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Factor request-forgery config so it can be used in an inline-expectations test
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@@ -11,30 +11,9 @@
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*/
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import java
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import semmle.code.java.dataflow.FlowSources
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import semmle.code.java.security.RequestForgery
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import semmle.code.java.security.RequestForgeryConfig
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import DataFlow::PathGraph
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class RequestForgeryConfiguration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
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RequestForgeryConfiguration() { this = "Server-Side Request Forgery" }
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override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) {
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source instanceof RemoteFlowSource and
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// Exclude results of remote HTTP requests: fetching something else based on that result
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// is no worse than following a redirect returned by the remote server, and typically
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// we're requesting a resource via https which we trust to only send us to safe URLs.
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not source.asExpr().(MethodAccess).getCallee() instanceof URLConnectionGetInputStreamMethod
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}
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override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof RequestForgerySink }
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override predicate isAdditionalTaintStep(DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ) {
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any(RequestForgeryAdditionalTaintStep r).propagatesTaint(pred, succ)
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}
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override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) { node instanceof RequestForgerySanitizer }
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}
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from DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink, RequestForgeryConfiguration conf
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where conf.hasFlowPath(source, sink)
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select sink.getNode(), source, sink, "Potential server-side request forgery due to $@.",
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