diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/frameworks/JsonIo.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/frameworks/JsonIo.qll
index ab4c1b115d9..aa332bd78ed 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/frameworks/JsonIo.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/frameworks/JsonIo.qll
@@ -42,8 +42,12 @@ class JsonIoUseMapsSetter extends MethodAccess {
   }
 }
 
-/** A data flow configuration tracing flow from JsonIo safe settings. */
-class SafeJsonIoConfig extends DataFlow2::Configuration {
+/**
+ * DEPRECATED: Use `SafeJsonIoFlow` instead.
+ *
+ * A data flow configuration tracing flow from JsonIo safe settings.
+ */
+deprecated class SafeJsonIoConfig extends DataFlow2::Configuration {
   SafeJsonIoConfig() { this = "UnsafeDeserialization::SafeJsonIoConfig" }
 
   override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) {
@@ -65,3 +69,30 @@ class SafeJsonIoConfig extends DataFlow2::Configuration {
     )
   }
 }
+
+/**
+ * A data flow configuration tracing flow from JsonIo safe settings.
+ */
+module SafeJsonIoConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) {
+    exists(MethodAccess ma |
+      ma instanceof JsonIoUseMapsSetter and
+      src.asExpr() = ma.getQualifier()
+    )
+  }
+
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+    exists(MethodAccess ma |
+      ma.getMethod() instanceof JsonIoJsonToJavaMethod and
+      sink.asExpr() = ma.getArgument(1)
+    )
+    or
+    exists(ClassInstanceExpr cie |
+      cie.getConstructor().getDeclaringType() instanceof JsonIoJsonReader and
+      sink.asExpr() = cie.getArgument(1)
+    )
+  }
+}
+
+/** Tracks flow from JsonIo safe settings. */
+module SafeJsonIoFlow = DataFlow::Global<SafeJsonIoConfig>;
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/frameworks/SnakeYaml.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/frameworks/SnakeYaml.qll
index 3ea5d79c138..f21b9552061 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/frameworks/SnakeYaml.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/frameworks/SnakeYaml.qll
@@ -4,8 +4,6 @@
 
 import java
 import semmle.code.java.dataflow.DataFlow
-import semmle.code.java.dataflow.DataFlow2
-import semmle.code.java.dataflow.DataFlow3
 
 /**
  * The class `org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.SafeConstructor`.
@@ -30,28 +28,28 @@ class Yaml extends RefType {
   Yaml() { this.getAnAncestor().hasQualifiedName("org.yaml.snakeyaml", "Yaml") }
 }
 
-private class SafeYamlConstructionFlowConfig extends DataFlow3::Configuration {
-  SafeYamlConstructionFlowConfig() { this = "SnakeYaml::SafeYamlConstructionFlowConfig" }
-
-  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) {
-    src.asExpr() instanceof SafeSnakeYamlConstruction
-  }
-
-  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink = this.yamlClassInstanceExprArgument(_) }
-
-  private DataFlow::ExprNode yamlClassInstanceExprArgument(ClassInstanceExpr cie) {
-    cie.getConstructedType() instanceof Yaml and
-    result.getExpr() = cie.getArgument(0)
-  }
-
-  ClassInstanceExpr getSafeYaml() { this.hasFlowTo(this.yamlClassInstanceExprArgument(result)) }
+private DataFlow::ExprNode yamlClassInstanceExprArgument(ClassInstanceExpr cie) {
+  cie.getConstructedType() instanceof Yaml and
+  result.getExpr() = cie.getArgument(0)
 }
 
+private module SafeYamlConstructionFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof SafeSnakeYamlConstruction }
+
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink = yamlClassInstanceExprArgument(_) }
+
+  additional ClassInstanceExpr getSafeYaml() {
+    SafeYamlConstructionFlow::flowTo(yamlClassInstanceExprArgument(result))
+  }
+}
+
+private module SafeYamlConstructionFlow = DataFlow::Global<SafeYamlConstructionFlowConfig>;
+
 /**
  * An instance of `Yaml` that does not allow arbitrary constructor to be called.
  */
 private class SafeYaml extends ClassInstanceExpr {
-  SafeYaml() { exists(SafeYamlConstructionFlowConfig conf | conf.getSafeYaml() = this) }
+  SafeYaml() { SafeYamlConstructionFlowConfig::getSafeYaml() = this }
 }
 
 /** A call to a parse method of `Yaml`. */
@@ -65,23 +63,25 @@ private class SnakeYamlParse extends MethodAccess {
   }
 }
 
-private class SafeYamlFlowConfig extends DataFlow2::Configuration {
-  SafeYamlFlowConfig() { this = "SnakeYaml::SafeYamlFlowConfig" }
+private module SafeYamlFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof SafeYaml }
 
-  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof SafeYaml }
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink = yamlParseQualifier(_) }
 
-  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink = this.yamlParseQualifier(_) }
-
-  private DataFlow::ExprNode yamlParseQualifier(SnakeYamlParse syp) {
+  additional DataFlow::ExprNode yamlParseQualifier(SnakeYamlParse syp) {
     result.getExpr() = syp.getQualifier()
   }
 
-  SnakeYamlParse getASafeSnakeYamlParse() { this.hasFlowTo(this.yamlParseQualifier(result)) }
+  additional SnakeYamlParse getASafeSnakeYamlParse() {
+    SafeYamlFlow::flowTo(yamlParseQualifier(result))
+  }
 }
 
+private module SafeYamlFlow = DataFlow::Global<SafeYamlFlowConfig>;
+
 /**
  * A call to a parse method of `Yaml` that allows arbitrary constructor to be called.
  */
 class UnsafeSnakeYamlParse extends SnakeYamlParse {
-  UnsafeSnakeYamlParse() { not exists(SafeYamlFlowConfig sy | sy.getASafeSnakeYamlParse() = this) }
+  UnsafeSnakeYamlParse() { not SafeYamlFlowConfig::getASafeSnakeYamlParse() = this }
 }
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/regex/RegexFlowConfigs.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/regex/RegexFlowConfigs.qll
index 5a913ccdef8..f517d6dec64 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/regex/RegexFlowConfigs.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/regex/RegexFlowConfigs.qll
@@ -136,24 +136,22 @@ private class GuavaRegexFlowStep extends RegexAdditionalFlowStep {
   }
 }
 
-private class RegexFlowConf extends DataFlow2::Configuration {
-  RegexFlowConf() { this = "RegexFlowConfig" }
+private module RegexFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node node) { node.asExpr() instanceof ExploitableStringLiteral }
 
-  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node node) {
-    node.asExpr() instanceof ExploitableStringLiteral
-  }
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node node) { node instanceof RegexFlowSink }
 
-  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node node) { node instanceof RegexFlowSink }
-
-  override predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node node1, DataFlow::Node node2) {
+  predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node node1, DataFlow::Node node2) {
     any(RegexAdditionalFlowStep s).step(node1, node2)
   }
 
-  override predicate isBarrier(DataFlow::Node node) {
+  predicate isBarrier(DataFlow::Node node) {
     node.getEnclosingCallable().getDeclaringType() instanceof NonSecurityTestClass
   }
 }
 
+private module RegexFlow = DataFlow::Global<RegexFlowConfig>;
+
 /**
  * Holds if `regex` is used as a regex, with the mode `mode` (if known).
  * If regex mode is not known, `mode` will be `"None"`.
@@ -162,7 +160,7 @@ private class RegexFlowConf extends DataFlow2::Configuration {
  * and therefore may be relevant for ReDoS queries are considered.
  */
 predicate usedAsRegex(StringLiteral regex, string mode, boolean match_full_string) {
-  any(RegexFlowConf c).hasFlow(DataFlow2::exprNode(regex), _) and
+  RegexFlow::flow(DataFlow::exprNode(regex), _) and
   mode = "None" and // TODO: proper mode detection
   (if matchesFullString(regex) then match_full_string = true else match_full_string = false)
 }
@@ -172,9 +170,9 @@ predicate usedAsRegex(StringLiteral regex, string mode, boolean match_full_strin
  * as though it was implicitly surrounded by ^ and $.
  */
 private predicate matchesFullString(StringLiteral regex) {
-  exists(RegexFlowConf c, RegexFlowSink sink |
+  exists(RegexFlowSink sink |
     sink.matchesFullString() and
-    c.hasFlow(DataFlow2::exprNode(regex), sink)
+    RegexFlow::flow(DataFlow::exprNode(regex), sink)
   )
 }
 
@@ -185,8 +183,8 @@ private predicate matchesFullString(StringLiteral regex) {
  * and therefore may be relevant for ReDoS queries are considered.
  */
 predicate regexMatchedAgainst(StringLiteral regex, Expr str) {
-  exists(RegexFlowConf c, RegexFlowSink sink |
+  exists(RegexFlowSink sink |
     str = sink.getStringArgument() and
-    c.hasFlow(DataFlow2::exprNode(regex), sink)
+    RegexFlow::flow(DataFlow::exprNode(regex), sink)
   )
 }
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/AndroidSensitiveCommunicationQuery.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/AndroidSensitiveCommunicationQuery.qll
index e0c9fbff800..e8d5a6d42d1 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/AndroidSensitiveCommunicationQuery.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/AndroidSensitiveCommunicationQuery.qll
@@ -151,7 +151,10 @@ deprecated class SensitiveCommunicationConfig extends TaintTracking::Configurati
   }
 }
 
-private module SensitiveCommunicationConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+/**
+ * Taint configuration tracking flow from variables containing sensitive information to broadcast Intents.
+ */
+module SensitiveCommunicationConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
   predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source.asExpr() instanceof SensitiveInfoExpr }
 
   predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/ArbitraryApkInstallationQuery.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/ArbitraryApkInstallationQuery.qll
index d066f4974a1..9df15067be9 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/ArbitraryApkInstallationQuery.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/ArbitraryApkInstallationQuery.qll
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ private import semmle.code.java.security.ArbitraryApkInstallation
  * A dataflow configuration for flow from an external source of an APK to the
  * `setData[AndType][AndNormalize]` method of an intent.
  */
-private module ApkInstallationConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+module ApkInstallationConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
   predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node node) { node instanceof ExternalApkSource }
 
   predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node node) {
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/CleartextStorageAndroidDatabaseQuery.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/CleartextStorageAndroidDatabaseQuery.qll
index 7edd9e74c50..d995d11ce5b 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/CleartextStorageAndroidDatabaseQuery.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/CleartextStorageAndroidDatabaseQuery.qll
@@ -29,16 +29,16 @@ class LocalDatabaseOpenMethodAccess extends Storable, Call {
   }
 
   override Expr getAnInput() {
-    exists(LocalDatabaseFlowConfig config, DataFlow::Node database |
+    exists(DataFlow::Node database |
       localDatabaseInput(database, result) and
-      config.hasFlow(DataFlow::exprNode(this), database)
+      LocalDatabaseFlow::flow(DataFlow::exprNode(this), database)
     )
   }
 
   override Expr getAStore() {
-    exists(LocalDatabaseFlowConfig config, DataFlow::Node database |
+    exists(DataFlow::Node database |
       localDatabaseStore(database, result) and
-      config.hasFlow(DataFlow::exprNode(this), database)
+      LocalDatabaseFlow::flow(DataFlow::exprNode(this), database)
     )
   }
 }
@@ -93,19 +93,17 @@ private predicate localDatabaseStore(DataFlow::Node database, MethodAccess store
   )
 }
 
-private class LocalDatabaseFlowConfig extends DataFlow::Configuration {
-  LocalDatabaseFlowConfig() { this = "LocalDatabaseFlowConfig" }
-
-  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) {
+private module LocalDatabaseFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) {
     source.asExpr() instanceof LocalDatabaseOpenMethodAccess
   }
 
-  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
     localDatabaseInput(sink, _) or
     localDatabaseStore(sink, _)
   }
 
-  override predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node n1, DataFlow::Node n2) {
+  predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node n1, DataFlow::Node n2) {
     // Adds a step for tracking databases through field flow, that is, a database is opened and
     // assigned to a field, and then an input or store method is called on that field elsewhere.
     exists(Field f |
@@ -115,3 +113,5 @@ private class LocalDatabaseFlowConfig extends DataFlow::Configuration {
     )
   }
 }
+
+private module LocalDatabaseFlow = DataFlow::Global<LocalDatabaseFlowConfig>;
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/CleartextStorageAndroidFilesystemQuery.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/CleartextStorageAndroidFilesystemQuery.qll
index 89cc7ac021b..2641a3ab0df 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/CleartextStorageAndroidFilesystemQuery.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/CleartextStorageAndroidFilesystemQuery.qll
@@ -24,16 +24,16 @@ class LocalFileOpenCall extends Storable {
   }
 
   override Expr getAnInput() {
-    exists(FilesystemFlowConfig conf, DataFlow::Node n |
+    exists(DataFlow::Node n |
       filesystemInput(n, result) and
-      conf.hasFlow(DataFlow::exprNode(this), n)
+      FilesystemFlow::flow(DataFlow::exprNode(this), n)
     )
   }
 
   override Expr getAStore() {
-    exists(FilesystemFlowConfig conf, DataFlow::Node n |
+    exists(DataFlow::Node n |
       closesFile(n, result) and
-      conf.hasFlow(DataFlow::exprNode(this), n)
+      FilesystemFlow::flow(DataFlow::exprNode(this), n)
     )
   }
 }
@@ -79,17 +79,15 @@ private class CloseFileMethod extends Method {
   }
 }
 
-private class FilesystemFlowConfig extends DataFlow::Configuration {
-  FilesystemFlowConfig() { this = "FilesystemFlowConfig" }
+private module FilesystemFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof LocalFileOpenCall }
 
-  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof LocalFileOpenCall }
-
-  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
     filesystemInput(sink, _) or
     closesFile(sink, _)
   }
 
-  override predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node node1, DataFlow::Node node2) {
+  predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node node1, DataFlow::Node node2) {
     // Add nested Writer constructors as extra data flow steps
     exists(ClassInstanceExpr cie |
       cie.getConstructedType().getAnAncestor().hasQualifiedName("java.io", "Writer") and
@@ -98,3 +96,5 @@ private class FilesystemFlowConfig extends DataFlow::Configuration {
     )
   }
 }
+
+private module FilesystemFlow = DataFlow::Global<FilesystemFlowConfig>;
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/CleartextStorageClassQuery.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/CleartextStorageClassQuery.qll
index 3fe06a2de08..41e5c060816 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/CleartextStorageClassQuery.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/CleartextStorageClassQuery.qll
@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ private class ClassCleartextStorageSink extends CleartextStorageSink {
 abstract class ClassStore extends Storable, ClassInstanceExpr {
   /** Gets an input, for example `input` in `instance.password = input`. */
   override Expr getAnInput() {
-    exists(ClassStoreFlowConfig conf, DataFlow::Node instance |
-      conf.hasFlow(DataFlow::exprNode(this), instance) and
+    exists(DataFlow::Node instance |
+      ClassStoreFlow::flow(DataFlow::exprNode(this), instance) and
       result = getInstanceInput(instance, this.getConstructor().getDeclaringType())
     )
   }
@@ -40,9 +40,9 @@ private class Serializable extends ClassStore {
 
   /** Gets a store, for example `outputStream.writeObject(instance)`. */
   override Expr getAStore() {
-    exists(ClassStoreFlowConfig conf, DataFlow::Node n |
+    exists(DataFlow::Node n |
       serializableStore(n, result) and
-      conf.hasFlow(DataFlow::exprNode(this), n)
+      ClassStoreFlow::flow(DataFlow::exprNode(this), n)
     )
   }
 }
@@ -53,9 +53,9 @@ private class Marshallable extends ClassStore {
 
   /** Gets a store, for example `marshaller.marshal(instance)`. */
   override Expr getAStore() {
-    exists(ClassStoreFlowConfig conf, DataFlow::Node n |
+    exists(DataFlow::Node n |
       marshallableStore(n, result) and
-      conf.hasFlow(DataFlow::exprNode(this), n)
+      ClassStoreFlow::flow(DataFlow::exprNode(this), n)
     )
   }
 }
@@ -73,20 +73,20 @@ private Expr getInstanceInput(DataFlow::Node instance, RefType t) {
   )
 }
 
-private class ClassStoreFlowConfig extends DataFlow::Configuration {
-  ClassStoreFlowConfig() { this = "ClassStoreFlowConfig" }
+private module ClassStoreFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof ClassStore }
 
-  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof ClassStore }
-
-  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
     exists(getInstanceInput(sink, _)) or
     serializableStore(sink, _) or
     marshallableStore(sink, _)
   }
 
-  override int fieldFlowBranchLimit() { result = 1 }
+  int fieldFlowBranchLimit() { result = 1 }
 }
 
+private module ClassStoreFlow = DataFlow::Global<ClassStoreFlowConfig>;
+
 private predicate serializableStore(DataFlow::Node instance, Expr store) {
   exists(MethodAccess m |
     store = m and
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/CleartextStorageCookieQuery.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/CleartextStorageCookieQuery.qll
index bd071e7fef6..59c098281f1 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/CleartextStorageCookieQuery.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/CleartextStorageCookieQuery.qll
@@ -20,9 +20,9 @@ class Cookie extends Storable, ClassInstanceExpr {
 
   /** Gets a store, for example `response.addCookie(cookie);`. */
   override Expr getAStore() {
-    exists(CookieToStoreFlowConfig conf, DataFlow::Node n |
+    exists(DataFlow::Node n |
       cookieStore(n, result) and
-      conf.hasFlow(DataFlow::exprNode(this), n)
+      CookieToStoreFlow::flow(DataFlow::exprNode(this), n)
     )
   }
 }
@@ -37,12 +37,12 @@ private predicate cookieStore(DataFlow::Node cookie, Expr store) {
   )
 }
 
-private class CookieToStoreFlowConfig extends DataFlow3::Configuration {
-  CookieToStoreFlowConfig() { this = "CookieToStoreFlowConfig" }
+private module CookieToStoreFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof Cookie }
 
-  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof Cookie }
-
-  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { cookieStore(sink, _) }
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { cookieStore(sink, _) }
 }
 
+private module CookieToStoreFlow = DataFlow::Global<CookieToStoreFlowConfig>;
+
 private Expr cookieInput(Cookie c) { result = c.getArgument(1) }
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/CleartextStoragePropertiesQuery.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/CleartextStoragePropertiesQuery.qll
index c75689c1fd2..f262104078e 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/CleartextStoragePropertiesQuery.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/CleartextStoragePropertiesQuery.qll
@@ -19,17 +19,17 @@ class Properties extends Storable, ClassInstanceExpr {
 
   /** Gets an input, for example `input` in `props.setProperty("password", input);`. */
   override Expr getAnInput() {
-    exists(PropertiesFlowConfig conf, DataFlow::Node n |
+    exists(DataFlow::Node n |
       propertiesInput(n, result) and
-      conf.hasFlow(DataFlow::exprNode(this), n)
+      PropertiesFlow::flow(DataFlow::exprNode(this), n)
     )
   }
 
   /** Gets a store, for example `props.store(outputStream, "...")`. */
   override Expr getAStore() {
-    exists(PropertiesFlowConfig conf, DataFlow::Node n |
+    exists(DataFlow::Node n |
       propertiesStore(n, result) and
-      conf.hasFlow(DataFlow::exprNode(this), n)
+      PropertiesFlow::flow(DataFlow::exprNode(this), n)
     )
   }
 }
@@ -50,13 +50,13 @@ private predicate propertiesStore(DataFlow::Node prop, Expr store) {
   )
 }
 
-private class PropertiesFlowConfig extends DataFlow::Configuration {
-  PropertiesFlowConfig() { this = "PropertiesFlowConfig" }
+private module PropertiesFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof Properties }
 
-  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof Properties }
-
-  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
     propertiesInput(sink, _) or
     propertiesStore(sink, _)
   }
 }
+
+private module PropertiesFlow = DataFlow::Global<PropertiesFlowConfig>;
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/CleartextStorageQuery.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/CleartextStorageQuery.qll
index 8bd14b63ea6..0fdf69eb8a3 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/CleartextStorageQuery.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/CleartextStorageQuery.qll
@@ -21,9 +21,7 @@ class CleartextStorageAdditionalTaintStep extends Unit {
 class SensitiveSource extends Expr instanceof SensitiveExpr {
   /** Holds if this source flows to the `sink`. */
   predicate flowsTo(Expr sink) {
-    exists(SensitiveSourceFlowConfig conf |
-      conf.hasFlow(DataFlow::exprNode(this), DataFlow::exprNode(sink))
-    )
+    SensitiveSourceFlow::flow(DataFlow::exprNode(this), DataFlow::exprNode(sink))
   }
 }
 
@@ -40,27 +38,25 @@ abstract class Storable extends Call {
   abstract Expr getAStore();
 }
 
-private class SensitiveSourceFlowConfig extends TaintTracking2::Configuration {
-  SensitiveSourceFlowConfig() { this = "SensitiveSourceFlowConfig" }
+private module SensitiveSourceFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof SensitiveExpr }
 
-  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof SensitiveExpr }
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof CleartextStorageSink }
 
-  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof CleartextStorageSink }
+  predicate isBarrier(DataFlow::Node sanitizer) { sanitizer instanceof CleartextStorageSanitizer }
 
-  override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node sanitizer) {
-    sanitizer instanceof CleartextStorageSanitizer
-  }
-
-  override predicate isAdditionalTaintStep(DataFlow::Node n1, DataFlow::Node n2) {
+  predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node n1, DataFlow::Node n2) {
     any(CleartextStorageAdditionalTaintStep c).step(n1, n2)
   }
 }
 
+private module SensitiveSourceFlow = TaintTracking::Global<SensitiveSourceFlowConfig>;
+
 private class DefaultCleartextStorageSanitizer extends CleartextStorageSanitizer {
   DefaultCleartextStorageSanitizer() {
     this.getType() instanceof NumericType or
     this.getType() instanceof BooleanType or
-    exists(EncryptedValueFlowConfig conf | conf.hasFlow(_, this))
+    EncryptedValueFlow::flowTo(this)
   }
 }
 
@@ -76,12 +72,10 @@ private class EncryptedSensitiveMethodAccess extends MethodAccess {
 }
 
 /** Flow configuration for encryption methods flowing to inputs of persistent storage. */
-private class EncryptedValueFlowConfig extends DataFlow4::Configuration {
-  EncryptedValueFlowConfig() { this = "EncryptedValueFlowConfig" }
+private module EncryptedValueFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof EncryptedSensitiveMethodAccess }
 
-  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) {
-    src.asExpr() instanceof EncryptedSensitiveMethodAccess
-  }
-
-  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink.asExpr() instanceof SensitiveExpr }
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink.asExpr() instanceof SensitiveExpr }
 }
+
+private module EncryptedValueFlow = DataFlow::Global<EncryptedValueFlowConfig>;
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/CleartextStorageSharedPrefsQuery.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/CleartextStorageSharedPrefsQuery.qll
index e67a2d1aa21..07764a251f7 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/CleartextStorageSharedPrefsQuery.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/CleartextStorageSharedPrefsQuery.qll
@@ -28,17 +28,17 @@ class SharedPreferencesEditorMethodAccess extends Storable, MethodAccess {
 
   /** Gets an input, for example `password` in `editor.putString("password", password);`. */
   override Expr getAnInput() {
-    exists(SharedPreferencesFlowConfig conf, DataFlow::Node editor |
+    exists(DataFlow::Node editor |
       sharedPreferencesInput(editor, result) and
-      conf.hasFlow(DataFlow::exprNode(this), editor)
+      SharedPreferencesFlow::flow(DataFlow::exprNode(this), editor)
     )
   }
 
   /** Gets a store, for example `editor.commit();`. */
   override Expr getAStore() {
-    exists(SharedPreferencesFlowConfig conf, DataFlow::Node editor |
+    exists(DataFlow::Node editor |
       sharedPreferencesStore(editor, result) and
-      conf.hasFlow(DataFlow::exprNode(this), editor)
+      SharedPreferencesFlow::flow(DataFlow::exprNode(this), editor)
     )
   }
 }
@@ -65,15 +65,15 @@ private predicate sharedPreferencesStore(DataFlow::Node editor, MethodAccess m)
 }
 
 /** Flow from `SharedPreferences.Editor` to either a setter or a store method. */
-private class SharedPreferencesFlowConfig extends DataFlow::Configuration {
-  SharedPreferencesFlowConfig() { this = "SharedPreferencesFlowConfig" }
-
-  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) {
+private module SharedPreferencesFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) {
     src.asExpr() instanceof SharedPreferencesEditorMethodAccess
   }
 
-  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
     sharedPreferencesInput(sink, _) or
     sharedPreferencesStore(sink, _)
   }
 }
+
+private module SharedPreferencesFlow = DataFlow::Global<SharedPreferencesFlowConfig>;
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/ConditionalBypassQuery.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/ConditionalBypassQuery.qll
index 9bff32eac02..a45afda4105 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/ConditionalBypassQuery.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/ConditionalBypassQuery.qll
@@ -37,9 +37,11 @@ private predicate endsWithStep(DataFlow::Node node1, DataFlow::Node node2) {
 }
 
 /**
+ * DEPRECATED: Use `ConditionalBypassFlow` instead.
+ *
  * A taint tracking configuration for untrusted data flowing to sensitive conditions.
  */
-class ConditionalBypassFlowConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
+deprecated class ConditionalBypassFlowConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
   ConditionalBypassFlowConfig() { this = "ConditionalBypassFlowConfig" }
 
   override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
@@ -50,3 +52,21 @@ class ConditionalBypassFlowConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
     endsWithStep(node1, node2)
   }
 }
+
+/**
+ * A taint tracking configuration for untrusted data flowing to sensitive conditions.
+ */
+module ConditionalBypassFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
+
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { conditionControlsMethod(_, sink.asExpr()) }
+
+  predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node node1, DataFlow::Node node2) {
+    endsWithStep(node1, node2)
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Taint tracking flow for untrusted data flowing to sensitive conditions.
+ */
+module ConditionalBypassFlow = TaintTracking::Global<ConditionalBypassFlowConfig>;
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/ExternalAPIs.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/ExternalAPIs.qll
index ef23d28a076..89b24006475 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/ExternalAPIs.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/ExternalAPIs.qll
@@ -98,8 +98,12 @@ class ExternalApiDataNode extends DataFlow::Node {
 /** DEPRECATED: Alias for ExternalApiDataNode */
 deprecated class ExternalAPIDataNode = ExternalApiDataNode;
 
-/** A configuration for tracking flow from `RemoteFlowSource`s to `ExternalApiDataNode`s. */
-class UntrustedDataToExternalApiConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
+/**
+ * DEPRECATED: Use `UntrustedDataToExternalApiFlow` instead.
+ *
+ * A configuration for tracking flow from `RemoteFlowSource`s to `ExternalApiDataNode`s.
+ */
+deprecated class UntrustedDataToExternalApiConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
   UntrustedDataToExternalApiConfig() { this = "UntrustedDataToExternalAPIConfig" }
 
   override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
@@ -107,17 +111,29 @@ class UntrustedDataToExternalApiConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
   override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof ExternalApiDataNode }
 }
 
+/**
+ * Taint tracking configuration for flow from `RemoteFlowSource`s to `ExternalApiDataNode`s.
+ */
+module UntrustedDataToExternalApiConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
+
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof ExternalApiDataNode }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Tracks flow from untrusted data to external APIs.
+ */
+module UntrustedDataToExternalApiFlow = TaintTracking::Global<UntrustedDataToExternalApiConfig>;
+
 /** DEPRECATED: Alias for UntrustedDataToExternalApiConfig */
 deprecated class UntrustedDataToExternalAPIConfig = UntrustedDataToExternalApiConfig;
 
 /** A node representing untrusted data being passed to an external API. */
 class UntrustedExternalApiDataNode extends ExternalApiDataNode {
-  UntrustedExternalApiDataNode() { any(UntrustedDataToExternalApiConfig c).hasFlow(_, this) }
+  UntrustedExternalApiDataNode() { UntrustedDataToExternalApiFlow::flowTo(this) }
 
   /** Gets a source of untrusted data which is passed to this external API data node. */
-  DataFlow::Node getAnUntrustedSource() {
-    any(UntrustedDataToExternalApiConfig c).hasFlow(result, this)
-  }
+  DataFlow::Node getAnUntrustedSource() { UntrustedDataToExternalApiFlow::flow(result, this) }
 }
 
 /** DEPRECATED: Alias for UntrustedExternalApiDataNode */
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/FragmentInjectionQuery.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/FragmentInjectionQuery.qll
index 94b1877a4a3..6164a6663a0 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/FragmentInjectionQuery.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/FragmentInjectionQuery.qll
@@ -23,7 +23,11 @@ deprecated class FragmentInjectionTaintConf extends TaintTracking::Configuration
   }
 }
 
-private module FragmentInjectionTaintConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+/**
+ * A taint-tracking configuration for unsafe user input
+ * that is used to create Android fragments dynamically.
+ */
+module FragmentInjectionTaintConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
   predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
 
   predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof FragmentInjectionSink }
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/HardcodedCredentialsApiCallQuery.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/HardcodedCredentialsApiCallQuery.qll
index fb786710d66..6080cd188b3 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/HardcodedCredentialsApiCallQuery.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/HardcodedCredentialsApiCallQuery.qll
@@ -7,9 +7,11 @@ import semmle.code.java.dataflow.DataFlow
 import HardcodedCredentials
 
 /**
+ * DEPRECATED: Use `HardcodedCredentialApiCallFlow` instead.
+ *
  * A data-flow configuration that tracks flow from a hard-coded credential in a call to a sensitive Java API which may compromise security.
  */
-class HardcodedCredentialApiCallConfiguration extends DataFlow::Configuration {
+deprecated class HardcodedCredentialApiCallConfiguration extends DataFlow::Configuration {
   HardcodedCredentialApiCallConfiguration() { this = "HardcodedCredentialApiCallConfiguration" }
 
   override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node n) {
@@ -52,3 +54,53 @@ class HardcodedCredentialApiCallConfiguration extends DataFlow::Configuration {
     n.asExpr().(MethodAccess).getMethod() instanceof MethodSystemGetenv
   }
 }
+
+/**
+ * A data-flow configuration that tracks flow from a hard-coded credential in a call to a sensitive Java API which may compromise security.
+ */
+module HardcodedCredentialApiCallConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node n) {
+    n.asExpr() instanceof HardcodedExpr and
+    not n.asExpr().getEnclosingCallable() instanceof ToStringMethod
+  }
+
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node n) { n.asExpr() instanceof CredentialsApiSink }
+
+  predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node node1, DataFlow::Node node2) {
+    node1.asExpr().getType() instanceof TypeString and
+    (
+      exists(MethodAccess ma | ma.getMethod().hasName(["getBytes", "toCharArray"]) |
+        node2.asExpr() = ma and
+        ma.getQualifier() = node1.asExpr()
+      )
+      or
+      // These base64 routines are usually taint propagators, and this is not a general
+      // TaintTracking::Configuration, so we must specifically include them here
+      // as a common transform applied to a constant before passing to a remote API.
+      exists(MethodAccess ma |
+        ma.getMethod()
+            .hasQualifiedName([
+                "java.util", "cn.hutool.core.codec", "org.apache.shiro.codec",
+                "apache.commons.codec.binary", "org.springframework.util"
+              ], ["Base64$Encoder", "Base64$Decoder", "Base64", "Base64Utils"],
+              [
+                "encode", "encodeToString", "decode", "decodeBase64", "encodeBase64",
+                "encodeBase64Chunked", "encodeBase64String", "encodeBase64URLSafe",
+                "encodeBase64URLSafeString"
+              ])
+      |
+        node1.asExpr() = ma.getArgument(0) and
+        node2.asExpr() = ma
+      )
+    )
+  }
+
+  predicate isBarrier(DataFlow::Node n) {
+    n.asExpr().(MethodAccess).getMethod() instanceof MethodSystemGetenv
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Tracks flow from a hard-coded credential in a call to a sensitive Java API which may compromise security.
+ */
+module HardcodedCredentialApiCallFlow = DataFlow::Global<HardcodedCredentialApiCallConfig>;
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/HttpsUrlsQuery.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/HttpsUrlsQuery.qll
index 50c76cefbca..cc827d34d46 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/HttpsUrlsQuery.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/HttpsUrlsQuery.qll
@@ -6,9 +6,11 @@ import semmle.code.java.frameworks.Networking
 import semmle.code.java.security.HttpsUrls
 
 /**
+ * DEPRECATED: Use `HttpsStringToUrlOpenMethodFlow` instead.
+ *
  * A taint tracking configuration for HTTP connections.
  */
-class HttpStringToUrlOpenMethodFlowConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
+deprecated class HttpStringToUrlOpenMethodFlowConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
   HttpStringToUrlOpenMethodFlowConfig() { this = "HttpStringToUrlOpenMethodFlowConfig" }
 
   override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof HttpStringLiteral }
@@ -23,3 +25,25 @@ class HttpStringToUrlOpenMethodFlowConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
     node.getType() instanceof PrimitiveType or node.getType() instanceof BoxedType
   }
 }
+
+/**
+ * A taint tracking configuration for HTTP connections.
+ */
+module HttpStringToUrlOpenMethodFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof HttpStringLiteral }
+
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof UrlOpenSink }
+
+  predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node node1, DataFlow::Node node2) {
+    any(HttpUrlsAdditionalTaintStep c).step(node1, node2)
+  }
+
+  predicate isBarrier(DataFlow::Node node) {
+    node.getType() instanceof PrimitiveType or node.getType() instanceof BoxedType
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Detect taint flow of HTTP connections.
+ */
+module HttpStringToUrlOpenMethodFlow = TaintTracking::Global<HttpStringToUrlOpenMethodFlowConfig>;
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/ImplicitPendingIntentsQuery.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/ImplicitPendingIntentsQuery.qll
index 814dc93f8d0..c02abb4de81 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/ImplicitPendingIntentsQuery.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/ImplicitPendingIntentsQuery.qll
@@ -7,10 +7,12 @@ import semmle.code.java.frameworks.android.PendingIntent
 import semmle.code.java.security.ImplicitPendingIntents
 
 /**
+ * DEPRECATED: Use `ImplicitPendingIntentStartFlow` instead.
+ *
  * A taint tracking configuration for implicit `PendingIntent`s
  * being wrapped in another implicit `Intent` that gets started.
  */
-class ImplicitPendingIntentStartConf extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
+deprecated class ImplicitPendingIntentStartConf extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
   ImplicitPendingIntentStartConf() { this = "ImplicitPendingIntentStartConf" }
 
   override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source, DataFlow::FlowState state) {
@@ -52,3 +54,50 @@ class ImplicitPendingIntentStartConf extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
     c instanceof DataFlow::ArrayContent
   }
 }
+
+/**
+ * A taint tracking configuration for implicit `PendingIntent`s
+ * being wrapped in another implicit `Intent` that gets started.
+ */
+module ImplicitPendingIntentStartConfig implements DataFlow::StateConfigSig {
+  class FlowState = DataFlow::FlowState;
+
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source, FlowState state) {
+    source.(ImplicitPendingIntentSource).hasState(state)
+  }
+
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink, FlowState state) {
+    sink.(ImplicitPendingIntentSink).hasState(state)
+  }
+
+  predicate isBarrier(DataFlow::Node sanitizer) { sanitizer instanceof ExplicitIntentSanitizer }
+
+  predicate isBarrier(DataFlow::Node node, FlowState state) { none() }
+
+  predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node node1, DataFlow::Node node2) {
+    any(ImplicitPendingIntentAdditionalTaintStep c).step(node1, node2)
+  }
+
+  predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(
+    DataFlow::Node node1, FlowState state1, DataFlow::Node node2, FlowState state2
+  ) {
+    any(ImplicitPendingIntentAdditionalTaintStep c).step(node1, state1, node2, state2)
+  }
+
+  predicate allowImplicitRead(DataFlow::Node node, DataFlow::ContentSet c) {
+    isSink(node, _) and
+    allowIntentExtrasImplicitRead(node, c)
+    or
+    isAdditionalFlowStep(node, _) and
+    c.(DataFlow::FieldContent).getType() instanceof PendingIntent
+    or
+    // Allow implicit reads of Intent arrays for steps like getActivities
+    // or sinks like startActivities
+    (isSink(node, _) or isAdditionalFlowStep(node, _, _, _)) and
+    node.getType().(Array).getElementType() instanceof TypeIntent and
+    c instanceof DataFlow::ArrayContent
+  }
+}
+
+module ImplicitPendingIntentStartFlow =
+  TaintTracking::GlobalWithState<ImplicitPendingIntentStartConfig>;
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/InsecureBasicAuthQuery.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/InsecureBasicAuthQuery.qll
index 941aaafe580..60e16662d9a 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/InsecureBasicAuthQuery.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/InsecureBasicAuthQuery.qll
@@ -6,10 +6,12 @@ import semmle.code.java.security.InsecureBasicAuth
 import semmle.code.java.dataflow.TaintTracking
 
 /**
+ * DEPRECATED: Use `InsecureBasicAuthFlow` instead.
+ *
  * A taint tracking configuration for the Basic authentication scheme
  * being used in HTTP connections.
  */
-class BasicAuthFlowConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
+deprecated class BasicAuthFlowConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
   BasicAuthFlowConfig() { this = "InsecureBasicAuth::BasicAuthFlowConfig" }
 
   override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src instanceof InsecureBasicAuthSource }
@@ -20,3 +22,22 @@ class BasicAuthFlowConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
     any(HttpUrlsAdditionalTaintStep c).step(node1, node2)
   }
 }
+
+/**
+ * A taint tracking configuration for the Basic authentication scheme
+ * being used in HTTP connections.
+ */
+module BasicAuthFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src instanceof InsecureBasicAuthSource }
+
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof InsecureBasicAuthSink }
+
+  predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node node1, DataFlow::Node node2) {
+    any(HttpUrlsAdditionalTaintStep c).step(node1, node2)
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Tracks flow for the Basic authentication scheme being used in HTTP connections.
+ */
+module InsecureBasicAuthFlow = TaintTracking::Global<BasicAuthFlowConfig>;
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/InsecureTrustManagerQuery.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/InsecureTrustManagerQuery.qll
index 22ab9bbcbc9..a7514ceff96 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/InsecureTrustManagerQuery.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/InsecureTrustManagerQuery.qll
@@ -5,10 +5,12 @@ import semmle.code.java.dataflow.FlowSources
 import semmle.code.java.security.InsecureTrustManager
 
 /**
+ * DEPRECATED: Use `InsecureTrustManagerFlow` instead.
+ *
  * A configuration to model the flow of an insecure `TrustManager`
  * to the initialization of an SSL context.
  */
-class InsecureTrustManagerConfiguration extends DataFlow::Configuration {
+deprecated class InsecureTrustManagerConfiguration extends DataFlow::Configuration {
   InsecureTrustManagerConfiguration() { this = "InsecureTrustManagerConfiguration" }
 
   override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) {
@@ -23,3 +25,21 @@ class InsecureTrustManagerConfiguration extends DataFlow::Configuration {
     c instanceof DataFlow::ArrayContent
   }
 }
+
+/**
+ * A configuration to model the flow of an insecure `TrustManager`
+ * to the initialization of an SSL context.
+ */
+module InsecureTrustManagerConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof InsecureTrustManagerSource }
+
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof InsecureTrustManagerSink }
+
+  predicate allowImplicitRead(DataFlow::Node node, DataFlow::ContentSet c) {
+    (isSink(node) or isAdditionalFlowStep(node, _)) and
+    node.getType() instanceof Array and
+    c instanceof DataFlow::ArrayContent
+  }
+}
+
+module InsecureTrustManagerFlow = DataFlow::Global<InsecureTrustManagerConfig>;
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/InsufficientKeySizeQuery.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/InsufficientKeySizeQuery.qll
index eb416d9647b..d0d51ffbf08 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/InsufficientKeySizeQuery.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/InsufficientKeySizeQuery.qll
@@ -3,8 +3,12 @@
 import semmle.code.java.dataflow.DataFlow
 import semmle.code.java.security.InsufficientKeySize
 
-/** A data flow configuration for tracking key sizes used in cryptographic algorithms. */
-class KeySizeConfiguration extends DataFlow::Configuration {
+/**
+ * DEPRECATED: Use `KeySizeFlow` instead.
+ *
+ * A data flow configuration for tracking key sizes used in cryptographic algorithms.
+ */
+deprecated class KeySizeConfiguration extends DataFlow::Configuration {
   KeySizeConfiguration() { this = "KeySizeConfiguration" }
 
   override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source, DataFlow::FlowState state) {
@@ -15,3 +19,30 @@ class KeySizeConfiguration extends DataFlow::Configuration {
     sink.(InsufficientKeySizeSink).hasState(state)
   }
 }
+
+/**
+ * A data flow configuration for tracking key sizes used in cryptographic algorithms.
+ */
+module KeySizeConfig implements DataFlow::StateConfigSig {
+  class FlowState = DataFlow::FlowState;
+
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source, DataFlow::FlowState state) {
+    source.(InsufficientKeySizeSource).hasState(state)
+  }
+
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink, DataFlow::FlowState state) {
+    sink.(InsufficientKeySizeSink).hasState(state)
+  }
+
+  predicate isBarrier(DataFlow::Node node, DataFlow::FlowState state) { none() }
+
+  predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(
+    DataFlow::Node node1, DataFlow::FlowState state1, DataFlow::Node node2,
+    DataFlow::FlowState state2
+  ) {
+    none()
+  }
+}
+
+/** Tracks key sizes used in cryptographic algorithms. */
+module KeySizeFlow = DataFlow::GlobalWithState<KeySizeConfig>;
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/IntentUriPermissionManipulationQuery.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/IntentUriPermissionManipulationQuery.qll
index 970cb4867fd..f563b4bf093 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/IntentUriPermissionManipulationQuery.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/IntentUriPermissionManipulationQuery.qll
@@ -35,7 +35,10 @@ deprecated class IntentUriPermissionManipulationConf extends TaintTracking::Conf
   }
 }
 
-private module IntentUriPermissionManipulationConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+/**
+ * A taint tracking configuration for user-provided Intents being returned to third party apps.
+ */
+module IntentUriPermissionManipulationConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
   predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
 
   predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof IntentUriPermissionManipulationSink }
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/LogInjectionQuery.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/LogInjectionQuery.qll
index a26e08d3edc..2610870b383 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/LogInjectionQuery.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/LogInjectionQuery.qll
@@ -23,7 +23,10 @@ deprecated class LogInjectionConfiguration extends TaintTracking::Configuration
   }
 }
 
-private module LogInjectionConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+/**
+ * A taint-tracking configuration for tracking untrusted user input used in log entries.
+ */
+module LogInjectionConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
   predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
 
   predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof LogInjectionSink }
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/MissingJWTSignatureCheckQuery.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/MissingJWTSignatureCheckQuery.qll
index 818a4c664fe..c316da2f965 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/MissingJWTSignatureCheckQuery.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/MissingJWTSignatureCheckQuery.qll
@@ -5,10 +5,12 @@ import semmle.code.java.dataflow.DataFlow
 import semmle.code.java.security.JWT
 
 /**
+ * DEPRECATED: Use `MissingJwtSignatureCheckFlow` instead.
+ *
  * Models flow from signing keys assignments to qualifiers of JWT insecure parsers.
  * This is used to determine whether a `JwtParser` performing unsafe parsing has a signing key set.
  */
-class MissingJwtSignatureCheckConf extends DataFlow::Configuration {
+deprecated class MissingJwtSignatureCheckConf extends DataFlow::Configuration {
   MissingJwtSignatureCheckConf() { this = "SigningToExprDataFlow" }
 
   override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) {
@@ -21,3 +23,19 @@ class MissingJwtSignatureCheckConf extends DataFlow::Configuration {
     any(JwtParserWithInsecureParseAdditionalFlowStep c).step(node1, node2)
   }
 }
+
+/**
+ * Models flow from signing keys assignments to qualifiers of JWT insecure parsers.
+ * This is used to determine whether a `JwtParser` performing unsafe parsing has a signing key set.
+ */
+module MissingJwtSignatureCheckConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof JwtParserWithInsecureParseSource }
+
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof JwtParserWithInsecureParseSink }
+
+  predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node node1, DataFlow::Node node2) {
+    any(JwtParserWithInsecureParseAdditionalFlowStep c).step(node1, node2)
+  }
+}
+
+module MissingJwtSignatureCheckFlow = DataFlow::Global<MissingJwtSignatureCheckConfig>;
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/PartialPathTraversalQuery.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/PartialPathTraversalQuery.qll
index a43f90ae10d..1fd25df25aa 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/PartialPathTraversalQuery.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/PartialPathTraversalQuery.qll
@@ -7,11 +7,13 @@ import semmle.code.java.dataflow.TaintTracking
 import semmle.code.java.dataflow.FlowSources
 
 /**
+ * DEPRECATED: Use `PartialPathTraversalFromRemoteFlow` instead.
+ *
  * A taint-tracking configuration for unsafe user input
  * that is used to validate against path traversal, but is insufficient
  * and remains vulnerable to Partial Path Traversal.
  */
-class PartialPathTraversalFromRemoteConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
+deprecated class PartialPathTraversalFromRemoteConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
   PartialPathTraversalFromRemoteConfig() { this = "PartialPathTraversalFromRemoteConfig" }
 
   override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node node) { node instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
@@ -20,3 +22,20 @@ class PartialPathTraversalFromRemoteConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration
     any(PartialPathTraversalMethodAccess ma).getQualifier() = node.asExpr()
   }
 }
+
+/**
+ * A taint-tracking configuration for unsafe user input
+ * that is used to validate against path traversal, but is insufficient
+ * and remains vulnerable to Partial Path Traversal.
+ */
+module PartialPathTraversalFromRemoteConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node node) { node instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
+
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node node) {
+    any(PartialPathTraversalMethodAccess ma).getQualifier() = node.asExpr()
+  }
+}
+
+/** Tracks flow of unsafe user input that is used to validate against path traversal, but is insufficient and remains vulnerable to Partial Path Traversal. */
+module PartialPathTraversalFromRemoteFlow =
+  TaintTracking::Global<PartialPathTraversalFromRemoteConfig>;
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/RandomQuery.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/RandomQuery.qll
index 1674cefdb70..b14191f4dd4 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/RandomQuery.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/RandomQuery.qll
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 import java
 import semmle.code.java.dataflow.DefUse
-import semmle.code.java.dataflow.DataFlow6
+import semmle.code.java.dataflow.DataFlow
 import RandomDataSource
 
 /**
@@ -29,20 +29,18 @@ private predicate isSeeded(RValue use) {
   )
 }
 
-private class PredictableSeedFlowConfiguration extends DataFlow6::Configuration {
-  PredictableSeedFlowConfiguration() { this = "Random::PredictableSeedFlowConfiguration" }
+private module PredictableSeedFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source.asExpr() instanceof PredictableSeedExpr }
 
-  override predicate isSource(DataFlow6::Node source) {
-    source.asExpr() instanceof PredictableSeedExpr
-  }
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { isSeeding(sink.asExpr(), _) }
 
-  override predicate isSink(DataFlow6::Node sink) { isSeeding(sink.asExpr(), _) }
-
-  override predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow6::Node node1, DataFlow6::Node node2) {
+  predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node node1, DataFlow::Node node2) {
     predictableCalcStep(node1.asExpr(), node2.asExpr())
   }
 }
 
+private module PredictableSeedFlow = DataFlow::Global<PredictableSeedFlowConfig>;
+
 private predicate predictableCalcStep(Expr e1, Expr e2) {
   e2.(BinaryExpr).hasOperands(e1, any(PredictableSeedExpr p))
   or
@@ -81,7 +79,7 @@ private predicate predictableCalcStep(Expr e1, Expr e2) {
 private predicate safelySeeded(RValue use) {
   exists(Expr arg |
     isSeeding(arg, use) and
-    not exists(PredictableSeedFlowConfiguration conf | conf.hasFlowToExpr(arg))
+    not PredictableSeedFlow::flowToExpr(arg)
   )
   or
   exists(GetRandomData da, RValue seeduse |
@@ -118,9 +116,7 @@ private predicate isSeeding(Expr arg, RValue use) {
 
 private predicate isSeedingSource(Expr arg, RValue use, Expr source) {
   isSeeding(arg, use) and
-  exists(PredictableSeedFlowConfiguration conf |
-    conf.hasFlow(DataFlow6::exprNode(source), DataFlow6::exprNode(arg))
-  )
+  PredictableSeedFlow::flow(DataFlow::exprNode(source), DataFlow::exprNode(arg))
 }
 
 private predicate isRandomSeeding(MethodAccess m, Expr arg) {
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/RsaWithoutOaepQuery.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/RsaWithoutOaepQuery.qll
index 0d9df09bb74..848a1c2b990 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/RsaWithoutOaepQuery.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/RsaWithoutOaepQuery.qll
@@ -26,7 +26,10 @@ deprecated class RsaWithoutOaepConfig extends DataFlow::Configuration {
   }
 }
 
-private module RsaWithoutOaepConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+/**
+ * A configuration for finding RSA ciphers initialized without using OAEP padding.
+ */
+module RsaWithoutOaepConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
   predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) {
     exists(CompileTimeConstantExpr specExpr, string spec |
       specExpr.getStringValue() = spec and
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/SensitiveLoggingQuery.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/SensitiveLoggingQuery.qll
index ea687d32a0a..d9ed2b970b0 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/SensitiveLoggingQuery.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/SensitiveLoggingQuery.qll
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ deprecated class SensitiveLoggerConfiguration extends TaintTracking::Configurati
 }
 
 /** A data-flow configuration for identifying potentially-sensitive data flowing to a log output. */
-private module SensitiveLoggerConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+module SensitiveLoggerConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
   predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source.asExpr() instanceof CredentialExpr }
 
   predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sinkNode(sink, "logging") }
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/StaticInitializationVectorQuery.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/StaticInitializationVectorQuery.qll
index 64dee88b7fd..38d426adc5a 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/StaticInitializationVectorQuery.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/StaticInitializationVectorQuery.qll
@@ -83,25 +83,23 @@ private class ArrayUpdate extends Expr {
 /**
  * A config that tracks dataflow from creating an array to an operation that updates it.
  */
-private class ArrayUpdateConfig extends DataFlow2::Configuration {
-  ArrayUpdateConfig() { this = "ArrayUpdateConfig" }
+private module ArrayUpdateConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source.asExpr() instanceof StaticByteArrayCreation }
 
-  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) {
-    source.asExpr() instanceof StaticByteArrayCreation
-  }
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink.asExpr() = any(ArrayUpdate upd).getArray() }
 
-  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink.asExpr() = any(ArrayUpdate upd).getArray() }
-
-  override predicate isBarrierOut(DataFlow::Node node) { this.isSink(node) }
+  predicate isBarrierOut(DataFlow::Node node) { isSink(node) }
 }
 
+private module ArrayUpdateFlow = DataFlow::Global<ArrayUpdateConfig>;
+
 /**
  * A source that defines an array that doesn't get updated.
  */
 private class StaticInitializationVectorSource extends DataFlow::Node {
   StaticInitializationVectorSource() {
     exists(StaticByteArrayCreation array | array = this.asExpr() |
-      not exists(ArrayUpdateConfig config | config.hasFlow(DataFlow2::exprNode(array), _)) and
+      not ArrayUpdateFlow::flow(DataFlow2::exprNode(array), _) and
       // Reduce FPs from utility methods that return an empty array in an exceptional case
       not exists(ReturnStmt ret |
         array.getADimension().(CompileTimeConstantExpr).getIntValue() = 0 and
@@ -146,9 +144,11 @@ private predicate createInitializationVectorSpecStep(DataFlow::Node fromNode, Da
 }
 
 /**
+ * DEPRECATED: Use `StaticInitializationVectorFlow` instead.
+ *
  * A config that tracks dataflow to initializing a cipher with a static initialization vector.
  */
-class StaticInitializationVectorConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
+deprecated class StaticInitializationVectorConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
   StaticInitializationVectorConfig() { this = "StaticInitializationVectorConfig" }
 
   override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) {
@@ -161,3 +161,19 @@ class StaticInitializationVectorConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
     createInitializationVectorSpecStep(fromNode, toNode)
   }
 }
+
+/**
+ * A config that tracks dataflow to initializing a cipher with a static initialization vector.
+ */
+module StaticInitializationVectorConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof StaticInitializationVectorSource }
+
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof EncryptionInitializationSink }
+
+  predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node fromNode, DataFlow::Node toNode) {
+    createInitializationVectorSpecStep(fromNode, toNode)
+  }
+}
+
+/** Tracks the flow from a static initialization vector to the initialization of a cipher */
+module StaticInitializationVectorFlow = TaintTracking::Global<StaticInitializationVectorConfig>;
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/UnsafeCertTrustQuery.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/UnsafeCertTrustQuery.qll
index ee87fdc64ee..0b45e150c0c 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/UnsafeCertTrustQuery.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/UnsafeCertTrustQuery.qll
@@ -6,9 +6,11 @@ import semmle.code.java.security.UnsafeCertTrust
 import semmle.code.java.security.Encryption
 
 /**
+ * DEPRECATED: Use `SslEndpointIdentificationFlow` instead.
+ *
  * A taint flow configuration for SSL connections created without a proper certificate trust configuration.
  */
-class SslEndpointIdentificationFlowConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
+deprecated class SslEndpointIdentificationFlowConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
   SslEndpointIdentificationFlowConfig() { this = "SslEndpointIdentificationFlowConfig" }
 
   override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof SslConnectionInit }
@@ -20,30 +22,44 @@ class SslEndpointIdentificationFlowConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
   }
 }
 
+/**
+ * A taint flow configuration for SSL connections created without a proper certificate trust configuration.
+ */
+module SslEndpointIdentificationFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof SslConnectionInit }
+
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof SslConnectionCreation }
+
+  predicate isBarrier(DataFlow::Node sanitizer) { sanitizer instanceof SslUnsafeCertTrustSanitizer }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Taint flow for SSL connections created without a proper certificate trust configuration.
+ */
+module SslEndpointIdentificationFlow = TaintTracking::Global<SslEndpointIdentificationFlowConfig>;
+
 /**
  * An SSL object that was assigned a safe `SSLParameters` object and can be considered safe.
  */
 private class SslConnectionWithSafeSslParameters extends SslUnsafeCertTrustSanitizer {
   SslConnectionWithSafeSslParameters() {
-    exists(SafeSslParametersFlowConfig config, DataFlow::Node safe, DataFlow::Node sanitizer |
-      config.hasFlowTo(safe) and
+    exists(DataFlow::Node safe, DataFlow::Node sanitizer |
+      SafeSslParametersFlow::flowTo(safe) and
       sanitizer = DataFlow::exprNode(safe.asExpr().(Argument).getCall().getQualifier()) and
       DataFlow::localFlow(sanitizer, this)
     )
   }
 }
 
-private class SafeSslParametersFlowConfig extends DataFlow2::Configuration {
-  SafeSslParametersFlowConfig() { this = "SafeSslParametersFlowConfig" }
-
-  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) {
+private module SafeSslParametersFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) {
     exists(MethodAccess ma |
       ma instanceof SafeSetEndpointIdentificationAlgorithm and
       DataFlow::getInstanceArgument(ma) = source.(DataFlow::PostUpdateNode).getPreUpdateNode()
     )
   }
 
-  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
     exists(MethodAccess ma, RefType t | t instanceof SslSocket or t instanceof SslEngine |
       ma.getMethod().hasName("setSSLParameters") and
       ma.getMethod().getDeclaringType().getAnAncestor() = t and
@@ -52,6 +68,8 @@ private class SafeSslParametersFlowConfig extends DataFlow2::Configuration {
   }
 }
 
+private module SafeSslParametersFlow = DataFlow::Global<SafeSslParametersFlowConfig>;
+
 /**
  * A call to `SSLParameters.setEndpointIdentificationAlgorithm` with a non-null and non-empty parameter.
  */
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/UnsafeContentUriResolutionQuery.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/UnsafeContentUriResolutionQuery.qll
index b59c4b79655..424edace82a 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/UnsafeContentUriResolutionQuery.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/UnsafeContentUriResolutionQuery.qll
@@ -26,7 +26,10 @@ deprecated class UnsafeContentResolutionConf extends TaintTracking::Configuratio
   }
 }
 
-private module UnsafeContentResolutionConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+/**
+ * A taint-tracking configuration to find paths from remote sources to content URI resolutions.
+ */
+module UnsafeContentResolutionConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
   predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
 
   predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof ContentUriResolutionSink }
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/UnsafeDeserializationQuery.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/UnsafeDeserializationQuery.qll
index 6d0ff888d82..7e995e5cbaf 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/UnsafeDeserializationQuery.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/UnsafeDeserializationQuery.qll
@@ -35,15 +35,13 @@ private class XmlDecoderReadObjectMethod extends Method {
   }
 }
 
-private class SafeXStream extends DataFlow2::Configuration {
-  SafeXStream() { this = "UnsafeDeserialization::SafeXStream" }
-
-  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) {
+private module SafeXStreamConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) {
     any(XStreamEnableWhiteListing ma).getQualifier().(VarAccess).getVariable().getAnAccess() =
       src.asExpr()
   }
 
-  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
     exists(MethodAccess ma |
       sink.asExpr() = ma.getQualifier() and
       ma.getMethod() instanceof XStreamReadObjectMethod
@@ -51,26 +49,26 @@ private class SafeXStream extends DataFlow2::Configuration {
   }
 }
 
-private class SafeKryo extends DataFlow2::Configuration {
-  SafeKryo() { this = "UnsafeDeserialization::SafeKryo" }
+private module SafeXStreamFlow = DataFlow::Global<SafeXStreamConfig>;
 
-  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) {
+private module SafeKryoConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) {
     any(KryoEnableWhiteListing ma).getQualifier().(VarAccess).getVariable().getAnAccess() =
       src.asExpr()
   }
 
-  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
     exists(MethodAccess ma |
       sink.asExpr() = ma.getQualifier() and
       ma.getMethod() instanceof KryoReadObjectMethod
     )
   }
 
-  override predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node node1, DataFlow::Node node2) {
-    this.stepKryoPoolBuilderFactoryArgToConstructor(node1, node2) or
-    this.stepKryoPoolRunMethodAccessQualifierToFunctionalArgument(node1, node2) or
-    this.stepKryoPoolBuilderChainMethod(node1, node2) or
-    this.stepKryoPoolBorrowMethod(node1, node2)
+  predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node node1, DataFlow::Node node2) {
+    stepKryoPoolBuilderFactoryArgToConstructor(node1, node2) or
+    stepKryoPoolRunMethodAccessQualifierToFunctionalArgument(node1, node2) or
+    stepKryoPoolBuilderChainMethod(node1, node2) or
+    stepKryoPoolBorrowMethod(node1, node2)
   }
 
   /**
@@ -126,6 +124,8 @@ private class SafeKryo extends DataFlow2::Configuration {
   }
 }
 
+private module SafeKryoFlow = DataFlow::Global<SafeKryoConfig>;
+
 /**
  * Holds if `ma` is a call that deserializes data from `sink`.
  */
@@ -145,11 +145,11 @@ predicate unsafeDeserialization(MethodAccess ma, Expr sink) {
     or
     m instanceof XStreamReadObjectMethod and
     sink = ma.getAnArgument() and
-    not exists(SafeXStream sxs | sxs.hasFlowToExpr(ma.getQualifier()))
+    not SafeXStreamFlow::flowToExpr(ma.getQualifier())
     or
     m instanceof KryoReadObjectMethod and
     sink = ma.getAnArgument() and
-    not exists(SafeKryo sk | sk.hasFlowToExpr(ma.getQualifier()))
+    not SafeKryoFlow::flowToExpr(ma.getQualifier())
     or
     m instanceof MethodApacheSerializationUtilsDeserialize and
     sink = ma.getArgument(0)
@@ -181,17 +181,17 @@ predicate unsafeDeserialization(MethodAccess ma, Expr sink) {
     ma.getMethod() instanceof ObjectMapperReadMethod and
     sink = ma.getArgument(0) and
     (
-      exists(UnsafeTypeConfig config | config.hasFlowToExpr(ma.getAnArgument()))
+      UnsafeTypeFlow::flowToExpr(ma.getAnArgument())
       or
-      exists(EnableJacksonDefaultTypingConfig config | config.hasFlowToExpr(ma.getQualifier()))
+      EnableJacksonDefaultTypingFlow::flowToExpr(ma.getQualifier())
       or
       hasArgumentWithUnsafeJacksonAnnotation(ma)
     ) and
-    not exists(SafeObjectMapperConfig config | config.hasFlowToExpr(ma.getQualifier()))
+    not SafeObjectMapperFlow::flowToExpr(ma.getQualifier())
     or
     m instanceof JabsorbUnmarshallMethod and
     sink = ma.getArgument(2) and
-    any(UnsafeTypeConfig config).hasFlowToExpr(ma.getArgument(1))
+    UnsafeTypeFlow::flowToExpr(ma.getArgument(1))
     or
     m instanceof JabsorbFromJsonMethod and
     sink = ma.getArgument(0)
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ predicate unsafeDeserialization(MethodAccess ma, Expr sink) {
     sink = ma.getArgument(0) and
     (
       // User controls the target type for deserialization
-      any(UnsafeTypeConfig c).hasFlowToExpr(ma.getArgument(1))
+      UnsafeTypeFlow::flowToExpr(ma.getArgument(1))
       or
       // jodd.json.JsonParser may be configured for unrestricted deserialization to user-specified types
       joddJsonParserConfiguredUnsafely(ma.getQualifier())
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ predicate unsafeDeserialization(MethodAccess ma, Expr sink) {
     or
     m instanceof GsonDeserializeMethod and
     sink = ma.getArgument(0) and
-    any(UnsafeTypeConfig config).hasFlowToExpr(ma.getArgument(1))
+    UnsafeTypeFlow::flowToExpr(ma.getArgument(1))
   )
 }
 
@@ -223,10 +223,80 @@ class UnsafeDeserializationSink extends DataFlow::ExprNode {
   MethodAccess getMethodAccess() { unsafeDeserialization(result, this.getExpr()) }
 }
 
+/** Holds if `node` is a sanitizer for unsafe deserialization */
+private predicate isUnsafeDeserializationSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) {
+  exists(ClassInstanceExpr cie |
+    cie.getConstructor().getDeclaringType() instanceof JsonIoJsonReader and
+    cie = node.asExpr() and
+    SafeJsonIoFlow::flowToExpr(cie.getArgument(1))
+  )
+  or
+  exists(MethodAccess ma |
+    ma.getMethod() instanceof JsonIoJsonToJavaMethod and
+    ma.getArgument(0) = node.asExpr() and
+    SafeJsonIoFlow::flowToExpr(ma.getArgument(1))
+  )
+  or
+  exists(MethodAccess ma |
+    // Sanitize the input to jodd.json.JsonParser.parse et al whenever it appears
+    // to be called with an explicit class argument limiting those types that can
+    // be instantiated during deserialization.
+    ma.getMethod() instanceof JoddJsonParseMethod and
+    ma.getArgument(1).getType() instanceof TypeClass and
+    not ma.getArgument(1) instanceof NullLiteral and
+    not ma.getArgument(1).getType().getName() = ["Class<Object>", "Class<?>"] and
+    node.asExpr() = ma.getAnArgument()
+  )
+  or
+  exists(MethodAccess ma |
+    // Sanitize the input to flexjson.JSONDeserializer.deserialize whenever it appears
+    // to be called with an explicit class argument limiting those types that can
+    // be instantiated during deserialization, or if the deserializer has already been
+    // configured to use a specified root class.
+    ma.getMethod() instanceof FlexjsonDeserializeMethod and
+    node.asExpr() = ma.getAnArgument() and
+    (
+      ma.getArgument(1).getType() instanceof TypeClass and
+      not ma.getArgument(1) instanceof NullLiteral and
+      not ma.getArgument(1).getType().getName() = ["Class<Object>", "Class<?>"]
+      or
+      isSafeFlexjsonDeserializer(ma.getQualifier())
+    )
+  )
+}
+
+/** Taint step for Unsafe deserialization */
+private predicate isUnsafeDeserializationTaintStep(DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ) {
+  exists(ClassInstanceExpr cie |
+    cie.getArgument(0) = pred.asExpr() and
+    cie = succ.asExpr() and
+    (
+      cie.getConstructor().getDeclaringType() instanceof JsonIoJsonReader or
+      cie.getConstructor().getDeclaringType() instanceof YamlBeansReader or
+      cie.getConstructor().getDeclaringType().getAnAncestor() instanceof UnsafeHessianInput or
+      cie.getConstructor().getDeclaringType() instanceof BurlapInput
+    )
+  )
+  or
+  exists(MethodAccess ma |
+    ma.getMethod() instanceof BurlapInputInitMethod and
+    ma.getArgument(0) = pred.asExpr() and
+    ma.getQualifier() = succ.asExpr()
+  )
+  or
+  createJacksonJsonParserStep(pred, succ)
+  or
+  createJacksonTreeNodeStep(pred, succ)
+  or
+  intentFlowsToParcel(pred, succ)
+}
+
 /**
+ * DEPRECATED: Use `UnsafeDeserializationFlow` instead.
+ *
  * Tracks flows from remote user input to a deserialization sink.
  */
-class UnsafeDeserializationConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
+deprecated class UnsafeDeserializationConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
   UnsafeDeserializationConfig() { this = "UnsafeDeserializationConfig" }
 
   override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
@@ -234,72 +304,27 @@ class UnsafeDeserializationConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
   override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof UnsafeDeserializationSink }
 
   override predicate isAdditionalTaintStep(DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ) {
-    exists(ClassInstanceExpr cie |
-      cie.getArgument(0) = pred.asExpr() and
-      cie = succ.asExpr() and
-      (
-        cie.getConstructor().getDeclaringType() instanceof JsonIoJsonReader or
-        cie.getConstructor().getDeclaringType() instanceof YamlBeansReader or
-        cie.getConstructor().getDeclaringType().getAnAncestor() instanceof UnsafeHessianInput or
-        cie.getConstructor().getDeclaringType() instanceof BurlapInput
-      )
-    )
-    or
-    exists(MethodAccess ma |
-      ma.getMethod() instanceof BurlapInputInitMethod and
-      ma.getArgument(0) = pred.asExpr() and
-      ma.getQualifier() = succ.asExpr()
-    )
-    or
-    createJacksonJsonParserStep(pred, succ)
-    or
-    createJacksonTreeNodeStep(pred, succ)
-    or
-    intentFlowsToParcel(pred, succ)
+    isUnsafeDeserializationTaintStep(pred, succ)
   }
 
-  override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) {
-    exists(ClassInstanceExpr cie |
-      cie.getConstructor().getDeclaringType() instanceof JsonIoJsonReader and
-      cie = node.asExpr() and
-      exists(SafeJsonIoConfig sji | sji.hasFlowToExpr(cie.getArgument(1)))
-    )
-    or
-    exists(MethodAccess ma |
-      ma.getMethod() instanceof JsonIoJsonToJavaMethod and
-      ma.getArgument(0) = node.asExpr() and
-      exists(SafeJsonIoConfig sji | sji.hasFlowToExpr(ma.getArgument(1)))
-    )
-    or
-    exists(MethodAccess ma |
-      // Sanitize the input to jodd.json.JsonParser.parse et al whenever it appears
-      // to be called with an explicit class argument limiting those types that can
-      // be instantiated during deserialization.
-      ma.getMethod() instanceof JoddJsonParseMethod and
-      ma.getArgument(1).getType() instanceof TypeClass and
-      not ma.getArgument(1) instanceof NullLiteral and
-      not ma.getArgument(1).getType().getName() = ["Class<Object>", "Class<?>"] and
-      node.asExpr() = ma.getAnArgument()
-    )
-    or
-    exists(MethodAccess ma |
-      // Sanitize the input to flexjson.JSONDeserializer.deserialize whenever it appears
-      // to be called with an explicit class argument limiting those types that can
-      // be instantiated during deserialization, or if the deserializer has already been
-      // configured to use a specified root class.
-      ma.getMethod() instanceof FlexjsonDeserializeMethod and
-      node.asExpr() = ma.getAnArgument() and
-      (
-        ma.getArgument(1).getType() instanceof TypeClass and
-        not ma.getArgument(1) instanceof NullLiteral and
-        not ma.getArgument(1).getType().getName() = ["Class<Object>", "Class<?>"]
-        or
-        isSafeFlexjsonDeserializer(ma.getQualifier())
-      )
-    )
-  }
+  override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) { isUnsafeDeserializationSanitizer(node) }
 }
 
+/** Tracks flows from remote user input to a deserialization sink. */
+private module UnsafeDeserializationConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
+
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof UnsafeDeserializationSink }
+
+  predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ) {
+    isUnsafeDeserializationTaintStep(pred, succ)
+  }
+
+  predicate isBarrier(DataFlow::Node node) { isUnsafeDeserializationSanitizer(node) }
+}
+
+module UnsafeDeserializationFlow = TaintTracking::Global<UnsafeDeserializationConfig>;
+
 /**
  * Gets a safe usage of the `use` method of Flexjson, which could be:
  *     use(String, ...) where the path is null or
@@ -350,18 +375,9 @@ predicate looksLikeResolveClassStep(DataFlow::Node fromNode, DataFlow::Node toNo
   )
 }
 
-/**
- * Tracks flow from a remote source to a type descriptor (e.g. a `java.lang.Class` instance)
- * passed to a deserialization method.
- *
- * If this is user-controlled, arbitrary code could be executed while instantiating the user-specified type.
- */
-class UnsafeTypeConfig extends TaintTracking2::Configuration {
-  UnsafeTypeConfig() { this = "UnsafeTypeConfig" }
-
-  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
-
-  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+/** A sink representing an argument of a deserialization method */
+private class UnsafeTypeSink extends DataFlow::Node {
+  UnsafeTypeSink() {
     exists(MethodAccess ma, int i, Expr arg | i > 0 and ma.getArgument(i) = arg |
       (
         ma.getMethod() instanceof ObjectMapperReadMethod
@@ -378,25 +394,75 @@ class UnsafeTypeConfig extends TaintTracking2::Configuration {
         or
         arg.getType().(RefType).hasQualifiedName("java.lang.reflect", "Type")
       ) and
-      arg = sink.asExpr()
+      arg = this.asExpr()
     )
   }
+}
+
+private predicate isUnsafeTypeAdditionalTaintStep(DataFlow::Node fromNode, DataFlow::Node toNode) {
+  resolveClassStep(fromNode, toNode) or
+  looksLikeResolveClassStep(fromNode, toNode) or
+  intentFlowsToParcel(fromNode, toNode)
+}
+
+/**
+ * DEPRECATED: Use `UnsafeTypeFlow` instead.
+ *
+ * Tracks flow from a remote source to a type descriptor (e.g. a `java.lang.Class` instance)
+ * passed to a deserialization method.
+ *
+ * If this is user-controlled, arbitrary code could be executed while instantiating the user-specified type.
+ */
+deprecated class UnsafeTypeConfig extends TaintTracking2::Configuration {
+  UnsafeTypeConfig() { this = "UnsafeTypeConfig" }
+
+  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
+
+  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof UnsafeTypeSink }
 
   /**
    * Holds if `fromNode` to `toNode` is a dataflow step that resolves a class
    * or at least looks like resolving a class.
    */
   override predicate isAdditionalTaintStep(DataFlow::Node fromNode, DataFlow::Node toNode) {
-    resolveClassStep(fromNode, toNode) or
-    looksLikeResolveClassStep(fromNode, toNode) or
-    intentFlowsToParcel(fromNode, toNode)
+    isUnsafeTypeAdditionalTaintStep(fromNode, toNode)
   }
 }
 
 /**
+ * Tracks flow from a remote source to a type descriptor (e.g. a `java.lang.Class` instance)
+ * passed to a deserialization method.
+ *
+ * If this is user-controlled, arbitrary code could be executed while instantiating the user-specified type.
+ */
+module UnsafeTypeConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
+
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof UnsafeTypeSink }
+
+  /**
+   * Holds if `fromNode` to `toNode` is a dataflow step that resolves a class
+   * or at least looks like resolving a class.
+   */
+  predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node fromNode, DataFlow::Node toNode) {
+    isUnsafeTypeAdditionalTaintStep(fromNode, toNode)
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Tracks flow from a remote source to a type descriptor (e.g. a `java.lang.Class` instance)
+ * passed to a deserialization method.
+ *
+ * If this is user-controlled, arbitrary code could be executed while instantiating the user-specified type.
+ */
+module UnsafeTypeFlow = TaintTracking::Global<UnsafeTypeConfig>;
+
+/**
+ * DEPRECATED: Use `EnableJacksonDefaultTypingFlow` instead.
+ *
  * Tracks flow from `enableDefaultTyping` calls to a subsequent Jackson deserialization method call.
  */
-class EnableJacksonDefaultTypingConfig extends DataFlow2::Configuration {
+deprecated class EnableJacksonDefaultTypingConfig extends DataFlow2::Configuration {
   EnableJacksonDefaultTypingConfig() { this = "EnableJacksonDefaultTypingConfig" }
 
   override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) {
@@ -406,13 +472,43 @@ class EnableJacksonDefaultTypingConfig extends DataFlow2::Configuration {
   override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof ObjectMapperReadQualifier }
 }
 
+private module EnableJacksonDefaultTypingConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) {
+    any(EnableJacksonDefaultTyping ma).getQualifier() = src.asExpr()
+  }
+
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof ObjectMapperReadQualifier }
+}
+
 /**
+ * Tracks flow from `enableDefaultTyping` calls to a subsequent Jackson deserialization method call.
+ */
+module EnableJacksonDefaultTypingFlow = DataFlow::Global<EnableJacksonDefaultTypingConfig>;
+
+/** Dataflow step that creates an `ObjectMapper` via a builder. */
+private predicate isObjectMapperBuilderAdditionalFlowStep(
+  DataFlow::Node fromNode, DataFlow::Node toNode
+) {
+  exists(MethodAccess ma, Method m | m = ma.getMethod() |
+    m.getDeclaringType() instanceof MapperBuilder and
+    m.getReturnType()
+        .(RefType)
+        .hasQualifiedName("com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.json",
+          ["JsonMapper$Builder", "JsonMapper"]) and
+    fromNode.asExpr() = ma.getQualifier() and
+    ma = toNode.asExpr()
+  )
+}
+
+/**
+ * DEPRECATED: Use `SafeObjectMapperFlow` instead.
+ *
  * Tracks flow from calls that set a type validator to a subsequent Jackson deserialization method call,
  * including across builder method calls.
  *
  * Such a Jackson deserialization method call is safe because validation will likely prevent instantiating unexpected types.
  */
-class SafeObjectMapperConfig extends DataFlow2::Configuration {
+deprecated class SafeObjectMapperConfig extends DataFlow2::Configuration {
   SafeObjectMapperConfig() { this = "SafeObjectMapperConfig" }
 
   override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) {
@@ -426,18 +522,38 @@ class SafeObjectMapperConfig extends DataFlow2::Configuration {
    * that configures or creates an `ObjectMapper` via a builder.
    */
   override predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node fromNode, DataFlow::Node toNode) {
-    exists(MethodAccess ma, Method m | m = ma.getMethod() |
-      m.getDeclaringType() instanceof MapperBuilder and
-      m.getReturnType()
-          .(RefType)
-          .hasQualifiedName("com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.json",
-            ["JsonMapper$Builder", "JsonMapper"]) and
-      fromNode.asExpr() = ma.getQualifier() and
-      ma = toNode.asExpr()
-    )
+    isObjectMapperBuilderAdditionalFlowStep(fromNode, toNode)
   }
 }
 
+/**
+ * Tracks flow from calls that set a type validator to a subsequent Jackson deserialization method call,
+ * including across builder method calls.
+ *
+ * Such a Jackson deserialization method call is safe because validation will likely prevent instantiating unexpected types.
+ */
+module SafeObjectMapperConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src instanceof SetPolymorphicTypeValidatorSource }
+
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof ObjectMapperReadQualifier }
+
+  /**
+   * Holds if `fromNode` to `toNode` is a dataflow step
+   * that configures or creates an `ObjectMapper` via a builder.
+   */
+  predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node fromNode, DataFlow::Node toNode) {
+    isObjectMapperBuilderAdditionalFlowStep(fromNode, toNode)
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Tracks flow from calls that set a type validator to a subsequent Jackson deserialization method call,
+ * including across builder method calls.
+ *
+ * Such a Jackson deserialization method call is safe because validation will likely prevent instantiating unexpected types.
+ */
+module SafeObjectMapperFlow = DataFlow::Global<SafeObjectMapperConfig>;
+
 /**
  * A method that configures Jodd's JsonParser, either enabling dangerous deserialization to
  * arbitrary Java types or restricting the types that can be instantiated.
@@ -454,20 +570,12 @@ private class JoddJsonParserConfigurationMethodQualifier extends DataFlow::ExprN
   }
 }
 
-/**
- * Configuration tracking flow from methods that configure `jodd.json.JsonParser`'s class
- * instantiation feature to a `.parse` call on the same parser.
- */
-private class JoddJsonParserConfigurationMethodConfig extends DataFlow2::Configuration {
-  JoddJsonParserConfigurationMethodConfig() {
-    this = "UnsafeDeserialization::JoddJsonParserConfigurationMethodConfig"
-  }
-
-  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) {
+private module JoddJsonParserConfigurationMethodConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) {
     src instanceof JoddJsonParserConfigurationMethodQualifier
   }
 
-  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
     exists(MethodAccess ma |
       ma.getMethod() instanceof JoddJsonParseMethod and
       sink.asExpr() = ma.getQualifier() // The class type argument
@@ -475,6 +583,13 @@ private class JoddJsonParserConfigurationMethodConfig extends DataFlow2::Configu
   }
 }
 
+/**
+ * Configuration tracking flow from methods that configure `jodd.json.JsonParser`'s class
+ * instantiation feature to a `.parse` call on the same parser.
+ */
+private module JoddJsonParserConfigurationMethodFlow =
+  DataFlow::Global<JoddJsonParserConfigurationMethodConfig>;
+
 /**
  * Gets the qualifier to a method call that configures a `jodd.json.JsonParser` instance unsafely.
  *
@@ -512,10 +627,8 @@ private DataFlow::Node getASafelyConfiguredParser() {
  * and which never appears to be configured safely.
  */
 private predicate joddJsonParserConfiguredUnsafely(Expr parserExpr) {
-  exists(DataFlow::Node parser, JoddJsonParserConfigurationMethodConfig config |
-    parser.asExpr() = parserExpr
-  |
-    config.hasFlow(getAnUnsafelyConfiguredParser(), parser) and
-    not config.hasFlow(getASafelyConfiguredParser(), parser)
+  exists(DataFlow::Node parser | parser.asExpr() = parserExpr |
+    JoddJsonParserConfigurationMethodFlow::flow(getAnUnsafelyConfiguredParser(), parser) and
+    not JoddJsonParserConfigurationMethodFlow::flow(getASafelyConfiguredParser(), parser)
   )
 }
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/XmlParsers.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/XmlParsers.qll
index 8cdf962584d..dd28d8b0117 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/XmlParsers.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/XmlParsers.qll
@@ -81,24 +81,18 @@ class DocumentBuilderParse extends XmlParserCall {
   override Expr getSink() { result = this.getArgument(0) }
 
   override predicate isSafe() {
-    exists(SafeDocumentBuilderToDocumentBuilderParseFlowConfig conf |
-      conf.hasFlowToExpr(this.getQualifier())
-    )
+    SafeDocumentBuilderToDocumentBuilderParseFlow::flowToExpr(this.getQualifier())
   }
 }
 
-private class SafeDocumentBuilderToDocumentBuilderParseFlowConfig extends DataFlow2::Configuration {
-  SafeDocumentBuilderToDocumentBuilderParseFlowConfig() {
-    this = "XmlParsers::SafeDocumentBuilderToDocumentBuilderParseFlowConfig"
-  }
+private module SafeDocumentBuilderToDocumentBuilderParseFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof SafeDocumentBuilder }
 
-  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof SafeDocumentBuilder }
-
-  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
     sink.asExpr() = any(DocumentBuilderParse dbp).getQualifier()
   }
 
-  override predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node node1, DataFlow::Node node2) {
+  predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node node1, DataFlow::Node node2) {
     exists(RefType t, ReturnStmt ret, Method m |
       node2.asExpr().(ClassInstanceExpr).getConstructedType().getSourceDeclaration() = t and
       t.getASourceSupertype+().hasQualifiedName("java.lang", "ThreadLocal") and
@@ -117,9 +111,12 @@ private class SafeDocumentBuilderToDocumentBuilderParseFlowConfig extends DataFl
     )
   }
 
-  override int fieldFlowBranchLimit() { result = 0 }
+  int fieldFlowBranchLimit() { result = 0 }
 }
 
+private module SafeDocumentBuilderToDocumentBuilderParseFlow =
+  DataFlow::Global<SafeDocumentBuilderToDocumentBuilderParseFlowConfig>;
+
 /**
  * A `ParserConfig` specific to `DocumentBuilderFactory`.
  */
@@ -198,31 +195,27 @@ private class DocumentBuilderConstruction extends MethodAccess {
   }
 }
 
-private class SafeDocumentBuilderFactoryToDocumentBuilderConstructionFlowConfig extends DataFlow3::Configuration
+private module SafeDocumentBuilderFactoryToDocumentBuilderConstructionFlowConfig implements
+  DataFlow::ConfigSig
 {
-  SafeDocumentBuilderFactoryToDocumentBuilderConstructionFlowConfig() {
-    this = "XmlParsers::SafeDocumentBuilderFactoryToDocumentBuilderConstructionFlowConfig"
-  }
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof SafeDocumentBuilderFactory }
 
-  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) {
-    src.asExpr() instanceof SafeDocumentBuilderFactory
-  }
-
-  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
     sink.asExpr() = any(DocumentBuilderConstruction dbc).getQualifier()
   }
 
-  override int fieldFlowBranchLimit() { result = 0 }
+  int fieldFlowBranchLimit() { result = 0 }
 }
 
+private module SafeDocumentBuilderFactoryToDocumentBuilderConstructionFlow =
+  DataFlow::Global<SafeDocumentBuilderFactoryToDocumentBuilderConstructionFlowConfig>;
+
 /**
  * A `DocumentBuilder` created from a safely configured `DocumentBuilderFactory`.
  */
 class SafeDocumentBuilder extends DocumentBuilderConstruction {
   SafeDocumentBuilder() {
-    exists(SafeDocumentBuilderFactoryToDocumentBuilderConstructionFlowConfig conf |
-      conf.hasFlowToExpr(this.getQualifier())
-    )
+    SafeDocumentBuilderFactoryToDocumentBuilderConstructionFlow::flowToExpr(this.getQualifier())
   }
 }
 
@@ -252,27 +245,24 @@ class XmlInputFactoryStreamReader extends XmlParserCall {
   }
 
   override predicate isSafe() {
-    exists(SafeXmlInputFactoryToXmlInputFactoryReaderFlowConfig conf |
-      conf.hasFlowToExpr(this.getQualifier())
-    )
+    SafeXmlInputFactoryToXmlInputFactoryReaderFlow::flowToExpr(this.getQualifier())
   }
 }
 
-private class SafeXmlInputFactoryToXmlInputFactoryReaderFlowConfig extends DataFlow2::Configuration {
-  SafeXmlInputFactoryToXmlInputFactoryReaderFlowConfig() {
-    this = "XmlParsers::SafeXmlInputFactoryToXmlInputFactoryReaderFlowConfig"
-  }
+private module SafeXmlInputFactoryToXmlInputFactoryReaderFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof SafeXmlInputFactory }
 
-  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof SafeXmlInputFactory }
-
-  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
     sink.asExpr() = any(XmlInputFactoryStreamReader xifsr).getQualifier() or
     sink.asExpr() = any(XmlInputFactoryEventReader xifer).getQualifier()
   }
 
-  override int fieldFlowBranchLimit() { result = 0 }
+  int fieldFlowBranchLimit() { result = 0 }
 }
 
+private module SafeXmlInputFactoryToXmlInputFactoryReaderFlow =
+  DataFlow::Global<SafeXmlInputFactoryToXmlInputFactoryReaderFlowConfig>;
+
 /** A call to `XMLInputFactory.createEventReader`. */
 class XmlInputFactoryEventReader extends XmlParserCall {
   XmlInputFactoryEventReader() {
@@ -290,9 +280,7 @@ class XmlInputFactoryEventReader extends XmlParserCall {
   }
 
   override predicate isSafe() {
-    exists(SafeXmlInputFactoryToXmlInputFactoryReaderFlowConfig conf |
-      conf.hasFlowToExpr(this.getQualifier())
-    )
+    SafeXmlInputFactoryToXmlInputFactoryReaderFlow::flowToExpr(this.getQualifier())
   }
 }
 
@@ -387,27 +375,24 @@ class SaxBuilderParse extends XmlParserCall {
   override Expr getSink() { result = this.getArgument(0) }
 
   override predicate isSafe() {
-    exists(SafeSaxBuilderToSaxBuilderParseFlowConfig conf | conf.hasFlowToExpr(this.getQualifier()))
+    SafeSaxBuilderToSaxBuilderParseFlow::flowToExpr(this.getQualifier())
   }
 }
 
 /** DEPRECATED: Alias for SaxBuilderParse */
 deprecated class SAXBuilderParse = SaxBuilderParse;
 
-private class SafeSaxBuilderToSaxBuilderParseFlowConfig extends DataFlow2::Configuration {
-  SafeSaxBuilderToSaxBuilderParseFlowConfig() {
-    this = "XmlParsers::SafeSAXBuilderToSAXBuilderParseFlowConfig"
-  }
+private module SafeSaxBuilderToSaxBuilderParseFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof SafeSaxBuilder }
 
-  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof SafeSaxBuilder }
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink.asExpr() = any(SaxBuilderParse sax).getQualifier() }
 
-  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
-    sink.asExpr() = any(SaxBuilderParse sax).getQualifier()
-  }
-
-  override int fieldFlowBranchLimit() { result = 0 }
+  int fieldFlowBranchLimit() { result = 0 }
 }
 
+private module SafeSaxBuilderToSaxBuilderParseFlow =
+  DataFlow::Global<SafeSaxBuilderToSaxBuilderParseFlowConfig>;
+
 /**
  * A `ParserConfig` specific to `SAXBuilder`.
  */
@@ -478,9 +463,7 @@ class SaxParserParse extends XmlParserCall {
 
   override Expr getSink() { result = this.getArgument(0) }
 
-  override predicate isSafe() {
-    exists(SafeSaxParserFlowConfig sp | sp.hasFlowToExpr(this.getQualifier()))
-  }
+  override predicate isSafe() { SafeSaxParserFlow::flowToExpr(this.getQualifier()) }
 }
 
 /** DEPRECATED: Alias for SaxParserParse */
@@ -536,14 +519,10 @@ class SafeSaxParserFactory extends VarAccess {
 /** DEPRECATED: Alias for SafeSaxParserFactory */
 deprecated class SafeSAXParserFactory = SafeSaxParserFactory;
 
-private class SafeSaxParserFactoryToNewSaxParserFlowConfig extends DataFlow5::Configuration {
-  SafeSaxParserFactoryToNewSaxParserFlowConfig() {
-    this = "XmlParsers::SafeSAXParserFactoryToNewSAXParserFlowConfig"
-  }
+private module SafeSaxParserFactoryToNewSaxParserFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof SafeSaxParserFactory }
 
-  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof SafeSaxParserFactory }
-
-  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
     exists(MethodAccess ma, Method m |
       sink.asExpr() = ma.getQualifier() and
       ma.getMethod() = m and
@@ -552,31 +531,32 @@ private class SafeSaxParserFactoryToNewSaxParserFlowConfig extends DataFlow5::Co
     )
   }
 
-  override int fieldFlowBranchLimit() { result = 0 }
+  int fieldFlowBranchLimit() { result = 0 }
 }
 
-private class SafeSaxParserFlowConfig extends DataFlow4::Configuration {
-  SafeSaxParserFlowConfig() { this = "XmlParsers::SafeSAXParserFlowConfig" }
+private module SafeSaxParserFactoryToNewSaxParserFlow =
+  DataFlow::Global<SafeSaxParserFactoryToNewSaxParserFlowConfig>;
 
-  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof SafeSaxParser }
+private module SafeSaxParserFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof SafeSaxParser }
 
-  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
     exists(MethodAccess ma |
       sink.asExpr() = ma.getQualifier() and ma.getMethod().getDeclaringType() instanceof SaxParser
     )
   }
 
-  override int fieldFlowBranchLimit() { result = 0 }
+  int fieldFlowBranchLimit() { result = 0 }
 }
 
+private module SafeSaxParserFlow = DataFlow::Global<SafeSaxParserFlowConfig>;
+
 /** A `SaxParser` created from a safely configured `SaxParserFactory`. */
 class SafeSaxParser extends MethodAccess {
   SafeSaxParser() {
-    exists(SafeSaxParserFactoryToNewSaxParserFlowConfig sdf |
-      this.getMethod().getDeclaringType() instanceof SaxParserFactory and
-      this.getMethod().hasName("newSAXParser") and
-      sdf.hasFlowToExpr(this.getQualifier())
-    )
+    this.getMethod().getDeclaringType() instanceof SaxParserFactory and
+    this.getMethod().hasName("newSAXParser") and
+    SafeSaxParserFactoryToNewSaxParserFlow::flowToExpr(this.getQualifier())
   }
 }
 
@@ -606,9 +586,7 @@ class SaxReaderRead extends XmlParserCall {
 
   override Expr getSink() { result = this.getArgument(0) }
 
-  override predicate isSafe() {
-    exists(SafeSaxReaderFlowConfig sr | sr.hasFlowToExpr(this.getQualifier()))
-  }
+  override predicate isSafe() { SafeSaxReaderFlow::flowToExpr(this.getQualifier()) }
 }
 
 /** DEPRECATED: Alias for SaxReaderRead */
@@ -628,20 +606,20 @@ class SaxReaderConfig extends ParserConfig {
 /** DEPRECATED: Alias for SaxReaderConfig */
 deprecated class SAXReaderConfig = SaxReaderConfig;
 
-private class SafeSaxReaderFlowConfig extends DataFlow4::Configuration {
-  SafeSaxReaderFlowConfig() { this = "XmlParsers::SafeSAXReaderFlowConfig" }
+private module SafeSaxReaderFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof SafeSaxReader }
 
-  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof SafeSaxReader }
-
-  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
     exists(MethodAccess ma |
       sink.asExpr() = ma.getQualifier() and ma.getMethod().getDeclaringType() instanceof SaxReader
     )
   }
 
-  override int fieldFlowBranchLimit() { result = 0 }
+  int fieldFlowBranchLimit() { result = 0 }
 }
 
+private module SafeSaxReaderFlow = DataFlow::Global<SafeSaxReaderFlowConfig>;
+
 /** A safely configured `SaxReader`. */
 class SafeSaxReader extends VarAccess {
   SafeSaxReader() {
@@ -715,18 +693,16 @@ class XmlReaderConfig extends ParserConfig {
 /** DEPRECATED: Alias for XmlReaderConfig */
 deprecated class XMLReaderConfig = XmlReaderConfig;
 
-private class ExplicitlySafeXmlReaderFlowConfig extends DataFlow3::Configuration {
-  ExplicitlySafeXmlReaderFlowConfig() { this = "XmlParsers::ExplicitlySafeXMLReaderFlowConfig" }
+private module ExplicitlySafeXmlReaderFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof ExplicitlySafeXmlReader }
 
-  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) {
-    src.asExpr() instanceof ExplicitlySafeXmlReader
-  }
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink.asExpr() instanceof SafeXmlReaderFlowSink }
 
-  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink.asExpr() instanceof SafeXmlReaderFlowSink }
-
-  override int fieldFlowBranchLimit() { result = 0 }
+  int fieldFlowBranchLimit() { result = 0 }
 }
 
+private module ExplicitlySafeXmlReaderFlow = DataFlow::Global<ExplicitlySafeXmlReaderFlowConfig>;
+
 /** An argument to a safe XML reader. */
 class SafeXmlReaderFlowSink extends Expr {
   SafeXmlReaderFlowSink() {
@@ -774,40 +750,35 @@ class ExplicitlySafeXmlReader extends VarAccess {
 
   /** Holds if `SafeXmlReaderFlowSink` detects flow from this to `sink` */
   predicate flowsTo(SafeXmlReaderFlowSink sink) {
-    any(ExplicitlySafeXmlReaderFlowConfig conf)
-        .hasFlow(DataFlow::exprNode(this), DataFlow::exprNode(sink))
+    ExplicitlySafeXmlReaderFlow::flow(DataFlow::exprNode(this), DataFlow::exprNode(sink))
   }
 }
 
 /** DEPRECATED: Alias for ExplicitlySafeXmlReader */
 deprecated class ExplicitlySafeXMLReader = ExplicitlySafeXmlReader;
 
-private class CreatedSafeXmlReaderFlowConfig extends DataFlow3::Configuration {
-  CreatedSafeXmlReaderFlowConfig() { this = "XmlParsers::CreatedSafeXMLReaderFlowConfig" }
+private module CreatedSafeXmlReaderFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof CreatedSafeXmlReader }
 
-  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof CreatedSafeXmlReader }
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink.asExpr() instanceof SafeXmlReaderFlowSink }
 
-  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink.asExpr() instanceof SafeXmlReaderFlowSink }
-
-  override int fieldFlowBranchLimit() { result = 0 }
+  int fieldFlowBranchLimit() { result = 0 }
 }
 
+private module CreatedSafeXmlReaderFlow = DataFlow::Global<CreatedSafeXmlReaderFlowConfig>;
+
 /** An `XmlReader` that is obtained from a safe source. */
 class CreatedSafeXmlReader extends Call {
   CreatedSafeXmlReader() {
     //Obtained from SAXParser
-    exists(SafeSaxParserFlowConfig safeParser |
-      this.(MethodAccess).getMethod().getDeclaringType() instanceof SaxParser and
-      this.(MethodAccess).getMethod().hasName("getXMLReader") and
-      safeParser.hasFlowToExpr(this.getQualifier())
-    )
+    this.(MethodAccess).getMethod().getDeclaringType() instanceof SaxParser and
+    this.(MethodAccess).getMethod().hasName("getXMLReader") and
+    SafeSaxParserFlow::flowToExpr(this.getQualifier())
     or
     //Obtained from SAXReader
-    exists(SafeSaxReaderFlowConfig safeReader |
-      this.(MethodAccess).getMethod().getDeclaringType() instanceof SaxReader and
-      this.(MethodAccess).getMethod().hasName("getXMLReader") and
-      safeReader.hasFlowToExpr(this.getQualifier())
-    )
+    this.(MethodAccess).getMethod().getDeclaringType() instanceof SaxReader and
+    this.(MethodAccess).getMethod().hasName("getXMLReader") and
+    SafeSaxReaderFlow::flowToExpr(this.getQualifier())
     or
     exists(RefType secureReader, string package |
       this.(ClassInstanceExpr).getConstructedType() = secureReader and
@@ -818,8 +789,7 @@ class CreatedSafeXmlReader extends Call {
 
   /** Holds if `CreatedSafeXmlReaderFlowConfig` detects flow from this to `sink` */
   predicate flowsTo(SafeXmlReaderFlowSink sink) {
-    any(CreatedSafeXmlReaderFlowConfig conf)
-        .hasFlow(DataFlow::exprNode(this), DataFlow::exprNode(sink))
+    CreatedSafeXmlReaderFlow::flow(DataFlow::exprNode(this), DataFlow::exprNode(sink))
   }
 }
 
@@ -975,26 +945,23 @@ class TransformerTransform extends XmlParserCall {
   override Expr getSink() { result = this.getArgument(0) }
 
   override predicate isSafe() {
-    exists(SafeTransformerToTransformerTransformFlowConfig st |
-      st.hasFlowToExpr(this.getQualifier())
-    )
+    SafeTransformerToTransformerTransformFlow::flowToExpr(this.getQualifier())
   }
 }
 
-private class SafeTransformerToTransformerTransformFlowConfig extends DataFlow2::Configuration {
-  SafeTransformerToTransformerTransformFlowConfig() {
-    this = "XmlParsers::SafeTransformerToTransformerTransformFlowConfig"
-  }
+private module SafeTransformerToTransformerTransformFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof SafeTransformer }
 
-  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof SafeTransformer }
-
-  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
     sink.asExpr() = any(TransformerTransform tt).getQualifier()
   }
 
-  override int fieldFlowBranchLimit() { result = 0 }
+  int fieldFlowBranchLimit() { result = 0 }
 }
 
+private module SafeTransformerToTransformerTransformFlow =
+  DataFlow::Global<SafeTransformerToTransformerTransformFlowConfig>;
+
 /** A call to `Transformer.newTransformer` with source. */
 class TransformerFactorySource extends XmlParserCall {
   TransformerFactorySource() {
@@ -1007,9 +974,7 @@ class TransformerFactorySource extends XmlParserCall {
 
   override Expr getSink() { result = this.getArgument(0) }
 
-  override predicate isSafe() {
-    exists(SafeTransformerFactoryFlowConfig stf | stf.hasFlowToExpr(this.getQualifier()))
-  }
+  override predicate isSafe() { SafeTransformerFactoryFlow::flowToExpr(this.getQualifier()) }
 }
 
 /** A `ParserConfig` specific to `TransformerFactory`. */
@@ -1024,10 +989,12 @@ class TransformerFactoryConfig extends TransformerConfig {
 }
 
 /**
+ * DEPRECATED: Use `SafeTransformerFactoryFlow` instead.
+ *
  * A dataflow configuration that identifies `TransformerFactory` and `SAXTransformerFactory`
  * instances that have been safely configured.
  */
-class SafeTransformerFactoryFlowConfig extends DataFlow3::Configuration {
+deprecated class SafeTransformerFactoryFlowConfig extends DataFlow3::Configuration {
   SafeTransformerFactoryFlowConfig() { this = "XmlParsers::SafeTransformerFactoryFlowConfig" }
 
   override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof SafeTransformerFactory }
@@ -1042,6 +1009,29 @@ class SafeTransformerFactoryFlowConfig extends DataFlow3::Configuration {
   override int fieldFlowBranchLimit() { result = 0 }
 }
 
+/**
+ * A dataflow configuration that identifies `TransformerFactory` and `SAXTransformerFactory`
+ * instances that have been safely configured.
+ */
+module SafeTransformerFactoryFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof SafeTransformerFactory }
+
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+    exists(MethodAccess ma |
+      sink.asExpr() = ma.getQualifier() and
+      ma.getMethod().getDeclaringType() instanceof TransformerFactory
+    )
+  }
+
+  int fieldFlowBranchLimit() { result = 0 }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Identifies `TransformerFactory` and `SAXTransformerFactory`
+ * instances that have been safely configured.
+ */
+module SafeTransformerFactoryFlow = DataFlow::Global<SafeTransformerFactoryFlowConfig>;
+
 /** A safely configured `TransformerFactory`. */
 class SafeTransformerFactory extends VarAccess {
   SafeTransformerFactory() {
@@ -1059,11 +1049,11 @@ class SafeTransformerFactory extends VarAccess {
 /** A `Transformer` created from a safely configured `TransformerFactory`. */
 class SafeTransformer extends MethodAccess {
   SafeTransformer() {
-    exists(SafeTransformerFactoryFlowConfig stf, Method m |
+    exists(Method m |
       this.getMethod() = m and
       m.getDeclaringType() instanceof TransformerFactory and
       m.hasName("newTransformer") and
-      stf.hasFlowToExpr(this.getQualifier())
+      SafeTransformerFactoryFlow::flowToExpr(this.getQualifier())
     )
   }
 }
@@ -1085,9 +1075,7 @@ class SaxTransformerFactoryNewXmlFilter extends XmlParserCall {
 
   override Expr getSink() { result = this.getArgument(0) }
 
-  override predicate isSafe() {
-    exists(SafeTransformerFactoryFlowConfig stf | stf.hasFlowToExpr(this.getQualifier()))
-  }
+  override predicate isSafe() { SafeTransformerFactoryFlow::flowToExpr(this.getQualifier()) }
 }
 
 /** DEPRECATED: Alias for SaxTransformerFactoryNewXmlFilter */
@@ -1123,26 +1111,23 @@ class SchemaFactoryNewSchema extends XmlParserCall {
   override Expr getSink() { result = this.getArgument(0) }
 
   override predicate isSafe() {
-    exists(SafeSchemaFactoryToSchemaFactoryNewSchemaFlowConfig ssf |
-      ssf.hasFlowToExpr(this.getQualifier())
-    )
+    SafeSchemaFactoryToSchemaFactoryNewSchemaFlow::flowToExpr(this.getQualifier())
   }
 }
 
-private class SafeSchemaFactoryToSchemaFactoryNewSchemaFlowConfig extends DataFlow2::Configuration {
-  SafeSchemaFactoryToSchemaFactoryNewSchemaFlowConfig() {
-    this = "XmlParsers::SafeSchemaFactoryToSchemaFactoryNewSchemaFlowConfig"
-  }
+private module SafeSchemaFactoryToSchemaFactoryNewSchemaFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof SafeSchemaFactory }
 
-  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof SafeSchemaFactory }
-
-  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
     sink.asExpr() = any(SchemaFactoryNewSchema sfns).getQualifier()
   }
 
-  override int fieldFlowBranchLimit() { result = 0 }
+  int fieldFlowBranchLimit() { result = 0 }
 }
 
+private module SafeSchemaFactoryToSchemaFactoryNewSchemaFlow =
+  DataFlow::Global<SafeSchemaFactoryToSchemaFactoryNewSchemaFlowConfig>;
+
 /** A safely configured `SchemaFactory`. */
 class SafeSchemaFactory extends VarAccess {
   SafeSchemaFactory() {
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/XxeQuery.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/XxeQuery.qll
index e1df8a1e601..18f7dd9e357 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/XxeQuery.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/XxeQuery.qll
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /** Provides default definitions to be used in XXE queries. */
 
 import java
-private import semmle.code.java.dataflow.TaintTracking2
+private import semmle.code.java.dataflow.TaintTracking
 private import semmle.code.java.security.XmlParsers
 import semmle.code.java.security.Xxe
 
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import semmle.code.java.security.Xxe
  */
 private class DefaultXxeSink extends XxeSink {
   DefaultXxeSink() {
-    not exists(SafeSaxSourceFlowConfig safeSource | safeSource.hasFlowTo(this)) and
+    not SafeSaxSourceFlow::flowTo(this) and
     exists(XmlParserCall parse |
       parse.getSink() = this.asExpr() and
       not parse.isSafe()
@@ -22,14 +22,12 @@ private class DefaultXxeSink extends XxeSink {
 /**
  * A taint-tracking configuration for safe XML readers used to parse XML documents.
  */
-private class SafeSaxSourceFlowConfig extends TaintTracking2::Configuration {
-  SafeSaxSourceFlowConfig() { this = "SafeSaxSourceFlowConfig" }
+private module SafeSaxSourceFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof SafeSaxSource }
 
-  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof SafeSaxSource }
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink.asExpr() = any(XmlParserCall parse).getSink() }
 
-  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
-    sink.asExpr() = any(XmlParserCall parse).getSink()
-  }
-
-  override int fieldFlowBranchLimit() { result = 0 }
+  int fieldFlowBranchLimit() { result = 0 }
 }
+
+private module SafeSaxSourceFlow = TaintTracking::Global<SafeSaxSourceFlowConfig>;
diff --git a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/regexp/PolynomialReDoSQuery.qll b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/regexp/PolynomialReDoSQuery.qll
index e85e130e381..4d7f963e968 100644
--- a/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/regexp/PolynomialReDoSQuery.qll
+++ b/java/ql/lib/semmle/code/java/security/regexp/PolynomialReDoSQuery.qll
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ deprecated predicate hasPolynomialReDoSResult(
 }
 
 /** A configuration for Polynomial ReDoS queries. */
-private module PolynomialRedosConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+module PolynomialRedosConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
   predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
 
   predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
diff --git a/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-020/UntrustedDataToExternalAPI.ql b/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-020/UntrustedDataToExternalAPI.ql
index b4a2e209513..fdbb34b2247 100644
--- a/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-020/UntrustedDataToExternalAPI.ql
+++ b/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-020/UntrustedDataToExternalAPI.ql
@@ -13,10 +13,10 @@ import java
 import semmle.code.java.dataflow.FlowSources
 import semmle.code.java.dataflow.TaintTracking
 import semmle.code.java.security.ExternalAPIs
-import DataFlow::PathGraph
+import UntrustedDataToExternalApiFlow::PathGraph
 
-from UntrustedDataToExternalApiConfig config, DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink
-where config.hasFlowPath(source, sink)
+from UntrustedDataToExternalApiFlow::PathNode source, UntrustedDataToExternalApiFlow::PathNode sink
+where UntrustedDataToExternalApiFlow::flowPath(source, sink)
 select sink, source, sink,
   "Call to " + sink.getNode().(ExternalApiDataNode).getMethodDescription() +
     " with untrusted data from $@.", source, source.toString()
diff --git a/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-023/PartialPathTraversalFromRemote.ql b/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-023/PartialPathTraversalFromRemote.ql
index 8ef4ab45853..ef62f433ae6 100644
--- a/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-023/PartialPathTraversalFromRemote.ql
+++ b/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-023/PartialPathTraversalFromRemote.ql
@@ -11,10 +11,12 @@
  */
 
 import semmle.code.java.security.PartialPathTraversalQuery
-import DataFlow::PathGraph
+import PartialPathTraversalFromRemoteFlow::PathGraph
 
-from DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink
-where any(PartialPathTraversalFromRemoteConfig config).hasFlowPath(source, sink)
+from
+  PartialPathTraversalFromRemoteFlow::PathNode source,
+  PartialPathTraversalFromRemoteFlow::PathNode sink
+where PartialPathTraversalFromRemoteFlow::flowPath(source, sink)
 select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
   "Partial Path Traversal Vulnerability due to insufficient guard against path traversal from $@.",
   source, "user-supplied data"
diff --git a/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-1204/StaticInitializationVector.ql b/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-1204/StaticInitializationVector.ql
index 669c4e6f946..258e0f87112 100644
--- a/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-1204/StaticInitializationVector.ql
+++ b/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-1204/StaticInitializationVector.ql
@@ -13,9 +13,9 @@
 
 import java
 import semmle.code.java.security.StaticInitializationVectorQuery
-import DataFlow::PathGraph
+import StaticInitializationVectorFlow::PathGraph
 
-from DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink, StaticInitializationVectorConfig conf
-where conf.hasFlowPath(source, sink)
+from StaticInitializationVectorFlow::PathNode source, StaticInitializationVectorFlow::PathNode sink
+where StaticInitializationVectorFlow::flowPath(source, sink)
 select sink.getNode(), source, sink, "A $@ should not be used for encryption.", source.getNode(),
   "static initialization vector"
diff --git a/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-273/UnsafeCertTrust.ql b/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-273/UnsafeCertTrust.ql
index 2925d588c74..eb5241ac87a 100644
--- a/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-273/UnsafeCertTrust.ql
+++ b/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-273/UnsafeCertTrust.ql
@@ -18,7 +18,5 @@ import semmle.code.java.security.UnsafeCertTrustQuery
 from Expr unsafeTrust
 where
   unsafeTrust instanceof RabbitMQEnableHostnameVerificationNotSet or
-  exists(SslEndpointIdentificationFlowConfig config |
-    config.hasFlowTo(DataFlow::exprNode(unsafeTrust))
-  )
+  SslEndpointIdentificationFlow::flowTo(DataFlow::exprNode(unsafeTrust))
 select unsafeTrust, "Unsafe configuration of trusted certificates."
diff --git a/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-295/InsecureTrustManager.ql b/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-295/InsecureTrustManager.ql
index 755f2b5a4a7..4904c08b195 100644
--- a/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-295/InsecureTrustManager.ql
+++ b/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-295/InsecureTrustManager.ql
@@ -13,10 +13,10 @@
 import java
 import semmle.code.java.dataflow.DataFlow
 import semmle.code.java.security.InsecureTrustManagerQuery
-import DataFlow::PathGraph
+import InsecureTrustManagerFlow::PathGraph
 
-from DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink
-where any(InsecureTrustManagerConfiguration cfg).hasFlowPath(source, sink)
+from InsecureTrustManagerFlow::PathNode source, InsecureTrustManagerFlow::PathNode sink
+where InsecureTrustManagerFlow::flowPath(source, sink)
 select sink, source, sink, "This uses $@, which is defined in $@ and trusts any certificate.",
   source, "TrustManager",
   source.getNode().asExpr().(ClassInstanceExpr).getConstructedType() as type, type.nestedName()
diff --git a/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-319/HttpsUrls.ql b/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-319/HttpsUrls.ql
index 745a2d6dfad..4bcf99fd4b6 100644
--- a/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-319/HttpsUrls.ql
+++ b/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-319/HttpsUrls.ql
@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@
 
 import java
 import semmle.code.java.security.HttpsUrlsQuery
-import DataFlow::PathGraph
+import HttpStringToUrlOpenMethodFlow::PathGraph
 
-from DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink
-where any(HttpStringToUrlOpenMethodFlowConfig c).hasFlowPath(source, sink)
+from HttpStringToUrlOpenMethodFlow::PathNode source, HttpStringToUrlOpenMethodFlow::PathNode sink
+where HttpStringToUrlOpenMethodFlow::flowPath(source, sink)
 select sink.getNode(), source, sink, "URL may have been constructed with HTTP protocol, using $@.",
   source.getNode(), "this HTTP URL"
diff --git a/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-326/InsufficientKeySize.ql b/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-326/InsufficientKeySize.ql
index 2cf3d9115b3..39e4c3e64e5 100644
--- a/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-326/InsufficientKeySize.ql
+++ b/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-326/InsufficientKeySize.ql
@@ -13,10 +13,10 @@
 
 import java
 import semmle.code.java.security.InsufficientKeySizeQuery
-import DataFlow::PathGraph
+import KeySizeFlow::PathGraph
 
-from DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink, KeySizeConfiguration cfg
-where cfg.hasFlowPath(source, sink)
+from KeySizeFlow::PathNode source, KeySizeFlow::PathNode sink
+where KeySizeFlow::flowPath(source, sink)
 select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
   "This $@ is less than the recommended key size of " + source.getState() + " bits.",
   source.getNode(), "key size"
diff --git a/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-347/MissingJWTSignatureCheck.ql b/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-347/MissingJWTSignatureCheck.ql
index 648321ec3ab..077d7a67370 100644
--- a/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-347/MissingJWTSignatureCheck.ql
+++ b/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-347/MissingJWTSignatureCheck.ql
@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@
 
 import java
 import semmle.code.java.security.MissingJWTSignatureCheckQuery
-import DataFlow::PathGraph
+import MissingJwtSignatureCheckFlow::PathGraph
 
-from DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink, MissingJwtSignatureCheckConf conf
-where conf.hasFlowPath(source, sink)
+from MissingJwtSignatureCheckFlow::PathNode source, MissingJwtSignatureCheckFlow::PathNode sink
+where MissingJwtSignatureCheckFlow::flowPath(source, sink)
 select sink.getNode(), source, sink, "This parses a $@, but the signature is not verified.",
   source.getNode(), "JWT signing key"
diff --git a/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-502/UnsafeDeserialization.ql b/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-502/UnsafeDeserialization.ql
index d494d92e657..1c5660653a6 100644
--- a/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-502/UnsafeDeserialization.ql
+++ b/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-502/UnsafeDeserialization.ql
@@ -13,9 +13,9 @@
 
 import java
 import semmle.code.java.security.UnsafeDeserializationQuery
-import DataFlow::PathGraph
+import UnsafeDeserializationFlow::PathGraph
 
-from DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink, UnsafeDeserializationConfig conf
-where conf.hasFlowPath(source, sink)
+from UnsafeDeserializationFlow::PathNode source, UnsafeDeserializationFlow::PathNode sink
+where UnsafeDeserializationFlow::flowPath(source, sink)
 select sink.getNode().(UnsafeDeserializationSink).getMethodAccess(), source, sink,
   "Unsafe deserialization depends on a $@.", source.getNode(), "user-provided value"
diff --git a/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-522/InsecureBasicAuth.ql b/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-522/InsecureBasicAuth.ql
index 069245b4a3e..ae74b355e5f 100644
--- a/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-522/InsecureBasicAuth.ql
+++ b/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-522/InsecureBasicAuth.ql
@@ -16,9 +16,9 @@
 
 import java
 import semmle.code.java.security.InsecureBasicAuthQuery
-import DataFlow::PathGraph
+import InsecureBasicAuthFlow::PathGraph
 
-from DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink, BasicAuthFlowConfig config
-where config.hasFlowPath(source, sink)
+from InsecureBasicAuthFlow::PathNode source, InsecureBasicAuthFlow::PathNode sink
+where InsecureBasicAuthFlow::flowPath(source, sink)
 select sink.getNode(), source, sink, "Insecure basic authentication from a $@.", source.getNode(),
   "HTTP URL"
diff --git a/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-798/HardcodedCredentialsApiCall.ql b/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-798/HardcodedCredentialsApiCall.ql
index 2b84f4b8065..410cea0ed03 100644
--- a/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-798/HardcodedCredentialsApiCall.ql
+++ b/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-798/HardcodedCredentialsApiCall.ql
@@ -11,10 +11,9 @@
  */
 
 import semmle.code.java.security.HardcodedCredentialsApiCallQuery
-import DataFlow::PathGraph
+import HardcodedCredentialApiCallFlow::PathGraph
 
-from
-  DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink, HardcodedCredentialApiCallConfiguration conf
-where conf.hasFlowPath(source, sink)
+from HardcodedCredentialApiCallFlow::PathNode source, HardcodedCredentialApiCallFlow::PathNode sink
+where HardcodedCredentialApiCallFlow::flowPath(source, sink)
 select source.getNode(), source, sink, "Hard-coded value flows to $@.", sink.getNode(),
   "sensitive API call"
diff --git a/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-807/ConditionalBypass.ql b/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-807/ConditionalBypass.ql
index 3cfa2079685..d012ae33810 100644
--- a/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-807/ConditionalBypass.ql
+++ b/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-807/ConditionalBypass.ql
@@ -15,15 +15,15 @@
 import java
 import semmle.code.java.dataflow.DataFlow
 import semmle.code.java.security.ConditionalBypassQuery
-import DataFlow::PathGraph
+import ConditionalBypassFlow::PathGraph
 
 from
-  DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink, MethodAccess m, Expr e,
-  ConditionalBypassFlowConfig conf
+  ConditionalBypassFlow::PathNode source, ConditionalBypassFlow::PathNode sink, MethodAccess m,
+  Expr e
 where
   conditionControlsMethod(m, e) and
   sink.getNode().asExpr() = e and
-  conf.hasFlowPath(source, sink)
+  ConditionalBypassFlow::flowPath(source, sink)
 select m, source, sink,
   "Sensitive method may not be executed depending on a $@, which flows from $@.", e,
   "this condition", source.getNode(), "user-controlled value"
diff --git a/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-927/ImplicitPendingIntents.ql b/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-927/ImplicitPendingIntents.ql
index 58eb6300868..f4065ceeae6 100644
--- a/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-927/ImplicitPendingIntents.ql
+++ b/java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-927/ImplicitPendingIntents.ql
@@ -15,10 +15,10 @@
 import java
 import semmle.code.java.dataflow.DataFlow
 import semmle.code.java.security.ImplicitPendingIntentsQuery
-import DataFlow::PathGraph
+import ImplicitPendingIntentStartFlow::PathGraph
 
-from DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink
-where any(ImplicitPendingIntentStartConf conf).hasFlowPath(source, sink)
+from ImplicitPendingIntentStartFlow::PathNode source, ImplicitPendingIntentStartFlow::PathNode sink
+where ImplicitPendingIntentStartFlow::flowPath(source, sink)
 select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
   "$@ and sent to an unspecified third party through a PendingIntent.", source.getNode(),
   "An implicit Intent is created"
diff --git a/java/ql/src/experimental/Security/CWE/CWE-611/XXELib.qll b/java/ql/src/experimental/Security/CWE/CWE-611/XXELib.qll
index 3f44faa54d0..61008ae63aa 100644
--- a/java/ql/src/experimental/Security/CWE/CWE-611/XXELib.qll
+++ b/java/ql/src/experimental/Security/CWE/CWE-611/XXELib.qll
@@ -232,9 +232,7 @@ class SaxTransformerFactoryNewTransformerHandler extends XmlParserCall {
 
   override Expr getSink() { result = this.getArgument(0) }
 
-  override predicate isSafe() {
-    exists(SafeTransformerFactoryFlowConfig stf | stf.hasFlowToExpr(this.getQualifier()))
-  }
+  override predicate isSafe() { SafeTransformerFactoryFlow::flowToExpr(this.getQualifier()) }
 }
 
 /** DEPRECATED: Alias for SaxTransformerFactoryNewTransformerHandler */
diff --git a/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-023/semmle/tests/PartialPathTraversalFromRemoteTest.ql b/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-023/semmle/tests/PartialPathTraversalFromRemoteTest.ql
index 7f441e62d4e..a07eb6892c3 100644
--- a/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-023/semmle/tests/PartialPathTraversalFromRemoteTest.ql
+++ b/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-023/semmle/tests/PartialPathTraversalFromRemoteTest.ql
@@ -1,21 +1,24 @@
 import java
-import TestUtilities.InlineFlowTest
+import TestUtilities.InlineExpectationsTest
 import semmle.code.java.security.PartialPathTraversalQuery
 
-class EnableLegacy extends EnableLegacyConfiguration {
-  EnableLegacy() { exists(this) }
-}
-
 class TestRemoteSource extends RemoteFlowSource {
   TestRemoteSource() { this.asParameter().hasName(["dir", "path"]) }
 
   override string getSourceType() { result = "TestSource" }
 }
 
-class Test extends InlineFlowTest {
-  override DataFlow::Configuration getValueFlowConfig() { none() }
+class Test extends InlineExpectationsTest {
+  Test() { this = "PartialPathTraversalFromRemoteTest" }
 
-  override TaintTracking::Configuration getTaintFlowConfig() {
-    result instanceof PartialPathTraversalFromRemoteConfig
+  override string getARelevantTag() { result = "hasTaintFlow" }
+
+  override predicate hasActualResult(Location location, string element, string tag, string value) {
+    tag = "hasTaintFlow" and
+    exists(DataFlow::Node sink | PartialPathTraversalFromRemoteFlow::flowTo(sink) |
+      sink.getLocation() = location and
+      element = sink.toString() and
+      value = ""
+    )
   }
 }
diff --git a/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-1204/StaticInitializationVectorTest.ql b/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-1204/StaticInitializationVectorTest.ql
index 653a3cefa7a..ceaf8e11a4f 100644
--- a/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-1204/StaticInitializationVectorTest.ql
+++ b/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-1204/StaticInitializationVectorTest.ql
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ class StaticInitializationVectorTest extends InlineExpectationsTest {
 
   override predicate hasActualResult(Location location, string element, string tag, string value) {
     tag = "staticInitializationVector" and
-    exists(DataFlow::Node sink, StaticInitializationVectorConfig conf | conf.hasFlowTo(sink) |
+    exists(DataFlow::Node sink | StaticInitializationVectorFlow::flowTo(sink) |
       sink.getLocation() = location and
       element = sink.toString() and
       value = ""
diff --git a/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-273/UnsafeCertTrustTest.ql b/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-273/UnsafeCertTrustTest.ql
index 344faa7f86b..fd18ccc27eb 100644
--- a/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-273/UnsafeCertTrustTest.ql
+++ b/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-273/UnsafeCertTrustTest.ql
@@ -12,9 +12,7 @@ class UnsafeCertTrustTest extends InlineExpectationsTest {
     exists(Expr unsafeTrust |
       unsafeTrust instanceof RabbitMQEnableHostnameVerificationNotSet
       or
-      exists(SslEndpointIdentificationFlowConfig config |
-        config.hasFlowTo(DataFlow::exprNode(unsafeTrust))
-      )
+      SslEndpointIdentificationFlow::flowTo(DataFlow::exprNode(unsafeTrust))
     |
       unsafeTrust.getLocation() = location and
       element = unsafeTrust.toString() and
diff --git a/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-295/InsecureTrustManager/InsecureTrustManagerTest.ql b/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-295/InsecureTrustManager/InsecureTrustManagerTest.ql
index fb00ff33b34..0f068d04679 100644
--- a/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-295/InsecureTrustManager/InsecureTrustManagerTest.ql
+++ b/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-295/InsecureTrustManager/InsecureTrustManagerTest.ql
@@ -1,13 +1,18 @@
 import java
 import semmle.code.java.security.InsecureTrustManagerQuery
-import TestUtilities.InlineFlowTest
+import TestUtilities.InlineExpectationsTest
 
-class EnableLegacy extends EnableLegacyConfiguration {
-  EnableLegacy() { exists(this) }
-}
+class InsecureTrustManagerTest extends InlineExpectationsTest {
+  InsecureTrustManagerTest() { this = "InsecureTrustManagerTest" }
 
-class InsecureTrustManagerTest extends InlineFlowTest {
-  override DataFlow::Configuration getValueFlowConfig() {
-    result = any(InsecureTrustManagerConfiguration c)
+  override string getARelevantTag() { result = "hasValueFlow" }
+
+  override predicate hasActualResult(Location location, string element, string tag, string value) {
+    tag = "hasValueFlow" and
+    exists(DataFlow::Node sink | InsecureTrustManagerFlow::flowTo(sink) |
+      sink.getLocation() = location and
+      element = sink.toString() and
+      value = ""
+    )
   }
 }
diff --git a/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-326/InsufficientKeySizeTest.ql b/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-326/InsufficientKeySizeTest.ql
index 12f667a67f3..1384a36e4ce 100644
--- a/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-326/InsufficientKeySizeTest.ql
+++ b/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-326/InsufficientKeySizeTest.ql
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ class InsufficientKeySizeTest extends InlineExpectationsTest {
 
   override predicate hasActualResult(Location location, string element, string tag, string value) {
     tag = "hasInsufficientKeySize" and
-    exists(DataFlow::PathNode sink | exists(KeySizeConfiguration cfg | cfg.hasFlowPath(_, sink)) |
+    exists(KeySizeFlow::PathNode sink | KeySizeFlow::flowPath(_, sink) |
       sink.getNode().getLocation() = location and
       element = sink.getNode().toString() and
       value = ""
diff --git a/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-347/MissingJWTSignatureCheckTest.ql b/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-347/MissingJWTSignatureCheckTest.ql
index b4f4c1c445e..df6867bbefe 100644
--- a/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-347/MissingJWTSignatureCheckTest.ql
+++ b/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-347/MissingJWTSignatureCheckTest.ql
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ class HasMissingJwtSignatureCheckTest extends InlineExpectationsTest {
 
   override predicate hasActualResult(Location location, string element, string tag, string value) {
     tag = "hasMissingJwtSignatureCheck" and
-    exists(DataFlow::Node sink, MissingJwtSignatureCheckConf conf | conf.hasFlowTo(sink) |
+    exists(DataFlow::Node sink | MissingJwtSignatureCheckFlow::flowTo(sink) |
       sink.getLocation() = location and
       element = sink.toString() and
       value = ""
diff --git a/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-502/UnsafeDeserialization.ql b/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-502/UnsafeDeserialization.ql
index a2ba654a540..4d10c798e33 100644
--- a/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-502/UnsafeDeserialization.ql
+++ b/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-502/UnsafeDeserialization.ql
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ class UnsafeDeserializationTest extends InlineExpectationsTest {
 
   override predicate hasActualResult(Location location, string element, string tag, string value) {
     tag = "unsafeDeserialization" and
-    exists(DataFlow::Node sink, UnsafeDeserializationConfig conf | conf.hasFlowTo(sink) |
+    exists(DataFlow::Node sink | UnsafeDeserializationFlow::flowTo(sink) |
       sink.getLocation() = location and
       element = sink.toString() and
       value = ""
diff --git a/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-522/InsecureBasicAuthTest.ql b/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-522/InsecureBasicAuthTest.ql
index b593c5476ef..29057edce71 100644
--- a/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-522/InsecureBasicAuthTest.ql
+++ b/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-522/InsecureBasicAuthTest.ql
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ class HasInsecureBasicAuthTest extends InlineExpectationsTest {
 
   override predicate hasActualResult(Location location, string element, string tag, string value) {
     tag = "hasInsecureBasicAuth" and
-    exists(DataFlow::Node sink, BasicAuthFlowConfig conf | conf.hasFlowTo(sink) |
+    exists(DataFlow::Node sink | InsecureBasicAuthFlow::flowTo(sink) |
       sink.getLocation() = location and
       element = sink.toString() and
       value = ""
diff --git a/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-798/semmle/tests/HardcodedCredentialsApiCall.ql b/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-798/semmle/tests/HardcodedCredentialsApiCall.ql
index 79ce1738f38..7d7b8e2d2a5 100644
--- a/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-798/semmle/tests/HardcodedCredentialsApiCall.ql
+++ b/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-798/semmle/tests/HardcodedCredentialsApiCall.ql
@@ -9,9 +9,7 @@ class HardcodedCredentialsApiCallTest extends InlineExpectationsTest {
 
   override predicate hasActualResult(Location location, string element, string tag, string value) {
     tag = "HardcodedCredentialsApiCall" and
-    exists(DataFlow::Node sink, HardcodedCredentialApiCallConfiguration conf |
-      conf.hasFlow(_, sink)
-    |
+    exists(DataFlow::Node sink | HardcodedCredentialApiCallFlow::flowTo(sink) |
       sink.getLocation() = location and
       element = sink.toString() and
       value = ""
diff --git a/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-807/semmle/tests/ConditionalBypassTest.ql b/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-807/semmle/tests/ConditionalBypassTest.ql
index ef676d4a8f0..20ca408f1b2 100644
--- a/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-807/semmle/tests/ConditionalBypassTest.ql
+++ b/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-807/semmle/tests/ConditionalBypassTest.ql
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ class ConditionalBypassTest extends InlineExpectationsTest {
 
   override predicate hasActualResult(Location location, string element, string tag, string value) {
     tag = "hasConditionalBypassTest" and
-    exists(DataFlow::Node sink, ConditionalBypassFlowConfig conf | conf.hasFlowTo(sink) |
+    exists(DataFlow::Node sink | ConditionalBypassFlow::flowTo(sink) |
       sink.getLocation() = location and
       element = sink.toString() and
       value = ""
diff --git a/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-927/ImplicitPendingIntentsTest.ql b/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-927/ImplicitPendingIntentsTest.ql
index 871dcd2cef2..972653380aa 100644
--- a/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-927/ImplicitPendingIntentsTest.ql
+++ b/java/ql/test/query-tests/security/CWE-927/ImplicitPendingIntentsTest.ql
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ class ImplicitPendingIntentsTest extends InlineExpectationsTest {
 
   override predicate hasActualResult(Location location, string element, string tag, string value) {
     tag = "hasImplicitPendingIntent" and
-    exists(DataFlow::Node sink | any(ImplicitPendingIntentStartConf c).hasFlowTo(sink) |
+    exists(DataFlow::Node sink | ImplicitPendingIntentStartFlow::flowTo(sink) |
       sink.getLocation() = location and
       element = sink.toString() and
       value = ""