Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into regex

This commit is contained in:
Nick Rolfe
2021-06-25 15:00:26 +01:00
24 changed files with 494 additions and 47 deletions

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@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
*/
private import codeql_ruby.DataFlow
private import codeql_ruby.Frameworks
/**
* A data-flow node that executes SQL statements.

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@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
/**
* Helper file that imports all framework modeling.
*/
private import codeql_ruby.frameworks.ActionController
private import codeql_ruby.frameworks.ActiveRecord

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@@ -113,6 +113,11 @@ class ReturningCfgNode extends AstCfgNode {
}
}
/** A control-flow node that wraps a `StringComponent` AST expression. */
class StringComponentCfgNode extends AstCfgNode {
StringComponentCfgNode() { this.getNode() instanceof StringComponent }
}
private Expr desugar(Expr n) {
result = n.getDesugared()
or
@@ -197,7 +202,7 @@ module ExprNodes {
BinaryOperationCfgNode() { e = bo }
final override BinaryOperation getExpr() { result = super.getExpr() }
override BinaryOperation getExpr() { result = super.getExpr() }
/** Gets the left operand of this binary operation. */
final ExprCfgNode getLeftOperand() { e.hasCfgChild(bo.getLeftOperand(), this, result) }
@@ -253,7 +258,7 @@ module ExprNodes {
class MethodCallCfgNode extends CallCfgNode {
MethodCallCfgNode() { super.getExpr() instanceof MethodCall }
final override MethodCall getExpr() { result = super.getExpr() }
override MethodCall getExpr() { result = super.getExpr() }
}
/** A control-flow node that wraps a `CaseExpr` AST expression. */
@@ -330,4 +335,44 @@ module ExprNodes {
final override VariableReadAccess getExpr() { result = ExprCfgNode.super.getExpr() }
}
/** A control-flow node that wraps a `StringInterpolationComponent` AST expression. */
class StringInterpolationComponentCfgNode extends StmtSequenceCfgNode {
StringInterpolationComponentCfgNode() { this.getNode() instanceof StringInterpolationComponent }
}
private class StringlikeLiteralChildMapping extends ExprChildMapping, StringlikeLiteral {
override predicate relevantChild(Expr e) { e = this.getComponent(_) }
}
/** A control-flow node that wraps a `StringlikeLiteral` AST expression. */
class StringlikeLiteralCfgNode extends ExprCfgNode {
override StringlikeLiteralChildMapping e;
final override StringlikeLiteral getExpr() { result = super.getExpr() }
/** Gets a component of this `StringlikeLiteral` */
StringComponentCfgNode getAComponent() { e.hasCfgChild(e.getComponent(_), this, result) }
}
/** A control-flow node that wraps a `StringLiteral` AST expression. */
class StringLiteralCfgNode extends ExprCfgNode {
override StringLiteral e;
final override StringLiteral getExpr() { result = super.getExpr() }
}
/** A control-flow node that wraps a `ComparisonOperation` AST expression. */
class ComparisonOperationCfgNode extends BinaryOperationCfgNode {
ComparisonOperationCfgNode() { e instanceof ComparisonOperation }
final override ComparisonOperation getExpr() { result = super.getExpr() }
}
/** A control-flow node that wraps an `ElementReference` AST expression. */
class ElementReferenceCfgNode extends MethodCallCfgNode {
ElementReferenceCfgNode() { e instanceof ElementReference }
final override ElementReference getExpr() { result = super.getExpr() }
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
/** Provides commonly used barriers to dataflow. */
private import ruby
private import codeql_ruby.DataFlow
private import codeql_ruby.CFG
/**
* A validation of value by comparing with a constant string value, for example
* in:
*
* ```rb
* dir = params[:order]
* dir = "DESC" unless dir == "ASC"
* User.order("name #{dir}")
* ```
*
* the equality operation guards against `dir` taking arbitrary values when used
* in the `order` call.
*/
class StringConstCompare extends DataFlow::BarrierGuard,
CfgNodes::ExprNodes::ComparisonOperationCfgNode {
private CfgNode checkedNode;
StringConstCompare() {
exists(CfgNodes::ExprNodes::StringLiteralCfgNode strLitNode |
this.getExpr() instanceof EqExpr or
this.getExpr() instanceof CaseEqExpr
|
this.getLeftOperand() = strLitNode and this.getRightOperand() = checkedNode
or
this.getLeftOperand() = checkedNode and this.getRightOperand() = strLitNode
)
}
override DataFlow::Node getAGuardedNode() { result.asExpr() = checkedNode }
}
/**
* A validation of a value by checking for inclusion in an array of string
* literal values, for example in:
*
* ```rb
* name = params[:user_name]
* if %w(alice bob charlie).include? name
* User.find_by("username = #{name}")
* end
* ```
*
* the `include?` call guards against `name` taking arbitrary values when used
* in the `find_by` call.
*/
//
class StringConstArrayInclusionCall extends DataFlow::BarrierGuard,
CfgNodes::ExprNodes::MethodCallCfgNode {
private CfgNode checkedNode;
StringConstArrayInclusionCall() {
exists(ArrayLiteral aLit |
this.getExpr().getMethodName() = "include?" and
this.getExpr().getReceiver() = aLit
|
forall(Expr elem | elem = aLit.getAnElement() | elem instanceof StringLiteral) and
this.getArgument(0) = checkedNode
)
}
override DataFlow::Node getAGuardedNode() { result.asExpr() = checkedNode }
}

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@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
*/
private import codeql_ruby.dataflow.internal.DataFlowPublic as DataFlow
// Need to import since frameworks can extend `RemoteFlowSource::Range`
private import codeql_ruby.Frameworks
/**
* A data flow source of remote user input.

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@@ -140,8 +140,6 @@ class Content extends TContent {
/**
* A guard that validates some expression.
*/
class BarrierGuard extends CfgNodes::ExprCfgNode {
BarrierGuard() { none() }
abstract class BarrierGuard extends CfgNodes::ExprCfgNode {
Node getAGuardedNode() { none() }
}

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@@ -15,9 +15,17 @@ predicate defaultTaintSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) { none() }
*/
cached
predicate defaultAdditionalTaintStep(DataFlow::Node nodeFrom, DataFlow::Node nodeTo) {
// operation involving `nodeFrom`
exists(CfgNodes::ExprNodes::OperationCfgNode op |
op = nodeTo.asExpr() and
op.getAnOperand() = nodeFrom.asExpr() and
not op.getExpr() instanceof AssignExpr
)
or
// string interpolation of `nodeFrom` into `nodeTo`
nodeFrom.asExpr() =
nodeTo.asExpr().(CfgNodes::ExprNodes::StringlikeLiteralCfgNode).getAComponent()
or
// element reference from nodeFrom
nodeFrom.asExpr() = nodeTo.asExpr().(CfgNodes::ExprNodes::ElementReferenceCfgNode).getReceiver()
}

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@@ -52,18 +52,49 @@ class ActiveRecordModelClassMethodCall extends MethodCall {
or
// e.g. Foo.joins(:bars).where(...)
this.getReceiver() instanceof ActiveRecordModelClassMethodCall
or
// e.g. self.where(...) within an ActiveRecordModelClass
this.getReceiver() instanceof Self and
this.getEnclosingModule() instanceof ActiveRecordModelClass
}
}
private predicate methodWithSqlFragmentArg(string methodName, int argIndex) {
methodName =
[
"delete_all", "destroy_all", "exists?", "find_by", "find_by_sql", "from", "group", "having",
"joins", "lock", "not", "order", "pluck", "where"
] and
argIndex = 0
private Expr sqlFragmentArgument(MethodCall call) {
exists(string methodName |
methodName = call.getMethodName() and
(
methodName =
[
"delete_all", "destroy_all", "exists?", "find_by", "find_by_sql", "from", "group",
"having", "joins", "lock", "not", "order", "pluck", "where"
] and
result = call.getArgument(0)
or
methodName = "calculate" and result = call.getArgument(1)
or
// This format was supported until Rails 2.3.8
methodName = ["all", "find", "first", "last"] and
result = call.getKeywordArgument("conditions")
)
)
}
// An expression that, if tainted by unsanitized input, should not be used as
// part of an argument to an SQL executing method
private predicate unsafeSqlExpr(Expr sqlFragmentExpr) {
// Literals containing an interpolated value
exists(StringInterpolationComponent interpolated |
interpolated = sqlFragmentExpr.(StringlikeLiteral).getComponent(_)
)
or
methodName = "calculate" and argIndex = 1
// String concatenations
sqlFragmentExpr instanceof AddExpr
or
// Variable reads
sqlFragmentExpr instanceof VariableReadAccess
or
// Method call
sqlFragmentExpr instanceof MethodCall
}
/**
@@ -81,29 +112,21 @@ private predicate methodWithSqlFragmentArg(string methodName, int argIndex) {
* rather than just one with a matching name.
*/
class PotentiallyUnsafeSqlExecutingMethodCall extends ActiveRecordModelClassMethodCall {
// The name of the method invoked
private string methodName;
// The zero-indexed position of the SQL fragment sink argument
private int sqlFragmentArgumentIndex;
// The SQL fragment argument itself
private Expr sqlFragmentExpr;
// TODO: `find` with `lock:` option also takes an SQL fragment
// TODO: refine this further to account for cases where the method called has
// been overriden to perform validation on its arguments
PotentiallyUnsafeSqlExecutingMethodCall() {
methodName = this.getMethodName() and
sqlFragmentExpr = this.getArgument(sqlFragmentArgumentIndex) and
methodWithSqlFragmentArg(methodName, sqlFragmentArgumentIndex) and
(
// select only literals containing an interpolated value...
exists(StringInterpolationComponent interpolated |
interpolated = sqlFragmentExpr.(StringlikeLiteral).getComponent(_)
exists(Expr arg |
arg = sqlFragmentArgument(this) and
unsafeSqlExpr(sqlFragmentExpr) and
(
sqlFragmentExpr = arg
or
sqlFragmentExpr = arg.(ArrayLiteral).getElement(0)
)
or
// ...or string concatenations...
sqlFragmentExpr instanceof AddExpr
or
// ...or variable reads
sqlFragmentExpr instanceof VariableReadAccess
)
}
@@ -124,3 +147,5 @@ class ActiveRecordSqlExecutionRange extends SqlExecution::Range {
override DataFlow::Node getSql() { result = this }
}
// TODO: model `ActiveRecord` sanitizers
// https://api.rubyonrails.org/classes/ActiveRecord/Sanitization/ClassMethods.html

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@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
<!DOCTYPE qhelp PUBLIC
"-//Semmle//qhelp//EN"
"qhelp.dtd">
<qhelp>
<overview>
<p>
If a database query (such as a SQL or NoSQL query) is built from
user-provided data without sufficient sanitization, a malicious user
may be able to run malicious database queries.
</p>
</overview>
<recommendation>
<p>
Most database connector libraries offer a way of safely embedding
untrusted data into a query by means of query parameters or
prepared statements.
</p>
</recommendation>
<example>
<p>
In the following Rails example, an <code>ActionController</code> class
has a <code>text_bio</code> method to handle requests to fetch a biography
for a specified user.
</p>
<p>
The user is specified using a parameter, <code>user_name</code> provided by
the client. This value is accessible using the <code>params</code> method.
</p>
<p>
The method illustrates three different ways to construct and execute an SQL
query to find the user by name.
</p>
<p>
In the first case, the parameter <code>user_name</code> is inserted into an
SQL fragment using string interpolation. The parameter is user-supplied and
is not sanitized. An attacker could use this to construct SQL queries that
were not intended to be executed here.
</p>
<p>
The second case uses string concatenation and is vulnerable in the same way
that the first case is.
</p>
<p>
In the third case, the name is passed in a hash instead.
<code>ActiveRecord</code> will construct a parameterized SQL query that is not
vulnerable to SQL injection attacks.
</p>
<sample src="examples/SqlInjection.rb" />
</example>
<references>
<li>Wikipedia: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SQL_injection">SQL injection</a>.</li>
<li>OWASP: <a href="https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/SQL_Injection_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html">SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet</a>.</li>
</references>
</qhelp>

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@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
/**
* @name SQL query built from user-controlled sources
* @description Building a SQL query from user-controlled sources is vulnerable to insertion of
* malicious SQL code by the user.
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity error
* @precision high
* @id rb/sql-injection
* @tags security
* external/cwe/cwe-089
* external/owasp/owasp-a1
*/
import ruby
import codeql_ruby.Concepts
import codeql_ruby.DataFlow
import codeql_ruby.dataflow.BarrierGuards
import codeql_ruby.dataflow.RemoteFlowSources
import codeql_ruby.TaintTracking
import DataFlow::PathGraph
class SQLInjectionConfiguration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
SQLInjectionConfiguration() { this = "SQLInjectionConfiguration" }
override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof SqlExecution }
override predicate isSanitizerGuard(DataFlow::BarrierGuard guard) {
guard instanceof StringConstCompare or
guard instanceof StringConstArrayInclusionCall
}
}
from SQLInjectionConfiguration config, DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink
where config.hasFlowPath(source, sink)
select sink.getNode(), source, sink, "This SQL query depends on $@.", source.getNode(),
"a user-provided value"

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@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
class UserController < ActionController::Base
def text_bio
# BAD -- Using string interpolation
user = User.find_by "name = '#{params[:user_name]}'"
# BAD -- Using string concatenation
find_str = "name = '" + params[:user_name] + "'"
user = User.find_by(find_str)
# GOOD -- Using a hash to parameterize arguments
user = User.find_by name: params[:user_name]
render plain: user&.text_bio
end
end

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@@ -3,11 +3,15 @@ activeRecordModelClasses
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:5:1:7:3 | User |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:9:1:10:3 | Admin |
activeRecordSqlExecutionRanges
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:19:30:19:44 | ...[...] |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:22:21:22:41 | "id = #{...}" |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:25:23:25:43 | "id = #{...}" |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:28:16:28:21 | <<-SQL |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:32:35:32:60 | "user.id = #{...}" |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:45:21:45:33 | ... + ... |
activeRecordModelClassMethodCalls
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:2:3:2:17 | call to has_many |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:6:3:6:24 | call to belongs_to |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:19:5:19:45 | call to calculate |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:22:5:22:42 | call to delete_all |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:25:5:25:45 | call to destroy_all |
@@ -16,7 +20,9 @@ activeRecordModelClassMethodCalls
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:32:5:32:61 | call to where |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:45:5:45:34 | call to delete_all |
potentiallyUnsafeSqlExecutingMethodCall
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:19:5:19:45 | call to calculate |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:22:5:22:42 | call to delete_all |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:25:5:25:45 | call to destroy_all |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:28:5:28:35 | call to where |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:32:5:32:61 | call to where |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:45:5:45:34 | call to delete_all |

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@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
class UserGroup < ActiveRecord::Base
has_many :users
end
class User < ApplicationRecord
belongs_to :user_group
def self.authenticate(name, pass)
# BAD: possible untrusted input interpolated into SQL fragment
find(:first, :conditions => "name='#{name}' and pass='#{pass}'")
end
end
class Admin < User
end
class FooController < ActionController::Base
MAX_USER_ID = 100_000
# A string tainted by user input is inserted into an SQL query
def some_request_handler
# BAD: executes `SELECT AVG(#{params[:column]}) FROM "users"`
# where `params[:column]` is unsanitized
User.calculate(:average, params[:column])
# BAD: executes `DELETE FROM "users" WHERE (id = '#{params[:id]}')`
# where `params[:id]` is unsanitized
User.delete_all("id = '#{params[:id]}'")
# BAD: executes `SELECT "users".* FROM "users" WHERE (id = '#{params[:id]}')`
# where `params[:id]` is unsanitized
User.destroy_all(["id = '#{params[:id]}'"])
# BAD: executes `SELECT "users".* FROM "users" WHERE id BETWEEN '#{params[:min_id]}' AND 100000`
# where `params[:min_id]` is unsanitized
User.where(<<-SQL, MAX_USER_ID)
id BETWEEN '#{params[:min_id]}' AND ?
SQL
# BAD: chained method case
# executes `SELECT "users".* FROM "users" WHERE (NOT (user_id = 'params[:id]'))`
# where `params[:id]` is unsanitized
User.where.not("user.id = '#{params[:id]}'")
User.authenticate(params[:name], params[:pass])
end
end
class BarController < ApplicationController
def some_other_request_handler
ps = params
uid = ps[:id]
uidEq = "= '#{uid}'"
# BAD: executes `DELETE FROM "users" WHERE (id = #{uid})`
# where `uid` is unsantized
User.delete_all("id " + uidEq)
end
def sanitized_paths
dir = params[:order]
# GOOD: barrier guard prevents taint flow
dir = "DESC" unless dir == "ASC"
User.order("name #{dir}")
name = params[:user_name]
# GOOD: barrier guard prevents taint flow
if %w(alice bob charlie).include? name
User.find_by("username = #{name}")
end
name = params[:user_name]
# GOOD: hash arguments are sanitized by ActiveRecord
User.find_by(user_name: name)
end
end
class BazController < BarController
end

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@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
edges
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:8:25:8:28 | name : | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:10:33:10:67 | "name='#{...}' and pass='#{...}'" |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:8:31:8:34 | pass : | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:10:33:10:67 | "name='#{...}' and pass='#{...}'" |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:25:30:25:35 | call to params : | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:25:30:25:44 | ...[...] |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:29:30:29:35 | call to params : | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:29:21:29:43 | "id = '#{...}'" |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:33:32:33:37 | call to params : | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:33:23:33:45 | "id = '#{...}'" |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:38:21:38:26 | call to params : | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:37:16:37:21 | <<-SQL |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:44:34:44:39 | call to params : | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:44:20:44:47 | "user.id = '#{...}'" |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:46:23:46:28 | call to params : | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:46:23:46:35 | ...[...] : |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:46:23:46:35 | ...[...] : | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:8:25:8:28 | name : |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:46:38:46:43 | call to params : | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:46:38:46:50 | ...[...] : |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:46:38:46:50 | ...[...] : | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:8:31:8:34 | pass : |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:54:10:54:15 | call to params : | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:60:21:60:33 | ... + ... |
nodes
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:8:25:8:28 | name : | semmle.label | name : |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:8:31:8:34 | pass : | semmle.label | pass : |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:10:33:10:67 | "name='#{...}' and pass='#{...}'" | semmle.label | "name='#{...}' and pass='#{...}'" |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:25:30:25:35 | call to params : | semmle.label | call to params : |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:25:30:25:44 | ...[...] | semmle.label | ...[...] |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:29:21:29:43 | "id = '#{...}'" | semmle.label | "id = '#{...}'" |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:29:30:29:35 | call to params : | semmle.label | call to params : |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:33:23:33:45 | "id = '#{...}'" | semmle.label | "id = '#{...}'" |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:33:32:33:37 | call to params : | semmle.label | call to params : |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:37:16:37:21 | <<-SQL | semmle.label | <<-SQL |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:38:21:38:26 | call to params : | semmle.label | call to params : |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:44:20:44:47 | "user.id = '#{...}'" | semmle.label | "user.id = '#{...}'" |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:44:34:44:39 | call to params : | semmle.label | call to params : |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:46:23:46:28 | call to params : | semmle.label | call to params : |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:46:23:46:35 | ...[...] : | semmle.label | ...[...] : |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:46:38:46:43 | call to params : | semmle.label | call to params : |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:46:38:46:50 | ...[...] : | semmle.label | ...[...] : |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:54:10:54:15 | call to params : | semmle.label | call to params : |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:60:21:60:33 | ... + ... | semmle.label | ... + ... |
#select
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:10:33:10:67 | "name='#{...}' and pass='#{...}'" | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:46:23:46:28 | call to params : | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:10:33:10:67 | "name='#{...}' and pass='#{...}'" | This SQL query depends on $@. | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:46:23:46:28 | call to params | a user-provided value |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:10:33:10:67 | "name='#{...}' and pass='#{...}'" | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:46:38:46:43 | call to params : | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:10:33:10:67 | "name='#{...}' and pass='#{...}'" | This SQL query depends on $@. | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:46:38:46:43 | call to params | a user-provided value |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:25:30:25:44 | ...[...] | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:25:30:25:35 | call to params : | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:25:30:25:44 | ...[...] | This SQL query depends on $@. | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:25:30:25:35 | call to params | a user-provided value |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:29:21:29:43 | "id = '#{...}'" | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:29:30:29:35 | call to params : | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:29:21:29:43 | "id = '#{...}'" | This SQL query depends on $@. | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:29:30:29:35 | call to params | a user-provided value |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:33:23:33:45 | "id = '#{...}'" | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:33:32:33:37 | call to params : | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:33:23:33:45 | "id = '#{...}'" | This SQL query depends on $@. | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:33:32:33:37 | call to params | a user-provided value |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:37:16:37:21 | <<-SQL | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:38:21:38:26 | call to params : | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:37:16:37:21 | <<-SQL | This SQL query depends on $@. | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:38:21:38:26 | call to params | a user-provided value |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:44:20:44:47 | "user.id = '#{...}'" | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:44:34:44:39 | call to params : | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:44:20:44:47 | "user.id = '#{...}'" | This SQL query depends on $@. | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:44:34:44:39 | call to params | a user-provided value |
| ActiveRecordInjection.rb:60:21:60:33 | ... + ... | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:54:10:54:15 | call to params : | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:60:21:60:33 | ... + ... | This SQL query depends on $@. | ActiveRecordInjection.rb:54:10:54:15 | call to params | a user-provided value |

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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
queries/security/cwe-089/SqlInjection.ql