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Add support for vulnerable CORS middlewares
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<!DOCTYPE qhelp PUBLIC
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"-//Semmle//qhelp//EN"
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"qhelp.dtd">
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<qhelp>
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<overview>
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<p>
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Web browsers, by default, disallow cross-origin resource sharing via direct HTTP requests (i.e. using a JavaScript HTTP client).
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Still, to satisfy some needs that arose with the growth of the web, an expedient was created to make exceptions possible.
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CORS (Cross-origin resource sharing) is a mechanism that allows resources of a web endpoint (let's call it "Peer A")
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to be accessed from another web page belonging to a different domain ("Peer B").
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</p>
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<p>
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For that to happen, Peer A needs to make available its CORS configuration via special headers on the desired endpoint
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via the OPTIONS method.
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</p>
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<p>
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This configuration can also allow the inclusion of cookies on the cross-origin request,
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(i.e. when the <code>Access-Control-Allow-Credentials</code> header is set to true)
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meaning that Peer B can send a request to Peer A that will include the cookies as if the request was executed by the user.
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</p>
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<p>
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That can have dangerous effects if Peer B origin is not restricted correctly.
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An example of a dangerous scenario is when <code>Access-Control-Allow-Origin</code> header is set to a value gotten from the Peer B's request
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(and not correctly validated), or is set to special values such as <code>*</code> or <code>null</code>.
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The above values can allow any Peer B to send requests to the misconfigured Peer A on behalf of the user.
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</p>
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<p>
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Example scenario:
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User is client of a bank that has its API misconfigured to accept CORS requests from any domain.
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When the user loads an evil page, the evil page sends a request to the bank's API to transfer all funds
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to evil party's account.
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Given that the user was already logged in to the bank website, and had its session cookies set,
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the evil party's request succeeds.
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</p>
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</overview>
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<recommendation>
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<p>
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When configuring CORS that allow credentials passing,
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it's best not to use user-provided values for the allowed origins response header,
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especially if the cookies grant session permissions on the user's account.
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</p>
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<p>
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It also can be very dangerous to set the allowed origins to <code>null</code> (which can be bypassed).
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</p>
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</recommendation>
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<example>
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<p>
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The first example shows a few possible CORS misconfiguration cases:
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</p>
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<sample src="CorsMisconfigurationMiddlewareBad.py"/>
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<p>
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The second example show better configurations:
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</p>
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<sample src="CorsMisconfigurationMiddlewareGood.py"/>
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</example>
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<references>
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<li>
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Reference 1: <a href="https://portswigger.net/web-security/cors">PortSwigger Web Security Academy on CORS</a>.
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</li>
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<li>
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Reference 2: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wgkj4ZgxI4c">AppSec EU 2017 Exploiting CORS Misconfigurations For Bitcoins And Bounties by James Kettle</a>.
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</li>
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</references>
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</qhelp>
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@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
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/**
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* @name SOP protection weak with credentials
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* @description Disabling or weakening SOP protection may make the application
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* vulnerable to a CORS attack.
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* @kind problem
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* @problem.severity warning
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* @security-severity 8.8
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* @precision high
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* @id py/insecure-cors-setting
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* @tags security
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* external/cwe/cwe-352
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*/
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import python
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import semmle.python.Concepts
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private import semmle.python.dataflow.new.DataFlow
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predicate containsStar(DataFlow::Node array){
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(array.asExpr() instanceof List and
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array.asExpr().getASubExpression().(StringLiteral).getText().matches("*")) or
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(array.asExpr().(StringLiteral).getText().matches(["*", "null"]))
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}
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predicate isCorsMiddleware(Http::Server::CorsMiddleware middleware){
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middleware.middleware_name().matches("CORSMiddleware")
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}
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predicate credentialsAllowed(Http::Server::CorsMiddleware middleware){
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middleware.allowed_credentials().asExpr() instanceof True
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}
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from Http::Server::CorsMiddleware a
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where credentialsAllowed(a) and
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containsStar(a.allowed_origins().getALocalSource()) and
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isCorsMiddleware(a)
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select a, "This CORS middleware uses a vulnerable configuration that leaves it open to attacks from arbitrary websites"
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@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
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from fastapi import FastAPI
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from fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware
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app = FastAPI()
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origins = [
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"*"
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]
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app.add_middleware(
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CORSMiddleware,
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allow_origins=origins,
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allow_credentials=True,
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allow_methods=["*"],
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allow_headers=["*"],
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)
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@app.get("/")
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async def main():
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return {"message": "Hello World"}
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@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
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from fastapi import FastAPI
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from fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware
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app = FastAPI()
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origins = [
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"http://localhost.tiangolo.com",
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"https://localhost.tiangolo.com",
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"http://localhost",
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"http://localhost:8080",
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]
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app.add_middleware(
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CORSMiddleware,
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allow_origins=origins,
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allow_credentials=True,
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allow_methods=["*"],
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allow_headers=["*"],
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)
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@app.get("/")
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async def main():
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return {"message": "Hello World"}
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