mirror of
https://github.com/github/codeql.git
synced 2025-12-24 04:36:35 +01:00
Merge pull request #6006 from artem-smotrakov/timing-attacks
Java: Timing attacks while comparing results of cryptographic operations
This commit is contained in:
Chris Smowton
@@ -0,0 +1,323 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Provides classes and predicates for queries that detect timing attacks.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
import semmle.code.java.controlflow.Guards
|
||||
import semmle.code.java.dataflow.TaintTracking
|
||||
import semmle.code.java.dataflow.TaintTracking2
|
||||
import semmle.code.java.dataflow.DataFlow3
|
||||
import semmle.code.java.dataflow.FlowSources
|
||||
|
||||
/** A method call that produces cryptographic result. */
|
||||
abstract private class ProduceCryptoCall extends MethodAccess {
|
||||
Expr output;
|
||||
|
||||
/** Gets the result of cryptographic operation. */
|
||||
Expr output() { result = output }
|
||||
|
||||
/** Gets a type of cryptographic operation such as MAC, signature or ciphertext. */
|
||||
abstract string getResultType();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** A method call that produces a MAC. */
|
||||
private class ProduceMacCall extends ProduceCryptoCall {
|
||||
ProduceMacCall() {
|
||||
getMethod().getDeclaringType().hasQualifiedName("javax.crypto", "Mac") and
|
||||
(
|
||||
getMethod().hasStringSignature(["doFinal()", "doFinal(byte[])"]) and this = output
|
||||
or
|
||||
getMethod().hasStringSignature("doFinal(byte[], int)") and getArgument(0) = output
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
override string getResultType() { result = "MAC" }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** A method call that produces a signature. */
|
||||
private class ProduceSignatureCall extends ProduceCryptoCall {
|
||||
ProduceSignatureCall() {
|
||||
getMethod().getDeclaringType().hasQualifiedName("java.security", "Signature") and
|
||||
(
|
||||
getMethod().hasStringSignature("sign()") and this = output
|
||||
or
|
||||
getMethod().hasStringSignature("sign(byte[], int, int)") and getArgument(0) = output
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
override string getResultType() { result = "signature" }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* A config that tracks data flow from initializing a cipher for encryption
|
||||
* to producing a ciphertext using this cipher.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private class InitializeEncryptorConfig extends DataFlow3::Configuration {
|
||||
InitializeEncryptorConfig() { this = "InitializeEncryptorConfig" }
|
||||
|
||||
override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) {
|
||||
exists(MethodAccess ma |
|
||||
ma.getMethod().hasQualifiedName("javax.crypto", "Cipher", "init") and
|
||||
ma.getArgument(0).(VarAccess).getVariable().hasName("ENCRYPT_MODE") and
|
||||
ma.getQualifier() = source.asExpr()
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
|
||||
exists(MethodAccess ma |
|
||||
ma.getMethod().hasQualifiedName("javax.crypto", "Cipher", "doFinal") and
|
||||
ma.getQualifier() = sink.asExpr()
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** A method call that produces a ciphertext. */
|
||||
private class ProduceCiphertextCall extends ProduceCryptoCall {
|
||||
ProduceCiphertextCall() {
|
||||
exists(Method m | m = this.getMethod() |
|
||||
m.getDeclaringType().hasQualifiedName("javax.crypto", "Cipher") and
|
||||
(
|
||||
m.hasStringSignature(["doFinal()", "doFinal(byte[])", "doFinal(byte[], int, int)"]) and
|
||||
this = output
|
||||
or
|
||||
m.hasStringSignature("doFinal(byte[], int)") and getArgument(0) = output
|
||||
or
|
||||
m.hasStringSignature([
|
||||
"doFinal(byte[], int, int, byte[])", "doFinal(byte[], int, int, byte[], int)"
|
||||
]) and
|
||||
getArgument(3) = output
|
||||
or
|
||||
m.hasStringSignature("doFinal(ByteBuffer, ByteBuffer)") and
|
||||
getArgument(1) = output
|
||||
)
|
||||
) and
|
||||
exists(InitializeEncryptorConfig config |
|
||||
config.hasFlowTo(DataFlow3::exprNode(this.getQualifier()))
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
override string getResultType() { result = "ciphertext" }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Holds if `fromNode` to `toNode` is a dataflow step that updates a cryptographic operation. */
|
||||
private predicate updateCryptoOperationStep(DataFlow2::Node fromNode, DataFlow2::Node toNode) {
|
||||
exists(MethodAccess call, Method m |
|
||||
m = call.getMethod() and
|
||||
call.getQualifier() = toNode.asExpr() and
|
||||
call.getArgument(0) = fromNode.asExpr()
|
||||
|
|
||||
m.hasQualifiedName("java.security", "Signature", "update")
|
||||
or
|
||||
m.hasQualifiedName("javax.crypto", ["Mac", "Cipher"], "update")
|
||||
or
|
||||
m.hasQualifiedName("javax.crypto", ["Mac", "Cipher"], "doFinal") and
|
||||
not m.hasStringSignature("doFinal(byte[], int)")
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Holds if `fromNode` to `toNode` is a dataflow step that creates a hash. */
|
||||
private predicate createMessageDigestStep(DataFlow2::Node fromNode, DataFlow2::Node toNode) {
|
||||
exists(MethodAccess ma, Method m | m = ma.getMethod() |
|
||||
m.getDeclaringType().hasQualifiedName("java.security", "MessageDigest") and
|
||||
m.hasStringSignature("digest()") and
|
||||
ma.getQualifier() = fromNode.asExpr() and
|
||||
ma = toNode.asExpr()
|
||||
)
|
||||
or
|
||||
exists(MethodAccess ma, Method m | m = ma.getMethod() |
|
||||
m.getDeclaringType().hasQualifiedName("java.security", "MessageDigest") and
|
||||
m.hasStringSignature("digest(byte[], int, int)") and
|
||||
ma.getQualifier() = fromNode.asExpr() and
|
||||
ma.getArgument(0) = toNode.asExpr()
|
||||
)
|
||||
or
|
||||
exists(MethodAccess ma, Method m | m = ma.getMethod() |
|
||||
m.getDeclaringType().hasQualifiedName("java.security", "MessageDigest") and
|
||||
m.hasStringSignature("digest(byte[])") and
|
||||
ma.getArgument(0) = fromNode.asExpr() and
|
||||
ma = toNode.asExpr()
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Holds if `fromNode` to `toNode` is a dataflow step that updates a hash. */
|
||||
private predicate updateMessageDigestStep(DataFlow2::Node fromNode, DataFlow2::Node toNode) {
|
||||
exists(MethodAccess ma, Method m | m = ma.getMethod() |
|
||||
m.hasQualifiedName("java.security", "MessageDigest", "update") and
|
||||
ma.getArgument(0) = fromNode.asExpr() and
|
||||
ma.getQualifier() = toNode.asExpr()
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* A config that tracks data flow from remote user input to a cryptographic operation
|
||||
* such as cipher, MAC or signature.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private class UserInputInCryptoOperationConfig extends TaintTracking2::Configuration {
|
||||
UserInputInCryptoOperationConfig() { this = "UserInputInCryptoOperationConfig" }
|
||||
|
||||
override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
|
||||
|
||||
override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
|
||||
exists(ProduceCryptoCall call | call.getQualifier() = sink.asExpr())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
override predicate isAdditionalTaintStep(DataFlow2::Node fromNode, DataFlow2::Node toNode) {
|
||||
updateCryptoOperationStep(fromNode, toNode)
|
||||
or
|
||||
createMessageDigestStep(fromNode, toNode)
|
||||
or
|
||||
updateMessageDigestStep(fromNode, toNode)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** A source that produces result of cryptographic operation. */
|
||||
class CryptoOperationSource extends DataFlow::Node {
|
||||
ProduceCryptoCall call;
|
||||
|
||||
CryptoOperationSource() { call.output() = this.asExpr() }
|
||||
|
||||
/** Holds if remote user input was used in the cryptographic operation. */
|
||||
predicate includesUserInput() {
|
||||
exists(
|
||||
DataFlow2::PathNode source, DataFlow2::PathNode sink, UserInputInCryptoOperationConfig config
|
||||
|
|
||||
config.hasFlowPath(source, sink)
|
||||
|
|
||||
sink.getNode().asExpr() = call.getQualifier()
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Gets a method call that produces cryptographic result. */
|
||||
ProduceCryptoCall getCall() { result = call }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Methods that use a non-constant-time algorithm for comparing inputs. */
|
||||
private class NonConstantTimeEqualsCall extends MethodAccess {
|
||||
NonConstantTimeEqualsCall() {
|
||||
getMethod()
|
||||
.hasQualifiedName("java.lang", "String", ["equals", "contentEquals", "equalsIgnoreCase"]) or
|
||||
getMethod().hasQualifiedName("java.nio", "ByteBuffer", ["equals", "compareTo"])
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** A static method that uses a non-constant-time algorithm for comparing inputs. */
|
||||
private class NonConstantTimeComparisonCall extends StaticMethodAccess {
|
||||
NonConstantTimeComparisonCall() {
|
||||
getMethod().hasQualifiedName("java.util", "Arrays", ["equals", "deepEquals"]) or
|
||||
getMethod().hasQualifiedName("java.util", "Objects", "deepEquals") or
|
||||
getMethod()
|
||||
.hasQualifiedName("org.apache.commons.lang3", "StringUtils",
|
||||
["equals", "equalsAny", "equalsAnyIgnoreCase", "equalsIgnoreCase"])
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* A config that tracks data flow from remote user input to methods
|
||||
* that compare inputs using a non-constant-time algorithm.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private class UserInputInComparisonConfig extends TaintTracking2::Configuration {
|
||||
UserInputInComparisonConfig() { this = "UserInputInComparisonConfig" }
|
||||
|
||||
override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
|
||||
|
||||
override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
|
||||
exists(NonConstantTimeEqualsCall call |
|
||||
sink.asExpr() = [call.getAnArgument(), call.getQualifier()]
|
||||
)
|
||||
or
|
||||
exists(NonConstantTimeComparisonCall call | sink.asExpr() = call.getAnArgument())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Holds if `expr` looks like a constant. */
|
||||
private predicate looksLikeConstant(Expr expr) {
|
||||
expr.isCompileTimeConstant()
|
||||
or
|
||||
expr.(VarAccess).getVariable().isFinal() and expr.getType() instanceof TypeString
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Holds if `firstObject` and `secondObject` are compared using a method
|
||||
* that does not use a constant-time algorithm, for example, `String.equals()`.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private predicate isNonConstantTimeEqualsCall(Expr firstObject, Expr secondObject) {
|
||||
exists(NonConstantTimeEqualsCall call |
|
||||
firstObject = call.getQualifier() and
|
||||
secondObject = call.getAnArgument()
|
||||
or
|
||||
firstObject = call.getAnArgument() and
|
||||
secondObject = call.getQualifier()
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Holds if `firstInput` and `secondInput` are compared using a static method
|
||||
* that does not use a constant-time algorithm, for example, `Arrays.equals()`.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private predicate isNonConstantTimeComparisonCall(Expr firstInput, Expr secondInput) {
|
||||
exists(NonConstantTimeComparisonCall call |
|
||||
firstInput = call.getArgument(0) and secondInput = call.getArgument(1)
|
||||
or
|
||||
firstInput = call.getArgument(1) and secondInput = call.getArgument(0)
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Holds if there is a fast-fail check while comparing `firstArray` and `secondArray`.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private predicate existsFailFastCheck(Expr firstArray, Expr secondArray) {
|
||||
exists(
|
||||
Guard guard, EqualityTest eqTest, boolean branch, Stmt fastFailingStmt,
|
||||
ArrayAccess firstArrayAccess, ArrayAccess secondArrayAccess
|
||||
|
|
||||
guard = eqTest and
|
||||
// For `==` false branch is fail fast; for `!=` true branch is fail fast
|
||||
branch = eqTest.polarity().booleanNot() and
|
||||
(
|
||||
fastFailingStmt instanceof ReturnStmt or
|
||||
fastFailingStmt instanceof BreakStmt or
|
||||
fastFailingStmt instanceof ThrowStmt
|
||||
) and
|
||||
guard.controls(fastFailingStmt.getBasicBlock(), branch) and
|
||||
DataFlow::localExprFlow(firstArrayAccess, eqTest.getLeftOperand()) and
|
||||
DataFlow::localExprFlow(secondArrayAccess, eqTest.getRightOperand())
|
||||
|
|
||||
firstArrayAccess.getArray() = firstArray and secondArray = secondArrayAccess
|
||||
or
|
||||
secondArrayAccess.getArray() = firstArray and secondArray = firstArrayAccess
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** A sink that compares input using a non-constant-time algorithm. */
|
||||
class NonConstantTimeComparisonSink extends DataFlow::Node {
|
||||
Expr anotherParameter;
|
||||
|
||||
NonConstantTimeComparisonSink() {
|
||||
(
|
||||
isNonConstantTimeEqualsCall(this.asExpr(), anotherParameter)
|
||||
or
|
||||
isNonConstantTimeComparisonCall(this.asExpr(), anotherParameter)
|
||||
or
|
||||
existsFailFastCheck(this.asExpr(), anotherParameter)
|
||||
) and
|
||||
not looksLikeConstant(anotherParameter)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Holds if remote user input was used in the comparison. */
|
||||
predicate includesUserInput() {
|
||||
exists(UserInputInComparisonConfig config |
|
||||
config.hasFlowTo(DataFlow2::exprNode(anotherParameter))
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* A configuration that tracks data flow from cryptographic operations
|
||||
* to methods that compare data using a non-constant-time algorithm.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
class NonConstantTimeCryptoComparisonConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
|
||||
NonConstantTimeCryptoComparisonConfig() { this = "NonConstantTimeCryptoComparisonConfig" }
|
||||
|
||||
override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof CryptoOperationSource }
|
||||
|
||||
override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof NonConstantTimeComparisonSink }
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
|
||||
<!DOCTYPE qhelp PUBLIC "-//Semmle//qhelp//EN" "qhelp.dtd">
|
||||
<qhelp>
|
||||
<include src="TimingAttackAgainstSignature.qhelp" />
|
||||
</qhelp>
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* @name Possible timing attack against signature validation
|
||||
* @description When checking a signature over a message, a constant-time algorithm should be used.
|
||||
* Otherwise, there is a risk of a timing attack that allows an attacker
|
||||
* to forge a valid signature for an arbitrary message. For a successful attack,
|
||||
* the attacker has to be able to send to the validation procedure both the message and the signature.
|
||||
* @kind path-problem
|
||||
* @problem.severity warning
|
||||
* @precision medium
|
||||
* @id java/possible-timing-attack-against-signature
|
||||
* @tags security
|
||||
* external/cwe/cwe-208
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
import java
|
||||
import NonConstantTimeCheckOnSignatureQuery
|
||||
import DataFlow::PathGraph
|
||||
|
||||
from DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink, NonConstantTimeCryptoComparisonConfig conf
|
||||
where conf.hasFlowPath(source, sink)
|
||||
select sink.getNode(), source, sink, "Possible timing attack against $@ validation.", source,
|
||||
source.getNode().(CryptoOperationSource).getCall().getResultType()
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
|
||||
public boolean validate(HttpRequest request, SecretKey key) throws Exception {
|
||||
byte[] message = getMessageFrom(request);
|
||||
byte[] signature = getSignatureFrom(request);
|
||||
|
||||
Mac mac = Mac.getInstance("HmacSHA256");
|
||||
mac.init(new SecretKeySpec(key.getEncoded(), "HmacSHA256"));
|
||||
byte[] actual = mac.doFinal(message);
|
||||
return MessageDigest.isEqual(signature, actual);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
|
||||
<!DOCTYPE qhelp PUBLIC "-//Semmle//qhelp//EN" "qhelp.dtd">
|
||||
<qhelp>
|
||||
|
||||
<overview>
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
A constant-time algorithm should be used for checking a MAC or a digital signature.
|
||||
In other words, the comparison time should not depend on the content of the input.
|
||||
Otherwise, an attacker may be able to forge a valid signature for an arbitrary message
|
||||
by running a timing attack if they can send to the validation procedure
|
||||
both the message and the signature. A successful attack can result in authentication bypass.
|
||||
</p>
|
||||
</overview>
|
||||
|
||||
<recommendation>
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
Use <code>MessageDigest.isEqual()</code> method to check MACs and signatures.
|
||||
If this method is used, then the calculation time depends only on the length of input byte arrays,
|
||||
and does not depend on the contents of the arrays.
|
||||
</p>
|
||||
</recommendation>
|
||||
|
||||
<example>
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
The following example uses <code>Arrays.equals()</code> method for validating a MAC over a message.
|
||||
This method implements a non-constant-time algorithm.
|
||||
Both the message and the signature come from an untrusted HTTP request:
|
||||
</p>
|
||||
<sample src="UnsafeMacComparison.java" />
|
||||
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
The next example uses a safe constant-time algorithm for validating a MAC:
|
||||
</p>
|
||||
<sample src="SafeMacComparison.java" />
|
||||
</example>
|
||||
|
||||
<references>
|
||||
<li>
|
||||
Wikipedia:
|
||||
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timing_attack">Timing attack</a>.
|
||||
</li>
|
||||
<li>
|
||||
Coursera:
|
||||
<a href="https://www.coursera.org/lecture/crypto/timing-attacks-on-mac-verification-FHGW1">Timing attacks on MAC verification</a>
|
||||
</li>
|
||||
<li>
|
||||
NCC Group:
|
||||
<a href="https://www.nccgroup.trust/globalassets/our-research/us/whitepapers/TimeTrial.pdf">Time Trial: Racing Towards Practical Remote Timing Attacks</a>
|
||||
</li>
|
||||
<li>
|
||||
Java API Specification:
|
||||
<a href="https://docs.oracle.com/en/java/javase/11/docs/api/java.base/java/security/MessageDigest.html#isEqual(byte[],byte[])">MessageDigest.isEqual() method</a>
|
||||
</li>
|
||||
</references>
|
||||
|
||||
</qhelp>
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* @name Timing attack against signature validation
|
||||
* @description When checking a signature over a message, a constant-time algorithm should be used.
|
||||
* Otherwise, an attacker may be able to forge a valid signature for an arbitrary message
|
||||
* by running a timing attack if they can send to the validation procedure
|
||||
* both the message and the signature.
|
||||
* A successful attack can result in authentication bypass.
|
||||
* @kind path-problem
|
||||
* @problem.severity error
|
||||
* @precision high
|
||||
* @id java/timing-attack-against-signature
|
||||
* @tags security
|
||||
* external/cwe/cwe-208
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
import java
|
||||
import NonConstantTimeCheckOnSignatureQuery
|
||||
import DataFlow::PathGraph
|
||||
|
||||
from DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink, NonConstantTimeCryptoComparisonConfig conf
|
||||
where
|
||||
conf.hasFlowPath(source, sink) and
|
||||
(
|
||||
source.getNode().(CryptoOperationSource).includesUserInput() and
|
||||
sink.getNode().(NonConstantTimeComparisonSink).includesUserInput()
|
||||
)
|
||||
select sink.getNode(), source, sink, "Timing attack against $@ validation.", source,
|
||||
source.getNode().(CryptoOperationSource).getCall().getResultType()
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
|
||||
public boolean validate(HttpRequest request, SecretKey key) throws Exception {
|
||||
byte[] message = getMessageFrom(request);
|
||||
byte[] signature = getSignatureFrom(request);
|
||||
|
||||
Mac mac = Mac.getInstance("HmacSHA256");
|
||||
mac.init(new SecretKeySpec(key.getEncoded(), "HmacSHA256"));
|
||||
byte[] actual = mac.doFinal(message);
|
||||
return Arrays.equals(signature, actual);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -268,11 +268,15 @@ private predicate summaryModelCsv(string row) {
|
||||
// qualifier to arg
|
||||
"java.io;InputStream;true;read;(byte[]);;Argument[-1];Argument[0];taint",
|
||||
"java.io;InputStream;true;read;(byte[],int,int);;Argument[-1];Argument[0];taint",
|
||||
"java.io;InputStream;true;readNBytes;(byte[],int,int);;Argument[-1];Argument[0];taint",
|
||||
"java.io;InputStream;true;transferTo;(OutputStream);;Argument[-1];Argument[0];taint",
|
||||
"java.io;ByteArrayOutputStream;false;writeTo;;;Argument[-1];Argument[0];taint",
|
||||
"java.io;Reader;true;read;;;Argument[-1];Argument[0];taint",
|
||||
// qualifier to return
|
||||
"java.io;ByteArrayOutputStream;false;toByteArray;;;Argument[-1];ReturnValue;taint",
|
||||
"java.io;ByteArrayOutputStream;false;toString;;;Argument[-1];ReturnValue;taint",
|
||||
"java.io;InputStream;true;readAllBytes;;;Argument[-1];ReturnValue;taint",
|
||||
"java.io;InputStream;true;readNBytes;(int);;Argument[-1];ReturnValue;taint",
|
||||
"java.util;StringTokenizer;false;nextElement;();;Argument[-1];ReturnValue;taint",
|
||||
"java.util;StringTokenizer;false;nextToken;;;Argument[-1];ReturnValue;taint",
|
||||
"javax.xml.transform.sax;SAXSource;false;getInputSource;;;Argument[-1];ReturnValue;taint",
|
||||
@@ -283,10 +287,12 @@ private predicate summaryModelCsv(string row) {
|
||||
"java.net;URI;false;toAsciiString;;;Argument[-1];ReturnValue;taint",
|
||||
"java.io;File;false;toURI;;;Argument[-1];ReturnValue;taint",
|
||||
"java.io;File;false;toPath;;;Argument[-1];ReturnValue;taint",
|
||||
"java.nio;ByteBuffer;false;array;();;Argument[-1];ReturnValue;taint",
|
||||
"java.nio.file;Path;false;toFile;;;Argument[-1];ReturnValue;taint",
|
||||
"java.io;BufferedReader;true;readLine;;;Argument[-1];ReturnValue;taint",
|
||||
"java.io;Reader;true;read;();;Argument[-1];ReturnValue;taint",
|
||||
// arg to return
|
||||
"java.nio;ByteBuffer;false;wrap;(byte[]);;Argument[0];ReturnValue;taint",
|
||||
"java.util;Base64$Encoder;false;encode;(byte[]);;Argument[0];ReturnValue;taint",
|
||||
"java.util;Base64$Encoder;false;encode;(ByteBuffer);;Argument[0];ReturnValue;taint",
|
||||
"java.util;Base64$Encoder;false;encodeToString;(byte[]);;Argument[0];ReturnValue;taint",
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user