Merge pull request #14854 from jcogs33/jcogs33/unsafe-url-forward-promotion

Java: Promote Unsafe URL Forward query from experimental
This commit is contained in:
Jami
2024-03-29 16:34:06 -04:00
committed by GitHub
42 changed files with 758 additions and 1307 deletions

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@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
extensions:
- addsTo:
pack: codeql/java-all
extensible: experimentalSummaryModel
data:
- ["io.undertow.server.handlers.resource", "Resource", True, "getFile", "", "", "Argument[this]", "ReturnValue", "taint", "manual", "unsafe-url-forward"]
- ["io.undertow.server.handlers.resource", "Resource", True, "getFilePath", "", "", "Argument[this]", "ReturnValue", "taint", "manual", "unsafe-url-forward"]
- ["io.undertow.server.handlers.resource", "Resource", True, "getPath", "", "", "Argument[this]", "ReturnValue", "taint", "manual", "unsafe-url-forward"]

View File

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
extensions:
- addsTo:
pack: codeql/java-all
extensible: experimentalSummaryModel
data:
- ["java.nio.file", "Path", True, "normalize", "", "", "Argument[this]", "ReturnValue", "taint", "manual", "unsafe-url-forward"]
- ["java.nio.file", "Path", True, "resolve", "", "", "Argument[this]", "ReturnValue", "taint", "manual", "unsafe-url-forward"]
- ["java.nio.file", "Path", True, "resolve", "", "", "Argument[0]", "ReturnValue", "taint", "manual", "unsafe-url-forward"]
- ["java.nio.file", "Path", True, "toString", "", "", "Argument[this]", "ReturnValue", "taint", "manual", "unsafe-url-forward"]
- ["java.nio.file", "Paths", True, "get", "", "", "Argument[0..1]", "ReturnValue", "taint", "manual", "unsafe-url-forward"]

View File

@@ -4,4 +4,3 @@ extensions:
extensible: experimentalSinkModel
data:
- ["java.util.concurrent", "TimeUnit", True, "sleep", "", "", "Argument[0]", "thread-pause", "manual", "thread-resource-abuse"]
- ["java.util.concurrent", "TimeUnit", True, "sleep", "", "", "Argument[0]", "thread-pause", "manual", "unsafe-url-forward"]

View File

@@ -1,9 +1,4 @@
extensions:
- addsTo:
pack: codeql/java-all
extensible: experimentalSourceModel
data:
- ["javax.servlet.http", "HttpServletRequest", True, "getServletPath", "", "", "ReturnValue", "remote", "manual", "unsafe-url-forward"]
- addsTo:
pack: codeql/java-all
extensible: experimentalSourceModel
@@ -13,4 +8,3 @@ extensions:
- ["javax.servlet.http", "HttpServletRequest", False, "getRequestURI", "()", "", "ReturnValue", "uri-path", "manual", "permissive-dot-regex-query"]
- ["javax.servlet.http", "HttpServletRequest", False, "getRequestURL", "()", "", "ReturnValue", "uri-path", "manual", "permissive-dot-regex-query"]
- ["javax.servlet.http", "HttpServletRequest", False, "getServletPath", "()", "", "ReturnValue", "uri-path", "manual", "permissive-dot-regex-query"]

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@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
extensions:
- addsTo:
pack: codeql/java-all
extensible: experimentalSinkModel
data:
- ["org.springframework.core.io", "ClassPathResource", True, "getFilename", "", "", "Argument[this]", "get-resource", "manual", "unsafe-url-forward"]
- ["org.springframework.core.io", "ClassPathResource", True, "getPath", "", "", "Argument[this]", "get-resource", "manual", "unsafe-url-forward"]
- ["org.springframework.core.io", "ClassPathResource", True, "getURL", "", "", "Argument[this]", "get-resource", "manual", "unsafe-url-forward"]
- ["org.springframework.core.io", "ClassPathResource", True, "resolveURL", "", "", "Argument[this]", "get-resource", "manual", "unsafe-url-forward"]
- addsTo:
pack: codeql/java-all
extensible: experimentalSummaryModel
data:
- ["org.springframework.core.io", "ClassPathResource", False, "ClassPathResource", "", "", "Argument[0]", "Argument[this]", "taint", "manual", "unsafe-url-forward"]
- ["org.springframework.core.io", "Resource", True, "createRelative", "", "", "Argument[0]", "ReturnValue", "taint", "manual", "unsafe-url-forward"]
- ["org.springframework.core.io", "ResourceLoader", True, "getResource", "", "", "Argument[0]", "ReturnValue", "taint", "manual", "unsafe-url-forward"]

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
extensions:
- addsTo:
pack: codeql/java-all
extensible: experimentalSourceModel
extensible: sourceModel
data:
- ["jakarta.servlet.http", "HttpServletRequest", True, "getServletPath", "", "", "ReturnValue", "remote", "manual", "unsafe-url-forward"]
- ["jakarta.servlet.http", "HttpServletRequest", True, "getServletPath", "", "", "ReturnValue", "remote", "manual"]

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
extensions:
- addsTo:
pack: codeql/java-all
extensible: sinkModel
data:
- ["jakarta.servlet", "ServletContext", True, "getRequestDispatcher", "(String)", "", "Argument[0]", "url-forward", "manual"]
- ["jakarta.servlet", "ServletRequest", True, "getRequestDispatcher", "(String)", "", "Argument[0]", "url-forward", "manual"]

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
extensions:
- addsTo:
pack: codeql/java-all
extensible: sinkModel
data:
- ["javax.portlet", "PortletContext", True, "getRequestDispatcher", "(String)", "", "Argument[0]", "url-forward", "manual"]

View File

@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ extensions:
- ["javax.servlet.http", "HttpServletRequest", False, "getRemoteUser", "()", "", "ReturnValue", "remote", "manual"]
- ["javax.servlet.http", "HttpServletRequest", False, "getRequestURI", "()", "", "ReturnValue", "remote", "manual"]
- ["javax.servlet.http", "HttpServletRequest", False, "getRequestURL", "()", "", "ReturnValue", "remote", "manual"]
- ["javax.servlet.http", "HttpServletRequest", False, "getServletPath", "()", "", "ReturnValue", "remote", "manual"]
- addsTo:
pack: codeql/java-all
extensible: sinkModel

View File

@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ extensions:
extensible: sinkModel
data:
- ["javax.servlet", "ServletContext", True, "getResourceAsStream", "(String)", "", "Argument[0]", "path-injection", "ai-manual"]
- ["javax.servlet", "ServletContext", True, "getRequestDispatcher", "(String)", "", "Argument[0]", "url-forward", "manual"]
- ["javax.servlet", "ServletRequest", True, "getRequestDispatcher", "(String)", "", "Argument[0]", "url-forward", "manual"]
- addsTo:
pack: codeql/java-all
extensible: summaryModel

View File

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ extensions:
- ["org.kohsuke.stapler", "HttpResponses", True, "staticResource", "(URL,long)", "", "Argument[0]", "request-forgery", "manual"]
- ["org.kohsuke.stapler", "HttpResponses", True, "html", "(String)", "", "Argument[0]", "html-injection", "manual"]
- ["org.kohsuke.stapler", "HttpResponses", True, "literalHtml", "(String)", "", "Argument[0]", "html-injection", "manual"]
- ["org.kohsuke.stapler", "StaplerResponse", True, "forward", "(Object,String,StaplerRequest)", "", "Argument[1]", "request-forgery", "manual"]
- ["org.kohsuke.stapler", "StaplerResponse", True, "forward", "(Object,String,StaplerRequest)", "", "Argument[1]", "url-forward", "manual"]
- ["org.kohsuke.stapler", "StaplerResponse", True, "sendRedirect2", "(String)", "", "Argument[0]", "url-redirection", "manual"]
- ["org.kohsuke.stapler", "StaplerResponse", True, "sendRedirect", "(int,String)", "", "Argument[1]", "url-redirection", "manual"]
- ["org.kohsuke.stapler", "StaplerResponse", True, "sendRedirect", "(String)", "", "Argument[0]", "url-redirection", "manual"]

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
extensions:
- addsTo:
pack: codeql/java-all
extensible: sinkModel
data:
- ["org.springframework.web.portlet", "ModelAndView", False, "ModelAndView", "", "", "Argument[0]", "url-forward", "manual"]
- ["org.springframework.web.portlet", "ModelAndView", False, "setViewName", "", "", "Argument[0]", "url-forward", "manual"]

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
extensions:
- addsTo:
pack: codeql/java-all
extensible: sinkModel
data:
- ["org.springframework.web.servlet", "ModelAndView", False, "ModelAndView", "", "", "Argument[0]", "url-forward", "manual"]
- ["org.springframework.web.servlet", "ModelAndView", False, "setViewName", "", "", "Argument[0]", "url-forward", "manual"]

View File

@@ -38,6 +38,13 @@ class StringLengthMethod extends Method {
StringLengthMethod() { this.hasName("length") and this.getDeclaringType() instanceof TypeString }
}
/** The `contains()` method of the class `java.lang.String`. */
class StringContainsMethod extends Method {
StringContainsMethod() {
this.hasName("contains") and this.getDeclaringType() instanceof TypeString
}
}
/**
* The methods on the class `java.lang.String` that are used to perform partial matches with a specified substring or char.
*/

View File

@@ -24,6 +24,11 @@ class TypeUrl extends RefType {
TypeUrl() { this.hasQualifiedName("java.net", "URL") }
}
/** The type `java.net.URLDecoder`. */
class TypeUrlDecoder extends RefType {
TypeUrlDecoder() { this.hasQualifiedName("java.net", "URLDecoder") }
}
/** The type `java.net.URI`. */
class TypeUri extends RefType {
TypeUri() { this.hasQualifiedName("java.net", "URI") }
@@ -157,6 +162,14 @@ class UrlOpenConnectionMethod extends Method {
}
}
/** The method `java.net.URLDecoder::decode`. */
class UrlDecodeMethod extends Method {
UrlDecodeMethod() {
this.getDeclaringType() instanceof TypeUrlDecoder and
this.getName() = "decode"
}
}
/** The method `javax.net.SocketFactory::createSocket`. */
class CreateSocketMethod extends Method {
CreateSocketMethod() {

View File

@@ -64,7 +64,11 @@ private predicate exactPathMatchGuard(Guard g, Expr e, boolean branch) {
)
}
private class ExactPathMatchSanitizer extends PathInjectionSanitizer {
/**
* A sanitizer that protects against path injection vulnerabilities
* by checking for a matching path.
*/
class ExactPathMatchSanitizer extends PathInjectionSanitizer {
ExactPathMatchSanitizer() {
this = DataFlow::BarrierGuard<exactPathMatchGuard/3>::getABarrierNode()
or

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@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
/** Provides classes and a taint-tracking configuration to reason about unsafe URL forwarding. */
import java
private import semmle.code.java.dataflow.ExternalFlow
private import semmle.code.java.dataflow.FlowSources
private import semmle.code.java.dataflow.StringPrefixes
private import semmle.code.java.security.PathSanitizer
private import semmle.code.java.controlflow.Guards
private import semmle.code.java.security.Sanitizers
/** A URL forward sink. */
abstract class UrlForwardSink extends DataFlow::Node { }
/**
* A default sink representing methods susceptible to URL
* forwarding attacks.
*/
private class DefaultUrlForwardSink extends UrlForwardSink {
DefaultUrlForwardSink() { sinkNode(this, "url-forward") }
}
/**
* An expression appended (perhaps indirectly) to `"forward:"`
* and reachable from a Spring entry point.
*/
private class SpringUrlForwardPrefixSink extends UrlForwardSink {
SpringUrlForwardPrefixSink() {
any(SpringRequestMappingMethod srmm).polyCalls*(this.getEnclosingCallable()) and
appendedToForwardPrefix(this)
}
}
pragma[nomagic]
private predicate appendedToForwardPrefix(DataFlow::ExprNode exprNode) {
exists(ForwardPrefix fp | exprNode.asExpr() = fp.getAnAppendedExpression())
}
private class ForwardPrefix extends InterestingPrefix {
ForwardPrefix() { this.getStringValue() = "forward:" }
override int getOffset() { result = 0 }
}
/** A URL forward barrier. */
abstract class UrlForwardBarrier extends DataFlow::Node { }
private class PrimitiveBarrier extends UrlForwardBarrier instanceof SimpleTypeSanitizer { }
/**
* A barrier for values appended to a "redirect:" prefix.
* These results are excluded because they should be handled
* by the `java/unvalidated-url-redirection` query instead.
*/
private class RedirectPrefixBarrier extends UrlForwardBarrier {
RedirectPrefixBarrier() { this.asExpr() = any(RedirectPrefix fp).getAnAppendedExpression() }
}
private class RedirectPrefix extends InterestingPrefix {
RedirectPrefix() { this.getStringValue() = "redirect:" }
override int getOffset() { result = 0 }
}
/**
* A value that is the result of prepending a string that prevents
* any value from controlling the path of a URL.
*/
private class FollowsBarrierPrefix extends UrlForwardBarrier {
FollowsBarrierPrefix() { this.asExpr() = any(BarrierPrefix fp).getAnAppendedExpression() }
}
private class BarrierPrefix extends InterestingPrefix {
int offset;
BarrierPrefix() {
// Matches strings that look like when prepended to untrusted input, they will restrict
// the path of a URL: for example, anything containing `?` or `#`.
exists(this.getStringValue().regexpFind("[?#]", 0, offset))
or
this.(CharacterLiteral).getValue() = ["?", "#"] and offset = 0
}
override int getOffset() { result = offset }
}
/**
* A barrier that protects against path injection vulnerabilities
* while accounting for URL encoding.
*/
private class UrlPathBarrier extends UrlForwardBarrier instanceof PathInjectionSanitizer {
UrlPathBarrier() {
this instanceof ExactPathMatchSanitizer or
this instanceof NoUrlEncodingBarrier or
this instanceof FullyDecodesUrlBarrier
}
}
/** A call to a method that decodes a URL. */
abstract class UrlDecodeCall extends MethodCall { }
private class DefaultUrlDecodeCall extends UrlDecodeCall {
DefaultUrlDecodeCall() {
this.getMethod() instanceof UrlDecodeMethod or
this.getMethod().hasQualifiedName("org.eclipse.jetty.util.URIUtil", "URIUtil", "decodePath")
}
}
/** A repeated call to a method that decodes a URL. */
abstract class RepeatedUrlDecodeCall extends MethodCall { }
private class DefaultRepeatedUrlDecodeCall extends RepeatedUrlDecodeCall instanceof UrlDecodeCall {
DefaultRepeatedUrlDecodeCall() { this.getAnEnclosingStmt() instanceof LoopStmt }
}
/** A method call that checks a string for URL encoding. */
abstract class CheckUrlEncodingCall extends MethodCall { }
private class DefaultCheckUrlEncodingCall extends CheckUrlEncodingCall {
DefaultCheckUrlEncodingCall() {
this.getMethod() instanceof StringContainsMethod and
this.getArgument(0).(CompileTimeConstantExpr).getStringValue() = "%"
}
}
/** A guard that looks for a method call that checks for URL encoding. */
private class CheckUrlEncodingGuard extends Guard instanceof CheckUrlEncodingCall {
Expr getCheckedExpr() { result = this.(MethodCall).getQualifier() }
}
/** Holds if `g` is guard for a URL that does not contain URL encoding. */
private predicate noUrlEncodingGuard(Guard g, Expr e, boolean branch) {
e = g.(CheckUrlEncodingGuard).getCheckedExpr() and
branch = false
or
branch = false and
g.(Expr).getType() instanceof BooleanType and
(
exists(CheckUrlEncodingCall call, AssignExpr ae |
ae.getSource() = call and
e = call.getQualifier() and
g = ae.getDest()
)
or
exists(CheckUrlEncodingCall call, LocalVariableDeclExpr vde |
vde.getInitOrPatternSource() = call and
e = call.getQualifier() and
g = vde.getAnAccess()
)
)
}
/** A barrier for URLs that do not contain URL encoding. */
private class NoUrlEncodingBarrier extends DataFlow::Node {
NoUrlEncodingBarrier() { this = DataFlow::BarrierGuard<noUrlEncodingGuard/3>::getABarrierNode() }
}
/** Holds if `g` is guard for a URL that is fully decoded. */
private predicate fullyDecodesUrlGuard(Expr e) {
exists(CheckUrlEncodingGuard g, RepeatedUrlDecodeCall decodeCall |
e = g.getCheckedExpr() and
g.controls(decodeCall.getBasicBlock(), true)
)
}
/** A barrier for URLs that are fully decoded. */
private class FullyDecodesUrlBarrier extends DataFlow::Node {
FullyDecodesUrlBarrier() {
exists(Variable v, Expr e | this.asExpr() = v.getAnAccess() |
fullyDecodesUrlGuard(e) and
e = v.getAnAccess() and
e.getBasicBlock().bbDominates(this.asExpr().getBasicBlock())
)
}
}
/**
* A taint-tracking configuration for reasoning about URL forwarding.
*/
module UrlForwardFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) {
source instanceof ThreatModelFlowSource and
// excluded due to FPs
not exists(MethodCall mc, Method m |
m instanceof HttpServletRequestGetRequestUriMethod or
m instanceof HttpServletRequestGetRequestUrlMethod or
m instanceof HttpServletRequestGetPathMethod
|
mc.getMethod() = m and
mc = source.asExpr()
)
}
predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof UrlForwardSink }
predicate isBarrier(DataFlow::Node node) { node instanceof UrlForwardBarrier }
DataFlow::FlowFeature getAFeature() { result instanceof DataFlow::FeatureHasSourceCallContext }
}
/**
* Taint-tracking flow for URL forwarding.
*/
module UrlForwardFlow = TaintTracking::Global<UrlForwardFlowConfig>;

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@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
public class UrlForward extends HttpServlet {
private static final String VALID_FORWARD = "https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html";
protected void doGet(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
ServletConfig cfg = getServletConfig();
ServletContext sc = cfg.getServletContext();
// BAD: a request parameter is incorporated without validation into a URL forward
sc.getRequestDispatcher(request.getParameter("target")).forward(request, response);
// GOOD: the request parameter is validated against a known fixed string
if (VALID_FORWARD.equals(request.getParameter("target"))) {
sc.getRequestDispatcher(VALID_FORWARD).forward(request, response);
}
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
<!DOCTYPE qhelp PUBLIC
"-//Semmle//qhelp//EN"
"qhelp.dtd">
<qhelp>
<overview>
<p>Directly incorporating user input into a URL forward request without validating the input
can cause file information disclosure by allowing an attacker to access unauthorized URLs.</p>
</overview>
<recommendation>
<p>To guard against untrusted URL forwarding, you should avoid putting user input
directly into a forwarded URL. Instead, you should maintain a list of authorized
URLs on the server, then choose from that list based on the user input provided.</p>
</recommendation>
<example>
<p>The following example shows an HTTP request parameter being used directly in a URL forward
without validating the input, which may cause file information disclosure.
It also shows how to remedy the problem by validating the user input against a known fixed string.
</p>
<sample src="UrlForward.java" />
</example>
<references>
<li>OWASP:
<a href="https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Unvalidated_Redirects_and_Forwards_Cheat_Sheet.html">Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards Cheat Sheet</a>.
</li>
</references>
</qhelp>

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
/**
* @name URL forward from a remote source
* @description URL forward based on unvalidated user input
* may cause file information disclosure.
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity error
* @security-severity 7.5
* @precision high
* @id java/unvalidated-url-forward
* @tags security
* external/cwe/cwe-552
*/
import java
import semmle.code.java.security.UrlForwardQuery
import UrlForwardFlow::PathGraph
from UrlForwardFlow::PathNode source, UrlForwardFlow::PathNode sink
where UrlForwardFlow::flowPath(source, sink)
select sink.getNode(), source, sink, "Untrusted URL forward depends on a $@.", source.getNode(),
"user-provided value"

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@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
---
category: newQuery
---
* The query `java/unsafe-url-forward-dispatch-load` has been promoted from experimental to the main query pack as `java/unvalidated-url-forward`. Its results will now appear by default. This query was originally submitted as an experimental query [by @haby0](https://github.com/github/codeql/pull/6240) and [by @luchua-bc](https://github.com/github/codeql/pull/7286).

View File

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
//BAD: no path validation in Spring resource loading
@GetMapping("/file")
public String getFileContent(@RequestParam(name="fileName") String fileName) {
ClassPathResource clr = new ClassPathResource(fileName);
File file = ResourceUtils.getFile(fileName);
Resource resource = resourceLoader.getResource(fileName);
}
//GOOD: check for a trusted prefix, ensuring path traversal is not used to erase that prefix in Spring resource loading:
@GetMapping("/file")
public String getFileContent(@RequestParam(name="fileName") String fileName) {
if (!fileName.contains("..") && fileName.hasPrefix("/public-content")) {
ClassPathResource clr = new ClassPathResource(fileName);
File file = ResourceUtils.getFile(fileName);
Resource resource = resourceLoader.getResource(fileName);
}
}

View File

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
// BAD: no URI validation
URL url = request.getServletContext().getResource(requestUrl);
url = getClass().getResource(requestUrl);
InputStream in = url.openStream();
InputStream in = request.getServletContext().getResourceAsStream(requestPath);
in = getClass().getClassLoader().getResourceAsStream(requestPath);
// GOOD: check for a trusted prefix, ensuring path traversal is not used to erase that prefix:
// (alternatively use `Path.normalize` instead of checking for `..`)
if (!requestPath.contains("..") && requestPath.startsWith("/trusted")) {
InputStream in = request.getServletContext().getResourceAsStream(requestPath);
}
Path path = Paths.get(requestUrl).normalize().toRealPath();
if (path.startsWith("/trusted")) {
URL url = request.getServletContext().getResource(path.toString());
}

View File

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
// BAD: no URI validation
String returnURL = request.getParameter("returnURL");
RequestDispatcher rd = sc.getRequestDispatcher(returnURL);
rd.forward(request, response);
// GOOD: check for a trusted prefix, ensuring path traversal is not used to erase that prefix:
// (alternatively use `Path.normalize` instead of checking for `..`)
if (!returnURL.contains("..") && returnURL.hasPrefix("/pages")) { ... }
// Also GOOD: check for a forbidden prefix, ensuring URL-encoding is not used to evade the check:
// (alternatively use `URLDecoder.decode` before `hasPrefix`)
if (returnURL.hasPrefix("/internal") && !returnURL.contains("%")) { ... }

View File

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
import java.io.IOException;
import javax.servlet.ServletException;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse;
import org.springframework.stereotype.Controller;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.GetMapping;
import org.springframework.web.servlet.ModelAndView;
@Controller
public class UnsafeUrlForward {
@GetMapping("/bad1")
public ModelAndView bad1(String url) {
return new ModelAndView(url);
}
@GetMapping("/bad2")
public void bad2(String url, HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) {
try {
request.getRequestDispatcher("/WEB-INF/jsp/" + url + ".jsp").include(request, response);
} catch (ServletException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
} catch (IOException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
@GetMapping("/good1")
public void good1(String url, HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) {
try {
request.getRequestDispatcher("/index.jsp?token=" + url).forward(request, response);
} catch (ServletException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
} catch (IOException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
<!DOCTYPE qhelp PUBLIC
"-//Semmle//qhelp//EN"
"qhelp.dtd">
<qhelp>
<overview>
<p>Constructing a server-side redirect path with user input could allow an attacker to download application binaries
(including application classes or jar files) or view arbitrary files within protected directories.</p>
</overview>
<recommendation>
<p>Unsanitized user provided data must not be used to construct the path for URL forwarding. In order to prevent
untrusted URL forwarding, it is recommended to avoid concatenating user input directly into the forwarding URL.
Instead, user input should be checked against allowed (e.g., must come within <code>user_content/</code>) or disallowed
(e.g. must not come within <code>/internal</code>) paths, ensuring that neither path traversal using <code>../</code>
or URL encoding are used to evade these checks.
</p>
</recommendation>
<example>
<p>The following examples show the bad case and the good case respectively.
The <code>bad</code> methods show an HTTP request parameter being used directly in a URL forward
without validating the input, which may cause file leakage. In the <code>good1</code> method,
ordinary forwarding requests are shown, which will not cause file leakage.
</p>
<sample src="UnsafeUrlForward.java" />
<p>The following examples show an HTTP request parameter or request path being used directly in a
request dispatcher of Java EE without validating the input, which allows sensitive file exposure
attacks. It also shows how to remedy the problem by validating the user input.
</p>
<sample src="UnsafeServletRequestDispatch.java" />
<p>The following examples show an HTTP request parameter or request path being used directly to
retrieve a resource of a Java EE application without validating the input, which allows sensitive
file exposure attacks. It also shows how to remedy the problem by validating the user input.
</p>
<sample src="UnsafeResourceGet.java" />
<p>The following examples show an HTTP request parameter being used directly to retrieve a resource
of a Java Spring application without validating the input, which allows sensitive file exposure
attacks. It also shows how to remedy the problem by validating the user input.
</p>
<sample src="UnsafeLoadSpringResource.java" />
</example>
<references>
<li>File Disclosure:
<a href="https://vulncat.fortify.com/en/detail?id=desc.dataflow.java.file_disclosure_spring">Unsafe Url Forward</a>.
</li>
<li>Jakarta Javadoc:
<a href="https://jakarta.ee/specifications/webprofile/9/apidocs/jakarta/servlet/servletrequest#getRequestDispatcher-java.lang.String-">Security vulnerability with unsafe usage of RequestDispatcher</a>.
</li>
<li>Micro Focus:
<a href="https://vulncat.fortify.com/en/detail?id=desc.dataflow.java.file_disclosure_j2ee">File Disclosure: J2EE</a>
</li>
<li>CVE-2015-5174:
<a href="https://vuldb.com/?id.81084">Apache Tomcat 6.0/7.0/8.0/9.0 Servletcontext getResource/getResourceAsStream/getResourcePaths Path Traversal</a>
</li>
<li>CVE-2019-3799:
<a href="https://github.com/mpgn/CVE-2019-3799">CVE-2019-3799 - Spring-Cloud-Config-Server Directory Traversal &lt; 2.1.2, 2.0.4, 1.4.6</a>
</li>
</references>
</qhelp>

View File

@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
/**
* @name Unsafe URL forward, dispatch, or load from remote source
* @description URL forward, dispatch, or load based on unvalidated user-input
* may cause file information disclosure.
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity error
* @precision high
* @id java/unsafe-url-forward-dispatch-load
* @tags security
* experimental
* external/cwe/cwe-552
*/
import java
import UnsafeUrlForward
import semmle.code.java.dataflow.FlowSources
import semmle.code.java.dataflow.TaintTracking
import experimental.semmle.code.java.frameworks.Jsf
import semmle.code.java.security.PathSanitizer
import UnsafeUrlForwardFlow::PathGraph
module UnsafeUrlForwardFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) {
source instanceof ThreatModelFlowSource and
not exists(MethodCall ma, Method m | ma.getMethod() = m |
(
m instanceof HttpServletRequestGetRequestUriMethod or
m instanceof HttpServletRequestGetRequestUrlMethod or
m instanceof HttpServletRequestGetPathMethod
) and
ma = source.asExpr()
)
}
predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof UnsafeUrlForwardSink }
predicate isBarrier(DataFlow::Node node) {
node instanceof UnsafeUrlForwardSanitizer or
node instanceof PathInjectionSanitizer
}
DataFlow::FlowFeature getAFeature() { result instanceof DataFlow::FeatureHasSourceCallContext }
predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node prev, DataFlow::Node succ) {
exists(MethodCall ma |
(
ma.getMethod() instanceof GetServletResourceMethod or
ma.getMethod() instanceof GetFacesResourceMethod or
ma.getMethod() instanceof GetClassResourceMethod or
ma.getMethod() instanceof GetClassLoaderResourceMethod or
ma.getMethod() instanceof GetWildflyResourceMethod
) and
ma.getArgument(0) = prev.asExpr() and
ma = succ.asExpr()
)
}
}
module UnsafeUrlForwardFlow = TaintTracking::Global<UnsafeUrlForwardFlowConfig>;
from UnsafeUrlForwardFlow::PathNode source, UnsafeUrlForwardFlow::PathNode sink
where UnsafeUrlForwardFlow::flowPath(source, sink)
select sink.getNode(), source, sink, "Potentially untrusted URL forward due to $@.",
source.getNode(), "user-provided value"

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@@ -1,163 +0,0 @@
import java
private import experimental.semmle.code.java.frameworks.Jsf
private import semmle.code.java.dataflow.ExternalFlow
private import semmle.code.java.dataflow.FlowSources
private import semmle.code.java.dataflow.StringPrefixes
private import semmle.code.java.frameworks.javaee.ejb.EJBRestrictions
private import experimental.semmle.code.java.frameworks.SpringResource
private import semmle.code.java.security.Sanitizers
private class ActiveModels extends ActiveExperimentalModels {
ActiveModels() { this = "unsafe-url-forward" }
}
/** A sink for unsafe URL forward vulnerabilities. */
abstract class UnsafeUrlForwardSink extends DataFlow::Node { }
/** A sanitizer for unsafe URL forward vulnerabilities. */
abstract class UnsafeUrlForwardSanitizer extends DataFlow::Node { }
/** An argument to `getRequestDispatcher`. */
private class RequestDispatcherSink extends UnsafeUrlForwardSink {
RequestDispatcherSink() {
exists(MethodCall ma |
ma.getMethod() instanceof GetRequestDispatcherMethod and
ma.getArgument(0) = this.asExpr()
)
}
}
/** The `getResource` method of `Class`. */
class GetClassResourceMethod extends Method {
GetClassResourceMethod() {
this.getDeclaringType() instanceof TypeClass and
this.hasName("getResource")
}
}
/** The `getResourceAsStream` method of `Class`. */
class GetClassResourceAsStreamMethod extends Method {
GetClassResourceAsStreamMethod() {
this.getDeclaringType() instanceof TypeClass and
this.hasName("getResourceAsStream")
}
}
/** The `getResource` method of `ClassLoader`. */
class GetClassLoaderResourceMethod extends Method {
GetClassLoaderResourceMethod() {
this.getDeclaringType() instanceof ClassLoaderClass and
this.hasName("getResource")
}
}
/** The `getResourceAsStream` method of `ClassLoader`. */
class GetClassLoaderResourceAsStreamMethod extends Method {
GetClassLoaderResourceAsStreamMethod() {
this.getDeclaringType() instanceof ClassLoaderClass and
this.hasName("getResourceAsStream")
}
}
/** The JBoss class `FileResourceManager`. */
class FileResourceManager extends RefType {
FileResourceManager() {
this.hasQualifiedName("io.undertow.server.handlers.resource", "FileResourceManager")
}
}
/** The JBoss method `getResource` of `FileResourceManager`. */
class GetWildflyResourceMethod extends Method {
GetWildflyResourceMethod() {
this.getDeclaringType().getASupertype*() instanceof FileResourceManager and
this.hasName("getResource")
}
}
/** The JBoss class `VirtualFile`. */
class VirtualFile extends RefType {
VirtualFile() { this.hasQualifiedName("org.jboss.vfs", "VirtualFile") }
}
/** The JBoss method `getChild` of `FileResourceManager`. */
class GetVirtualFileChildMethod extends Method {
GetVirtualFileChildMethod() {
this.getDeclaringType().getASupertype*() instanceof VirtualFile and
this.hasName("getChild")
}
}
/** An argument to `getResource()` or `getResourceAsStream()`. */
private class GetResourceSink extends UnsafeUrlForwardSink {
GetResourceSink() {
sinkNode(this, "request-forgery")
or
sinkNode(this, "get-resource")
or
exists(MethodCall ma |
(
ma.getMethod() instanceof GetServletResourceAsStreamMethod or
ma.getMethod() instanceof GetFacesResourceAsStreamMethod or
ma.getMethod() instanceof GetClassResourceAsStreamMethod or
ma.getMethod() instanceof GetClassLoaderResourceAsStreamMethod or
ma.getMethod() instanceof GetVirtualFileChildMethod
) and
ma.getArgument(0) = this.asExpr()
)
}
}
/** A sink for methods that load Spring resources. */
private class SpringResourceSink extends UnsafeUrlForwardSink {
SpringResourceSink() {
exists(MethodCall ma |
ma.getMethod() instanceof GetResourceUtilsMethod and
ma.getArgument(0) = this.asExpr()
)
}
}
/** An argument to `new ModelAndView` or `ModelAndView.setViewName`. */
private class SpringModelAndViewSink extends UnsafeUrlForwardSink {
SpringModelAndViewSink() {
exists(ClassInstanceExpr cie |
cie.getConstructedType() instanceof ModelAndView and
cie.getArgument(0) = this.asExpr()
)
or
exists(SpringModelAndViewSetViewNameCall smavsvnc | smavsvnc.getArgument(0) = this.asExpr())
}
}
private class PrimitiveSanitizer extends UnsafeUrlForwardSanitizer instanceof SimpleTypeSanitizer {
}
private class SanitizingPrefix extends InterestingPrefix {
SanitizingPrefix() {
not this.getStringValue().matches("/WEB-INF/%") and
not this.getStringValue() = "forward:"
}
override int getOffset() { result = 0 }
}
private class FollowsSanitizingPrefix extends UnsafeUrlForwardSanitizer {
FollowsSanitizingPrefix() { this.asExpr() = any(SanitizingPrefix fp).getAnAppendedExpression() }
}
private class ForwardPrefix extends InterestingPrefix {
ForwardPrefix() { this.getStringValue() = "forward:" }
override int getOffset() { result = 0 }
}
/**
* An expression appended (perhaps indirectly) to `"forward:"`, and which
* is reachable from a Spring entry point.
*/
private class SpringUrlForwardSink extends UnsafeUrlForwardSink {
SpringUrlForwardSink() {
any(SpringRequestMappingMethod sqmm).polyCalls*(this.getEnclosingCallable()) and
this.asExpr() = any(ForwardPrefix fp).getAnAppendedExpression()
}
}

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@@ -1,155 +0,0 @@
package com.example;
import java.io.File;
import java.io.FileReader;
import java.io.InputStreamReader;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.Reader;
import java.io.UnsupportedEncodingException;
import java.net.URLDecoder;
import java.nio.file.Files;
import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.Autowired;
import org.springframework.core.io.ClassPathResource;
import org.springframework.core.io.Resource;
import org.springframework.core.io.ResourceLoader;
import org.springframework.util.ResourceUtils;
import org.springframework.util.StringUtils;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.GetMapping;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestParam;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RestController;
/** Sample class of Spring RestController */
@RestController
public class UnsafeLoadSpringResource {
@GetMapping("/file1")
//BAD: Get resource from ClassPathResource without input validation
public String getFileContent1(@RequestParam(name="fileName") String fileName) {
// A request such as the following can disclose source code and application configuration
// fileName=/../../WEB-INF/views/page.jsp
// fileName=/com/example/package/SampleController.class
ClassPathResource clr = new ClassPathResource(fileName);
char[] buffer = new char[4096];
StringBuilder out = new StringBuilder();
try {
Reader in = new FileReader(clr.getFilename());
for (int numRead; (numRead = in.read(buffer, 0, buffer.length)) > 0; ) {
out.append(buffer, 0, numRead);
}
} catch (IOException ie) {
ie.printStackTrace();
}
return out.toString();
}
@GetMapping("/file1a")
//GOOD: Get resource from ClassPathResource with input path validation
public String getFileContent1a(@RequestParam(name="fileName") String fileName) {
String result = null;
if (fileName.startsWith("/safe_dir") && !fileName.contains("..")) {
ClassPathResource clr = new ClassPathResource(fileName);
char[] buffer = new char[4096];
StringBuilder out = new StringBuilder();
try {
Reader in = new InputStreamReader(clr.getInputStream(), "UTF-8");
for (int numRead; (numRead = in.read(buffer, 0, buffer.length)) > 0; ) {
out.append(buffer, 0, numRead);
}
} catch (IOException ie) {
ie.printStackTrace();
}
result = out.toString();
}
return result;
}
@GetMapping("/file2")
//BAD: Get resource from ResourceUtils without input validation
public String getFileContent2(@RequestParam(name="fileName") String fileName) {
String content = null;
try {
// A request such as the following can disclose source code and system configuration
// fileName=/etc/hosts
// fileName=file:/etc/hosts
// fileName=/opt/appdir/WEB-INF/views/page.jsp
File file = ResourceUtils.getFile(fileName);
//Read File Content
content = new String(Files.readAllBytes(file.toPath()));
} catch (IOException ie) {
ie.printStackTrace();
}
return content;
}
@GetMapping("/file2a")
//GOOD: Get resource from ResourceUtils with input path validation
public String getFileContent2a(@RequestParam(name="fileName") String fileName) {
String content = null;
if (fileName.startsWith("/safe_dir") && !fileName.contains("..")) {
try {
File file = ResourceUtils.getFile(fileName);
//Read File Content
content = new String(Files.readAllBytes(file.toPath()));
} catch (IOException ie) {
ie.printStackTrace();
}
}
return content;
}
@Autowired
ResourceLoader resourceLoader;
@GetMapping("/file3")
//BAD: Get resource from ResourceLoader (same as application context) without input validation
// Note it is not detected without the generic `resource.getInputStream()` check
public String getFileContent3(@RequestParam(name="fileName") String fileName) {
String content = null;
try {
// A request such as the following can disclose source code and system configuration
// fileName=/WEB-INF/views/page.jsp
// fileName=/WEB-INF/classes/com/example/package/SampleController.class
// fileName=file:/etc/hosts
Resource resource = resourceLoader.getResource(fileName);
char[] buffer = new char[4096];
StringBuilder out = new StringBuilder();
Reader in = new InputStreamReader(resource.getInputStream(), "UTF-8");
for (int numRead; (numRead = in.read(buffer, 0, buffer.length)) > 0; ) {
out.append(buffer, 0, numRead);
}
content = out.toString();
} catch (IOException ie) {
ie.printStackTrace();
}
return content;
}
@GetMapping("/file3a")
//GOOD: Get resource from ResourceLoader (same as application context) with input path validation
public String getFileContent3a(@RequestParam(name="fileName") String fileName) {
String content = null;
if (fileName.startsWith("/safe_dir") && !fileName.contains("..")) {
try {
Resource resource = resourceLoader.getResource(fileName);
char[] buffer = new char[4096];
StringBuilder out = new StringBuilder();
Reader in = new InputStreamReader(resource.getInputStream(), "UTF-8");
for (int numRead; (numRead = in.read(buffer, 0, buffer.length)) > 0; ) {
out.append(buffer, 0, numRead);
}
content = out.toString();
} catch (IOException ie) {
ie.printStackTrace();
}
}
return content;
}
}

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@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
import java.io.IOException;
import javax.servlet.Filter;
import javax.servlet.FilterChain;
import javax.servlet.FilterConfig;
import javax.servlet.ServletException;
import javax.servlet.ServletRequest;
import javax.servlet.ServletResponse;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse;
// @WebFilter("/*")
public class UnsafeRequestPath implements Filter {
private static final String BASE_PATH = "/pages";
@Override
// BAD: Request dispatcher from servlet path without check
public void doFilter(ServletRequest request, ServletResponse response, FilterChain chain)
throws IOException, ServletException {
String path = ((HttpServletRequest) request).getServletPath();
// A sample payload "/%57EB-INF/web.xml" can bypass this `startsWith` check
if (path != null && !path.startsWith("/WEB-INF")) {
request.getRequestDispatcher(path).forward(request, response);
} else {
chain.doFilter(request, response);
}
}
// GOOD: Request dispatcher from servlet path with check
public void doFilter2(ServletRequest request, ServletResponse response, FilterChain chain)
throws IOException, ServletException {
String path = ((HttpServletRequest) request).getServletPath();
if (path.startsWith(BASE_PATH) && !path.contains("..")) {
request.getRequestDispatcher(path).forward(request, response);
} else {
chain.doFilter(request, response);
}
}
// GOOD: Request dispatcher from servlet path with whitelisted string comparison
public void doFilter3(ServletRequest request, ServletResponse response, FilterChain chain)
throws IOException, ServletException {
String path = ((HttpServletRequest) request).getServletPath();
if (path.equals("/comaction")) {
request.getRequestDispatcher(path).forward(request, response);
} else {
chain.doFilter(request, response);
}
}
}

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@@ -1,270 +0,0 @@
package com.example;
import java.io.InputStream;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.PrintWriter;
import java.nio.file.Path;
import java.nio.file.Paths;
import java.net.URI;
import java.net.URL;
import java.net.URISyntaxException;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse;
import javax.servlet.ServletOutputStream;
import javax.servlet.ServletException;
import javax.servlet.ServletConfig;
import javax.servlet.ServletContext;
import io.undertow.server.handlers.resource.FileResourceManager;
import io.undertow.server.handlers.resource.Resource;
import org.jboss.vfs.VFS;
import org.jboss.vfs.VirtualFile;
public class UnsafeResourceGet extends HttpServlet {
private static final String BASE_PATH = "/pages";
@Override
// BAD: getResource constructed from `ServletContext` without input validation
protected void doGet(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String requestUrl = request.getParameter("requestURL");
ServletOutputStream out = response.getOutputStream();
ServletConfig cfg = getServletConfig();
ServletContext sc = cfg.getServletContext();
// A sample request /fake.jsp/../WEB-INF/web.xml can load the web.xml file
URL url = sc.getResource(requestUrl);
InputStream in = url.openStream();
byte[] buf = new byte[4 * 1024]; // 4K buffer
int bytesRead;
while ((bytesRead = in.read(buf)) != -1) {
out.write(buf, 0, bytesRead);
}
}
// GOOD: getResource constructed from `ServletContext` with input validation
protected void doGetGood(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String requestUrl = request.getParameter("requestURL");
ServletOutputStream out = response.getOutputStream();
ServletConfig cfg = getServletConfig();
ServletContext sc = cfg.getServletContext();
Path path = Paths.get(requestUrl).normalize().toRealPath();
if (path.startsWith(BASE_PATH)) {
URL url = sc.getResource(path.toString());
InputStream in = url.openStream();
byte[] buf = new byte[4 * 1024]; // 4K buffer
int bytesRead;
while ((bytesRead = in.read(buf)) != -1) {
out.write(buf, 0, bytesRead);
}
}
}
// GOOD: getResource constructed from `ServletContext` with null check only
protected void doGetGood2(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String requestUrl = request.getParameter("requestURL");
PrintWriter writer = response.getWriter();
ServletConfig cfg = getServletConfig();
ServletContext sc = cfg.getServletContext();
// A sample request /fake.jsp/../WEB-INF/web.xml can load the web.xml file
URL url = sc.getResource(requestUrl);
if (url == null) {
writer.println("Requested source not found");
}
}
// GOOD: getResource constructed from `ServletContext` with `equals` check
protected void doGetGood3(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String requestUrl = request.getParameter("requestURL");
ServletOutputStream out = response.getOutputStream();
ServletContext sc = request.getServletContext();
if (requestUrl.equals("/public/crossdomain.xml")) {
URL url = sc.getResource(requestUrl);
InputStream in = url.openStream();
byte[] buf = new byte[4 * 1024]; // 4K buffer
int bytesRead;
while ((bytesRead = in.read(buf)) != -1) {
out.write(buf, 0, bytesRead);
}
}
}
@Override
// BAD: getResourceAsStream constructed from `ServletContext` without input validation
protected void doPost(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String requestPath = request.getParameter("requestPath");
ServletOutputStream out = response.getOutputStream();
// A sample request /fake.jsp/../WEB-INF/web.xml can load the web.xml file
InputStream in = request.getServletContext().getResourceAsStream(requestPath);
byte[] buf = new byte[4 * 1024]; // 4K buffer
int bytesRead;
while ((bytesRead = in.read(buf)) != -1) {
out.write(buf, 0, bytesRead);
}
}
// GOOD: getResourceAsStream constructed from `ServletContext` with input validation
protected void doPostGood(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String requestPath = request.getParameter("requestPath");
ServletOutputStream out = response.getOutputStream();
if (!requestPath.contains("..") && requestPath.startsWith("/trusted")) {
InputStream in = request.getServletContext().getResourceAsStream(requestPath);
byte[] buf = new byte[4 * 1024]; // 4K buffer
int bytesRead;
while ((bytesRead = in.read(buf)) != -1) {
out.write(buf, 0, bytesRead);
}
}
}
@Override
// BAD: getResource constructed from `Class` without input validation
protected void doHead(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String requestUrl = request.getParameter("requestURL");
ServletOutputStream out = response.getOutputStream();
// A sample request /fake.jsp/../../../WEB-INF/web.xml can load the web.xml file
// Note the class is in two levels of subpackages and `Class.getResource` starts from its own directory
URL url = getClass().getResource(requestUrl);
InputStream in = url.openStream();
byte[] buf = new byte[4 * 1024]; // 4K buffer
int bytesRead;
while ((bytesRead = in.read(buf)) != -1) {
out.write(buf, 0, bytesRead);
}
}
// GOOD: getResource constructed from `Class` with input validation
protected void doHeadGood(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String requestUrl = request.getParameter("requestURL");
ServletOutputStream out = response.getOutputStream();
Path path = Paths.get(requestUrl).normalize().toRealPath();
if (path.startsWith(BASE_PATH)) {
URL url = getClass().getResource(path.toString());
InputStream in = url.openStream();
byte[] buf = new byte[4 * 1024]; // 4K buffer
int bytesRead;
while ((bytesRead = in.read(buf)) != -1) {
out.write(buf, 0, bytesRead);
}
}
}
@Override
// BAD: getResourceAsStream constructed from `ClassLoader` without input validation
protected void doPut(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String requestPath = request.getParameter("requestPath");
ServletOutputStream out = response.getOutputStream();
ServletConfig cfg = getServletConfig();
ServletContext sc = cfg.getServletContext();
// A sample request /fake.jsp/../../../WEB-INF/web.xml can load the web.xml file
// Note the class is in two levels of subpackages and `ClassLoader.getResourceAsStream` starts from its own directory
InputStream in = getClass().getClassLoader().getResourceAsStream(requestPath);
byte[] buf = new byte[4 * 1024]; // 4K buffer
int bytesRead;
while ((bytesRead = in.read(buf)) != -1) {
out.write(buf, 0, bytesRead);
}
}
// GOOD: getResourceAsStream constructed from `ClassLoader` with input validation
protected void doPutGood(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String requestPath = request.getParameter("requestPath");
ServletOutputStream out = response.getOutputStream();
ServletConfig cfg = getServletConfig();
ServletContext sc = cfg.getServletContext();
if (!requestPath.contains("..") && requestPath.startsWith("/trusted")) {
InputStream in = getClass().getClassLoader().getResourceAsStream(requestPath);
byte[] buf = new byte[4 * 1024]; // 4K buffer
int bytesRead;
while ((bytesRead = in.read(buf)) != -1) {
out.write(buf, 0, bytesRead);
}
}
}
// BAD: getResource constructed from `ClassLoader` without input validation
protected void doPutBad(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String requestUrl = request.getParameter("requestURL");
ServletOutputStream out = response.getOutputStream();
// A sample request /fake.jsp/../../../WEB-INF/web.xml can load the web.xml file
// Note the class is in two levels of subpackages and `ClassLoader.getResource` starts from its own directory
URL url = getClass().getClassLoader().getResource(requestUrl);
InputStream in = url.openStream();
byte[] buf = new byte[4 * 1024]; // 4K buffer
int bytesRead;
while ((bytesRead = in.read(buf)) != -1) {
out.write(buf, 0, bytesRead);
}
}
// BAD: getResource constructed using Undertow IO without input validation
protected void doPutBad2(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String requestPath = request.getParameter("requestPath");
try {
FileResourceManager rm = new FileResourceManager(VFS.getChild(new URI("/usr/share")).getPhysicalFile());
Resource rs = rm.getResource(requestPath);
VirtualFile overlay = VFS.getChild(new URI("EAP_HOME/modules/"));
// Do file operations
overlay.getChild(rs.getPath());
} catch (URISyntaxException ue) {
throw new IOException("Cannot parse the URI");
}
}
// GOOD: getResource constructed using Undertow IO with input validation
protected void doPutGood2(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String requestPath = request.getParameter("requestPath");
try {
FileResourceManager rm = new FileResourceManager(VFS.getChild(new URI("/usr/share")).getPhysicalFile());
Resource rs = rm.getResource(requestPath);
VirtualFile overlay = VFS.getChild(new URI("EAP_HOME/modules/"));
String path = rs.getPath();
if (path.startsWith("/trusted_path") && !path.contains("..")) {
// Do file operations
overlay.getChild(path);
}
} catch (URISyntaxException ue) {
throw new IOException("Cannot parse the URI");
}
}
}

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@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
package com.example;
import javax.faces.context.FacesContext;
import java.io.BufferedReader;
import java.io.InputStream;
import java.io.InputStreamReader;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.net.URL;
import java.util.Map;
/** Sample class of JSF managed bean */
public class UnsafeResourceGet2 {
// BAD: getResourceAsStream constructed from `ExternalContext` without input validation
public String parameterActionBad1() throws IOException {
FacesContext fc = FacesContext.getCurrentInstance();
Map<String, String> params = fc.getExternalContext().getRequestParameterMap();
String loadUrl = params.get("loadUrl");
InputStreamReader isr = new InputStreamReader(fc.getExternalContext().getResourceAsStream(loadUrl));
BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(isr);
if(br.ready()) {
//Do Stuff
return "result";
}
return "home";
}
// BAD: getResource constructed from `ExternalContext` without input validation
public String parameterActionBad2() throws IOException {
FacesContext fc = FacesContext.getCurrentInstance();
Map<String, String> params = fc.getExternalContext().getRequestParameterMap();
String loadUrl = params.get("loadUrl");
URL url = fc.getExternalContext().getResource(loadUrl);
InputStream in = url.openStream();
//Do Stuff
return "result";
}
// GOOD: getResource constructed from `ExternalContext` with input validation
public String parameterActionGood1() throws IOException {
FacesContext fc = FacesContext.getCurrentInstance();
Map<String, String> params = fc.getExternalContext().getRequestParameterMap();
String loadUrl = params.get("loadUrl");
if (loadUrl.equals("/public/crossdomain.xml")) {
URL url = fc.getExternalContext().getResource(loadUrl);
InputStream in = url.openStream();
//Do Stuff
return "result";
}
return "home";
}
}

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@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
import java.io.IOException;
import java.net.URLDecoder;
import java.io.File;
import java.nio.file.Path;
import java.nio.file.Paths;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse;
import javax.servlet.RequestDispatcher;
import javax.servlet.ServletException;
import javax.servlet.ServletConfig;
import javax.servlet.ServletContext;
public class UnsafeServletRequestDispatch extends HttpServlet {
private static final String BASE_PATH = "/pages";
@Override
// BAD: Request dispatcher constructed from `ServletContext` without input validation
protected void doGet(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String action = request.getParameter("action");
String returnURL = request.getParameter("returnURL");
ServletConfig cfg = getServletConfig();
if (action.equals("Login")) {
ServletContext sc = cfg.getServletContext();
RequestDispatcher rd = sc.getRequestDispatcher("/Login.jsp");
rd.forward(request, response);
} else {
ServletContext sc = cfg.getServletContext();
RequestDispatcher rd = sc.getRequestDispatcher(returnURL);
rd.forward(request, response);
}
}
@Override
// BAD: Request dispatcher constructed from `HttpServletRequest` without input validation
protected void doPost(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String action = request.getParameter("action");
String returnURL = request.getParameter("returnURL");
if (action.equals("Login")) {
RequestDispatcher rd = request.getRequestDispatcher("/Login.jsp");
rd.forward(request, response);
} else {
RequestDispatcher rd = request.getRequestDispatcher(returnURL);
rd.forward(request, response);
}
}
@Override
// GOOD: Request dispatcher with a whitelisted URI
protected void doPut(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String action = request.getParameter("action");
if (action.equals("Login")) {
RequestDispatcher rd = request.getRequestDispatcher("/Login.jsp");
rd.forward(request, response);
} else if (action.equals("Register")) {
RequestDispatcher rd = request.getRequestDispatcher("/Register.jsp");
rd.forward(request, response);
}
}
// BAD: Request dispatcher without path traversal check
protected void doHead2(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String path = request.getParameter("path");
// A sample payload "/pages/welcome.jsp/../WEB-INF/web.xml" can bypass the `startsWith` check
// The payload "/pages/welcome.jsp/../../%57EB-INF/web.xml" can bypass the check as well since RequestDispatcher will decode `%57` as `W`
if (path.startsWith(BASE_PATH)) {
request.getServletContext().getRequestDispatcher(path).include(request, response);
}
}
// GOOD: Request dispatcher with path traversal check
protected void doHead3(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String path = request.getParameter("path");
if (path.startsWith(BASE_PATH) && !path.contains("..")) {
request.getServletContext().getRequestDispatcher(path).include(request, response);
}
}
// GOOD: Request dispatcher with path normalization and comparison
protected void doHead4(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String path = request.getParameter("path");
Path requestedPath = Paths.get(BASE_PATH).resolve(path).normalize();
// /pages/welcome.jsp/../../WEB-INF/web.xml becomes /WEB-INF/web.xml
// /pages/welcome.jsp/../../%57EB-INF/web.xml becomes /%57EB-INF/web.xml
if (requestedPath.startsWith(BASE_PATH)) {
request.getServletContext().getRequestDispatcher(requestedPath.toString()).forward(request, response);
}
}
// FN: Request dispatcher with negation check and path normalization, but without URL decoding
// When promoting this query, consider using FlowStates to make `getRequestDispatcher` a sink
// only if a URL-decoding step has NOT been crossed (i.e. make URLDecoder.decode change the
// state to a different value than the one required at the sink).
protected void doHead5(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String path = request.getParameter("path");
Path requestedPath = Paths.get(BASE_PATH).resolve(path).normalize();
if (!requestedPath.startsWith("/WEB-INF") && !requestedPath.startsWith("/META-INF")) {
request.getServletContext().getRequestDispatcher(requestedPath.toString()).forward(request, response);
}
}
// GOOD: Request dispatcher with path traversal check and URL decoding
protected void doHead6(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String path = request.getParameter("path");
boolean hasEncoding = path.contains("%");
while (hasEncoding) {
path = URLDecoder.decode(path, "UTF-8");
hasEncoding = path.contains("%");
}
if (!path.startsWith("/WEB-INF/") && !path.contains("..")) {
request.getServletContext().getRequestDispatcher(path).include(request, response);
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
edges
| UnsafeLoadSpringResource.java:27:32:27:77 | fileName : String | UnsafeLoadSpringResource.java:31:49:31:56 | fileName : String | provenance | |
| UnsafeLoadSpringResource.java:31:27:31:57 | new ClassPathResource(...) : ClassPathResource | UnsafeLoadSpringResource.java:35:31:35:33 | clr | provenance | |
| UnsafeLoadSpringResource.java:31:49:31:56 | fileName : String | UnsafeLoadSpringResource.java:31:27:31:57 | new ClassPathResource(...) : ClassPathResource | provenance | |
| UnsafeLoadSpringResource.java:68:32:68:77 | fileName : String | UnsafeLoadSpringResource.java:76:38:76:45 | fileName | provenance | |
| UnsafeLoadSpringResource.java:108:32:108:77 | fileName : String | UnsafeLoadSpringResource.java:116:51:116:58 | fileName | provenance | |
| UnsafeRequestPath.java:20:17:20:63 | getServletPath(...) : String | UnsafeRequestPath.java:23:33:23:36 | path | provenance | |
| UnsafeResourceGet2.java:16:32:16:79 | getRequestParameterMap(...) : Map | UnsafeResourceGet2.java:17:20:17:25 | params : Map | provenance | |
| UnsafeResourceGet2.java:17:20:17:25 | params : Map | UnsafeResourceGet2.java:17:20:17:40 | get(...) : String | provenance | |
| UnsafeResourceGet2.java:17:20:17:40 | get(...) : String | UnsafeResourceGet2.java:19:93:19:99 | loadUrl | provenance | |
| UnsafeResourceGet2.java:32:32:32:79 | getRequestParameterMap(...) : Map | UnsafeResourceGet2.java:33:20:33:25 | params : Map | provenance | |
| UnsafeResourceGet2.java:33:20:33:25 | params : Map | UnsafeResourceGet2.java:33:20:33:40 | get(...) : String | provenance | |
| UnsafeResourceGet2.java:33:20:33:40 | get(...) : String | UnsafeResourceGet2.java:35:49:35:55 | loadUrl : String | provenance | |
| UnsafeResourceGet2.java:35:13:35:56 | getResource(...) : URL | UnsafeResourceGet2.java:37:20:37:22 | url | provenance | |
| UnsafeResourceGet2.java:35:49:35:55 | loadUrl : String | UnsafeResourceGet2.java:35:13:35:56 | getResource(...) : URL | provenance | |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:32:23:32:56 | getParameter(...) : String | UnsafeResourceGet.java:39:28:39:37 | requestUrl : String | provenance | |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:39:13:39:38 | getResource(...) : URL | UnsafeResourceGet.java:41:20:41:22 | url | provenance | |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:39:28:39:37 | requestUrl : String | UnsafeResourceGet.java:39:13:39:38 | getResource(...) : URL | provenance | |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:111:24:111:58 | getParameter(...) : String | UnsafeResourceGet.java:115:68:115:78 | requestPath | provenance | |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:143:23:143:56 | getParameter(...) : String | UnsafeResourceGet.java:148:36:148:45 | requestUrl : String | provenance | |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:148:13:148:46 | getResource(...) : URL | UnsafeResourceGet.java:150:20:150:22 | url | provenance | |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:148:36:148:45 | requestUrl : String | UnsafeResourceGet.java:148:13:148:46 | getResource(...) : URL | provenance | |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:181:24:181:58 | getParameter(...) : String | UnsafeResourceGet.java:189:68:189:78 | requestPath | provenance | |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:219:23:219:56 | getParameter(...) : String | UnsafeResourceGet.java:224:53:224:62 | requestUrl : String | provenance | |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:224:13:224:63 | getResource(...) : URL | UnsafeResourceGet.java:226:20:226:22 | url | provenance | |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:224:53:224:62 | requestUrl : String | UnsafeResourceGet.java:224:13:224:63 | getResource(...) : URL | provenance | |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:237:24:237:58 | getParameter(...) : String | UnsafeResourceGet.java:241:33:241:43 | requestPath : String | provenance | |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:241:18:241:44 | getResource(...) : Resource | UnsafeResourceGet.java:245:21:245:22 | rs : Resource | provenance | |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:241:33:241:43 | requestPath : String | UnsafeResourceGet.java:241:18:241:44 | getResource(...) : Resource | provenance | |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:245:21:245:22 | rs : Resource | UnsafeResourceGet.java:245:21:245:32 | getPath(...) | provenance | |
| UnsafeServletRequestDispatch.java:23:22:23:54 | getParameter(...) : String | UnsafeServletRequestDispatch.java:32:51:32:59 | returnURL | provenance | |
| UnsafeServletRequestDispatch.java:42:22:42:54 | getParameter(...) : String | UnsafeServletRequestDispatch.java:48:56:48:64 | returnURL | provenance | |
| UnsafeServletRequestDispatch.java:71:17:71:44 | getParameter(...) : String | UnsafeServletRequestDispatch.java:76:53:76:56 | path | provenance | |
| UnsafeUrlForward.java:13:27:13:36 | url : String | UnsafeUrlForward.java:14:27:14:29 | url | provenance | |
| UnsafeUrlForward.java:18:27:18:36 | url : String | UnsafeUrlForward.java:20:28:20:30 | url | provenance | |
| UnsafeUrlForward.java:25:21:25:30 | url : String | UnsafeUrlForward.java:26:23:26:25 | url | provenance | |
| UnsafeUrlForward.java:30:27:30:36 | url : String | UnsafeUrlForward.java:31:48:31:63 | ... + ... | provenance | |
| UnsafeUrlForward.java:30:27:30:36 | url : String | UnsafeUrlForward.java:31:61:31:63 | url | provenance | |
| UnsafeUrlForward.java:36:19:36:28 | url : String | UnsafeUrlForward.java:38:33:38:35 | url | provenance | |
| UnsafeUrlForward.java:47:19:47:28 | url : String | UnsafeUrlForward.java:49:33:49:62 | ... + ... | provenance | |
| UnsafeUrlForward.java:58:19:58:28 | url : String | UnsafeUrlForward.java:60:33:60:62 | ... + ... | provenance | |
nodes
| UnsafeLoadSpringResource.java:27:32:27:77 | fileName : String | semmle.label | fileName : String |
| UnsafeLoadSpringResource.java:31:27:31:57 | new ClassPathResource(...) : ClassPathResource | semmle.label | new ClassPathResource(...) : ClassPathResource |
| UnsafeLoadSpringResource.java:31:49:31:56 | fileName : String | semmle.label | fileName : String |
| UnsafeLoadSpringResource.java:35:31:35:33 | clr | semmle.label | clr |
| UnsafeLoadSpringResource.java:68:32:68:77 | fileName : String | semmle.label | fileName : String |
| UnsafeLoadSpringResource.java:76:38:76:45 | fileName | semmle.label | fileName |
| UnsafeLoadSpringResource.java:108:32:108:77 | fileName : String | semmle.label | fileName : String |
| UnsafeLoadSpringResource.java:116:51:116:58 | fileName | semmle.label | fileName |
| UnsafeRequestPath.java:20:17:20:63 | getServletPath(...) : String | semmle.label | getServletPath(...) : String |
| UnsafeRequestPath.java:23:33:23:36 | path | semmle.label | path |
| UnsafeResourceGet2.java:16:32:16:79 | getRequestParameterMap(...) : Map | semmle.label | getRequestParameterMap(...) : Map |
| UnsafeResourceGet2.java:17:20:17:25 | params : Map | semmle.label | params : Map |
| UnsafeResourceGet2.java:17:20:17:40 | get(...) : String | semmle.label | get(...) : String |
| UnsafeResourceGet2.java:19:93:19:99 | loadUrl | semmle.label | loadUrl |
| UnsafeResourceGet2.java:32:32:32:79 | getRequestParameterMap(...) : Map | semmle.label | getRequestParameterMap(...) : Map |
| UnsafeResourceGet2.java:33:20:33:25 | params : Map | semmle.label | params : Map |
| UnsafeResourceGet2.java:33:20:33:40 | get(...) : String | semmle.label | get(...) : String |
| UnsafeResourceGet2.java:35:13:35:56 | getResource(...) : URL | semmle.label | getResource(...) : URL |
| UnsafeResourceGet2.java:35:49:35:55 | loadUrl : String | semmle.label | loadUrl : String |
| UnsafeResourceGet2.java:37:20:37:22 | url | semmle.label | url |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:32:23:32:56 | getParameter(...) : String | semmle.label | getParameter(...) : String |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:39:13:39:38 | getResource(...) : URL | semmle.label | getResource(...) : URL |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:39:28:39:37 | requestUrl : String | semmle.label | requestUrl : String |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:41:20:41:22 | url | semmle.label | url |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:111:24:111:58 | getParameter(...) : String | semmle.label | getParameter(...) : String |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:115:68:115:78 | requestPath | semmle.label | requestPath |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:143:23:143:56 | getParameter(...) : String | semmle.label | getParameter(...) : String |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:148:13:148:46 | getResource(...) : URL | semmle.label | getResource(...) : URL |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:148:36:148:45 | requestUrl : String | semmle.label | requestUrl : String |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:150:20:150:22 | url | semmle.label | url |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:181:24:181:58 | getParameter(...) : String | semmle.label | getParameter(...) : String |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:189:68:189:78 | requestPath | semmle.label | requestPath |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:219:23:219:56 | getParameter(...) : String | semmle.label | getParameter(...) : String |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:224:13:224:63 | getResource(...) : URL | semmle.label | getResource(...) : URL |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:224:53:224:62 | requestUrl : String | semmle.label | requestUrl : String |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:226:20:226:22 | url | semmle.label | url |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:237:24:237:58 | getParameter(...) : String | semmle.label | getParameter(...) : String |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:241:18:241:44 | getResource(...) : Resource | semmle.label | getResource(...) : Resource |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:241:33:241:43 | requestPath : String | semmle.label | requestPath : String |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:245:21:245:22 | rs : Resource | semmle.label | rs : Resource |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:245:21:245:32 | getPath(...) | semmle.label | getPath(...) |
| UnsafeServletRequestDispatch.java:23:22:23:54 | getParameter(...) : String | semmle.label | getParameter(...) : String |
| UnsafeServletRequestDispatch.java:32:51:32:59 | returnURL | semmle.label | returnURL |
| UnsafeServletRequestDispatch.java:42:22:42:54 | getParameter(...) : String | semmle.label | getParameter(...) : String |
| UnsafeServletRequestDispatch.java:48:56:48:64 | returnURL | semmle.label | returnURL |
| UnsafeServletRequestDispatch.java:71:17:71:44 | getParameter(...) : String | semmle.label | getParameter(...) : String |
| UnsafeServletRequestDispatch.java:76:53:76:56 | path | semmle.label | path |
| UnsafeUrlForward.java:13:27:13:36 | url : String | semmle.label | url : String |
| UnsafeUrlForward.java:14:27:14:29 | url | semmle.label | url |
| UnsafeUrlForward.java:18:27:18:36 | url : String | semmle.label | url : String |
| UnsafeUrlForward.java:20:28:20:30 | url | semmle.label | url |
| UnsafeUrlForward.java:25:21:25:30 | url : String | semmle.label | url : String |
| UnsafeUrlForward.java:26:23:26:25 | url | semmle.label | url |
| UnsafeUrlForward.java:30:27:30:36 | url : String | semmle.label | url : String |
| UnsafeUrlForward.java:31:48:31:63 | ... + ... | semmle.label | ... + ... |
| UnsafeUrlForward.java:31:61:31:63 | url | semmle.label | url |
| UnsafeUrlForward.java:36:19:36:28 | url : String | semmle.label | url : String |
| UnsafeUrlForward.java:38:33:38:35 | url | semmle.label | url |
| UnsafeUrlForward.java:47:19:47:28 | url : String | semmle.label | url : String |
| UnsafeUrlForward.java:49:33:49:62 | ... + ... | semmle.label | ... + ... |
| UnsafeUrlForward.java:58:19:58:28 | url : String | semmle.label | url : String |
| UnsafeUrlForward.java:60:33:60:62 | ... + ... | semmle.label | ... + ... |
subpaths
#select
| UnsafeLoadSpringResource.java:35:31:35:33 | clr | UnsafeLoadSpringResource.java:27:32:27:77 | fileName : String | UnsafeLoadSpringResource.java:35:31:35:33 | clr | Potentially untrusted URL forward due to $@. | UnsafeLoadSpringResource.java:27:32:27:77 | fileName | user-provided value |
| UnsafeLoadSpringResource.java:76:38:76:45 | fileName | UnsafeLoadSpringResource.java:68:32:68:77 | fileName : String | UnsafeLoadSpringResource.java:76:38:76:45 | fileName | Potentially untrusted URL forward due to $@. | UnsafeLoadSpringResource.java:68:32:68:77 | fileName | user-provided value |
| UnsafeLoadSpringResource.java:116:51:116:58 | fileName | UnsafeLoadSpringResource.java:108:32:108:77 | fileName : String | UnsafeLoadSpringResource.java:116:51:116:58 | fileName | Potentially untrusted URL forward due to $@. | UnsafeLoadSpringResource.java:108:32:108:77 | fileName | user-provided value |
| UnsafeRequestPath.java:23:33:23:36 | path | UnsafeRequestPath.java:20:17:20:63 | getServletPath(...) : String | UnsafeRequestPath.java:23:33:23:36 | path | Potentially untrusted URL forward due to $@. | UnsafeRequestPath.java:20:17:20:63 | getServletPath(...) | user-provided value |
| UnsafeResourceGet2.java:19:93:19:99 | loadUrl | UnsafeResourceGet2.java:16:32:16:79 | getRequestParameterMap(...) : Map | UnsafeResourceGet2.java:19:93:19:99 | loadUrl | Potentially untrusted URL forward due to $@. | UnsafeResourceGet2.java:16:32:16:79 | getRequestParameterMap(...) | user-provided value |
| UnsafeResourceGet2.java:37:20:37:22 | url | UnsafeResourceGet2.java:32:32:32:79 | getRequestParameterMap(...) : Map | UnsafeResourceGet2.java:37:20:37:22 | url | Potentially untrusted URL forward due to $@. | UnsafeResourceGet2.java:32:32:32:79 | getRequestParameterMap(...) | user-provided value |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:41:20:41:22 | url | UnsafeResourceGet.java:32:23:32:56 | getParameter(...) : String | UnsafeResourceGet.java:41:20:41:22 | url | Potentially untrusted URL forward due to $@. | UnsafeResourceGet.java:32:23:32:56 | getParameter(...) | user-provided value |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:115:68:115:78 | requestPath | UnsafeResourceGet.java:111:24:111:58 | getParameter(...) : String | UnsafeResourceGet.java:115:68:115:78 | requestPath | Potentially untrusted URL forward due to $@. | UnsafeResourceGet.java:111:24:111:58 | getParameter(...) | user-provided value |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:150:20:150:22 | url | UnsafeResourceGet.java:143:23:143:56 | getParameter(...) : String | UnsafeResourceGet.java:150:20:150:22 | url | Potentially untrusted URL forward due to $@. | UnsafeResourceGet.java:143:23:143:56 | getParameter(...) | user-provided value |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:189:68:189:78 | requestPath | UnsafeResourceGet.java:181:24:181:58 | getParameter(...) : String | UnsafeResourceGet.java:189:68:189:78 | requestPath | Potentially untrusted URL forward due to $@. | UnsafeResourceGet.java:181:24:181:58 | getParameter(...) | user-provided value |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:226:20:226:22 | url | UnsafeResourceGet.java:219:23:219:56 | getParameter(...) : String | UnsafeResourceGet.java:226:20:226:22 | url | Potentially untrusted URL forward due to $@. | UnsafeResourceGet.java:219:23:219:56 | getParameter(...) | user-provided value |
| UnsafeResourceGet.java:245:21:245:32 | getPath(...) | UnsafeResourceGet.java:237:24:237:58 | getParameter(...) : String | UnsafeResourceGet.java:245:21:245:32 | getPath(...) | Potentially untrusted URL forward due to $@. | UnsafeResourceGet.java:237:24:237:58 | getParameter(...) | user-provided value |
| UnsafeServletRequestDispatch.java:32:51:32:59 | returnURL | UnsafeServletRequestDispatch.java:23:22:23:54 | getParameter(...) : String | UnsafeServletRequestDispatch.java:32:51:32:59 | returnURL | Potentially untrusted URL forward due to $@. | UnsafeServletRequestDispatch.java:23:22:23:54 | getParameter(...) | user-provided value |
| UnsafeServletRequestDispatch.java:48:56:48:64 | returnURL | UnsafeServletRequestDispatch.java:42:22:42:54 | getParameter(...) : String | UnsafeServletRequestDispatch.java:48:56:48:64 | returnURL | Potentially untrusted URL forward due to $@. | UnsafeServletRequestDispatch.java:42:22:42:54 | getParameter(...) | user-provided value |
| UnsafeServletRequestDispatch.java:76:53:76:56 | path | UnsafeServletRequestDispatch.java:71:17:71:44 | getParameter(...) : String | UnsafeServletRequestDispatch.java:76:53:76:56 | path | Potentially untrusted URL forward due to $@. | UnsafeServletRequestDispatch.java:71:17:71:44 | getParameter(...) | user-provided value |
| UnsafeUrlForward.java:14:27:14:29 | url | UnsafeUrlForward.java:13:27:13:36 | url : String | UnsafeUrlForward.java:14:27:14:29 | url | Potentially untrusted URL forward due to $@. | UnsafeUrlForward.java:13:27:13:36 | url | user-provided value |
| UnsafeUrlForward.java:20:28:20:30 | url | UnsafeUrlForward.java:18:27:18:36 | url : String | UnsafeUrlForward.java:20:28:20:30 | url | Potentially untrusted URL forward due to $@. | UnsafeUrlForward.java:18:27:18:36 | url | user-provided value |
| UnsafeUrlForward.java:26:23:26:25 | url | UnsafeUrlForward.java:25:21:25:30 | url : String | UnsafeUrlForward.java:26:23:26:25 | url | Potentially untrusted URL forward due to $@. | UnsafeUrlForward.java:25:21:25:30 | url | user-provided value |
| UnsafeUrlForward.java:31:48:31:63 | ... + ... | UnsafeUrlForward.java:30:27:30:36 | url : String | UnsafeUrlForward.java:31:48:31:63 | ... + ... | Potentially untrusted URL forward due to $@. | UnsafeUrlForward.java:30:27:30:36 | url | user-provided value |
| UnsafeUrlForward.java:31:61:31:63 | url | UnsafeUrlForward.java:30:27:30:36 | url : String | UnsafeUrlForward.java:31:61:31:63 | url | Potentially untrusted URL forward due to $@. | UnsafeUrlForward.java:30:27:30:36 | url | user-provided value |
| UnsafeUrlForward.java:38:33:38:35 | url | UnsafeUrlForward.java:36:19:36:28 | url : String | UnsafeUrlForward.java:38:33:38:35 | url | Potentially untrusted URL forward due to $@. | UnsafeUrlForward.java:36:19:36:28 | url | user-provided value |
| UnsafeUrlForward.java:49:33:49:62 | ... + ... | UnsafeUrlForward.java:47:19:47:28 | url : String | UnsafeUrlForward.java:49:33:49:62 | ... + ... | Potentially untrusted URL forward due to $@. | UnsafeUrlForward.java:47:19:47:28 | url | user-provided value |
| UnsafeUrlForward.java:60:33:60:62 | ... + ... | UnsafeUrlForward.java:58:19:58:28 | url : String | UnsafeUrlForward.java:60:33:60:62 | ... + ... | Potentially untrusted URL forward due to $@. | UnsafeUrlForward.java:58:19:58:28 | url | user-provided value |

View File

@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
import java.io.IOException;
import javax.servlet.ServletException;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse;
import org.springframework.stereotype.Controller;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.GetMapping;
import org.springframework.web.servlet.ModelAndView;
@Controller
public class UnsafeUrlForward {
@GetMapping("/bad1")
public ModelAndView bad1(String url) {
return new ModelAndView(url);
}
@GetMapping("/bad2")
public ModelAndView bad2(String url) {
ModelAndView modelAndView = new ModelAndView();
modelAndView.setViewName(url);
return modelAndView;
}
@GetMapping("/bad3")
public String bad3(String url) {
return "forward:" + url + "/swagger-ui/index.html";
}
@GetMapping("/bad4")
public ModelAndView bad4(String url) {
ModelAndView modelAndView = new ModelAndView("forward:" + url);
return modelAndView;
}
@GetMapping("/bad5")
public void bad5(String url, HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) {
try {
request.getRequestDispatcher(url).include(request, response);
} catch (ServletException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
} catch (IOException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
@GetMapping("/bad6")
public void bad6(String url, HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) {
try {
request.getRequestDispatcher("/WEB-INF/jsp/" + url + ".jsp").include(request, response);
} catch (ServletException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
} catch (IOException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
@GetMapping("/bad7")
public void bad7(String url, HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) {
try {
request.getRequestDispatcher("/WEB-INF/jsp/" + url + ".jsp").forward(request, response);
} catch (ServletException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
} catch (IOException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
@GetMapping("/good1")
public void good1(String url, HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) {
try {
request.getRequestDispatcher("/index.jsp?token=" + url).forward(request, response);
} catch (ServletException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
} catch (IOException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
experimental/Security/CWE/CWE-552/UnsafeUrlForward.ql

View File

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
//semmle-extractor-options: --javac-args -cp ${testdir}/../../../../stubs/servlet-api-2.4:${testdir}/../../../../stubs/springframework-5.3.8/:${testdir}/../../../../stubs/javax-faces-2.3/:${testdir}/../../../../stubs/undertow-io-2.2/:${testdir}/../../../../stubs/jboss-vfs-3.2/:${testdir}/../../../../stubs/springframework-5.3.8/

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,411 @@
import java.io.IOException;
import java.net.URLDecoder;
import java.nio.file.Path;
import java.nio.file.Paths;
import javax.servlet.Filter;
import javax.servlet.FilterChain;
import javax.servlet.RequestDispatcher;
import javax.servlet.ServletConfig;
import javax.servlet.ServletContext;
import javax.servlet.ServletException;
import javax.servlet.ServletRequest;
import javax.servlet.ServletResponse;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse;
import org.springframework.stereotype.Controller;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.GetMapping;
import org.springframework.web.servlet.ModelAndView;
import org.kohsuke.stapler.StaplerRequest;
import org.kohsuke.stapler.StaplerResponse;
@Controller
public class UrlForwardTest extends HttpServlet implements Filter {
// Spring `ModelAndView` test cases
@GetMapping("/bad1")
public ModelAndView bad1(String url) {
return new ModelAndView(url); // $ hasTaintFlow
}
@GetMapping("/bad2")
public ModelAndView bad2(String url) {
ModelAndView modelAndView = new ModelAndView();
modelAndView.setViewName(url); // $ hasTaintFlow
return modelAndView;
}
// Spring `"forward:"` prefix test cases
@GetMapping("/bad3")
public String bad3(String url) {
return "forward:" + url + "/swagger-ui/index.html"; // $ hasTaintFlow
}
@GetMapping("/bad4")
public ModelAndView bad4(String url) {
ModelAndView modelAndView = new ModelAndView("forward:" + url); // $ hasTaintFlow
return modelAndView;
}
// Not relevant for this query since redirecting instead of forwarding
// This result should be found by the `java/unvalidated-url-redirection` query instead.
@GetMapping("/redirect")
public ModelAndView redirect(String url) {
ModelAndView modelAndView = new ModelAndView("redirect:" + url);
return modelAndView;
}
// `RequestDispatcher` test cases from a Spring `GetMapping` entry point
@GetMapping("/bad5")
public void bad5(String url, HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) {
try {
request.getRequestDispatcher(url).include(request, response); // $ hasTaintFlow
} catch (ServletException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
} catch (IOException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
@GetMapping("/bad6")
public void bad6(String url, HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) {
try {
request.getRequestDispatcher("/WEB-INF/jsp/" + url + ".jsp").include(request, response); // $ hasTaintFlow
} catch (ServletException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
} catch (IOException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
@GetMapping("/bad7")
public void bad7(String url, HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) {
try {
request.getRequestDispatcher("/WEB-INF/jsp/" + url + ".jsp").forward(request, response); // $ hasTaintFlow
} catch (ServletException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
} catch (IOException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
@GetMapping("/good1")
public void good1(String url, HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) {
try {
request.getRequestDispatcher("/index.jsp?token=" + url).forward(request, response);
} catch (ServletException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
} catch (IOException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
// BAD: appended to a prefix without path sanitization
@GetMapping("/bad8")
public void bad8(String urlPath, HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) {
try {
String url = "/pages" + urlPath;
request.getRequestDispatcher(url).forward(request, response); // $ hasTaintFlow
} catch (ServletException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
} catch (IOException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
// GOOD: appended to a prefix with path sanitization
@GetMapping("/good2")
public void good2(String urlPath, HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) {
try {
while (urlPath.contains("%")) {
urlPath = URLDecoder.decode(urlPath, "UTF-8");
}
if (!urlPath.contains("..") && !urlPath.startsWith("/WEB-INF")) {
// Note: path injection sanitizer does not account for string concatenation instead of a `startswith` check
String url = "/pages" + urlPath;
request.getRequestDispatcher(url).forward(request, response);
}
} catch (ServletException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
} catch (IOException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
// `RequestDispatcher` test cases from non-Spring entry points
private static final String BASE_PATH = "/pages";
@Override
// BAD: Request dispatcher from servlet path without check
public void doFilter(ServletRequest request, ServletResponse response, FilterChain chain)
throws IOException, ServletException {
String path = ((HttpServletRequest) request).getServletPath();
// A sample payload "/%57EB-INF/web.xml" can bypass this `startsWith` check
if (path != null && !path.startsWith("/WEB-INF")) {
request.getRequestDispatcher(path).forward(request, response); // $ hasTaintFlow
} else {
chain.doFilter(request, response);
}
}
// BAD: Request dispatcher from servlet path with check that does not decode
// the user-supplied path; could bypass check with ".." encoded as "%2e%2e".
public void doFilter2(ServletRequest request, ServletResponse response, FilterChain chain)
throws IOException, ServletException {
String path = ((HttpServletRequest) request).getServletPath();
if (path.startsWith(BASE_PATH) && !path.contains("..")) {
request.getRequestDispatcher(path).forward(request, response); // $ hasTaintFlow
} else {
chain.doFilter(request, response);
}
}
// GOOD: Request dispatcher from servlet path with whitelisted string comparison
public void doFilter3(ServletRequest request, ServletResponse response, FilterChain chain)
throws IOException, ServletException {
String path = ((HttpServletRequest) request).getServletPath();
if (path.equals("/comaction")) {
request.getRequestDispatcher(path).forward(request, response);
} else {
chain.doFilter(request, response);
}
}
@Override
// BAD: Request dispatcher constructed from `ServletContext` without input validation
protected void doGet(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String action = request.getParameter("action");
String returnURL = request.getParameter("returnURL");
ServletConfig cfg = getServletConfig();
if (action.equals("Login")) {
ServletContext sc = cfg.getServletContext();
RequestDispatcher rd = sc.getRequestDispatcher("/Login.jsp");
rd.forward(request, response);
} else {
ServletContext sc = cfg.getServletContext();
RequestDispatcher rd = sc.getRequestDispatcher(returnURL); // $ hasTaintFlow
rd.forward(request, response);
}
}
@Override
// BAD: Request dispatcher constructed from `HttpServletRequest` without input validation
protected void doPost(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String action = request.getParameter("action");
String returnURL = request.getParameter("returnURL");
if (action.equals("Login")) {
RequestDispatcher rd = request.getRequestDispatcher("/Login.jsp");
rd.forward(request, response);
} else {
RequestDispatcher rd = request.getRequestDispatcher(returnURL); // $ hasTaintFlow
rd.forward(request, response);
}
}
@Override
// GOOD: Request dispatcher with a whitelisted URI
protected void doPut(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String action = request.getParameter("action");
if (action.equals("Login")) {
RequestDispatcher rd = request.getRequestDispatcher("/Login.jsp");
rd.forward(request, response);
} else if (action.equals("Register")) {
RequestDispatcher rd = request.getRequestDispatcher("/Register.jsp");
rd.forward(request, response);
}
}
// BAD: Request dispatcher without path traversal check
protected void doHead1(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String path = request.getParameter("path");
// A sample payload "/pages/welcome.jsp/../WEB-INF/web.xml" can bypass the `startsWith` check
if (path.startsWith(BASE_PATH)) {
request.getServletContext().getRequestDispatcher(path).include(request, response); // $ hasTaintFlow
}
}
// BAD: Request dispatcher with path traversal check that does not decode
// the user-supplied path; could bypass check with ".." encoded as "%2e%2e".
protected void doHead2(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String path = request.getParameter("path");
if (path.startsWith(BASE_PATH) && !path.contains("..")) {
request.getServletContext().getRequestDispatcher(path).include(request, response); // $ hasTaintFlow
}
}
// BAD: Request dispatcher with path normalization and comparison, but
// does not decode before normalization.
protected void doHead3(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String path = request.getParameter("path");
// Since not decoded before normalization, "%2e%2e" can remain in the path
Path requestedPath = Paths.get(BASE_PATH).resolve(path).normalize();
if (requestedPath.startsWith(BASE_PATH)) {
request.getServletContext().getRequestDispatcher(requestedPath.toString()).forward(request, response); // $ hasTaintFlow
}
}
// BAD: Request dispatcher with negation check and path normalization, but without URL decoding.
protected void doHead4(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String path = request.getParameter("path");
// Since not decoded before normalization, "/%57EB-INF" can remain in the path and pass the `startsWith` check.
Path requestedPath = Paths.get(BASE_PATH).resolve(path).normalize();
if (!requestedPath.startsWith("/WEB-INF") && !requestedPath.startsWith("/META-INF")) {
request.getServletContext().getRequestDispatcher(requestedPath.toString()).forward(request, response); // $ hasTaintFlow
}
}
// BAD: Request dispatcher with path traversal check and single URL decoding; may be vulnerable to double-encoding
protected void doHead5(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String path = request.getParameter("path");
path = URLDecoder.decode(path, "UTF-8");
if (!path.startsWith("/WEB-INF/") && !path.contains("..")) {
request.getServletContext().getRequestDispatcher(path).include(request, response); // $ hasTaintFlow
}
}
// GOOD: Request dispatcher with path traversal check and URL decoding in a loop to avoid double-encoding bypass
protected void doHead6(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String path = request.getParameter("path");
if (path.contains("%")){
while (path.contains("%")) {
path = URLDecoder.decode(path, "UTF-8");
}
}
if (!path.startsWith("/WEB-INF/") && !path.contains("..")) {
request.getServletContext().getRequestDispatcher(path).include(request, response);
}
}
// GOOD: Request dispatcher with URL encoding check and path traversal check
protected void doHead7(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String path = request.getParameter("path");
if (!path.contains("%")){
if (!path.startsWith("/WEB-INF/") && !path.contains("..")) {
request.getServletContext().getRequestDispatcher(path).include(request, response);
}
}
}
// BAD: Request dispatcher without URL decoding before WEB-INF and path traversal checks
protected void doHead8(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String path = request.getParameter("path");
if (path.contains("%")){ // incorrect check
if (!path.startsWith("/WEB-INF/") && !path.contains("..")) {
request.getServletContext().getRequestDispatcher(path).include(request, response); // $ hasTaintFlow
}
}
}
// GOOD: Request dispatcher with WEB-INF, path traversal, and URL encoding checks
protected void doHead9(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String path = request.getParameter("path");
if (!path.startsWith("/WEB-INF/") && !path.contains("..")) {
if (!path.contains("%")){ // correct check
request.getServletContext().getRequestDispatcher(path).include(request, response);
}
}
}
// GOOD: Request dispatcher with path traversal check and URL decoding in a loop to avoid double-encoding bypass
protected void doHead10(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String path = request.getParameter("path");
while (path.contains("%")) {
path = URLDecoder.decode(path, "UTF-8");
}
if (!path.startsWith("/WEB-INF/") && !path.contains("..")) {
request.getServletContext().getRequestDispatcher(path).include(request, response);
}
}
// GOOD: Request dispatcher with path traversal check and URL decoding in a loop to avoid double-encoding bypass
protected void doHead11(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
String path = request.getParameter("path");
// FP: we don't currently handle the scenario where the
// `path.contains("%")` check is stored in a variable.
boolean hasEncoding = path.contains("%");
while (hasEncoding) {
path = URLDecoder.decode(path, "UTF-8");
hasEncoding = path.contains("%");
}
if (!path.startsWith("/WEB-INF/") && !path.contains("..")) {
request.getServletContext().getRequestDispatcher(path).include(request, response); // $ SPURIOUS: hasTaintFlow
}
}
// BAD: `StaplerResponse.forward` without any checks
public void generateResponse(StaplerRequest req, StaplerResponse rsp, Object obj) throws IOException, ServletException {
String url = req.getParameter("target");
rsp.forward(obj, url, req); // $ hasTaintFlow
}
// QHelp example
private static final String VALID_FORWARD = "https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html";
protected void doGet2(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
ServletConfig cfg = getServletConfig();
ServletContext sc = cfg.getServletContext();
// BAD: a request parameter is incorporated without validation into a URL forward
sc.getRequestDispatcher(request.getParameter("target")).forward(request, response); // $ hasTaintFlow
// GOOD: the request parameter is validated against a known fixed string
if (VALID_FORWARD.equals(request.getParameter("target"))) {
sc.getRequestDispatcher(VALID_FORWARD).forward(request, response);
}
}
// GOOD: char `?` appended before the user input
private static final String LOGIN_URL = "/UI/Login";
public void doPost2(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
StringBuilder forwardUrl = new StringBuilder(200);
forwardUrl.append(LOGIN_URL);
String queryString = request.getQueryString();
forwardUrl.append('?').append(queryString);
String fUrl = forwardUrl.toString();
ServletConfig config = getServletConfig();
RequestDispatcher dispatcher = config.getServletContext().getRequestDispatcher(fUrl);
dispatcher.forward(request, response);
}
}

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import java
import TestUtilities.InlineFlowTest
import semmle.code.java.security.UrlForwardQuery
import TaintFlowTest<UrlForwardFlowConfig>

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//semmle-extractor-options: --javac-args -cp ${testdir}/../../../stubs/servlet-api-2.4:${testdir}/../../../stubs/springframework-5.3.8/:${testdir}/../../../stubs/javax-faces-2.3/:${testdir}/../../../stubs/undertow-io-2.2/:${testdir}/../../../stubs/jboss-vfs-3.2/:${testdir}/../../../stubs/stapler-1.263/:${testdir}/../../../stubs/apache-commons-fileupload-1.4/:${testdir}/../../../stubs/apache-commons-beanutils/:${testdir}/../../../stubs/saxon-xqj-9.x/:${testdir}/../../../stubs/apache-commons-lang/:${testdir}/../../../stubs/javax-servlet-2.5/