Added modeling infrastructure

This commit is contained in:
Benjamin Rodes
2023-09-12 12:11:17 -04:00
committed by Josh Brown
parent 2d44724acd
commit 7256faa7eb
10 changed files with 15228 additions and 0 deletions

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import experimental.crypto.CryptoArtifact
import experimental.crypto.CryptoAlgorithmNames
import experimental.crypto.modules.OpenSSL as OpenSSL

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/**
* Names of known cryptographic algorithms.
* The names are standardized into upper-case, no spaces, dashes or underscores.
*/
/**
* Returns a string to represent generally unknown algorithms.
* Predicate is to be used to get a consistent string representation
* for unknown algorithms.
*/
string unknownAlgorithm() { result = "UNKNOWN" }
string getHashType() { result = "HASH" }
string getSymmetricEncryptionType() { result = "SYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION" }
string getAsymmetricEncryptionType() { result = "ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION" }
string getKeyDerivationType() { result = "KEY_DERIVATION" }
string getCipherBlockModeType() { result = "BLOCK_MODE" }
string getSymmetricPaddingType() { result = "SYMMETRIC_PADDING" }
string getAsymmetricPaddingType() { result = "ASYMMETRIC_PADDING" }
string getEllipticCurveType() { result = "ELLIPTIC_CURVE" }
string getSignatureType() { result = "SIGNATURE" }
string getKeyExchangeType() { result = "KEY_EXCHANGE" }
string getAsymmetricType(){
result in [getAsymmetricEncryptionType(), getSignatureType(), getKeyExchangeType(), getEllipticCurveType()]
}
predicate isKnownType(string algType){
algType in [
getHashType(), getSymmetricEncryptionType(), getAsymmetricEncryptionType(), getKeyDerivationType(),
getCipherBlockModeType(), getSymmetricPaddingType(), getAsymmetricPaddingType(), getEllipticCurveType(),
getSignatureType(), getKeyExchangeType()
]
}
predicate isKnownAlgorithm(string name) { isKnownAlgorithm(name, _) }
predicate isKnownAlgorithm(string name, string algType) {
isHashingAlgorithm(name) and algType = "HASH"
or
isEncryptionAlgorithm(name, algType) and algType in ["SYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION", "ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION"]
or
isKeyDerivationAlgorithm(name) and algType = "KEY_DERIVATION"
or
isCipherBlockModeAlgorithm(name) and algType = "BLOCK_MODE"
or
isPaddingAlgorithm(name, algType) and algType in ["SYMMETRIC_PADDING", "ASYMMETRIC_PADDING"]
or
isEllipticCurveAlgorithm(name) and algType = "ELLIPTIC_CURVE"
or
isSignatureAlgorithm(name) and algType = "SIGNATURE"
or
isKeyExchangeAlgorithm(name) and algType = "KEY_EXCHANGE"
}
/**
* Holds if `name` is a known hashing algorithm in the model/library.
*/
predicate isHashingAlgorithm(string name) {
name =
[
"BLAKE2", "BLAKE2B", "BLAKE2S",
"SHA2", "SHA224", "SHA256", "SHA384", "SHA512", "SHA512224", "SHA512256",
"SHA3", "SHA3224", "SHA3256", "SHA3384", "SHA3512", "SHAKE128", "SHAKE256", "SM3",
"WHIRLPOOL", "POLY1305", "HAVEL128", "MD2", "MD4", "MD5", "PANAMA", "RIPEMD", "RIPEMD128",
"RIPEMD256", "RIPEMD160", "RIPEMD320", "SHA0", "SHA1", "SHA", "MGF1","MGF1SHA1", "MDC2", "SIPHASH"
]
}
predicate isEncryptionAlgorithm(string name, string algType) {
isAsymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm(name) and algType = "ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION"
or
isSymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm(name) and algType = "SYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION"
}
predicate isEncryptionAlgorithm(string name) { isEncryptionAlgorithm(name, _) }
/**
* Holds if `name` corresponds to a known symmetric encryption algorithm.
*/
predicate isSymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm(string name) {
// NOTE: AES is meant to caputure all possible key lengths
name =
[
"AES", "AES128", "AES192", "AES256", "ARIA", "BLOWFISH", "BF", "ECIES", "CAST", "CAST5",
"CAMELLIA", "CAMELLIA128", "CAMELLIA192", "CAMELLIA256", "CHACHA", "CHACHA20",
"CHACHA20POLY1305", "GOST", "GOSTR34102001", "GOSTR341094", "GOSTR341194", "GOST2814789",
"GOSTR341194", "GOST2814789", "GOST28147", "GOSTR341094", "GOST89", "GOST94", "GOST34102012",
"GOST34112012", "IDEA", "RABBIT",
"SEED", "SM4", "DES", "DESX", "3DES", "TDES", "2DES", "DES3", "TRIPLEDES", "TDEA", "TRIPLEDEA",
"ARC2", "RC2", "ARC4", "RC4", "ARCFOUR", "ARC5", "RC5", "MAGMA", "KUZNYECHIK"
]
}
/**
* Holds if `name` corresponds to a known key derivation algorithm.
*/
predicate isKeyDerivationAlgorithm(string name) {
name =
[
"ARGON2", "CONCATKDF", "CONCATKDFHASH", "CONCATKDFHMAC", "KBKDFCMAC", "BCRYPT", "HKDF",
"HKDFEXPAND", "KBKDF", "KBKDFHMAC", "PBKDF1", "PBKDF2", "PBKDF2HMAC", "PKCS5", "SCRYPT",
"X963KDF", "EVPKDF"
]
}
/**
* Holds if `name` corresponds to a known cipher block mode
*/
predicate isCipherBlockModeAlgorithm(string name) {
name = ["CBC", "GCM", "CCM", "CFB", "OFB", "CFB8", "CTR", "OPENPGP", "XTS", "EAX", "SIV", "ECB"]
}
/**
* Holds if `name` corresponds to a known padding algorithm
*/
predicate isPaddingAlgorithm(string name, string algType) {
isSymmetricPaddingAlgorithm(name) and algType = "SYMMETRIC_PADDING"
or
isAsymmetricPaddingAlgorithm(name) and algType = "ASYMMETRIC_PADDING"
}
/**
* holds if `name` corresponds to a known symmetric padding algorithm
*/
predicate isSymmetricPaddingAlgorithm(string name) { name = ["PKCS7", "ANSIX923"] }
/**
* Holds if `name` corresponds to a known asymmetric padding algorithm
*/
predicate isAsymmetricPaddingAlgorithm(string name) { name = ["OAEP", "PKCS1V15", "PSS", "KEM"] }
predicate isBrainpoolCurve(string curveName, int keySize) {
// ALL BRAINPOOL CURVES
keySize in [160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512] and
(
curveName = "BRAINPOOLP" + keySize.toString() + "R1"
or
curveName = "BRAINPOOLP" + keySize.toString() + "T1"
)
}
predicate isSecCurve(string curveName, int keySize) {
// ALL SEC CURVES
keySize in [112, 113, 128, 131, 160, 163, 192, 193, 224, 233, 239, 256, 283, 384, 409, 521, 571] and
exists(string suff | suff in ["R1", "R2", "K1"] |
curveName = "SECT" + keySize.toString() + suff or
curveName = "SECP" + keySize.toString() + suff
)
}
predicate isC2Curve(string curveName, int keySize) {
// ALL C2 CURVES
keySize in [163, 176, 191, 208, 239, 272, 304, 359, 368, 431] and
exists(string pre, string suff |
pre in ["PNB", "ONB", "TNB"] and suff in ["V1", "V2", "V3", "V4", "V5", "W1", "R1"]
|
curveName = "C2" + pre + keySize.toString() + suff
)
}
predicate isPrimeCurve(string curveName, int keySize) {
// ALL PRIME CURVES
keySize in [192, 239, 256] and
exists(string suff | suff in ["V1", "V2", "V3"] | curveName = "PRIME" + keySize.toString() + suff)
}
predicate isEllipticCurveAlgorithm(string curveName) { isEllipticCurveAlgorithm(curveName, _) }
/**
* Holds if `name` corresponds to a known elliptic curve.
*/
predicate isEllipticCurveAlgorithm(string curveName, int keySize) {
isSecCurve(curveName, keySize)
or
isBrainpoolCurve(curveName, keySize)
or
isC2Curve(curveName, keySize)
or
isPrimeCurve(curveName, keySize)
or
curveName = "ES256" and keySize = 256
or
curveName = "CURVE25519" and keySize = 255
or
curveName = "X25519" and keySize = 255
or
curveName = "ED25519" and keySize = 255
or
curveName = "CURVE448" and keySize = 448 // TODO: need to check the key size
or
curveName = "ED448" and keySize = 448
or
curveName = "X448" and keySize = 448
or
curveName = "NUMSP256T1" and keySize = 256
or
curveName = "NUMSP384T1" and keySize = 384
or
curveName = "NUMSP512T1" and keySize = 512
or
curveName = "SM2" and keySize in [256, 512]
}
/**
* Holds if `name` corresponds to a known signature algorithm.
*/
predicate isSignatureAlgorithm(string name) {
name = ["DSA", "ECDSA", "EDDSA", "ES256", "ES256K", "ES384", "ES512", "ED25519", "ED448", "ECDSA256", "ECDSA384", "ECDSA512"]
}
/**
* Holds if `name` is a key exchange algorithm.
*/
predicate isKeyExchangeAlgorithm(string name) { name = ["ECDH", "DH", "DIFFIEHELLMAN", "X25519", "X448"] }
/**
* Holds if `name` corresponds to a known asymmetric encryption.
*/
predicate isAsymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm(string name) { name = ["RSA"] }

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import cpp
private import experimental.semmle.code.cpp.crypto.CryptoAlgorithmNames
import semmle.code.cpp.ir.dataflow.TaintTracking
/*
* A cryptographic artifact is a DataFlow::Node associated with some
* operation, algorithm, or any other aspect of cryptography.
*/
abstract class CryptographicArtifact extends Expr {}
// /**
// * Associates a symmetric encryption algorithm with a block mode.
// * The DataFlow::Node representing this association should be the
// * point where the algorithm and block mode are combined.
// * This may be at the call to encryption or in the construction
// * of an object prior to encryption.
// */
// abstract class SymmetricCipher extends CryptographicArtifact{
// abstract SymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm getEncryptionAlgorithm();
// abstract BlockMode getBlockMode();
// final predicate hasBlockMode(){
// exists(this.getBlockMode())
// }
// }
// /**
// * A cryptographic operation is a method call that invokes a cryptographic
// * algorithm (encrypt/decrypt) or a function in support of a cryptographic algorithm
// * (key generation).
// *
// * Since operations are related to or in support of algorithms, operations must
// * provide a reference to their associated algorithm. Often operataions themselves
// * encapsulate algorithms, so operations can also extend CryptographicAlgorithm
// * and refer to themselves as the target algorithm.
// */
// abstract class CryptographicOperation extends CryptographicArtifact, Call{
// // bindingset[paramName, ind]
// // final DataFlow::Node getParameterSource(int ind, string paramName){
// // result = Utils::getUltimateSrcFromApiNode(this.(API::CallNode).getParameter(ind, paramName))
// // }
// final string getAlgorithmName(){
// if exists(this.getAlgorithm().getName())
// then result = this.getAlgorithm().getName()
// else result = unknownAlgorithm()
// }
// final predicate hasAlgorithm(){
// exists(this.getAlgorithm())
// }
// final predicate isUnknownAlgorithm(){
// this.getAlgorithmName() = unknownAlgorithm()
// or
// not this.hasAlgorithm()
// }
// // TODO: this might have to be parameterized by a configuration source for
// // situations where an operation is passed an algorithm
// abstract CryptographicAlgorithm getAlgorithm();
// }
// /** A key generation operation for asymmetric keys */
// abstract class KeyGen extends CryptographicOperation{
// int getAKeySizeInBits(){
// result = getKeySizeInBits(_)
// }
// final predicate hasKeySize(Expr configSrc){
// exists(this.getKeySizeInBits(configSrc))
// }
// final predicate hasKeySize(){
// exists(this.getAKeySizeInBits())
// }
// abstract Expr getKeyConfigSrc();
// abstract int getKeySizeInBits(Expr configSrc);
// }
abstract class CryptographicOperation extends CryptographicArtifact, Call{}
abstract class KeyGeneration extends CryptographicOperation {
// TODO: what if the algorithm is UNKNOWN?
abstract Expr getKeyConfigurationSource(CryptographicAlgorithm alg);
abstract CryptographicAlgorithm getAlgorithm();
int getKeySizeInBits(CryptographicAlgorithm alg){
result = getKeyConfigurationSource(alg).(Literal).getValue().toInt()
}
predicate hasConstantKeySize(CryptographicAlgorithm alg){
exists(this.getKeySizeInBits(alg))
}
predicate hasKeyConfigurationSource(CryptographicAlgorithm alg){
exists(this.getKeyConfigurationSource(alg))
}
Expr getAKeyConfigurationSource(){
result = getKeyConfigurationSource(_)
}
}
abstract class AsymmetricKeyGeneration extends KeyGeneration{}
abstract class SymmetricKeyGeneration extends KeyGeneration{}
/**
* A cryptographic algorithm is a `CryptographicArtifact`
* representing a cryptographic algorithm (see `CryptoAlgorithmNames.qll`).
* Cryptographic algorithms can be functions referencing common crypto algorithms (e.g., hashlib.md5)
* or strings that are used in cryptographic operation configurations (e.g., hashlib.new("md5")).
* Cryptogrpahic algorithms may also be operations that wrap or abstract one or
* more algorithms (e.g., cyrptography.fernet.Fernet and AES, CBC and PKCS7).
*
* In principle, this class should model the location where an algorithm enters the program, not
* necessarily where it is used.
*/
abstract class CryptographicAlgorithm extends CryptographicArtifact
{
abstract string getName();
abstract string getAlgType();
// string getAlgType(){
// if this instanceof HashAlgorithm then result = getHashType()
// else if this instanceof KeyDerivationAlgorithm then result = getKeyDerivationType()
// else if this instanceof SymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm then result = getSymmetricEncryptionType()
// else if this instanceof AsymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm then result = getAsymmetricEncryptionType()
// else if this instanceof SymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm then result = getSymmetricPaddingType()
// else if this instanceof AsymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm then result = getAsymmetricPaddingType()
// else if this instanceof EllipticCurveAlgorithm then result = getEllipticCurveType()
// else if this instanceof BlockMode then result = getCipherBlockModeType()
// else if this instanceof KeyExchangeAlgorithm then result = getKeyExchangeType()
// else if this instanceof SigningAlgorithm then result = getSignatureType()
// else result = unknownAlgorithm()
// }
// TODO: handle case where name isn't known, not just unknown?
/**
* Normalizes a raw name into a normalized name as found in `CryptoAlgorithmNames.qll`.
* Subclassess should override for more api-specific normalization.
* By deafult, converts a raw name to upper-case with no hyphen, underscore, hash, or space.
*/
bindingset[s]
string normalizeName(string s)
{
exists(string normStr |
normStr = s.toUpperCase().regexpReplaceAll("[-_ ]|/", "")
|
(result = normStr and isKnownAlgorithm(result))
or
(result = unknownAlgorithm() and not isKnownAlgorithm(normStr))
)
}
abstract Expr configurationSink();
predicate hasConfigurationSink(){
exists(this.configurationSink())
}
}
abstract class HashAlgorithm extends CryptographicAlgorithm{
final string getHashName(){
if exists(string n | n = this.getName() and isHashingAlgorithm(n))
then (isHashingAlgorithm(result) and result = this.getName())
else result = unknownAlgorithm()
}
override string getAlgType(){
result = getHashType()
}
}
abstract class KeyDerivationAlgorithm extends CryptographicAlgorithm{
final string getKDFName(){
if exists(string n | n = this.getName() and isKeyDerivationAlgorithm(n))
then (isKeyDerivationAlgorithm(result) and result = this.getName())
else result = unknownAlgorithm()
}
override string getAlgType(){
result = getKeyDerivationType()
}
}
// abstract class KeyDerivationOperation extends CryptographicOperation{
// DataFlow::Node getIterationSizeSrc(){
// none()
// }
// DataFlow::Node getSaltConfigSrc(){
// none()
// }
// DataFlow::Node getHashConfigSrc(){
// none()
// }
// // TODO: get encryption algorithm for CBC-based KDF?
// DataFlow::Node getDerivedKeySizeSrc(){
// none()
// }
// DataFlow::Node getModeSrc(){
// none()
// }
// // TODO: add more to cover all the parameters of most KDF operations? Perhaps subclass for each type?
// abstract predicate requiresIteration();
// abstract predicate requiresSalt();
// abstract predicate requiresHash();
// //abstract predicate requiresKeySize(); // Going to assume all requires a size
// abstract predicate requiresMode();
// }
abstract class EncryptionAlgorithm extends CryptographicAlgorithm
{
final predicate isAsymmetric() { this instanceof AsymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm }
final predicate isSymmetric() { not this.isAsymmetric() }
// NOTE: DO_NOT add getEncryptionName here, we rely on the fact the parent
// class does not have this common predicate.
}
/**
* A parent class to represent any algorithm for which
* asymmetric cryptography is involved.
* Intended to be distinct from AsymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm
* which is intended only for asymmetric algorithms that specifically encrypt.
*/
abstract class AsymmetricAlgorithm extends CryptographicAlgorithm{}
/**
* Algorithms directly or indirectly related to asymmetric encryption,
* e.g., RSA, DSA, but also RSA padding algorithms
*/
abstract class AsymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm extends AsymmetricAlgorithm, EncryptionAlgorithm{
final string getEncryptionName(){
if exists(string n | n = this.getName() and isAsymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm(n))
then (isAsymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm(result) and result = this.getName())
else result = unknownAlgorithm()
}
override string getAlgType(){
result = getAsymmetricEncryptionType()
}
}
/**
* Algorithms directly or indirectly related to symmetric encryption,
* e.g., AES, DES, but also block modes and padding
*/
abstract class SymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm extends EncryptionAlgorithm
{
final string getEncryptionName(){
if exists(string n | n = this.getName() and isSymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm(n))
then (isSymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm(result) and result = this.getName())
else result = unknownAlgorithm()
}
// TODO: add a stream cipher predicate?
override string getAlgType(){
result = getSymmetricEncryptionType()
}
}
// Used only to categorize all padding into a single object,
// DO_NOT add predicates here. Only for categorization purposes.
abstract class PaddingAlgorithm extends CryptographicAlgorithm{}
abstract class SymmetricPadding extends PaddingAlgorithm {
final string getPaddingName(){
if exists(string n | n = this.getName() and isSymmetricPaddingAlgorithm(n))
then (isSymmetricPaddingAlgorithm(result) and result = this.getName())
else result = unknownAlgorithm()
}
override string getAlgType(){
result = getSymmetricPaddingType()
}
}
abstract class AsymmetricPadding extends PaddingAlgorithm {
final string getPaddingName(){
if exists(string n | n = this.getName() and isAsymmetricPaddingAlgorithm(n))
then (isAsymmetricPaddingAlgorithm(result) and result = this.getName())
else result = unknownAlgorithm()
}
override string getAlgType(){
result = getAsymmetricPaddingType()
}
}
abstract class EllipticCurveAlgorithm extends AsymmetricAlgorithm{
final string getCurveName(){
if exists(string n | n = this.getName() and isEllipticCurveAlgorithm(n))
then (isEllipticCurveAlgorithm(result) and result = this.getName())
else result = unknownAlgorithm()
}
final int getCurveBitSize(){
isEllipticCurveAlgorithm(this.getCurveName(), result)
}
override string getAlgType(){
result = getEllipticCurveType()
}
}
abstract class BlockModeAlgorithm extends CryptographicAlgorithm{
final string getBlockModeName(){
if exists(string n | n = this.getName() and isCipherBlockModeAlgorithm(n))
then (isCipherBlockModeAlgorithm(result) and result = this.getName())
else result = unknownAlgorithm()
}
/**
* Gets the source of the IV configuration.
*/
abstract Expr getIVorNonce();
final predicate hasIVorNonce() { exists(this.getIVorNonce()) }
override string getAlgType(){
result = getCipherBlockModeType()
}
}
// abstract class KeyWrapOperation extends CryptographicOperation{
// }
abstract class AuthenticatedEncryptionAlgorithm extends SymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm{
final string getAuthticatedEncryptionName(){
if exists(string n | n = this.getName() and isSymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm(n))
then (isSymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm(result) and result = this.getName())
else result = unknownAlgorithm()
}
}
abstract class KeyExchangeAlgorithm extends AsymmetricAlgorithm{
final string getKeyExchangeName(){
if exists(string n | n = this.getName() and isKeyExchangeAlgorithm(n))
then (isKeyExchangeAlgorithm(result) and result = this.getName())
else result = unknownAlgorithm()
}
override string getAlgType(){
result = getKeyExchangeType()
}
}
abstract class SigningAlgorithm extends AsymmetricAlgorithm{
final string getSigningName(){
if exists(string n | n = this.getName() and isSignatureAlgorithm(n))
then (isSignatureAlgorithm(result) and result = this.getName())
else result = unknownAlgorithm()
}
override string getAlgType(){
result = getSignatureType()
}
}

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import cpp
import experimental.crypto.CryptoAlgorithmNames
import experimental.crypto.CryptoArtifact
import experimental.crypto.utils.OpenSSL.CryptoFunction
import experimental.crypto.utils.OpenSSL.AlgorithmSink
import experimental.crypto.utils.OpenSSL.PassthroughFunction
import experimental.crypto.utils.OpenSSL.CryptoAlgorithm
import experimental.crypto.CryptoArtifact
// import semmle.code.cpp.ir.dataflow.TaintTracking
import semmle.code.cpp.ir.dataflow.DataFlow
/**
Problematic case in OpenSSL speed.c
static const char *names[ALGOR_NUM] = {
"md2", "mdc2", "md4", "md5", "sha1", "rmd160",
"sha256", "sha512", "whirlpool", "hmac(md5)",
"des-cbc", "des-ede3", "rc4", "idea-cbc", "seed-cbc",
"rc2-cbc", "rc5-cbc", "blowfish", "cast-cbc",
"aes-128-cbc", "aes-192-cbc", "aes-256-cbc",
"camellia-128-cbc", "camellia-192-cbc", "camellia-256-cbc",
"evp", "ghash", "rand", "cmac"
};
Every entry is considered a block mode, hash, and symmetric encryption algorithm
getEncryptionName for example, will return unknown
*/
predicate nodeToExpr(DataFlow::Node node, Expr e){
e = node.asExpr() or e = node.asIndirectArgument()
}
Expr getExprFromNode(DataFlow::Node node){
nodeToExpr(node, result)
}
DataFlow::Node getNodeFromExpr(Expr e){
nodeToExpr(result, e)
}
predicate isEVP_PKEY_CTX(Type t){
t.getUnderlyingType().stripType().getName() = "evp_pkey_ctx_st"
}
/**
* An expression representing an EVP_PKEY_CTX* at the location of a
* known AlgorithmSinkArgument.
* The EVP_PKEY_CTX* represents the location where the CTX is tied to the algorithm,
* and can be used as a source for tracing EVP_PKEY_CTX to other operations.
*/
class Known_EVP_PKEY_CTX_Ptr_Source extends Expr{
Known_EVP_PKEY_CTX_Ptr_Source(){
isEVP_PKEY_CTX(this.getUnderlyingType()) and
this.getUnderlyingType() instanceof PointerType and
exists(AlgorithmSinkArgument arg, Call sinkCall |
arg.getSinkCall() = sinkCall and
sinkCall.getAnArgument() = this or this = sinkCall)
}
}
// module CTXFlow implements DataFlow::ConfigSig{
// predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) {
// // ASSUMPTION: at a sink, an algorithm is converted into a CTX through a return of the call only
// // and is the primary source of interest for CTX tracing
// source.asExpr() instanceof AlgorithmSinkArgument
// }
// predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink){
// sink.asExpr() instanceof CTXSink
// }
// predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node node1, DataFlow::Node node2) {
// // cls.getName() = "asn1_object_st" flow out on any EVP_PKEY_CTX which is "evp_pkey_ctx_st"
// exists(Call c |
// isEVP_PKEY_CTX(c.getUnderlyingType()) and
// node1.asExpr() = c.getAnArgument() and c = node2.asExpr())
// }
// }
// module CTXFlowConfig = DataFlow::Global<CTXFlow>;
// TODO: currently only handles tracing from literals to sinks
module LiteralAlgorithmTracerConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig
{
predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) {
source.asExpr() instanceof Literal
and
// Optimization to reduce literal tracing on integers to only those that are known/relevant NIDs.
(exists(source.asExpr().getValue().toInt()) implies source.asExpr().getValue().toInt() < getNIDMax())
and
// False positives observed inside OBJ_nid2* and OBJ_sn2* functions where NULL is a possible assignment.
// While this is a concern, it only occurs if the object being referenced is NULL to begin with
// Perhaps a different query should be used to find these caes if they represent a threat.
// Filter out any open ssl function source in a function namae Obj_*
// False positives in OpenSSL also observed for CRYPTO_strndup (filtering any CRYPTO_* function)
// due to setting a null byte in the string
(isPossibleOpenSSLFunction(source.getEnclosingCallable()) implies
not source.getEnclosingCallable().getName().matches("OBJ_%") and not source.getEnclosingCallable().getName().matches("CRYPTO_%"))
}
predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink){
// A sink is a call to a function that takes an algorithm as an argument
// must include checks for asIndirectArgument since the input may be a pointer to an object
// and the member of the object holds the algorithm on the trace.
getExprFromNode(sink) instanceof AlgorithmSinkArgument
}
predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node node1, DataFlow::Node node2) {
knownPassThroughStep(node1, node2)
}
predicate isBarrier(DataFlow::Node node) {
// If the node is the 'next' argument of a isCallPassThrough, it is only allowed if it is an out parameter
// i.e., a defining argument. This barrier says that if the node is an expression not an out parameter, it is filtered.
// Out arguments will not be filtered.
exists(Call c | knownPassthoughCall(c, _, node.asExpr()) and c.getAnArgument() = node.asExpr())
or
// False positive reducer, don't flow out through argv
node.asVariable().hasName("argv")
or
node.asIndirectVariable().hasName("argv")
}
predicate allowImplicitRead(DataFlow::Node node, DataFlow::ContentSet c) {
// Assume a read on crypto identifying field for any object of type asn1_object_st (i.e., ASN1_OBJECT)
exists(Class cls | cls.getName() = "asn1_object_st" |
node.getType().getUnspecifiedType().stripType() = cls
and
c.(DataFlow::FieldContent).getField() = cls.getAMember()
and
c.(DataFlow::FieldContent).getField().getName() in ["nid", "sn", "ln"]
)
}
}
module LiteralAlgorithmTracer = DataFlow::Global<LiteralAlgorithmTracerConfig>;
/**
* `source` is an expression that is a source of an algorithm of type `algType`.
* `algType` may be `UNKONWN`.
* See CryptoAlgorithmNames for other possible values of `algType`.
*/
bindingset[sinkAlgType]
predicate hasLiteralPathToAlgSink(DataFlow::Node source, DataFlow::Node sink, string sinkAlgType){
LiteralAlgorithmTracer::flow(source, sink) and getExprFromNode(sink).(AlgorithmSinkArgument).algType() = sinkAlgType
}
private predicate knownTracedAlgorithm(Literal e, string srcSinkType){
knownTracedAlgorithm(e, srcSinkType, srcSinkType)
}
private predicate knownTracedAlgorithm(Literal e, string srcType, string sinkType){
resolveAlgorithmFromLiteral(e, _, srcType)
and hasLiteralPathToAlgSink(DataFlow::exprNode(e), _, sinkType)
and isKnownType(sinkType)
and isKnownType(srcType)
}
private predicate unknownTracedLiteralAlgorithm(Literal e, string srcSinkType){
// Asymmetric special case:
// Since asymmetric algorithm sinks are used for various categories of asymmetric algorithms
// an asymmetric algorithm is only unknown if there is no trace from any asymmetric type to the given srcSinkType sink
if getAsymmetricType() = srcSinkType
then forall(string t | t =getAsymmetricType() | unknownTracedLiteralAlgorithm(e, t, srcSinkType))
else unknownTracedLiteralAlgorithm(e, srcSinkType, srcSinkType)
}
private predicate unknownTracedLiteralAlgorithm(Literal e, string srcType, string sinkType){
// the literal resolves to an algorithm, but not to the sinktype
// or generally doesn't resolve to any algorithm type
// this case covers 'nonsense' cases e.g., use RSA for symmetric encryption
not resolveAlgorithmFromLiteral(e, _, srcType)
and isValidAlgorithmLiteral(e)
and hasLiteralPathToAlgSink(DataFlow::exprNode(e), _, sinkType)
and isKnownType(sinkType)
and isKnownType(srcType)
}
private predicate unknownTracedNonLiteralAlgorithm(AlgorithmSinkArgument e, string srcSinkType){
// Asymmetric special case:
// Since asymmetric algorithm sinks are used for various categories of asymmetric algorithms
// an asymmetric algorithm is only unknown if there is no trace from any asymmetric type to the given srcSinkType sink
if getAsymmetricType() = srcSinkType then
forall(string t | t =getAsymmetricType() | unknownTracedNonLiteralAlgorithm(e, t, srcSinkType))
else
unknownTracedNonLiteralAlgorithm(e, srcSinkType, srcSinkType)
}
private predicate unknownTracedNonLiteralAlgorithm(AlgorithmSinkArgument e, string srcType, string sinkType){
not hasLiteralPathToAlgSink(_, getNodeFromExpr(e), srcType)
and LiteralAlgorithmTracerConfig::isSink(getNodeFromExpr(e))
and e.algType() = sinkType
and isKnownType(srcType)
and isKnownType(sinkType)
}
private predicate functionAlgorithm(Call c, string algType){
isOpenSSLCryptoFunctionCall(c , _ , algType)
}
abstract class OpenSSLTracedAlgorithm extends CryptographicAlgorithm {
override string getName(){
resolveAlgorithmFromLiteral(this, result, this.getAlgType())
}
override Expr configurationSink(){
exists(DataFlow::Node sink |
hasLiteralPathToAlgSink(DataFlow::exprNode(this), sink, this.getAlgType()) |
result = getExprFromNode(sink)
)
}
}
abstract class OpenSSLFunctionAlgorithm extends CryptographicAlgorithm{
override string getName(){
isOpenSSLCryptoFunctionCall(this , result , this.getAlgType())
}
override Expr configurationSink(){
result = this
}
}
abstract class OpenSSLUnknownTracedLiteralAlgorithm extends CryptographicAlgorithm{
override string getName(){
result = unknownAlgorithm()
}
override Expr configurationSink(){
exists(DataFlow::Node sink |
hasLiteralPathToAlgSink(DataFlow::exprNode(this), sink, this.getAlgType()) |
result = getExprFromNode(sink)
)
}
}
abstract class OpenSSLUnknownTracedNonLiteralAlgorithm extends CryptographicAlgorithm{
override string getName(){
result = unknownAlgorithm()
}
override Expr configurationSink(){
result = this
}
}
module SymmetricEncryption{
abstract class OpenSSLSymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm extends SymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm
{}
class OpenSSLSymmetricEncryptionTracedAlgorithm extends OpenSSLTracedAlgorithm, OpenSSLSymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm{
OpenSSLSymmetricEncryptionTracedAlgorithm(){
knownTracedAlgorithm(this, getSymmetricEncryptionType())
}
}
class OpenSSLSymmetricEncryptionFunctionAlgorithm extends OpenSSLFunctionAlgorithm, OpenSSLSymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm{
OpenSSLSymmetricEncryptionFunctionAlgorithm(){
functionAlgorithm(this , getSymmetricEncryptionType())
}
}
class OpenSSLSymmetricEncryptionTracedUnknownLiteralAlgorithm extends OpenSSLUnknownTracedLiteralAlgorithm, OpenSSLSymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm{
OpenSSLSymmetricEncryptionTracedUnknownLiteralAlgorithm(){
unknownTracedLiteralAlgorithm(this, getSymmetricEncryptionType())
}
}
class OpenSSLSymmetricEncryptionUnknownNonLiteralTracedAlgorithm extends OpenSSLUnknownTracedNonLiteralAlgorithm, OpenSSLSymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm{
OpenSSLSymmetricEncryptionUnknownNonLiteralTracedAlgorithm(){
unknownTracedNonLiteralAlgorithm(this, getSymmetricEncryptionType())
}
}
}
module BlockModes{
/**
* In OpenSSL, block modes are associated directly with symmetric encryption algorithms.
* As such, OpenSSLBLockModes are modeled as extensions of any openssl symmetric encryption algorithm
*/
class OpenSSLBlockModeAlgorithm extends BlockModeAlgorithm, Expr instanceof SymmetricEncryption::OpenSSLSymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm{
OpenSSLBlockModeAlgorithm(){
//two cases, either the block mode is a literal or it is a function call
resolveAlgorithmFromLiteral(this, _, "BLOCK_MODE")
or
isOpenSSLCryptoFunctionCall(this, _, "BLOCK_MODE")
}
override string getName(){
resolveAlgorithmFromLiteral(this, result, "BLOCK_MODE")
or
isOpenSSLCryptoFunctionCall(this, result, "BLOCK_MODE")
}
override Expr configurationSink(){
result = this.(SymmetricEncryption::OpenSSLSymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm).configurationSink()
}
override Expr getIVorNonce(){
// TODO
none()
}
}
class UnknownOpenSSLBlockModeAlgorithm extends BlockModeAlgorithm, Expr instanceof SymmetricEncryption::OpenSSLSymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm{
UnknownOpenSSLBlockModeAlgorithm(){
//two cases, either the block mode is a literal or it is a function call
not resolveAlgorithmFromLiteral(this, _, "BLOCK_MODE")
and
not isOpenSSLCryptoFunctionCall(this, _, "BLOCK_MODE")
}
override string getName(){
result = unknownAlgorithm()
}
override Expr configurationSink(){
result = this.(SymmetricEncryption::OpenSSLSymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm).configurationSink()
}
override Expr getIVorNonce(){
none()
}
}
}
module Hashes{
abstract class OpenSSLHashAlgorithm extends HashAlgorithm
{}
class OpenSSLHashTracedAlgorithm extends OpenSSLTracedAlgorithm, OpenSSLHashAlgorithm{
OpenSSLHashTracedAlgorithm(){
knownTracedAlgorithm(this, getHashType())
}
}
class OpenSSLHashFunctionAlgorithm extends OpenSSLFunctionAlgorithm, OpenSSLHashAlgorithm{
OpenSSLHashFunctionAlgorithm(){
functionAlgorithm(this, getHashType())
}
}
class OpenSSLHashTracedUnknownLiteralAlgorithm extends OpenSSLUnknownTracedLiteralAlgorithm, OpenSSLHashAlgorithm{
OpenSSLHashTracedUnknownLiteralAlgorithm(){
unknownTracedLiteralAlgorithm(this, getHashType())
}
}
class OpenSSLHashUnknownNonLiteralTracedAlgorithm extends OpenSSLUnknownTracedNonLiteralAlgorithm, OpenSSLHashAlgorithm{
OpenSSLHashUnknownNonLiteralTracedAlgorithm(){
unknownTracedNonLiteralAlgorithm(this, getHashType())
}
}
class OpenSSLNullHash extends HashAlgorithm{
OpenSSLNullHash(){
exists(Call c | this = c and isPossibleOpenSSLFunction(c.getTarget()) and
c.getTarget().getName() in ["EVP_md_null"])
}
override string getName(){
result = unknownAlgorithm()
}
override Expr configurationSink(){
result = this
}
}
}
module EllipticCurves{
// TODO: need to address EVP_PKEY_Q_keygen where the type is "EC" but the curve is UNKNOWN?
class OpenSSLEllipticCurveTracedAlgorithm extends OpenSSLTracedAlgorithm, EllipticCurveAlgorithm{
OpenSSLEllipticCurveTracedAlgorithm(){
knownTracedAlgorithm(this, getEllipticCurveType())
}
}
class OpenSSLEllipticCurveFunctionAlgorithm extends OpenSSLFunctionAlgorithm, EllipticCurveAlgorithm{
OpenSSLEllipticCurveFunctionAlgorithm(){
functionAlgorithm(this, getEllipticCurveType())
}
}
class OpenSSLEllipticCurveTracedUnknownLiteralAlgorithm extends OpenSSLUnknownTracedLiteralAlgorithm, EllipticCurveAlgorithm{
OpenSSLEllipticCurveTracedUnknownLiteralAlgorithm(){
unknownTracedLiteralAlgorithm(this, getEllipticCurveType())
}
}
class OpenSSLEllipticCurvehUnknownNonLiteralTracedAlgorithm extends OpenSSLUnknownTracedNonLiteralAlgorithm, EllipticCurveAlgorithm{
OpenSSLEllipticCurvehUnknownNonLiteralTracedAlgorithm(){
unknownTracedNonLiteralAlgorithm(this, getEllipticCurveType())
}
}
// https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/EC_KEY_new_ex.html
class OpenSSLNullEllipticCurve extends EllipticCurveAlgorithm{
OpenSSLNullEllipticCurve(){
exists(Call c | this = c and isPossibleOpenSSLFunction(c.getTarget()) and c.getTarget().getName() in ["EC_KEY_new", "EC_KEY_new_ex"])
}
override string getName(){
result = unknownAlgorithm()
}
override Expr configurationSink(){
result = this
}
}
}
module AsymmetricEncryption{
class OpenSSLAsymmetricEncryptionTracedAlgorithm extends OpenSSLTracedAlgorithm, AsymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm{
OpenSSLAsymmetricEncryptionTracedAlgorithm(){
knownTracedAlgorithm(this, getAsymmetricEncryptionType())
}
}
class OpenSSLAsymmetricEncryptionFunctionAlgorithm extends OpenSSLFunctionAlgorithm, AsymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm{
OpenSSLAsymmetricEncryptionFunctionAlgorithm(){
functionAlgorithm(this, getAsymmetricEncryptionType())
}
}
class OpenSSLAsymmetricEncryptionTracedUnknownLiteralAlgorithm extends OpenSSLUnknownTracedLiteralAlgorithm, AsymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm{
OpenSSLAsymmetricEncryptionTracedUnknownLiteralAlgorithm(){
unknownTracedLiteralAlgorithm(this, getAsymmetricEncryptionType())
}
}
class OpenSSLAsymmetricEncryptionUnknownNonLiteralTracedAlgorithm extends OpenSSLUnknownTracedNonLiteralAlgorithm, AsymmetricEncryptionAlgorithm{
OpenSSLAsymmetricEncryptionUnknownNonLiteralTracedAlgorithm(){
unknownTracedNonLiteralAlgorithm(this, getAsymmetricEncryptionType())
}
}
}
module SigningAlgorithms{
class OpenSSLSignatureTracedAlgorithm extends OpenSSLTracedAlgorithm, SigningAlgorithm{
OpenSSLSignatureTracedAlgorithm(){
knownTracedAlgorithm(this, getSignatureType())
}
}
class OpenSSLSignatureFunctionAlgorithm extends OpenSSLFunctionAlgorithm, SigningAlgorithm{
OpenSSLSignatureFunctionAlgorithm(){
functionAlgorithm(this, getSignatureType())
}
}
class OpenSSLSignatureTracedUnknownLiteralAlgorithm extends OpenSSLUnknownTracedLiteralAlgorithm, SigningAlgorithm{
OpenSSLSignatureTracedUnknownLiteralAlgorithm(){
unknownTracedLiteralAlgorithm(this, getSignatureType())
}
}
class OpenSSLSignatureUnknownNonLiteralTracedAlgorithm extends OpenSSLUnknownTracedNonLiteralAlgorithm, SigningAlgorithm{
OpenSSLSignatureUnknownNonLiteralTracedAlgorithm(){
unknownTracedNonLiteralAlgorithm(this, getSignatureType())
}
}
}
module KeyExchange{
class OpenSSLKeyExchangeTracedAlgorithm extends OpenSSLTracedAlgorithm, KeyExchangeAlgorithm{
OpenSSLKeyExchangeTracedAlgorithm(){
knownTracedAlgorithm(this, getKeyExchangeType())
}
}
class OpenSSLKeyExchangeFunctionAlgorithm extends OpenSSLFunctionAlgorithm, KeyExchangeAlgorithm{
OpenSSLKeyExchangeFunctionAlgorithm(){
functionAlgorithm(this, getKeyExchangeType())
}
}
class OpenSSLKeyExchangeTracedUnknownLiteralAlgorithm extends OpenSSLUnknownTracedLiteralAlgorithm, KeyExchangeAlgorithm{
OpenSSLKeyExchangeTracedUnknownLiteralAlgorithm(){
unknownTracedLiteralAlgorithm(this, getKeyExchangeType())
}
}
class OpenSSLKeyExchangeUnknownNonLiteralTracedAlgorithm extends OpenSSLUnknownTracedNonLiteralAlgorithm, KeyExchangeAlgorithm{
OpenSSLKeyExchangeUnknownNonLiteralTracedAlgorithm(){
unknownTracedNonLiteralAlgorithm(this, getKeyExchangeType())
}
}
}
module KeyGeneration{
/**
* Functions that explicitly set key generation parameters.
* `sizeInd` is the parameter specifying the size of the key.
* `outInd` is the parameter or return value that the key is written to.
* `outInd` is -1 if the key is written to the return value.
*/
predicate isAsymmetricKeyGenExplicitAlgorithm(Function func, int sizeInd, int outInd){
isPossibleOpenSSLFunction(func) and
exists(string name | func.hasGlobalName(name) |
(
name in [
"EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dsa_paramgen_bits", "DSA_generate_parameters_ex",
"EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits", "RSA_generate_key_ex", "RSA_generate_key_fips",
"EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_prime_len", "DH_generate_parameters_ex"
] and
sizeInd = 1 and outInd = 0
)
or
(
name in ["DSA_generate_parameters", "RSA_generate_key", "DH_generate_parameters"] and
sizeInd = 0 and outInd = -1
)
)
and
exists(Type t |
(if sizeInd = -1
then t = func.getType().getUnderlyingType()
else t = func.getParameter(sizeInd).getUnderlyingType())
and
t instanceof IntegralType and
not t instanceof CharType
)
}
module AsymExplicitAlgKeyLengthFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node node) {
// Optimizations to avoid tracing all integers
node.asExpr().(Literal).getValue().toInt() > 0 and // exclude sentinel values
node.asExpr().(Literal).getValue().toInt() < 8500
}
predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node node) {
exists(FunctionCall c, int sizeInd |
isAsymmetricKeyGenExplicitAlgorithm(c.getTarget(), sizeInd, _) and
c.getArgument(sizeInd) = node.asExpr())
}
}
module AsymExplicitAlgKeyLengthFlow = DataFlow::Global<AsymExplicitAlgKeyLengthFlowConfig>;
class OpenSSLAsymmetricKeyGenTiedToAlgorithm extends AsymmetricKeyGeneration{
OpenSSLAsymmetricKeyGenTiedToAlgorithm(){
exists(Call c |
this = c and isPossibleOpenSSLFunction(c.getTarget()) and
isAsymmetricKeyGenExplicitAlgorithm(c.getTarget(), _, _))
}
override CryptographicAlgorithm getAlgorithm(){
result = this
}
override Expr getKeyConfigurationSource(CryptographicAlgorithm alg){
alg = this and
exists(int sizeInd | isAsymmetricKeyGenExplicitAlgorithm(this.getTarget(), sizeInd, _) and
AsymExplicitAlgKeyLengthFlow::flow(DataFlow::exprNode(result), DataFlow::exprNode(this.getArgument(sizeInd))))
}
}
module Length_to_RSA_EVP_PKEY_Q_keygen_Config implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node node) {
// Optimizations to avoid tracing all integers
node.asExpr().(Literal).getValue().toInt() > 0 and // exclude sentinel values
node.asExpr().(Literal).getValue().toInt() < 5000
}
predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node node) {
exists(FunctionCall c|
c.getTarget().getName() = "EVP_PKEY_Q_keygen" and
isPossibleOpenSSLFunction(c.getTarget()) and
c.getArgument(3) = node.asExpr())
}
}
module Length_to_RSA_EVP_PKEY_Q_keygen_Flow = DataFlow::Global<Length_to_RSA_EVP_PKEY_Q_keygen_Config>;
class OpenSSL_RSA_EVP_PKEY_Q_keygen extends AsymmetricKeyGeneration{
OpenSSL_RSA_EVP_PKEY_Q_keygen(){
exists(Call c |
this = c and
isPossibleOpenSSLFunction(c.getTarget()) and
this.getTarget().getName() = "EVP_PKEY_Q_keygen" and
this.getArgument(3).getUnderlyingType() instanceof IntegralType)
}
override CryptographicAlgorithm getAlgorithm(){
result.configurationSink().(AlgorithmSinkArgument).getSinkCall() = this
}
override Expr getKeyConfigurationSource(CryptographicAlgorithm alg){
alg = this.getAlgorithm() and
Length_to_RSA_EVP_PKEY_Q_keygen_Flow::flow(DataFlow::exprNode(result), DataFlow::exprNode(this.getArgument(3)))
}
}
predicate isKeyGenOperationWithNoSize(Function func){
isPossibleOpenSSLFunction(func) and
exists(string name | func.hasGlobalName(name) |
name in ["EVP_PKEY_keygen", "DSA_generate_key", "DH_generate_key", "EVP_PKEY_generate"])
}
module KeyGenKeySizeInitToKeyGenConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node node) {
exists(Call c, Function func, int outInd |
isAsymmetricKeyGenExplicitAlgorithm(func, _, outInd) and
c.getTarget() = func
|
if outInd = -1
then node.asExpr() = c
else node.asExpr() = c.getArgument(outInd)
)
}
predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node node) {
exists(Call c | isKeyGenOperationWithNoSize(c.getTarget()) and c.getAnArgument() = node.asExpr())
}
}
module KeyGenKeySizeInitToKeyGenFlow = DataFlow::Global<KeyGenKeySizeInitToKeyGenConfig>;
predicate isEVP_PKEY_CTX_Source(DataFlow::Node node, CryptographicAlgorithm alg){
exists(Call c |
alg.configurationSink().(AlgorithmSinkArgument).getSinkCall() = c and
(
node.asExpr() = c
or
node.asExpr() = c.getAnArgument()
or
node.asDefiningArgument() = c.getAnArgument()
)
)
and
(
node.asExpr() instanceof Known_EVP_PKEY_CTX_Ptr_Source
or
node.asDefiningArgument() instanceof Known_EVP_PKEY_CTX_Ptr_Source
)
}
predicate isKeyGen_EVP_PKEY_CTX_Sink(DataFlow::Node node, Call c){
isKeyGenOperationWithNoSize(c.getTarget()) and nodeToExpr(node, c.getAnArgument())
}
/**
* Trace from EVP_PKEY_CTX* at algorithm sink to keygen,
* users can then extrapolatae the matching algorithm from the alg sink to the keygen
*/
module EVP_PKEY_CTX_Ptr_Source_to_KeyGenOperationWithNoSize implements DataFlow::ConfigSig{
predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) {
isEVP_PKEY_CTX_Source(source, _)
}
predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink){
isKeyGen_EVP_PKEY_CTX_Sink(sink, _)
}
}
module EVP_PKEY_CTX_Ptr_Source_to_KeyGenOperationWithNoSize_Flow = DataFlow::Global<EVP_PKEY_CTX_Ptr_Source_to_KeyGenOperationWithNoSize>;
/**
* UNKNOWN key sizes to general purpose key generation functions (i.e., that take in no key size and assume
* is it set on context prior to the call). No path from a key configuration to these operations
* means the key size is UNKNOWN, or more precisely the key size is DEFAULT but
* the defaults can change with each version of OpenSSL, we simply assume the size is generally UNKNOWN.
* ASSUMPTION/TODO: we currently model all known locations where a key size is set explicitly.
* When a key is set implicitly, this usually means a key generation operation
* is called where the operation takes in no key size, and no flow to this operation
* initializes the context with a key size.
* Currently, without a definitive source (set of sources) to start tracing from, we cannot determine
* determine if a single path exists that initializes the context with a key size and another that doesn't.
* Rather than attempt to model all possible sources, we assume that if no path
* from a key config location reaches a generic key generation operation, then the key size is not set.
* NOTE: while this is true, it is possible a key size is set in one path, but not in another
* meaning this approach (and other similar approaches used in this model for UNKNOWN)
* can produce false negatives.
*/
class OpenSSLDefaultKeyGeneration extends AsymmetricKeyGeneration{
OpenSSLDefaultKeyGeneration(){
// this is a call to a function matching isKeyGenOperationWithNoSize
// and there is no flow from a key configuration source to this call
exists(Call c |
this = c and
isKeyGenOperationWithNoSize(this.getTarget()) and
not exists(DataFlow::Node src, DataFlow::Node sink |
KeyGenKeySizeInitToKeyGenFlow::flow(src, sink) and
nodeToExpr(sink, this.getAnArgument()))
)
}
override CryptographicAlgorithm getAlgorithm(){
if this.getTarget().getName() in ["DSA_generate_key", "DH_generate_key"] then
result = this
else
(
// NOTE/ASSUMPTION: EVP_PKEY_keygen, EVP_PKEY_generate assume only other possibilities,
// each take in a CTX as the first arg, need to trace from an alg sink from this CTX param
// get every alg sink, get the corresponding call, trace out on any CTX type variable
// to the key gen
// NOTE: looking for any cryptographic algorithm tracing to the keygen to handle
// any odd cases we aren't awaare of where keygen can be used for other algorithm types
exists(DataFlow::Node src, DataFlow::Node sink |
EVP_PKEY_CTX_Ptr_Source_to_KeyGenOperationWithNoSize_Flow::flow(src,sink)
and
isEVP_PKEY_CTX_Source(src, result)
and
isKeyGen_EVP_PKEY_CTX_Sink(sink, this)
// TODO: what if there is no CTX source? then the keygen becomes an UNKNOWN sink
)
)
}
/**
* For this class, there is no known configuration source for any algorithm
*/
override Expr getKeyConfigurationSource(CryptographicAlgorithm alg){
none()
}
}
}

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/**
* Predicates/classes for identifying algorithm sinks.
* An Algorithm Sink is a function that takes an algorithm as an argument.
* In particular, any function that takes in an algorithm that until the call
* the algorithm is not definitely known to be an algorithm (e.g., an integer used as an identifier to fetch an algorithm)
*/
//TODO: enforce a hierarchy of AlgorithmSinkArgument, e.g., so I can get all Asymmetric SinkArguments that includes all the strictly RSA etc.
import cpp
import experimental.crypto.utils.OpenSSL.LibraryFunction
import experimental.crypto.CryptoAlgorithmNames
predicate isAlgorithmSink(AlgorithmSinkArgument arg, string algType){
arg.algType() = algType
}
abstract class AlgorithmSinkArgument extends Expr {
AlgorithmSinkArgument() {
exists(Call c| c.getAnArgument() = this and openSSLLibraryFunc(c.getTarget()))
}
/**
* Gets the function call in which the argument exists
*/
Call getSinkCall(){
result.getAnArgument() = this
}
abstract string algType();
}
// https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/EVP_CIPHER_fetch.html
predicate cipherAlgorithmSink(string funcName, int argInd){
(funcName in ["EVP_get_cipherbyname", "EVP_get_cipherbynid", "EVP_get_cipherbyobj"] and argInd = 0)
or
(funcName = "EVP_CIPHER_fetch" and argInd = 1)
}
class CipherAlgorithmSink extends AlgorithmSinkArgument {
CipherAlgorithmSink() {
exists(Call c, string funcName, int argInd | funcName = c.getTarget().getName() and this = c.getArgument(argInd) |
cipherAlgorithmSink(funcName, argInd)
)
}
override string algType() { result = getSymmetricEncryptionType() }
}
// https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/EVP_MAC_fetch
predicate macAlgorithmSink(string funcName, int argInd){
(funcName = "EVP_MAC_fetch" and argInd = 1)
}
class MACAlgorithmSink extends AlgorithmSinkArgument {
MACAlgorithmSink() {
exists(Call c, string funcName, int argInd | funcName = c.getTarget().getName() and this = c.getArgument(argInd) |
macAlgorithmSink(funcName, argInd)
)
}
override string algType() { result = "TBD" }
}
// https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/EVP_MD_fetch
predicate messageDigestAlgorithmSink(string funcName, int argInd){
(funcName in ["EVP_get_digestbyname", "EVP_get_digestbynid", "EVP_get_digestbyobj"] and argInd = 0)
or
funcName = "EVP_MD_fetch" and argInd = 1
}
class MessageDigestAlgorithmSink extends AlgorithmSinkArgument {
MessageDigestAlgorithmSink() {
exists(Call c, string funcName, int argInd | funcName = c.getTarget().getName() and this = c.getArgument(argInd) |
messageDigestAlgorithmSink(funcName, argInd)
)
}
override string algType() { result = getHashType() }
}
// https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/EVP_KEYEXCH_fetch
// https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/EVP_KEM_fetch
predicate keyExchangeAlgorithmSink(string funcName, int argInd){
funcName = "EVP_KEYEXCH_fetch" and argInd = 1
or
funcName = "EVP_KEM_fetch" and argInd = 1
}
class KeyExchangeAlgorithmSink extends AlgorithmSinkArgument {
KeyExchangeAlgorithmSink() {
exists(Call c, string funcName, int argInd | funcName = c.getTarget().getName() and this = c.getArgument(argInd) |
keyExchangeAlgorithmSink(funcName, argInd)
)
}
override string algType() { result = getKeyExchangeType() }
}
// https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch
predicate keyManagementAlgorithmSink(string funcName, int argInd){
funcName = "EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch" and argInd = 1
}
class KeyManagementAlgorithmSink extends AlgorithmSinkArgument {
KeyManagementAlgorithmSink() {
exists(Call c, string funcName, int argInd | funcName = c.getTarget().getName() and this = c.getArgument(argInd) |
keyManagementAlgorithmSink(funcName, argInd)
)
}
override string algType() { result = "TBD" }
}
// https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/EVP_KDF
predicate keyDerivationAlgorithmSink(string funcName, int argInd){
funcName = "EVP_KDF_fetch" and argInd = 1
}
class KeyDerivationAlgorithmSink extends AlgorithmSinkArgument {
KeyDerivationAlgorithmSink() {
exists(Call c, string funcName, int argInd | funcName = c.getTarget().getName() and this = c.getArgument(argInd) |
keyDerivationAlgorithmSink(funcName, argInd)
)
}
override string algType() { result = getKeyDerivationType() }
}
// https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/EVP_ASYM_CIPHER_fetch
// https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id
// https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/EVP_PKEY_new_CMAC_key.html
predicate asymmetricCipherAlgorithmSink(string funcName, int argInd){
(funcName = "EVP_ASYM_CIPHER_fetch" and argInd = 1)
or
(funcName = "EVP_PKEY_new_CMAC_key" and argInd = 3)
// NOTE: other cases are handled by AsymmetricAlgorithmSink
}
class AsymmetricCipherAlgorithmSink extends AlgorithmSinkArgument {
AsymmetricCipherAlgorithmSink() {
exists(Call c, string funcName, int argInd | funcName = c.getTarget().getName() and this = c.getArgument(argInd) |
asymmetricCipherAlgorithmSink(funcName, argInd)
)
}
override string algType() { result = "ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION"}
}
class AsymmetricCipherAlgorithmSink_EVP_PKEY_Q_keygen extends AlgorithmSinkArgument {
AsymmetricCipherAlgorithmSink_EVP_PKEY_Q_keygen() {
exists(Call c, string funcName |
funcName = c.getTarget().getName() and
this = c.getArgument(3) |
funcName = "EVP_PKEY_Q_keygen" and
c.getArgument(3).getType().getUnderlyingType() instanceof IntegralType
)
}
override string algType() { result = "ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION"}
}
// https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/EVP_RAND_fetch
predicate randomAlgorithmSink(string funcName, int argInd){
funcName = "EVP_RAND_fetch" and argInd = 1
}
class RandomAlgorithmSink extends AlgorithmSinkArgument {
RandomAlgorithmSink() {
exists(Call c, string funcName, int argInd | funcName = c.getTarget().getName() and this = c.getArgument(argInd) |
randomAlgorithmSink(funcName, argInd)
)
}
override string algType() { result = "TBD" }
}
// https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/EVP_SIGNATURE_fetch
predicate signatureAlgorithmSink(string funcName, int argInd){
funcName = "EVP_SIGNATURE_fetch" and argInd = 1
}
class SignatureAlgorithmSink extends AlgorithmSinkArgument {
SignatureAlgorithmSink() {
exists(Call c, string funcName, int argInd | funcName = c.getTarget().getName() and this = c.getArgument(argInd) |
signatureAlgorithmSink(funcName, argInd)
)
}
override string algType() { result = getSignatureType() }
}
// https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name.html
// https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid.html
predicate ellipticCurveAlgorithmSink(string funcName, int argInd){
funcName in ["EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name", "EVP_EC_gen"] and argInd = 0
or
funcName = "EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name_ex" and argInd = 2
or
funcName in ["EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid"] and argInd = 1
}
class EllipticCurveAlgorithmSink extends AlgorithmSinkArgument {
EllipticCurveAlgorithmSink() {
exists(Call c, string funcName, int argInd | funcName = c.getTarget().getName() and this = c.getArgument(argInd) |
ellipticCurveAlgorithmSink(funcName, argInd)
)
}
override string algType() { result = getEllipticCurveType() }
}
/**
* Special cased to address the fact that arg index 3 (zero offset based) is the curve name.
* ASSUMPTION: if the arg ind 3 is a char* assume it is an elliptic curve
*/
class EllipticCurveAlgorithmSink_EVP_PKEY_Q_keygen extends AlgorithmSinkArgument {
EllipticCurveAlgorithmSink_EVP_PKEY_Q_keygen() {
exists(Call c, string funcName |
funcName = c.getTarget().getName() and
this = c.getArgument(3) |
funcName = "EVP_PKEY_Q_keygen" and
c.getArgument(3).getType().getUnderlyingType() instanceof PointerType and
c.getArgument(3).getType().getUnderlyingType().stripType() instanceof CharType
)
}
override string algType() { result = getEllipticCurveType() }
}
// https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id.html
// https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key.html
// https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/EVP_PKEY_new.html
// https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.html
// https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/EVP_PKEY_Q_keygen.html
// https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.html
predicate asymmetricAlgorithmSink(string funcName, int argInd){
funcName = "EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id" and argInd = 0
or
funcName = "EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name" and argInd = 1
or
funcName in ["EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key", "EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key", "EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key"] and argInd = 0
or
funcName in ["EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex", "EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key_ex"] and argInd = 1
// special casing this as arg index 3 must be specified depending on if RSA or ECC, and otherwise not specified for other algs
// funcName = "EVP_PKEY_Q_keygen" and argInd = 2
or
funcName in ["EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl", "EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_group_name"] and argInd = 1
// TODO consider void cases EVP_PKEY_new
}
class AsymmetricAlgorithmSink extends AlgorithmSinkArgument {
AsymmetricAlgorithmSink() {
exists(Call c, string funcName, int argInd | funcName = c.getTarget().getName() and this = c.getArgument(argInd) |
asymmetricAlgorithmSink(funcName, argInd)
)
}
override string algType() { result = getAsymmetricType() }
}
class AsymmetricAlgorithmSink_EVP_PKEY_Q_keygen extends AlgorithmSinkArgument {
AsymmetricAlgorithmSink_EVP_PKEY_Q_keygen() {
exists(Call c, string funcName |
funcName = c.getTarget().getName() and
this = c.getArgument(2) |
funcName = "EVP_PKEY_Q_keygen" and
not exists(c.getArgument(3))
)
}
override string algType() { result = getAsymmetricType() }
}

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import cpp
import experimental.crypto.utils.OpenSSL.LibraryFunction
import experimental.crypto.CryptoAlgorithmNames
predicate inferredOpenSSLCryptoFunctionCall(Call c , string normalized, string algType){
inferredOpenSSLCryptoFunction(c.getTarget(), normalized, algType)
}
predicate inferredOpenSSLCryptoFunction(Function f, string normalized, string algType){
isPossibleOpenSSLFunction(f) and
normalizeFunctionName(f, algType) = normalized
}
predicate isOpenSSLCryptoFunction(Function f, string normalized, string algType){
// NOTE: relying on inference as there are thousands of functions for crypto
// enumerating them all and maintaining the list seems problematic.
// For now, we will rely on dynamically inferring algorithms for function names.
// This has been seen to be reasonably efficient and accurate.
inferredOpenSSLCryptoFunction(f, normalized, algType)
}
predicate isOpenSSLCryptoFunctionCall(Call c, string normalized, string algType){
isOpenSSLCryptoFunction(c.getTarget(), normalized, algType)
}
private string basicNormalizeFunctionName(Function f, string algType) {
isPossibleOpenSSLFunction(f) and
isKnownAlgorithm(result, algType) and
exists(string normStr |
normStr = f.getName().toUpperCase().regexpReplaceAll("[-_ ]|/", "")
|
normStr.matches("%" + result + "%")
)
}
/**
* Converts a raw OpenSSL algorithm to a normalized algorithm name.
*
* If more than one match occurs for a given algorithm type, normalize attempts to find the "max"
* string (max in terms of string length) e.g., matching AES128 to AES128 and not simply AES.
*
* An unknown algorithm is only identified if there exists no known algorithm found for any algorithm type.
*
* `f` is the function name to normalize.
* `algType` is a string representing the classification of the algorithm (see `CryptoAlgorithmNames`)
*/
private string privateNormalizeFunctionName(Function f, string algType) {
isPossibleOpenSSLFunction(f) and
(
result = basicNormalizeFunctionName(f, algType)
) and
not exists(string res2 |
result != res2 and
res2 = basicNormalizeFunctionName(f, algType) and
res2.length() > result.length()
)
}
/**
* Normalizes a function name to a known algorithm name, similar to `normalizeName`.
* A function is not, however, allowed to be UNKNOWN. The function either
* normalizes to a known algorithm name, or the predicate does not hold (no result).
*
* The predicate attempts to restrict normalization to what looks like an openssl
* library by looking for functions only in an openssl path (see `isPossibleOpenSSLFunction`).
* This may give false postive functions if a directory erronously appears to be openssl;
* however, we take the stance that if a function
* exists strongly mapping to a known function name in a directory such as these,
* regardless of whether its actually a part of openSSL or not, we will analyze it as though it were.
*/
private string normalizeFunctionName(Function f, string algType) {
algType != "UNKNOWN" and
isPossibleOpenSSLFunction(f) and
result = privateNormalizeFunctionName(f, algType) and
// Addressing false positives
// For algorithm names less than or equal to 4, we must see the algorithm name
// in the original function as upper case (it can't be split between tokens)
// One exception found is DES_xcbc_encrypt, this is DESX
((result.length() <= 4 and result != "DESX") implies (f.getName().toUpperCase().matches("%" + result + "%")))
and
((result.length() <= 4 and result = "DESX") implies (f.getName().toUpperCase().matches("%DESX%") or f.getName().toUpperCase().matches("%DES_X%")))
and
// (result.length() <= 3 implies (not f.getName().toUpperCase().regexpMatch(".*" + result + "[a-zA-Z0-9].*|.*[a-zA-Z0-9]" + result + ".*")))
// and
// DES specific false positives
(result.matches("DES") implies (not f.getName().toUpperCase().regexpMatch(".*DES[a-zA-Z0-9].*|.*[a-zA-Z0-9]DES.*")))
and
// ((result.matches("%DES%")) implies not exists(string s | s in ["DESCRIBE", "DESTROY", "DESCRIPTION", "DESCRIPTOR", "NODES"] |
// f.getName().toUpperCase().matches("%" + s + "%"))) and
// SEED specific false positives
((result.matches("SEED")) implies not exists(string s | s in ["SEED_SRC_GENERATE", "RAND","NEW_SEED", "GEN_SEED", "SEED_GEN", "SET_SEED", "GET_SEED", "GET0_SEED", "RESEED", "SEEDING"] |
f.getName().toUpperCase().matches("%" + s + "%"))) and
// ARIA specific false positives
((result.matches("ARIA")) implies not f.getName().toUpperCase().matches("%VARIANT%")) and
// CTR false positives
((result.matches("CTR") implies not f.getName().toUpperCase().matches("%CTRL%"))) and
// ES false positives (e.g., ES256 from AES256)
((result.matches("ES%")) implies not f.getName().toUpperCase().matches("%AES%")) and
// RSA false positives
(((result.matches("RSA")) implies not f.getName().toUpperCase().matches("%UNIVERSAL%")))
and
//rsaz functions deemed to be too low level, and can be ignored
not f.getLocation().getFile().getBaseName().matches("rsaz_exp.c") and
// General False positives
// Functions that 'get' do not set an algorithm, and therefore are considered ignorable
not f.getName().toLowerCase().matches("%get%")
}

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/**
* This file contains predicates create to build up initial data sets for OpenSSL
* predicates. E.g., These predicates were used to assist in associating all
* openSSL functions with their known crypto algorithms.
*/
import cpp
import experimental.crypto.CryptoAlgorithmNames
import experimental.crypto.utils.OpenSSL.CryptoFunction
private string basicNormalizeFunctionName(Function f, string algType) {
isKnownAlgorithm(result, algType) and
exists(string normStr |
normStr = f.getName().toUpperCase().regexpReplaceAll("[-_ ]|/", "")
|
normStr.matches("%" + result + "%")
)
}
/**
* Converts a raw OpenSSL algorithm to a normalized algorithm name.
*
* If more than one match occurs for a given algorithm type, normalize attempts to find the "max"
* string (max in terms of string length) e.g., matching AES128 to AES128 and not simply AES.
*
* An unknown algorithm is only identified if there exists no known algorithm found for any algorithm type.
*
* `f` is the function name to normalize.
* `algType` is a string representing the classification of the algorithm (see `CryptoAlgorithmNames`)
*/
private string privateNormalizeFunctionName(Function f, string algType) {
(
result = basicNormalizeFunctionName(f, algType)
) and
not exists(string res2 |
result != res2 and
res2 = basicNormalizeFunctionName(f, algType) and
res2.length() > result.length()
) and
// Addressing bad normalization case-by-case
// CASE: ES256 being identified when the algorithm is AES256
(result.matches("ES256") implies not exists(string res2 | res2 = basicNormalizeFunctionName(f, _) and res2.matches("AES%")))
}
/**
* Normalizes a function name to a known algorithm name, similar to `normalizeName`.
* A function is not, however, allowed to be UNKNOWN. The function either
* normalizes to a known algorithm name, or the predicate does not hold (no result).
*
* The predicate attempts to restrict normalization to what looks like an openssl
* library by looking for functions only in an openssl path (see `isPossibleOpenSSLFunction`).
* This may give false postive functions if a directory erronously appears to be openssl;
* however, we take the stance that if a function
* exists strongly mapping to a known function name in a directory such as these,
* regardless of whether its actually a part of openSSL or not, we will analyze it as though it were.
*/
string normalizeFunctionName(Function f, string algType) {
algType != "UNKNOWN" and
result = privateNormalizeFunctionName(f, algType) and
openSSLLibraryFunc(f) and
// Addressing false positives
// For algorithm names less than or equal to 4, we must see the algorithm name
// in the original function as upper case (it can't be split between tokens)
// One exception found is DES_xcbc_encrypt, this is DESX
((result.length() <= 4 and result != "DESX") implies (f.getName().toUpperCase().matches("%" + result + "%")))
and
((result.length() <= 4 and result = "DESX") implies (f.getName().toUpperCase().matches("%DESX%") or f.getName().toUpperCase().matches("%DES_X%")))
and
// (result.length() <= 3 implies (not f.getName().toUpperCase().regexpMatch(".*" + result + "[a-zA-Z0-9].*|.*[a-zA-Z0-9]" + result + ".*")))
// and
// DES specific false positives
(result.matches("DES") implies (not f.getName().toUpperCase().regexpMatch(".*DES[a-zA-Z0-9].*|.*[a-zA-Z0-9]DES.*")))
and
// ((result.matches("%DES%")) implies not exists(string s | s in ["DESCRIBE", "DESTROY", "DESCRIPTION", "DESCRIPTOR", "NODES"] |
// f.getName().toUpperCase().matches("%" + s + "%"))) and
// SEED specific false positives
((result.matches("%SEED%")) implies not not exists(string s | s in ["NEW_SEED", "GEN_SEED", "SET_SEED", "GET_SEED", "GET0_SEED", "RESEED", "SEEDING"] |
f.getName().toUpperCase().matches("%" + s + "%"))) and
// ARIA specific false positives
((result.matches("%ARIA%")) implies not f.getName().toUpperCase().matches("%VARIANT%"))
}
/**
* Predicate to support name normalization.
* Converts the raw name upper-case with no hyphen, slash, underscore, hash, or space.
* Looks for substrings that are known algorithms, and normalizes the name.
* If the algorithm cannot be determined or is in the ignorable list (`isIgnorableOpenSSLAlgorithm`)
* this predicate will not resolve a name.
*
* Rationale for private: For normalization, we want to get the longest string for a normalized name match
* for a given algorithm type. I found this easier to express if the public normalizeName
* checks that the name is the longest, and that UNKNOWN is reserved if there exists no
* result from this predicate that is known.
*/
bindingset[name]
string privateNormalizeName(string name, string algType) {
//not isIgnorableOpenSSLAlgorithm(name, _, _) and
// targetOpenSSLAlgorithm(name, _) and
isKnownAlgorithm(result, algType) and
exists(string normStr |
normStr = name.toUpperCase().regexpReplaceAll("[-_ ]|/", "")
|
normStr.matches("%" + result + "%")
)
}
/**
* Converts a raw OpenSSL algorithm to a normalized algorithm name.
*
* If more than one match occurs for a given algorithm type, normalize attempts to find the "max"
* string (max in terms of string length) e.g., matching AES128 to AES128 and not simply AES.
*
* An unknown algorithm is only identified if there exists no known algorithm found for any algorithm type.
*
* `name` is the name to normalize.
* `algType` is a string representing the classification of the algorithm (see `CryptoAlgorithmNames`)
*/
bindingset[name]
string normalizeName(string name, string algType) {
(
if exists(privateNormalizeName(name, _))
then result = privateNormalizeName(name, algType)
else (
result = unknownAlgorithm() and algType = "UNKNOWN"
)
) and
not exists(string res2 |
result != res2 and
res2 = privateNormalizeName(name, algType) and
res2.length() > result.length()
) and
// Addressing bad normalization case-by-case
// CASE: ES256 being identified when the algorithm is AES256
(result.matches("ES256") implies not exists(string res2 | res2 = privateNormalizeName(name, _) and res2.matches("AES%")))
}

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import cpp
import experimental.crypto.utils.OpenSSL.LibraryFunction
import semmle.code.cpp.ir.dataflow.DataFlow
// TODO: possible use of extensible predicates here
// NOTE: -1 for outInd represents the return value
predicate knownPassthroughFunction(Function f, int inInd, int outInd){
// Trace through functions
// See https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/OBJ_obj2txt
// https://www.openssl.org/docs/man3.0/man3/EVP_CIPHER_get0_name
openSSLLibraryFunc(f)
and
(
(
f.getName() in [
"OBJ_nid2obj", "OBJ_nid2ln", "OBJ_nid2sn",
"OBJ_obj2nid", "OBJ_ln2nid", "OBJ_sn2nid",
"OBJ_txt2nid","OBJ_txt2obj", "OBJ_dup",
"EVP_CIPHER_get0_name"]
and inInd = 0 and outInd = -1)
or
(
f.getName() in ["OBJ_obj2txt","i2t_ASN1_OBJECT"] and
inInd = 2 and outInd = 0
)
or
// Dup/copy pattern occurs in more places,
//see: https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/EC_KEY_copy.html and https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup.html
f.getName().matches("%_dup") and inInd = 0 and outInd = -1
or
f.getName().matches("%_copy") and inInd = 0 and outInd = -1
)
}
/**
* `c` is a call to a function that preserves the algorithm but changes its form.
* `onExpr` is the input argument passing through to, `outExpr` is the next expression in a dataflow step associated with `c`
*/
predicate knownPassthoughCall(Call c, Expr inExpr, Expr outExpr){
exists(int inInd, int outInd |
knownPassthroughFunction(c.getTarget(), inInd, outInd) and
inExpr = c.getArgument(inInd) and
if(outInd = -1)
then outExpr = c
else outExpr = c.getArgument(outInd)
)
}
/*
* Explicitly add flow through openssl functions that preserve the algorithm but alter the form (e.g., from NID to string)
*/
predicate knownPassThroughStep(DataFlow::Node node1, DataFlow::Node node2){
exists(Expr cur, Expr next |
(cur = node1.asExpr() or cur = node1.asIndirectArgument()) and
(next = node2.asExpr() or next = node2.asIndirectArgument() or next = node2.asDefiningArgument())
|
exists(Call c | knownPassthoughCall(c, cur, next)))
}