add query to detect improperly sanitized code

This commit is contained in:
Erik Krogh Kristensen
2020-06-10 19:40:26 +02:00
parent b6e0e6645f
commit 373a437d71
5 changed files with 202 additions and 0 deletions

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<!DOCTYPE qhelp PUBLIC
"-//Semmle//qhelp//EN"
"qhelp.dtd">
<qhelp>
<overview>
<p>
Placeholder
</p>
</overview>
<recommendation>
<p>
Placeholder
</p>
</recommendation>
<example>
<p>
Placeholder
</p>
</example>
<references>
<li>
OWASP:
<a href="https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Code_Injection">Code Injection</a>.
</li>
<li>
MDN: <a href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Global_Objects#Function_properties">Global functions</a>.
</li>
<li>
MDN: <a href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Global_Objects/Function">Function constructor</a>.
</li>
</references>
</qhelp>

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/**
* @name Improper code sanitization
* @description Escaping code as HTML does not provide protection against code-injection.
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity error
* @precision high
* @id js/bad-code-sanitization
* @tags security
* external/cwe/cwe-094
* external/cwe/cwe-079
* external/cwe/cwe-116
*/
// TODO: Proper customizations module, Source class Sink class etc.
import javascript
import DataFlow::PathGraph
private import semmle.javascript.heuristics.AdditionalSinks
private import semmle.javascript.security.dataflow.CodeInjectionCustomizations
/**
* A taint-tracking configuration for reasoning about improper code sanitization vulnerabilities.
*/
class Configuration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
Configuration() { this = "ImproperCodeSanitization" }
override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source = source() }
override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink = sink() }
override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node sanitizer) {
sanitizer instanceof StringReplaceCall // any string-replace that happens after the bad-sanitizer, is assumed to be a good sanitizer.
// TODO: Specialize? This regexp sanitizes: /[<>\b\f\n\r\t\0\u2028\u2029]/g
}
}
private DataFlow::Node source() {
result instanceof HtmlSanitizerCall
or
result = DataFlow::globalVarRef("JSON").getAMemberCall("stringify")
}
private StringOps::ConcatenationLeaf sink() {
exists(StringOps::ConcatenationRoot root, int i |
root.getOperand(i) = result and
not exists(result.getStringValue()) and
not root = endsInCodeInjectionSink()
|
exists(StringOps::ConcatenationLeaf functionLeaf |
functionLeaf = root.getOperand(any(int j | j < i))
|
functionLeaf
.getStringValue()
.regexpMatch([".*function( )?([a-zA-Z0-9]+)?( )?\\(.*", ".*eval\\(.*",
".*new Function\\(.*", "(^|.*[^a-zA-Z0-9])\\(.*\\)( )?=>.*"])
)
)
}
private DataFlow::Node endsInCodeInjectionSink(DataFlow::TypeBackTracker t) {
t.start() and
result instanceof CodeInjection::Sink and
not result instanceof StringOps::ConcatenationRoot // the heuristic CodeInjection sink looks for string-concats, we are not interrested in those here.
or
exists(DataFlow::TypeBackTracker t2 | t = t2.smallstep(result, endsInCodeInjectionSink(t2)))
}
private DataFlow::Node endsInCodeInjectionSink() {
result = endsInCodeInjectionSink(DataFlow::TypeBackTracker::end())
}
from Configuration cfg, DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink
where cfg.hasFlowPath(source, sink)
select sink.getNode(), source, sink, "$@ flows to here and is used to construct code.",
source.getNode(), "Improperly sanitized value"

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nodes
| bad-code-sanitization.js:2:12:2:90 | /^[_$a- ... key)}]` |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:2:65:2:90 | `[${JSO ... key)}]` |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:2:69:2:87 | JSON.stringify(key) |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:2:69:2:87 | JSON.stringify(key) |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:6:11:6:25 | statements |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:6:24:6:25 | [] |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:7:21:7:70 | `${name ... key])}` |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:7:31:7:43 | safeProp(key) |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:8:27:8:36 | statements |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:8:27:8:46 | statements.join(';') |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:8:27:8:46 | statements.join(';') |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:15:44:15:63 | htmlescape(pathname) |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:15:44:15:63 | htmlescape(pathname) |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:15:44:15:63 | htmlescape(pathname) |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:19:27:19:47 | JSON.st ... (input) |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:19:27:19:47 | JSON.st ... (input) |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:19:27:19:47 | JSON.st ... (input) |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:40:23:40:43 | JSON.st ... (input) |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:40:23:40:43 | JSON.st ... (input) |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:40:23:40:43 | JSON.st ... (input) |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:44:22:44:42 | JSON.st ... (input) |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:44:22:44:42 | JSON.st ... (input) |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:44:22:44:42 | JSON.st ... (input) |
edges
| bad-code-sanitization.js:2:12:2:90 | /^[_$a- ... key)}]` | bad-code-sanitization.js:7:31:7:43 | safeProp(key) |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:2:65:2:90 | `[${JSO ... key)}]` | bad-code-sanitization.js:2:12:2:90 | /^[_$a- ... key)}]` |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:2:69:2:87 | JSON.stringify(key) | bad-code-sanitization.js:2:65:2:90 | `[${JSO ... key)}]` |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:2:69:2:87 | JSON.stringify(key) | bad-code-sanitization.js:2:65:2:90 | `[${JSO ... key)}]` |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:6:11:6:25 | statements | bad-code-sanitization.js:8:27:8:36 | statements |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:6:24:6:25 | [] | bad-code-sanitization.js:6:11:6:25 | statements |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:7:21:7:70 | `${name ... key])}` | bad-code-sanitization.js:6:24:6:25 | [] |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:7:31:7:43 | safeProp(key) | bad-code-sanitization.js:7:21:7:70 | `${name ... key])}` |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:8:27:8:36 | statements | bad-code-sanitization.js:8:27:8:46 | statements.join(';') |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:8:27:8:36 | statements | bad-code-sanitization.js:8:27:8:46 | statements.join(';') |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:15:44:15:63 | htmlescape(pathname) | bad-code-sanitization.js:15:44:15:63 | htmlescape(pathname) |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:19:27:19:47 | JSON.st ... (input) | bad-code-sanitization.js:19:27:19:47 | JSON.st ... (input) |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:40:23:40:43 | JSON.st ... (input) | bad-code-sanitization.js:40:23:40:43 | JSON.st ... (input) |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:44:22:44:42 | JSON.st ... (input) | bad-code-sanitization.js:44:22:44:42 | JSON.st ... (input) |
#select
| bad-code-sanitization.js:8:27:8:46 | statements.join(';') | bad-code-sanitization.js:2:69:2:87 | JSON.stringify(key) | bad-code-sanitization.js:8:27:8:46 | statements.join(';') | $@ flows to here and is used to construct code. | bad-code-sanitization.js:2:69:2:87 | JSON.stringify(key) | Improperly sanitized value |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:15:44:15:63 | htmlescape(pathname) | bad-code-sanitization.js:15:44:15:63 | htmlescape(pathname) | bad-code-sanitization.js:15:44:15:63 | htmlescape(pathname) | $@ flows to here and is used to construct code. | bad-code-sanitization.js:15:44:15:63 | htmlescape(pathname) | Improperly sanitized value |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:19:27:19:47 | JSON.st ... (input) | bad-code-sanitization.js:19:27:19:47 | JSON.st ... (input) | bad-code-sanitization.js:19:27:19:47 | JSON.st ... (input) | $@ flows to here and is used to construct code. | bad-code-sanitization.js:19:27:19:47 | JSON.st ... (input) | Improperly sanitized value |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:40:23:40:43 | JSON.st ... (input) | bad-code-sanitization.js:40:23:40:43 | JSON.st ... (input) | bad-code-sanitization.js:40:23:40:43 | JSON.st ... (input) | $@ flows to here and is used to construct code. | bad-code-sanitization.js:40:23:40:43 | JSON.st ... (input) | Improperly sanitized value |
| bad-code-sanitization.js:44:22:44:42 | JSON.st ... (input) | bad-code-sanitization.js:44:22:44:42 | JSON.st ... (input) | bad-code-sanitization.js:44:22:44:42 | JSON.st ... (input) | $@ flows to here and is used to construct code. | bad-code-sanitization.js:44:22:44:42 | JSON.st ... (input) | Improperly sanitized value |

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Security/CWE-094/ImproperCodeSanitization.ql

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function safeProp(key) {
return /^[_$a-zA-Z][_$a-zA-Z0-9]*$/.test(key) ? `.${key}` : `[${JSON.stringify(key)}]`;
}
function test1() {
const statements = [];
statements.push(`${name}${safeProp(key)}=${stringify(thing[key])}`);
return `(function(){${statements.join(';')}})` // NOT OK
}
import htmlescape from 'htmlescape'
function test2(props) {
const pathname = props.data.pathname;
return `function(){return new Error('${htmlescape(pathname)}')}`; // NOT OK
}
function test3(input) {
return `(function(){${JSON.stringify(input)}))` // NOT OK
}
function evenSaferProp(key) {
return /^[_$a-zA-Z][_$a-zA-Z0-9]*$/.test(key) ? `.${key}` : `[${JSON.stringify(key)}]`.replace(/[<>\b\f\n\r\t\0\u2028\u2029]/g, '');
}
function test4(input) {
return `(function(){${evenSaferProp(input)}))` // OK
}
function test4(input) {
var foo = `(function(){${JSON.stringify(input)}))` // OK - for this query - we can type-track to a code-injection sink.
setTimeout(foo);
}
function test5(input) {
console.log('methodName() => ' + JSON.stringify(input)); // OK
}
function test6(input) {
return `(() => {${JSON.stringify(input)})` // NOT OK
}
function test7(input) {
return `() => {${JSON.stringify(input)}` // NOT OK
}