diff --git a/cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/security/regexp/ExponentialReDoSQuery.qll b/cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/security/regexp/ExponentialReDoSQuery.qll
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..87b2064705c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cpp/ql/lib/semmle/code/cpp/security/regexp/ExponentialReDoSQuery.qll
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+/**
+ * Provides classes and predicates for reasoning about exponential-time
+ * regular-expression denial-of-service (ReDoS) vulnerabilities in C++.
+ *
+ * The library mirrors the JavaScript `js/redos` query: it plugs the C++
+ * regex parse-tree view (`semmle.code.cpp.regex.RegexTreeView`) into the
+ * shared `ExponentialBackTracking` analysis, and exposes the
+ * `hasReDoSResult` predicate that identifies regex terms whose worst-case
+ * matching is exponential in the input length.
+ *
+ * Unlike the polynomial ReDoS query, no data-flow path from a
+ * user-controlled source is required: the vulnerable regex term itself is
+ * the alert. The parse-tree view already restricts to string literals used
+ * as `std::regex` patterns (see Phase 1's `RegExp` class in
+ * `semmle.code.cpp.regex.internal.ParseRegExp`), so only regexes that are
+ * actually used with `std::regex` are considered.
+ */
+
+import semmle.code.cpp.regex.RegexTreeView
+private import semmle.code.cpp.regex.RegexTreeView::RegexTreeView as TreeView
+import codeql.regex.nfa.ExponentialBackTracking::Make<TreeView>
diff --git a/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-1333/ReDoS.qhelp b/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-1333/ReDoS.qhelp
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..014e604ec32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-1333/ReDoS.qhelp
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+<!DOCTYPE qhelp PUBLIC "-//Semmle//qhelp//EN" "qhelp.dtd">
+<qhelp>
+
+  <include src="ReDoSIntroduction.inc.qhelp" />
+
+  <example>
+    <p>
+      Consider this regular expression:
+    </p>
+
+    <sample language="cpp">
+static const std::regex re("^(a+)+$");
+if (std::regex_match(input, re)) { /* ... */ } // BAD
+    </sample>
+
+    <p>
+      Its sub-expression <code>"(a+)+"</code> can match the string
+      <code>"aa"</code> either by a single iteration of the outer group
+      matching two <code>a</code>s in the inner <code>a+</code>, or by two
+      iterations of the outer group each matching a single <code>a</code>.
+      Thus, an input consisting of many <code>a</code>s followed by a
+      non-matching character will cause the regular expression engine to run
+      for an exponential amount of time before rejecting the input.
+    </p>
+
+    <p>
+      This problem can be avoided by rewriting the regular expression so
+      that the repetition of the outer group cannot overlap with the
+      repetition of the inner group. For example, by simply using a single
+      repetition:
+    </p>
+
+    <sample language="cpp">
+static const std::regex re("^a+$");
+if (std::regex_match(input, re)) { /* ... */ }
+    </sample>
+  </example>
+
+  <example>
+    <p>
+      As a slightly subtler example, consider the regular expression
+      <code>"^(a|a)*$"</code>. The two alternatives inside the group both
+      match the same character, so the regular expression engine can match
+      each character in the input in two different ways. The number of ways
+      of matching an input consisting of <em>n</em> <code>a</code>s
+      followed by a non-matching character grows as <em>2<sup>n</sup></em>,
+      leading to exponential worst-case behavior:
+    </p>
+
+    <sample language="cpp">
+static const std::regex re("^(a|a)*$");
+if (std::regex_match(input, re)) { /* ... */ } // BAD
+    </sample>
+
+    <p>
+      This can be fixed by removing the ambiguity between the two branches
+      of the alternative, for instance by rewriting the pattern as
+      <code>"^a*$"</code>.
+    </p>
+  </example>
+
+  <include src="ReDoSReferences.inc.qhelp" />
+
+</qhelp>
diff --git a/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-1333/ReDoS.ql b/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-1333/ReDoS.ql
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..80ba6873435
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cpp/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-1333/ReDoS.ql
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/**
+ * @name Inefficient regular expression
+ * @description A regular expression that requires exponential time to match certain inputs
+ *              can be a performance bottleneck, and may be vulnerable to denial-of-service
+ *              attacks.
+ * @kind problem
+ * @problem.severity error
+ * @security-severity 7.5
+ * @precision high
+ * @id cpp/redos
+ * @tags security
+ *       external/cwe/cwe-1333
+ *       external/cwe/cwe-730
+ *       external/cwe/cwe-400
+ */
+
+import cpp
+import semmle.code.cpp.security.regexp.ExponentialReDoSQuery
+
+from RegExpTerm t, string pump, State s, string prefixMsg
+where hasReDoSResult(t, pump, s, prefixMsg)
+select t,
+  "This part of the regular expression may cause exponential backtracking on strings " + prefixMsg +
+    "containing many repetitions of '" + pump + "'."
diff --git a/cpp/ql/src/change-notes/2026-07-16-redos.md b/cpp/ql/src/change-notes/2026-07-16-redos.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..3e87de1adc6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cpp/ql/src/change-notes/2026-07-16-redos.md
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+---
+category: newQuery
+---
+* Added a new query, `cpp/redos`, for detecting regular expressions that can exhibit exponential worst-case matching behavior when used with `std::regex`. Unlike `cpp/polynomial-redos`, this query does not require a dataflow path from a user-controlled source; the vulnerable regex term itself is the alert, mirroring the design of `js/redos`. The query is based on the shared `ExponentialBackTracking` analysis wired to the C++ regex parse tree (`semmle.code.cpp.regex.RegexTreeView`).
diff --git a/cpp/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE/CWE-1333-ReDoS/ReDoS.expected b/cpp/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE/CWE-1333-ReDoS/ReDoS.expected
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..e69de29bb2d
diff --git a/cpp/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE/CWE-1333-ReDoS/ReDoS.qlref b/cpp/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE/CWE-1333-ReDoS/ReDoS.qlref
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..945149dec70
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cpp/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE/CWE-1333-ReDoS/ReDoS.qlref
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+query: Security/CWE/CWE-1333/ReDoS.ql
diff --git a/cpp/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE/CWE-1333-ReDoS/test.cpp b/cpp/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE/CWE-1333-ReDoS/test.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..38ff0386879
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cpp/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE/CWE-1333-ReDoS/test.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+// Minimal std::regex/std::basic_string stubs, mirroring the ones in
+// cpp/ql/test/library-tests/regex/test.cpp. Real headers are not available
+// in the extractor sandbox.
+
+namespace std {
+
+template <class CharT>
+class basic_string {
+public:
+    basic_string() {}
+    basic_string(const CharT*) {}
+    const CharT* c_str() const { return 0; }
+    const CharT* data() const { return 0; }
+    unsigned long size() const { return 0; }
+};
+
+typedef basic_string<char> string;
+
+namespace regex_constants {
+    enum syntax_option_type {
+        ECMAScript = 1, basic = 2, extended = 4, awk = 8, grep = 16, egrep = 32,
+        icase = 256, nosubs = 512, optimize = 1024, collate = 2048, multiline = 4096
+    };
+    enum match_flag_type { match_default = 0 };
+}
+
+template <class CharT>
+class basic_regex {
+public:
+    typedef regex_constants::syntax_option_type flag_type;
+    basic_regex(const CharT* p) {}
+    basic_regex(const CharT* p, flag_type f) {}
+    basic_regex(const basic_string<CharT>& p) {}
+};
+
+typedef basic_regex<char> regex;
+
+template <class CharT>
+bool regex_match(const basic_string<CharT>& s, const basic_regex<CharT>& re) { return false; }
+template <class CharT>
+bool regex_search(const basic_string<CharT>& s, const basic_regex<CharT>& re) { return false; }
+template <class CharT>
+basic_string<CharT> regex_replace(const basic_string<CharT>& s, const basic_regex<CharT>& re,
+                                  const basic_string<CharT>& fmt) { return basic_string<CharT>(); }
+
+} // namespace std
+
+// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Tests
+//
+// The exponential ReDoS query does not require a dataflow path from a
+// user-controlled source: the vulnerable regex term itself is the alert.
+// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+void test_exp_redos(const std::string& input) {
+    // BAD: classic nested-quantifier pattern with exponential backtracking.
+    {
+        std::regex re("^(a+)+$");
+        std::regex_match(input, re);
+    }
+
+    // BAD: alternation of identical branches inside a repetition.
+    {
+        std::regex re("^(a|a)*$");
+        std::regex_match(input, re);
+    }
+
+    // BAD: alternation with overlapping branches inside a repetition.
+    {
+        std::regex re("^(a|ab)*$");
+        std::regex_match(input, re);
+    }
+
+    // GOOD: a linear pattern.
+    {
+        std::regex re("^abc.*$");
+        std::regex_match(input, re);
+    }
+
+    // GOOD: a polynomial pattern -- reported by cpp/polynomial-redos when
+    // reached by user input, but not by the exponential query.
+    {
+        std::regex re("^\\s+|\\s+$");
+        std::regex_replace(input, re, std::string(""));
+    }
+
+    // GOOD: the pattern is not used as an ECMAScript std::regex (basic
+    // grammar is not modeled), so the parser does not consider it a
+    // RegExp at all.
+    {
+        std::regex re("^(a+)+$", std::regex_constants::basic);
+        std::regex_match(input, re);
+    }
+}