patch upper-case acronyms to be PascalCase

This commit is contained in:
Erik Krogh Kristensen
2022-03-11 11:10:33 +01:00
parent e3a15792fa
commit 69353bb014
422 changed files with 3532 additions and 2244 deletions

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@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import java
import semmle.code.java.security.ExternalAPIs
import semmle.code.java.dataflow.DataFlow
from ExternalAPIUsedWithUntrustedData externalAPI
select externalAPI, count(externalAPI.getUntrustedDataNode()) as numberOfUses,
externalAPI.getNumberOfUntrustedSources() as numberOfUntrustedSources order by
from ExternalApiUsedWithUntrustedData externalApi
select externalApi, count(externalApi.getUntrustedDataNode()) as numberOfUses,
externalApi.getNumberOfUntrustedSources() as numberOfUntrustedSources order by
numberOfUntrustedSources desc

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@@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ import semmle.code.java.dataflow.TaintTracking
import semmle.code.java.security.ExternalAPIs
import DataFlow::PathGraph
from UntrustedDataToExternalAPIConfig config, DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink
from UntrustedDataToExternalApiConfig config, DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink
where config.hasFlowPath(source, sink)
select sink, source, sink,
"Call to " + sink.getNode().(ExternalAPIDataNode).getMethodDescription() +
"Call to " + sink.getNode().(ExternalApiDataNode).getMethodDescription() +
" with untrusted data from $@.", source, source.toString()

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@@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ import semmle.code.java.dataflow.FlowSources
import semmle.code.java.security.XSS
import DataFlow::PathGraph
class XSSConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
XSSConfig() { this = "XSSConfig" }
class XssConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
XssConfig() { this = "XSSConfig" }
override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ class XSSConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
}
}
from DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink, XSSConfig conf
from DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink, XssConfig conf
where conf.hasFlowPath(source, sink)
select sink.getNode(), source, sink, "Cross-site scripting vulnerability due to $@.",
source.getNode(), "user-provided value"

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@@ -16,15 +16,15 @@ import semmle.code.java.dataflow.FlowSources
import semmle.code.java.security.XSS
import DataFlow::PathGraph
class XSSLocalConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
XSSLocalConfig() { this = "XSSLocalConfig" }
class XssLocalConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
XssLocalConfig() { this = "XSSLocalConfig" }
override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof LocalUserInput }
override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof XssSink }
}
from DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink, XSSLocalConfig conf
from DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink, XssLocalConfig conf
where conf.hasFlowPath(source, sink)
select sink.getNode(), source, sink, "Cross-site scripting vulnerability due to $@.",
source.getNode(), "user-provided value"

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@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ import java
import semmle.code.java.dataflow.TypeFlow
import semmle.code.java.security.Encryption
class URLConnection extends RefType {
URLConnection() {
class UrlConnection extends RefType {
UrlConnection() {
this.getAnAncestor().hasQualifiedName("java.net", "URLConnection") and
not this.hasName("JarURLConnection")
}
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ from MethodAccess m, Class c, string type
where
m.getQualifier().getType() = c and
(
c instanceof URLConnection and type = "connection"
c instanceof UrlConnection and type = "connection"
or
c instanceof Socket and type = "socket"
) and

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@@ -19,10 +19,10 @@ import semmle.code.java.dataflow.FlowSources
import semmle.code.java.dataflow.TaintTracking2
import DataFlow::PathGraph
class SafeSAXSourceFlowConfig extends TaintTracking2::Configuration {
SafeSAXSourceFlowConfig() { this = "XmlParsers::SafeSAXSourceFlowConfig" }
class SafeSaxSourceFlowConfig extends TaintTracking2::Configuration {
SafeSaxSourceFlowConfig() { this = "XmlParsers::SafeSAXSourceFlowConfig" }
override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof SafeSAXSource }
override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof SafeSaxSource }
override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
sink.asExpr() = any(XmlParserCall parse).getSink()
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ class SafeSAXSourceFlowConfig extends TaintTracking2::Configuration {
class UnsafeXxeSink extends DataFlow::ExprNode {
UnsafeXxeSink() {
not exists(SafeSAXSourceFlowConfig safeSource | safeSource.hasFlowTo(this)) and
not exists(SafeSaxSourceFlowConfig safeSource | safeSource.hasFlowTo(this)) and
exists(XmlParserCall parse |
parse.getSink() = this.getExpr() and
not parse.isSafe()