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add barrier when data flows into user messages for system prompt detection, remove embeddings from user prompt injection query
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@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ module Anthropic {
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// messages: [{ role: "assistant", content: "..." }]
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exists(API::Node msg |
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msg = messagesCreateParams().getMember("messages").getArrayElement() and
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msg.getMember("role").asSink().mayHaveStringValue("assistant")
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msg.getMember("role").asSink().mayHaveStringValue(["system", "assistant"])
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result = msg.getMember("content")
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)
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@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ module Anthropic {
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// messages: [{ role: "user", content: "..." }]
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exists(API::Node msg |
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msg = messagesCreateParams().getMember("messages").getArrayElement() and
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not msg.getMember("role").asSink().mayHaveStringValue("assistant")
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not msg.getMember("role").asSink().mayHaveStringValue(["system", "assistant"])
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result = msg.getMember("content")
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)
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@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ module GoogleGenAI {
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.getParameter(0)
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.getMember("contents")
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.getArrayElement() and
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msg.getMember("role").asSink().mayHaveStringValue("model")
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msg.getMember("role").asSink().mayHaveStringValue(["system", "model"])
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result = msg.getMember("parts").getArrayElement().getMember("text")
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)
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@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ module GoogleGenAI {
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.getParameter(0)
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.getMember("contents")
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.getArrayElement() and
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not msg.getMember("role").asSink().mayHaveStringValue("model")
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not msg.getMember("role").asSink().mayHaveStringValue(["system", "model"])
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result = msg.getMember("parts").getArrayElement().getMember("text")
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)
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@@ -171,14 +171,6 @@ module OpenAI {
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.getParameter(0)
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.getMember("prompt")
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or
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// embeddings.create({ input: ... })
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result =
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clientsNoGuardrails()
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.getMember("embeddings")
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.getMember("create")
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.getParameter(0)
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.getMember("input")
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or
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// beta.threads.messages.create(threadId, { role: "user", content: ... })
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exists(API::Node msg |
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msg =
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@@ -74,6 +74,24 @@ module SystemPromptInjection {
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}
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}
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/**
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* Content placed in a message with `role: "user"` is not a system prompt
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* injection vector; it is intended user-role content.
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*
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* This prevents false positives when user input and system prompts are
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* combined in the same message array (e.g. `[{role:"system", content: ...},
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* {role:"user", content: tainted}]`) and taint would otherwise propagate
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* through array operations to the system message.
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*/
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private class UserRoleMessageContentBarrier extends Sanitizer {
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UserRoleMessageContentBarrier() {
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exists(DataFlow::SourceNode obj |
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obj.getAPropertySource("role").mayHaveStringValue("user") and
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this = obj.getAPropertyWrite("content").getRhs()
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)
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}
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}
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/**
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* A comparison with a constant, considered as a sanitizer-guard.
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*/
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