Java: recognize Path.toRealPath() as path normalization sanitizer

PathNormalizeSanitizer recognized Path.normalize() and
File.getCanonicalPath()/getCanonicalFile(), but not Path.toRealPath().

toRealPath() is strictly stronger than normalize() (resolves symlinks
and verifies file existence in addition to normalizing ".." components),
and is functionally equivalent to File.getCanonicalPath() for the NIO.2
API. CERT FIO16-J and OWASP both recommend it for path traversal defense.

This adds toRealPath to PathNormalizeSanitizer alongside normalize,
reducing false positives for code using idiomatic NIO.2 path handling.

java/ql/lib/change-notes/2026-04-04-path-injection-torealpath.md

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+---
+category: minorAnalysis
+---
+* The `java/path-injection` and `java/zipslip` queries now recognize `Path.toRealPath()` as a path normalization sanitizer, consistent with the existing treatment of `Path.normalize()` and `File.getCanonicalPath()`. This reduces false positives for code that uses the NIO.2 API for path canonicalization.

java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/PathSanitizer.qll

@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ private class PathNormalizeSanitizer extends MethodCall {
   PathNormalizeSanitizer() {
     exists(RefType t | this.getMethod().getDeclaringType() = t |
       (t instanceof TypePath or t instanceof FilesKt) and
-      this.getMethod().hasName("normalize")
+      this.getMethod().hasName(["normalize", "toRealPath"])
       or
       t instanceof TypeFile and
       this.getMethod().hasName(["getCanonicalPath", "getCanonicalFile"])

java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-022/semmle/tests/TaintedPath.java

@@ -72,6 +72,27 @@ public class TaintedPath {
         }
     }
 
+    public void sendUserFileGood5(Socket sock, String user) throws Exception {
+        BufferedReader filenameReader =
+                new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(sock.getInputStream(), "UTF-8"));
+        String filename = filenameReader.readLine();
+
+        Path publicFolder = Paths.get("/home/" + user + "/public").toRealPath();
+        Path filePath = publicFolder.resolve(filename).toRealPath();
+
+        // GOOD: toRealPath() normalizes the path (resolves ".." and symlinks),
+        // equivalent to File.getCanonicalPath()
+        if (!filePath.startsWith(publicFolder + File.separator)) {
+            throw new IllegalArgumentException("Invalid filename");
+        }
+        BufferedReader fileReader = new BufferedReader(new FileReader(filePath.toString()));
+        String fileLine = fileReader.readLine();
+        while (fileLine != null) {
+            sock.getOutputStream().write(fileLine.getBytes());
+            fileLine = fileReader.readLine();
+        }
+    }
+
     public void sendUserFileGood4(Socket sock, String user) throws IOException {
         BufferedReader filenameReader =
                 new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(sock.getInputStream(), "UTF-8"));