Query to detect LDAP injections in Java

JNDI and UnboundID sinks
JNDI, UnboundID and Spring LDAP sanitizers
This commit is contained in:
Grzegorz Golawski
2020-01-11 21:55:54 +01:00
parent 367d13c0ad
commit 7570fa9137
2 changed files with 261 additions and 0 deletions

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/**
* @name LDAP query built from user-controlled sources
* @description Building an LDAP query from user-controlled sources is vulnerable to insertion of
* malicious LDAP code by the user.
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity error
* @precision high
* @id java/ldap-injection
* @tags security
* external/cwe/cwe-090
*/
import semmle.code.java.Expr
import semmle.code.java.dataflow.FlowSources
import LdapInjectionLib
import DataFlow::PathGraph
from
DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink, LdapInjectionFlowConfig conf
where conf.hasFlowPath(source, sink)
// select sink.getNode(), source, sink, "LDAP query might include code from $@.", source.getNode(),
// "this user input",
select source, sink, sink.getNode().getEnclosingCallable().getName(), sink.getNode().getLocation().getStartLine()

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import java
import semmle.code.java.dataflow.FlowSources
import DataFlow
/** The class `com.unboundid.ldap.sdk.SearchRequest`. */
class TypeSearchRequest extends Class {
TypeSearchRequest() { this.hasQualifiedName("com.unboundid.ldap.sdk", "SearchRequest") }
}
/** The class `com.unboundid.ldap.sdk.ReadOnlySearchRequest`. */
class TypeReadOnlySearchRequest extends Interface {
TypeReadOnlySearchRequest() {
this.hasQualifiedName("com.unboundid.ldap.sdk", "ReadOnlySearchRequest")
}
}
/** The class `com.unboundid.ldap.sdk.Filter`. */
class TypeFilter extends Class {
TypeFilter() { this.hasQualifiedName("com.unboundid.ldap.sdk", "Filter") }
}
/** The class `com.unboundid.ldap.sdk.LDAPConnection`. */
class TypeLDAPConnection extends Class {
TypeLDAPConnection() { this.hasQualifiedName("com.unboundid.ldap.sdk", "LDAPConnection") }
}
/** The class `org.springframework.ldap.support.LdapEncoder`. */
class TypeLdapEncoder extends Class {
TypeLdapEncoder() { this.hasQualifiedName("org.springframework.ldap.support", "LdapEncoder") }
}
/** A data flow source for unvalidated user input that is used to construct LDAP queries. */
abstract class LdapInjectionSource extends DataFlow::Node { }
/** A data flow sink for unvalidated user input that is used to construct LDAP queries. */
abstract class LdapInjectionSink extends DataFlow::ExprNode { }
/** A sanitizer for unvalidated user input that is used to construct LDAP queries. */
abstract class LdapInjectionSanitizer extends DataFlow::ExprNode { }
/**
* A taint-tracking configuration for unvalidated user input that is used to construct LDAP queries.
*/
class LdapInjectionFlowConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
LdapInjectionFlowConfig() { this = "LdapInjectionFlowConfig" }
override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof LdapInjectionSource }
override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof LdapInjectionSink }
override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) { node instanceof LdapInjectionSanitizer }
override predicate isAdditionalTaintStep(DataFlow::Node node1, DataFlow::Node node2) {
filterStep(node1, node2) or searchRequestStep(node1, node2)
}
}
/** A source of remote user input. */
class RemoteSource extends LdapInjectionSource {
RemoteSource() { this instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
}
/** A source of local user input. */
class LocalSource extends LdapInjectionSource {
LocalSource() { this instanceof LocalUserInput }
}
abstract class Context extends RefType { }
/**
* The interface `javax.naming.directory.DirContext` or
* the class `javax.naming.directory.InitialDirContext`.
*/
class DirContext extends Context {
DirContext() {
this.hasQualifiedName("javax.naming.directory", "DirContext") or
this.hasQualifiedName("javax.naming.directory", "InitialDirContext")
}
}
/**
* The interface `javax.naming.ldap.LdapContext` or
* the class `javax.naming.ldap.InitialLdapContext`.
*/
class LdapContext extends Context {
LdapContext() {
this.hasQualifiedName("javax.naming.ldap", "LdapContext") or
this.hasQualifiedName("javax.naming.ldap", "InitialLdapContext")
}
}
/**
* JNDI sink for LDAP injection vulnerabilities, i.e. 2nd argument to search method from
* DirContext, InitialDirContext, LdapContext or InitialLdapContext.
*/
class JndiLdapInjectionSink extends LdapInjectionSink {
JndiLdapInjectionSink() {
exists(MethodAccess ma, Method m, int index |
ma.getMethod() = m and
ma.getArgument(index) = this.getExpr()
|
m.getDeclaringType() instanceof Context and m.hasName("search") and index = 1
)
}
}
/**
* UnboundID sink for LDAP injection vulnerabilities,
* i.e. LDAPConnection.search or LDAPConnection.searchForEntry method.
*/
class UnboundIdLdapInjectionSink extends LdapInjectionSink {
UnboundIdLdapInjectionSink() {
exists(MethodAccess ma, Method m, int index, RefType argType |
ma.getMethod() = m and
ma.getArgument(index) = this.getExpr() and
ma.getArgument(index).getType() = argType
|
// LDAPConnection.search or LDAPConnection.searchForEntry method
m.getDeclaringType() instanceof TypeLDAPConnection and
(m.hasName("search") or m.hasName("searchForEntry")) and
(
// Parameter type is SearchRequest or ReadOnlySearchRequest
(
argType instanceof TypeReadOnlySearchRequest or
argType instanceof TypeSearchRequest
) or
// Or parameter index is 2, 3, 5, 6 or 7 (this is where filter parameter is)
// but it's not the last one nor beyond the last one (varargs representing attributes)
index = any(int i |
(i = [2..3] or i = [5..7]) and i < ma.getMethod().getNumberOfParameters() - 1
)
)
)
}
}
/**
* Spring LDAP sink for LDAP injection vulnerabilities,
* i.e. LDAPConnection.search or LDAPConnection.searchForEntry method.
*/
// LdapTemplate:
// find(LdapQuery query, Class<T> clazz)
// find(Name base, Filter filter, SearchControls searchControls, Class<T> clazz)
// findOne(LdapQuery query, Class<T> clazz)
// search - 2nd param if String (filter)
// search - 1st param if LdapQuery
// searchForContext(LdapQuery query)
// searchForObject - 2nd param if String (filter)
// searchForObject - 1st param if LdapQuery
class SpringLdapInjectionSink extends LdapInjectionSink {
SpringLdapInjectionSink() {
exists(MethodAccess ma, Method m, int index, RefType argType |
ma.getMethod() = m and
ma.getArgument(index) = this.getExpr() and
ma.getArgument(index).getType() = argType
|
// LDAPConnection.search or LDAPConnection.searchForEntry method
m.getDeclaringType() instanceof TypeLDAPConnection and
(m.hasName("search") or m.hasName("searchForEntry")) and
(
// Parameter type is SearchRequest or ReadOnlySearchRequest
(
argType instanceof TypeReadOnlySearchRequest or
argType instanceof TypeSearchRequest
) or
// Or parameter index is 2, 3, 5, 6 or 7 (this is where filter parameter is)
// but it's not the last one nor beyond the last one (varargs representing attributes)
index = any(int i |
(i = [2..3] or i = [5..7]) and i < ma.getMethod().getNumberOfParameters() - 1
)
)
)
}
}
/** An expression node with a primitive type. */
class PrimitiveTypeSanitizer extends LdapInjectionSanitizer {
PrimitiveTypeSanitizer() { this.getType() instanceof PrimitiveType }
}
/** An expression node with a boxed type. */
class BoxedTypeSanitizer extends LdapInjectionSanitizer {
BoxedTypeSanitizer() { this.getType() instanceof BoxedType }
}
/** encodeForLDAP and encodeForDN from OWASP ESAPI. */
class EsapiSanitizer extends LdapInjectionSanitizer {
EsapiSanitizer() {
this.getExpr().(MethodAccess).getMethod().hasName("encodeForLDAP")
}
}
/** LdapEncoder.filterEncode and LdapEncoder.nameEncode from Spring LDAP. */
class SpringLdapSanitizer extends LdapInjectionSanitizer {
SpringLdapSanitizer() {
this.getType() instanceof TypeLdapEncoder and
this.getExpr().(MethodAccess).getMethod().hasName("filterEncode")
}
}
/** Filter.encodeValue from UnboundID. */
class UnboundIdSanitizer extends LdapInjectionSanitizer {
UnboundIdSanitizer() {
this.getType() instanceof TypeFilter and
this.getExpr().(MethodAccess).getMethod().hasName("encodeValue")
}
}
/**
* Holds if `n1` to `n2` is a dataflow step that converts between `String` and UnboundID `Filter`,
* i.e. `Filter.create(tainted)`.
*/
predicate filterStep(ExprNode n1, ExprNode n2) {
exists(MethodAccess ma, Method m |
n1.asExpr() = ma.getQualifier() or
n1.asExpr() = ma.getAnArgument()
|
n2.asExpr() = ma and
ma.getMethod() = m and
m.getDeclaringType() instanceof TypeFilter and
m.hasName("create")
)
}
/**
* Holds if `n1` to `n2` is a dataflow step that converts between `String` and UnboundID
* `SearchRequest`, i.e. `new SearchRequest([...], tainted, [...])`, where `tainted` is
* parameter number 3, 4, 7, 8 or 9, but not the last one or beyond the last one (varargs).
*/
predicate searchRequestStep(ExprNode n1, ExprNode n2) {
exists(ConstructorCall cc, int index | cc.getConstructedType() instanceof TypeSearchRequest |
n1.asExpr() = cc.getArgument(index) and
n2.asExpr() = cc and
index = any(int i |
(i = [2..3] or i = [6..8]) and i < cc.getConstructor().getNumberOfParameters() - 1
)
)
}