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Exlucde environmental variables from default detection in regexp injection
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@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
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*/
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import javascript
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private import codeql.threatmodels.ThreatModels
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module RegExpInjection {
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/**
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@@ -32,19 +33,32 @@ module RegExpInjection {
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/**
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* An active threat-model source, considered as a flow source.
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* Excludes environment variables by default - they require the "environment" threat model.
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*/
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private class ActiveThreatModelSourceAsSource extends Source instanceof ActiveThreatModelSource {
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ActiveThreatModelSourceAsSource() { not this.isClientSideSource() }
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ActiveThreatModelSourceAsSource() {
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not this.isClientSideSource() and
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not this.(ThreatModelSource).getThreatModel() = "environment"
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}
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}
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private import IndirectCommandInjectionCustomizations
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/**
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* Environment variables as a source when the "environment" threat model is active.
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*/
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private class EnvironmentVariableAsSource extends Source instanceof ThreatModelSource {
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EnvironmentVariableAsSource() {
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this.getThreatModel() = "environment" and
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currentThreatModel("environment")
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}
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override string describe() { result = "environment variable" }
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}
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/**
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* A read of `process.env`, `process.argv`, and similar, considered as a flow source for regular
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* expression injection.
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* Command line arguments as a source for regular expression injection.
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*/
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class ArgvAsSource extends Source instanceof IndirectCommandInjection::Source {
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override string describe() { result = IndirectCommandInjection::Source.super.describe() }
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private class CommandLineArgumentAsSource extends Source instanceof CommandLineArguments {
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override string describe() { result = "command-line argument" }
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}
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/**
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@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
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| RegExpInjection.js:49:14:49:52 | key.spl ... in("-") | RegExpInjection.js:5:13:5:28 | req.param("key") | RegExpInjection.js:49:14:49:52 | key.spl ... in("-") | This regular expression is constructed from a $@. | RegExpInjection.js:5:13:5:28 | req.param("key") | user-provided value |
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| RegExpInjection.js:59:14:59:18 | input | RegExpInjection.js:55:39:55:56 | req.param("input") | RegExpInjection.js:59:14:59:18 | input | This regular expression is constructed from a $@. | RegExpInjection.js:55:39:55:56 | req.param("input") | user-provided value |
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| RegExpInjection.js:82:14:82:55 | "^.*\\.( ... + ")$" | RegExpInjection.js:77:15:77:32 | req.param("input") | RegExpInjection.js:82:14:82:55 | "^.*\\.( ... + ")$" | This regular expression is constructed from a $@. | RegExpInjection.js:77:15:77:32 | req.param("input") | user-provided value |
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| RegExpInjection.js:86:16:86:50 | `^${pro ... r.app$` | RegExpInjection.js:86:20:86:30 | process.env | RegExpInjection.js:86:16:86:50 | `^${pro ... r.app$` | This regular expression is constructed from a $@. | RegExpInjection.js:86:20:86:30 | process.env | environment variable |
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| RegExpInjection.js:88:16:88:49 | `^${pro ... r.app$` | RegExpInjection.js:88:20:88:31 | process.argv | RegExpInjection.js:88:16:88:49 | `^${pro ... r.app$` | This regular expression is constructed from a $@. | RegExpInjection.js:88:20:88:31 | process.argv | command-line argument |
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| RegExpInjection.js:95:14:95:22 | sanitized | RegExpInjection.js:92:15:92:32 | req.param("input") | RegExpInjection.js:95:14:95:22 | sanitized | This regular expression is constructed from a $@. | RegExpInjection.js:92:15:92:32 | req.param("input") | user-provided value |
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| tst.js:6:16:6:35 | "^"+ data.name + "$" | tst.js:5:16:5:29 | req.query.data | tst.js:6:16:6:35 | "^"+ data.name + "$" | This regular expression is constructed from a $@. | tst.js:5:16:5:29 | req.query.data | user-provided value |
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@@ -57,7 +56,6 @@ edges
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| RegExpInjection.js:77:15:77:32 | req.param("input") | RegExpInjection.js:77:7:77:32 | input | provenance | |
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| RegExpInjection.js:82:25:82:29 | input | RegExpInjection.js:82:25:82:48 | input.r ... g, "\|") | provenance | |
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| RegExpInjection.js:82:25:82:48 | input.r ... g, "\|") | RegExpInjection.js:82:14:82:55 | "^.*\\.( ... + ")$" | provenance | |
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| RegExpInjection.js:86:20:86:30 | process.env | RegExpInjection.js:86:16:86:50 | `^${pro ... r.app$` | provenance | |
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| RegExpInjection.js:88:20:88:31 | process.argv | RegExpInjection.js:88:16:88:49 | `^${pro ... r.app$` | provenance | |
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| RegExpInjection.js:92:7:92:32 | input | RegExpInjection.js:94:19:94:23 | input | provenance | |
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| RegExpInjection.js:92:15:92:32 | req.param("input") | RegExpInjection.js:92:7:92:32 | input | provenance | |
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@@ -109,8 +107,6 @@ nodes
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| RegExpInjection.js:82:14:82:55 | "^.*\\.( ... + ")$" | semmle.label | "^.*\\.( ... + ")$" |
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| RegExpInjection.js:82:25:82:29 | input | semmle.label | input |
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| RegExpInjection.js:82:25:82:48 | input.r ... g, "\|") | semmle.label | input.r ... g, "\|") |
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| RegExpInjection.js:86:16:86:50 | `^${pro ... r.app$` | semmle.label | `^${pro ... r.app$` |
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| RegExpInjection.js:86:20:86:30 | process.env | semmle.label | process.env |
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| RegExpInjection.js:88:16:88:49 | `^${pro ... r.app$` | semmle.label | `^${pro ... r.app$` |
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| RegExpInjection.js:88:20:88:31 | process.argv | semmle.label | process.argv |
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| RegExpInjection.js:92:7:92:32 | input | semmle.label | input |
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@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ app.get('/has-sanitizer', function(req, res) {
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});
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app.get("argv", function(req, res) {
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new RegExp(`^${process.env.HOME}/Foo/bar.app$`); // $ Alert[js/regex-injection]
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new RegExp(`^${process.env.HOME}/Foo/bar.app$`); // environment variable, should be detected only with threat model enabled.
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new RegExp(`^${process.argv[1]}/Foo/bar.app$`); // $ Alert[js/regex-injection]
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});
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