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Add command injection sink kind

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This commit is contained in:
Tony Torralba
2023-03-28 10:23:37 +02:00
parent aeaeade75e
commit 534725f9eb
6 changed files with 101 additions and 70 deletions
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5
java/ql/lib/change-notes/2023-03-28-cmdi-queries-models-as-data.md Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
---
category: minorAnalysis
---
* A new models as data sink kind `command-injection` has been added.
* The queries `java/command-line-injection` and `java/concatenated-command-line` now can be extended using the `command-injection` models as data sink kind.

2
java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/dataflow/ExternalFlow.qll
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@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ module ModelValidation {
"groovy", "xss", "ognl-injection", "intent-start", "pending-intent-sent",
"url-open-stream", "url-redirect", "create-file", "read-file", "write-file",
"set-hostname-verifier", "header-splitting", "information-leak", "xslt", "jexl",
"bean-validation", "ssti", "fragment-injection"
"bean-validation", "ssti", "fragment-injection", "command-injection"
] and
not kind.matches("regex-use%") and
not kind.matches("qltest%") and

153
java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/CommandLineQuery.qll
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@@ -7,9 +7,93 @@
* query.
*/
import semmle.code.java.dataflow.FlowSources
import semmle.code.java.security.ExternalProcess
import semmle.code.java.security.CommandArguments
import java
private import semmle.code.java.dataflow.FlowSources
private import semmle.code.java.dataflow.ExternalFlow
private import semmle.code.java.security.ExternalProcess
private import semmle.code.java.security.CommandArguments
/** A sink for command injection vulnerabilities. */
abstract class CommandInjectionSink extends DataFlow::Node { }
/** A sanitizer for command injection vulnerabilities. */
abstract class CommandInjectionSanitizer extends DataFlow::Node { }
/**
* A unit class for adding additional taint steps.
*
* Extend this class to add additional taint steps that should apply to configurations related to command injection.
*/
class CommandInjectionAdditionalTaintStep extends Unit {
/**
* Holds if the step from `node1` to `node2` should be considered a taint
* step for configurations related to command injection.
*/
abstract predicate step(DataFlow::Node node1, DataFlow::Node node2);
}
private class DefaultCommandInjectionSink extends CommandInjectionSink {
DefaultCommandInjectionSink() {
this.asExpr() instanceof ArgumentToExec or sinkNode(this, "command-injection")
}
}
private class DefaultCommandInjectionSanitizer extends CommandInjectionSanitizer {
DefaultCommandInjectionSanitizer() {
this.getType() instanceof PrimitiveType
or
this.getType() instanceof BoxedType
or
isSafeCommandArgument(this.asExpr())
}
}
/**
* A taint-tracking configuration for unvalidated user input that is used to run an external process.
*/
module RemoteUserInputToArgumentToExecFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof CommandInjectionSink }
predicate isBarrier(DataFlow::Node node) { node instanceof CommandInjectionSanitizer }
predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node n1, DataFlow::Node n2) {
any(CommandInjectionAdditionalTaintStep s).step(n1, n2)
}
}
/**
* Taint-tracking flow for unvalidated user input that is used to run an external process.
*/
module RemoteUserInputToArgumentToExecFlow =
TaintTracking::Global<RemoteUserInputToArgumentToExecFlowConfig>;
/**
* Implementation of `ExecTainted.ql`. It is extracted to a QLL
* so that it can be excluded from `ExecUnescaped.ql` to avoid
* reporting overlapping results.
*/
predicate execIsTainted(
RemoteUserInputToArgumentToExecFlow::PathNode source,
RemoteUserInputToArgumentToExecFlow::PathNode sink, Expr execArg
) {
RemoteUserInputToArgumentToExecFlow::flowPath(source, sink) and
sink.getNode().asExpr() = execArg
}
/**
* DEPRECATED: Use `execIsTainted` instead.
*
* Implementation of `ExecTainted.ql`. It is extracted to a QLL
* so that it can be excluded from `ExecUnescaped.ql` to avoid
* reporting overlapping results.
*/
deprecated predicate execTainted(DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink, Expr execArg) {
exists(RemoteUserInputToArgumentToExecFlowConfig conf |
conf.hasFlowPath(source, sink) and sink.getNode().asExpr() = execArg
)
}
/**
* DEPRECATED: Use `RemoteUserInputToArgumentToExecFlow` instead.
@@ -23,64 +107,11 @@ deprecated class RemoteUserInputToArgumentToExecFlowConfig extends TaintTracking
override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink.asExpr() instanceof ArgumentToExec }
override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof CommandInjectionSink }
override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) {
node.getType() instanceof PrimitiveType
or
node.getType() instanceof BoxedType
or
isSafeCommandArgument(node.asExpr())
override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) { node instanceof CommandInjectionSanitizer }
override predicate isAdditionalTaintStep(DataFlow::Node n1, DataFlow::Node n2) {
any(CommandInjectionAdditionalTaintStep s).step(n1, n2)
}
}
/**
* A taint-tracking configuration for unvalidated user input that is used to run an external process.
*/
module RemoteUserInputToArgumentToExecFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink.asExpr() instanceof ArgumentToExec }
predicate isBarrier(DataFlow::Node node) {
node.getType() instanceof PrimitiveType
or
node.getType() instanceof BoxedType
or
isSafeCommandArgument(node.asExpr())
}
}
/**
* Taint-tracking flow for unvalidated user input that is used to run an external process.
*/
module RemoteUserInputToArgumentToExecFlow =
TaintTracking::Global<RemoteUserInputToArgumentToExecFlowConfig>;
/**
* DEPRECATED: Use `execIsTainted` instead.
*
* Implementation of `ExecTainted.ql`. It is extracted to a QLL
* so that it can be excluded from `ExecUnescaped.ql` to avoid
* reporting overlapping results.
*/
deprecated predicate execTainted(
DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink, ArgumentToExec execArg
) {
exists(RemoteUserInputToArgumentToExecFlowConfig conf |
conf.hasFlowPath(source, sink) and sink.getNode() = DataFlow::exprNode(execArg)
)
}
/**
* Implementation of `ExecTainted.ql`. It is extracted to a QLL
* so that it can be excluded from `ExecUnescaped.ql` to avoid
* reporting overlapping results.
*/
predicate execIsTainted(
RemoteUserInputToArgumentToExecFlow::PathNode source,
RemoteUserInputToArgumentToExecFlow::PathNode sink, ArgumentToExec execArg
) {
RemoteUserInputToArgumentToExecFlow::flowPath(source, sink) and
sink.getNode() = DataFlow::exprNode(execArg)
}