Merge pull request #20048 from Napalys/js/xml_bomb_sinks

JS: Exclude patched libraries from `xml-bomb` sink

javascript/ql/lib/change-notes/2025-07-15-xml-bomb-sinks.md

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+---
+category: minorAnalysis
+---
+* Removed `libxmljs` as an XML bomb sink. The underlying libxml2 library now includes [entity reference loop detection](https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/blob/0c948334a8f5c66d50e9f8992e62998017dc4fc6/NEWS#L905-L908) that prevents XML bomb attacks.

javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/frameworks/XmlParsers.qll

@@ -49,9 +49,7 @@ module XML {
     override JS::Expr getSourceArgument() { result = this.getArgument(0) }
 
     override predicate resolvesEntities(EntityKind kind) {
-      // internal entities are always resolved
+      not kind = InternalEntity() and
-      kind = InternalEntity()
-      or
       // other entities are only resolved if the configuration option `noent` is set to `true`
       exists(JS::Expr noent |
         this.hasOptionArgument(1, "noent", noent) and
@@ -126,8 +124,9 @@ module XML {
     override JS::Expr getSourceArgument() { result = this.getArgument(0) }
 
     override predicate resolvesEntities(EntityKind kind) {
-      // entities are resolved by default
+      // SAX parsers in libxmljs also inherit libxml2's protection against XML bombs
-      any()
+      kind = ExternalEntity(_) or
+      kind = ParameterEntity(true)
     }
 
     override DataFlow::Node getAResult() {
@@ -149,8 +148,9 @@ module XML {
     override JS::Expr getSourceArgument() { result = this.getArgument(0) }
 
     override predicate resolvesEntities(EntityKind kind) {
-      // entities are resolved by default
+      // SAX push parsers in libxmljs also inherit libxml2's protection against XML bombs
-      any()
+      kind = ExternalEntity(_) or
+      kind = ParameterEntity(true)
     }
 
     override DataFlow::Node getAResult() {

javascript/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-776/XmlBomb.expected

@@ -5,10 +5,6 @@
 | domparser.js:11:57:11:59 | src | domparser.js:2:13:2:36 | documen ... .search | domparser.js:11:57:11:59 | src | XML parsing depends on a $@ without guarding against uncontrolled entity expansion. | domparser.js:2:13:2:36 | documen ... .search | user-provided value |
 | expat.js:6:16:6:36 | req.par ... e-xml") | expat.js:6:16:6:36 | req.par ... e-xml") | expat.js:6:16:6:36 | req.par ... e-xml") | XML parsing depends on a $@ without guarding against uncontrolled entity expansion. | expat.js:6:16:6:36 | req.par ... e-xml") | user-provided value |
 | jquery.js:4:14:4:16 | src | jquery.js:2:13:2:36 | documen ... .search | jquery.js:4:14:4:16 | src | XML parsing depends on a $@ without guarding against uncontrolled entity expansion. | jquery.js:2:13:2:36 | documen ... .search | user-provided value |
-| libxml.js:5:21:5:41 | req.par ... e-xml") | libxml.js:5:21:5:41 | req.par ... e-xml") | libxml.js:5:21:5:41 | req.par ... e-xml") | XML parsing depends on a $@ without guarding against uncontrolled entity expansion. | libxml.js:5:21:5:41 | req.par ... e-xml") | user-provided value |
-| libxml.noent.js:5:21:5:41 | req.par ... e-xml") | libxml.noent.js:5:21:5:41 | req.par ... e-xml") | libxml.noent.js:5:21:5:41 | req.par ... e-xml") | XML parsing depends on a $@ without guarding against uncontrolled entity expansion. | libxml.noent.js:5:21:5:41 | req.par ... e-xml") | user-provided value |
-| libxml.sax.js:6:22:6:42 | req.par ... e-xml") | libxml.sax.js:6:22:6:42 | req.par ... e-xml") | libxml.sax.js:6:22:6:42 | req.par ... e-xml") | XML parsing depends on a $@ without guarding against uncontrolled entity expansion. | libxml.sax.js:6:22:6:42 | req.par ... e-xml") | user-provided value |
-| libxml.saxpush.js:6:15:6:35 | req.par ... e-xml") | libxml.saxpush.js:6:15:6:35 | req.par ... e-xml") | libxml.saxpush.js:6:15:6:35 | req.par ... e-xml") | XML parsing depends on a $@ without guarding against uncontrolled entity expansion. | libxml.saxpush.js:6:15:6:35 | req.par ... e-xml") | user-provided value |
 edges
 | closure.js:2:7:2:36 | src | closure.js:3:24:3:26 | src | provenance |  |
 | closure.js:2:13:2:36 | documen ... .search | closure.js:2:7:2:36 | src | provenance |  |
@@ -31,8 +27,4 @@ nodes
 | jquery.js:2:7:2:36 | src | semmle.label | src |
 | jquery.js:2:13:2:36 | documen ... .search | semmle.label | documen ... .search |
 | jquery.js:4:14:4:16 | src | semmle.label | src |
-| libxml.js:5:21:5:41 | req.par ... e-xml") | semmle.label | req.par ... e-xml") |
-| libxml.noent.js:5:21:5:41 | req.par ... e-xml") | semmle.label | req.par ... e-xml") |
-| libxml.sax.js:6:22:6:42 | req.par ... e-xml") | semmle.label | req.par ... e-xml") |
-| libxml.saxpush.js:6:15:6:35 | req.par ... e-xml") | semmle.label | req.par ... e-xml") |
 subpaths

javascript/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-776/libxml.js

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@ const express = require('express');
 const libxmljs = require('libxmljs');
 
 express().get('/some/path', function(req) {
-  libxmljs.parseXml(req.param("some-xml")); // $ Alert - libxml expands internal general entities by default
+  libxmljs.parseXml(req.param("some-xml"));
 });

javascript/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-776/libxml.noent.js

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@ const express = require('express');
 const libxmljs = require('libxmljs');
 
 express().get('/some/path', function(req) {
-  libxmljs.parseXml(req.param("some-xml"), { noent: true }); // $ Alert - unguarded entity expansion
+  libxmljs.parseXml(req.param("some-xml"), { noent: true });
 });

javascript/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-776/libxml.sax.js

@@ -3,5 +3,5 @@ const libxmljs = require('libxmljs');
 
 express().get('/some/path', function(req) {
   const parser = new libxmljs.SaxParser();
-  parser.parseString(req.param("some-xml")); // $ Alert - the SAX parser expands external entities by default
+  parser.parseString(req.param("some-xml"));
 });

javascript/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-776/libxml.saxpush.js

@@ -3,5 +3,5 @@ const libxmljs = require('libxmljs');
 
 express().get('/some/path', function(req) {
   const parser = new libxmljs.SaxPushParser();
-  parser.push(req.param("some-xml")); // $ Alert - the SAX parser expands external entities by default
+  parser.push(req.param("some-xml"));
 });

python/ql/lib/change-notes/2025-07-15-xml-bomb-sinks-python.md

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+---
+category: minorAnalysis
+---
+* Removed `lxml` as an XML bomb sink. The underlying libxml2 library now includes [entity reference loop detection](https://github.com/lxml/lxml/blob/f33ac2c2f5f9c4c4c1fc47f363be96db308f2fa6/doc/FAQ.txt#L1077) that prevents XML bomb attacks. 

python/ql/lib/semmle/python/frameworks/Lxml.qll

@@ -129,11 +129,6 @@ module Lxml {
             any(True t)
         )
         or
-        kind.isXmlBomb() and
-        this.getKeywordParameter("huge_tree").getAValueReachingSink().asExpr() = any(True t) and
-        not this.getKeywordParameter("resolve_entities").getAValueReachingSink().asExpr() =
-          any(False t)
-        or
         kind.isDtdRetrieval() and
         this.getKeywordParameter("load_dtd").getAValueReachingSink().asExpr() = any(True t) and
         this.getKeywordParameter("no_network").getAValueReachingSink().asExpr() = any(False t)
@@ -305,9 +300,8 @@ module Lxml {
       // note that there is no `resolve_entities` argument, so it's not possible to turn off XXE :O
       kind.isXxe()
       or
-      kind.isXmlBomb() and
+      // libxml2 has built-in protection against XML bombs via entity reference loop detection,
-      this.getKeywordParameter("huge_tree").getAValueReachingSink().asExpr() = any(True t)
+      // so lxml is not vulnerable to XML bomb attacks.
-      or
       kind.isDtdRetrieval() and
       this.getKeywordParameter("load_dtd").getAValueReachingSink().asExpr() = any(True t) and
       this.getKeywordParameter("no_network").getAValueReachingSink().asExpr() = any(False t)

python/ql/test/library-tests/frameworks/lxml/parsing.py

@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ lxml.etree.fromstring(x, parser=parser) # $ decodeFormat=XML decodeInput=x xmlVu
 
 # Billion laughs vuln (also XXE)
 parser = lxml.etree.XMLParser(huge_tree=True)
-lxml.etree.fromstring(x, parser=parser) # $ decodeFormat=XML decodeInput=x xmlVuln='XML bomb' xmlVuln='XXE' decodeOutput=lxml.etree.fromstring(..)
+lxml.etree.fromstring(x, parser=parser) # $ decodeFormat=XML decodeInput=x xmlVuln='XXE' decodeOutput=lxml.etree.fromstring(..)
 
 # Safe for both Billion laughs and XXE
 parser = lxml.etree.XMLParser(resolve_entities=False, huge_tree=True)
@@ -63,5 +63,5 @@ lxml.etree.fromstring(x, parser=parser) # $ decodeFormat=XML decodeInput=x xmlVu
 # iterparse configurations ... this doesn't use a parser argument but takes MOST (!) of
 # the normal XMLParser arguments. Specifically, it doesn't allow disabling XXE :O
 
-lxml.etree.iterparse(xml_file, huge_tree=True) # $ decodeFormat=XML decodeInput=xml_file xmlVuln='XML bomb' xmlVuln='XXE' decodeOutput=lxml.etree.iterparse(..) getAPathArgument=xml_file
+lxml.etree.iterparse(xml_file, huge_tree=True) # $ decodeFormat=XML decodeInput=xml_file xmlVuln='XXE' decodeOutput=lxml.etree.iterparse(..) getAPathArgument=xml_file
 lxml.etree.iterparse(xml_file, load_dtd=True, no_network=False) # $ decodeFormat=XML decodeInput=xml_file xmlVuln='DTD retrieval' xmlVuln='XXE' decodeOutput=lxml.etree.iterparse(..) getAPathArgument=xml_file

python/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-776-XmlBomb/XmlBomb.expected

@@ -1,14 +1,4 @@
 edges
-| test.py:1:26:1:32 | ControlFlowNode for ImportMember | test.py:1:26:1:32 | ControlFlowNode for request | provenance |  |
-| test.py:1:26:1:32 | ControlFlowNode for request | test.py:19:19:19:25 | ControlFlowNode for request | provenance |  |
-| test.py:19:5:19:15 | ControlFlowNode for xml_content | test.py:30:34:30:44 | ControlFlowNode for xml_content | provenance |  |
-| test.py:19:19:19:25 | ControlFlowNode for request | test.py:19:5:19:15 | ControlFlowNode for xml_content | provenance | AdditionalTaintStep |
 nodes
-| test.py:1:26:1:32 | ControlFlowNode for ImportMember | semmle.label | ControlFlowNode for ImportMember |
-| test.py:1:26:1:32 | ControlFlowNode for request | semmle.label | ControlFlowNode for request |
-| test.py:19:5:19:15 | ControlFlowNode for xml_content | semmle.label | ControlFlowNode for xml_content |
-| test.py:19:19:19:25 | ControlFlowNode for request | semmle.label | ControlFlowNode for request |
-| test.py:30:34:30:44 | ControlFlowNode for xml_content | semmle.label | ControlFlowNode for xml_content |
 subpaths
 #select
-| test.py:30:34:30:44 | ControlFlowNode for xml_content | test.py:1:26:1:32 | ControlFlowNode for ImportMember | test.py:30:34:30:44 | ControlFlowNode for xml_content | XML parsing depends on a $@ without guarding against uncontrolled entity expansion. | test.py:1:26:1:32 | ControlFlowNode for ImportMember | user-provided value |