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Add UnsafeHostnameVerificationQuery
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@@ -11,109 +11,9 @@
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*/
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import java
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import semmle.code.java.controlflow.Guards
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import semmle.code.java.dataflow.DataFlow
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import semmle.code.java.dataflow.FlowSources
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import semmle.code.java.security.Encryption
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import semmle.code.java.security.SecurityFlag
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private import semmle.code.java.dataflow.ExternalFlow
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/**
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* Holds if `m` always returns `true` ignoring any exceptional flow.
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*/
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private predicate alwaysReturnsTrue(HostnameVerifierVerify m) {
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forex(ReturnStmt rs | rs.getEnclosingCallable() = m |
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rs.getResult().(CompileTimeConstantExpr).getBooleanValue() = true
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)
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}
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/**
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* A class that overrides the `javax.net.ssl.HostnameVerifier.verify` method and **always** returns `true` (though it could also exit due to an uncaught exception), thus
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* accepting any certificate despite a hostname mismatch.
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*/
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class TrustAllHostnameVerifier extends RefType {
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TrustAllHostnameVerifier() {
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this.getAnAncestor() instanceof HostnameVerifier and
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exists(HostnameVerifierVerify m |
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m.getDeclaringType() = this and
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alwaysReturnsTrue(m)
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)
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}
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}
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/**
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* A configuration to model the flow of a `TrustAllHostnameVerifier` to a `set(Default)HostnameVerifier` call.
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*/
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module TrustAllHostnameVerifierConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
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predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) {
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source.asExpr().(ClassInstanceExpr).getConstructedType() instanceof TrustAllHostnameVerifier
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}
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predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof HostnameVerifierSink }
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predicate isBarrier(DataFlow::Node barrier) {
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// ignore nodes that are in functions that intentionally disable hostname verification
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barrier
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.getEnclosingCallable()
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.getName()
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/*
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* Regex: (_)* :
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* some methods have underscores.
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* Regex: (no|ignore|disable)(strictssl|ssl|verify|verification|hostname)
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* noStrictSSL ignoreSsl
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* Regex: (set)?(accept|trust|ignore|allow)(all|every|any)
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* acceptAll trustAll ignoreAll setTrustAnyHttps
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* Regex: (use|do|enable)insecure
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* useInsecureSSL
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* Regex: (set|do|use)?no.*(check|validation|verify|verification)
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* setNoCertificateCheck
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* Regex: disable
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* disableChecks
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*/
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.regexpMatch("^(?i)(_)*((no|ignore|disable)(strictssl|ssl|verify|verification|hostname)" +
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"|(set)?(accept|trust|ignore|allow)(all|every|any)" +
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"|(use|do|enable)insecure|(set|do|use)?no.*(check|validation|verify|verification)|disable).*$")
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}
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}
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module TrustAllHostnameVerifierFlow = DataFlow::Global<TrustAllHostnameVerifierConfig>;
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import semmle.code.java.security.UnsafeHostnameVerificationQuery
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import TrustAllHostnameVerifierFlow::PathGraph
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/**
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* A sink that sets the `HostnameVerifier` on `HttpsURLConnection`.
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*/
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private class HostnameVerifierSink extends DataFlow::Node {
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HostnameVerifierSink() { sinkNode(this, "set-hostname-verifier") }
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}
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/**
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* Flags suggesting a deliberately unsafe `HostnameVerifier` usage.
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*/
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private class UnsafeHostnameVerificationFlag extends FlagKind {
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UnsafeHostnameVerificationFlag() { this = "UnsafeHostnameVerificationFlag" }
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bindingset[result]
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override string getAFlagName() {
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result
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.regexpMatch("(?i).*(secure|disable|selfCert|selfSign|validat|verif|trust|ignore|nocertificatecheck).*") and
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result != "equalsIgnoreCase"
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}
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}
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/** Gets a guard that represents a (likely) flag controlling an unsafe `HostnameVerifier` use. */
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private Guard getAnUnsafeHostnameVerifierFlagGuard() {
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result = any(UnsafeHostnameVerificationFlag flag).getAFlag().asExpr()
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}
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/** Holds if `node` is guarded by a flag that suggests an intentionally insecure use. */
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private predicate isNodeGuardedByFlag(DataFlow::Node node) {
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exists(Guard g | g.controls(node.asExpr().getBasicBlock(), _) |
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g = getASecurityFeatureFlagGuard() or g = getAnUnsafeHostnameVerifierFlagGuard()
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)
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}
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from
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TrustAllHostnameVerifierFlow::PathNode source, TrustAllHostnameVerifierFlow::PathNode sink,
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RefType verifier
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