From 3850f878793f5373ef6bdbef3fd7bf4df4e63348 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mark Shannon
Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2019 16:47:23 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Make qhelp for 'Incomplete URL substring sanitization'
consistent across languages.
---
.../CWE-020/IncompleteUrlSubstringSanitization.qhelp | 6 +++---
.../CWE-020/IncompleteUrlSubstringSanitization.qhelp | 7 +++----
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/javascript/ql/src/Security/CWE-020/IncompleteUrlSubstringSanitization.qhelp b/javascript/ql/src/Security/CWE-020/IncompleteUrlSubstringSanitization.qhelp
index 80f4a8b44fd..b23557aa557 100644
--- a/javascript/ql/src/Security/CWE-020/IncompleteUrlSubstringSanitization.qhelp
+++ b/javascript/ql/src/Security/CWE-020/IncompleteUrlSubstringSanitization.qhelp
@@ -15,9 +15,9 @@
- However, it is notoriously error-prone to treat the URL as
- a string and check if one of the allowed hosts is a substring of the
- URL. Malicious URLs can bypass such security checks by embedding one
+ However, treating the URL as a string and checking if one of the
+ allowed hosts is a substring of the URL is very prone to errors.
+ Malicious URLs can bypass such security checks by embedding one
of the allowed hosts in an unexpected location.
- - However, it is notoriously error-prone to treat the URL as - a string and check if one of the allowed hosts is a substring of the - URL. Malicious URLs can bypass such security checks by embedding one + However, treating the URL as a string and checking if one of the + allowed hosts is a substring of the URL is very prone to errors. + Malicious URLs can bypass such security checks by embedding one of the allowed hosts in an unexpected location.