16,,1849,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,14,,,,,,,,,2,,,,,,,,,,1836,13
 net.sf.json,2,,338,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,2,,,,,,,,,,321,17
 net.sf.saxon.s9api,5,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,5,,,,,
 ognl,6,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,6,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
-okhttp3,4,,48,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,4,,,,,,,,,,23,25
+okhttp3,4,,50,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,4,,,,,,,,,,23,27
 org.acegisecurity,,,49,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,49,
 org.antlr.runtime,1,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,1,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
 org.apache.commons.codec,,,6,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,6,
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ org.apache.commons.jelly,6,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,6,,,,,,,,,,,
 org.apache.commons.jexl2,15,,,,,,,,,,,,15,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
 org.apache.commons.jexl3,15,,,,,,,,,,,,15,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
 org.apache.commons.lang,,,765,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,594,171
-org.apache.commons.lang3,6,,424,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,6,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,293,131
+org.apache.commons.lang3,6,,425,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,6,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,294,131
 org.apache.commons.logging,6,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,6,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
 org.apache.commons.net,9,12,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,3,,,,,,,,,6,,,,,,,,,12,,
 org.apache.commons.ognl,6,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,6,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ org.dom4j,20,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,20,,,,,,
 org.eclipse.jetty.client,1,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,1,,,,,,,,,,,
 org.fusesource.leveldbjni,1,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,1,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
 org.geogebra.web.full.main,1,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,1,,,,,,,
+org.gradle.api.file,,,2,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,2,
 org.hibernate,7,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,7,,,,,,,,,
 org.influxdb,1,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,1,,,,,,,,,,,
 org.jboss.logging,324,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,324,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
@@ -180,4 +181,4 @@ ratpack.func,,,35,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,35
 ratpack.handling,,6,4,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,6,4,
 ratpack.http,,10,10,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,10,10,
 ratpack.util,,,35,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,35
-retrofit2,1,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,1,,,,,,,,,,,
+retrofit2,1,,1,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,1,,,,,,,,,,1,

java/documentation/library-coverage/coverage.rst

@@ -11,17 +11,17 @@ Java framework & library support
    Android extensions,``androidx.*``,5,183,19,,,,,,
    `Apache Commons Collections <https://commons.apache.org/proper/commons-collections/>`_,"``org.apache.commons.collections``, ``org.apache.commons.collections4``",,1600,,,,,,,
    `Apache Commons IO <https://commons.apache.org/proper/commons-io/>`_,``org.apache.commons.io``,,560,111,94,,,,,15
-   `Apache Commons Lang <https://commons.apache.org/proper/commons-lang/>`_,``org.apache.commons.lang3``,,424,6,,,,,,
+   `Apache Commons Lang <https://commons.apache.org/proper/commons-lang/>`_,``org.apache.commons.lang3``,,425,6,,,,,,
    `Apache Commons Text <https://commons.apache.org/proper/commons-text/>`_,``org.apache.commons.text``,,272,,,,,,,
    `Apache HttpComponents <https://hc.apache.org/>`_,"``org.apache.hc.core5.*``, ``org.apache.http``",5,182,122,,3,,,,119
    `Apache Log4j 2 <https://logging.apache.org/log4j/2.0/>`_,``org.apache.logging.log4j``,,8,359,,,,,,
    `Google Guava <https://guava.dev/>`_,``com.google.common.*``,,730,41,7,,,,,
    JBoss Logging,``org.jboss.logging``,,,324,,,,,,
    `JSON-java <https://github.com/stleary/JSON-java>`_,``org.json``,,236,,,,,,,
-   Java Standard Library,``java.*``,3,683,197,76,,9,,,17
+   Java Standard Library,``java.*``,3,688,205,80,,9,,,18
    Java extensions,"``javax.*``, ``jakarta.*``",63,672,34,2,4,,1,1,2
    Kotlin Standard Library,``kotlin*``,,1849,16,14,,,,,2
    `Spring <https://spring.io/>`_,``org.springframework.*``,29,483,115,4,,28,14,,35
-   Others,"``antlr``, ``cn.hutool.core.codec``, ``com.alibaba.druid.sql``, ``com.esotericsoftware.kryo.io``, ``com.esotericsoftware.kryo5.io``, ``com.fasterxml.jackson.core``, ``com.fasterxml.jackson.databind``, ``com.google.gson``, ``com.hubspot.jinjava``, ``com.jcraft.jsch``, ``com.mitchellbosecke.pebble``, ``com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl``, ``com.rabbitmq.client``, ``com.thoughtworks.xstream``, ``com.unboundid.ldap.sdk``, ``com.zaxxer.hikari``, ``flexjson``, ``freemarker.cache``, ``freemarker.template``, ``groovy.lang``, ``groovy.text``, ``groovy.util``, ``hudson``, ``io.jsonwebtoken``, ``io.netty.bootstrap``, ``io.netty.buffer``, ``io.netty.channel``, ``io.netty.handler.codec``, ``io.netty.handler.ssl``, ``io.netty.handler.stream``, ``io.netty.resolver``, ``io.netty.util``, ``javafx.scene.web``, ``jenkins``, ``jodd.json``, ``net.sf.json``, ``net.sf.saxon.s9api``, ``ognl``, ``okhttp3``, ``org.acegisecurity``, ``org.antlr.runtime``, ``org.apache.commons.codec``, ``org.apache.commons.compress.archivers.tar``, ``org.apache.commons.exec``, ``org.apache.commons.httpclient.util``, ``org.apache.commons.jelly``, ``org.apache.commons.jexl2``, ``org.apache.commons.jexl3``, ``org.apache.commons.lang``, ``org.apache.commons.logging``, ``org.apache.commons.net``, ``org.apache.commons.ognl``, ``org.apache.directory.ldap.client.api``, ``org.apache.hadoop.fs``, ``org.apache.hadoop.hive.metastore``, ``org.apache.hc.client5.http.async.methods``, ``org.apache.hc.client5.http.classic.methods``, ``org.apache.hc.client5.http.fluent``, ``org.apache.hive.hcatalog.templeton``, ``org.apache.ibatis.jdbc``, ``org.apache.log4j``, ``org.apache.shiro.codec``, ``org.apache.shiro.jndi``, ``org.apache.tools.ant``, ``org.apache.tools.zip``, ``org.apache.velocity.app``, ``org.apache.velocity.runtime``, ``org.codehaus.cargo.container.installer``, ``org.codehaus.groovy.control``, ``org.dom4j``, ``org.eclipse.jetty.client``, ``org.fusesource.leveldbjni``, ``org.geogebra.web.full.main``, ``org.hibernate``, ``org.influxdb``, ``org.jdbi.v3.core``, ``org.jenkins.ui.icon``, ``org.jenkins.ui.symbol``, ``org.jooq``, ``org.kohsuke.stapler``, ``org.mvel2``, ``org.openjdk.jmh.runner.options``, ``org.scijava.log``, ``org.slf4j``, ``org.thymeleaf``, ``org.xml.sax``, ``org.xmlpull.v1``, ``org.yaml.snakeyaml``, ``play.libs.ws``, ``play.mvc``, ``ratpack.core.form``, ``ratpack.core.handling``, ``ratpack.core.http``, ``ratpack.exec``, ``ratpack.form``, ``ratpack.func``, ``ratpack.handling``, ``ratpack.http``, ``ratpack.util``, ``retrofit2``",126,5232,577,89,6,18,18,,200
-   Totals,,283,13595,2059,286,16,122,33,1,390
+   Others,"``antlr``, ``cn.hutool.core.codec``, ``com.alibaba.druid.sql``, ``com.esotericsoftware.kryo.io``, ``com.esotericsoftware.kryo5.io``, ``com.fasterxml.jackson.core``, ``com.fasterxml.jackson.databind``, ``com.google.gson``, ``com.hubspot.jinjava``, ``com.jcraft.jsch``, ``com.mitchellbosecke.pebble``, ``com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl``, ``com.rabbitmq.client``, ``com.thoughtworks.xstream``, ``com.unboundid.ldap.sdk``, ``com.zaxxer.hikari``, ``flexjson``, ``freemarker.cache``, ``freemarker.template``, ``groovy.lang``, ``groovy.text``, ``groovy.util``, ``hudson``, ``io.jsonwebtoken``, ``io.netty.bootstrap``, ``io.netty.buffer``, ``io.netty.channel``, ``io.netty.handler.codec``, ``io.netty.handler.ssl``, ``io.netty.handler.stream``, ``io.netty.resolver``, ``io.netty.util``, ``javafx.scene.web``, ``jenkins``, ``jodd.json``, ``net.sf.json``, ``net.sf.saxon.s9api``, ``ognl``, ``okhttp3``, ``org.acegisecurity``, ``org.antlr.runtime``, ``org.apache.commons.codec``, ``org.apache.commons.compress.archivers.tar``, ``org.apache.commons.exec``, ``org.apache.commons.httpclient.util``, ``org.apache.commons.jelly``, ``org.apache.commons.jexl2``, ``org.apache.commons.jexl3``, ``org.apache.commons.lang``, ``org.apache.commons.logging``, ``org.apache.commons.net``, ``org.apache.commons.ognl``, ``org.apache.directory.ldap.client.api``, ``org.apache.hadoop.fs``, ``org.apache.hadoop.hive.metastore``, ``org.apache.hc.client5.http.async.methods``, ``org.apache.hc.client5.http.classic.methods``, ``org.apache.hc.client5.http.fluent``, ``org.apache.hive.hcatalog.templeton``, ``org.apache.ibatis.jdbc``, ``org.apache.log4j``, ``org.apache.shiro.codec``, ``org.apache.shiro.jndi``, ``org.apache.tools.ant``, ``org.apache.tools.zip``, ``org.apache.velocity.app``, ``org.apache.velocity.runtime``, ``org.codehaus.cargo.container.installer``, ``org.codehaus.groovy.control``, ``org.dom4j``, ``org.eclipse.jetty.client``, ``org.fusesource.leveldbjni``, ``org.geogebra.web.full.main``, ``org.gradle.api.file``, ``org.hibernate``, ``org.influxdb``, ``org.jdbi.v3.core``, ``org.jenkins.ui.icon``, ``org.jenkins.ui.symbol``, ``org.jooq``, ``org.kohsuke.stapler``, ``org.mvel2``, ``org.openjdk.jmh.runner.options``, ``org.scijava.log``, ``org.slf4j``, ``org.thymeleaf``, ``org.xml.sax``, ``org.xmlpull.v1``, ``org.yaml.snakeyaml``, ``play.libs.ws``, ``play.mvc``, ``ratpack.core.form``, ``ratpack.core.handling``, ``ratpack.core.http``, ``ratpack.exec``, ``ratpack.form``, ``ratpack.func``, ``ratpack.handling``, ``ratpack.http``, ``ratpack.util``, ``retrofit2``",126,5237,577,89,6,18,18,,200
+   Totals,,283,13606,2067,290,16,122,33,1,391
 

java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/dataflow/internal/DataFlowImpl.qll

@@ -2706,7 +2706,7 @@ module Impl<FullStateConfigSig Config> {
 
     ParamNodeEx getParamNode() { result = p }
 
-    override string toString() { result = p + ": " + ap }
+    override string toString() { result = p + concat(" : " + ppReprType(t)) + " " + ap }
 
     predicate hasLocationInfo(
       string filepath, int startline, int startcolumn, int endline, int endcolumn
@@ -2758,12 +2758,21 @@ module Impl<FullStateConfigSig Config> {
     )
   }
 
+  private predicate forceUnfold(AccessPathApprox apa) {
+    forceHighPrecision(apa.getHead())
+    or
+    exists(Content c2 |
+      apa = TConsCons(_, _, c2, _) and
+      forceHighPrecision(c2)
+    )
+  }
+
   /**
    * Holds with `unfold = false` if a precise head-tail representation of `apa` is
    * expected to be expensive. Holds with `unfold = true` otherwise.
    */
   private predicate evalUnfold(AccessPathApprox apa, boolean unfold) {
-    if forceHighPrecision(apa.getHead())
+    if forceUnfold(apa)
     then unfold = true
     else
       exists(int aps, int nodes, int apLimit, int tupleLimit |
@@ -3092,6 +3101,12 @@ module Impl<FullStateConfigSig Config> {
       result = " <" + this.(PathNodeMid).getCallContext().toString() + ">"
     }
 
+    private string ppSummaryCtx() {
+      this instanceof PathNodeSink and result = ""
+      or
+      result = " <" + this.(PathNodeMid).getSummaryCtx().toString() + ">"
+    }
+
     /** Gets a textual representation of this element. */
     string toString() { result = this.getNodeEx().toString() + this.ppType() + this.ppAp() }
 
@@ -3100,7 +3115,9 @@ module Impl<FullStateConfigSig Config> {
      * representation of the call context.
      */
     string toStringWithContext() {
-      result = this.getNodeEx().toString() + this.ppType() + this.ppAp() + this.ppCtx()
+      result =
+        this.getNodeEx().toString() + this.ppType() + this.ppAp() + this.ppCtx() +
+          this.ppSummaryCtx()
     }
 
     /**

java/ql/src/Telemetry/AutomodelApplicationModeExtractCandidates.ql

@@ -12,9 +12,44 @@
  * @tags internal extract automodel application-mode candidates
  */
 
+import java
 private import AutomodelApplicationModeCharacteristics
 private import AutomodelJavaUtil
 
+/**
+ * Gets a sample of endpoints (of at most `limit` samples) with the given method signature.
+ *
+ * The main purpose of this helper predicate is to avoid selecting too many candidates, as this may
+ * cause the SARIF file to exceed the maximum size limit.
+ */
+bindingset[limit]
+private Endpoint getSampleForSignature(
+  int limit, string package, string type, string subtypes, string name, string signature,
+  string input
+) {
+  exists(int n, int num_endpoints, ApplicationModeMetadataExtractor meta |
+    num_endpoints =
+      count(Endpoint e | meta.hasMetadata(e, package, type, subtypes, name, signature, input))
+  |
+    result =
+      rank[n](Endpoint e, Location loc |
+        loc = e.getLocation() and
+        meta.hasMetadata(e, package, type, subtypes, name, signature, input)
+      |
+        e
+        order by
+          loc.getFile().getAbsolutePath(), loc.getStartLine(), loc.getStartColumn(),
+          loc.getEndLine(), loc.getEndColumn()
+      ) and
+    // To avoid selecting samples that are too close together (as the ranking above goes by file
+    // path first), we select `limit` evenly spaced samples from the ranked list of endpoints. By
+    // default this would always include the first sample, so we add a random-chosen prime offset
+    // to the first sample index, and reduce modulo the number of endpoints.
+    // Finally, we add 1 to the result, as ranking results in a 1-indexed relation.
+    n = 1 + (([0 .. limit - 1] * (num_endpoints / limit).floor() + 46337) % num_endpoints)
+  )
+}
+
 from
   Endpoint endpoint, string message, ApplicationModeMetadataExtractor meta, DollarAtString package,
   DollarAtString type, DollarAtString subtypes, DollarAtString name, DollarAtString signature,
@@ -23,6 +58,7 @@ where
   not exists(CharacteristicsImpl::UninterestingToModelCharacteristic u |
     u.appliesToEndpoint(endpoint)
   ) and
+  endpoint = getSampleForSignature(9, package, type, subtypes, name, signature, input) and
   // If a node is already a known sink for any of our existing ATM queries and is already modeled as a MaD sink, we
   // don't include it as a candidate. Otherwise, we might include it as a candidate for query A, but the model will
   // label it as a sink for one of the sink types of query B, for which it's already a known sink. This would result in

javascript/ql/experimental/adaptivethreatmodeling/lib/experimental/adaptivethreatmodeling/XssATM.qll

@@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ class DomBasedXssAtmConfig extends AtmConfig {
 
   override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) {
     super.isSanitizer(node) or
-    node instanceof DomBasedXss::Sanitizer
+    node instanceof DomBasedXss::Sanitizer or
+    DomBasedXss::isOptionallySanitizedNode(node)
   }
 
   override predicate isSanitizerGuard(TaintTracking::SanitizerGuardNode guard) {
@@ -31,10 +32,6 @@ class DomBasedXssAtmConfig extends AtmConfig {
     guard instanceof QuoteGuard or
     guard instanceof ContainsHtmlGuard
   }
-
-  override predicate isSanitizerEdge(DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ) {
-    DomBasedXss::isOptionallySanitizedEdge(pred, succ)
-  }
 }
 
 private import semmle.javascript.security.dataflow.Xss::Shared as Shared

javascript/ql/experimental/adaptivethreatmodeling/lib/experimental/adaptivethreatmodeling/XssThroughDomATM.qll

@@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ class XssThroughDomAtmConfig extends AtmConfig {
 
   override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) {
     super.isSanitizer(node) or
-    node instanceof DomBasedXss::Sanitizer
+    node instanceof DomBasedXss::Sanitizer or
+    DomBasedXss::isOptionallySanitizedNode(node)
   }
 
   override predicate isSanitizerGuard(TaintTracking::SanitizerGuardNode guard) {
@@ -34,10 +35,6 @@ class XssThroughDomAtmConfig extends AtmConfig {
     guard instanceof QuoteGuard or
     guard instanceof ContainsHtmlGuard
   }
-
-  override predicate isSanitizerEdge(DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ) {
-    DomBasedXss::isOptionallySanitizedEdge(pred, succ)
-  }
 }
 
 /**

javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/dataflow/Configuration.qll

@@ -166,6 +166,26 @@ abstract class Configuration extends string {
     )
   }
 
+  /**
+   * Holds if flow into `node` is prohibited.
+   */
+  predicate isBarrierIn(DataFlow::Node node) { none() }
+
+  /**
+   * Holds if flow out `node` is prohibited.
+   */
+  predicate isBarrierOut(DataFlow::Node node) { none() }
+
+  /**
+   * Holds if flow into `node` is prohibited for the flow label `lbl`.
+   */
+  predicate isBarrierIn(DataFlow::Node node, FlowLabel lbl) { none() }
+
+  /**
+   * Holds if flow out `node` is prohibited for the flow label `lbl`.
+   */
+  predicate isBarrierOut(DataFlow::Node node, FlowLabel lbl) { none() }
+
   /**
    * Holds if flow from `pred` to `succ` is prohibited.
    */
@@ -494,7 +514,7 @@ private BasicBlock getADominatedBasicBlock(BarrierGuardNode guard, ConditionGuar
  *
  * Only holds for barriers that should apply to all flow labels.
  */
-private predicate isBarrierEdge(Configuration cfg, DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ) {
+private predicate isBarrierEdgeRaw(Configuration cfg, DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ) {
   cfg.isBarrierEdge(pred, succ)
   or
   exists(DataFlow::BarrierGuardNode guard |
@@ -503,11 +523,26 @@ private predicate isBarrierEdge(Configuration cfg, DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow
   )
 }
 
+/**
+ * Holds if there is a barrier edge `pred -> succ` in `cfg` either through an explicit barrier edge
+ * or one implied by a barrier guard, or by an out/in barrier for `pred` or `succ`, respectively.
+ *
+ * Only holds for barriers that should apply to all flow labels.
+ */
+pragma[inline]
+private predicate isBarrierEdge(Configuration cfg, DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ) {
+  isBarrierEdgeRaw(cfg, pred, succ)
+  or
+  cfg.isBarrierOut(pred)
+  or
+  cfg.isBarrierIn(succ)
+}
+
 /**
  * Holds if there is a labeled barrier edge `pred -> succ` in `cfg` either through an explicit barrier edge
  * or one implied by a barrier guard.
  */
-private predicate isLabeledBarrierEdge(
+private predicate isLabeledBarrierEdgeRaw(
   Configuration cfg, DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ, DataFlow::FlowLabel label
 ) {
   cfg.isBarrierEdge(pred, succ, label)
@@ -518,6 +553,21 @@ private predicate isLabeledBarrierEdge(
   )
 }
 
+/**
+ * Holds if there is a labeled barrier edge `pred -> succ` in `cfg` either through an explicit barrier edge
+ * or one implied by a barrier guard, or by an out/in barrier for `pred` or `succ`, respectively.
+ */
+pragma[inline]
+private predicate isLabeledBarrierEdge(
+  Configuration cfg, DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ, DataFlow::FlowLabel label
+) {
+  isLabeledBarrierEdgeRaw(cfg, pred, succ, label)
+  or
+  cfg.isBarrierOut(pred, label)
+  or
+  cfg.isBarrierIn(succ, label)
+}
+
 /**
  * A guard node that only blocks specific labels.
  */

javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/dataflow/TaintTracking.qll

@@ -62,6 +62,26 @@ module TaintTracking {
      */
     predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) { none() }
 
+    /**
+     * Holds if flow into `node` is prohibited.
+     */
+    predicate isSanitizerIn(DataFlow::Node node) { none() }
+
+    /**
+     * Holds if flow out `node` is prohibited.
+     */
+    predicate isSanitizerOut(DataFlow::Node node) { none() }
+
+    /**
+     * Holds if flow into `node` is prohibited for the flow label `lbl`.
+     */
+    predicate isSanitizerIn(DataFlow::Node node, DataFlow::FlowLabel lbl) { none() }
+
+    /**
+     * Holds if flow out `node` is prohibited for the flow label `lbl`.
+     */
+    predicate isSanitizerOut(DataFlow::Node node, DataFlow::FlowLabel lbl) { none() }
+
     /** Holds if the edge from `pred` to `succ` is a taint sanitizer. */
     predicate isSanitizerEdge(DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ) { none() }
 
@@ -108,6 +128,22 @@ module TaintTracking {
       this.isSanitizerEdge(source, sink) and lbl.isTaint()
     }
 
+    final override predicate isBarrierIn(DataFlow::Node node) { none() }
+
+    final override predicate isBarrierOut(DataFlow::Node node) { none() }
+
+    final override predicate isBarrierIn(DataFlow::Node node, DataFlow::FlowLabel lbl) {
+      this.isSanitizerIn(node, lbl)
+      or
+      this.isSanitizerIn(node) and lbl.isTaint()
+    }
+
+    final override predicate isBarrierOut(DataFlow::Node node, DataFlow::FlowLabel lbl) {
+      this.isSanitizerOut(node, lbl)
+      or
+      this.isSanitizerOut(node) and lbl.isTaint()
+    }
+
     final override predicate isBarrierGuard(DataFlow::BarrierGuardNode guard) {
       super.isBarrierGuard(guard) or
       guard.(AdditionalSanitizerGuardNode).appliesTo(this) or

javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/BuildArtifactLeakQuery.qll

@@ -27,10 +27,6 @@ class Configuration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
 
   override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) { node instanceof CleartextLogging::Barrier }
 
-  override predicate isSanitizerEdge(DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ) {
-    CleartextLogging::isSanitizerEdge(pred, succ)
-  }
-
   override predicate isAdditionalTaintStep(DataFlow::Node src, DataFlow::Node trg) {
     CleartextLogging::isAdditionalTaintStep(src, trg)
   }

javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/CleartextLoggingCustomizations.qll

@@ -175,12 +175,24 @@ module CleartextLogging {
   }
 
   /**
+   * DEPRECATED. Use `Barrier` instead, sanitized have been replaced by sanitized nodes.
+   *
    * Holds if the edge `pred` -> `succ` should be sanitized for clear-text logging of sensitive information.
    */
-  predicate isSanitizerEdge(DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ) {
+  deprecated predicate isSanitizerEdge(DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ) {
     succ.(DataFlow::PropRead).getBase() = pred
   }
 
+  private class PropReadAsBarrier extends Barrier {
+    PropReadAsBarrier() {
+      this = any(DataFlow::PropRead read).getBase() and
+      // the 'foo' in 'foo.bar()' may have flow, we only want to suppress plain property reads
+      not this = any(DataFlow::MethodCallNode call).getReceiver() and
+      // do not block custom taint steps from this node
+      not isAdditionalTaintStep(this, _)
+    }
+  }
+
   /**
    * Holds if the edge `src` -> `trg` is an additional taint-step for clear-text logging of sensitive information.
    */

javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/CleartextLoggingQuery.qll

@@ -33,10 +33,6 @@ class Configuration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
 
   override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) { node instanceof Barrier }
 
-  override predicate isSanitizerEdge(DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ) {
-    CleartextLogging::isSanitizerEdge(pred, succ)
-  }
-
   override predicate isAdditionalTaintStep(DataFlow::Node src, DataFlow::Node trg) {
     CleartextLogging::isAdditionalTaintStep(src, trg)
   }

javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/ClientSideRequestForgeryQuery.qll

@@ -31,9 +31,7 @@ class Configuration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
     node instanceof Sanitizer
   }
 
-  override predicate isSanitizerEdge(DataFlow::Node source, DataFlow::Node sink) {
-    sanitizingPrefixEdge(source, sink)
-  }
+  override predicate isSanitizerOut(DataFlow::Node node) { sanitizingPrefixEdge(node, _) }
 
   override predicate isAdditionalTaintStep(DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ) {
     isAdditionalRequestForgeryStep(pred, succ)

javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/ClientSideUrlRedirectQuery.qll

@@ -33,9 +33,7 @@ class Configuration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
     node instanceof Sanitizer
   }
 
-  override predicate isSanitizerEdge(DataFlow::Node source, DataFlow::Node sink) {
-    hostnameSanitizingPrefixEdge(source, sink)
-  }
+  override predicate isSanitizerOut(DataFlow::Node node) { hostnameSanitizingPrefixEdge(node, _) }
 
   override predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(
     DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ, DataFlow::FlowLabel f, DataFlow::FlowLabel g

javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/DomBasedXssCustomizations.qll

@@ -290,9 +290,13 @@ module DomBasedXss {
   private class HtmlSanitizerAsSanitizer extends Sanitizer instanceof HtmlSanitizerCall { }
 
   /**
+   * DEPRECATED. Use `isOptionallySanitizedNode` instead.
+   *
    * Holds if there exists two dataflow edges to `succ`, where one edges is sanitized, and the other edge starts with `pred`.
    */
-  predicate isOptionallySanitizedEdge(DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ) {
+  deprecated predicate isOptionallySanitizedEdge = isOptionallySanitizedEdgeInternal/2;
+
+  private predicate isOptionallySanitizedEdgeInternal(DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ) {
     exists(HtmlSanitizerCall sanitizer |
       // sanitized = sanitize ? sanitizer(source) : source;
       exists(ConditionalExpr branch, Variable var, VarAccess access |
@@ -319,6 +323,17 @@ module DomBasedXss {
     )
   }
 
+  /**
+   * Holds if `node` should be considered optionally sanitized as it occurs in a branch
+   * that controls whether sanitization is enabled.
+   *
+   * For example, in `sanitized = sanitize ? sanitizer(source) : source`, the right-hand `source` expression
+   * is considered an optionally sanitized node.
+   */
+  predicate isOptionallySanitizedNode(DataFlow::Node node) {
+    isOptionallySanitizedEdgeInternal(_, node)
+  }
+
   /** A source of remote user input, considered as a flow source for DOM-based XSS. */
   class RemoteFlowSourceAsSource extends Source instanceof RemoteFlowSource { }
 

javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/DomBasedXssQuery.qll

@@ -86,13 +86,9 @@ class Configuration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
     // we assume that `.join()` calls have a prefix, and thus block the prefix label.
     node = any(DataFlow::MethodCallNode call | call.getMethodName() = "join") and
     lbl = prefixLabel()
-  }
-
-  override predicate isSanitizerEdge(
-    DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ, DataFlow::FlowLabel label
-  ) {
-    isOptionallySanitizedEdge(pred, succ) and
-    label = [DataFlow::FlowLabel::taint(), prefixLabel(), TaintedUrlSuffix::label()]
+    or
+    isOptionallySanitizedNode(node) and
+    lbl = [DataFlow::FlowLabel::taint(), prefixLabel(), TaintedUrlSuffix::label()]
   }
 
   override predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(

javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/ExternalAPIUsedWithUntrustedDataQuery.qll

@@ -46,15 +46,11 @@ class Configuration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
     )
   }
 
-  override predicate isSanitizerEdge(DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ) {
+  override predicate isSanitizerIn(DataFlow::Node node) {
     // Block flow from the location to its properties, as the relevant properties (hash and search) are taint sources of their own.
     // The location source is only used for propagating through API calls like `new URL(location)` and into external APIs where
     // the whole location object escapes.
-    exists(DataFlow::PropRead read |
-      read = DOM::locationRef().getAPropertyRead() and
-      pred = read.getBase() and
-      succ = read
-    )
+    node = DOM::locationRef().getAPropertyRead()
   }
 }
 

javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/InsecureRandomnessQuery.qll

@@ -27,11 +27,9 @@ class Configuration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
     node instanceof Sanitizer
   }
 
-  override predicate isSanitizerEdge(DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ) {
+  override predicate isSanitizerOut(DataFlow::Node node) {
     // stop propagation at the sinks to avoid double reporting
-    pred instanceof Sink and
-    // constrain succ
-    pred = succ.getAPredecessor()
+    this.isSink(node)
   }
 
   override predicate isAdditionalTaintStep(DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ) {

javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/PrototypePollutingAssignmentQuery.qll

@@ -55,20 +55,11 @@ class Configuration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
     )
   }
 
-  override predicate isSanitizerEdge(
-    DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ, DataFlow::FlowLabel lbl
-  ) {
+  override predicate isSanitizerOut(DataFlow::Node node, DataFlow::FlowLabel lbl) {
     // Suppress the value-preserving step src -> dst in `extend(dst, src)`. This is modeled as a value-preserving
     // step because it preserves all properties, but the destination is not actually Object.prototype.
-    exists(ExtendCall call |
-      pred = call.getASourceOperand() and
-      (
-        succ = call.getDestinationOperand().getALocalSource()
-        or
-        succ = call
-      ) and
-      lbl instanceof ObjectPrototype
-    )
+    node = any(ExtendCall call).getASourceOperand() and
+    lbl instanceof ObjectPrototype
   }
 
   override predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(

javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/RequestForgeryQuery.qll

@@ -26,9 +26,7 @@ class Configuration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
     node instanceof Sanitizer
   }
 
-  override predicate isSanitizerEdge(DataFlow::Node source, DataFlow::Node sink) {
-    sanitizingPrefixEdge(source, sink)
-  }
+  override predicate isSanitizerOut(DataFlow::Node node) { sanitizingPrefixEdge(node, _) }
 
   override predicate isAdditionalTaintStep(DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ) {
     isAdditionalRequestForgeryStep(pred, succ)

javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/ResourceExhaustionQuery.qll

@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@ class Configuration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
 
   override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) {
     super.isSanitizer(node) or
-    node instanceof Sanitizer
+    node instanceof Sanitizer or
+    node = any(DataFlow::PropRead read | read.getPropertyName() = "length")
   }
 
   override predicate isAdditionalTaintStep(DataFlow::Node src, DataFlow::Node dst) {
@@ -32,10 +33,6 @@ class Configuration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
   override predicate isSanitizerGuard(TaintTracking::SanitizerGuardNode guard) {
     guard instanceof UpperBoundsCheckSanitizerGuard
   }
-
-  override predicate isSanitizerEdge(DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ) {
-    succ.(DataFlow::PropRead).accesses(pred, "length")
-  }
 }
 
 /** Holds if data is converted to a number from `src` to `dst`. */

javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/ServerSideUrlRedirectQuery.qll

@@ -27,9 +27,7 @@ class Configuration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
     node instanceof Sanitizer
   }
 
-  override predicate isSanitizerEdge(DataFlow::Node source, DataFlow::Node sink) {
-    hostnameSanitizingPrefixEdge(source, sink)
-  }
+  override predicate isSanitizerOut(DataFlow::Node node) { hostnameSanitizingPrefixEdge(node, _) }
 
   override predicate isSanitizerGuard(TaintTracking::SanitizerGuardNode guard) {
     guard instanceof LocalUrlSanitizingGuard or

javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/UnsafeHtmlConstructionQuery.qll

@@ -31,10 +31,8 @@ class Configration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
     node instanceof DomBasedXss::Sanitizer
     or
     node instanceof UnsafeJQueryPlugin::Sanitizer
-  }
-
-  override predicate isSanitizerEdge(DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ) {
-    DomBasedXss::isOptionallySanitizedEdge(pred, succ)
+    or
+    DomBasedXss::isOptionallySanitizedNode(node)
   }
 
   // override to require that there is a path without unmatched return steps

javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/UnsafeJQueryPluginQuery.qll

@@ -31,16 +31,13 @@ class Configuration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
     aliasPropertyPresenceStep(src, sink)
   }
 
-  override predicate isSanitizerEdge(DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ) {
+  override predicate isSanitizerOut(DataFlow::Node node) {
     // prefixing prevents forced html/css confusion:
     // prefixing through concatenation:
-    StringConcatenation::taintStep(pred, succ, _, any(int i | i >= 1))
+    StringConcatenation::taintStep(node, _, _, any(int i | i >= 1))
     or
     // prefixing through a poor-mans templating system:
-    exists(StringReplaceCall replace |
-      replace = succ and
-      pred = replace.getRawReplacement()
-    )
+    node = any(StringReplaceCall call).getRawReplacement()
   }
 
   override predicate isSanitizerGuard(TaintTracking::SanitizerGuardNode node) {

javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/UnvalidatedDynamicMethodCallCustomizations.qll

@@ -34,11 +34,24 @@ module UnvalidatedDynamicMethodCall {
 
   /**
    * A sanitizer for unvalidated dynamic method calls.
-   * Override the `sanitizes` predicate to specify an edge that should be sanitized.
-   * The `this` value is not seen as a sanitizer.
    */
   abstract class Sanitizer extends DataFlow::Node {
-    abstract predicate sanitizes(DataFlow::Node source, DataFlow::Node sink, DataFlow::FlowLabel lbl);
+    /**
+     * Gets the flow label blocked by this sanitizer.
+     */
+    DataFlow::FlowLabel getFlowLabel() { result.isTaint() }
+
+    /**
+     * DEPRECATED. Use sanitizer nodes instead.
+     *
+     * This predicate no longer has any effect. The `this` value of `Sanitizer` is instead
+     * treated as a sanitizing node, that is, flow in and out of that node is prohibited.
+     */
+    deprecated predicate sanitizes(
+      DataFlow::Node source, DataFlow::Node sink, DataFlow::FlowLabel lbl
+    ) {
+      none()
+    }
   }
 
   /**

javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/UnvalidatedDynamicMethodCallQuery.qll

@@ -38,10 +38,10 @@ class Configuration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
     sink.(Sink).getFlowLabel() = label
   }
 
-  override predicate isSanitizerEdge(
-    DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ, DataFlow::FlowLabel lbl
-  ) {
-    any(Sanitizer s).sanitizes(pred, succ, lbl)
+  override predicate isLabeledBarrier(DataFlow::Node node, DataFlow::FlowLabel label) {
+    super.isLabeledBarrier(node, label)
+    or
+    node.(Sanitizer).getFlowLabel() = label
   }
 
   override predicate isSanitizerGuard(TaintTracking::SanitizerGuardNode guard) {

javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/XssThroughDomQuery.qll

@@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ class Configuration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
 
   override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) {
     super.isSanitizer(node) or
-    node instanceof DomBasedXss::Sanitizer
+    node instanceof DomBasedXss::Sanitizer or
+    DomBasedXss::isOptionallySanitizedNode(node)
   }
 
   override predicate isSanitizerGuard(TaintTracking::SanitizerGuardNode guard) {
@@ -32,10 +33,6 @@ class Configuration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
     guard instanceof ContainsHtmlGuard
   }
 
-  override predicate isSanitizerEdge(DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ) {
-    DomBasedXss::isOptionallySanitizedEdge(pred, succ)
-  }
-
   override predicate isAdditionalTaintStep(DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ) {
     succ = DataFlow::globalVarRef("URL").getAMemberCall("createObjectURL") and
     pred = succ.(DataFlow::InvokeNode).getArgument(0)

javascript/ql/src/experimental/Security/CWE-918/SSRF.qll

@@ -29,8 +29,8 @@ class Configuration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
     )
   }
 
-  override predicate isSanitizerEdge(DataFlow::Node source, DataFlow::Node sink) {
-    this.strictSanitizingPrefixEdge(source, sink)
+  override predicate isSanitizerOut(DataFlow::Node node) {
+    this.strictSanitizingPrefixEdge(node, _)
   }
 
   override predicate isSanitizerGuard(TaintTracking::SanitizerGuardNode nd) {

javascript/ql/test/library-tests/InterProceduralFlow/DataFlowConfig.qll

@@ -22,10 +22,7 @@ class TestDataFlowConfiguration extends DataFlow::Configuration {
       f.getName().matches("%noReturnTracking%") and
       node = f.getAReturnedExpr().flow()
     )
-  }
-
-  override predicate isBarrierEdge(DataFlow::Node src, DataFlow::Node snk) {
-    src = src and
-    snk.asExpr().(PropAccess).getPropertyName() = "notTracked"
+    or
+    node.asExpr().(PropAccess).getPropertyName() = "notTracked"
   }
 }

javascript/ql/test/library-tests/InterProceduralFlow/tests.ql

@@ -61,11 +61,8 @@ class TestTaintTrackingConfiguration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
       f.getName().matches("%noReturnTracking%") and
       node = f.getAReturnedExpr().flow()
     )
-  }
-
-  override predicate isSanitizerEdge(DataFlow::Node src, DataFlow::Node snk) {
-    src = src and
-    snk.asExpr().(PropAccess).getPropertyName() = "notTracked"
+    or
+    node.asExpr().(PropAccess).getPropertyName() = "notTracked"
   }
 }
 
@@ -99,11 +96,8 @@ class GermanFlowConfig extends DataFlow::Configuration {
       f.getName().matches("%noReturnTracking%") and
       node = f.getAReturnedExpr().flow()
     )
-  }
-
-  override predicate isBarrierEdge(DataFlow::Node src, DataFlow::Node snk) {
-    src = src and
-    snk.asExpr().(PropAccess).getPropertyName() = "notTracked"
+    or
+    node.asExpr().(PropAccess).getPropertyName() = "notTracked"
   }
 }
 

javascript/ql/test/library-tests/TaintBarriers/ExampleConfiguration.qll

@@ -1,10 +1,18 @@
 import javascript
 
+DataFlow::Node sourceVariable() { result.asExpr().(VarRef).getName() = "sourceVariable" }
+
+StringOps::ConcatenationRoot sinkConcatenation() {
+  result.getConstantStringParts().matches("<sink>%</sink>")
+}
+
 class ExampleConfiguration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
   ExampleConfiguration() { this = "ExampleConfiguration" }
 
   override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) {
     source.asExpr().(CallExpr).getCalleeName() = "SOURCE"
+    or
+    source = sourceVariable()
   }
 
   override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
@@ -12,8 +20,14 @@ class ExampleConfiguration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
       callExpr.getCalleeName() = "SINK" and
       DataFlow::valueNode(callExpr.getArgument(0)) = sink
     )
+    or
+    sink = sinkConcatenation()
   }
 
+  override predicate isSanitizerIn(DataFlow::Node node) { node = sourceVariable() }
+
+  override predicate isSanitizerOut(DataFlow::Node node) { node = sinkConcatenation() }
+
   override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) {
     exists(CallExpr callExpr |
       callExpr.getCalleeName() = "SANITIZE" and

javascript/ql/test/library-tests/TaintBarriers/sanitizer-in-out.js

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+import 'dummy';
+
+function barrierIn() {
+    var sourceVariable = 123;
+    SINK(sourceVariable); // NOT OK
+
+    flowWithSourceParam(sourceVariable);
+}
+
+function barrierInParameter(sourceVariable) {
+    SINK(sourceVariable); // NOT OK, but only report the parameter as the source
+}
+
+function barrierOut() {
+    let taint = SOURCE();
+    taint = "<sink>" + taint + "</sink>"; // NOT OK
+    taint = "<sink>" + taint + "</sink>"; // OK - only report first instance
+}

javascript/ql/test/library-tests/TaintBarriers/tests.expected

@@ -133,6 +133,9 @@ sanitizingGuard
 | tst.js:399:16:399:41 | o.hasOw ... "p.q"]) | tst.js:399:33:399:40 | v["p.q"] | true |
 | tst.js:401:16:401:34 | Object.hasOwn(o, v) | tst.js:401:33:401:33 | v | true |
 taintedSink
+| sanitizer-in-out.js:5:10:5:23 | sourceVariable | sanitizer-in-out.js:5:10:5:23 | sourceVariable |
+| sanitizer-in-out.js:11:10:11:23 | sourceVariable | sanitizer-in-out.js:11:10:11:23 | sourceVariable |
+| sanitizer-in-out.js:15:17:15:24 | SOURCE() | sanitizer-in-out.js:16:13:16:40 | "<sink> ... /sink>" |
 | tst.js:2:13:2:20 | SOURCE() | tst.js:3:10:3:10 | v |
 | tst.js:2:13:2:20 | SOURCE() | tst.js:8:14:8:14 | v |
 | tst.js:2:13:2:20 | SOURCE() | tst.js:12:14:12:14 | v |

javascript/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-312/BuildArtifactLeak.expected

@@ -9,12 +9,15 @@ nodes
 | build-leaks.js:14:18:14:20 | env |
 | build-leaks.js:15:24:15:34 | process.env |
 | build-leaks.js:15:24:15:34 | process.env |
+| build-leaks.js:15:24:15:39 | process.env[key] |
 | build-leaks.js:16:20:16:22 | env |
 | build-leaks.js:21:11:26:5 | stringifed |
 | build-leaks.js:21:24:26:5 | {\\n      ... )\\n    } |
 | build-leaks.js:22:24:25:14 | Object. ...  }, {}) |
 | build-leaks.js:22:49:22:51 | env |
+| build-leaks.js:23:24:23:47 | JSON.st ... w[key]) |
 | build-leaks.js:23:39:23:41 | raw |
+| build-leaks.js:23:39:23:46 | raw[key] |
 | build-leaks.js:24:20:24:22 | env |
 | build-leaks.js:30:22:30:31 | stringifed |
 | build-leaks.js:34:26:34:57 | getEnv( ... ngified |
@@ -36,13 +39,19 @@ edges
 | build-leaks.js:14:18:14:20 | env | build-leaks.js:16:20:16:22 | env |
 | build-leaks.js:15:24:15:34 | process.env | build-leaks.js:14:18:14:20 | env |
 | build-leaks.js:15:24:15:34 | process.env | build-leaks.js:14:18:14:20 | env |
+| build-leaks.js:15:24:15:34 | process.env | build-leaks.js:15:24:15:39 | process.env[key] |
+| build-leaks.js:15:24:15:34 | process.env | build-leaks.js:15:24:15:39 | process.env[key] |
+| build-leaks.js:15:24:15:39 | process.env[key] | build-leaks.js:14:18:14:20 | env |
 | build-leaks.js:16:20:16:22 | env | build-leaks.js:13:17:19:10 | Object. ...      }) |
 | build-leaks.js:16:20:16:22 | env | build-leaks.js:14:18:14:20 | env |
 | build-leaks.js:21:11:26:5 | stringifed | build-leaks.js:30:22:30:31 | stringifed |
 | build-leaks.js:21:24:26:5 | {\\n      ... )\\n    } | build-leaks.js:21:11:26:5 | stringifed |
 | build-leaks.js:22:24:25:14 | Object. ...  }, {}) | build-leaks.js:21:24:26:5 | {\\n      ... )\\n    } |
 | build-leaks.js:22:49:22:51 | env | build-leaks.js:24:20:24:22 | env |
+| build-leaks.js:23:24:23:47 | JSON.st ... w[key]) | build-leaks.js:22:49:22:51 | env |
 | build-leaks.js:23:39:23:41 | raw | build-leaks.js:22:49:22:51 | env |
+| build-leaks.js:23:39:23:41 | raw | build-leaks.js:23:39:23:46 | raw[key] |
+| build-leaks.js:23:39:23:46 | raw[key] | build-leaks.js:23:24:23:47 | JSON.st ... w[key]) |
 | build-leaks.js:24:20:24:22 | env | build-leaks.js:22:24:25:14 | Object. ...  }, {}) |
 | build-leaks.js:24:20:24:22 | env | build-leaks.js:22:49:22:51 | env |
 | build-leaks.js:30:22:30:31 | stringifed | build-leaks.js:34:26:34:57 | getEnv( ... ngified |

python/ql/lib/semmle/python/dataflow/new/internal/DataFlowImpl.qll

@@ -2706,7 +2706,7 @@ module Impl<FullStateConfigSig Config> {
 
     ParamNodeEx getParamNode() { result = p }
 
-    override string toString() { result = p + ": " + ap }
+    override string toString() { result = p + concat(" : " + ppReprType(t)) + " " + ap }
 
     predicate hasLocationInfo(
       string filepath, int startline, int startcolumn, int endline, int endcolumn
@@ -2758,12 +2758,21 @@ module Impl<FullStateConfigSig Config> {
     )
   }
 
+  private predicate forceUnfold(AccessPathApprox apa) {
+    forceHighPrecision(apa.getHead())
+    or
+    exists(Content c2 |
+      apa = TConsCons(_, _, c2, _) and
+      forceHighPrecision(c2)
+    )
+  }
+
   /**
    * Holds with `unfold = false` if a precise head-tail representation of `apa` is
    * expected to be expensive. Holds with `unfold = true` otherwise.
    */
   private predicate evalUnfold(AccessPathApprox apa, boolean unfold) {
-    if forceHighPrecision(apa.getHead())
+    if forceUnfold(apa)
     then unfold = true
     else
       exists(int aps, int nodes, int apLimit, int tupleLimit |
@@ -3092,6 +3101,12 @@ module Impl<FullStateConfigSig Config> {
       result = " <" + this.(PathNodeMid).getCallContext().toString() + ">"
     }
 
+    private string ppSummaryCtx() {
+      this instanceof PathNodeSink and result = ""
+      or
+      result = " <" + this.(PathNodeMid).getSummaryCtx().toString() + ">"
+    }
+
     /** Gets a textual representation of this element. */
     string toString() { result = this.getNodeEx().toString() + this.ppType() + this.ppAp() }
 
@@ -3100,7 +3115,9 @@ module Impl<FullStateConfigSig Config> {
      * representation of the call context.
      */
     string toStringWithContext() {
-      result = this.getNodeEx().toString() + this.ppType() + this.ppAp() + this.ppCtx()
+      result =
+        this.getNodeEx().toString() + this.ppType() + this.ppAp() + this.ppCtx() +
+          this.ppSummaryCtx()
     }
 
     /**

ruby/ql/lib/codeql/ruby/ApiGraphs.qll

@@ -978,6 +978,12 @@ module API {
         pred = Impl::MkModuleInstanceUp(mod) and
         succ = getBackwardEndNode(mod.getOwnInstanceMethod("call"))
       )
+      or
+      // Step through callable wrappers like `proc` and `lambda` calls.
+      exists(DataFlow::Node node |
+        pred = getBackwardEndNode(node) and
+        succ = getBackwardStartNode(node.asCallable())
+      )
     }
 
     pragma[nomagic]

ruby/ql/lib/codeql/ruby/Concepts.qll

@@ -843,6 +843,58 @@ module XmlParserCall {
   }
 }
 
+/**
+ * A data-flow node that constructs an XPath expression.
+ *
+ * If it is important that the XPath expression is indeed executed, then use `XPathExecution`.
+ *
+ * Extend this class to refine existing API models. If you want to model new APIs,
+ * extend `XPathConstruction::Range` instead.
+ */
+class XPathConstruction extends DataFlow::Node instanceof XPathConstruction::Range {
+  /** Gets the argument that specifies the XPath expressions to be constructed. */
+  DataFlow::Node getXPath() { result = super.getXPath() }
+}
+
+/** Provides a class for modeling new XPath construction APIs. */
+module XPathConstruction {
+  /**
+   * A data-flow node that constructs an XPath expression.
+   *
+   * Extend this class to model new APIs. If you want to refine existing API models,
+   * extend `XPathConstruction` instead.
+   */
+  abstract class Range extends DataFlow::Node {
+    /** Gets the argument that specifies the XPath expressions to be constructed. */
+    abstract DataFlow::Node getXPath();
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * A data-flow node that executes an XPath expression.
+ *
+ * Extend this class to refine existing API models. If you want to model new APIs,
+ * extend `XPathExecution::Range` instead.
+ */
+class XPathExecution extends DataFlow::Node instanceof XPathExecution::Range {
+  /** Gets the argument that specifies the XPath expressions to be executed. */
+  DataFlow::Node getXPath() { result = super.getXPath() }
+}
+
+/** Provides a class for modeling new XPath execution APIs. */
+module XPathExecution {
+  /**
+   * A data-flow node that executes an XPath expression.
+   *
+   * Extend this class to model new APIs. If you want to refine existing API models,
+   * extend `XPathExecution` instead.
+   */
+  abstract class Range extends DataFlow::Node {
+    /** Gets the argument that specifies the XPath expressions to be executed. */
+    abstract DataFlow::Node getXPath();
+  }
+}
+
 /**
  * A data-flow node that may represent a database object in an ORM system.
  *

ruby/ql/lib/codeql/ruby/dataflow/internal/DataFlowImpl.qll

@@ -2706,7 +2706,7 @@ module Impl<FullStateConfigSig Config> {
 
     ParamNodeEx getParamNode() { result = p }
 
-    override string toString() { result = p + ": " + ap }
+    override string toString() { result = p + concat(" : " + ppReprType(t)) + " " + ap }
 
     predicate hasLocationInfo(
       string filepath, int startline, int startcolumn, int endline, int endcolumn
@@ -2758,12 +2758,21 @@ module Impl<FullStateConfigSig Config> {
     )
   }
 
+  private predicate forceUnfold(AccessPathApprox apa) {
+    forceHighPrecision(apa.getHead())
+    or
+    exists(Content c2 |
+      apa = TConsCons(_, _, c2, _) and
+      forceHighPrecision(c2)
+    )
+  }
+
   /**
    * Holds with `unfold = false` if a precise head-tail representation of `apa` is
    * expected to be expensive. Holds with `unfold = true` otherwise.
    */
   private predicate evalUnfold(AccessPathApprox apa, boolean unfold) {
-    if forceHighPrecision(apa.getHead())
+    if forceUnfold(apa)
     then unfold = true
     else
       exists(int aps, int nodes, int apLimit, int tupleLimit |
@@ -3092,6 +3101,12 @@ module Impl<FullStateConfigSig Config> {
       result = " <" + this.(PathNodeMid).getCallContext().toString() + ">"
     }
 
+    private string ppSummaryCtx() {
+      this instanceof PathNodeSink and result = ""
+      or
+      result = " <" + this.(PathNodeMid).getSummaryCtx().toString() + ">"
+    }
+
     /** Gets a textual representation of this element. */
     string toString() { result = this.getNodeEx().toString() + this.ppType() + this.ppAp() }
 
@@ -3100,7 +3115,9 @@ module Impl<FullStateConfigSig Config> {
      * representation of the call context.
      */
     string toStringWithContext() {
-      result = this.getNodeEx().toString() + this.ppType() + this.ppAp() + this.ppCtx()
+      result =
+        this.getNodeEx().toString() + this.ppType() + this.ppAp() + this.ppCtx() +
+          this.ppSummaryCtx()
     }
 
     /**

ruby/ql/lib/codeql/ruby/dataflow/internal/DataFlowPrivate.qll

@@ -1333,11 +1333,20 @@ predicate lambdaCreation(Node creation, LambdaCallKind kind, DataFlowCallable c)
     creation.asExpr() =
       any(CfgNodes::ExprNodes::MethodCallCfgNode mc |
         c.asCallable() = mc.getBlock().getExpr() and
-        mc.getExpr().getMethodName() = ["lambda", "proc"]
+        isProcCreationCall(mc.getExpr())
       )
   )
 }
 
+/** Holds if `call` is a call to `lambda`, `proc`, or `Proc.new` */
+pragma[nomagic]
+private predicate isProcCreationCall(MethodCall call) {
+  call.getMethodName() = ["proc", "lambda"]
+  or
+  call.getMethodName() = "new" and
+  call.getReceiver().(ConstantReadAccess).getAQualifiedName() = "Proc"
+}
+
 /**
  * Holds if `call` is a from-source lambda call of kind `kind` where `receiver`
  * is the lambda expression.

ruby/ql/lib/codeql/ruby/frameworks/XmlParsing.qll

@@ -45,6 +45,17 @@ private class NokogiriXmlParserCall extends XmlParserCall::Range, DataFlow::Call
   }
 }
 
+/** Execution of a XPath statement. */
+private class NokogiriXPathExecution extends XPathExecution::Range, DataFlow::CallNode {
+  NokogiriXPathExecution() {
+    exists(NokogiriXmlParserCall parserCall |
+      this = parserCall.getAMethodCall(["xpath", "at_xpath", "search", "at"])
+    )
+  }
+
+  override DataFlow::Node getXPath() { result = this.getArgument(0) }
+}
+
 /**
  * Holds if `assign` enables the `default_substitute_entities` option in
  * libxml-ruby.
@@ -123,6 +134,40 @@ private predicate xmlMiniEntitySubstitutionEnabled() {
   enablesLibXmlDefaultEntitySubstitution(_)
 }
 
+/** Execution of a XPath statement. */
+private class LibXmlXPathExecution extends XPathExecution::Range, DataFlow::CallNode {
+  LibXmlXPathExecution() {
+    exists(LibXmlRubyXmlParserCall parserCall |
+      this = parserCall.getAMethodCall(["find", "find_first"])
+    )
+  }
+
+  override DataFlow::Node getXPath() { result = this.getArgument(0) }
+}
+
+/** A call to `REXML::Document.new`, considered as a XML parsing. */
+private class RexmlParserCall extends XmlParserCall::Range, DataFlow::CallNode {
+  RexmlParserCall() {
+    this = API::getTopLevelMember("REXML").getMember("Document").getAnInstantiation()
+  }
+
+  override DataFlow::Node getInput() { result = this.getArgument(0) }
+
+  /** No option for parsing */
+  override predicate externalEntitiesEnabled() { none() }
+}
+
+/** Execution of a XPath statement. */
+private class RexmlXPathExecution extends XPathExecution::Range, DataFlow::CallNode {
+  RexmlXPathExecution() {
+    this =
+      [API::getTopLevelMember("REXML").getMember("XPath"), API::getTopLevelMember("XPath")]
+          .getAMethodCall(["each", "first", "match"])
+  }
+
+  override DataFlow::Node getXPath() { result = this.getArgument(1) }
+}
+
 /**
  * A call to `ActiveSupport::XmlMini.parse` considered as an `XmlParserCall`.
  */

ruby/ql/lib/codeql/ruby/frameworks/rack/internal/App.qll

@@ -18,16 +18,7 @@ private class PotentialRequestHandler extends DataFlow::CallableNode {
     (
       this.(DataFlow::MethodNode).getMethodName() = "call"
       or
-      not this instanceof DataFlow::MethodNode and
-      exists(DataFlow::CallNode cn | cn.getMethodName() = "run" |
-        this.(DataFlow::LocalSourceNode).flowsTo(cn.getArgument(0))
-        or
-        // TODO: `Proc.new` should automatically propagate flow from its block argument
-        any(DataFlow::CallNode proc |
-          proc = API::getTopLevelMember("Proc").getAnInstantiation() and
-          proc.getBlock() = this
-        ).(DataFlow::LocalSourceNode).flowsTo(cn.getArgument(0))
-      )
+      this = API::getTopLevelCall("run").getArgument(0).asCallable()
     )
   }
 }

ruby/ql/lib/codeql/ruby/security/XpathInjectionCustomizations.qll

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/**
+ * Provides class and predicates to track external data that
+ * may represent malicious xpath query objects.
+ *
+ * This module is intended to be imported into a taint-tracking query.
+ */
+
+private import codeql.ruby.Concepts
+private import codeql.ruby.DataFlow
+private import codeql.ruby.dataflow.BarrierGuards
+private import codeql.ruby.dataflow.RemoteFlowSources
+
+/** Models Xpath Injection related classes and functions */
+module XpathInjection {
+  /** A data flow source for "XPath injection" vulnerabilities. */
+  abstract class Source extends DataFlow::Node { }
+
+  /** A data flow sink for "XPath injection" vulnerabilities */
+  abstract class Sink extends DataFlow::Node { }
+
+  /** A sanitizer for "XPath injection" vulnerabilities. */
+  abstract class Sanitizer extends DataFlow::Node { }
+
+  /**
+   * A source of remote user input, considered as a flow source.
+   */
+  private class RemoteFlowSourceAsSource extends Source, RemoteFlowSource { }
+
+  /**
+   * An execution of an XPath expression, considered as a sink.
+   */
+  private class XPathExecutionAsSink extends Sink {
+    XPathExecutionAsSink() { this = any(XPathExecution e).getXPath() }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * A construction of an XPath expression, considered as a sink.
+   */
+  private class XPathConstructionAsSink extends Sink {
+    XPathConstructionAsSink() { this = any(XPathConstruction c).getXPath() }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * A comparison with a constant string, considered as a sanitizer-guard.
+   */
+  private class StringConstCompareAsSanitizerGuard extends Sanitizer, StringConstCompareBarrier { }
+
+  /**
+   * An inclusion check against an array of constant strings, considered as a
+   * sanitizer-guard.
+   */
+  private class StringConstArrayInclusionCallAsSanitizer extends Sanitizer,
+    StringConstArrayInclusionCallBarrier
+  { }
+}

ruby/ql/lib/codeql/ruby/security/XpathInjectionQuery.qll

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/**
+ * Provides a taint-tracking configuration for detecting "Xpath Injection" vulnerabilities.
+ *
+ * Note, for performance reasons: only import this file if
+ * `XpathInjection::Configuration` is needed, otherwise
+ * `XpathInjectionCustomizations` should be imported instead.
+ */
+
+private import codeql.ruby.DataFlow
+private import codeql.ruby.TaintTracking
+import XpathInjectionCustomizations::XpathInjection
+
+/** Provides a taint-tracking configuration for detecting "Xpath Injection" vulnerabilities. */
+module XpathInjection {
+  /**
+   * A taint-tracking configuration for detecting "Xpath Injection" vulnerabilities.
+   */
+  private module Config implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+    predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof Source }
+
+    predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof Sink }
+
+    predicate isBarrier(DataFlow::Node node) { node instanceof Sanitizer }
+  }
+
+  import TaintTracking::Global<Config>
+}

ruby/ql/src/change-notes/2023-05-11-xpath-injection-query.md

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+---
+category: newQuery
+---
+* Added a new experimental query, `rb/xpath-injection`, to detect cases where XPath statements are constructed from user input in an unsafe manner.

ruby/ql/src/change-notes/2023-06-29-api-graph-explicit-proc-lambda.md

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+---
+category: minorAnalysis
+---
+* Improved resolution of calls performed on an object created with `Proc.new`.

ruby/ql/src/experimental/xpath-injection/XpathInjection.qhelp

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+<!DOCTYPE qhelp PUBLIC "-//Semmle//qhelp//EN" "qhelp.dtd">
+<qhelp>
+
+<overview>
+<p>
+If an XPath expression is built using string concatenation, and the components of the concatenation
+include user input, it makes it very easy for a user to create a malicious XPath expression.
+</p>
+</overview>
+
+<recommendation>
+<p>
+If user input must be included in an XPath expression, either sanitize the data or use variable
+references to safely embed it without altering the structure of the expression.
+</p>
+</recommendation>
+
+<example>
+<p>
+The following example uses the <code>nokogiri</code>, <code>rexml</code> and <code>libxml</code> XML parsers to parse a string <code>xml</code>.
+Then the xpath query is controlled by the user and hence leads to a vulnerability.
+</p>
+<sample src="examples/XPathBad.rb"/>
+
+<p>
+To guard against XPath Injection attacks, the user input should be sanitized.
+</p>
+<sample src="examples/XPathGood.rb"/>
+</example>
+
+<references>
+<li>
+OWASP:
+<a href="https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/XPATH_Injection">XPath injection</a>.
+</li>
+</references>
+</qhelp>

ruby/ql/src/experimental/xpath-injection/XpathInjection.ql

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+/**
+ * @name XPath query built from user-controlled sources
+ * @description Building a XPath query from user-controlled sources is vulnerable to insertion of
+ *              malicious XPath code by the user.
+ * @kind path-problem
+ * @problem.severity error
+ * @security-severity 9.8
+ * @precision high
+ * @id rb/xpath-injection
+ * @tags security
+ *       external/cwe/cwe-643
+ */
+
+import codeql.ruby.DataFlow
+import codeql.ruby.security.XpathInjectionQuery
+import XpathInjection::PathGraph
+
+from XpathInjection::PathNode source, XpathInjection::PathNode sink
+where XpathInjection::flowPath(source, sink)
+select sink.getNode(), source, sink, "XPath expression depends on a $@.", source.getNode(),
+  "user-provided value"

ruby/ql/src/experimental/xpath-injection/examples/XPathBad.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+require 'nokogiri'
+require 'rexml'
+require 'libxml'
+
+class BadNokogiriController < ActionController::Base
+  def some_request_handler
+    name = params["name"]
+    xml = <<-XML
+      <root>
+        <foo>bar</foo>
+        <password>THIS IS SECRET</password>
+      </root>
+    XML
+    doc = Nokogiri::XML.parse(xml)
+    results = doc.xpath("//#{name}")
+  end
+end
+
+class BadRexmlController < ActionController::Base
+  def some_request_handler
+    name = params["name"]
+    xml = <<-XML
+      <root>
+        <foo>bar</foo>
+        <password>THIS IS SECRET</password>
+      </root>
+    XML
+    doc = REXML::Document.new(xml)
+    results = REXML::XPath.first(doc, "//#{name}")
+  end
+end
+
+class BadLibxmlController < ActionController::Base
+  def some_request_handler
+    name = params["name"]
+    xml = <<-XML
+      <root>
+        <foo>bar</foo>
+        <password>THIS IS SECRET</password>
+      </root>
+    XML
+    doc = LibXML::XML::Document.string(xml)
+    results = doc.find_first("//#{name}")
+  end
+end

ruby/ql/src/experimental/xpath-injection/examples/XPathGood.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+require 'nokogiri'
+require 'rexml'
+require 'libxml'
+
+class BadNokogiriController < ActionController::Base
+  def some_request_handler
+    name = params["name"]
+    xml = <<-XML
+      <root>
+        <foo>bar</foo>
+        <password>THIS IS SECRET</password>
+      </root>
+    XML
+    doc = Nokogiri::XML.parse(xml)
+    name = if ["foo", "foo2"].include? name
+      name
+    else 
+      name = "foo"
+    end
+    results = doc.xpath("//#{name}")
+  end
+end
+
+class BadRexmlController < ActionController::Base
+  def some_request_handler
+    name = params["name"]
+    xml = <<-XML
+      <root>
+        <foo>bar</foo>
+        <password>THIS IS SECRET</password>
+      </root>
+    XML
+    doc = REXML::Document.new(xml)
+    name = if ["foo", "foo2"].include? name
+      name
+    else 
+      name = "foo"
+    end
+    results = REXML::XPath.first(doc, "//#{name}")
+  end
+end
+
+class BadLibxmlController < ActionController::Base
+  def some_request_handler
+    name = params["name"]
+    xml = <<-XML
+      <root>
+        <foo>bar</foo>
+        <password>THIS IS SECRET</password>
+      </root>
+    XML
+    doc = LibXML::XML::Document.string(xml)
+    name = if ["foo", "foo2"].include? name
+      name
+    else 
+      name = "foo"
+    end
+    results = doc.find_first("//#{name}")
+  end
+end

ruby/ql/test/library-tests/dataflow/api-graphs/explicit-proc.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+Foo.bar proc { |x|
+    x # $ reachableFromSource=Member[Foo].Method[bar].Argument[0].Parameter[0]
+}
+
+Foo.bar lambda { |x|
+    x # $ reachableFromSource=Member[Foo].Method[bar].Argument[0].Parameter[0]
+}
+
+Foo.bar Proc.new { |x|
+    x # $ reachableFromSource=Member[Foo].Method[bar].Argument[0].Parameter[0]
+}

ruby/ql/test/query-tests/experimental/XPathInjection/LibxmlInjection.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+require 'libxml'
+
+class FooController < ActionController::Base
+  def libxml_handler(event:, context:)
+    name = params[:user_name]
+
+    xml = <<-XML
+      <root>
+        <foo>bar</foo>
+        <password>THIS IS SECRET</password>
+      </root>
+    XML
+
+    # Parse the XML
+    doc = LibXML::XML::Document.string(xml)
+
+    # GOOD: XPath query is not constructed from user input
+    results1 = doc.find_first('//foo')
+
+    # BAD: XPath query is constructed from user input
+    results2 = doc.find_first("//#{name}")
+
+    # GOOD: XPath query is not constructed from user input
+    results3 = doc.find('//foo')
+
+    # BAD: XPath query is constructed from user input
+    results4 = doc.find("//#{name}")
+  end
+end
+
+class BarController < ActionController::Base
+  def libxml_safe_handler(event:, context:)
+    safe_name = params[:user_name]
+
+    xml = <<-XML
+      <root>
+        <foo>bar</foo>
+        <password>THIS IS SECRET</password>
+      </root>
+    XML
+
+    # Parse the XML
+    doc = REXML::Document.new(xml)
+
+    # GOOD: barrier guard prevents taint flow
+    safe_name = if ["foo", "foo2"].include? safe_name
+      safe_name
+    else 
+      safe_name = "foo"
+    end
+
+    # GOOD: XPath query is not constructed from unsanitized user input
+    results5 = doc.find_first("//#{safe_name}")
+
+    # GOOD: XPath query is not constructed from unsanitized user input
+    results6 = doc.find("//#{safe_name}")
+
+  end
+end

ruby/ql/test/query-tests/experimental/XPathInjection/NokogiriInjection.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+require 'nokogiri'
+
+class FooController < ActionController::Base
+  def nokogiri_handler(event:, context:)
+    name = params[:user_name]
+
+    xml = <<-XML
+      <root>
+        <foo>bar</foo>
+        <password>THIS IS SECRET</password>
+      </root>
+    XML
+
+    # Parse the XML
+    doc = Nokogiri::XML.parse(xml)
+
+    # GOOD: XPath query is not constructed from user input
+    results1 = doc.at('//foo')
+
+    # BAD: XPath query is constructed from user input
+    results2 = doc.at("//#{name}")
+
+    # GOOD: XPath query is not constructed from user input
+    results3 = doc.xpath('//foo')
+
+    # BAD: XPath query is constructed from user input
+    results4 = doc.xpath("//#{name}")
+
+    # GOOD: XPath query is not constructed from user input
+    results5 = doc.at_xpath('//foo')
+
+    # BAD: XPath query is constructed from user input
+    results6 = doc.at_xpath("//#{name}")
+
+    # GOOD: XPath query is not constructed from user input
+    doc.xpath('//foo').each do |element|
+        puts element.text
+    end
+
+    # BAD: XPath query constructed from user input
+    doc.xpath("//#{name}").each do |element|
+        puts element.text
+    end
+
+    # GOOD: XPath query is not constructed from user input
+    doc.search('//foo').each do |element|
+        puts element.text
+    end
+
+    # BAD: XPath query constructed from user input
+    doc.search("//#{name}").each do |element|
+        puts element.text
+    end
+  end
+end
+
+class BarController < ActionController::Base
+  def nokogiri_safe_handler(event:, context:)
+    safe_name = params[:user_name]
+
+    xml = <<-XML
+      <root>
+        <foo>bar</foo>
+        <password>THIS IS SECRET</password>
+      </root>
+    XML
+
+    # Parse the XML
+    doc = Nokogiri::XML.parse(xml)
+
+    # GOOD: barrier guard prevents taint flow
+    safe_name = if ["foo", "foo2"].include? safe_name
+      safe_name
+    else 
+      safe_name = "foo"
+    end
+
+    # GOOD: XPath query is not constructed from unsanitized user input
+    results7 = doc.at("//#{safe_name}")
+
+    # GOOD: XPath query is not constructed from unsanitized user input
+    results8 = doc.xpath("//#{safe_name}")
+
+    # GOOD: XPath query is not constructed from unsanitized user input
+    results9 = doc.at_xpath("//#{safe_name}")
+
+  end
+end

ruby/ql/test/query-tests/experimental/XPathInjection/RexmlInjection.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+require 'rexml'
+
+class FooController < ActionController::Base
+  def rexml_handler(event:, context:)
+    name = params[:user_name]
+
+    xml = <<-XML
+        <root>
+            <foo>bar</foo>
+            <password>THIS IS SECRET</password>
+        </root>
+    XML
+
+    # Parse the XML
+    doc = REXML::Document.new(xml)
+
+    # GOOD: XPath query is not constructed from user input
+    results1 = REXML::XPath.first(doc, "//foo")
+
+    # BAD: XPath query is constructed from user input
+    results2 = REXML::XPath.first(doc, "//#{name}")
+
+    # GOOD: XPath query is not constructed from user input
+    results3 = REXML::XPath.match(doc, "//foo", nil)
+
+    # BAD: XPath query is constructed from user input
+    results4 = REXML::XPath.match(doc, "//#{name}", nil)
+
+    # GOOD: XPath query is not constructed from user input
+    REXML::XPath.each(doc, "//foo") do |element|
+        puts element.text
+    end
+
+    # BAD: XPath query constructed from user input
+    REXML::XPath.each(doc, "//#{name}") do |element|
+        puts element.text
+    end
+  end
+end
+
+class BarController < ActionController::Base
+  def rexml_safe_handler(event:, context:)
+    safe_name = params[:user_name]
+
+    xml = <<-XML
+      <root>
+        <foo>bar</foo>
+        <password>THIS IS SECRET</password>
+      </root>
+    XML
+
+    # Parse the XML
+    doc = REXML::Document.new(xml)
+
+    # GOOD: barrier guard prevents taint flow
+    safe_name = if ["foo", "foo2"].include? safe_name
+      safe_name
+    else 
+      safe_name = "foo"
+    end
+
+    # GOOD: XPath query is not constructed from unsanitized user input
+    results5 = REXML::XPath.first(doc, "//#{safe_name}")
+
+    # GOOD: XPath query is not constructed from unsanitized user input
+    results6 = REXML::XPath.match(doc, "//#{safe_name}", nil)
+
+  end
+end

ruby/ql/test/query-tests/experimental/XPathInjection/XPathInjection.expected

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+edges
+| LibxmlInjection.rb:5:5:5:8 | name | LibxmlInjection.rb:21:31:21:41 | "//#{...}" |
+| LibxmlInjection.rb:5:5:5:8 | name | LibxmlInjection.rb:27:25:27:35 | "//#{...}" |
+| LibxmlInjection.rb:5:12:5:17 | call to params | LibxmlInjection.rb:5:12:5:29 | ...[...] |
+| LibxmlInjection.rb:5:12:5:29 | ...[...] | LibxmlInjection.rb:5:5:5:8 | name |
+| NokogiriInjection.rb:5:5:5:8 | name | NokogiriInjection.rb:21:23:21:33 | "//#{...}" |
+| NokogiriInjection.rb:5:5:5:8 | name | NokogiriInjection.rb:27:26:27:36 | "//#{...}" |
+| NokogiriInjection.rb:5:5:5:8 | name | NokogiriInjection.rb:33:29:33:39 | "//#{...}" |
+| NokogiriInjection.rb:5:5:5:8 | name | NokogiriInjection.rb:41:15:41:25 | "//#{...}" |
+| NokogiriInjection.rb:5:5:5:8 | name | NokogiriInjection.rb:51:16:51:26 | "//#{...}" |
+| NokogiriInjection.rb:5:12:5:17 | call to params | NokogiriInjection.rb:5:12:5:29 | ...[...] |
+| NokogiriInjection.rb:5:12:5:29 | ...[...] | NokogiriInjection.rb:5:5:5:8 | name |
+| RexmlInjection.rb:5:5:5:8 | name | RexmlInjection.rb:21:40:21:50 | "//#{...}" |
+| RexmlInjection.rb:5:5:5:8 | name | RexmlInjection.rb:27:40:27:50 | "//#{...}" |
+| RexmlInjection.rb:5:5:5:8 | name | RexmlInjection.rb:35:28:35:38 | "//#{...}" |
+| RexmlInjection.rb:5:12:5:17 | call to params | RexmlInjection.rb:5:12:5:29 | ...[...] |
+| RexmlInjection.rb:5:12:5:29 | ...[...] | RexmlInjection.rb:5:5:5:8 | name |
+nodes
+| LibxmlInjection.rb:5:5:5:8 | name | semmle.label | name |
+| LibxmlInjection.rb:5:12:5:17 | call to params | semmle.label | call to params |
+| LibxmlInjection.rb:5:12:5:29 | ...[...] | semmle.label | ...[...] |
+| LibxmlInjection.rb:21:31:21:41 | "//#{...}" | semmle.label | "//#{...}" |
+| LibxmlInjection.rb:27:25:27:35 | "//#{...}" | semmle.label | "//#{...}" |
+| NokogiriInjection.rb:5:5:5:8 | name | semmle.label | name |
+| NokogiriInjection.rb:5:12:5:17 | call to params | semmle.label | call to params |
+| NokogiriInjection.rb:5:12:5:29 | ...[...] | semmle.label | ...[...] |
+| NokogiriInjection.rb:21:23:21:33 | "//#{...}" | semmle.label | "//#{...}" |
+| NokogiriInjection.rb:27:26:27:36 | "//#{...}" | semmle.label | "//#{...}" |
+| NokogiriInjection.rb:33:29:33:39 | "//#{...}" | semmle.label | "//#{...}" |
+| NokogiriInjection.rb:41:15:41:25 | "//#{...}" | semmle.label | "//#{...}" |
+| NokogiriInjection.rb:51:16:51:26 | "//#{...}" | semmle.label | "//#{...}" |
+| RexmlInjection.rb:5:5:5:8 | name | semmle.label | name |
+| RexmlInjection.rb:5:12:5:17 | call to params | semmle.label | call to params |
+| RexmlInjection.rb:5:12:5:29 | ...[...] | semmle.label | ...[...] |
+| RexmlInjection.rb:21:40:21:50 | "//#{...}" | semmle.label | "//#{...}" |
+| RexmlInjection.rb:27:40:27:50 | "//#{...}" | semmle.label | "//#{...}" |
+| RexmlInjection.rb:35:28:35:38 | "//#{...}" | semmle.label | "//#{...}" |
+subpaths
+#select
+| LibxmlInjection.rb:21:31:21:41 | "//#{...}" | LibxmlInjection.rb:5:12:5:17 | call to params | LibxmlInjection.rb:21:31:21:41 | "//#{...}" | XPath expression depends on a $@. | LibxmlInjection.rb:5:12:5:17 | call to params | user-provided value |
+| LibxmlInjection.rb:27:25:27:35 | "//#{...}" | LibxmlInjection.rb:5:12:5:17 | call to params | LibxmlInjection.rb:27:25:27:35 | "//#{...}" | XPath expression depends on a $@. | LibxmlInjection.rb:5:12:5:17 | call to params | user-provided value |
+| NokogiriInjection.rb:21:23:21:33 | "//#{...}" | NokogiriInjection.rb:5:12:5:17 | call to params | NokogiriInjection.rb:21:23:21:33 | "//#{...}" | XPath expression depends on a $@. | NokogiriInjection.rb:5:12:5:17 | call to params | user-provided value |
+| NokogiriInjection.rb:27:26:27:36 | "//#{...}" | NokogiriInjection.rb:5:12:5:17 | call to params | NokogiriInjection.rb:27:26:27:36 | "//#{...}" | XPath expression depends on a $@. | NokogiriInjection.rb:5:12:5:17 | call to params | user-provided value |
+| NokogiriInjection.rb:33:29:33:39 | "//#{...}" | NokogiriInjection.rb:5:12:5:17 | call to params | NokogiriInjection.rb:33:29:33:39 | "//#{...}" | XPath expression depends on a $@. | NokogiriInjection.rb:5:12:5:17 | call to params | user-provided value |
+| NokogiriInjection.rb:41:15:41:25 | "//#{...}" | NokogiriInjection.rb:5:12:5:17 | call to params | NokogiriInjection.rb:41:15:41:25 | "//#{...}" | XPath expression depends on a $@. | NokogiriInjection.rb:5:12:5:17 | call to params | user-provided value |
+| NokogiriInjection.rb:51:16:51:26 | "//#{...}" | NokogiriInjection.rb:5:12:5:17 | call to params | NokogiriInjection.rb:51:16:51:26 | "//#{...}" | XPath expression depends on a $@. | NokogiriInjection.rb:5:12:5:17 | call to params | user-provided value |
+| RexmlInjection.rb:21:40:21:50 | "//#{...}" | RexmlInjection.rb:5:12:5:17 | call to params | RexmlInjection.rb:21:40:21:50 | "//#{...}" | XPath expression depends on a $@. | RexmlInjection.rb:5:12:5:17 | call to params | user-provided value |
+| RexmlInjection.rb:27:40:27:50 | "//#{...}" | RexmlInjection.rb:5:12:5:17 | call to params | RexmlInjection.rb:27:40:27:50 | "//#{...}" | XPath expression depends on a $@. | RexmlInjection.rb:5:12:5:17 | call to params | user-provided value |
+| RexmlInjection.rb:35:28:35:38 | "//#{...}" | RexmlInjection.rb:5:12:5:17 | call to params | RexmlInjection.rb:35:28:35:38 | "//#{...}" | XPath expression depends on a $@. | RexmlInjection.rb:5:12:5:17 | call to params | user-provided value |

ruby/ql/test/query-tests/experimental/XPathInjection/XPathInjection.qlref

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+experimental/xpath-injection/XpathInjection.ql

swift/ql/lib/change-notes/2023-05-30-sensitive-exprs.md

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+---
+category: minorAnalysis
+---
+* Added new heuristics to `SensitiveExprs.qll`, enhancing detection from the library.

swift/ql/lib/codeql/swift/dataflow/internal/DataFlowImpl.qll

@@ -2706,7 +2706,7 @@ module Impl<FullStateConfigSig Config> {
 
     ParamNodeEx getParamNode() { result = p }
 
-    override string toString() { result = p + ": " + ap }
+    override string toString() { result = p + concat(" : " + ppReprType(t)) + " " + ap }
 
     predicate hasLocationInfo(
       string filepath, int startline, int startcolumn, int endline, int endcolumn
@@ -2758,12 +2758,21 @@ module Impl<FullStateConfigSig Config> {
     )
   }
 
+  private predicate forceUnfold(AccessPathApprox apa) {
+    forceHighPrecision(apa.getHead())
+    or
+    exists(Content c2 |
+      apa = TConsCons(_, _, c2, _) and
+      forceHighPrecision(c2)
+    )
+  }
+
   /**
    * Holds with `unfold = false` if a precise head-tail representation of `apa` is
    * expected to be expensive. Holds with `unfold = true` otherwise.
    */
   private predicate evalUnfold(AccessPathApprox apa, boolean unfold) {
-    if forceHighPrecision(apa.getHead())
+    if forceUnfold(apa)
     then unfold = true
     else
       exists(int aps, int nodes, int apLimit, int tupleLimit |
@@ -3092,6 +3101,12 @@ module Impl<FullStateConfigSig Config> {
       result = " <" + this.(PathNodeMid).getCallContext().toString() + ">"
     }
 
+    private string ppSummaryCtx() {
+      this instanceof PathNodeSink and result = ""
+      or
+      result = " <" + this.(PathNodeMid).getSummaryCtx().toString() + ">"
+    }
+
     /** Gets a textual representation of this element. */
     string toString() { result = this.getNodeEx().toString() + this.ppType() + this.ppAp() }
 
@@ -3100,7 +3115,9 @@ module Impl<FullStateConfigSig Config> {
      * representation of the call context.
      */
     string toStringWithContext() {
-      result = this.getNodeEx().toString() + this.ppType() + this.ppAp() + this.ppCtx()
+      result =
+        this.getNodeEx().toString() + this.ppType() + this.ppAp() + this.ppCtx() +
+          this.ppSummaryCtx()
     }
 
     /**

swift/ql/lib/codeql/swift/security/SensitiveExprs.qll

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ class SensitiveCredential extends SensitiveDataType, TCredential {
       result = HeuristicNames::maybeSensitiveRegexp(classification)
     )
     or
-    result = "(?is).*(account|accnt|license).?(id|key).*"
+    result = "(?is).*((account|accnt|licen(se|ce)).?(id|key)|one.?time.?code|pass.?phrase).*"
   }
 }
 
@@ -50,21 +50,26 @@ class SensitivePrivateInfo extends SensitiveDataType, TPrivateInfo {
       "(?is).*(" +
         // Inspired by the list on https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/359.html
         // Government identifiers, such as Social Security Numbers
-        "social.?security|national.?insurance|" +
+        "social.?security|employer.?identification|national.?insurance|resident.?id|" +
+        "passport.?(num|no)|" +
         // Contact information, such as home addresses
-        "post.?code|zip.?code|home.?address|" +
+        "post.?code|zip.?code|home.?addr|" +
         // and telephone numbers
-        "(mob(ile)?|home).?(num|no|tel|phone)|(tel|fax).?(num|no)|telephone|" +
+        "(mob(ile)?|home).?(num|no|tel|phone)|(tel|fax).?(num|no|phone)|" + "emergency.?contact|" +
         // Geographic location - where the user is (or was)
-        "latitude|longitude|" +
+        "l(atitude|ongitude)|nationality|" +
         // Financial data - such as credit card numbers, salary, bank accounts, and debts
-        "credit.?card|debit.?card|salary|bank.?account|acc(ou)?nt.?(no|num)|" +
+        "(credit|debit|bank|visa).?(card|num|no|acc(ou?)nt)|acc(ou)?nt.?(no|num|credit)|" +
+        "salary|billing|credit.?(rating|score)|" +
         // Communications - e-mail addresses, private e-mail messages, SMS text messages, chat logs, etc.
-        "email|" +
+        "e(mail|_mail)|" +
         // Health - medical conditions, insurance status, prescription records
-        "birthday|birth.?date|date.?of.?birth|medical|" +
+        "birth.?da(te|y)|da(te|y).?(of.?)?birth|" +
+        "medical|(health|care).?plan|healthkit|appointment|prescription|" +
+        "blood.?(type|alcohol|glucose|pressure)|heart.?(rate|rhythm)|body.?(mass|fat)|" +
+        "menstrua|pregnan|insulin|inhaler|" +
         // Relationships - work and family
-        "employer|spouse" +
+        "employ(er|ee)|spouse|maiden.?name" +
         // ---
         ").*"
   }
@@ -80,13 +85,32 @@ private string regexpProbablySafe() {
   result = "(?is).*(file|path|url|invalid).*"
 }
 
+/**
+ * Gets a string that is to be tested for sensitivity.
+ */
+private string sensitiveCandidateStrings() {
+  result = any(VarDecl v).getName()
+  or
+  result = any(Function f).getShortName()
+  or
+  result = any(Argument a).getLabel()
+}
+
+/**
+ * Gets a string from the candidates that is sensitive.
+ */
+private string sensitiveStrings(SensitiveDataType sensitiveType) {
+  result = sensitiveCandidateStrings() and
+  result.regexpMatch(sensitiveType.getRegexp())
+}
+
 /**
  * A `VarDecl` that might be used to contain sensitive data.
  */
 private class SensitiveVarDecl extends VarDecl {
   SensitiveDataType sensitiveType;
 
-  SensitiveVarDecl() { this.getName().regexpMatch(sensitiveType.getRegexp()) }
+  SensitiveVarDecl() { this.getName() = sensitiveStrings(sensitiveType) }
 
   predicate hasInfo(string label, SensitiveDataType type) {
     label = this.getName() and
@@ -99,15 +123,11 @@ private class SensitiveVarDecl extends VarDecl {
  */
 private class SensitiveFunction extends Function {
   SensitiveDataType sensitiveType;
-  string name; // name of the function, not including the argument list.
 
-  SensitiveFunction() {
-    name = this.getShortName() and
-    name.regexpMatch(sensitiveType.getRegexp())
-  }
+  SensitiveFunction() { this.getShortName() = sensitiveStrings(sensitiveType) }
 
   predicate hasInfo(string label, SensitiveDataType type) {
-    label = name and
+    label = this.getShortName() and
     sensitiveType = type
   }
 }
@@ -118,7 +138,7 @@ private class SensitiveFunction extends Function {
 private class SensitiveArgument extends Argument {
   SensitiveDataType sensitiveType;
 
-  SensitiveArgument() { this.getLabel().regexpMatch(sensitiveType.getRegexp()) }
+  SensitiveArgument() { this.getLabel() = sensitiveStrings(sensitiveType) }
 
   predicate hasInfo(string label, SensitiveDataType type) {
     label = this.getLabel() and
@@ -169,6 +189,7 @@ class SensitiveExpr extends Expr {
  * A function that is likely used to encrypt or hash data.
  */
 private class EncryptionFunction extends Function {
+  cached
   EncryptionFunction() { this.getName().regexpMatch("(?is).*(crypt|hash|encode|protect).*") }
 }
 

swift/ql/src/change-notes/2023-06-23-redos-query.md

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+---
+category: newQuery
+---
+* Added new query "Inefficient regular expression" (`swift/redos`). This query finds regular expressions that require exponential time to match certain inputs and may make an application vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks.

swift/ql/src/queries/Security/CWE-1333/ReDoS.qhelp

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+<!DOCTYPE qhelp PUBLIC "-//Semmle//qhelp//EN" "qhelp.dtd">
+<qhelp>
+  <include src="ReDoSIntroduction.inc.qhelp" />
+  <example>
+    <p>Consider the following regular expression:</p>
+    <sample language="swift">
+/^_(__|.)+_$/</sample>
+    <p>
+      Its sub-expression <code>"(__|.)+"</code> can match the string
+      <code>"__"</code> either by the first alternative <code>"__"</code> to the
+      left of the <code>"|"</code> operator, or by two repetitions of the second
+      alternative <code>"."</code> to the right. Therefore, a string consisting of an
+      odd number of underscores followed by some other character will cause the
+      regular expression engine to run for an exponential amount of time before
+      rejecting the input.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      This problem can be avoided by rewriting the regular expression to remove
+      the ambiguity between the two branches of the alternative inside the
+      repetition:
+    </p>
+    <sample language="swift">
+/^_(__|[^_])+_$/</sample>
+  </example>
+  <include src="ReDoSReferences.inc.qhelp"/>
+</qhelp>

swift/ql/src/queries/Security/CWE-1333/ReDoS.ql

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+/**
+ * @name Inefficient regular expression
+ * @description A regular expression that requires exponential time to match certain inputs
+ *              can be a performance bottleneck, and may be vulnerable to denial-of-service
+ *              attacks.
+ * @kind problem
+ * @problem.severity error
+ * @security-severity 7.5
+ * @precision high
+ * @id swift/redos
+ * @tags security
+ *       external/cwe/cwe-1333
+ *       external/cwe/cwe-730
+ *       external/cwe/cwe-400
+ */
+
+import codeql.swift.regex.Regex
+private import codeql.swift.regex.RegexTreeView::RegexTreeView as TreeView
+import codeql.regex.nfa.ExponentialBackTracking::Make<TreeView>
+
+from TreeView::RegExpTerm t, string pump, State s, string prefixMsg
+where hasReDoSResult(t, pump, s, prefixMsg)
+select t,
+  "This part of the regular expression may cause exponential backtracking on strings " + prefixMsg +
+    "containing many repetitions of '" + pump + "'."

swift/ql/src/queries/Security/CWE-1333/ReDoSIntroduction.inc.qhelp

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+<!DOCTYPE qhelp PUBLIC "-//Semmle//qhelp//EN" "qhelp.dtd">
+<qhelp>
+  <overview>
+    <p>
+      Some regular expressions take a long time to match certain input strings
+      to the point where the time it takes to match a string of length <i>n</i>
+      is proportional to <i>n<sup>k</sup></i> or even <i>2<sup>n</sup></i>.
+      Such regular expressions can negatively affect performance, and potentially allow
+      a malicious user to perform a Denial of Service ("DoS") attack by crafting
+      an expensive input string for the regular expression to match.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      The regular expression engine used by Swift uses
+      backtracking non-deterministic finite automata to implement regular
+      expression matching. While this approach is space-efficient and allows
+      supporting advanced features like capture groups, it is not time-efficient
+      in general. The worst-case time complexity of such an automaton can be
+      polynomial or exponential, meaning that for strings of a certain
+      shape, increasing the input length by ten characters may make the
+      automaton about 1000 times slower.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+      Typically, a regular expression is affected by this problem if it contains
+      a repetition of the form <code>r*</code> or <code>r+</code> where the
+      sub-expression <code>r</code> is ambiguous in the sense that it can match
+      some string in multiple ways. More information about the precise
+      circumstances can be found in the references.
+    </p>
+  </overview>
+  <recommendation>
+    <p>
+      Modify the regular expression to remove the ambiguity, or ensure that the
+      strings matched with the regular expression are short enough that the
+      time complexity does not matter.
+    </p>
+  </recommendation>
+</qhelp>

swift/ql/src/queries/Security/CWE-1333/ReDoSReferences.inc.qhelp

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+<!DOCTYPE qhelp PUBLIC "-//Semmle//qhelp//EN" "qhelp.dtd">
+<qhelp>
+  <references>
+    <li> OWASP:
+      <a href="https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Regular_expression_Denial_of_Service_-_ReDoS">Regular expression Denial of Service - ReDoS</a>.
+    </li>
+    <li>Wikipedia: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ReDoS">ReDoS</a>.</li>
+    <li>Wikipedia: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time_complexity">Time complexity</a>.</li>
+    <li>James Kirrage, Asiri Rathnayake, Hayo Thielecke:
+      <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1301.0849">Static Analysis for Regular Expression Denial-of-Service Attack</a>.
+    </li>
+  </references>
+</qhelp>

swift/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-1333/ReDoS.expected

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+| ReDoS.swift:65:22:65:22 | a* | This part of the regular expression may cause exponential backtracking on strings containing many repetitions of 'a'. |
+| ReDoS.swift:66:22:66:22 | a* | This part of the regular expression may cause exponential backtracking on strings containing many repetitions of 'a'. |
+| ReDoS.swift:69:18:69:18 | a* | This part of the regular expression may cause exponential backtracking on strings containing many repetitions of 'a'. |
+| ReDoS.swift:77:57:77:57 | a* | This part of the regular expression may cause exponential backtracking on strings containing many repetitions of 'a'. |
+| ReDoS.swift:80:57:80:57 | a* | This part of the regular expression may cause exponential backtracking on strings containing many repetitions of 'a'. |

swift/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-1333/ReDoS.qlref

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+queries/Security/CWE-1333/ReDoS.ql

swift/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-1333/ReDoS.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+
+// --- stubs ---
+
+struct URL {
+	init?(string: String) {}
+}
+
+struct AnyRegexOutput {
+}
+
+protocol RegexComponent {
+}
+
+struct Regex<Output> : RegexComponent {
+	struct Match {
+	}
+
+	init(_ pattern: String) throws where Output == AnyRegexOutput { }
+
+	func firstMatch(in string: String) throws -> Regex<Output>.Match? { return nil}
+
+	typealias RegexOutput = Output
+}
+
+extension String {
+	init(contentsOf: URL) {
+        let data = ""
+        self.init(data)
+    }
+}
+
+class NSObject {
+}
+
+struct _NSRange {
+	init(location: Int, length: Int) { }
+}
+
+typealias NSRange = _NSRange
+
+class NSRegularExpression : NSObject {
+	struct Options : OptionSet {
+	    var rawValue: UInt
+	}
+
+	struct MatchingOptions : OptionSet {
+	    var rawValue: UInt
+	}
+
+	init(pattern: String, options: NSRegularExpression.Options = []) throws { }
+
+	func stringByReplacingMatches(in string: String, options: NSRegularExpression.MatchingOptions = [], range: NSRange, withTemplate templ: String) -> String { return "" }
+}
+
+// --- tests ---
+
+func myRegexpTests(myUrl: URL) throws {
+    let tainted = String(contentsOf: myUrl) // tainted
+    let untainted = "abcdef"
+
+    // Regex
+
+    _ = "((a*)*b)" // GOOD (never used)
+    _ = try Regex("((a*)*b)") // DUBIOUS (never used)
+    _ = try Regex("((a*)*b)").firstMatch(in: untainted) // DUBIOUS (never used on tainted input) [FLAGGED]
+    _ = try Regex("((a*)*b)").firstMatch(in: tainted) // BAD
+    _ = try Regex(".*").firstMatch(in: tainted) // GOOD (safe regex)
+
+    let str = "((a*)*b)" // BAD
+    let regex = try Regex(str)
+    _ = try regex.firstMatch(in: tainted)
+
+    // NSRegularExpression
+
+    _ = try? NSRegularExpression(pattern: "((a*)*b)") // DUBIOUS (never used)
+
+    let nsregex1 = try? NSRegularExpression(pattern: "((a*)*b)") // DUBIOUS (never used on tainted input) [FLAGGED]
+    _ = nsregex1?.stringByReplacingMatches(in: untainted, range: NSRange(location: 0, length: untainted.utf16.count), withTemplate: "")
+
+    let nsregex2 = try? NSRegularExpression(pattern: "((a*)*b)") // BAD
+    _ = nsregex2?.stringByReplacingMatches(in: tainted, range: NSRange(location: 0, length: tainted.utf16.count), withTemplate: "")
+
+    let nsregex3 = try? NSRegularExpression(pattern: ".*") // GOOD (safe regex)
+    _ = nsregex3?.stringByReplacingMatches(in: tainted, range: NSRange(location: 0, length: tainted.utf16.count), withTemplate: "")
+}

swift/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-311/CleartextTransmission.expected

@@ -5,14 +5,17 @@ edges
 | testSend.swift:33:14:33:32 | call to Data.init(_:) | testSend.swift:37:19:37:19 | data2 |
 | testSend.swift:33:19:33:19 | passwordPlain | testSend.swift:33:14:33:32 | call to Data.init(_:) |
 | testSend.swift:41:10:41:18 | data | testSend.swift:41:45:41:45 | data |
-| testSend.swift:52:13:52:13 | password | testSend.swift:59:27:59:27 | str1 |
-| testSend.swift:53:13:53:13 | password | testSend.swift:60:27:60:27 | str2 |
-| testSend.swift:54:13:54:25 | call to pad(_:) | testSend.swift:61:27:61:27 | str3 |
-| testSend.swift:54:17:54:17 | password | testSend.swift:41:10:41:18 | data |
-| testSend.swift:54:17:54:17 | password | testSend.swift:54:13:54:25 | call to pad(_:) |
-| testURL.swift:13:54:13:54 | passwd | testURL.swift:13:22:13:54 | ... .+(_:_:) ... |
-| testURL.swift:15:55:15:55 | account_no | testURL.swift:15:22:15:55 | ... .+(_:_:) ... |
-| testURL.swift:16:55:16:55 | credit_card_no | testURL.swift:16:22:16:55 | ... .+(_:_:) ... |
+| testSend.swift:58:13:58:13 | password | testSend.swift:65:27:65:27 | str1 |
+| testSend.swift:59:13:59:13 | password | testSend.swift:66:27:66:27 | str2 |
+| testSend.swift:60:13:60:25 | call to pad(_:) | testSend.swift:67:27:67:27 | str3 |
+| testSend.swift:60:17:60:17 | password | testSend.swift:41:10:41:18 | data |
+| testSend.swift:60:17:60:17 | password | testSend.swift:60:13:60:25 | call to pad(_:) |
+| testURL.swift:17:54:17:54 | passwd | testURL.swift:17:22:17:54 | ... .+(_:_:) ... |
+| testURL.swift:19:55:19:55 | account_no | testURL.swift:19:22:19:55 | ... .+(_:_:) ... |
+| testURL.swift:20:55:20:55 | credit_card_no | testURL.swift:20:22:20:55 | ... .+(_:_:) ... |
+| testURL.swift:28:55:28:55 | e_mail | testURL.swift:28:22:28:55 | ... .+(_:_:) ... |
+| testURL.swift:30:57:30:57 | a_homeaddr_z | testURL.swift:30:22:30:57 | ... .+(_:_:) ... |
+| testURL.swift:32:55:32:55 | resident_ID | testURL.swift:32:22:32:55 | ... .+(_:_:) ... |
 nodes
 | testAlamofire.swift:150:13:150:45 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | semmle.label | ... .+(_:_:) ... |
 | testAlamofire.swift:150:45:150:45 | password | semmle.label | password |
@@ -26,36 +29,55 @@ nodes
 | testSend.swift:37:19:37:19 | data2 | semmle.label | data2 |
 | testSend.swift:41:10:41:18 | data | semmle.label | data |
 | testSend.swift:41:45:41:45 | data | semmle.label | data |
-| testSend.swift:52:13:52:13 | password | semmle.label | password |
-| testSend.swift:53:13:53:13 | password | semmle.label | password |
-| testSend.swift:54:13:54:25 | call to pad(_:) | semmle.label | call to pad(_:) |
-| testSend.swift:54:17:54:17 | password | semmle.label | password |
-| testSend.swift:59:27:59:27 | str1 | semmle.label | str1 |
-| testSend.swift:60:27:60:27 | str2 | semmle.label | str2 |
-| testSend.swift:61:27:61:27 | str3 | semmle.label | str3 |
-| testSend.swift:65:27:65:27 | license_key | semmle.label | license_key |
-| testSend.swift:66:27:66:30 | .mobileNumber | semmle.label | .mobileNumber |
-| testURL.swift:13:22:13:54 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | semmle.label | ... .+(_:_:) ... |
-| testURL.swift:13:54:13:54 | passwd | semmle.label | passwd |
-| testURL.swift:15:22:15:55 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | semmle.label | ... .+(_:_:) ... |
-| testURL.swift:15:55:15:55 | account_no | semmle.label | account_no |
-| testURL.swift:16:22:16:55 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | semmle.label | ... .+(_:_:) ... |
-| testURL.swift:16:55:16:55 | credit_card_no | semmle.label | credit_card_no |
-| testURL.swift:20:22:20:22 | passwd | semmle.label | passwd |
+| testSend.swift:58:13:58:13 | password | semmle.label | password |
+| testSend.swift:59:13:59:13 | password | semmle.label | password |
+| testSend.swift:60:13:60:25 | call to pad(_:) | semmle.label | call to pad(_:) |
+| testSend.swift:60:17:60:17 | password | semmle.label | password |
+| testSend.swift:65:27:65:27 | str1 | semmle.label | str1 |
+| testSend.swift:66:27:66:27 | str2 | semmle.label | str2 |
+| testSend.swift:67:27:67:27 | str3 | semmle.label | str3 |
+| testSend.swift:71:27:71:27 | license_key | semmle.label | license_key |
+| testSend.swift:72:27:72:30 | .mobileNumber | semmle.label | .mobileNumber |
+| testSend.swift:76:27:76:30 | .Telephone | semmle.label | .Telephone |
+| testSend.swift:77:27:77:30 | .birth_day | semmle.label | .birth_day |
+| testSend.swift:78:27:78:30 | .CarePlanID | semmle.label | .CarePlanID |
+| testSend.swift:79:27:79:30 | .BankCardNo | semmle.label | .BankCardNo |
+| testSend.swift:80:27:80:30 | .MyCreditRating | semmle.label | .MyCreditRating |
+| testURL.swift:17:22:17:54 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | semmle.label | ... .+(_:_:) ... |
+| testURL.swift:17:54:17:54 | passwd | semmle.label | passwd |
+| testURL.swift:19:22:19:55 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | semmle.label | ... .+(_:_:) ... |
+| testURL.swift:19:55:19:55 | account_no | semmle.label | account_no |
+| testURL.swift:20:22:20:55 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | semmle.label | ... .+(_:_:) ... |
+| testURL.swift:20:55:20:55 | credit_card_no | semmle.label | credit_card_no |
+| testURL.swift:24:22:24:22 | passwd | semmle.label | passwd |
+| testURL.swift:28:22:28:55 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | semmle.label | ... .+(_:_:) ... |
+| testURL.swift:28:55:28:55 | e_mail | semmle.label | e_mail |
+| testURL.swift:30:22:30:57 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | semmle.label | ... .+(_:_:) ... |
+| testURL.swift:30:57:30:57 | a_homeaddr_z | semmle.label | a_homeaddr_z |
+| testURL.swift:32:22:32:55 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | semmle.label | ... .+(_:_:) ... |
+| testURL.swift:32:55:32:55 | resident_ID | semmle.label | resident_ID |
 subpaths
-| testSend.swift:54:17:54:17 | password | testSend.swift:41:10:41:18 | data | testSend.swift:41:45:41:45 | data | testSend.swift:54:13:54:25 | call to pad(_:) |
+| testSend.swift:60:17:60:17 | password | testSend.swift:41:10:41:18 | data | testSend.swift:41:45:41:45 | data | testSend.swift:60:13:60:25 | call to pad(_:) |
 #select
 | testAlamofire.swift:150:13:150:45 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | testAlamofire.swift:150:45:150:45 | password | testAlamofire.swift:150:13:150:45 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | This operation transmits '... .+(_:_:) ...', which may contain unencrypted sensitive data from $@. | testAlamofire.swift:150:45:150:45 | password | password |
 | testAlamofire.swift:152:19:152:51 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | testAlamofire.swift:152:51:152:51 | password | testAlamofire.swift:152:19:152:51 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | This operation transmits '... .+(_:_:) ...', which may contain unencrypted sensitive data from $@. | testAlamofire.swift:152:51:152:51 | password | password |
 | testAlamofire.swift:154:14:154:46 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | testAlamofire.swift:154:38:154:38 | email | testAlamofire.swift:154:14:154:46 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | This operation transmits '... .+(_:_:) ...', which may contain unencrypted sensitive data from $@. | testAlamofire.swift:154:38:154:38 | email | email |
 | testSend.swift:29:19:29:19 | passwordPlain | testSend.swift:29:19:29:19 | passwordPlain | testSend.swift:29:19:29:19 | passwordPlain | This operation transmits 'passwordPlain', which may contain unencrypted sensitive data from $@. | testSend.swift:29:19:29:19 | passwordPlain | passwordPlain |
 | testSend.swift:37:19:37:19 | data2 | testSend.swift:33:19:33:19 | passwordPlain | testSend.swift:37:19:37:19 | data2 | This operation transmits 'data2', which may contain unencrypted sensitive data from $@. | testSend.swift:33:19:33:19 | passwordPlain | passwordPlain |
-| testSend.swift:59:27:59:27 | str1 | testSend.swift:52:13:52:13 | password | testSend.swift:59:27:59:27 | str1 | This operation transmits 'str1', which may contain unencrypted sensitive data from $@. | testSend.swift:52:13:52:13 | password | password |
-| testSend.swift:60:27:60:27 | str2 | testSend.swift:53:13:53:13 | password | testSend.swift:60:27:60:27 | str2 | This operation transmits 'str2', which may contain unencrypted sensitive data from $@. | testSend.swift:53:13:53:13 | password | password |
-| testSend.swift:61:27:61:27 | str3 | testSend.swift:54:17:54:17 | password | testSend.swift:61:27:61:27 | str3 | This operation transmits 'str3', which may contain unencrypted sensitive data from $@. | testSend.swift:54:17:54:17 | password | password |
-| testSend.swift:65:27:65:27 | license_key | testSend.swift:65:27:65:27 | license_key | testSend.swift:65:27:65:27 | license_key | This operation transmits 'license_key', which may contain unencrypted sensitive data from $@. | testSend.swift:65:27:65:27 | license_key | license_key |
-| testSend.swift:66:27:66:30 | .mobileNumber | testSend.swift:66:27:66:30 | .mobileNumber | testSend.swift:66:27:66:30 | .mobileNumber | This operation transmits '.mobileNumber', which may contain unencrypted sensitive data from $@. | testSend.swift:66:27:66:30 | .mobileNumber | .mobileNumber |
-| testURL.swift:13:22:13:54 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | testURL.swift:13:54:13:54 | passwd | testURL.swift:13:22:13:54 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | This operation transmits '... .+(_:_:) ...', which may contain unencrypted sensitive data from $@. | testURL.swift:13:54:13:54 | passwd | passwd |
-| testURL.swift:15:22:15:55 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | testURL.swift:15:55:15:55 | account_no | testURL.swift:15:22:15:55 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | This operation transmits '... .+(_:_:) ...', which may contain unencrypted sensitive data from $@. | testURL.swift:15:55:15:55 | account_no | account_no |
-| testURL.swift:16:22:16:55 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | testURL.swift:16:55:16:55 | credit_card_no | testURL.swift:16:22:16:55 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | This operation transmits '... .+(_:_:) ...', which may contain unencrypted sensitive data from $@. | testURL.swift:16:55:16:55 | credit_card_no | credit_card_no |
-| testURL.swift:20:22:20:22 | passwd | testURL.swift:20:22:20:22 | passwd | testURL.swift:20:22:20:22 | passwd | This operation transmits 'passwd', which may contain unencrypted sensitive data from $@. | testURL.swift:20:22:20:22 | passwd | passwd |
+| testSend.swift:65:27:65:27 | str1 | testSend.swift:58:13:58:13 | password | testSend.swift:65:27:65:27 | str1 | This operation transmits 'str1', which may contain unencrypted sensitive data from $@. | testSend.swift:58:13:58:13 | password | password |
+| testSend.swift:66:27:66:27 | str2 | testSend.swift:59:13:59:13 | password | testSend.swift:66:27:66:27 | str2 | This operation transmits 'str2', which may contain unencrypted sensitive data from $@. | testSend.swift:59:13:59:13 | password | password |
+| testSend.swift:67:27:67:27 | str3 | testSend.swift:60:17:60:17 | password | testSend.swift:67:27:67:27 | str3 | This operation transmits 'str3', which may contain unencrypted sensitive data from $@. | testSend.swift:60:17:60:17 | password | password |
+| testSend.swift:71:27:71:27 | license_key | testSend.swift:71:27:71:27 | license_key | testSend.swift:71:27:71:27 | license_key | This operation transmits 'license_key', which may contain unencrypted sensitive data from $@. | testSend.swift:71:27:71:27 | license_key | license_key |
+| testSend.swift:72:27:72:30 | .mobileNumber | testSend.swift:72:27:72:30 | .mobileNumber | testSend.swift:72:27:72:30 | .mobileNumber | This operation transmits '.mobileNumber', which may contain unencrypted sensitive data from $@. | testSend.swift:72:27:72:30 | .mobileNumber | .mobileNumber |
+| testSend.swift:76:27:76:30 | .Telephone | testSend.swift:76:27:76:30 | .Telephone | testSend.swift:76:27:76:30 | .Telephone | This operation transmits '.Telephone', which may contain unencrypted sensitive data from $@. | testSend.swift:76:27:76:30 | .Telephone | .Telephone |
+| testSend.swift:77:27:77:30 | .birth_day | testSend.swift:77:27:77:30 | .birth_day | testSend.swift:77:27:77:30 | .birth_day | This operation transmits '.birth_day', which may contain unencrypted sensitive data from $@. | testSend.swift:77:27:77:30 | .birth_day | .birth_day |
+| testSend.swift:78:27:78:30 | .CarePlanID | testSend.swift:78:27:78:30 | .CarePlanID | testSend.swift:78:27:78:30 | .CarePlanID | This operation transmits '.CarePlanID', which may contain unencrypted sensitive data from $@. | testSend.swift:78:27:78:30 | .CarePlanID | .CarePlanID |
+| testSend.swift:79:27:79:30 | .BankCardNo | testSend.swift:79:27:79:30 | .BankCardNo | testSend.swift:79:27:79:30 | .BankCardNo | This operation transmits '.BankCardNo', which may contain unencrypted sensitive data from $@. | testSend.swift:79:27:79:30 | .BankCardNo | .BankCardNo |
+| testSend.swift:80:27:80:30 | .MyCreditRating | testSend.swift:80:27:80:30 | .MyCreditRating | testSend.swift:80:27:80:30 | .MyCreditRating | This operation transmits '.MyCreditRating', which may contain unencrypted sensitive data from $@. | testSend.swift:80:27:80:30 | .MyCreditRating | .MyCreditRating |
+| testURL.swift:17:22:17:54 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | testURL.swift:17:54:17:54 | passwd | testURL.swift:17:22:17:54 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | This operation transmits '... .+(_:_:) ...', which may contain unencrypted sensitive data from $@. | testURL.swift:17:54:17:54 | passwd | passwd |
+| testURL.swift:19:22:19:55 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | testURL.swift:19:55:19:55 | account_no | testURL.swift:19:22:19:55 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | This operation transmits '... .+(_:_:) ...', which may contain unencrypted sensitive data from $@. | testURL.swift:19:55:19:55 | account_no | account_no |
+| testURL.swift:20:22:20:55 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | testURL.swift:20:55:20:55 | credit_card_no | testURL.swift:20:22:20:55 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | This operation transmits '... .+(_:_:) ...', which may contain unencrypted sensitive data from $@. | testURL.swift:20:55:20:55 | credit_card_no | credit_card_no |
+| testURL.swift:24:22:24:22 | passwd | testURL.swift:24:22:24:22 | passwd | testURL.swift:24:22:24:22 | passwd | This operation transmits 'passwd', which may contain unencrypted sensitive data from $@. | testURL.swift:24:22:24:22 | passwd | passwd |
+| testURL.swift:28:22:28:55 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | testURL.swift:28:55:28:55 | e_mail | testURL.swift:28:22:28:55 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | This operation transmits '... .+(_:_:) ...', which may contain unencrypted sensitive data from $@. | testURL.swift:28:55:28:55 | e_mail | e_mail |
+| testURL.swift:30:22:30:57 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | testURL.swift:30:57:30:57 | a_homeaddr_z | testURL.swift:30:22:30:57 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | This operation transmits '... .+(_:_:) ...', which may contain unencrypted sensitive data from $@. | testURL.swift:30:57:30:57 | a_homeaddr_z | a_homeaddr_z |
+| testURL.swift:32:22:32:55 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | testURL.swift:32:55:32:55 | resident_ID | testURL.swift:32:22:32:55 | ... .+(_:_:) ... | This operation transmits '... .+(_:_:) ...', which may contain unencrypted sensitive data from $@. | testURL.swift:32:55:32:55 | resident_ID | resident_ID |

swift/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-311/SensitiveExprs.expected

@@ -119,16 +119,24 @@
 | testRealm.swift:73:15:73:15 | myPassword | label:myPassword, type:credential |
 | testSend.swift:29:19:29:19 | passwordPlain | label:passwordPlain, type:credential |
 | testSend.swift:33:19:33:19 | passwordPlain | label:passwordPlain, type:credential |
-| testSend.swift:52:13:52:13 | password | label:password, type:credential |
-| testSend.swift:53:13:53:13 | password | label:password, type:credential |
-| testSend.swift:54:17:54:17 | password | label:password, type:credential |
-| testSend.swift:55:23:55:23 | password | label:password, type:credential |
-| testSend.swift:56:27:56:27 | password | label:password, type:credential |
-| testSend.swift:57:27:57:27 | password | label:password, type:credential |
-| testSend.swift:65:27:65:27 | license_key | label:license_key, type:credential |
-| testSend.swift:66:27:66:30 | .mobileNumber | label:mobileNumber, type:private information |
-| testSend.swift:69:27:69:30 | .passwordFeatureEnabled | label:passwordFeatureEnabled, type:credential |
-| testURL.swift:13:54:13:54 | passwd | label:passwd, type:credential |
-| testURL.swift:15:55:15:55 | account_no | label:account_no, type:private information |
-| testURL.swift:16:55:16:55 | credit_card_no | label:credit_card_no, type:private information |
-| testURL.swift:20:22:20:22 | passwd | label:passwd, type:credential |
+| testSend.swift:58:13:58:13 | password | label:password, type:credential |
+| testSend.swift:59:13:59:13 | password | label:password, type:credential |
+| testSend.swift:60:17:60:17 | password | label:password, type:credential |
+| testSend.swift:61:23:61:23 | password | label:password, type:credential |
+| testSend.swift:62:27:62:27 | password | label:password, type:credential |
+| testSend.swift:63:27:63:27 | password | label:password, type:credential |
+| testSend.swift:71:27:71:27 | license_key | label:license_key, type:credential |
+| testSend.swift:72:27:72:30 | .mobileNumber | label:mobileNumber, type:private information |
+| testSend.swift:75:27:75:30 | .passwordFeatureEnabled | label:passwordFeatureEnabled, type:credential |
+| testSend.swift:76:27:76:30 | .Telephone | label:Telephone, type:private information |
+| testSend.swift:77:27:77:30 | .birth_day | label:birth_day, type:private information |
+| testSend.swift:78:27:78:30 | .CarePlanID | label:CarePlanID, type:private information |
+| testSend.swift:79:27:79:30 | .BankCardNo | label:BankCardNo, type:private information |
+| testSend.swift:80:27:80:30 | .MyCreditRating | label:MyCreditRating, type:private information |
+| testURL.swift:17:54:17:54 | passwd | label:passwd, type:credential |
+| testURL.swift:19:55:19:55 | account_no | label:account_no, type:private information |
+| testURL.swift:20:55:20:55 | credit_card_no | label:credit_card_no, type:private information |
+| testURL.swift:24:22:24:22 | passwd | label:passwd, type:credential |
+| testURL.swift:28:55:28:55 | e_mail | label:e_mail, type:private information |
+| testURL.swift:30:57:30:57 | a_homeaddr_z | label:a_homeaddr_z, type:private information |
+| testURL.swift:32:55:32:55 | resident_ID | label:resident_ID, type:private information |

swift/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-311/testSend.swift

@@ -46,6 +46,12 @@ struct MyStruct {
 	var mobileUrl: String
 	var mobilePlayer: String
 	var passwordFeatureEnabled: Bool
+	var Telephone: String
+	var birth_day: String
+	var CarePlanID: String
+	var BankCardNo: String
+	var MyCreditRating: String
+	var OneTimeCode: String
 }
 
 func test2(password : String, license_key: String, ms: MyStruct, connection : NWConnection) {
@@ -67,4 +73,10 @@ func test2(password : String, license_key: String, ms: MyStruct, connection : NW
 	connection.send(content: ms.mobileUrl, completion: .idempotent) // GOOD (not sensitive)
 	connection.send(content: ms.mobilePlayer, completion: .idempotent) // GOOD (not sensitive)
 	connection.send(content: ms.passwordFeatureEnabled, completion: .idempotent) // GOOD (not sensitive)
+	connection.send(content: ms.Telephone, completion: .idempotent) // BAD
+	connection.send(content: ms.birth_day, completion: .idempotent) // BAD
+	connection.send(content: ms.CarePlanID, completion: .idempotent) // BAD
+	connection.send(content: ms.BankCardNo, completion: .idempotent) // BAD
+	connection.send(content: ms.MyCreditRating, completion: .idempotent) // BAD
+	connection.send(content: ms.OneTimeCode, completion: .idempotent) // BAD [NOT DETECTED]
 }

swift/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-311/testURL.swift

@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@ struct URL
 
 // --- tests ---
 
+var myString = ""
+func setMyString(str: String) { myString = str }
+func getMyString() -> String { return myString }
+
 func test1(passwd : String, encrypted_passwd : String, account_no : String, credit_card_no : String) {
 	let a = URL(string: "http://example.com/login?p=" + passwd); // BAD
 	let b = URL(string: "http://example.com/login?p=" + encrypted_passwd); // GOOD (not sensitive)
@@ -19,4 +23,11 @@ func test1(passwd : String, encrypted_passwd : String, account_no : String, cred
 	let e = URL(string: "abc", relativeTo: base); // GOOD (not sensitive)
 	let f = URL(string: passwd, relativeTo: base); // BAD
 	let g = URL(string: "abc", relativeTo: f); // BAD (reported on line above)
+
+	let e_mail = myString
+	let h = URL(string: "http://example.com/login?em=" + e_mail); // BAD
+	var a_homeaddr_z = getMyString()
+	let i = URL(string: "http://example.com/login?home=" + a_homeaddr_z); // BAD
+	var resident_ID = getMyString()
+	let j = URL(string: "http://example.com/login?id=" + resident_ID); // BAD
 }

swift/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-312/cleartextLoggingTest.swift

@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ struct Logger {
 
 // --- tests ---
 
-func test1(password: String, passwordHash : String) {
+func test1(password: String, passwordHash : String, passphrase: String, pass_phrase: String) {
 	print(password) // $ MISSING: hasCleartextLogging=87
 	print(password, separator: "") // $ MISSING: $ hasCleartextLogging=88
 	print("", separator: password) // $ hasCleartextLogging=89
@@ -132,6 +132,9 @@ func test1(password: String, passwordHash : String) {
     log.critical("\(passwordHash, privacy: .public)") // Safe
     log.fault("\(password, privacy: .public)") // $ MISSING: hasCleartextLogging=133
     log.fault("\(passwordHash, privacy: .public)") // Safe
+
+    NSLog(passphrase) // $ hasCleartextLogging=136
+    NSLog(pass_phrase) // $ hasCleartextLogging=137
 }
 
 class MyClass {
@@ -145,14 +148,14 @@ func doSomething(password: String) { }
 func test3(x: String) {
 	// alternative evidence of sensitivity...
 
-	NSLog(x) // $ MISSING: hasCleartextLogging=148
+	NSLog(x) // $ MISSING: hasCleartextLogging=152
 	doSomething(password: x);
-	NSLog(x) // $ hasCleartextLogging=149
+	NSLog(x) // $ hasCleartextLogging=152
 
 	let y = getPassword();
-	NSLog(y) // $ hasCleartextLogging=152
+	NSLog(y) // $ hasCleartextLogging=155
 
 	let z = MyClass()
 	NSLog(z.harmless) // Safe
-	NSLog(z.password) // $ hasCleartextLogging=157
+	NSLog(z.password) // $ hasCleartextLogging=160
 }