move files out of experimental

This commit is contained in:
Jami Cogswell
2022-10-23 20:03:10 -04:00
parent 53b7584a90
commit 32b140045e
8 changed files with 21 additions and 5 deletions

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package com.example.demo;
import java.util.regex.Matcher;
import java.util.regex.Pattern;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.GetMapping;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestParam;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RestController;
@RestController
public class DemoApplication {
@GetMapping("/string1")
public String string1(@RequestParam(value = "input", defaultValue = "test") String input,
@RequestParam(value = "pattern", defaultValue = ".*") String pattern) {
// BAD: Unsanitized user input is used to construct a regular expression
if (input.matches("^" + pattern + "=.*$"))
return "match!";
return "doesn't match!";
}
@GetMapping("/string2")
public String string2(@RequestParam(value = "input", defaultValue = "test") String input,
@RequestParam(value = "pattern", defaultValue = ".*") String pattern) {
// GOOD: User input is sanitized before constructing the regex
if (input.matches("^" + escapeSpecialRegexChars(pattern) + "=.*$"))
return "match!";
return "doesn't match!";
}
Pattern SPECIAL_REGEX_CHARS = Pattern.compile("[{}()\\[\\]><-=!.+*?^$\\\\|]");
String escapeSpecialRegexChars(String str) {
return SPECIAL_REGEX_CHARS.matcher(str).replaceAll("\\\\$0");
}
}

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<!DOCTYPE qhelp PUBLIC
"-//Semmle//qhelp//EN"
"qhelp.dtd">
<qhelp>
<overview>
<p>
Constructing a regular expression with unsanitized user input is dangerous as a malicious user may
be able to modify the meaning of the expression. In particular, such a user may be able to provide
a regular expression fragment that takes exponential time in the worst case, and use that to
perform a Denial of Service attack.
</p>
</overview>
<recommendation>
<p>
Before embedding user input into a regular expression, use a sanitization function
to escape meta-characters that have special meaning.
</p>
</recommendation>
<example>
<p>
The following example shows a HTTP request parameter that is used to construct a regular expression:
</p>
<sample src="RegexInjection.java" />
<p>
In the first case the user-provided regex is not escaped.
If a malicious user provides a regex that has exponential worst case performance,
then this could lead to a Denial of Service.
</p>
<p>
In the second case, the user input is escaped using <code>escapeSpecialRegexChars</code> before being included
in the regular expression. This ensures that the user cannot insert characters which have a special
meaning in regular expressions.
</p>
</example>
<references>
<li>
OWASP:
<a href="https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Regular_expression_Denial_of_Service_-_ReDoS">Regular expression Denial of Service - ReDoS</a>.
</li>
<li>
Wikipedia: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ReDoS">ReDoS</a>.
</li>
</references>
</qhelp>

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/**
* @name Regular expression injection
* @description User input should not be used in regular expressions without first being sanitized,
* otherwise a malicious user may be able to provide a regex that could require
* exponential time on certain inputs.
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity error
* @precision high
* @id java/regex-injection
* @tags security
* external/cwe/cwe-730
* external/cwe/cwe-400
*/
import java
import semmle.code.java.dataflow.FlowSources
import semmle.code.java.dataflow.TaintTracking
import DataFlow::PathGraph
/**
* A data flow sink for untrusted user input used to construct regular expressions.
*/
class RegexSink extends DataFlow::ExprNode {
RegexSink() {
exists(MethodAccess ma, Method m | m = ma.getMethod() |
(
m.getDeclaringType() instanceof TypeString and
(
ma.getArgument(0) = this.asExpr() and
// TODO: confirm if more/less than the below need to be handled
m.hasName(["matches", "split", "replaceFirst", "replaceAll"])
)
or
// TODO: review Java Pattern API
m.getDeclaringType().hasQualifiedName("java.util.regex", "Pattern") and
(
ma.getArgument(0) = this.asExpr() and
// TODO: confirm if more/less than the below need to be handled
m.hasName(["compile", "matches"])
)
or
// TODO: read docs about regex APIs in Java
m.getDeclaringType().hasQualifiedName("org.apache.commons.lang3", "RegExUtils") and
(
ma.getArgument(1) = this.asExpr() and
m.getParameterType(1) instanceof TypeString and
// TODO: confirm if more/less than the below need to be handled
m.hasName([
"removeAll", "removeFirst", "removePattern", "replaceAll", "replaceFirst",
"replacePattern"
])
)
)
)
}
}
// TODO: is this abstract class needed? Are there pre-existing sanitizer classes that can be used instead?
abstract class Sanitizer extends DataFlow::ExprNode { }
/**
* A call to a function whose name suggests that it escapes regular
* expression meta-characters.
*/
class RegExpSanitizationCall extends Sanitizer {
RegExpSanitizationCall() {
exists(string calleeName, string sanitize, string regexp |
calleeName = this.asExpr().(Call).getCallee().getName() and
sanitize = "(?:escape|saniti[sz]e)" and // TODO: confirm this is sufficient
regexp = "regexp?" // TODO: confirm this is sufficient
|
calleeName
.regexpMatch("(?i)(" + sanitize + ".*" + regexp + ".*)" + "|(" + regexp + ".*" + sanitize +
".*)") // TODO: confirm this is sufficient
)
}
}
/**
* A taint-tracking configuration for untrusted user input used to construct regular expressions.
*/
class RegexInjectionConfiguration extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
RegexInjectionConfiguration() { this = "RegexInjectionConfiguration" }
override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof RegexSink }
override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) { node instanceof Sanitizer }
}
from DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink, RegexInjectionConfiguration c
where c.hasFlowPath(source, sink)
select sink.getNode(), source, sink, "This regular expression is constructed from a $@.",
source.getNode(), "user-provided value"
// from MethodAccess ma
// where
// // ma.getMethod().hasName("startsWith") and // graphhopper
// // ma.getFile().getBaseName() = "NavigateResource.java" // graphhopper
// // ma.getMethod().hasName("substring") and // jfinal
// // ma.getFile().getBaseName() = "FileManager.java" // jfinal
// ma.getMethod().hasName("startsWith") and // roller
// ma.getFile().getBaseName() = "PageServlet.java" // roller (or RegexUtil.java)
// ProteinArraySignificanceTestJSON.java or MockRKeys.java for cbioportal
// select ma, "method access"